

deduced from it. There can be no doubt about the identification of *doctrina catholica* in chapter nine with the *appendices fidei* which are mentioned in chapter four. The very words used in the description of both concepts are almost the same. Catholic doctrine as understood by Cano may be said, therefore, to comprise the appendices of revealed truth, i. e. doctrine which is intimately connected with the faith, and universally held throughout the Church. Its denial will not entail a direct or indirect denial of faith. Nevertheless, the faith is weakened when this lesser category of Catholic truth is denied.

To help us understand this concept of *doctrina catholica*, Cano gives two examples¹.

1^o Special prayers which are applied to one person by religious or by prelates are more beneficial to that person than general prayers.

2^o It is licit for friars to be mendicant, as they are not obliged to earn their living by manual labour.

These propositions are neither immediately nor mediately revealed. Yet they are universally believed to be true and belong to that category of truth which guards the outward rim of revelation, i. e. Catholic doctrine. A denial of such propositions will incur the censure of *error*.

This concept of the erroneous proposition makes for a specific difference between heresy and *error*. Cano has succeeded, therefore, where Alphonsus de Castro failed. We have seen that Castro held for this specific difference, but when he came to stating what exactly would merit the censure of *error*, his explanation failed to distinguish sufficiently the erroneous from the heretical proposition. Cano's position is more logical, as this concept of Catholic doctrine makes for a clear-cut distinction between the two censures. Whether he was correct or not in this interpretation is a matter which remains to be seen.

One thing which strikes us on reading Cano's description of the erroneous proposition is that there is no authority brought forward to support his interpretation. His concept of Catholic doctrine and its relation to the censure of *error* seems to be something personal which is there put forward for the first time. At such an early stage in the development of the censures, this is not to be wondered at. We

¹ *Ibid.*, cap. 9, col. 616.

have seen that the main opinions of the theologians who preceded Cano were all personal, without any proof from authority. What then, we may ask, influenced Cano in this notion of Catholic doctrine and its relation to *error*? This question cannot be answered with certainty. We shall give our own view, however, which is based on certain clues which we find in his exposition.

It must be remembered first and foremost that Cano was insistent that the erroneous proposition should be explained in such a way as to make it specifically distinct from heresy. It was imperative, therefore, that the theological note corresponding to *error* should be placed well outside the pale of revealed truth. As we shall afterwards see, for Cano truth of faith is twofold, i. e. that which is immediately and mediately revealed. To distinguish clearly *error* from heresy, the corresponding theological note had to be placed outside this boundary.

We noted that when Cano wished to prove the specific difference between the heretical and erroneous proposition, he quoted the condemnation which the Council of Constance affixed to the articles of Wyclif. This condemnation reads as follows¹.

... quibus articulis examinatis, fuit repertum (prout in veritate est) aliquos et plures ex ipsis fuisse et esse notorie haereticos, et a sanctis patribus reprobatos; alios *non catholicos*, sed *erroneos*; alios scandalosos et blasphemos, quosdam piarum aurium offensivos, nonnullos eorum temerarios et seditiosos.

It will be noted from the phrasing of this condemnation that the term "*non catholicos*" seems to qualify the term "*erroneos*," and that alone. A semi-colon is placed after the word "*erroneos*," which seems to indicate a break from the remaining censures which are mentioned. It may be gathered from this that the erroneous proposition is non-Catholic. In other words, the theological note corresponding to *error* is something which *is* Catholic. Immediate and mediate revelation are already ruled out, so Cano conceives the notion of a certain category of truth outside revelation, which is nevertheless universally believed in the Church. We recall that when Cano examined the hierarchy of Catholic truth, he stressed the point that *doctrina catholica* is no less Catholic and universal than that which is revealed.

We put forward this theory as being a probable explanation of Cano's concept of the erroneous proposition. Whether he was correct

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1 a.

in thinking that the term "*non catholicos*" qualifies the censure of *error* and that alone, is a matter which we will now discuss.

It has already been pointed out that when Cano wished to prove the specific difference between the heretical and erroneous proposition he cited the condemnation which was affixed to the articles of Wyclif. Another condemnation, very rarely quoted, was applied by the same council to the articles of Huss. It reads as follows¹.

Articulos infrascriptos... non esse catholicos, nec tanquam tales esse dogmatizandos; sed ex eis plures esse erroneos, alios scandalosos, aliquos piarum aurium offensivos, pluresque eorum esse temerarios et seditiosos, et nonnullos eorumdem esse notorie haereticos.

It is obvious from this citation that the term "*non catholicos*" qualifies not only the erroneous propositions, but also all the other censures which are listed after them.

After the Council of Constance, Pope Martin V drew up certain points of doctrine on which suspected heretics were to be interrogated. One of these interrogations concerned the condemnation of the articles of Wyclif and Huss. It reads as follows².

Item, specialiter litteratus interrogetur, utrum credat, sententiam sacri Constantiensis Concilii super quadraginta quinque Ioannis Wicleff, et Ioannis Hus triginta articulis superius descriptis latam, fore veram et catholicam: scilicet, quod supradicti quadraginta quinque articuli Ioannis Wicleff et Ioannis Hus triginta non sunt catholici, sed quidam ex eis sunt notorie haeretici, quidam erronei, alii temerarii et seditiosi, alii piarum aurium offensivi.

It is obvious from the wording of this interrogation, that the term "*non catholici*" refers to all the articles of Wyclif and Huss which were condemned, and not just to those which are erroneous.

If Cano was influenced by the first condemnation of Constance in placing the notion of *doctrina catholica* as the theological note corresponding to *error*, he was mistaken. From the second condemnation of the same council and from the above mentioned interrogation of Pope Martin V, it is quite evident that the term "*non catholici*" is not restricted to *error* alone.

Before passing on to consider what Cano calls the second and third degrees of the censure of *error*, there is one last remark regarding

¹ Ibid. no. 1 b.

² Cf. Dz, no. 661.

doctrina catholica which we wish to make. After his division of Catholic truth, he points out that propositions which are in opposition to what he calls *doctrina catholica*, while not being heretical, are nevertheless *haeresi proxima*¹.

The censure *haeresi proxima* was used by the Church for the first time when the Holy Office condemned the propositions of the Jansenists in 1690 A. D.², i. e. over a hundred years after Cano's death. In his exposition of the theological censures, Cano does not treat of *haeresi proxima*, and the only mention of this term is to be found here, where he treats of the erroneous proposition.

We cannot say, therefore, that for Cano, the censure of *error* and that of *haeresi proxima* meant the same thing. When he used the term "*haeresi proxima*" here, he merely wished to state that the erroneous proposition, while not being heretical, comes close to being so, in so far as the doctrine which is denied is closely connected with revelation.

At the outset, we noted that Cano placed three theological notes corresponding to the erroneous proposition. Consequently, he holds for three grades of the censure of *error*. We shall now pass on to examine the second and third grades.

C. The second grade of error

The theological note corresponding to what Cano calls the second grade of erroneous propositions, may be explained as follows. There are certain truths which theologians generally regard as being of faith. Such truths, however, are not defined by the Church, neither have they been proved to be of faith by any certain argument. Opposition to doctrine of this nature, according to Cano, will merit the second grade of the censure of *error*³.

¹ Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. XII, cap. 9, col. 616. "Quae igitur propositiones huius posterioris generis veritatibus contradicent, (i. e. doctrina catholica) eas equidem erroneas appello; quae quoniam doctrinae catholicae adversantur, errores sunt haeresi proximi, haereses non sunt."

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

³ Cf. CANO, loc. cit., col. 617. "Quum enim veritas aliqua, sapientum quidem opinione vehementi, fidei veritas est, sed non est plane ab Ecclesia definita, nec certo argumento demonstrata; tunc veritati illae adversari non est haereticum sed erroneum."

In this case, the truth which is denied may, in fact, be revealed and contained in the deposit of faith. The opposing proposition cannot be censured as heretical because there is not absolute certainty that the doctrine denied is of faith. Nevertheless, this uncertainty which rules out heresy, will not excuse from grave sin, nor from the censure of *error*¹.

To consider this notion in more detail, we note that the doctrine denied is generally regarded as being of faith. The exact words of Cano are: "*sapientum quidem opinione vehementi, fidei veritas est*". We take it that the word "*sapientum*" indicates theologians, and not just ordinary theologians, but those who enjoy considerable authority. The use of the adjective "*vehementi*" indicates the strength of the opinion. Seeing that Cano does not expressly allow for any exceptions among the *sapientes*, we must presume that he wishes to indicate that the opinion is unanimous amongst grave theologians.

There is quite a difference between this theological note and the *doctrina catholica* which he placed as corresponding to the first grade of *error*. This latter comprises a body of truth which exists outside revelation, while the theological note corresponding to the second grade of *error* may, in fact, be of faith.

We note that Cano succeeds in preserving his specific distinction between heresy and *error* even in this second grade. The element of uncertainty which excludes heresy, is sufficient to constitute a specific distinction between the two censures.

D. The third grade of error

The third grade of erroneous propositions differs very little from the second. Here there is also question of faith, a common opinion among grave theologians, and a lack of absolute certainty which excludes heresy. In this case, however, the doctrine which is opposed is certainly of faith, and the doubt concerns the opposition between the two propositions. In other words, there is no absolute certainty that the censurable proposition is opposed to faith. Nevertheless, the consensus of opinion

¹ Ibid. "Ita licet veritas illa ad fidem suapte natura pertineat, quia tamen nec hoc certum nec expeditum est, haeretica pertinacia abest, error gravis et periculosus non abest."

holds that it is, and while this authority makes it almost certain that the opposing doctrine is heretical, the lack of absolute certainty requires that a lesser censure be applied¹.

The second and third grade of *error*, as understood by Cano, may be briefly explained as follows. Two conditions must be complied with before any doctrine may be censured as heretical.

1° The truth which is contradicted must *certainly* be contained in the deposit of faith.

2° The censurable proposition must be in *certain* and *evident* opposition to the truth which is of faith.

If there is not absolute certainty regarding the first of these two conditions, then the second grade of *error* is constituted. On the other hand, if the lack of absolute certainty is in respect of the second condition, then we have the third grade of *error*.

In spite of the fact that in the first grade of *error*, it is merely *doctrina catholica* which is denied, it seems that for Cano this constitutes a more serious censure than the second and third. It must be remembered that in the first grade there is a certainty regarding the exact position of the truth which is contradicted and the opposition entailed, which is not to be found in either of the other two.

We have already noted that in his explanation of the first grade of erroneous propositions Cano was quite original, in the sense that no authority was quoted to support this doctrine. The same may be said regarding his exposition of the second and third grades. We may ask, therefore, why he thought it necessary to introduce a second and third degree of *error*, and why these concepts were not included under some other censure.

The notions which Cano puts forward as representing the second and third grades of *error* indicate a doctrinal deviation which is too serious to be placed under *haeresim sapiens*, which is the next censure after *error* of which he treats. Seeing that heresy and *haeresim sapiens*

¹ Ibid. "Similiter et propositio erronea tertio quodam gradu vocari potest, quae certae veritati catholicae fidei adversatur, non manifeste quidem, sed sapientum omnium longe probabili ac ferme necessaria sententia. Eius quippe erratio gravis est, qui hoc defendit contumaciter, quod viri omnes docti sentiunt periculum grande catholicae fidei conflare."

are ruled out, he places these notions under *error*, and includes a second and third grade within this censure to cope with these additions.

In Cano's entire exposition of the theological censures, there is no explanation of *haeresi proxima* to be found. Seeing that this censure was not used by the Church until 1690 A. D., the omission on Cano's part is not surprising. In later years, however, when the theologians began to explain *haeresi proxima*, they placed it between *error* and *haeresim sapiens*. We shall see in due course that what Cano here includes under the second and third grades of *error*, was regarded by very many later theologians as being *haeresi proxima*. It was Cano's ignorance of this censure, therefore, which necessitated his placing a second and a third grade of *error*.

We have now examined Cano's doctrine on all three grades of the censure, and expressed our own opinion as to the factors which influenced him in interpreting the erroneous proposition the way he did. Before concluding our exposition of his doctrine, there is one other important problem which remains to be solved. Under which of the censures does Cano place the denial of a theological conclusion? This question is important, because in later years the theological conclusion became intimately connected with the censure of *error*. To be perfectly clear, therefore, as to Cano's mind on this subject, we shall outline his doctrine on the theological conclusion as follows.

E. The theological conclusion according to the doctrine of Cano

1^e For Melchior Cano, truth of faith may be either mediate or immediate, according as the doctrine in question is either mediately or immediately revealed. Mediate revelation comprises theological conclusions which are not revealed in themselves, but only in so far as they are contained in principles which are immediately revealed. Because of the intimate connection between these theological conclusions and immediate revelation, both are called truths of faith. However, when Cano uses this terminology in respect of theological conclusions, he is always careful to qualify with the words "*mediate revelata*"¹.

¹ Ibid., cap. 4, col. 579. "Fidei porro quaestio bifariam intelligitur. Una quae immediate ad fidem attinet, ut vere attinent omnia, quae Deus Ecclesiae suae aut verbo edidit aut scripto; altera quae *mediate* fidei est, cuiusmodi sunt omnes

2^o Mediate revelation or theological conclusions are not of faith in the strict sense of the term. They pertain to theology, while the principles which are immediately revealed pertain to the supernatural virtue of faith¹.

3^o Theological conclusions, however, may be defined by the Church, and then they must be regarded in the same way as truth which is immediately revealed. After such a definition, the denial of these conclusions will mean heresy in the strict sense of the term².

4^o When Cano speaks of theological conclusions which may be defined by the Church as being of faith, he means proper theological conclusions, i. e. those deduced by means of two principles of faith, or those which are acquired by means of one premise of faith and another known by the light of natural reason. For Cano, these are theological conclusions in the strict sense of the term, and they are distinguished from another type which may be called theological conclusions in an extended sense only, i. e. doctrine which is already immediately revealed, but needs to be made more explicit by the *magisterium* of the Church³.

conclusiones quae ordine disciplinae ex illis prioribus colligere et definire possumus. Quae quoniam non in seipsis sed in aliis tanquam in principiis revelata a Deo sunt, *mediate* fidei dicuntur esse, et qui eas negat, is fidem negare hoc modo dicitur."

¹ Ibid., cap. 5, col. 588, '*octava praeceptio*' "Sed ne quis sit admiratus, cur, etiam inter omnes fere theologos constet, a meque ipso saepe affirmatum sit, eiusmodi conclusiones, quae ex fide per explicitam consecutionem derivantur, theologiae proprie esse non fidei, nunc ita confundam quasi theologia et fides eadem virtus sint. Si enim error conclusionis theologiae error fidei est, ut est revera, si eam negare sit haeresis, sequitur fidem ac theologiam ad eandem pertinere virtutem, quandoquidem errores utriusque facultati contrarii ad idem pertinent vitium. Sunt enim utriusque haereses. Sed non erit difficile ei qui superiora relegit, hanc obterere contundereque callumniam. Diximus enim, fidem, licet non immediate, sed versari tamen circa eas conclusiones, quae per evidentem et necessariam consequentiam ex articulis fidei colliguntur. Quare necesse est ut infidelitas mediata quoque circa conclusiones theologiae contrarias versetur."

² Ibid., col. 586, '*septima praeceptio*' "Si vel Ecclesia vel Concilium, vel Sedes Apostolica, vel etiam sancti una mente eademque voce aliquam theologiae conclusionem et confecerint et fidelibus etiam praescripserint, haec veritas catholica ita censebitur ut si esset per se a Christo revelata; et illi qui adversetur, aequae erit haereticus, ac si sacris litteris traditionibusve Apostolorum refragaretur. Conclusionem sane theologiae hic appello eam proprie quae ex principiis huius facultatis certa et firma consecutione ducitur."

