

however, nor did he consider it as a separate censure. This is not surprising, since the Council of Constance, which was his guide in these matters, had made no mention of it. S. Antoninus, Turrecremata and Castro did not so much as once use the words '*haeresi proxima*' in their treatment of the theological censures.

Even though Cano did not consider *haeresi proxima* as a special theological censure, there are two references in his exposition of the erroneous proposition which we wish to examine. In the first case, he uses the words '*haeresi proxima*' with regard to articles which are erroneous. In the second case, he treats of a notion which in later years became associated with *haeresi proxima*, considered as a separate and distinct censure.

Having explained the notion of *doctrina catholica* as the first theological note corresponding to the censure of *error*, Cano states that propositions which are in opposition to this, even though not heretical, are nevertheless in the next grade to heresy, i. e. *haeresi proxima*. His exact words are as follows¹:

"Quae igitur propositiones huius posterioris generis veritatibus contradicent, (i. e. doctrina catholica) eas equidem erroneas appello; quae quoniam doctrinae catholicae adversantur, errores sunt haeresi proximi, haereses non sunt."

This is the only use of the words '*haeresi proximi*' which we find in all Cano's exposition of the theological censures. In our opinion, it is impossible to argue from this reference that for Cano, the censures of *error* and *haeresi proxima* are identified. It is clear from the context that all he wished to say was that the erroneous proposition comes immediately after heresy, and that the words *haeresi proximi* are used in a purely material sense, without any reference to a theological censure which could be named as such.

We recall that Cano, when explaining the censure of *error*, placed three theological notes corresponding to the erroneous proposition. Lugo rejected the second and third, on the grounds that they pertain to the censure *haeresi proxima* rather than to *error*. We shall now examine these two notions of Cano in detail.

According to Cano, the second grade of *error* obtains when truths generally regarded as being of faith by the theologians are denied.

¹ Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. XII, cap. 9, in T. C. C., t. 1, col. 616.

Such truths, however, are not defined by the Church, neither have they been proved to be of faith by any certain argument. Cano's exact words in describing this notion are as follows¹:

"Est et propositionis erroneae alius item gradus. Quum enim veritas aliqua, sapientum quidem opinione vehementi, fidei veritas est, sed non est plane ab Ecclesia definita, nec certo argumento demonstrata; tunc veritati illi adversari non est haereticum, sed erroneum."

From this we gather that the doctrine which is denied is regarded as being of faith by all grave theologians. The use of the word "*sapientum*" seems to indicate that the theologians in question enjoy more than ordinary authority. We note that he does not expressly allow for any exception among these *sapientes*. Furthermore, the use of the words "*opinionem vehementem*" indicates the strength of the opinion. Cano states that doctrine of this nature may, in fact, pertain to faith. However, its denial cannot be censured as heretical, because of the lack of absolute certainty. Nevertheless, this lack of certainty will not excuse from grave sin².

The third grade of *error*, as understood by Cano differs very little from the second. In this case the doctrine which is denied is definitely of faith, and the doubt is with regard to the opposition between the two propositions. In other words, there is no absolute certainty that the censurable proposition is *opposed* to the doctrine which is of faith³.

Both of these notions which Cano puts forward to explain the second and third grades of *error* are very similar. In either case, the great weight of authority holds that the opposing proposition is heretical. However, this censure cannot be applied because there is not absolute certainty, either with regard to the opposed proposition being of faith, or concerning the contrary proposition being in opposition to what is certainly of faith. Both of these ideas, though very

¹ Ibid., col. 617.

² Ibid. "Ita licet veritas illa ad fidem suapte natura pertineat, quia tamen nec hoc certum nec expeditum est, haeretica pertinacia abest, error gravis et periculosus non abest."

³ Ibid. "Similiter et propositio erronea tertio quidam gradu vocari potest, quae certae veritati catholicae fidei adversatur, non manifeste quidem, sed sapientum omnium longe probabili ac ferme necessaria sententia. Eius quippe erratum gravis est, qui hoc defendit contumaciter, quod viri omnes docti sentiunt periculum grande catholicae fidei conflare."

similar to each other, are completely different from what Cano holds to be the first grade of *error*.

No theologian before Cano had ever placed more than one degree of erroneous propositions. Cano gave no reason why he placed three grades, but merely stated his doctrine without citing any authority. In our opinion, it was necessary for Cano to invent a second and third grade of *error*, because he was not aware of *haeresi proxima*, considered as a distinct censure. These extra notions which he included under *error*, were far too serious to be placed in the category of *haeresim sapiens*, which is the next censure after *error* of which Cano treats. Consequently, he placed them all under *error*, and to avoid confusion, invented three separate grades of this censure.

We may sum up our investigation of Cano's doctrine by saying that while he was ignorant of *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, he applied this terminology to the first grade of erroneous propositions. What he included under the second and third grades of *error*, later became associated with *haeresi proxima*, considered as a separate and distinct censure.

B. Petrus de Lorca O. Cist. (1614)

Petrus de Lorca is the first theologian we have seen to consider *haeresi proxima* as a separate and distinct censure. There was no evidence in any of the condemnations of the Church to guide him in this, because, as we have already stated, this censure was officially applied by the Church for the first time in the year 1690. From this point of view, therefore, we may consider Lorca's invention as a considerable advance. However, from another point of view, as we shall presently see, his doctrine in this matter only added to the confusion which already existed.

When explaining the censure *haeresim sapiens*¹, Lorca states that in this category the denial of a theological conclusion, deduced by

¹ Cf. PETRUS DE LORCA, *Commentaria et Disputationes in Secundam Secundae Divi Thomae*, disput. 40, no. 10. Matrini (1614), p. 261. "Ad hoc genus reduci possunt propositiones illae, quae adversantur conclusionibus ex principiis fidei deductis, sive deducantur ex una de fide et altera naturali, sive ex utraque de fide... Sed quamvis huiuscemodi assertiones quae adversantur conclusionibus, sapientes haeresim appellari possunt, aliam quoque censuram habent, quam statim exponam."

means of a principle of faith and another principle known by the natural light of reason, may also be included. Such a denial is at least *haeresim sapiens*. Nevertheless, he states, there is a separate censure to cope with this form of deviation from theological orthodoxy, which he hopes to explain later on. Soon afterwards, we find Lorca treating of *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure which has the theological conclusion for its theological note¹.

Lorca's reason for placing the theological conclusion in connection with *haeresi proxima* is that such conclusions enjoy the next grade of certainty to that of faith. Consequently, their denial merits the next censure to heresy, which is *haeresi proxima*, as is evident from the name. It is interesting to note that in spite of all this, Lorca does not hold that *haeresi proxima* is a graver censure than *error*. When the majority of theologians after Banez began to hold that the censure of *error* is merited by the denial of a theological conclusion, Lorca did not fall into line. He held out for the old explanation of S. Antoninus, in stating that the erroneous proposition is, in fact, heresy, and differs from it only in so far as it is not *manifest* heresy. Consequently, when Lorca states that the censure *haeresi proxima* is merited by the denial of a theological conclusion which enjoys the next grade of certainty after faith, he does not depart from the common opinion of all the theologians who wrote before him, and who held that *error* is more intimately connected with heresy than any other censure. For Lorca, the erroneous proposition is heresy, provided, however, that such heresy is not notorious.

Considering the conclusions which we reached in our first chapter regarding the censure of *error*, we must consider Lorca's explanation of *haeresi proxima* as devoid of all probability. The same theological note cannot correspond to two theological censures which are specifically distinct.

¹ Ibid., no. 11. "Dixi, aliam esse censuram quae proprie convenit assertionibus quae contrariae sunt veritatibus ex principiis fidei proxima et necessaria conclusionem illatis; quia nimirum huiuscemodi assertiones proximae haeresi, vel errori, suo iure appellari debent, quia veritates propositae proxime ad certitudinem fidei accedunt. Nec video quibus aliis haec censura convenienter aptari possit, servata vocum proprietate."

C. Franciscus Suarez S. J. (1621)

Like Cano, Suarez does not treat of *haeresi proxima* as a separate theological censure. However, in an isolated passage of his exposition, he mentions the term in passing. We now wish to examine this reference, and find out if it is accidental or by design.

When explaining the censure *haeresim sapiens*, Suarez wished to show that this term may be taken in a specific or generic sense. Understood in the former manner, the term applies to one theological censure which is specifically distinct from all others. Understood in a generic fashion, however, this term comprises all propositions which, though not being heretical, point to heresy in any way. In this broad sense even the erroneous proposition may be called *haeresim sapiens*, and in fact is more so than the censure which is specifically termed as such, because the denial of a theological conclusion contains the *sapor haeresis* in the greatest degree. Because of this, Suarez adds, the erroneous proposition may be called *haeresi proxima*¹.

From this isolated reference we cannot say that Suarez identifies the censures *error* and *haeresi proxima*. It seems obvious that the words here used by Suarez are to be taken in a material sense, i. e. not indicating any specific censure. It is quite true to say that the erroneous proposition is *haeresi proxima*, just as it is true to call it *haeresim sapiens*. However, this does not rule out the possibility of another censure specifically termed *haeresi proxima* and distinguished from *error*, just as the fact that the erroneous proposition may be called *haeresim sapiens* does not rule out the possibility of a lower censure which is specifically termed as such. In short, Suarez' use of the words '*haeresi proxima*' in this text is to be taken in a very broad sense, and has no reference to the censure which is so termed and of which Suarez did not treat.

It is interesting to note that all these references which we have considered in the writings of Cano, Lorca and Suarez tend to confuse

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 9, sect. 11, no. 16. "Tamen in hoc sapore, ut sic dicam, possunt esse gradus, et in propositione erronea est in summo, et ideo potius dicenda est proxima haeresi; potest autem esse alia propositio magnam quidem speciem haeresis habens, in minori tamen gradu, et haec recte dicitur sapiens haeresim, applicando nomen generis ad inferiorem seu minus gravem speciem."

haeresi proxima with the erroneous proposition. Once again we note that none of them had seen this censure in any official condemnation of the Church, and neither Cano nor Suarez even suggested the existence of a separate censure called *haeresi proxima*.

Such inaccurate use of the term *haeresi proxima* led to considerable confusion in later years. A number of subsequent writers either identified the censures *haeresi proxima* and *error*, or did not sufficiently distinguish them, and the reason for this confusion was the authority of the three theologians whom we have mentioned above.