³ Ibid., lib. V, cap. 5, col. 297, '*ad postremum argumentum*' "Duplex conclusionum genus posse in concilio definiri. Unum earum quae sunt propriae theo-

5° One may be presumed a heretic for the denial of an undefined theological conclusion. This holds especially when the natural truth used in the deduction is self-evident. Then, one is not regarded as being ignorant of the natural self-evident principle, so the obvious presumption is that the denial of the conclusion is caused by the rejection of the principle which is of faith¹.

We see from this brief outline that according to the doctrine of Cano, the denial of a defined theological conclusion will merit the censure of heresy. If an undefined conclusion is denied, one may be presumed a heretic. The presumption of heresy, however, is not a theological censure. It is in respect of the *person* and not the doctrine which is denied. Which of the censures does Cano apply to the actual proposition which denies a theological conclusion? This question must be left unanswered, because the undefined theological conclusion is completely neglected by Cano in his entire exposition of the censures.

We note this omission on Cano's part, because very soon after the publication of *De Locis Theologicis*, the theological conclusion began to be associated with the censure of *error*.

We now bring our examination of Cano's doctrine to a close. His exposition of the censure of *error* was certainly original, as we have seen. He made a complete departure from every explanation which had been given before his time. It will be interesting, therefore, to see how his doctrine fared in later years.

logiae facultatis, quoniam vel ex duobus principiis per fidem creditis, vel alio credito, alio lumine naturae cognito colliguntur. Alterum autem genus est earum quas Spiritus Sanctus ipse revelavit quidem Apostolis, Evangelistis, et Prophetis, sed quoniam non erat id perinde manifestum, a synodo declaratur."

¹ Ibid., lib. XII, cap. 5, col. 588, '*octava praeceptio*' "Quamobrem Ecclesia, tametsi intelligit eiusmodi conclusiones non e fide solum, sed e principiis quoque naturae pendere; quia tamen non putat, hominem rationalem ea quae rationi perspicua sunt et manifesta negare, eum qui illas inficiatus sit, haereticum judicat. Sumit enim, maximaque ex causa sumit, illum non in naturae ratione, quae erat evidens, sed in fide claudicare."

ARTICLE IV

Cano's Explanation under Scrutiny

After Cano, the next major authority who gives a thorough examination of the problem of erroneous propositions is Francis Suarez S. J. His treatise on the theological virtues, where his explanation of the censures is to be found, was first published at Coimbra in 1621 A. D., fifty-eight years after the publication of Cano's *De Locis*.

Before treating of Suarez' doctrine, however, we wish to note certain points of interest and developments which took place in the intervening period. After the publication of *De Locis Theologicis* (1563), Cano's doctrine on the erroneous propositions was examined and discussed in almost every treatise which touched on the theological censures. In the period which we are now about to examine, we shall see his interpretation under scrutiny.

A. Jacobus de Simancas (1575 A. D.)

When treating of the different opinions which preceded Cano, we examined the doctrine of Simancas on erroneous propositions. After the publication of *De Locis*, Simancas brought out the second edition of his *Institutiones Catholicae* in Rome 1575 A. D., and in this he examined the doctrine of Cano.

Having made a summary of the opinions of S. Antoninus, Turrecremata and Castro, Simancas notes that Cano, unlike all the foregoing, places a specific difference between the heretical and the erroneous proposition. He is pleased with this distinction of Cano, and agrees that this is the only way in which the condemnation of the Council of Constance can be interpreted¹. Nevertheless, he rejects Cano's interpretation of the erroneous proposition, and singles out the concept of *doctrina catholica* for special attack.

The denial of truths which are Catholic and universal, Simancas notes, should be censured as heretical and not merely as erroneous. The erroneous proposition differs from heresy in so far as it does not

¹ Cf. SIMANCAS, *Institutiones Catholicae*, tit. 54, no. 9. Romae (1575), p. 425.

contain *manifest* heresy. Likewise, it is not in opposition to Catholic truth which believed by all¹. It seems, therefore, that it was Cano's insistence on the universal character of *doctrina catholica* which displeased Simancas most. He could not understand how anything pertaining to Catholic truth and so universally believed could not be of faith. Consequently, its denial should merit the censure of heresy.

It is clear from this that Simancas did not understand Cano's doctrine regarding *doctrina catholica*. Time and again, Cano stresses the fact that this concept represents Catholic truth outside the limits of revelation. If Simancas had rightly understood this point, he would not have stated that the denial of *doctrina catholica*, (as understood by Cano), should be censured as heretical.

B. Dominicus Banez O. P. (1584 A. D.)

Banez' commentary on the *secunda secundae* of S. Thomas was first published at Salamanca in 1584 A. D.². In his exposition of q. 11, a. 1, he treats of the theological censures less than heresy. We shall now examine his doctrine on the erroneous proposition and see if he differs in any way from his former master, Melchior Cano³.

In reading Banez' explanation of the erroneous proposition, not only do we recognise the doctrine, but almost the very words of Cano. We find the same three grades of *error* and the corresponding theological notes. Banez tells us that this doctrine is Master Cano's opinion with which he readily agrees.

This agreement, however, does not imply a merely mechanical endorsement of Cano's doctrine. Banez makes one very important correction, or to be more exact, supplement to his master's doctrine:

¹ Ibid. "Deinde alia subiungit (Cano), quae mihi non omnino probatur. Nam propositiones contra veritates catholicas et universales, et quae doctrinae christianaev veritates sunt, erroneas esse, sed non haereticas, id vero est quod mihi displicuit: illud autem probo, erroneam propositionem, minus quippiam continere, quam haereticam manifestam, atque adeo erroneum esse asserere aliquid contra veritatem ab ecclesia nondum plane definitam: vel contra veritatem catholicam, non omnibus manifestam, aut certe ab eo ignoratam, qui propositionem erroneam dixit."

² Cf. HURTER N. L., t. 3, p. 389.

³ Cf. BANEZ, in 2/2, q. 11, a. 2, 'circa hos articulos' Lugduni (1588), col. 447 et seqq.

while agreeing with Cano's three grades of *error*, he observes that the most important type of erroneous proposition is altogether neglected by Cano, that is, the question of the denial of an undefined theological conclusion¹.

We note that he merely supplements Cano's doctrine with this extra notion. He does not disagree with the explanation which Cano has given, but merely introduces something which was omitted by his former master. This was a serious omission, however, since Banez now claims it to be the most important type of erroneous proposition.

He does not claim that this addition to Cano's doctrine is original on his part. On the contrary, he states that it is commonly held by theologians that the denial of an undefined theological conclusion constitutes the most serious grade of erroneous proposition. Unfortunately, he gives us no references to justify this assertion. If this doctrine was the common opinion of theologians in 1584 A. D., how can we explain the fact that Petrus de Lorca, writing on these censures thirty years afterwards, gave an entirely different opinion regarding the erroneous proposition, and like Banez, claimed it to be the common doctrine?

The main point to be noted, however, is that in Banez' exposition of this censure we find the erroneous proposition being associated with the denial of a theological conclusion for the first time. We shall presently see that it took some time after Banez before these two concepts were definitely related to each other by the common opinion of theologians.

Banez is explicit in stating that it is the *undefined* theological conclusion which is associated with the censure of *error*. Like Cano, he held that such conclusions may be defined by the Church as being of faith, and after that, their denial would be heretical rather than erroneous².

¹ Cf. BANEZ, loc. cit. "Nihilominus notandum nobis videtur, quod primus et potissimus gradus propositionis erroneae secundum communem loquendi modum theologorum est, quando quis dicit contrarium manifeste conclusioni theologicae, quae per evidentem consequentiam colligitur ex fide: quae nondum est definita ab Ecclesia nec proposita tanquam traditio apostolica vel Sacra Scriptura."

² Cf. BANEZ, in 1, q. 1, a. 2, 'ad tertium argumentum' (Lugduni 1588, col. 19.) "Quoniam ab Ecclesia non est hactenus definitum quod Christus est risibilis. At vero si ab Ecclesia definiretur, risibilitatem pertinere ad perfectionem humanae naturae, quamadmodum definitum est, Christum habere duplicem voluntatem, humanam et divinam, iam qui negaret Christum esse risibilem esset haereticus. Quia repugnaret doctrinae Ecclesiae, quae columna est, et firmamentum veritatis."

C. Petrus de Lorca O. Cist. (1614 A. D.)¹

Before giving his own opinion as to what constitutes an erroneous proposition, de Lorca reviews the doctrine of those theologians who preceded him. He considers Cano's opinion and then proceeds to reject it.

Unlike Simancas, de Lorca rightly understood what Cano wished to convey by the notion of *doctrina catholica*. He notes, for instance, that according to Cano, this concept represents a body of truth outside the boundary of revelation, yet piously believed throughout the Church. Its denial will not destroy faith, but weaken it. Like Simancas, he confines himself to examining what Cano called the first grade of *error*, and makes no mention of the second and third².

In spite of the fact that he rightly understood Cano on the notion of *doctrina catholica*, de Lorca rejects his explanation of the censure of *error* for the following reasons. The Council of Constance, he states, regarded erroneous propositions as being *non-Catholic*³. This signifies that such propositions are in no way Catholic, and doctrine which is no way Catholic is obviously that which is opposed to faith. In other words, if the erroneous proposition is *non-Catholic*, it must contain something which is contrary to divine faith. Cano's conception of *doctrina catholica* does not fall in with this description, since a denial of that which is just piously believed throughout the Church may still be called Catholic, in the sense that it contains nothing contrary to faith⁴.

We see from this that one of the main reasons why de Lorca rejects Cano's explanation is because the Council of Constance considered

¹ PETRUS DE LORCA O. Cist. († 1606 A. D.) His *Commentaria et Disputationes in Secundam Secundae S. Thomae* was first published at Madrid in 1614 A. D. In his treatise on faith, disput. 40, we find his exposition of the theological censures.

² Cf. LORCA, *Commentaria et Disputationes in Secundam Secundae S. Thomae*, de fide, disput. 40, no. 5. *Matriiti* (1614), p. 259.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1.a.

⁴ Cf. LORCA, loc. cit. "Quod Concilium Constantiense erroneas propositiones absolute dixit non esse catholicas; nihil autem absolute dicitur non catholicum, nisi quod fidei ipsae contrarium est, nam non catholicum idem est quod nullo modo catholicum; negatio enim praeposita omnia destruit, ut non album, nullo modo album; non homo, nullo modo homo: et illa sola nullo modo catholica sunt, quae fidei adversantur: nam quae pia credulitati solum opponuntur, aliquo modo catholica sunt, id est, non contraria fidei."

the erroneous proposition as being non-Catholic. We have already considered this qualification as used by the council, and proved beyond doubt that the term "*non-Catholic*" not only governs the erroneous propositions, but all the other propositions which are censured. This is clearly stated in the condemnation affixed to the articles of Huss¹, and in the subsequent interrogation which was drawn up by Pope Martin V².

Having stated that the qualification "*non-Catholic*" governs the erroneous propositions alone, de Lorca goes on to say that which is *non-Catholic* must necessarily be contrary to faith. Not only is this weak logic, but is also disproved by the two decrees which we have just cited, where the term "*non-Catholic*" is applied to all propositions censured below heresy. From all this it is apparent that de Lorca's rejection of Cano's explanation cannot be taken too seriously. He was obviously misled by the wording of the condemnation affixed to the articles of Wyclif, and by presupposing that anything which is not Catholic must necessarily be contrary to divine faith.

After his examination of Cano's doctrine, de Lorca expresses his own view regarding the censure of *error*, which he claims to be the common opinion among theologians. The erroneous proposition, he states, is in direct opposition to truth of faith. It has this characteristic in common with heresy. The differentiating factor, however, is that the erroneous proposition is not manifestly and notoriously opposed to faith, as heresy must be³. To illustrate this notion, he points to the fact that many truths which are now dogmas of faith were once held in doubt before their definition by the Church. In this state of uncertainty, the denial of such doctrine would merit the censure of *error*. After definition, however, denial would entail the censure of heresy⁴.

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1 b.

² Ibid., no. 1 c.

³ Cf. LORCA, loc. cit., no. 7, p. 259. "His ergo definitionibus omissis, vera est definitio quam communis sententia tradit, erroneam propositionem esse, quae directe quidem doctrinae fidei adversatur, sed non manifeste et notorie; ut in hoc differat erroneum ab haeresi, quod haeresis est error manifestus in fide, erroneum vero, error in fide, sed non manifestus."

⁴ Ibid., p. 260. "Exempla huius gradus sunt omnes propositiones de quibus aliquando in Ecclesia dubitatum est, et postea definitae sunt; non enim potuerunt esse haereses post definitionem, nisi prius essent errores."

S. Antoninus is the first authority quoted by de Lorca to support this explanation. We recall that according to the doctrine of the former, the two factors which distinguish the heretical from the erroneous proposition are notorious opposition to revelation and pertinacity. Here, de Lorca makes no mention of the second condition but stresses the first; the heretical proposition must be notorious and manifest. We have already seen that this explanation of S. Antoninus was later endorsed by Sylvester de Prierias and quoted by Simancas. All these authorities are brought forward by de Lorca to prove that his doctrine constitutes the common opinion of theologians. He even goes so far as to state that Cano, in a way, holds this view. In all probability, he is referring to Cano's explanation of the second and third grade of *error*.

The main authority for this opinion is S. Antoninus, who stated that the heretical proposition must be notorious. In our estimation, the factor which influenced him in placing this condition for heresy was the terminology used by the Council of Constance in condemning the articles of Wyclif and Huss¹. In these condemnations it was stated that some of the articles were *notoriously heretical*, while others were not Catholic but erroneous, etc. From this it would appear that *notorious heresy* is distinguished from *error*. In the interrogations which were later drawn up by Pope Martin V, this same terminology is used². We note, however, that in all the subsequent condemnations, (which may be seen outlined in the introduction), the term '*notorious*' was never again used in relation to the censure of heresy. S. Antoninus could not have been aware of this, but the same excuse cannot be brought forward for de Lorca, because in the condemnation of the seventy-nine articles of Baius by Pope S. Pius V (1567 A. D.), simple heresy was distinguished from plain *error*, without any qualifying terms such as '*notorie*', or '*non catholici*'³. All this goes to show that the explanation put forward here by de Lorca has not the weight of authority which he thinks it has, in spite of the fact that such an eminent theologian as S. Antoninus is cited as being of the same opinion.

When examining Banez' doctrine on this censure, we noticed that

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1, a and b.

² *Ibid.*, no. 1.c

³ *Ibid.*, no. 3.

the theological conclusion was introduced as one of the notes corresponding to the censure of *error*. He claimed this to be commonly accepted by the theologians. In de Lorca's explanation, however, we find no mention of the theological conclusion in relation to the erroneous proposition. Nevertheless, it is not completely neglected, and we shall now consider how he applies it as a theological note corresponding to an entirely different censure.

Having explained the type of proposition which merits the censure *haeresim sapiens*, de Lorca goes on to state that the denial of a theological conclusion (whether deduced by means of two premises of faith, or one premise of faith with another known by the natural light of reason) could also be placed in this category. He points out, however, that there is a special censure which deals with propositions in opposition to such conclusions, and this he hopes to explain further down¹.

Soon afterwards we find de Lorca explaining the censure *haeresi proxima*. He points out that the name of this censure suggests that the doctrine denied comes very close to faith. Seeing that a theological conclusion, logically deduced from faith, enjoys the next grade of certainty, he places it as the theological note corresponding to *haeresi proxima*².

This is the first time we have seen *haeresi proxima* explained as a separate censure. Lorca had never seen it used by the Church³, neither did any of those theologians whom he quotes and whom we have already considered, regard it as a separate censure.