To take one example, let us consider the interpretation of *error* which is given by Cardinal Gotti O. P. (1664-1742). We hope to show that this eminent theologian was misled by Cano into thinking that the censures of *error* and *haeresi proxima* are identified.

The first tome of Gotti's *Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica*, in which he treats of the theological censures, was published in 1727 A. D. We may assume, therefore, that he was aware of the condemnation of the thirty one Jansenistic propositions by the Holy Office in 1690 A. D.¹ In this condemnation, the censure *haeresi proxima* was explicitly distinguished from *error*.

According to Gotti, the erroneous proposition is that which is in opposition either to doctrine which the Fathers and theologians commonly hold to be of faith but which is not defined by the Church, or to an undefined theological conclusion². As an example of such an undefined theological conclusion, he gives the old favourite, *Christus est risivus*. A denial of this, he states, will merit the censure of *error* and *haeresi proxima*³.

There is no doubt but that Gotti was misled by Cano into this position. Immediately after his statement of doctrine which we have

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

² Cf. GOTTI O. P., *Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica*, t. 1, q. 1, dub. 4, no. 9. Bononiae (1727), p. 43. "Dico, propositionem erroneam in fide esse illam, quae opponitur veritati, seu doctrinae, quam unanimis SS. Patrum ac Doctorum consensus judicat esse revelatam, sed nondum per Ecclesiam definita est: vel illam, quae opponitur doctrinae non quidem per Ecclesiam definitae, aut formaliter et expresse revelatae, communiter tamen a Doctoribus per discursum necessario illatae ex revelatis."

³ Ibid., p. 44. "Qui ergo negaret Christum esse risivum, non esset quidem haereticus, quia non negaret veritatem expresse contentam in scriptura, vel definitam ab Ecclesia; esset tamen erroneus et haeresi proximus."

just examined, he quotes Cano as his authority, and once again identifies the censures *error* and *haeresi proxima*¹.

This is but one example of how later theologians were misled by such casual references as those we have examined in the writings of Cano, Lorca and Suarez, into identifying the censures of *error* and *haeresi proxima*, or not sufficiently distinguishing them. Unfortunately, there were others who were misled in the same way.

Once again we note that neither Cano, Lorca and Suarez intended to identify these censures. Lorca considered *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, but made sure that it was specifically distinct from what he understood to be the erroneous proposition. On the other hand, Cano and Suarez used the words '*haeresi proxima*' in a very broad sense, without suggesting that they may be used to name any particular theological censure.

ARTICLE II

Lugo's Interpretation of 'Haeresi Proxima'

A. Lugo's Interpretation (1646)

So far, though we have seen a number of references to *haeresi proxima*, the only theologian we have seen to consider it as a separate and distinct censure was Petrus de Lorca². In his estimation, it is incurred by the denial of a theological conclusion. Lugo, in his exposition of *haeresi proxima*³, considers this opinion at the outset, and rejects it on the grounds that it is commonly held by theologians that such a denial merits the censure of *error*. If, therefore, a distinction is to be placed between these two censures, another explanation and another theological note must be found for *haeresi proxima*.

According to Lugo, the proposition which is called *haeresi proxima* is constituted by opposition to doctrine which the majority hold to

¹ Ibid., no. 10. Gotti explains in detail the three grades of *error*, as understood by Cano. Apropos of the first grade of erroneous propositions, he states: "... quibus si quis contradicat, erroneus quidem erit, haeresisque proximus, sed nondum haerergo nostrae resolutioni non refragatur, sed eam extendit."

² Cf. supra, ch. 2, art. 1.

³ Cf. LUGO, de fide, disput. 20, sect. 3, no. 79-86.

be of faith. Doctrine of this nature, he states, is not certainly of faith. However, the majority regard it as being so, which makes it *probably of faith*, or *fidei proxima*¹.

This statement of doctrine which Lugo gives at the beginning of his exposition of the censure is rather vague. For instance, we may well ask what he means to convey by the *majority*, and again, what are we to understand by doctrine which is *probably of faith*? These points become clear as we follow Lugo's interpretation of *haeresi proxima*. However, we shall treat of them here, so that we may have a clear idea as to what constitutes this censure before we begin to compare it with others.

When Lugo states that the majority regard the opposed doctrine to be of faith, he means the majority of grave theologians. Furthermore, he says that they should have a solid argument as a basis for their opinion². It is interesting to note that Lugo requires the consensus of the *majority of grave theologians* and not simply the *majority of theologians*. This means that Lugo admits of some grave theologians dissenting from this view.

Likewise, he states that the doctrine opposed is *fidei proxima* or *probably of faith*, and consequently, the censurable proposition becomes *haeresi proxima* or *probable heresy*. Here the question presents itself; does Lugo hold that the opinion of the few grave dissenting theologians is a probable opinion? It seems that this is so, because elsewhere in his exposition of this censure, he states that a denial of doctrine which is *fidei proxima* cannot be censured as heretical, *because of the contrary probable opinion*³.

¹ Ibid., no. 79. "... hac censura comprehendi propositionem oppositam doctrinae, quae licet non omnino certo, est tamen probabiliter, et ut plerisque videtur, de fide: nam sicut illa propositio est fere, seu proxime de fide, quae plerisque apparet de fide, ita illa erit fere, vel proxime haeresis, quae plerisque apparet haeresis. Idem est de propositione illa, quae opponitur non certo sed plurium iudicio propositioni indubitatae de fide; nam sicut accedit ad oppositionem manifestam cum fide, ita accedit ad haeresim."

² Ibid., no. 81. "Illam ergo solam propositionem iudicarem haeresi proximam, quam non omnes plures tamen graves doctores et cum gravi fundamento dicunt esse haeticam."

³ Ibid., no. 80. "Saepe autem continget propositionem affirmantem esse veram, nam opinio probabilis aliquando, et saepe vera est: tunc ergo vere propositio illa erit haeretica, sed propter opinionem probabilem contrariam, non puto esse iudicandam in iudicio ultimo ut haeticam simpliciter, et sine addito, sed ut haeticam aliquorum iudicio, et simpliciter ut proximam haeresi."

From all this we may state Lugo's doctrine on *haeresi proxima* as follows. This censure is merited when that which the majority of grave theologians hold to be of faith is denied. Their opinion, founded on solid arguments, makes such doctrine *fidei proxima* or *probably of faith*. Consequently, the denial of such doctrine will merit the censure of *haeresi proxima* or *probable heresy*. The censure of heresy cannot be applied to such a denial, since the opposed doctrine is not certainly of faith, and since there is a probable opinion to the contrary, constituted by the dissenting view of some grave theologians.

Now we ask the crucial question with regard to Lugo's interpretation of this censure; is it ever licit to follow the probable opinion of some grave theologians who hold that the opposed doctrine is *not* of faith? If it is licit, then how can such an opinion be condemned as *haeresi proxima*? Here there is an obvious weakness in Lugo's explanation, and we shall not be surprised if he is later brought to task on this account.

When we examined Lugo's doctrine on the censure of *error*, we saw that he studied Cano's interpretation of this same censure, and rejected his notions of the second and third grades of erroneous propositions on the grounds that they pertain to *haeresi proxima* rather than to *error*. It is true that these notions which Cano places as corresponding to *error*, greatly resemble Lugo's interpretation of *haeresi proxima*. However, we note that Cano does not say that there are a few grave theologians dissenting whose opinion may be judged as probable. He makes no allowance for any theologians dissenting, but simply states; *sapientum quidem opinione vehementi, fidei veritas est, sed non est plane ab Ecclesia definita, nec certo argumento demonstrata*¹.

Having considered Lugo's basic interpretation of *haeresi proxima*, we shall now proceed to examine some very interesting points which he makes regarding this censure.

B. The censure of *haeresi proxima* is extrinsic to the condemned proposition

The different theological censures correspond to different forms of deviation from Catholic truth or sound doctrine. For instance, the heretical proposition is that which is in immediate opposition to faith,

¹ Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. 12, cap. 9, in T. C. C., t. 1, col. 617.

whereas the erroneous proposition is in mediate opposition to faith, since it entails the denial of a theological conclusion which necessitates an indirect or mediate denial of revelation. Likewise, the other theological censures indicate a special mode of departure from orthodoxy, which is intrinsic to the censurable proposition.

We have just seen that in Lugo's interpretation of *haeresi proxima*, he stated that the majority of grave theologians hold that the opposed doctrine is *of faith*. There is no question as to whether or not they hold if it is *fidei proxima*, but whether or not it is *of faith*.

According to Lugo's interpretation, there is no intrinsic mode of *haeresi proxima*, just as there is of *error* or of heresy. The doctrine in question is either heretical or not, just as the doctrine opposed is either of faith, or not. Considered intrinsically, the proposition which is censured as *haeresi proxima* may, in fact, be heretical.

The role which extrinsic authority plays in *haeresi proxima* gives it a peculiar characteristic which sets it apart from all the other theological censures. When doctrine which is *fidei proxima* is denied, it is not so much the objective truth which is taken into account, but the great weight of authority which holds that it is of faith. Consequently, when the censure *haeresi proxima* is applied, it does not concern so much the objective denial, but the almost unanimous opinion of grave theologians who hold that the opposed doctrine is of faith¹. In this way, *haeresi proxima* as understood by Lugo, differs from all the other theological censures. It does not affect the condemned proposition intrinsically, but extrinsically, in so far as it is judged to be opposed to what the great weight of authority holds to be of faith.

C. *Haeresi proxima* in comparison with the censure of *error*

The very name of this censure, *haeresi proxima*, seems to indicate that it comes closer to heresy than any other. Likewise, according to Lugo's explanation, the only thing which comes between a proposition which is *haeresi proxima* and absolute heresy is the opinion of some

¹ Cf. LUGO, loc. cit., no. 80. "... quae censura (i. e. haeresi proxima) ut supra notabam, non tam videtur intrinseca ipsi propositioni, quam extrinseca propter diversa doctorum judicia, quorum aliqui eam dicunt esse haeresim, alii negant, quam varietatem et controversiam significamus, dum dicimus esse proximam haeresi."

theologians who hold that the doctrine denied is not of faith. In spite of all this, however, we have seen that all the theologians we considered apropos of the censure of *error* held that it occupies the next place to heresy. Lugo now corroborates this opinion, and brings forward some arguments to show that even *haeresi proxima* occupies a lesser place in relation to heresy, than the erroneous proposition.

When a proposition is censured as *haeresi proxima*, it is quite true that in substance it may be heresy. However, there is no absolute certainty about this, and it is possible that the opinion of even the majority of theologians may be false in this respect. Consequently, *haeresi proxima* has a contingent rather than a necessary connection with heresy.

On the contrary, *error* entails a necessary connection with heresy. When a theological conclusion is denied, an indirect denial of the premise of faith is necessitated. The theological conclusion which is associated with the erroneous proposition is that which is *evidently* deduced from a principle of faith with the aid of another *evident* natural principle. Hence, when such a conclusion is denied, it is only because one of the premises or the consequence is denied. In this case, the natural premise and the consequence are evident. Therefore, the necessity arises of denying the premise of faith¹. We can best explain this with that very simple theological conclusion; *Christus est risibilis*, which is deduced as follows:

Omnis homo est risibilis.	(Natural and evident premise.)
Atqui Christus est homo.	(Principle of faith.)
Ergo, Christus est risibilis.	(Theological conclusion.)

Presupposing that there has been a denial of this theological con-

¹ Ibid., no. 83. "Credo, omnibus pensatis graviorem esse censuram erroris: nam qui dicitur haeresi proximus, solum significatur, quod in aliquorum opinione sit haereticus, quae tamen opinio falsa esse potest; et ideo non invenitur in eo necessaria connexio cum haeresi, sed contingens. Qui tamen negat conclusionem theologicam, deductam evidenter ex praemissa certa de fide, et ex alia praemissa evidenti lumine naturae, quae conclusio sine errore negari non potest, eo ipso invenitur habere necessitatem ad negandam praemissam de fide, quantum est ex parte objecti negati, quia praemissa evidens necessitat ad eam non negandam, et aliunde constat non posse conclusionem esse falsam, nisi una ex praemissis sit falsa: cum ergo illatio etiam sit evidens, et negari non possit, invenitur necessitas, quantum est ex parte objecti nisi ignorantia excuset, ad negandam praemissam de fide, quae sola potest libere negari."

clusion, we can argue to an indirect but necessary denial of faith as follows:

Christus non est risibilis
Sed omnis homo est risibilis,
Ergo, Christus non est homo.

It may be clearly seen from this that the denial of the theological conclusion necessitates an indirect denial of faith, unless crass ignorance of the natural premise or of the evident deduction intervenes.

In this way, Lugo shows that the erroneous proposition has a more certain and necessary connection with heresy than *haeresi proxima*, and consequently, constitutes a graver censure. Finally, Lugo points out that in the external forum, the obstinate avowal of an erroneous proposition gives a greater presumption of heresy than the proposition which is *haeresi proxima*. If one were to deny obstinately the theological conclusion, *Christus est risibilis*, in the external forum, one could be presumed as denying *Christus est homo*, which is of faith¹.

D. Errori proxima

Before concluding our examination of Lugo's exposition of *haeresi proxima*, we wish to point out that he applies the same principles to the theological conclusion, and gives us a new censure, *errori proxima*. In other words, if the majority of grave theologians hold a particular doctrine to be a theological conclusion, and yet there is not absolute certainty about this because of the dissension of some theologians who hold the contrary, then, according to Lugo, the denial of such doctrine would merit the censure *errori proxima*².

We can find no evidence of the use of this censure in any of the official condemnations of the Church. At the same time however, it must be admitted as a possible mode of deviation from Catholic truth. In the introduction to his exposition of the censures, Lugo claims that this idea of *errori proxima*, along with *suspecta de errore*, is original³. Certainly, this is the first time we have seen these censures mentioned. However, as we shall see later on, the notion

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid., no. 84.

³ Cf. Lugo, de fide, disput. 20, sect. 3, no. 72.

which Suarez places as corresponding to the censure *haeresim sapiens* is exactly the same as Lugo's explanation of *errori proxima*¹. We shall consider this more closely when dealing with the doctrine of both these theologians on *haeresim sapiens*. Lugo makes no mention of Suarez here when explaining *errori proxima*.

E. Conclusion

Lugo is the second theologian we have seen to consider and explain *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure. The first was Petrus de Lorca, but since his interpretation is in direct opposition to the conclusions we reached when considering the censure of *error*, we are forced to dismiss it as of little authority.

The notion which Lugo brought forward to explain *haeresi proxima* was not altogether new. We saw that a very similar idea was used by Cano to explain the second and third grades of erroneous propositions². There is this difference, however, between the two concepts; while Lugo allowed for a few grave theologians who hold that the opposed doctrine is *not* of faith and whose dissenting view constitutes a probable opinion, Cano made no such allowance. According to Cano, the weight of authority in this matter is so great, that it cannot be opposed without grave sin. It is difficult to see how Lugo admitted of a probable opinion being censurable as *haeresi proxima*.

Having understood *haeresi proxima* in this way, Lugo showed how extrinsic authority plays such an important role in this censure. It is in respect of this extrinsic authority that the censure is applied, since there is no intrinsic mode corresponding to *haeresi proxima*. A proposition which is censurable in this way is either heretical or not,

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 19, sect. 2, no. 16.

² When giving his explanation of *haeresi proxima*, Lugo cites the authority of two theologians, Hurtado, (de fide, disput. 18, parag. 17) and Coninck (de fide, disput. 18, no. 132). It seems, therefore, that Lugo was depending not only on Cano, for the notion which he used to explain *haeresi proxima*, but also on Hurtado and Coninck for the application of this notion to this particular censure. The authors here referred to are: Aegidius Coninck S. J. (1571-1633) and Petrus Hurtado de Mendoza S. J. († 1651). Unfortunately, we have been unable to check the references which Lugo gives to these theologians, so we cannot say to what extent he depends on them for his exposition of the censure *haeresi proxima*.

just as the corresponding theological note, *fidei proxima*, is, objectively speaking, either of faith or not.

One of the most interesting points we noted in Lugo's exposition of this censure was his comparison between *haeresi proxima* and *error*. We were not surprised to find him holding that the erroneous proposition is more serious than that which is *haeresi proxima*, because in examining the different opinions on the censure of *error*, we saw that all the theologians whom we considered were unanimous in holding that the erroneous proposition occupies the next place in gravity after heresy. However, Lugo made a special comparison between *error* and *haeresi proxima*, and brought forward arguments which we had not seen before.

Finally, we note once again that when Lugo wrote his exposition of the theological censures (1646), he had no guidance from the condemnations of the Church concerning *haeresi proxima*. As we have often pointed out, this censure was applied for the first time in 1690 A. D., when thirty one Jansenistic propositions were condemned. Lugo notes, however, that the Council of Constance (1418), in censuring the errors of Wyclif, stated that some of his articles were *notoriously heretical*. In Lugo's estimation, this meant that the articles in question were *certainly* heretical and unanimously held as such by theologians. In this way, Lugo states, the council distinguished between heresy and that which later became known as *haeresi proxima*¹.

After Lugo, our next authority on the theological censures is that of the Salmanticenses (1676). However, we look in vain through their exposition for even a mention of the words '*haeresi proxima*'². The first explanation of their silence which comes to our mind is the special attitude which they take towards interpreting these censures. When examining their doctrine on *error* we noted that they set out to find the common opinion, or at least the interpretation which was more widely received, with regard to each censure. We have already seen that the censure *haeresi proxima* was treated only by very few theologians, and it was not officially used by the Church until 1690 A. D., several years after the Salmanticenses had written their exposition of the censures. Consequently, the first explanation of their silence

¹ Cf. LUGO, loc. cit., no. 80.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 9, dub. 4, no. 43 et seqq.

which suggests itself to us is that they judged this censure to be lacking sufficient authority, and omitted it altogether.

However plausible this explanation may seem at first sight, there is one argument against it. The Salmanticenses explained *errori proxima*, which had even less authority than *haeresi proxima*. The only other explanation of their silence we can think of is that they identified this censure with *error*. It is very probable that they were misled into this position by the references we have considered in the first part of this chapter.

ARTICLE III

Panormo Corrects the Interpretation of Lugo
1709 A. D.

After Lugo, our next authority on *haeresi proxima* is Antonio de Panormo (1709). In the period intervening between these two theologians, this censure was for the first time officially applied by the Church¹. Consequently, Panormo could never have been in doubt as to whether or not *haeresi proxima* was a distinct censure.

The only opinion which Panormo considers in his exposition of this censure, is that of Lugo. It seems, therefore, that no advance had been made on this in the intervening years. As we shall presently see, Panormo does not supplant Lugo's doctrine in this matter. He retains the fundamental notion, but excludes all the weak points which we have already pointed out in our own examination of his doctrine. We shall now consider Panormo's corrections in detail.

A. Probable heresy, as distinct from *haeresi proxima*

The main objection which Panormo has against Lugo's interpretation of this censure is that it represents *probable heresy* rather than *haeresi proxima*. We have already pointed out that for Lugo, doctrine is said to be *fidei proxima* when the majority of grave theologians hold it to be of faith. He admits of some grave theologians dissenting, whose

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

view constitutes a probable opinion to the contrary. It follows from this that the opposite opinion is also in the realm of probability. It was this consideration which induced Panormo to correct Lugo's interpretation of this censure. It is an explanation of probable heresy rather than *haeresi proxima*¹.

The notion of *probable heresy* does not indicate a theological censure, but represents a private judgment without any intention to censure those who hold such dubious doctrine. On the contrary, when *haeresi proxima* is applied, an opinion is *condemned*. Furthermore, Panormo points out, opinions which are probable are never censured by the Church. Consequently, when a proposition is condemned as *haeresi proxima*, we may take it for granted that it is devoid of all probability². In this way, Panormo rejects Lugo's interpretation of *haeresi proxima*. He concentrates on the weakness of the argument which allowed of a few dissenting grave theologians, and shows that Lugo identified *haeresi proxima* with *probable heresy*, two very distinct concepts. After this, Panormo proceeds to give his own interpretation of the censure, and we find that while retaining the basic notion of Lugo, he introduces a seemingly slight modification, which serves, however, to distinguish sufficiently *haeresi proxima* from *probable heresy*.

Like Lugo, Panormo also admits the possibility of some dissenting theologians who hold that the doctrine denied is not of faith. There is this great difference, however, that for Panormo these are not grave theologians, and their opinion in this matter is not to be considered as probable, since it is devoid of any solid theological foundation — *utpote nullo gravi motivo innixi, quod fundamentum esse valeat verae probabilitatis*. In this way, he greatly enhances the authority of the

¹ Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 6, art. 1, no. 14, p. 340.