We recall that Banez placed the theological conclusion as a note corresponding to the censure of *error*, and stated that this was generally

¹ Cf. LORCA, loc. cit., no. 10, p. 261. "Ad hoc genus reduci possunt propositiones illas, quae adversantur conclusionibus, ex principiis fidei deductis, sive deducantur ex una de fide et altera naturali, sive ex utraque de fide... Sed quamvis huiusmodi assertiones quae adversantur conclusionibus theologicis, sapientes haeresim appellari possunt, aliam quoque censuram habent, quae propriior et germanior est illis, quam statim exponam."

² *Ibid.*, no. 11, p. 261. "Dixi aliam esse censuram quae proprie convenit assertionibus quae contrariae sunt veritatibus ex principiis fidei, proxima et necessaria consecutione illatis; quia nimirum huiusmodi assertiones proximae haeresi, vel errori, suo iure appellari debent, quia veritates oppositae proxime ad certitudinem fidei accedunt. Nec video quibus aliis haec censura convenienter aptari possit, servata vocum proprietate."

³ The censure *haeresi proxima* was for the first time officially used by the Church in 1690 A. D., when thirty-one propositions of the Jansenists were condemned *in globo*. Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

taken for granted by the theologians. Now, thirty years afterwards, we find de Lorca placing it in relation to *haeresi proxima*.

Having examined this intervening period between the publication of *De Locis* and Suarez' commentary on faith, (1563-1621 A. D.) we may sum up the main points of interest as follows. Simancas rejected Cano's explanation of the erroneous proposition because he misunderstood the concept of *doctrina catholica*. Lorca, on the contrary, rightly understood this notion of Cano, but was forced to reject his explanation of *error*, thinking that the Council of Constance used the term "*non Catholici*" as governing the erroneous propositions alone, and furthermore, thinking that anything which is not Catholic must necessarily be contrary to faith. In their own explanation of the erroneous proposition, both of these theologians went back to the doctrine of S. Antoninus.

Unlike these, Banez agreed with the explanation of Cano, but at the same time he introduced the theological conclusion as a theological note corresponding to *error*. This is perhaps the most important advance which was made in the whole period. In subsequent years, as we shall see, this relationship between the theological conclusion and the censure of *error* was taken more and more for granted by the theologians.

ARTICLE V

The Erroneous Proposition According to Suarez¹
1621 A. D.

In *disput.* 19 of his tract on faith, Suarez treats of the different types of infidelity, and of heresy in particular. He devotes the second section of the *disputatio* to the consideration of theological censures, so this will be the subject of our special study with regard to his interpretation of the erroneous proposition².

¹ Like Cano and Banez, Suarez was also a professor at Salamanca for some time. Hurter tells us that his works were published between 1594-1655 A. D. Père Monnat (DTC, t. 14, col. 2648) says that his commentary on the *secunda secundae* of S. Thomas, was posthumously published at Coimbra in 1621 A. D. It is in this work that we find Suarez' treatise on the theological censures.

² Cf. SUAREZ, *In Secundam Secundae Divi Thomae*, de fide, *disput.* 19, sect. 2. (Vivès, t. 12, p. 426 et seqq.)

There is no doubting the fact that Suarez is one of our major authorities on the explanation of the theological censures. We shall presently see that he is not satisfied with merely giving the opinion of others. On the contrary, he makes a special study of each censure, bringing logic and reason to bear on all the evidence which is available. At the same time he has the greatest respect for authority, and before giving his own view, usually makes a good examination of other opinions. At the beginning of his exposition of the censures, he notes the main authorities who had written on the subject before him. In this list we see that almost all those authors are included whom we have already studied.

Before considering Suarez on the censure of *error*, let us first of all see what evidence was at his disposal from the official condemnations of the Church. Seeing that he died in the year 1617, he was aware of the condemnation of the articles of Baius, which was made by Pope Pius V in 1567 A. D., seven years after the death of Cano. These articles were censured as heretical, erroneous, suspected of heresy, temerarious, scandalous and offensive to pious ears¹. We note that in all the cumulative condemnations of the Church which were known to Suarez², the censure of *error* appears immediately after heresy. With this in mind, we shall now consider his exposition of the erroneous proposition³.

Suarez begins his explanation by discussing the meaning of the term "*error*". Following Cano, he holds for a specific distinction between the heretical and the erroneous proposition, and on this principle he rejects the opinions of S. Antoninus, Turrecremata, and all others whose explanation does not tally with this fundamental tenet.

There is one interesting fact regarding the significance of the word "*error*" which Suarez points out and of which we have not been made aware before this. The most common meaning of the term "*error*", he states, is falsity. When the word is used in a scientific sense, however, it signifies something much more than mere falsity; a certain type of falsity is indicated, which distinguishes it from the commonplace meaning of the word. When, for instance, an opinion is

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 3.

² *Ibid.*, no. 1, 2, and 3.

³ Cf. SUAREZ, *loc. cit.*, no. 11-15.

evidently false and contradicts the very principles of a science, it is termed erroneous. In theology, likewise, a proposition is said to be erroneous when it contradicts doctrine which is certain and commonly taken for granted¹.

We have seen that Cano was the first to demand and explain the specific distinction between the heretical and the erroneous proposition. He showed with the aid of analogy that the term "error" can have a generic and specific meaning, and that if it is to be regarded as a distinct censure, the specific signification must be employed. However, he did not explain why this particular word "error", more than any other, should be used to indicate the censure which comes immediately after heresy. Suarez does so by pointing out that the specific meaning of the term which connotes the censure, must be taken in the scientific sense, that is, indicating manifest and blatant falsity in matters which are commonly taken for granted.

Before giving his own interpretation of the censure of *error*, Suarez discusses some opinions. The doctrine of Cano is singled out for special examination, which shows that Suarez regarded it as being the most authoritative of all opinions which preceded him.

A. Suarez examines the interpretation of Cano²

Suarez certainly interpreted Cano correctly on the second and third grades of *error*. This is obvious from the clear description he gives of Cano's doctrine on these two notions. We cannot say the same, however, regarding his interpretation of the first grade. It seems that Suarez was completely misled in his conception of Cano's *doctrina catholica*. He says that the only way it differs from truth of faith is that it is neither expressly revealed, nor defined by the Church³. To

¹ Ibid., no. 11. "... juxta communem autem loquendi modum, error quasi per antonomasiam in unaquaque materia significare solet, non quodcumque judicium falsum, sed per quandam exaggerationem, quod evidentius vel certius falsum est; et ita in philosophia vocatur error vel opinio erronea, non omnis falsa opinio aut minus probabilis, sed quae est contra principia vel axiomata communiter in philosophia recepta. Sic ergo error in doctrina sacra per antonomasiam dicitur propositio falsa, et contraria doctrinae certae, ac communiter receptae a sacris doctoribus."

² Ibid., no. 13.

³ Ibid. "Primus (gradus) est, errorem in hoc convenire cum haeresi, quod

illustrate this he does not adhere to the simple examples of Cano, but introduces two others which are more in keeping with his own interpretation. These two examples are; *a*, the Assumption of Our Lady, and *b*, the fact that she never even venially sinned (i. e. considering this doctrine before the Council of Trent.)

For Suarez, Cano's second and third degrees of *error* are just explicit forms of the first. This is clear from the way he introduces them once he has finished treating of *doctrina catholica*: "alter modus rem hanc explicandi est..."

We cannot agree with this interpretation of Cano's doctrine. We have pointed out time and again that *doctrina catholica*, as understood by Cano, comprises truths outside the boundary of immediate and mediate revelation, yet piously believed by the faithful throughout the universal Church. If this concept were rightly understood by Suarez, there would have been no necessity to change Cano's examples which are as follows.

1° Special prayers which are applied to one person by religious or prelates, are more beneficial to that person than general prayers.

2° It is licit for friars to be mendicant, as they are not obliged to earn their living by manual labour.

It is obvious that there is a considerable difference between these examples and those which Suarez substituted.

Having interpreted Cano's doctrine in this way, Suarez does not reject it outright, but merely states that it is probable. He points out, however, that while Cano succeeded in distinguishing *error* from heresy, he did not succeed in distinguishing it from the other theological censures¹.

opponatur catholicae doctrinae, id est, ita receptae communi consensu Ecclesiae, ut nullus pius ac vere doctus de illa dubitare audeat. Differt tamen quia interdum aliqua propositio est hoc modo recepta ab Ecclesia, quamvis non sit expresse revelata aut definita, et tunc, inquiunt, propositio contraria est erronea, non tamen haeretica, quia non est contra expressam fidem."

¹ Ibid. "... atque omnes isti modi probabiles quidem sunt, satisque distinguunt propositionem erroneam ab haeretica; nihilominus non videntur satis illam distinguere a propositione sapiente haeresim, et aliis statim tractandis."

B. Suarez' own explanation of the erroneous proposition

After examining Cano's doctrine, Suarez gives his own opinion as to what constitutes the erroneous proposition. This is perhaps the simplest explanation we have seen so far, since he holds that the censure of *error* is incurred by the denial of a theological conclusion, and that alone¹. What Suarez here understands as a theological conclusion is that which is evidently deduced from a principle of faith, with the aid of a premise known by the natural light of reason. Conclusions of this nature, he states, have the next grade of certainty to doctrine of faith. Their denial will consequently merit the next gravest censure after heresy, which is *error*². If the erroneous proposition is understood in this manner, then it is equally distinguished from heresy and all the lower theological censures.

This is not the first time we have seen the theological conclusion being associated with the erroneous proposition. We recall that Banez also related these two concepts, but with this difference; he placed the denial of a theological conclusion as one of many theological notes corresponding to the censure. He did not reject Cano's doctrine, but only supplemented it by introducing the theological conclusion. Suarez, on the contrary, supplants the three grades with this simple explanation.

So far, when examining the different notions which theologians put forward to explain the erroneous proposition, we have always tried, as far as possible, to ascertain the factors which influenced them in interpreting the censure the way they did. We found that sometimes their opinions were based on the use of a particular word used by the Church, or the slightest evidence which they could use as authority. We shall now give our own opinion as to what influenced Suarez in placing the theological conclusion as the theological note corresponding to *error*.

¹ Ibid., no. 14. "Quapropter addi potest alius modus propositionis erroneae nimirum ut sit illa quae opponitur veritati certae theologiae certitudine, quae non attingit gradum certitudinis fidei, quia nullo modo est immediate revelata, ut supponitur, sed est conclusio evidenter illata ex una de fide, et ex altera evidente lumine naturali; nam quod talis conclusio sit certa certitudine theologiae, manifestum est, quia est scientifica in illo ordine."

² Ibid. "Hoc ergo supposito, manifeste sequitur propositionem contrariam tali propositioni non attingere gradum propositionis haereticae, quia non habet

We have already noted that in all global condemnations of the Church of which Suarez was aware, *error* occupies the next place to heresy in the gradation of censures. This indicated that the erroneous proposition came next to heresy in gravity. Likewise, the very name of the censure, "*error*", corroborated this. For Suarez, the word "*error*", when used in scientific matters, indicates manifest or notorious falsity, or the denial of something which is commonly held as certain. All this went to show that the erroneous proposition comes immediately after heresy.

To fit in with this, a theological note had to be found which would occupy the next grade in certainty to doctrine of faith. This obviously meant the theological conclusion which is mediately revealed, and the denial of which entails a mediate denial of faith.

There is something very logical about this explanation of Suarez which we have not seen in any other exposition considered so far. The principle underlying his doctrine is the fact that the erroneous proposition comes immediately after heresy. From this he argues that the corresponding note must be the theological conclusion, which comes immediately after faith.

We notice that Suarez is far from being dogmatic about this explanation of the erroneous proposition. He does not claim it to be the common opinion of theologians, and in fact, does not so much as cite one authority to support his doctrine. We noticed that when he had examined Cano's explanation of *error* he did not reject it outright, and even went so far as to say that it was a probable opinion.

The concept of the erroneous proposition has now been very much simplified. There is no certainty as yet, however, as to this new interpretation. We must wait and see how it was accepted by later theologians. Before passing on to consider these, we wish to investigate Suarez' doctrine on theological conclusions more fully. This will help us to have a still clearer idea of his interpretation of the erroneous proposition.

summam oppositionem cum propositione fidei, qualis est immediate; quod autem sit erronea, manifestum est, quia post haereticam propositionem habet summam repugnantiam cum veritate fidei, scilicet, mediatam, per evidentem illationem, et ita distinguitur ab inferioribus gradibus propositionum damnabilium, ut videbimus."

C. Theological conclusions according to Suarez

When Suarez gives his own opinion on the erroneous proposition, he does not expressly say that it is constituted by the denial of an *undefined* theological conclusion. This is not necessary, since he has already laid down that such conclusions may be defined by the Church and become doctrine of faith. After such a definition, their denial would be heretical¹.

He expressly states that the theological conclusion which corresponds to the censure of *error* is that which is evidently deduced by means of one premise of faith and another known by the natural light of reason. He regards conclusions which are acquired by means of two premises of faith as being within the pale of immediate revelation, and consequently their denial may be censured as heretical. He admits, however, that conclusions deduced in this way may not always be the object of an act of faith, that is, if the reason for the assent happens to be the evident deduction rather than the divine testimony².

According to Suarez, therefore, the theological conclusion which corresponds to the erroneous proposition is that which is evidently deduced from a principle of faith with the aid of a premise known by the natural light of reason, and which has not yet been defined by the Church. Furthermore, he states that virtual revelation, or the true theological conclusion, is in respect of properties which are *not* formally contained in the revealed subject but only *in radice*, as the

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 3, sect. 11, no. 11. "Nihilominus dicendum est tertio, conclusionem theologicam, quae prius tantum virtute continebatur in rebus revelatis, postquam per Ecclesiam definitur, esse formaliter et propriissime de fide, non mediate tantum, sed immediate; quia jam non habetur illa veritas tantum ut virtute et mediate revelata, sed ut revelata formaliter et in se." A little further down, he explains the mode of transition from mediate to immediate revelation, as follows:

"Ratio vero est, quia quod Ecclesia definit, Deus per Ecclesiam testificatur; Ecclesia autem definit talem veritatem in se ac formaliter; ergo jam Deus illum in se ac formaliter testificatur; ergo eo ipso est constituta sufficienter sub objecto formali fidei; nam testimonium divinum idem est, et aequum certum, sive per seipsum, sive per Ecclesiam, vel alium ministrum Deus illud praebeat, ut supra ostensum est."

Both Cano and Banez held for this transition, but were not quite so explicit as to the way it may come about. The explanation of Suarez just quoted is tantamount to saying that the Church is capable of making new revelations.

² Ibid., no. 6.

property *visibilitas* is contained *in radice* in human nature¹. This suggests that Suarez limits the notion of virtual revelation and the strict theological conclusion to physical properties which are contained *in radice* in the revealed subject. It cannot be said that metaphysical properties are contained *in radice* in the revealed subject, as these are identified with it, and it would be absurd to say that anything is contained in itself *tanquam in radice*.

The concept of the theological conclusion which Suarez placed as corresponding to the erroneous proposition is much more explicit than any we have seen so far. That which concerns us most, however, is his interpretation of the censure of *error*, which has now been very much simplified. If we were to treat fully of Suarez' doctrine on theological conclusions, and its subsequent effects on the history of theology, we fear that it would take us too far afield. In recent years, this has been the subject of a very thorough study by Fr. Marin-Sola O. P., who claims that Suarez' innovations regarding the theological conclusion, began a new epoch in the history of theology².

¹ Ibid., no. 5. "Revelatio autem virtualis est respectu proprietatis quae nullo modo continetur formaliter in re dicta, sed tantum in radice, ut in exemplo de visibilitate, et similibus."

² Cf. MARIN-SOLA O. P., *L'Evolution homogène du Dogme catholique*. Fribourg/Suisse, (1924).