² *Ibid.*, no. 15, p. 341. "Quoties enim dicitur *probabiliter* propositio haeretica, vel erronea, toties indicatur, non absoluta propositionis pravitas, sed privatum de pravitate iudicium, ex quo nulla in diversimode opinantes injuria, a qua difficillime liberari potest, qui absolute pronuncietur propositionem haeresi vel errori proximam. Quod adhuc clarius innotescet, si attendamus quod nota pro-xima haeresi pronunciata, ut vidimus, sit a Romanis Pontificibus, qui nunquam censura inurunt propositiones quae probabiles extant apud doctores, eas relin-quendo in sua probabilitate, quam habebant. Et proinde eo ipso, quod aliqua propositio haeresi proxima declaratur, omni prorsus necesse est probabilitate destitui, alias si in ea ulla probabilitas maneret, absolute haeresi proxima minime declararetur. Cum vero hinc inde est doctorum opinio, patet nullam ex opinionibus posse omni probabilitate destitutam, et idcirco nullam proximam haeresi."

doctrine which is denied, since all grave theologians hold it to be of faith, and the opinion of those who hold otherwise is not to be seriously considered. In spite of this great authority, however, the doctrine in question is not *certainly* of faith, but almost certainly so. There is still the slight shadow of doubt which is incompatible with divine faith, and which reduces the theological note from *de fide* to *fidei proxima*, and the corresponding censure from *haeretica* to *haeresi proxima*¹.

To illustrate this notion, and to distinguish it from heresy and probable heresy, Panormo considers three grades of certainty with which we may judge a proposition to be heretical or erroneous².

1^o When it may be clearly seen, without the least doubt, that the doctrine denied is either immediately or mediately revealed. Such certainty obtains when the doctrine in question is obviously contained in S. Scripture or in the definitions of the Church. In circumstances such as these, the denial may be censured as heretical or erroneous, as the case may be.

2^o When the majority of theologians hold the doctrine denied to be immediately or mediately revealed. In this case, there are a few dissenting theologians whose opinion, however, is devoid of all probability, since it has no solid theological foundation. In circumstances such as these, the denial of what is commonly held to be immediately or mediately revealed is to be censured as *haeresi proxima* and *errori proxima* respectively.

¹ Ibid., no. 17. "Relate itaque ad extrinsecam auctoritatem desumendam credimus quidditatem propositionis proximae haeresi, dummodo talis, ac tanta sit huiusmodi auctoritas, ut ob eam propositio, omnibus perpensis, ex communi theologorum mente habeatur haeretica, adeo ut si qui pro haeretica illam non tenent, attendendi non sint, utpote nullo gravi motivo innixi, quod fundamentum esse valeat verae probabilitatis. Cum hac moderatione, prae aliis placet opinio laudati Societatis Doctoris, (i. e. Lugo) qui per extrinsecam auctoritatem non ita distinguit proximam haeresi a reliquis censuris, ac si unice per illam constituatur. Requiritur namque fundamentum immediatae oppositionis propositionis huiusmodi cum revelata; sed quia, vel quod haec sit revelata, vel quod illa revera cum revelata opponatur, non est omnino certum, quae revelatam absolute fidei objectum reddat, et contrariam ipsi, absolute haeticam, sed fere certum id extet ob commune doctorum catholicorum iudicium ita putantium; et ideo, sicuti revelata dici potest proxima fidei, ita, et opposita proxima haeresi. Sicque discurrendum proportione servata de propositione proxima errori"

² Ibid., no. 18, p. 342.

3^o When there is a division amongst the theologians regarding the status of the doctrine which is denied, so that both opinions are probable. In this case, no censure is to be applied, but the denial of doctrine which is probably of faith, or probably a theological conclusion, may be justly called probable heresy, or probable *error*.

In spite of the fact that Panormo changes the concept of *haeresi proxima*, bringing it much closer to actual heresy, he agrees with Lugo in considering this censure as being less serious than *error*. For both of these theologians the argument is that the erroneous proposition entails a necessary connection with heresy, whereas the proposition which is *haeresi proxima* has a mere contingent connection with it. However, there is this difference, that while Lugo based this contingency on the probable opinion to the contrary, Panormo admits of no such probable opinion. He states that it is the contingency of mere possibility, of metaphysical non-repugnance. However slight this contingency may be, in Panormo's opinion it suffices to make *haeresi proxima* less serious than *error*, which has a necessary connection with heresy¹.

B. An alternative explanation

After correcting Lugo's notion of *haeresi proxima*, Panormo goes on to give an alternative explanation of this censure, which, in fact, differs very little from the first. In this second explanation, he brings *haeresi proxima* still closer to absolute heresy, and describes it as the interpretation which is safer in practice.

According to this alternative explanation, the proposition which is censurable as *haeresi proxima* is in the ultimate stage of being defined as heretical, in so far as all the necessary conditions are present. In this case, there is no longer any controversy or doubt, and all that

¹ Ibid. "Unde ulterius patet, quo sensu est verum, quod erroneitatis censura gravior sit proximae haeresi, quia negans conclusionem theologiam cogitur necessario negare et praemissam de fide; cum tamen sustinens propositionem haeresi proximam, possit non esse haeticus, ex quo opinio asserens illam propositionem haeticam, falsa esse queat, et proinde inter eam et haeresim, non sit necessaria haeticam, sed contigens, sumendo videlicet contingens pro contingenti, connexionio, sed contigens, sumendo videlicet contingens pro contingenti, contigens merae possibilitatis, seu verius, metaphysicae non repugnantiae, non vero pro contingencia verae et propriae probabilitatis."

is necessary is the formal declaration of the Church to make it an absolute heretical proposition. Panormo gives the following two examples to illustrate this notion: 1) when a general council, not yet approved by the Pope, condemns a proposition as heretical, and 2) when the unanimous opinion of the Fathers and theologians holds a proposition to be heretical¹.

This alternative explanation of Panormo goes so far in eliminating doubt and controversy from the concept of *haeresi proxima*, that it seems to identify this censure with heresy. Take, for instance, his second example given above with regard to the unanimous consent of the Fathers and theologians—does not this seem to constitute absolute heresy? Panormo, however, is aware of this difficulty, and sets out to show that this alternative explanation, while bringing *haeresi proxima* much closer to heresy, nevertheless leaves room for distinction between the two censures.

To meet this difficulty, he makes a distinction between the authentic and unauthentic heretical proposition. The former is that on which the rule of faith is quite explicit, in so far as it is evidently opposed to doctrine contained in S. Scripture, or to truth defined by the Church. With regard to the latter, i. e. the unauthentic heretical proposition, the rule of faith is not so explicit. Nevertheless, all the necessary conditions are present for it to be declared as heretical².

Both these types of heretical proposition have one element in common, immediate opposition to revelation. They differ with regard to the medium by which this immediate opposition becomes known to us. We know the authentic heretical proposition by an infallible

¹ Ibid., no. 19. "Potest et alio modo proxima haeresi explicari, qui forte expeditior videbitur et in praxi tutior, ut nempe ea propositio dicenda sit haeresi proxima, quae est in ultimo, vel fere ultimo constituta deffinibilitatis gradu, ut declaretur haeretica. Et huiusmodi esset propositio quae vel a concilio generali praecisa Romani Pontificis approbatione et consensu proponitur ut haeretica, vel ab unanimi omnium Patrum aut theologorum consensu."

² Ibid. "Animadvertere juvat, propositionem aliquam haeticam dici posse authentice et non-authentice. In priori acceptione, haeretica habetur propositio quoties vel expressa de huiusmodi eius pravitate habetur in sacris literis testificatio, aut clara extet de ea Ecclesiae seu Romanae Cathedrae definitio. In posteriori vero, quoties etsi adeo explicita non habeatur de ea fidei regula, quae ostendat haberi debere ut haeticam, nihilominus concurrunt omnes conditiones quae requiruntur, ut declarari valeat haeretica. ... In hac itaque suppositione, propositio eius generis haberi potest et simpliciter haeretica et haeresi proxima."

medium which enjoys the certainty of faith. Our knowledge of the unauthentic heretical proposition, however, comes through a different medium which has not the certainty of faith, but that certainty which is presupposed by faith. This latter medium cannot be called the rule of faith like the first, but a sign of the rule of faith¹. According to Panormo, therefore, it is the medium of *our knowledge* which makes the difference between heresy and *haeresi proxima*. Both propositions are in direct opposition to faith, but in one case, our knowledge of this comes through an infallible medium which is the rule of faith, while in the other, our knowledge depends on another medium which, though certain, does not enjoy the certainty of faith. Accordingly, *haeresi proxima* may be defined as *propositio haeretica definibilis*. The term "*haeretica*" implies immediate opposition to faith, which element it has in common with absolute heresy. The term "*definibilis*", however, indicates the deficiency of the medium by which such opposition to faith becomes known to us, and which distinguishes it from absolute heresy².

In this alternative explanation, Panormo brings *haeresi proxima* much closer to absolute heresy. Both concepts are basically the same, in so far as there is question of extrinsic authority. In the second explanation, however, the least doubt and uncertainty is ruled out. Consequently, we cannot speak of a contingent connection between *haeresi proxima* and absolute heresy, as we did when considering the first interpretation which Panormo gave of this censure. If all doubt is removed, then there is a *certain* connection between *haeresi proxima* and heresy.

When comparing the censure of *error* with that of *haeresi proxima*, we saw Lugo and Panormo pointing out that the former comes closer to absolute heresy, because of its certain connection with this greatest

¹ Ibid., p. 348. "Inspecta enim oppositione immediata quam importat (i. e. propositio haeresi proxima) cum fide, est simpliciter haeretica. ... Inspecto tamen modo, quo dictam oppositionem immediatam cognoscimus, non est ex eo praecise simpliciter haeretica, quia non est medium certum in se ipso certitudine fidei, sed certitudine praesuppositiva fidei, quae tamen sufficit ut inde propositio sic agnita ut haeretica, talis simpliciter aestimetur. Ac eatenus eadem propositio haeretica simpliciter habebitur in se ipsa et relata ad Primam Veritatem cui contradicit, et proxima haeresi relate ad medium quo dicta contradictio est nobis nota, quod non est in se ipso regula fidei, sed potius signum regulae fidei."