Marin-Sola's examination of Suarez' doctrine on the theological conclusion may be seen in t. 1, chap. 2, no. 65 et seqq. According to Marin-Sola, Suarez was confronted with two opinions which were opposed in the extreme. The first was the traditional Thomistic doctrine which stated that theological conclusions are not of faith before they are defined by the Church. The second was that of Vasques and Vega, who held that such conclusions are of faith, even before definition. Instead of taking sides with either of these opinions, Suarez devised a *via media* which partly agreed with one school of thought, and partly with the other. To bring about this *via media*, he introduced a new division of formal revelation, formal-explicit and formal-confused.

In the category of formal-confused revelation, Suarez placed not only conclusions deduced by means of improper reasoning, such as mere explanation of terms, etc., but also the metaphysical properties of the revealed subject. These metaphysical properties are identified with the revealed essence, and only conceptually differ from it. They are distinguished from physical properties which not only express a distinct concept, but a distinct reality from the revealed essence. According to Marin-Sola, Suarez restricted virtual revelation to this latter type of properties, which are merely physico-connected with revelation. In this way, Suarez brought about the *via media*. He was able to agree with the traditional Thomistic view by stating that the strict theological conclusion, (i. e. understood in respect of physical properties) is not of faith before definition by the Church, and that

ARTICLE VI

Lugo Endorses the Interpretation of Suarez
(1646 A. D.)

After Suarez, our next authority on the theological censures is Cardinal de Lugo S. J. (1583-1660 A. D.)¹. His very thorough exposition is to be found in his tract on faith, where he examines the sin of heresy². This consideration of Lugo's doctrine brings us forward twenty-five years after the publication of Suarez' commentary on the *secunda secundae*. In the intervening period, there were no condemnations issued by the Church in which the lesser theological censures were applied. From the point of view of guidance from this official source, therefore, we may say that Lugo was in the same position as his predecessor Suarez.

The publication of Lugo's tract on faith constituted a great advance in the interpretation of the theological censures. He gives the entire problem a thorough examination, and we find such detail and clarity in his exposition as we have not met before this.

In his explanation of the erroneous proposition³, he first of all treats of the name of this censure and its distinction from heresy. He then reviews all the important opinions, and here we are happy to note that we have already studied the doctrine of each theologian

the theological conclusion understood in a broad sense, (i. e. in respect of metaphysical properties) is of faith before being defined.

Marin-Sola's contention is that Suarez' limitation of virtual revelation and the true theological conclusion to mere physical properties, began a new epoch in the history of theology. It was against the traditional doctrine which held that true virtuality concerns the metaphysical properties — which differed only in concept from the revealed essence. This change of Suarez, Marin-Sola states, was the cause of immense confusion in later years, and presented insurmountable difficulties in explaining the homogeneous development of dogma.

¹ The Opera Omnia of Lugo was first published at Lyons in 1652 A. D. Hurter gives no specific date for the first publication of his tract on faith. However, in the general preface to the Vivès edition, this date is given as 1646 A. D. Lugo's dedication to Pope Innocent X, placed at the beginning of the tract on faith, is dated the first day of May, 1645 A. D.

² Cf. Lugo, *Disputationes Scholasticae et Morales, tractatus de virtute fidei divinae*, disput. 20, sect. 3. (Vivès, t. 2, p. 1 et seqq.)

³ Cf. LUGO, loc. cit., no. 73-78.

whose opinion is analysed by Lugo. Finally, he gives his own interpretation as to what constitutes the erroneous proposition. We shall now examine his doctrine on all these points.

A. The erroneous proposition constitutes a distinct censure¹

In discussing the signification of the name of this censure and its distinction from the heretical proposition, Lugo has nothing new to add to the doctrine of Cano and Suarez on these points. Immediately he goes on to discuss the main opinions on the erroneous proposition, and the first theologian mentioned is S. Antoninus O. P.

B. Lugo on the interpretation of S. Antoninus²

We have already considered the opinion of S. Antoninus and seen that the main difference he placed between the heretical and the erroneous proposition was a mere subjective one, i. e. the pertinacity of the assertor. This interpretation was unacceptable to Cano and others since it did not tally with the official pronouncements of the Church, especially the decrees of the Council of Constance which seemed to place a more objective distinction between these two censures. Lugo now reiterates this rejection of the saint's explanation, and points out that such condemnations do not concern the sins of those who originally asserted the articles, but rather the objective propositions in themselves. There is one other interesting argument against the opinion of S. Antoninus which Lugo brings forward here, referring to the bull of Pope S. Pius V condemning the articles of Baius. This argument could not have been used by Cano who died in 1560 A. D. Lugo now brings it forward to discredit for good the opinion of S. Antoninus on the censure of *error*.

When Pope S. Pius V condemned the articles of Baius³, Lugo states, he applied both the censures, heresy and *error*. There is no mention of pertinacity in this condemnation, and in fact, there could not be since Baius always remained a Catholic and obedient to the Church.

¹ Ibid., no. 73.

² Ibid., no. 74.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 3.

On the other hand, when the Council of Constance condemned the articles of Wyclif and Huss¹, both of whom were obdurate heretics, it found the same pertinacity in all the condemned articles, and yet distinguished between the heretical and erroneous proposition. This proves without doubt that subjective pertinacity does not enter into the distinction between the censures of heresy and *error*.

The Church has never given an official interpretation as to the meaning of the individual theological censures. This was a matter which was left to the theologians to work out. Consequently, in our efforts to understand these censures, it is to these we must go, always bearing in mind that the greater the theologian, the greater will be his authority. There is no doubting the fact that S. Antoninus bears great theological weight, and perhaps it was because of this that his opinion received so much attention. We are anxious to examine every criticism of the saint's doctrine, because it cannot be rejected unless strong and cogent arguments are brought against it. It seems now, however, that these arguments are at hand, and we may safely say that the doctrine of S. Antoninus on the erroneous proposition is untenable.

C. Lugo considers the opinion of Alphonsus de Castro²

When considering the various opinions on the erroneous proposition which were in vogue before Cano, (art. 2 of this chapter) we had occasion to study the doctrine of Alphonsus de Castro. Lugo now examines the same opinion, which shows that even at this late date, Castro's doctrine was still of considerable importance.

We recall that according to Castro, the censure of heresy may be applied when purely supernatural truths are denied. From these he distinguished natural *credibilia*, that is, doctrine which does not transcend the natural intellectual powers, but which is nevertheless revealed. Denial of this latter type of truth constitutes the erroneous proposition for Castro.

Lugo rejects this opinion on the grounds that it makes for no distinction between heresy and *error*. Once these natural truths are revealed, he states, their denial will constitute heresy.

In our own analysis of Castro's doctrine, we saw that he insisted

¹ Ibid., no. 1 (a, b, c).

² Cf. LUGO, loc. cit., no. 75.

on the revelation of these natural truths, the denial of which constitutes the erroneous proposition. Soon afterwards, he went on to explain that if such a natural truth is revealed, its denial will be simultaneously heretical and erroneous. Either Castro contradicted himself in this, or else he held that it is impossible to have an erroneous proposition which is not, at the same time, heretical.

D. Lugo considers the doctrine of Cano¹

Ever since the publication of *De Locis Theologicis* (1563), the doctrine of Cano on the theological censures was regarded as being of the highest authority. We have seen that in every treatise we have considered since then, his opinion on the erroneous proposition was examined. In Lugo's lengthy treatise of the censure of *error*, the greater part by far is taken up with his examination of Cano's doctrine. As yet, we have seen no critical analysis of this. Suarez considered it, but neither rejected nor accepted it. He concluded by saying that it was probable. It now appears, however, that Lugo makes a better examination of Cano's thought, and we shall presently see that he leaves no doubt as to whether it should be accepted or not.

At the outset, Lugo notes that Cano places the concept of *doctrina catholica* as a theological note corresponding to the erroneous proposition. This body of truth, he notes, is not of faith, yet universally believed so that no one truly pious and learned would doubt it. The term "Catholic doctrine", he states, has a much wider meaning than doctrine of faith. The word "Catholic" signifies universality, and consequently, any doctrine which is universally believed throughout the Church, may be called Catholic.

Though Lugo agrees with Cano with regard to this terminology, he disagrees with him in placing this notion as a theological note corresponding to the erroneous proposition. We shall now examine his reasons for this rejection.

In all the official condemnations of the Church in which these censures were used², the erroneous proposition is always enumerated immediately after heresy. From this it is clear that according to the

¹ Ibid., no. 76-77.

² The condemnations of which Lugo was aware and to which he made special reference, are those which are numbered as 1 (a, b, c), 2 and 3, in the outline of condemnations in the introduction.

mind of the Church it is next in gravity to the heretical proposition. It cannot be said, therefore, that the censure of *error* may be incurred by the denial of something which is commonly believed throughout the Church. This concept is far too vague to constitute *error* as a special censure. The scandalous and temerarious propositions are also in opposition to truth which is commonly believed, and yet they are generally regarded as being distinct from *error*. If the erroneous proposition is to be distinguished from these other censures, a theological note more intimately connected with divine faith, must be found¹.

The censure which is called *error in fide* must entail opposition to doctrine which is, in some way, connected with faith. According to Cano's notion of *doctrina catholica*, this connection with faith is an extrinsic one, founded on a common belief. There is, however, a greater connection than this, namely the intrinsic connection which may be clearly seen by way of deduction. If the common assent of the faithful regarding some doctrine which is not of faith is founded on reasons other than the evident intrinsic connection with revelation, opposition to such a common assent will incur a censure lower than *error*².

In short, Cano's idea of *doctrina catholica* cannot be admitted as a theological note corresponding to the erroneous proposition; firstly, because it is not sufficiently connected with revealed truth, and secondly, because it is not sufficiently distinguished from the theological notes corresponding to the lower censures, especially the temerarious and scandalous propositions.

In this analysis of Cano's first grade of *error*, Lugo introduces the very important distinction between an intrinsic and extrinsic connection with faith. The extrinsic connection is founded on authority, whereas the intrinsic connection is nothing other than the logical

¹ Cf. Lugo, loc. cit., no. 76. "Caeterum, quia error in praesenti materia proximum gradum post haeresim videtur habere, et ideo in Concilio Constantiensi et bulla pontificia supra allegatis, post haereticas nominantur immediate propositiones erroneae, non videtur satis ad errorem proprie, et in rigore sumptum, quod adversetur doctrinae quam omnes pro certa tenent. Nam temeraria etiam et scandalosa propositio, videtur adversari doctrinae quam omnes indubitanter tenent, alioquin non esset temeraria, vel scandalosa."

² Ibid. "Error enim in fide, opponi debet aliquo modo cum ipsa fide, quatenus saltem negat aliquid, quod propter connexionem cum fide nemo negare audeat. Quando vero communis ille consensus fidelium aliunde oritur, et non ex connexionem rei illius cum principiis fidei, non videtur proprie erronea doctrina, quae rem illam negat; sed aliam censuram habebit ex infra adducendis."

evidence which may be clearly seen by way of deduction. These are important concepts for the interpretation of the censure *haeresi proxima*, which is mainly concerned with extrinsic evidence.

The arguments which Lugo brings forward against Cano's first grade of *error* seem quite cogent. They are founded on the principle that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy. It seems that Cano also held for this principle since he treated of the erroneous proposition immediately after heresy, and the Council of Constance, which was his only authority, also enumerated the censures in this gradation. The notion of *doctrina catholica* does not seem to fit in with this. Something much more intimately connected with faith must be placed as the theological note corresponding to the censure which comes immediately after heresy.

After this exposition of the first grade of *error*, Lugo proceeds to examine the second and third grades of erroneous propositions as understood by Cano. Before considering his analysis, however, it would be well to recall briefly what Cano taught with regard to these.

Two conditions must be fulfilled before an heretical proposition is constituted; a) the doctrine which is denied must *certainly* be of faith, and b) the censurable proposition must be in direct and *certain* opposition to the doctrine which is of faith. If there is any reasonable doubt about the certainty of the first condition, then the second grade of erroneous propositions is constituted. If, however, the doubt should be with regard to the second condition, then we have the third degree of *error* as understood by Cano.

Lugo does not agree with these notions as theological notes corresponding to the erroneous proposition. Doctrine which is censurable in this way, he states, does not, in effect, differ in substance from heresy. If, for instance, a theologian were fully aware of the opposition which a proposition of this nature has to doctrine of faith, and if he could not prudently doubt this on the authority of the few theologians who hold the contrary, then, in adhering to such doctrine he could not escape heresy before God¹.

¹ Ibid., no. 77. "... participant enim substantiam haeresis, quae est oppositio immediata cum fide, et ideo diximus supra, eum cui certo constaret ea oppositio, ita ut nec per principia extrinseca prudenter posset dubitari, de illa oppositione cum fide, et cum communi fidelium sensu, non posse sine haeresi assensum eis praebere, licet apud aliquos sit dubium an sint haereses."

Even though such propositions do not differ in substance from heresy, they differ in mode. This special mode is caused by the fact that there is no absolute certainty as to whether they are of faith or not. For Lugo, however, propositions of this nature correspond to the censure *haeresi proxima*, and not to *error*¹.

The last argument which Lugo brings against Cano's doctrine in this matter is by way of a *reductio ad absurdum*. If these propositions, which differ only in mode from heresy, were to be censured absolutely as erroneous, then it could never afterwards be said that they are, in fact, heretical. Before the application of the censure of *error*, the majority of theologians held such propositions to be heretical. Once they are censured as erroneous, however, the opinion of the majority of theologians immediately becomes false².

After examining these arguments which Lugo brings forward against Cano's doctrine on the second and third degrees of *error*, it seems that his main objection is that these notions correspond to the censure *haeresi proxima*. Cano never treated of the censure *haeresi proxima*. However, these notions had to fit in somewhere, so he put them under *error*, since they came far too close to divine faith to be put under what he thought was the next censure, *haeresim sapiens*. Lugo does treat of *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, and in due course we shall have occasion to consider once again those very concepts which he rejects here as corresponding to the censure of *error*.

We have now considered Lugo on the three grades of erroneous propositions as proposed by Cano. Suarez, as we saw, also considered Cano's doctrine, but left us without any definite rejection or approbation. He merely said it was a probable explanation. Lugo, on the contrary, completely rejects it, and the arguments he brings forward seem quite cogent. This is the first time we have seen a thorough examination

¹ Ibid. "Differunt ergo ab haeresi non tam in ipsa substantia, quam in modo, hoc est, in certitudine an sint haereses, et ideo vocari possunt proximae haeresi, quatenus non ab omnibus, sed a pluribus aestimantur haereses."

² Ibid. "Frequenter etiam opinio affirmans contrarium esse de fide et illam esse haeresim erit vera: si ergo opinio illa vera est, propositio illa erit revera haeretica: . . . Alioquin si propositio illa nunquam sit haeretica, sed solum error, nunquam erit vera, sententia docens illam esse haeresim et contrarium esse de fide, nec possent unquam esse opiniones circa hoc punctum: quia ubi primum aliqui dubitarent, an sit haeretica ea propositio, eo ipso non jam esset haeretica, atque adeo falsa esset quaelibet sententia dicens esse haeticam."

of Cano's doctrine on the erroneous proposition. Like S. Antoninus, he also was a theologian of the first rank, and consequently, his authority cannot be lightly disregarded. We think, however, that the arguments which Lugo brings against his interpretation give sufficient grounds for rejecting his opinion on what constitutes the censure of *error*.

E. Lugo's interpretation of the erroneous proposition¹

When considering Lugo's examination of *doctrina catholica* and the first grade of *error*, we saw that he held that the erroneous proposition comes immediately after heresy. Likewise, he stated that the greatest connection which any doctrine may have with faith, is the intrinsic connection which may be seen by evident deduction. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that when he comes to state his own interpretation of the erroneous proposition, he holds that it is constituted by the denial of a theological conclusion². Thus he corroborates the opinion of Suarez, and for the same reasons. He is more definite than Suarez, however, about this opinion, stating that it is now commonly received amongst the theologians.

It is to be noted that Lugo explicitly states that the theological conclusion which he places as corresponding to the erroneous proposition is that which is evidently deduced from a principle of faith with the aid of a premise known by the light of natural reason. He states that if the conclusion is obtained with the aid of two premises of faith its denial incurs the censure of heresy, and not just *error*. He holds that the object of such a conclusion is formally contained in the two revealed premises³.

Elsewhere in his tract on faith, Lugo discusses the theological conclusion at much fuller length. He explicitly states that virtual revelation and the true theological conclusion concerns physical properties

¹ Ibid., no. 78.

² Ibid. "Restat ergo quintus et ultimus modus explicandi satis communis et probabilis, quod error proprie sit, qui non opponitur immediate, sed solum mediate doctrinae fidei, quatenus negat immediate propositionem, quae non est de fide, sed conclusio solum theologica, deducta evidenter ex una de fide, et altera evidenti lumine naturae."

³ For a fuller treatment of this problem, cf. Lugo, de fide, disput. 1, sect. 13, no. 278-297.

which are connected with the revealed subject. The metaphysical properties which are identified with the revealed subject, he considers as being within the realm of immediate revelation¹.

Finally, we note that Lugo, following Cano, Banez and Suarez, also holds that theological conclusions may be defined by the Church as being of divine faith, and after such definition, their denial will incur the censure of heresy².

¹ Cf. LUGO, de fide, disput. 1, sect. 13, no. 265. Here Lugo considers the difficulty which states that a denial of the theological conclusion, *Christus est risibilis*, will entail heresy, since this necessarily includes a denial of Christ's humanity. The difficulty is solved as follows: "Potest autem facile responderi, hominem sine radice risibilitatis esse chymaeram: neque hoc negari de Christo a negante esse risibilem, sed potius affirmari, dum asserit esse hominem: tunc enim conceptu confuso concipit omnia praedicata realia identificata cum vero homine, et ideo altera propositio est falsa, qua negat hominem esse risibilem, quia de homine vero conceptu ex parte subjecti cum radice risibilitatis in confuso negat explicite risibilitatem in actu secundo, in quo solo errat, quod tamen non est formaliter revelatum."

It seems clear from this text that for Lugo, the metaphysical property of *risibilitas* is in the campus of immediate revelation, while the physical property, *risibilitas in actu secundo*, constitutes the theological conclusion.

It is also evident from Lugo's doctrine on virtual revelation, (loc. cit., no. 259) that for him, the true theological conclusion is in respect of physical properties connected with the revealed essence from which they may be separated by the absolute power of God.

² Ibid., no. 270. While Lugo agrees with Suarez that even strict theological conclusions may be defined by the Church and become doctrine of faith, he does not agree with his explanation of this transition, since it is tantamount to saying that the Church is capable of making new revelations.

His own explanation of this transition, (loc. cit., no. 257) states that if the Church were to make such a definition, e. g. defining *Christus est risibilis*, then it is to be believed on divine faith; not because of a new revelation, but because this proposition becomes a conclusion deduced by means of two premises of faith which are as follows:

- a) Spiritus Sanctus assistit Ecclesiae definienti Christum esse risibilem.
- b) Non potest esse falsum id quod proponit et definit Ecclesia assistente illae Spiritu Sancto ne erret.

Lugo claims that this explanation upholds Suarez' doctrine that theological conclusions may be defined as of faith, and yet safeguards the limits of revelation,

For a criticism of this theory, cf. SALMANTICENSIS, de fide, disput. 1, dubium 4, no. 145 and MARIN-SOLA, *L'Evolution homogène du Dogme catholique*, t. 1, no. 79.

ARTICLE VII

The Salmanticenses and the "More Common Opinion"¹
1679 A. D.

The exposition which the Carmelites of Salamanca give of the theological censures seems rather disappointing at first sight. There is no evidence of originality, and most of their conclusions we have met before in the works of other theologians. In spite of this, however, we do not hesitate to include the Salmanticenses among the authorities on theological censures. We shall presently see that this apparent lack of originality has a very special purpose, and is, in fact, a point in their favour.

In an introductory paragraph to their exposition of the censures, the Salmanticenses point out that most authors, especially the more recent ones, are not of one mind with regard to the meaning of the different theological censures. Very often, they state, theologians are more interested in criticising the opinions of others, and this makes it rather difficult to understand the individual censures, and to select a suitable definition.

The Salmanticenses adopt a completely different attitude: recognising that the interpretation of the censures is a matter which depends on authority, they search out the common opinion in each case, and when this is not possible, at least the more common opinion, or the interpretation which is more widely received².

We do not often find the Salmanticenses cited as authorities on the theological censures, and because of this, one might easily overlook their great contribution in this field. However, their special atti-

¹ Cf. DEMAN O. P., DTC, t. 14, coll. 1017-1031. The Salmanticenses wrote their tract on faith in 1676 A. D., and it was first published at Lyons in 1679 A. D. Their exposition of the theological censures is to be found in this tract, disput. 9, dub. 4.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSIS, *Cursus Theologicus*, de fide, disput. 9, dub. 4, no. 42. "Tandem observandum est, auctores, et praecipue recentes, non semper convenire in describendo propriam uniuscuiusque censurae rationem; sed plurimum studium in eo praesertim esse, ut definitiones ab aliis traditas carpant, et impugnent, ut difficile est lectoribus legitimum dicendi modum eligere. Nos vero contrariam sequemur viam adducendo censurarum descriptiones secundum communes sententias, et si eae non semper constant, secundum communiores, et magis receptas."

tude towards the interpretation of these censures, coupled with the great weight of authority which they themselves enjoy as theologians, make it imperative for us to consider their doctrine. We shall see their opinion on the censure of *error*, or that which they judge to be the more widely received interpretation of the erroneous proposition¹.

A. The more common opinion

It is generally taken for granted, the Salmanticenses state, that the erroneous proposition constitutes a distinct censure which has not the same gravity as heresy. With regard to its explanation, however, the same unanimity of opinion is not to be found. Faithful to their promise, the Salmanticenses now seek out the doctrine which is most widely received, and we see that their selection falls on that particular interpretation which was introduced by Banez, endorsed by Suarez, and finally adopted by Lugo. The more common opinion, they state, is that the erroneous proposition is constituted by evident, immediate, and direct opposition to mediate revelation; in other words, that which is evidently and immediately opposed to a theological conclusion².

It is interesting to note that the Salmanticenses judge this to be the *more common opinion*. In all probability, it was out of reverence to such great theologians as S. Antoninus, Turrecremata, Cano and others, that they reduced the authority of this doctrine to *more common*, instead of rating it simply as the *common opinion*.

We recall that Banez was the first theologian we saw to relate the erroneous proposition to the theological conclusion. In doing so, he claimed that this was commonly accepted amongst the theologians of his time. Suarez was more cautious and less dogmatic, admitting the opinion of Cano to be probable. Lugo claimed this interpretation to be commonly received, and now we see the Salmanticenses very carefully stating that it is the *more common opinion*.

After giving us the result of their investigations, the Salmanticenses quote S. Thomas (2/2, q. 11, a. 2), Banez, Suarez and Tapia as au-

¹ Ibid., no. 48.

² Ibid. "Ille autem videtur verior, et communior dicendi modus, qui asserit propositionem erroneam esse, quae immediate, et evidenter opponitur veritati a Deo revelatae mediate, et secundo, sive quae immediate, et evidenter adversatur conclusioni theologicae, ut haec propositio, Christus non est risibilis."

thorities for this explanation. We notice that they conclude this list with the following words: "*Et communiter doctores moderni.*" From this we gather that that which they call the more common opinion of all theologians was, in fact, the common opinion of the more recent theologians, i. e. after Banez.

All this goes to prove that it was the doctrine of S. Antoninus, Turrecremata, Cano, and the other dissenting opinions we have considered, which prohibited the Salmanticenses from absolutely stating that the *common opinion* of theologians regarded the erroneous proposition as being in direct opposition to the theological conclusion.

B. The theological conclusion according to the Salmanticenses

We have seen that for the Carmelites of Salamanca the censure of *error* is incurred by the direct and evident denial of a theological conclusion. They do not go into more detail about the nature of the theological conclusion here, when treating of the censures. We must go back to the beginning of their tract on faith, therefore, to get more precise knowledge on this point.

According to the Salmanticenses, doctrine which is deduced by means of two premises of faith is not a theological conclusion in the strict sense of the term. On the contrary, such a conclusion is formally revealed and may be believed on divine faith. In this, the Salmanticenses are of one mind with Suarez and Lugo¹.

Likewise, conclusions which are merely explicit forms of doctrine which is already formally but confusedly revealed, are not theological

¹ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 1, dub. 4, no. 127-132. The Salmanticenses give a very thorough examination of this problem of conclusions deduced by means of two premises of faith. In no. 132 of the reference given above, they point out that the two revealed premises contain the medium of demonstration and formally express its connection with both extremes which are enunciated in the conclusion. However, this union between the medium of demonstration and both extremes cannot be expressed unless at the same time, the union between the extremes themselves (i. e. the actual conclusion) is at least implicitly shown. In this way, the Salmanticenses show that the conclusion is already formally revealed in the two premises. Cf. SALMANTICENSES, loc. cit., no. 132. "Ratio vero est, quia causa naturalis praedictae veritatis, (i. e. the conclusion) est medium demonstrationis, ex quo infertur; praemissae autem non solum includunt medium demonstrationis, sed etiam expriment unionem illam cum extremitatibus, quam non possunt exprimere, quin eo ipso significant saltem implicite unionem extremitatum inter se, in qua consistit ipsa conclusio."

conclusions in the strict sense of the word. The reasoning employed in the deduction of such conclusions is not strict theological syllogism, but rather a clarification of confused knowledge¹.

The strict theological conclusion for the Salmanticenses is that which is evidently deduced by means of rigorous reasoning from a principle of faith, with another principle known by the natural light of reason. To understand what they intend by rigorous theological reasoning, we must consider the famous distinction of the Salmanticenses between *discursus illativus* and *discursus explicativus*.

Rigorous theological reasoning (*discursus illativus*) implies an intellectual movement from the known to the unknown, whether this be from principles to effects or from effects to principles. This type of reasoning means real discovery and progress.

On the other hand, "improper" reasoning (*discursus explicativus*) merely explains and makes more explicit that which is already confusedly known, and does not imply the same progress and intellectual movement from the known to the unknown. In short, it gains no new knowledge from the premises, but only perfects and illustrates that which is already known².

Thus far, there is nothing very extraordinary to note about the doctrine of the Salmanticenses on the theological conclusion. Most of it we have already seen before. However, we are now about to consider one great change introduced by the Salmanticenses and which concerns the censure of *error* very intimately.

Most of the theologians we have considered so far expressly stated that a theological conclusion, once defined by the Church, becomes doctrine of faith. Consequently, whenever there was question of the erroneous proposition, those theologians who associated it with the theological conclusion were careful to state that it is the denial of

¹ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 1, dub. 4, no. 116-119.

² Ibid., no. 122. "... discursus est duplex, proprius scilicet, et improprius. Prior importat motum intellectus a principiis ad effectus, vel ab effectibus ad sua principia; est enim progressus a notis ad ignota. Posterior vero non includit huiusmodi motum, sed quasi in eodem puncto persistens, tantum explicat in consequenti, quod in praemissis non ita perspicue significatum habebatur. Ob idque illius consequentia non dicitur illativa, et probativa, sicut appellatur consequentia antecedentis, sed tantum explicativa. Et merito, quia non est apta nata generare diversam specie notitiam a cognitione praemissarum, quod videtur proprium esse discursus; sed tantum hanc perficit, et illustrat."

an *undefined* theological conclusion which merits the censure of *error*. This distinction is not necessary for the Salmanticenses, since they have already categorically laid down *that the theological conclusion, understood in the strict sense, can never become doctrine of faith*¹.

Cano, Banez, Suarez and Lugo expressly state that such conclusions, understood even in the strict sense, may be defined by the Church and become doctrine of faith. Consequently, an erroneous proposition may, in the course of time, become heretical. Now we see the Salmanticenses ruling out the possibility of such a transition².

¹ Ibid., no. 146. "Ecclesia enim nunquam definit ut dogma fidei id, quod non praesupponitur illius definitioni revelatum formaliter in Sacris Litteris, saltem confuse et implicite."

A little further on (Ibid., no. 147) we find the following: "... id autem quod solum includitur in propositione revelata sicut effectus in causa, non sit a Spiritu Sancto dictum, et attestatum, non potest ab Ecclesia ut fidei dogma definiri."

Apropos of Suarez' explanation of the transition of the theological conclusion to doctrine of faith, the Salmanticenses (Ibid., no. 144) state: "Caeterum haec solutio haud est consentanea veritati, falliturque illius auctor dum eam dicit communem theologorum; vix enim ullus est, qui ei subscribat: nam etsi omnes concedant ea, quae Ecclesia definit ut dogmata esse proprie de fide; nullus tamen asserit, hoc ideo esse, quia Deus per Ecclesiae definitionem aliquid denuo nobis revelet, quinimo hic dicendi modus ab omnibus rejicitur."

Likewise, the Salmanticenses reject the explanation of Lugo. Cf. SALMANTICENSES, loc. cit., no. 145. "Nec refert id, quod in hac solutione adjecit ipse Lugo, scilicet Ecclesiae definitionem efficere ut propositio quam definit, contenta fuerit in revelatione divina universalis; id enim est prorsus impossibile, ad praeteritum enim non datur potentia."

² MARIN-SOLA (*L'Evolution homogène du dogme catholique*, t. 1, ch. 2, no. 80) considers this stand taken by the Salmanticenses on the possibility of the theological conclusion becoming doctrine of faith, and attributes it to the influence of Suarez and Lugo. Like the Jesuit theologians, the Salmanticenses regarded virtual revelation as being in respect of physical properties of the revealed essence. In their description of virtual revelation, they state that it is related to faith as an effect is related to its cause. Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 1, dub. 4, no. 124. "Dicendum est tertio, revelationem virtualement alicuius veritatis in sua causa adaequata vel inadaequata, qualiter v. g. *Christus esse visibilem*, revelatum est in illa propositione, *Homo factus est*, non sufficere ad rationem sub qua habitus fidei, adeoque praedictam veritatem non esse de fide, sed conclusionem theologiam.

Afterwards (cf. SALMANTICENSES, loc. cit., no. 132), in referring to this same text, the Salmanticenses make it clear that it is a physical or natural cause they have in mind. "Respondetur negando majorem intellectam de causa naturali, sive in esse, et apparere, de qua loquuti sumus in nostra tertia conclusione."

According to Marin-Sola, virtual revelation or the theological conclusion, when understood as a physical effect or property of the revealed essence, is only physico-connected with revelation and exists outside it. Consequently, the Salmanti-

C. Concluding remarks

After considering the doctrine of the Salmanticenses on the censure of *error*, we wish to recapitulate the main points as follows:

The fundamental principle underlying their exposition of the theological censures is that the correct interpretation of these censures is a matter which depends on common opinion and authority in general.

They set out to find the most widely received explanation of the erroneous proposition, and the result of their investigation is that it is constituted by direct and evident opposition to a theological conclusion.

The Salmanticenses judge this opinion to be the *more common* interpretation of the censure of *error*. If, however, only the more recent authors are considered, i. e. after Banez, then this explanation may be called the *common opinion*.

What they consider to be the strict theological conclusion is that which is evidently deduced from a principle of faith with the aid of a premise known by the natural light of reason. In this they agree with Suarez and Lugo. They differ, however, in stating that such conclusions may never become doctrine of faith, and consequently, the denial of these can never merit more than the censure of *error*.