² Ibid.

form of deviation from Catholic truth. The connection which *haeresi proxima* has with heresy was described as *contingent*. In this second explanation of the censure, however, the question of this contingent connection does not arise, since every shade of uncertainty and doubt is ruled out. Consequently, Panormo changes his opinion with regard to this second interpretation of *haeresi proxima*, saying that if the censure is understood in this way, it comes before *error* and closer to absolute heresy. The fact that all conditions are complied with so that it may be authentically declared as heretical, gives it a certainty, at least equivalent to the certainty which mediate opposition to faith entails. Its connection with heresy, therefore, can no longer be described as contingent, and since there is question of *immediate opposition* to revelation, it takes precedence over *error* and constitutes a more serious censure¹.

Having given this alternative explanation of the censure, Panormo does not determine which interpretation is to be accepted, but leaves the matter open for the reader to select the explanation which seems more suitable². We recall, however, that he considers the second solution to be safer in practice, in so far as it eliminates the difficulty of determining the importance of the few dissenting theologians, and avoids the possibility of rashly applying this censure.

ARTICLE IV

Recapitulation and Conclusion

In comparison with our treatment of the censure of *error*, we have found very little on *haeresi proxima*. This may be explained by the late use of this latter censure in the official condemnations of the Church. The Council of Constance (1418) applied the censure of *error*

¹ Ibid. "Sicque censura proxima haeresi gravior procul dubio erit erronea, quia simpliciter haeretica est, et certo talis, certitudine quae proximam definitivam constituit, quaeque aequivalens dici potest certitudini quam habemus de mediata oppositione, quam cum fide sufficienter involvit erronea, licet adhuc non pertingente supremum gradum certitudinis regulae fidei."

² Ibid. "An autem re vera haec prae alia absolute ineunda sit via? aequi doctique lectores determinent."

to some of the articles of Wyclif and Huss. It was not until 1690 A. D., however, that *haeresi proxima* was used, and even though we have considered different explanations of the censure before this date, Antonio de Panormo (1709) was the only theologian who could point to an official source, to show that this was a distinct censure.

We have examined references both to the name and notion of *haeresi proxima*, in the writings of Cano (1563) and Suarez (1621), and have seen how these two theologians unwittingly confused this censure with the erroneous proposition. Petrus de Lorca (1614) was the first theologian we saw to consider *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, and in doing so, he anticipated the official distinction which was made by the Church seventy-six years later. However, like Cano and Suarez he confused *haeresi proxima* with the erroneous proposition.

In the exposition of Lugo (1646), we saw that a considerable advance was made. The notion of extrinsic authority, which Cano used to explain the second and third grades of *error*, was now applied to explain *haeresi proxima*. If Lugo had adopted this notion as it stood, and as it was put forward by Cano, there would have been no need for the subsequent corrections of Panormo. Instead of this, however, Lugo allowed for some grave theologians holding the opposite view, and finally he confused *haeresi proxima* with probable heresy, two concepts altogether distinct.

In the interpretation of Panormo (1709) we saw *haeresi proxima* being explained as a separate censure, distinct from all others and coming immediately after *error*. Here there was no confusion with probable heresy, and the basic notion of extrinsic authority was retained but enhanced considerably to bring the censure much closer to heresy. Then, in an alternative interpretation, we saw Panormo explaining *haeresi proxima* as a non-authentic heretical proposition. Understood in this way, it comes closer to heresy than the erroneous proposition.

The name of this censure, *haeresi proxima*, suggests that it comes next to heresy. However, we cannot argue from this, because, as we have often seen, the names of these censures may be understood in a generic and specific sense, and it is in this latter way that they indicate the separate censures. The heretical proposition, for instance, is more erroneous than the proposition which is specifically termed as such. Likewise, the censure of *error* has a greater *sapor haeresis* than that which is specifically called *haeresim sapiens*. Consequently,

there is nothing to be wondered at if the censure of *error* comes closer to heresy than the censure which is specifically termed '*haeresi proxima*.' If we consider these words in a generic sense, they may be applied to the erroneous proposition. If, however, we restrict them to their specific signification, then they are applicable only to the separate and distinct censure, *haeresi proxima*.

We have seen that Panormo gave two explanations of this censure. These explanations are basically the same, in so far as they depend on the notion of extrinsic authority. However, according as we adopt one or other of these interpretations, the censure *haeresi proxima* will come before or after *error*. Panormo himself did not make a decision with regard to these two interpretations, but left the question open.

The official condemnations of the Church give no evidence as to the exact position of *haeresi proxima* in relation to heresy. In the very first use of this censure by the Church¹, *error* is listed in the next place to heresy. However, in a subsequent condemnation², *haeresi proxima* comes closer to heresy. We must depend on the authority of the theologians, therefore, as to the gradation and hierarchy of these censures.

We recall that all the theologians we examined apropos of the erroneous proposition were unanimous in stating that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy. True, not all of these had considered *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, but even those who had, including Panormo, held that it was less grave than *error*. When Panormo explained the erroneous proposition, he categorically stated that *error* comes closer to heresy than *haeresi proxima*. There, he made no reservations, and made no mention of the possibility of *haeresi proxima* being the more serious censure. Now, however, if his alternative explanation is to be adopted, this order has to be changed, with *error* taking second place to *haeresi proxima*. All things considered, it seems to us that the bulk of authority holds that *error* is the more serious censure, and consequently, the first interpretation which Panormo gives of *haeresi proxima* is the more plausible. In later years, one or other of these two interpretations, and sometimes both, were adopted by subsequent theologians. However we do not

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

² *Ibid.*, no. 8.

claim that there was any unanimity of opinion with regard to *haeresi proxima* in later years. The doctrine of Lugo was often put forward as it stood, thus confusing this censure with *probable heresy*¹.

¹ The following are examples of the way *haeresi proxima* was interpreted after Panormo:

^{1°} MONTAIGNE, *De Censuris, seu Notis Theologicis, et de Sensu Propositionum*, in Migne, T. C. C., t. 1, col. 1175-7. (Note: this work was first published in 1732 A. D.) — Montaigne's doctrine on *haeresi proxima* may be described as a synopsis of Panormo's interpretation.

^{2°} TOURNELY, *Continuatio Praelectionum Theologicarum*, t. 6. Appendix de propositionibus ad moralem disciplinam spectantibus. Parisiis (1745), p. 682: "Propositio haeresi proxima est ea quam major et sanior theologorum pars ex Scriptura aut Traditione iudicat esse haereticam; etsi absolute et simpliciter non audeat pronuntiare eam esse haereticam, eo quod graves quidam theologi contendunt censuram hanc eidem inuri non debere." — In these few lines, Tournely outlines Lugo's opinion. He makes the same mistake by allowing for some grave theologians who hold that the doctrine in question is not heretical. According to Panormo, this is a description of probable heresy, and not *haeresi proxima*.

^{3°} KILBER S. J., *Institutiones Theologicae, de virtutibus theologicis, de fide*, cap. 3. Wirceburgi (1751), p. 584: "Proxima haeresi vel errori est, quam quidem non omnes, plures tamen et graves doctores cum gravi fundamento dicunt esse haereticam vel erroneam; quia ipsum proximitatis vocabulum maximam indicat propinquitatem, quae aliter explicari nequit." — This description is very general, and seems to depend on Lugo's doctrine.

^{4°} GAUTIER S. J., *Prodromus ad Theologiam Dogmatico-Scholasticam*, dissert. 2, cap. 2, art. 4. Coloniae & Francofurti (1756), pp. 119-120. — Like Montaigne, Gautier follows Panormo, and gives even his alternative explanation of *haeresi proxima*.

^{5°} FRANZELIN S. J., *Tractatus de Divina Traditione*, sect. 1, th. XII, scholion 2. Romae (1875), p. 161: "Igitur censura propositionis erroneae comprehendit tum eam quae ita, ut dictum est, opponitur conclusioni theologiae certae, . . . tum eam quae opponitur doctrinae ex universali consensione et praedicatione indubitanter tenendae ut verae, quae tamen non simpliciter et certo tamquam de fide proponitur. . . ." — It seems that for Franzelin the censure *haeresi proxima* is a species of *error*.

^{6°} DE GROOT O. P., *Summa Apologetica*, q. 10, art. 5. Ratisbonae (1906), p. 380: "Haeresi proxima propositio doctrinae adversatur, quae communi propemodum omnium sententia de fide esse censetur, esto ab ecclesia non sit definita." — This short description seems to resemble the alternative interpretation given by Panormo.

It is obvious from these examples that after Panormo, very few theologians went into any detail regarding the correct interpretation of these censures. There is nothing personal or original about these descriptions which, at the most, are mere repetitions of earlier opinions. For later references regarding the censure *haeresi proxima*, confer the following: PESCH S. J., *Praelectiones Dogmaticae*, t. 1, pars 2, sect. 5. Friburgi Brisgoviae (1909), p. 378; QUILLIET, DTC, t. 2, col. 2106; SCHULTES O. P., *De Ecclesia Catholica*, art. 70. Parisiis (1931), p. 639, etc.

Having now recapitulated all our investigations and conclusions regarding *haeresi proxima*, there is just one other point we wish to explain before concluding this chapter, viz. how this censure differs from *temeraria*. In this work we are not treating ex professo of the temerarious proposition. However, it must be mentioned here to give a fuller understanding of *haeresi proxima*.

We have already stated that in the case of *haeresi proxima* the majority of theologians are unanimous in stating that the doctrine denied is revealed and of faith, and that the few theologians who are not in accord with the majority in this matter, have no sound arguments either from reason or authority to support their claim. It is to be carefully noted that the majority hold the denied doctrine to be of faith, and not just merely hold it to be true. In the latter case, i. e. when the majority of theologians hold a doctrine to be true (not necessarily revealed or of faith), then such doctrine is regarded as being *doctrina communis*, and the corresponding theological censure is *temeraria*. It is clear from this that the two censures *haeresi proxima* and *temeraria* closely resemble each other, and could easily be confused.

CHAPTER THREE

Haeresim Sapiens — De Haeresi Suspecta

The third theological censure which we are to examine is that which was termed *haeresim sapiens* or *de haeresi suspecta*. These words signify something less than heresy and *haeresi proxima*. The "taste" of heresy indicates something much more remote, but which, however, arouses suspicion that there is something far more serious latent in the background.

It will be noted that in the title of this chapter we give two names to this censure: *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta*. This does not mean that we wish to make these two terms synonymous. As we shall presently see, very many theologians held for this, while others placed a difference of degree between them. This will become more evident as we explain the different interpretations later on. For the sake of clarity we shall treat of both of these together from the outset, and when occasion arises, we shall indicate any distinctions which may have been made by individual theologians.

As we have already done in our examination of the censures of *error* and *haeresi proxima*, we shall first of all recapitulate the main opinions which existed before Melchior Cano, and then proceed to examine the evolution of the censure until 1709 A. D., when the *Scrutinium Doctrinarum* of Antonio de Panormo was published. Before considering the theologians, however, it would be well to study the use of this censure in the condemnations of the Church. This will place us in a better position to judge the interpretation of each theologian, in so far as we shall know exactly what guidance and evidence each one had from this official source.

ARTICLE I

Haeresim Sapiens and De Haeresi Suspecta
as used in the Condemnations of the Church

We may outline the use of the censure *haeresim sapiens* — *de haeresi suspecta* in the condemnations of the Church, as follows:

1° Before the Council of Constance (1418), we can point to at least two occasions on which the censure *suspecta* was applied. a) In 1329 A. D., eleven articles of Ekard were condemned as suspected of heresy¹. b) In 1347 A. D., certain errors of Nicholas of Autrécourt were censured as suspected². In neither of these condemnations is there any mention of the censure *haeresim sapiens*.

2° The Council of Constance makes no mention of either *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta*. We have already pointed out that it was the condemnations of this council which aroused the interest of the theologians in the theological censures. However, in spite of the fact that it makes no mention of *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta*, we shall see that these censures were explained by the theologians at a very early date, and distinguished from each other long before any official distinction was made in the condemnations of the Church. It is interesting to note that we have never seen a reference made to condemnations which took place before the Council of Constance. It seems that all the theologians whom we are considering apropos of these theological censures, were either unaware of, or did not take trouble to examine these previous condemnations.

3° In the condemnation of the errors of Baius by Pope S. Pius V (1569), we find the censure *suspecta*, but there is no mention of *haeresim sapiens*³. This was the first occasion in the post-Constance period that the censure *suspecta* was applied by the Church.

¹ Cf. Dz 501-529. The exact words of the condemnation are to be found in no. 529.

² Cf. Dz 553-570.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 3.

4° In 1690 A. D., the Holy Office condemned thirty one propositions of the Jansenists, and here we find the censure *haeresim sapiens* being applied for the first time in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. It is distinguished from *error*, *haeresi proxima*, and *male sonans*¹. It is to be noted, however, that in this decree there is no mention of *suspecta*. As yet, therefore, we have seen no official distinction made between these two censures.

5° In the condemnation of a hundred and one propositions of Quesnel by Pope Clement XI in 1713 A. D., both *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* were applied². Here, at last, is the official distinction between these two censures. We note, however, that it came rather late, in 1713, after the publication of Panormo's *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*. We shall not be surprised, therefore, if we find a certain amount of confusion with regard to the identification of these two censures, especially when we recall that in all the previous condemnations, when one of these censures was applied, the other was omitted. This seemed to indicate that according to the mind of the Church, these terms were synonymous.

ARTICLE II

Haeresim Sapiens According to the Doctrine of Cano
(1563)

Having treated of the erroneous proposition, the next censure which Cano sets out to explain is that of *haeresim sapiens*³. We have already seen that he did not treat of *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, but included what later theologians understood by this under the second and third grades of *error*.

In his exposition of *haeresim sapiens*, Cano does not mention the term *de haeresi suspecta*, nor does he do so when explaining the other theological censures. In all probability, he took *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* to mean the same thing. We have already pointed

¹ Ibid., no. 6.

² Ibid., no. 8.

³ Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. XII, cap. 9, in T. C. C., t. 1, col. 617 et seqq.

out that the Council of Constance, which was Cano's guide in interpreting and distinguishing the censures, makes no mention of either of these terms. In fact, the censure *haeresim sapiens* was not officially used by the Church until 1690, over a hundred years after Cano's death. From the point of view of evidence and guidance from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, therefore, Cano was very much handicapped. However, he had seen a number of interpretations of *haeresim sapiens* which were put forward by previous theologians. Perhaps these influenced him to treat of it as a special censure. We shall now briefly examine these opinions which existed before Cano, and see if they influenced his doctrine in any way.

A. Different interpretations of *haeresim sapiens* before Cano

Before Melchior Cano, the three main opinions which were put forward as explanations of *haeresim sapiens* were as follows.

1° Turrecremata (1489) held that *haeresim sapiens* is incurred by the denial of a theological conclusion. In other words, he confused it with what later came to be known as the censure of *error*¹.

2° Alphonsus de Castro (1547) identified *haeresim sapiens* with *male sonans*. In his famous definition, he stated that the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* is that which at first sight and in its proper sense, is heretical. Nevertheless, it is capable of a pious interpretation, and understood in this way, the sense is rendered to conform to Catholic doctrine². According to this explanation of Castro, the pious interpretation of an otherwise heretical proposition reduces the censure from heresy to *haeresim sapiens*. We shall see this doctrine being examined again and again by later theologians. Cano, in his exposition of this censure, does nothing else but refute the opinion of Alphonsus de Castro.

¹ Cf. TURRECREMATA, *Summa de Ecclesia*, lib. 4, pars 2, cap. 10. Venetiis (1561), p. 383. We have already examined Turrecremata's doctrine on this point, when considering the censure of *error*. Cf. supra, pp. 7-8, where he is quoted in full.

² Cf. CASTRO, *De Justa Punitione Haereticorum*, lib. 1, cap. 3. (Opera Omnia, Parisiis 1571, col. 1054 E et seqq.) "Propositio haeresim sapiens, aut male circa ea quae ad fidem pertinent, sonans, est illa quae in prima significatione quam verba prima facie ostendunt, sensum habet haereticum: quamvis pie intellecta, sensum aliquem habeat verum."

As examples of *haeresim sapiens*, Castro gives the following propositions: *Pater est major Filio; Christus est creatura; Tres sunt Dii; Vesci carnibus vel non vesci, impertinens est christianae perfectioni; Philosophi gentiles in sola lege naturae salvari potuerunt.*

3° Simancas (1552) endorsed the definition of Castro, but made a slight change by adding that a proposition is *haeresim manifestam sapiens* when it is in mediate opposition to divine faith. In other words, he agreed with Castro regarding *haeresim sapiens*, but identified *haeresim manifestam sapiens* with what we now know to be the erroneous proposition¹.

B. Cano examines the definition of Castro

The only one of the three opinions examined above which Cano mentions in his exposition of *haeresim sapiens*, is that of Alphonsus de Castro. In fact, Cano does nothing else but attack Castro's doctrine on this matter, so that his exposition of the censure is purely negative, telling us what *haeresim sapiens* is not, rather than what it is. It is interesting to note that he does not mention Castro by name in his rejection of this opinion, but merely refers to it as that which was held by "some theologians".

At the outset, Cano gives Castro's definition of the censure, and notes that it requires two senses for the proposition which is censurable as *haeresim sapiens*: the first and proper sense is heretical, while the second and metaphorical sense is Catholic. Cano very simply dismisses this theory by pointing to a proposition which, for him, is certainly *haeresim sapiens*, and yet does not conform to the rules of this definition, since it cannot be piously interpreted in any Catholic sense. This famous example of Cano reads as follows: '*Ridiculum est*

¹ Cf. SIMANCAS, *Institutiones Catholicae*, cap. 52, no. 3. Vallisoleti (1552), p. 190. "Illa propositio sapit haeresim, quae in prima verborum significatione et prima facie, sensum habet haereticum: quamvis pie intellecta, possit habere sensum catholicum, ut ait Alphonsus (i. e. Castro.) Illa vero sapit manifestam haeresim, ex qua et quibusdam veris, quae nulla tergiversatione possunt negari, sequitur haeresis manifesta..."

In the second edition of this work (Romae 1575), Simancas gives the same doctrine, in spite of the fact that Cano had bitterly attacked Castro's doctrine in the meantime. (Cf. op. cit., Romae 1575, tit. 54, no. 6, p. 424.)

Eucharistiae sacramentum solemniter per vias publicas circumferre. He judges this to be a perfect example of *haeresim sapiens*, because, while not being heretical, it smacks of the Lutheran doctrine which denies the Real Presence¹. It is on this example alone that Cano bases his rejection of Castro's definition. He makes no mention of the fact that this particular doctrine had already been considered by the Council of Trent². As we shall see later on, subsequent theologians regarded this example of Cano as being far more serious than *haeresim sapiens*.

It is not Castro's definition alone which displeases Cano, but all his examples as well. For Cano, these are outright heresy, and consequently cannot be censured merely as *haeresim sapiens*³.

Thus far, Cano's exposition has been mostly negative, in so far as it consists of a refutation of Castro's interpretation. There is very little positive doctrine to be found which would help us to construct a definition of *haeresim sapiens* according to Cano's mind. In fact, Cano deliberately refrains from giving any rules for the interpretation of this censure, and time and again insists that it is not a matter for rules and definitions, but rather for the *gustus* and prudence of a wise theologian⁴.

There is but one positive element to which we can point in Cano's exposition of this censure, and that is his insistence on the fact that

¹ Cf. CANO, *De Locis*, lib. XII, cap. 9, in T. C. C., t. 1, col. 617. "Quae definitio nec vocabuli potestatem exprimit, nec rei definitae vim naturamque declarat, nec mutuo nexu cum illa est copulata. Quis enim dubitet illam propositionem: Ridiculum est Eucharistiae sacramentum solemniter per vias publicas circumferre, Lutheranorum haeresim sapere, qua negant in Eucharistia corpus Christi verum contineri? Et tamen in nullo pio sensu vera est."

² Cf. Dz 888.

³ Cf. CANO, loc. cit., in T. C. C., col. 618. "Itaque, ut mea fert opinio, propositiones illae ac caeterae eiusmodi non tanquam sapientes haeresim, sed tanquam haereticas a Nicaenis Patribus sunt damnatae. At propositionem haereticam et sapientem eandem esse, mihi quidem non sit verisimile. Stultus nempe haberetur is, qui quam rem vinum esse constaret, hanc vinum sapere, nisi per jocum et ridiculum, diceret."

⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 619. "Quamobrem, quid haeresim sapiat, quid non sapiat, non tam finitione et argumentatione speculatricis disciplinae, quam sensu quodam, gustuque prudentiae judicatur."