ARTICLE VIII

Antonio de Panormo¹
1709 A. D.

The period which we have selected to investigate the different interpretations of the theological censures, ranges between the years 1563 and 1709. Both of these dates indicate great moments in the

censures, having understood the theological conclusion in this way, were much more logical than Suarez and Lugo, in stating that such conclusions can never become doctrine of faith.

This great problem of the theological conclusion is still an open question even to-day. The doctrine of the Salmanticenses has many partisans, and in recent times its greatest upholder was Fr. R. SCHULTES O. P., in his famous book, *Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum*. (Parisii, 1922.)

¹ Cf. HURTER, N. L., t. 4, p. 684. — QUILLET, DTC, t. 2, col. 2113. — TEETAERT, DTC, t. 14, col. 1987.

development of doctrine on the censures. In 1563, Cano's *De Locis Theologicis* was first published at Salamanca, and in 1709, Antonio de Panormo's *Scrutinium* was published at Rome.

Antoninus Sessa, or as he is more commonly called, Antonio de Panormo, was a Franciscan friar and professor of theology at Rome at the beginning of the eighteenth century. He worked for many congregations of the Holy See, and was one of the theologians appointed to examine and censure the different works of Quesnel, from which a hundred and one propositions were selected and finally condemned in 1713 A. D.¹

It was Panormo's work, *Scrutinium doctrinarum qualificandis assertionibus thesibusque atque libris conducentium*, which earned for him a place in the history of theology. In this book, he examines sixty-nine theological censures, and makes a thorough examination of each one.

Before Panormo, the theological censures were usually treated in connection with the virtue of faith. When the theologians came to consider heresy, they would often consider the problem of the lesser censures. Now, however, we see Antonio de Panormo devoting this entire work solely to the consideration of these censures. To the best of our knowledge, this was the first time any exclusive study was made with regard to this problem.

Writing at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Panormo had many advantages over his predecessors. He had access to the works of other theologians who had been trying to find suitable explanations of these censures for over a period of two hundred years. Likewise, from the official condemnations of the Church there was more evidence at hand. In 1690 A. D., two propositions were specifically condemned by the Holy Office. The second one of these was condemned as erroneous, so this afforded a concrete example of an erroneous proposition². In the same year, thirty-one propositions of the Jansenists were condemned, and in this condemnation the censure *haeresi proxima*, among others, was officially used for the first time by the Church³. Then in 1699 A. D., twenty-three propositions of Fénelon were condem-

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8.

² *Ibid.*, no. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 6.

ned¹. All this extra guidance from the Church was a great advantage to Panormo. We shall now see if he made full use of it in his interpretation of the censure of *error*.

A. The erroneous proposition is opposed to mediate revelation

When we come to consider the doctrine of Antonio de Panormo on the erroneous proposition, we are not surprised to find him correlating it to mediate revelation. Ever since we examined the doctrine of Banez on this point, we have seen this interpretation becoming more popular among the theologians. Panormo now canonizes this theory.

He begins his exposition of the censure of *error* by asking if the erroneous proposition is constituted by mediate opposition to revealed truth? His answer is in the affirmative, and he states that this is the common opinion of theologians. The erroneous proposition is in opposition to doctrine which is contained in revelation, *in terminis illative aequipollentibus*. In other words, that which is denied differs from the revealed object only in so far as it does not imply *the same formal signification*. This other signification, however, is essentially connected with revelation².

In chapter five of his *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, where Panormo treats *ex professo* of the censure of *error*, he does not go into further detail about mediate revelation or the theological conclusion. The reason for this omission is that he has already treated fully of this matter earlier in his book. In order to have a clear knowledge of his doctrine on virtual revelation, we shall first of all go back and consider his earlier exposition of this point. So far, we have seen that while many theologians held that the erroneous proposition is in opposition to mediate or virtual revelation, not all of them were of the same mind as to the nature of virtual revelation.

¹ Ibid., no. 7.

² Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 5, art. 4, Romae (1709), p. 318 "Affirmative respondendum censemus cum theologorum communi, quorum aliquos recenset et sequitur Cardinalis De Lugo, cohaerenter ad ea, quae dicta sunt cap. 3, art. 5, ad excludendam a nota haeresis propositionem oppositam alteri contentae in sacris paginis in terminis illative aequipollentibus, idest non importantibus idem formale significatum cum objecto revelato, sed aliud cum illo essentialiter connexum, adeo ut ad convertentiam valeat illatio, sive a priori ea fit, sive a posteriori."

For Panormo, conclusions which are deduced by means of two premises of faith do not constitute virtual or mediate revelation. Such conclusions, considered in themselves, are immediately revealed, and their denial may be censured as heresy¹. True virtual revelation, therefore, and the strict theological conclusion, is that which is deduced by means of one premise of faith and another known by the natural light of reason. In this, Panormo is in agreement with Suarez, Lugo and the Salmanticenses.

We have seen that Panormo opens his exposition of the censure of *error* by stating that the erroneous proposition is in opposition to mediate revelation. He describes mediate revelation as that which is contained in the deposit of faith *in terminis illative aequipollentibus*. By considering his doctrine on virtual revelation, we now hope to get more precise knowledge as to what is intended by these words.

A proposition is said to be *aequivalens illative* in respect of another proposition, when it has a *different formal signification*, and yet the objects enunciated by both propositions are identified *in re*. In other words, both propositions express different concepts, and yet the objects enunciated and represented in the concepts are ontologically identified².

Terms which are formally equivalent (*formaliter aequipollentes*) are those which express the same concept, and differ only in words or

¹ Ibid., cap. 3, art. 19, p. 257. "Parum in resolutione huius quaestionis immorandum nobis est, quia nullam fere discrepantiam agnoscimus a posteriori parte asserti articuli praecedentis propugnata, ut propterea dicendum putemus propositionem oppositam alteri deductae ex praemissis revelatis esse quidem haereticam specificative sumptam, minime vero, si consideretur sub reduplicazione illa, qua propositio deducta et illata consideretur *ut talis*. Et ratio est eadem, ob quam propositio deducta, sic inspecta, non est de fide, utpote cui assensum praebemus, non praecise propter divinam Veritatem dicentem, sed etiam propter connexionem conclusionis cum praemissis lumine naturali cognitam, quam mixtionem excludit fides."

² Ibid., cap. 3, art. 5, no. 2, p. 129. "Dicitur itaque propositio aequivalens illative, ea quae non eundem cum altera exprimit formaliter objectivum conceptum significatum, sed aliud formaliter diversum; quia vero res, aut formalitas per eam, seu verius per eius terminos importata, realem importat identitatem cum re, aut formalitate, seu cum significato alterius, inde sequitur ex hac illam inferri posse, et vice versa, et eatenus illative aequivalentiae denominationem assumit. Cuiusmodi ad invicem se habent essentiae et proprietates rerum, quae reciprocam suscipiunt illationem, hoc discrimine, quod ex essentia ad proprietates illatio est a priori, et tamquam a quasi-causa ad quasi-effectum; a proprietatibus vero ad essentiam, illatio est a posteriori, et veluti a quasi-effectu ad suam quasi-causam."

in the manner of expressing the same formal signification, (*idem formale significatum*). For example, the terms 'homo' and 'animal rationale' convey the same idea, and both of these words may be used indiscriminately to mean the same thing¹.

On the other hand, terms which are merely virtually the same (*illative tantummodo aequipollentes*), convey different concepts. In spite of the fact that objects enunciated by these terms are ontologically identified, they differ in their formal signification, and consequently, they cannot be used indiscriminately. It is true, for example, that the essence of man is ontologically identified with the metaphysical property of *risibilitas*. Yet, the proposition which states "*risibilitas est hominis essentia*", is false².

This description which Panormo gives of mediate or virtual revelation is of paramount importance. It is clear from the foregoing that he considers virtual revelation to be in respect of metaphysical properties which are ontologically identified with the revealed essence. We have already considered the idea of virtual revelation according to the doctrine of Suarez, Lugo and the Salmanticenses, and have seen that these theologians were more concerned with the physical properties, placing the metaphysical properties of the revealed object within the pale of immediate revelation.

According to the theory of Fr. Marin-Sola, the traditional Thomistic view on virtual revelation held that it was in respect of the metaphysical properties of the revealed object. Accordingly, the true theological conclusion expressed an object which differed only conceptually from revelation, since it was ontologically identified with it. When the theological conclusion was understood in this way, Fr. Marin-Sola says, there was no difficulty in explaining the homogeneous evolution of dogma and the fact that such conclusions have been defined by

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 4.

² *Ibid.*, no 5, p. 130. "Non sic, cum termini sunt illative tantummodo aequipollentes; non enim in his diversitas est, vel in solis vocibus, vel in modo significandi idem formale significatum, sed in ipsa re significata, quae etsi pro statu reali identico sit eadem, non tamen, ut formaliter per dictos terminos designata. Unde sicuti licet in se essentia sit eadem cum proprietatibus, adhuc tamen non potest dici: risibilitas, e. g. est hominis essentia, ad eum modum quo dicitur de rationalitate; ita ex identitate eadem non valeat enuntiari, ut eodem modo, ac immediate sit revelata risibilitas, etiam ex hypothesi quod sit immediate revelata rationalitas."

the Church. All the confusion and difficulty began when Suarez first limited virtual revelation and the theological conclusion to mere physical properties of the revealed essence. This presented insurmountable difficulties in explaining the transition of the theological conclusion to doctrine of faith. Both Suarez and Lugo put forward theories to explain this transition, but these proved inadequate. The Salmanticenses understood virtual revelation in the same manner as the Jesuit theologians, but were more logical in denying the possibility of the theological conclusion becoming doctrine of faith¹.

We are not concerned here with Fr. Marin-Sola's theory about the traditional Thomistic view regarding virtual revelation, nor with his explanation of the homogeneous evolution of dogma. But we note as a point of interest, that the explanation which we have seen Panormo give of virtual revelation is exactly the same as that which Fr. Marin-Sola holds to be the traditional Thomistic view. It will be interesting to see, therefore, if Panormo goes so far as to hold that the theological conclusion may become doctrine of faith. If he does, then his doctrine is in perfect accord with Fr. Marin-Sola's theories regarding the nature of virtual revelation and the problem of the homogeneous evolution of dogma².

In spite of the fact that Panormo holds that virtual revelation is in respect of metaphysical properties, he denies that the theological conclusion may be defined as of faith. He notes the opinion of Suarez and others who hold for this possibility, but rejects it on the grounds that the Church cannot augment the deposit of faith, but merely declares that which is already revealed³. If the Church were to define such a theological conclusion, he states, even then, its denial could never merit more than the censure of *error*. If, however, the infallibility of the Church in making such a definition were denied, then there would be question of formal heresy⁴.

¹ Cf. *supra* p. 59, notes 1, 2.

² MARIN-SOLA does not consider the doctrine of Antonio de Panormo, in his book, *L'Evolution homogène du Dogme catholique*.

³ Cf. PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 3, art. 5, no. 20, p. 134. "Cum enim Ecclesia non habet auctoritatem condendi novos fidei articulos, novaque dogmata, sequitur ea solum posse ut talia declarare et consequenter proscribere tamquam haeretica, ipsis opposita, de quibus revelatio divina immediate est habita, nam si id faceret per novam revelationem, jam de novo conderet dogmata..."

⁴ *Ibid.*, cap. 3, art. 18, no. 4, p. 254. "Si Ecclesia definiret Christum esse risi-

After this consideration of Panormo's doctrine on virtual revelation, we are now in a better position to understand his interpretation of the erroneous proposition which he gives at the beginning of chapter five of his *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, where he treats *ex professo* of the censure of *error*. This will also serve as a key to understanding some other observations which he makes in this same chapter, and which we are now about to consider.

B. Are the censures of error and heresy mutually exclusive?

Each of the theological censures indicates a distinct grade of deviation from Catholic truth, or from its correct mode of expression. It is generally admitted that these censures may double up, so that several of them may be simultaneously applied to the one proposition, since the same proposition may be simultaneously found wanting in many respects. Suarez discusses this problem¹, and admits that these censures may be cumulatively applied to the same doctrine. He makes an exception, however, for the censures of *error* and heresy. He holds that these two censures are incompatible, because of the different type of opposition which each of them has to divine faith. In other words, a proposition cannot be simultaneously immediately and mediately opposed to faith. We recall that Suarez holds for a transition from mediate to immediate revelation, brought about by the Church defining a theological conclusion as being of faith. Logically, he must also hold for a similar transition between the erroneous and the heretical proposition. Panormo now considers this problem, and we shall presently see that he entirely departs from Suarez' opinion on this point.

According to Panormo, strict theological conclusions can never be defined as of faith by the Church. Consequently, he admits of no transition between the erroneous and the heretical proposition in this way. Mediate revelation can never become immediate revelation by

bilem praecise ex revelatione mediata virtuali et in causa, qua de fide est esse hominem, qui negaret Christum esse risibilem habendus foret erroneus; qui tamen negaret Ecclesiae infallibilitatem in dicta definitione condenda, formalissime haereticus; quia hic negaret fidei objectum immediate revelatum, quale putamus esse infallibilitatem Ecclesiae, ne dnm in rebus tamquam de fide habendis, definitis, sed et in ipsismet definitionibus rerum infra fidem tenendis."

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 19, sect. 2, no. 21.

the definition of the Church, and consequently, strict *error* can never become heresy.

Panormo admits of one possible mode of transition, however, and this is not a strict transit from *error* to heresy, but rather from implicit to explicit heresy. It often happens in the course of time that a particular doctrine passes from the state of implicit to explicit revelation. This is a common occurrence in the life of the Church, when some dogmas are latent for centuries and then finally defined as of faith. Before such a definition, the doctrine in question could be regarded as a theological conclusion in connection with some other truth explicitly revealed. In circumstances such as these, its denial would merit the censure of *error*. After definition, however, when there is no longer any doubt about the revelation of the doctrine in question, then its denial would mean heresy. However, this transit from *error* to heresy is accidental in so far as the doctrine which is denied, both before and after the definition of the Church, is immediately revealed. There was never a transit from mediate to immediate revelation, nor from *error* to heresy, as such¹. This is the only transition between the erroneous proposition and heresy which Panormo will admit.

Unlike Suarez, Panormo holds that the censures of *error* and heresy are not incompatible, and a proposition may be simultaneously erroneous and heretical. He admits that there is no evidence of such a condemnation in the official decrees of the Church, and considers this problem merely as a possibility.

To prove this, Panormo takes two propositions; *Christus est homo*, and *Christus est risibilis*. The first is immediately revealed and of faith, while the second is a theological conclusion, evidently deduced from the first, and necessarily connected with it.

If the proposition which states *Christus est risibilis*, were immediately revealed by God, i. e. in such a way that the doctrine itself would be revealed but not its connection with Christ's humanity, then its denial

¹ Cf. PANORMO, op. cit., cap. 5, art. 5, p. 331. "Ex quo elucere innuimus transitum praedictum minime habitum, praecise per hoc, quod propositio relata ex erroneitate ad haeresis quidditatem, sed quod ab implicito et ignoto haeresis statu, in quo erat, ad explicitum et manifestum devenerit. Alias quantumvis erronea ea exstittisset, per nullam subsequentem definitionem evadere potuisset haeretica..."

could be censured as heretical and erroneous. It would be heretical, because immediate revelation is denied, and erroneous, because something *connected* with immediate revelation is denied. In other words, such a proposition would enjoy the certitude of faith and of theology, in so far as it may be considered as revealed or connected with revelation. Depending on either of these two points of view, the denial of that proposition may be censured as heretical or erroneous. It is important to note that in this hypothesis, even though the proposition *Christus est risibilis* is immediately revealed, its connection with *Christus est homo* is not revealed, and because of this, its denial may still be censured as erroneous¹.

We note once again that Panormo discusses this problem as a mere possibility. He explicitly states that these two censures have never been officially applied by the Church to the same proposition. In considering this problem, however, Panormo was not as far removed from reality as he thought. We can point to at least one condemnation where the censures of heresy and *error* have been applied to the same proposition. In the dogmatic constitution of Pope Urban V (28th Dec. 1368), three propositions of Dionysius Foullechat were condemned, and each one was specifically censured as "*falsa, erronea, haeretica*"².

C. The erroneous proposition in relation to heresy

All the theologians, excluding Panormo, we have considered so far unanimously held that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy. None of them, however, had ever seen the censure *haeresi*

¹ Ibid., no. 9, p. 333. "De fide est Christum esse hominem, non tamen ipsum esse risibilem, sed certum dumtaxat certitudine theologica, quod per evidentem illationem sequatur ex revelata humanitate, cum qua necessario connectitur. Revelet iam Deus Christum esse risibilem revelatione quae immediate afficiat risibilitatem, non quae afficiat connexionem risibilitatis cum humanitate; hoc casu, risibilitas esset quidem fidei objectum, considerata ut divinitus immediate revelata, non inde tamen, vel connexionem cum humanitate dependeret, vel haec redderetur immediate revelata, et proinde non obstante immediata risibilitatis revelatione adhuc risibilitas considerari posset, ut connexa cum humanitate, etiam immediate revelata, et proinde dici certa ex certitudine fidei ob immediatam sui revelationem, et certitudine theologica ob revelationem immediatam humanitatis. Quo posito, patet propositionem oppositam, et fore haeticam ob oppositionem immediatam cum risibilitatis revelatione, et erroneam, propter mediatam cum revelatione humanitatis."

² Cf. Dz 575-577.

proxima officially used by the Church. Panormo, on the contrary, was aware of the condemnation of the Jansenistic propositions which was issued by the Holy Office in 1690, in which this censure was applied¹.

In spite of the fact that Panormo had seen the censure *haeresi proxima* being officially applied by the Church, and that the name of this censure indicates proximity to heresy, he expressly states that mediate opposition to divine faith is the gravest after heresy. Consequently, the censure of *error* comes closer to heresy than any other². We shall discuss this doctrine at greater length when we come to consider *haeresi proxima*.

D. A proposition judged erroneous on extrinsic evidence

We have already noted that Panormo falls into line with the majority of theologians who wrote after Cano, in holding that the erroneous proposition is in opposition to mediate revelation or the theological conclusion. This agreement notwithstanding, he introduces a very important change even in this doctrine. Most of the other theologians, and especially Lugo, stipulated that the theological conclusion in question should be evidently deduced from a principle of faith with the aid of another premise known by the natural light of reason. In other words, the intrinsic connection between the theological conclusion and the truth of faith must be obvious.

Panormo thinks that this explanation restricts the erroneous proposition too much³. If this intrinsic connection is evident, then a denial of such a theological conclusion will certainly merit the censure of *error*. However, Panormo notes, there are many truths which are universally regarded by the theologians as being theological conclusions and yet have not this evident intrinsic connection with revelation. As an example, Panormo (writing in 1709) brings forward the doctrine of Our Lady's Immaculate Conception. This truth, he states, is universally

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

² Cf. PANORMO, op. cit., cap. 5, art. 4, no. 1, p. 319. "In huiusmodi siquidem propositionibus ex una parte non habetur ea immediata oppositio, quae satis sit ad eas tenendas tamquam haeticas; et ex altera extat repugnantia mediata, quae est gradus oppositionis immediatae proximior, et proinde constituens propositionem censura notandam, qualibet alia, haeresi magis affini, cuiusmodi non est nisi erronea."

³ Ibid., cap. 5, art. 4, no. 5, p. 320.

regarded as being a theological conclusion, deduced from the dogma of the divine maternity of Our Lady. The intrinsic connection between these two truths, however, is not evident, but this is made up for by extrinsic authority, i. e. the universal consensus of opinion among theologians.

According to Panormo, the denial of theological conclusions which depend on extrinsic authority for their connection with revelation, will also merit the censure of *error*. In the first category of theological conclusion, i. e. where the intrinsic connection with revelation is evident, the opinion of theologians is not necessary, and the proposition may be censured as erroneous without it. In the second category, however, the extrinsic authority of theologians is necessary to supplement the defect of intrinsic evidence¹.

Mediate opposition to revelation, therefore, may be had in two ways: firstly, when the truth which is denied is evidently connected with revelation, and secondly, when such evidence of the connection with revelation is not apparent, but nevertheless, the majority of theologians hold that the doctrine thus denied is, in fact, a theological conclusion².

This doctrine of Panormo very much enlarges the scope of the erroneous proposition. He brings forward a good argument to prove his point in saying that if the majority of theologians hold that such a doctrine is a theological conclusion and the contrary constitutes an erroneous proposition, they must be believed without hesitation. In matters of this nature, so intimately connected with faith, God would not allow the Church to be deceived³.

¹ Ibid., no. 6. "In secunda (hypothesi) vero, redditur necessarius dictus communis consensus, qui veluti sit suppletivus defectus evidentiæ mediatae connexionis inter objectum fidei et objectum cui contradicit propositio erroneitatis nota inurenda."

² Ibid. "... vel nempe quia aliqua propositio alteri opponitur, quae sit de objecto, quod evidenter lumine naturae constat connecti cum alio, quod est fide divina tenendum, ac divinitus revelatum. Vel deficienti huiusmodi evidentiæ, adhuc talis est dicta connexio ut ab omnibus theologis admittatur."

³ Ibid., no. 7, p. 321. "Quae connexio, etsi in se ipsa evidens non sit, et ex suis terminis nota, talis aequivalenter fit ab extrinseco, ex quo firmiter tenemus Deum non permissurum quod circa propositiones, quas vel amplecti obstringantur fideles tamquam de fide, aut fidei proximas et ad fidei munimen conducentes, vel eas rejicere, ut fidei noxias et adversantes, decipiantur a theologis; quoties hi unanimes omnes sint, sive in asserenda propositione aliqua tamquam de fide, aut fidei affini, sive in rejicienda alia tamquam haeretica, erronea, etc."

E. Examples of erroneous propositions

An outstanding feature of Antonio de Panormo's exposition of the censure of *error* is the concrete examples he gives to illustrate the erroneous proposition. Up to this, the only example of mediate opposition to revelation which we have seen, is the proposition which states: '*Christus non est visibilis*'. Now, however, we see Panormo considering more concrete examples, in so far as he examines propositions which were actually condemned by the Church. In his opinion, these are examples of *error*, so he shows how they are in mediate opposition to faith and in immediate opposition to a theological conclusion.

Panormo is not quite original in these examples, however. Most of them are taken from Laurentius Brancatus de Lauria O. Min. Conv., who also held that the erroneous proposition is in direct opposition to mediate revelation, and selected these examples to illustrate his doctrine¹. Panormo admits his indebtedness to de Lauria for these examples.

The first example considered is the third proposition of Huss, which was condemned with twenty-nine others *in globo* by the Council of Constance².

"Praesciti non sunt partes Ecclesiae, cum nulla pars eius finaliter excidet ab ea, eo quod praedestinationis caritas, quae ipsam ligat, non excidet."

In the opinion of both de Lauria and Panormo, this proposition merits the censure of *error*. Panormo makes the following analysis to show how it is in direct opposition to a theological conclusion.

¹ LAURENTIUS BRANCATUS DE LAURIA O. Min. conv. (1612-1693 A. D.) He wrote commentaries on the third and fourth books of the Sentences of John Duns Scotus, which were published at Rome between 1653 and 1682 A. D. For his exposition of the theological censures, cf. his *Commentaria in Tertium Librum Sententiarum Mag. Fr. Joannis Duns Scoti*, t. 3, pars 1, disput. 16, art. 2.

After discussing a number of opinions regarding the interpretation of the erroneous proposition, Lauria states his own doctrine as follows (cf. LAURIA, loc. cit., no. 30; Romae 1673, p. 853): "Melius ac facilius declaratur doctrina erronea, si dicatur esse illa, quae est contraria alicui propositioni deductae vel deductibili evidenter, ac theologice, ex argumento constante ex una de fide et alia naturaliter evidente." Immediately after this, he gives the examples which we have seen Panormo considering above.

² Cf. Dz 629.

"Omnis qui Christum induit per sacramenti regenerationis lavacrum, fit membrum Ecclesiae. (Major, which is of faith.)
Atqui praesciti revera Christum per Baptismum induerint, qui fuerit rite collatus, (Minor, a natural premise.)
Ergo, praesciti sunt membra Ecclesiae." (Theological conclusion.)

The second example is also taken from Huss and the same condemnation¹.

"Oboedientia ecclesiastica est oboedientia secundum adinventionem sacerdotum Ecclesiae praeter expressam auctoritatem Scripturae."

To show that this is a denial of a theological conclusion, Panormo constructs the following syllogism:

"Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit; et episcopi sunt tales potestates. Atqui, laici et minores sunt eis subditi, Ergo..."

He does not explicitly state the conclusion in this case, but it seems to be the proposition which states that the laity and minors must be subject to the bishops and ecclesiastical authority. This example is not as clear as the first.

The third example is the twenty-fourth proposition of Wyclif, which was condemned with forty four others *in globo* by the Council of Constance².

"Fratres tenentur per laborem manuum victum acquirere, et non per mendicitatem."

According to Panormo, this constitutes a denial of a theological conclusion which is deduced from faith as follows:

"Ut aliquis operam daret vitae perfectae, licitum est omnia dare pauperibus, et mendicare. (Of faith.)
Atqui fratres dant operam vitae perfectae. (Natural premise.)
Ergo licitum eis est omnia dare pauperibus et mendicare." (Theological conclusion.)

Thus far, Panormo has depended on de Lauria for these examples. The fourth and last example, however, is his own.

On the 24th of August, 1690 A. D., the Holy Office condemned two propositions³. The first, pertaining to the goodness of human acts, was condemned as heretical. The second, regarding the nature of the

¹ Ibid: 641.

² Ibid. 604.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 5.

so called "philosophical sin", was condemned as scandalous, temerarious, offensive to pious ears and erroneous. Unlike the other propositions which were condemned *in globo*, this condemnation afforded a perfect example of an erroneous proposition. Panormo now considers this as his fourth and last example¹.

"Peccatum philosophicum seu morale est actus humanus disconveniens naturae rationali et rectae rationi; theologicum vero et mortale est transgressio libera divinae legis. Philosophicum, quantumvis grave, in illo, qui Deum vel ignorat vel de Deo actu non cogitat, est grave peccatum, sed non est offensa Dei, neque peccatum mortale dissolvens amicitiam Dei, neque aeterna poena dignum."

In spite of the fact that this condemnation afforded a certain example of the censure of *error*, Panormo does not dwell on it for long, nor does he give the same analysis of this, as we have just seen him give of the other examples.

It is revealed doctrine, he states, that the eternal law of God is impressed on Man's mind, and represented by the dictates of reason. For this he quotes the authority of Sacred Scripture; '*Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui Domine*' (Ps. 4/7), and '*Gentes naturaliter ea quae legis sunt, faciunt*' (Rom. 2/14). It may be deduced from this, he states, that any sin against the dictates of reason, is also against the law of God. In other words, every philosophical sin must necessarily be a theological sin. This is all Panormo has to say about such an important condemnation. We note that he does not make a full syllogism to show how the theological conclusion is deduced, as he did for the other examples. However, if we consider just the two observations which he makes with regard to this condemnation, we can construct a hypothetical syllogism as follows:

If the eternal law of God is represented to man by the dictates of reason, then any sin against the dictates of reason is also against the law of God. (Major, a natural premise.)
But the eternal law of God is represented to man by the dictates of reason. (Minor, of faith.)
Therefore, any sin against the dictates of reason is also against the law of God. (Theological conclusion.)

In this syllogism we got the minor and conclusion from Panormo, and the major we supplied ourselves. It is rather surprising that he

¹ Cf. Dz 1290.

does not make more capital out of this example, especially since the proposition was specifically censured as erroneous. At the same time, however, we must admit that this example is not so straightforward as it appears at first sight. The concept of a purely philosophical sin presents great difficulties, especially when we consider that it is generally regarded as being an impossibility.

Just a year before the publication of Panormo's *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, another work written by Dominicus Viva S. J. was published at Naples, and had for a title *Damnatarum Thesium Theologica Trutina*¹. In this book, Viva examines the propositions which were condemned by Popes Alexander VII, Innocent IX, and Alexander VIII. He makes a thorough analysis of the proposition which Panormo gives as the fourth example, i. e. regarding the philosophical sin, and also explains how it is in opposition to mediate revelation². It is not

¹ Cf. AMANN, DTC, t. 15, col. 3144. *Damnatarum Thesium Theologica Trutina* was first published at Naples in 1708 A. D., and had many subsequent editions.

² Cf. DOMINICUS VIVA S. J., *Damnatarum Thesium Theologica Trutina*, pars. 3. Francofurti ad Moenum (1711), p. 9. et seqq. Viva explains how the condemned proposition is opposed to a theological conclusion, as follows (loc. cit. p. 10):

"Est autem erronea, utpote quae non immediate adversatur doctrinae revelatae, sed mediate; opponitur enim dumtaxat conclusioni theologicae erutae ex una praemissa de fide, et altera naturaliter cognita: de fide enim est, reum esse odii divini, ac gehennae, qui Deum offendit; naturaliter vero apertissime cognoscitur, ut mox explicabimus, Deum offendere, saltem tanquam supremum Legislatorem, qui advertit operationem quam ponit, esse disconvenientem naturae rationali, et rectae rationi, atque adeo a supremo Legislatore prohibitam (cum divinae prohibitionis veluti praeco sit dictamen rationis) etiam si tunc Deus ignoretur sub conceptu entis optimi, et a se, aut primae causae; aut de illo sub tali explicito conceptu actu non cogitetur. Vel saltem est lumine naturae notum dari Deum, illumque prohibere, quae rectae rationi adversantur, adeo ut in praesenti providentia moraliter contingere non possit, quod detur invincibilis Dei ignorantia, aut inadvertentia, dum peccatur. Est itaque conclusio theologica, quod peccatum philosophicum sit etiam theologicum, hoc est offensae Dei, dissolvens eius amicitiam, et poena aeterna dignum, saltem in praesenti providentia; ut proinde propositio opposita, quae hic proscribitur, sit erronea."

Further on, Viva explains the sense in which this proposition was condemned. (loc. cit., p. 23.) "... sensus enim proscriptionis huius thesis est universalis, ac si diceret, quaecumque ignorantia Dei sive vincibilis, sive invincibilis excusat a Dei offensa operantem contra rectam rationem; unde eius contradictoria (quae est vera) debet esse particularis, videlicet, aliqua Dei ignorantia, sive vincibilis, sive invincibilis non excusat ab offensa Dei..."

For a more recent consideration of this condemnation, cf. H. BEYLARD S. J., *Le péché philosophique*, Nouv. rev. théol. 62 (1935), p. 591 et seqq.; p. 673 et seqq.

surprising to find that Panormo makes no reference to Viva's work, because for all practical purposes the publication of these two books may be regarded as simultaneous.

We now come to conclude our examination of Panormo's doctrine on the erroneous proposition. We may sum up the salient points as follows.

1° He holds that the erroneous proposition is in direct opposition to mediate revelation or the theological conclusion. In this he agrees with the common opinion of theologians who wrote on this problem after Melchior Cano. Panormo is very explicit as to the nature of mediate or virtual revelation, and we noted as a point of interest that his doctrine in this matter is identical with that which Fr. Marin-Sola holds to be the traditional Thomistic view, at least before Suarez introduced his new theory.