A little further down, we find; "Itaque non praecceptis et regulis, sed prudentia et sagacitate dijudicantur." And he ends his exposition of the censure with a final warning; "Saporem igitur propositionum, ut dixi, non tam scientia quam prudentia dijudicat. Quocirca, quae propositio haeresim sapiat, quae contra non sapiat, non theologi quivis, sed prudentes solum atque experientes poterunt judicare."

circumstances count considerably when a proposition is to be censured as *haeresim sapiens*¹. We have seen that Castro made no mention of circumstances with regard to this censure, but gave a definition which should suitably fit every proposition censurable as *haeresim sapiens*. For Cano, on the contrary, the circumstances, such as the person, place and time of utterance, are all important. His great insistence on these led him to scorn any definition of the censure and any hard and fast rules by which it might be governed.

Having considered Cano's doctrine on this censure, we have, as yet, very little to go on, except a refutation of Castro's definition and the fact that circumstances are all important in censuring a proposition as *haeresim sapiens*. Before passing on to examine Suarez' interpretation of this censure, we shall briefly consider the doctrine of Banez (1584) and Lorca (1614), and see if they were influenced in any way by Cano in giving their opinions with regard to *haeresim sapiens*. We recall that when tracing the development of the censure of *error*, we noticed that Banez, while faithfully following his master Cano, made a big advance in associating this censure with the denial of a theological conclusion. We shall now see if he makes a similar contribution with regard to *haeresim sapiens*.

C. Banez interprets the mind of Cano (1584)

In explaining the theological censures, Banez always keeps very close to the doctrine of Cano. When he comes to give his opinion on *haeresim sapiens*, he notes how Cano disagreed with the interpretation of Castro, and then goes on to give a résumé of Cano's thought. One might pass quite easily over this outline, but on closer examination it proves to be a perfect definition of the censure according to the mind of Cano himself! We have seen how Cano again and again rejected

¹ *Ibid.*, col. 620. "Atque ut idem vinum ex vase uno sapit picem, ex altero non sapit, et res eadem illud olet, unde sit, e coeno male, ex arcu muliebri bene; sic una et eadem oratio ex uno corde et ore odorem spirat jucundissimum, ex altero teterimum; ex uno saporem suavem servat, ex altero insuavem. Quemadmodum etiam videmus, aquam e radicibus et canalibus, per quos transit, aliud atque aliud et olere et sapere. Non itaque e rerum ipsarum orationumque natura sapor, odorve omnis existimandus est, sed tum res, tum orationes ipsae a venis aliquando et visis, per quas permeant, saporem et odorem accipiunt."

any definition and any hard and fast rules which might govern this censure. Now we find Banez making a résumé of his doctrine, and constructing a perfect definition of the censure according to Cano's mind, avoiding all the disagreeable elements which Cano rejected. This résumé of Banez is a masterpiece of condensation, and deserves quotation in full ¹.

Propositio sapiens haeresim illa est, quae quamvis non appareat haeresis manifesta, quin potius *aliquando* poterit habere aliquem bonum sensum; tamen ex quibusdam circumstantiis, vel ex parte asserentis vel ex temporum calamitate, saporem quandam habet haeresis et suspitionis, iudicio prudentum et sapientum.

The use of the word "*aliquando*" is to be noted. In the definition which was rejected by Cano, it was stated that the censurable proposition (i. e. as *haeresim sapiens*) should *always* be capable of a pious and Catholic interpretation. Cano pointed to at least one example of *haeresim sapiens* which is incapable of any metaphorical sense, but he did not altogether rule out the possibility of a double sense. Now, Banez by using the word "*aliquando*", avoids the pitfall of Castro, and in the second part of his definition, embodies all Cano's doctrine on the important role which circumstances play with regard to *haeresim sapiens*. Then, in the very last phrase of the above citation, he brings in Cano's doctrine regarding the prudence which is necessary when this censure is to be applied.

D. Petrus de Lorca (1614)

Like Banez, Lorca wholeheartedly agrees with Cano's doctrine on *haeresim sapiens*. He rejects Castro's definition, and says that it disagrees with the very name of this censure ².

¹ Cf. BANEZ, in *Secundam Secundae*, q. XI, art. 2. Lugduni (1588), col. 448.

² Cf. PETRUS DE LORCA, *Commentaria et Disputationes in 2/2 Divi Thomae, de fide*, disput. 40, no. 9-10. Matriti (1614), p. 260.

ARTICLE III

Haeresim Sapiens According to the Doctrine of Suarez (1621)

Like his predecessor Cano, Suarez does not treat of *haeresi proxima* as a special theological censure, and after he has finished explaining the erroneous proposition, he immediately considers *haeresim sapiens* ¹.

From the point of view of guidance from the condemnations of the Church, Suarez had one advantage over Cano. In 1567 (seven years after Cano's death) Pope S. Pius V condemned seventy-nine propositions of Baius, and in this condemnation, the censure *de haeresi suspecta* was applied for the first time in the post-Constance period ². We shall presently see Suarez referring to this to prove that *haeresim sapiens* is distinct from the censure of *error*.

Suarez' exposition of *haeresim sapiens* may be divided into three parts; 1) his examination of the opinion of Simancas, 2) his examination of the opinion of Castro, and 3) his own interpretation.

A. Suarez on the opinion of Simancas

When considering the different opinions on *haeresim sapiens* which existed before Cano, we outlined the position of Simancas (1552) and saw that for him, doctrine which is *haeresim manifestam sapiens* is that which denies a theological conclusion. In other words, he identified it with what we now know to be the censure of *error*.

In the beginning of his exposition ³, Suarez admits that these two censures have very much in common, but nevertheless insists that they are specifically distinct. To prove this, he cites the condemnation of the errors of Baius by Pope S. Pius V ⁴, and points out that in this decree, the two censures, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*, are distinguished from each other.

When we examine this condemnation of Baius, however, we find that it makes no mention of *haeresim sapiens*. We have already pointed

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, *de fide*, disput. 19, sect. 2, no. 16-17. (Vivès., t. 12.)

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 3.

³ Cf. SUAREZ, loc. cit., no. 16.

⁴ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 3.

out that the first use of this censure was in 1690, when the Holy Office condemned the errors of the Jansenists¹. However, in the bull of Pope S. Pius V, there is mention of *de haeresi suspecta*, and in all probability it was this which Suarez had in mind when he referred to that condemnation to prove that *error* and *haeresim sapiens* are distinct censures. We must take it, therefore, that for Suarez, the terms *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* are synonymous.

Suarez takes great pains to point out the difference between *error* and *haeresim sapiens*, because the erroneous proposition is, in fact, much more *haeresim sapiens* than the censure which is specifically named as such. To explain this, he has recourse to that famous distinction originally introduced by Cano, between the generic and specific signification of these terms. If we take the words "*haeresim sapiens*" in their generic sense, they may be applied to the erroneous proposition, just as the term '*error*', taken in this same way, may be applied to heresy. However, the name of the genus may be applied to its lowest species, as in the case of *habitus* and *dispositio*, and in this way the words "*haeresim sapiens*" indicate a separate censure, specifically distinct from *error* and all the others². Thus, with the aid of Cano's famous distinction, Suarez disproves the opinion of Simancas, and shows how *haeresim sapiens* is specifically distinct from the censure of *error*.

B. Suarez on the opinion of Castro

The only other opinion which Suarez discusses concerning the censure *haeresim sapiens*, is that of Alphonsus de Castro. It is interesting to note that he makes no mention of Cano's refutation of this doctrine.

¹ Ibid., no. 6.

² Cf. SUAREZ, loc. cit., "... quocirca, sicut supra diximus, nomen erroris generice et specificè sumi, et primo modo comprehendere haeresim, secundo autem modo ab illa distingui, ita de nomine propositionis sapientis haeresim, judicandum censeo; nam potest esse genericum, et significare omnem propositionem, quae, licet non sit haeretica, multum redolet haeresim, et hoc modo non est dubium, quin propositio erronea sapiat haeresim. Tamen in hoc sapore, ut sic dicam, possunt esse gradus, et in propositione erronea est in summo, et ideo potius dicenda est proxima haeresi; potest autem esse alia propositio magnam quidem speciem haeresis habens, in minori tamen gradu, et haec recte dicitur sapiens haeresim, applicando nomen generis ad inferiorem seu minus gravem speciem."

First of all, Suarez explains how Castro required that the proposition which is censurable as *haeresim sapiens* should be capable of two interpretations, one heretical and the other Catholic. He then proceeds to analyse Castro's definition of the censure, and reasons as follows: if both senses, Catholic and heretical, are proper (as distinct from metaphorical) then we have an equivocal proposition which cannot incur any censure graver than *male sonans*. If, however, the heretical sense is the proper interpretation, while the Catholic sense is merely metaphorical, such a proposition merits a more serious censure than *haeresim sapiens*. The pious and metaphorical interpretation will not save it from the more serious censure which it deserves¹. As an example of this, Suarez cites the Council of Basle which condemned the proposition "*Christus quotidie peccat*" as erroneous². This proposition is capable of a pious or metaphorical interpretation, in so far as it may be understood to refer to the Mystical Body of Christ. However, this did not save it from the censure of *error*.

There is a considerable difference between Suarez' refutation of Castro's opinion and that put forward by Cano. Suarez takes the definition and analyses it, and then shows that it cannot be upheld. On the other hand, Cano rejects it by pointing to an arbitrary example which does not comply with the definition. From this point of view, the criticism given by Suarez has more value. However, we notice that Suarez makes no reference to the part played by external circumstances in judging a proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*. We recall that this was very much stressed by Cano, and was one of his main

¹ Ibid., no. 17. "Primo, ut uterque sensus sit proprius secundum aliquam propriam significationem verborum, et sic nimium rigorosa videtur illa censura; nam talis propositio simpliciter est aequivoca, et ideo de se in meliori sensu accipienda, vel certe ad summum erit male sonans, ... Alio modo potest propositio esse contra fidem in sensu proprio, et solum in metaphorico ab errore liberari, et tunc magis videtur pertinere ad secundum gradum, quam ad hunc tertium."

² Cf. Msr., t. 29, col. 109. "Et potissime scandalosam illam assertionem erroream in fide, in ipso libello contentam, quam pia e fidelium aures sine horrore audire non possunt, videlicet: Christus quotidie peccat, et ex quo fuit Christus quotidie peccavit, quamvis de Capite Ecclesia Christo Jesu salvatore nostro dicat se non intelligere, sed ad membra sua, quae cum Christo capite unum esse Christum asseruit, intelligentiam eius esse referendam dicat."