2° For Panormo, a theological conclusion can never be defined as of faith. Consequently, he does not admit of a transition between the erroneous proposition and heresy. In this he departs from the doctrine of Cano, Banez, Suarez and Lugo, and agrees with the Salmanticenses.

3° He explains that in the course of time an erroneous proposition which is, in fact, latent heresy, may become explicit heresy. However, this is not a direct transit from *error* to heresy, as such.

4° He shows that the censures of *error* and heresy are not incompatible. Consequently, a proposition may be erroneous and heretical at the same time, but under two different aspects. In this he departs from the doctrine of Suarez.

5° Like his predecessors, Panormo holds that the erroneous proposition comes next to heresy, since mediate opposition to faith is the greatest after immediate opposition which heresy entails. Panormo had seen the censure *haeresi proxima* officially applied by the Church, and explained it as a separate censure. At the same time, however, he insisted that it comes after *error*.

6° A very important observation made by Panormo, and which we had not seen before, was that the true theological conclusion need not necessarily be evidently connected with divine faith. If the con-

sensus of opinion among theologians holds that a particular proposition is a theological conclusion connected with a certain revealed truth, then, according to Panormo, its denial will merit the censure of *error*. In this case, the weight of extrinsic authority supplements the defect of intrinsic evidence.

7^o We noticed that one of the main characteristics of Panormo's treatment of the censure of *error* was the concrete examples which he gave to illustrate the erroneous proposition. Up to this point, we had to be content with *Christus non est risibilis* as the only example of direct opposition to mediate revelation.

In short, Panormo endorsed the interpretation of *error* which was introduced by Banez and which later became commonly accepted among the theologians. However, while agreeing in substance with this, he clarified many points which were still rather vague, and in all, made a very worthy contribution towards the full explanation of the erroneous proposition.

ARTICLE IX

Recapitulation and Conclusion

Between the Council of Constance (1418) and the year 1563 when *De Locis Theologicis* was first published, theologians who tried to explain the censure of *error* were obviously battling with a great problem. The Council of Constance had used the term '*error*' or '*error in fide*' as a separate censure, and seemingly had distinguished it from heresy. This distinction had to be explained, and the difficulty was all the greater since error in matters of faith seemed to be synonymous with heresy.

In face of this difficulty, Turrecremata (1489) took the easy way out, and said that the term '*error*', as used by Constance, was to be taken in a generic sense, including heresy and every other form of deviation from Catholic truth. This was a very simple explanation, but avoided the difficulty. Why did Constance use this term and seemingly distinguish it from the other censures which were applied?

S. Antoninus (1477) distinguished the erroneous proposition from heresy, in so far as he held that *error* is constituted by a denial of revealed doctrine, which denial, however, is not notorious and does not imply subjective pertinacity which is necessary for the sin of heresy. This distinction was more subjective than objective, as if Constance judged Wyclif and Huss to have had heretical dispositions for some articles, and to have inculpably erred with regard to others.

Alphonsus de Castro (1547) was not satisfied with any of these explanations, and pointed out that the wording of the condemnation which was made by the Council of Constance seemed to indicate that a more objective distinction existed between the erroneous and the heretical propositions. He candidly admitted his own perplexity in trying to make an objective distinction between *error in fide* and heresy, since these terms seemed synonymous. With great misgivings he put forward his own explanation, stating it was at least as good as any other he had seen. At the same time, he made it clear that he was quite willing to abandon it in favour of any other explanation which would prove more suitable. This attitude of Castro is characteristic of all the theologians who wrote on the erroneous proposition before Melchior Cano. There was an air of uncertainty about every theory which was put forward. They were obviously groping in the dark, trying to distinguish two terms which seemed to mean the same thing.

The greatest contribution which Melchior Cano (1563) made towards establishing an explanation of the erroneous proposition, was his insistence on the fact that the term '*error*' may be regarded in a generic and specific sense. To show how this is possible, he made an analogy with the philosophical notions of *habitus* and *dispositio*. The Gordian knot was now cut, since it was clearly shown that *error in fide* need not necessarily mean heresy. According to this distinction of Cano, the term '*error*' may be applied to both heresy and the censure of *error*, preserving a specific distinction between the erroneous and the heretical propositions.

In his explanation of the erroneous proposition, i. e. understood as the second theological censure, Cano was absolutely original. He departed completely from any explanation which had been put forward before his time, and based his theory solely on the little evidence which the condemnations of Constance afforded. We have seen that he placed three theological notes corresponding to the censure of *error*. The

most important of these was the first, *doctrina catholica*. To make sure that the censure of *error* would be specifically distinguished from heresy, he explained *doctrina catholica* as being well outside the pale of revelation, but as Lugo and Suarez afterwards pointed out, he failed to distinguish it from the lesser censures, especially the temerarious and scandalous propositions. We have already put forward our own theory as to what influenced Cano in selecting this notion. It seems to us that he was misled by the words '*non catholici*', which were used in the condemnation of the articles of Wyclif. Cano interpreted these words as applying solely to the erroneous articles, but we have proved beyond doubt that this qualification applied to all the censured propositions. The second and third theological notes which Cano placed as corresponding to *error*, later became associated with the censure *haeresi proxima*. Cano had never seen *haeresi proxima* applied by the Church, nor did he mention it in his explanation of the theological censures.

Cano's interpretation of the erroneous proposition did not enjoy popularity for long. Nevertheless, when his doctrine on *doctrina catholica* was subsequently rejected, and when his explanation of the erroneous proposition had become of mere historical interest, his authority on the specific distinction between the heretical and erroneous propositions was always cited. This was Cano's greatest contribution towards a logical interpretation of the censure of *error*.

After Cano put forward his explanation of the erroneous proposition, later theologians had something definite to go on in their efforts to explain this censure. His opinion was afterwards discussed and analysed in almost every treatise which touched on the theological censures. Banez (1584) considered his doctrine and agreed with it. He made one important correction, however, in so far as he supplemented Cano's doctrine with yet another theological note, the theological conclusion. According to Banez, the denial of an undefined theological conclusion constitutes the greatest grade of *error*. Cano had entirely neglected the undefined theological conclusion in his distribution of the theological notes which correspond to the censures. Banez supplemented his doctrine by introducing this, and stated that the denial of an undefined theological conclusion constitutes the greatest degree of *error*. This supplement of Banez introduced a new era in the interpretation of the censure of *error*. From then onwards, the theological conclusion became more

and more associated with the erroneous proposition, until it was finally regarded as the only theological note corresponding to the censure.

Suarez (1621) held that the censure of *error* is merited by the denial of an undefined theological conclusion, and that alone. Mediate opposition to revelation, he stated, comes next to immediate opposition which heresy implies. Seeing that the censure of *error* occupies the next place to heresy, its theological note must be that which enjoys the greatest certainty after faith. That meant the undefined theological conclusion. This became the greatest argument of later theologians who wished to show that the erroneous proposition is intimately connected with the theological conclusion. We say, however, that Suarez was not at all certain about his explanation of *error*, and went so far as to say that the interpretation of Cano was probable.

Lugo (1646) was more emphatic than Suarez in associating the theological conclusion with the erroneous proposition. This interpretation was not merely probable, he stated, but the common doctrine. We noted that the most important contribution of Lugo's exposition of this censure was his examination of the doctrine of S. Antoninus, Castro and Cano. These three theologians offered the only dissonant explanations of the erroneous proposition. In our judgment, the critical analysis which Lugo made of each of these went a long way in establishing the theory of Banez and Suarez, that the censure of *error* is to be explained in relation to the theological conclusion.

The Salmanticenses (1679) took a very special attitude towards these censures, and set out to find the doctrine which was more widely received. They decided that the theory which associated the censure of *error* with the theological conclusion, constituted *the more common opinion* at the end of the seventeenth century. We noted that they would regard this interpretation as *the common opinion*, were it not for the dissenting views of S. Antoninus, Turrecremata, Castro and Cano.

The erroneous proposition was once again correlated to the theological conclusion in the exposition of Antonio de Panormo (1709), who had no scruples about calling this interpretation the common opinion. He made great capital of Suarez' argument, that mediate opposition to revelation comes next to the immediate opposition which heresy implies. Consequently, since *error* comes after heresy, it must be related to mediate or indirect opposition to faith, in other words, to the theological conclusion.

In spite of the fact that we have seen so many theologians holding that the censure of *error* concerns the denial of a theological conclusion, there were many accidental differences in the individual explanations. For instance, not all were of one mind as to what constituted virtual revelation, and consequently, the theological conclusion. Similarly, not all agreed as to whether such a theological conclusion can be defined and become doctrine of faith. In spite of these differences, however, they agreed that the erroneous proposition was in direct opposition to mediate revelation¹.

We have already noted that the Salmanticenses (1679) claimed this explanation to be *the more common opinion*. They would not go so far as to call it *the common opinion* because of the disagreement of some grave theologians. The correct interpretation of these theological censures is a matter which largely depends on authority. Consequently, when such great theologians as S. Antoninus, Turrecremata, Castro and Cano held contrary views, the Salmanticenses did not wish to call the theory which was later accepted, *the common opinion*. However, we have considered in detail the doctrine of each of these dissenting theologians, and we have seen the opinion of each one under critical scrutiny in later years. Strong and cogent arguments were brought against each of these dissenting views, so that we can now safely disregard them as being suitable explanations of the erroneous proposition.

Almost all the theologians who had other explanations for the erroneous proposition, rather than direct opposition to mediate reve-

¹ As already pointed out, direct opposition to mediate revelation is equivalent to indirect opposition to that which is immediately revealed. When one directly denies a theological conclusion (mediate revelation), an indirect denial of the premise of faith is necessitated. Consequently, it may be truly said that the censure of *error* concerns indirect denials of a dogma. This aspect of the censure leads us to another problem, viz the denial of a dogmatic fact. The denial of a dogmatic fact may necessitate an indirect denial of a dogma, e. g. if one were to deny the legitimacy of the election of Pope Pius XII, would not this necessitate an indirect denial of the dogma of the Assumption of Our Lady?

We refer to this difficulty without any intention of treating of it here, but only to point out an interesting problem which deserves investigation in its own right. Such an investigation, however, would presuppose an enquiry into the nature of dogmatic facts, their relationship to the theological conclusion, and the difference between their denial both before and after the Church has pronounced on them.

lation, were those who were pioneers in treating of the theological censures. They were labouring under a great disadvantage, in so far as they had very little evidence and authority to go on. However, once the erroneous proposition was related to the theological conclusion, this theory became more and more popular, and in fact, was the theory which eventually survived¹.

The underlying principle of this explanation is that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy, and concerns doctrine which

¹ Cf. CLAUDE MONTAIGNE, *De Censuris, seu de Notis Theologicis, et de Sensu Propositionum* (in Migne, T. C. C., t. 1, col. 1162). Note: this work of Montaigne was first published in 1732 A. D.

After discussing various opinions regarding the censure of *error*, Montaigne gives the following as the true doctrine. "Tandem, Banez, de Lugo, Suarez, Castro, Turianus, Panormo aliique communiter theologi censent propositionem erroneam formaliter constitui per oppositionem mediatam cum doctrina divinitus revelata, eamque esse definiunt quae opponitur veritati certae theologiae certitudine, id est, veritati quae non sit in se immediate revelata, sed ex uno fidei placito et altero naturali certo et evidenter eruitur. Unde sicut haeresis directe et immediate opponitur fidei, ita et error proprie ac theologice sumptus, directe et immediate adversatur conclusioni theologiae. Arridet haec sententia."

The main proof which Montaigne gives for this opinion is as follows: "Pressius proponitur istud ratiocinium: repugnantia mediatam veritati revelatae est gradus oppositionis immediatae proximior et proinde constituens propositionem censura notandam qualibet alia haeresi magis affini; porro non est propositio quae magis accedat ad haereticam quam erronea."

Cf. JOS. GAUTIER S. J., *Prodromus ad Theologiam Dogmatico-Scholasticam*, dissert. 2, cap. 2, art. 3, no. 3. Coloniae et Francofurti, (1756) p. 118. "Altera sententia eaque communior, ac verisimilior, quam tenent Suarez, etc. . . Propositionem erroneam specificè sumptam, dicunt, illam esse, quae directe et immediate opponitur conclusioni theologiae pure tali, sive illi veritati, quae esto non sit immediate revelata in seipsa, certo tamen et evidenter eruitur ex una non sit immediate revelata in seipsa, certo tamen et evidenter eruitur ex una praemissa de fide, et altera naturali, certa quoque ac evidenti. Quapropter erronea propositio habet oppositionem immediatam quidem cum conclusione theologiae pure tali: mediatam tamen cum doctrina divinitus immediate revelata."

Cf. GASPARE JUVENIN, *Institutiones Theologicae*, dissert. 5, q. 2, concl. 4. Antuerpiae (1759), p. 443. "Propositio erronea stricte sumpta, est ea, quae negat veritatem quam communis Ecclesiae consensus judicat esse mediate revelatam, quamvis Ecclesia id nondum expresse definierit."

Cf. CAMILLUS MAZZELLA S. J., *De Virtutibus Infusis*, disput. 2, art. 10, no. 531. Romae (1879), p. 279. "... videtur dicendum cum Suarez, propositionem erroneam dici illam quae directe et immediate opponitur alicui conclusioni theologiae certae, ac proinde indirecte et mediate fidei, quemadmodum fieret si e. g., aliquis negaret propositionem virtualiter contentam in doctrina explicite revelata, seu quae hanc consequitur, sensu jam supra explicato."

Cf. DE GROOT O. P., *Summa Apologetica*, q. 10, art. 5. Ratisbonae (1906), p. 381. "Erronea (propositio) dicitur, quae immediate opponitur veritati mediate

is in the next grade to heresy. It is true that in the majority of condemnations where these censures are listed, *error* is always enumerated after heresy. However, we cannot hold this to be a definite proof, since there are some official condemnations of the Church where this order is not observed. Nevertheless, we think that this fundamental principle is well established. Even though there were different opinions as to the interpretation of the erroneous proposition, all the theologians between S. Antoninus and Antonio de Panormo were unanimous in this one point, that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy, and concerns doctrine which is in the next grade to heresy.

revelatae seu conclusioni theologicae. Exempli gratia, haec propositio: *Christus non est visibilis*, dicitur erronea; eruitur enim ex praemissa de fide; *Christus est homo*, et ex praemissa lumine naturae nota: *homo est visibilis*."

- Cf. BILLOT S. J., *De Ecclesia Christi*, thesis XVII. Romae (1927), p. 413.

- Cf. GARRIGOU LAGRANGE O. P., *De Deo Uno*, q. 1, art. 2, dub. 4. Torino (1950), p. 46.

- Cf. SCHEEBEN, in *Katholik*... 11 (1867), p. 487 seq.

CHAPTER TWO

The Proposition which is 'Haeresi Proxima'

The censure *haeresi proxima* was not applied by the Church in its dogmatic condemnations until the year 1690, when the Holy Office condemned thirty-one propositions of the Jansenists¹. It is not surprising, therefore, that most of the earlier theologians whom we considered apropos of the censure of *error*, did not so much as mention *haeresi proxima* in their exposition of the theological censures. The first theologian of note who treated of this censure was Cardinal de Lugo, and even he had never seen it used in the official condemnations of the Church.

In spite of the fact Lugo is our first authority on the interpretation of the censure *haeresi proxima*, we wish to devote the first article of this chapter to the consideration of any references in the works of previous theologians either to the name or notion of this censure. After that, we shall examine the interpretation of Lugo in the second article, and finally, that of Antonio de Panormo in the third article.

ARTICLE I

Interpretations of 'Haeresi Proxima' before Lugo

A. Melchior Cano O. P. (1563)

We have already seen that Melchior Cano was the first outstanding theologian who gave adequate consideration to the problem of interpreting the theological censures. He did not treat of *haeresi proxima*,

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.