There is no unanimity of opinion as to whether the Council of Basle was oecumenical or not. However, the majority of theologians seem to hold that it was not, in spite of the fact that it was convened as such. Cf. BAUDRILLART, DTC, t. 2, col. 113 et seqq.

objections to Castro's clear-cut definition. From this point of view, therefore, Cano's refutation of Castro scores over that of Suarez. Taking the two criticisms together, we conclude that the interpretation of *haeresim sapiens* put forward by Alphonsus de Castro is an untenable explanation of the censure.

C. Suarez gives his own interpretation of *haeresim sapiens*

Having considered Suarez on the doctrine of Castro and Simancas, we now come to examine his own interpretation of *haeresim sapiens*. In a few words, he states his opinion as follows¹.

Dicendum ergo est propositionem illam sapere haeresim, ex qua coassumptis aliis principiis, sequitur haeresis, quando vel illa alia principia non sunt omnino certa, licet in Ecclesia sint valde recepta et fere certa, vel etiam illatio non est evidens, cum tamen probabilissima sit, et communiter probata.

The foregoing citation may be divided in two at the words "*quando vel illa alia*", and then the first part gives us a perfect definition of the censure of *error* or the denial of a theological conclusion. This is best explained by an example. If one were to state '*Christus non est risibilis*', this statement would clearly lead to heresy, especially when another principle, '*omnis homo est risibilis*', is taken into account.

Christus non est risibilis.

(The denial.)

Sed omnis homo est risibilis.

(External principle.)

Ergo Christus non est homo.

(Heresy.)

In the case of the erroneous proposition, '*Christus non est risibilis*', which we have just examined, the external principle which is introduced is absolutely certain, as also is the reasoning used in the syllogism. The first part of Suarez description, therefore, gives us a definition of the erroneous proposition; '*propositio ex qua coassumptis aliis principiis, sequitur haeresis*', or in other words, mediate denial of divine faith.

We have already seen, however, that Suarez insists on a distinction between *error* and *haeresim sapiens*. The latter part of the above quotation brings out this distinction; '*quando vel illa alia principia non sunt omnino certa, etc.*'. In this qualifying phrase, Suarez shows that there is a certain diminution in *haeresim sapiens* which serves

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, loc. cit.

to distinguish it from *error*. This diminution may be brought about in either of two ways; 1) the external principle introduced, even though commonly received, is not absolutely certain, or 2) the reasoning which leads to heresy, even though most probable, is not altogether evident. By this explanation Suarez shows how closely *haeresim sapiens* approximates to *error*. The difference between both of these censures is small, yet sufficient to distinguish them specifically.

We notice that in his exposition of this censure, Suarez makes no mention of Cano, nor does he insist on the value of circumstances or the prudence which is required when the censure *haeresim sapiens* is to be applied.

He takes it for granted that *haeresim sapiens* comes immediately after *error*. We recall that he did not treat of *haeresi proxima* as a separate censure, but applied this terminology to *error*. In order to bring *haeresim sapiens* as close as possible to the erroneous proposition, he selected this slight diminution which we have explained above. This also serves to distinguish these censures from each other¹.

The notion which Suarez puts forward to explain *haeresim sapiens* is not altogether new to us. In the previous chapter, when examining the censure *haeresi proxima*, we saw this same idea being given by Lugo and the Salmanticenses to explain *errori proxima*. Later, Panormo used it to explain *probable error*². It is to be noted, however, that all these theologians came after Suarez. As already pointed out, Suarez did not treat of *haeresi proxima* or *errori proxima* as separate censures.

The main point of Suarez' exposition is his consideration of the opinions of Castro and Simancas. His own interpretation of the censure is of little importance. It was soon forgotten and hardly ever again referred to, as we shall afterwards see.

¹ Ibid. "... non potest autem consecutio certa requiri; nam hoc pertinet ad gradum erroneae propositionis; ergo necesse est ut ab illa certitudine deficiat, quamvis ad eam proxime accedat."

² Cf. LUGO, de fide, disput. 20, sect. 3, no. 84. (Vivès, t. 2.) — Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 9, dub. 4, no. 49. (Palmé 1879 t. 2.) — Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 6, art. 1, no. 14. Romae (1709), p. 341. "Ex eo namque, quod aliqua propositio appareat plerisque doctoribus inferri evidenter ex praemissis, quarum una sit de fide, altera naturali lumine nota, solum sequitur, quod illa sit habenda probabiliter erronea, semel posito, quod alii doctores graves, uti supponimus, gravi ducti motivo, evidentem illationem non teneant."

ARTICLE IV

A Distinction Introduced by Lugo
(1646 A. D.)

After explaining *haeresi proxima*, the next censure which Lugo considers is *haeresim sapiens*¹. Unlike most of his predecessors, he does not regard this censure as coming immediately after *error*. We have already seen in the preceding chapter that Lugo was one of the first theologians who considered *haeresi proxima* as a distinct censure, and placed it between *error* and *haeresim sapiens*.

At the beginning of his exposition of *haeresim sapiens*, Lugo considers some opinions. However, we find nothing here which we have not seen before. We shall pass on immediately, therefore, and examine his own interpretation.

The greatest contribution Lugo made in explaining this censure was the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* which he discovered. We have seen that before his time, these two terms were taken as synonymous. As yet, Lugo had not seen *haeresim sapiens* being used in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. The two terms, *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, did not appear in the same dogmatic condemnation until 1713 A. D.² Consequently, Lugo was very much ahead of his time when he suggested, as early as 1646, that a difference existed between the two censures.

First of all, Lugo points out that *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* have much in common, in so far as a proposition censured in either way gives sufficient reason for fearing that its assertor is imbued with heresy. In neither case, however, is there sufficient proof to censure the proposition as heretical. In this respect, *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* are very much akin³.

Both *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* give sufficient cause

¹ Cf. Lugo, de fide, disput. 20, sect. 3, no. 87 et seqq. (Vivès, t. 2.)

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8.

³ Cf. Lugo, loc. cit., no. 88. "Utraque quidem dat ansam timendi, ne lateat haeresis; neutra dat fundamentum sufficiens alicui judicandi absolute esse haeresim, vel errorem: dat tamen fundamentum sufficiens ad suspicandum, vel timendum quod auctor illius propositionis habeat apud se haeresim aliquam, vel errorem, ex quibus illa propositio oriatur."

for suspecting latent heresy. This cause, however, is not something indivisible which does not admit of greater and less degrees. It depends on the words of the proposition and all kinds of circumstances. Sometimes these circumstances will be so great as to permit us to make a probable judgement that the assertor is imbued with heresy which influences the statement under scrutiny. In such a case, the proposition is to be censured as *haeresim sapiens*. If, however, it should happen that the circumstances do not give cause for such a probable judgement, but serve only to arouse suspicion, then, according to Lugo, the censure *de haeresi suspecta* is to be applied¹.

It is clear from all this that Lugo's distinction between these two censures is based solely on circumstances, according as they are greater or less. In this, his doctrine very closely resembles that of Cano. True, Cano considered *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* as being synonymous terms, but we have seen the importance which he attached to circumstantial evidence. It is also interesting to note that Lugo does not mention a double sense being required for the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta*. All this is in keeping with Cano's interpretation.

Lugo does not mention Suarez' opinion on this censure, and when he explains *errori proxima*², he does not draw attention to the fact that the interpretation which he suggests is the same as that which Suarez has already put forward as an explanation of *haeresim sapiens*. This is just one example of how Suarez' doctrine on *haeresim sapiens* was soon forgotten and hardly ever again referred to.

We have already pointed out that there is a basic similarity between Cano's notion of *haeresim sapiens* and that which was afterwards held by Lugo. It seems, however, that this similarity is not intentional. There is reason to believe that Lugo had not considered Cano's expla-

¹ Ibid. "Hoc tamen fundamentum non consistit in indivisibili, sed habet latitudinem secundum magis et minus, et ideo dixi posse secundum illum excessum distingui duos gradus; aliquando enim fundamentum sive propter verba, sive propter materiam, sive propter locum, tempus, personam loquentis, et alias circumstantias, tale erit, ut probabiliter possit judicari, aliquam aliam haeresim esse in auctore, ex qua haec alia assertio procedat: aliquando vero fundamentum non erit tantum, sed solum sufficet ad id suspicandum. In primo casu poterit propositio appellari *sapiens haeresim*. ... In secundo autem casu poterit appellari *suspecta*..."

² Cf. Lugo, loc. cit., no. 84-86.

nation of this censure. Towards the end of his exposition of *haeresim sapiens*¹, Lugo notes that Lorca (1614) gave the following example of this censure: '*stultum et inutile est, sacramentum Eucharistiae solemniter per plateas circumducere*'. He disagrees with this example of *haeresim sapiens*, saying that it is outright heresy and condemned as such by the Council of Trent². The point we wish to stress, however, is that this is the famous example which was originally suggested by Cano. Lugo would certainly have recognised this if he had considered Cano's exposition of *haeresim sapiens*.

Before concluding his examination of *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, Lugo points out that the same principles may be applied to the erroneous proposition, thus giving two new censures, *errorem sapiens*, and *de errore suspecta*³. We recall that when explaining *haeresi proxima*, Lugo made a similar analogy, and invented the censure *errori proxima*. We have no evidence of any of these three censures, *errori proxima*, *errorem sapiens*, and *de errore suspecta*, being officially used in any of the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. However, it must be admitted that they represent possible modes of deviation from Catholic truth.

To conclude our examination of Lugo's doctrine, we wish to point out once again that the greatest contribution he made was in distinguishing *haeresim sapiens* from *de haeresi suspecta*. This distinction, however, seems to be one of degree rather than of species. According as the circumstances permit of a greater or less suspicion, the censure will be either *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta*.

ARTICLE V

The Salmanticenses Combine the Doctrine of Cano and Lugo 1679 A. D.

When treating of the censure of *error*, we stated our reasons for considering the Salmanticenses on the theological censures. They are not often quoted as an authority in this respect. Yet for us their doc-

¹ Ibid., no. 89.

² Cf. Dz 888.

³ Cf. Lugo, loc. cit. no. 90.

trine is of paramount importance, because of the special attitude they take towards this entire question. The Salmanticenses decided to seek out the common opinion with regard to each censure, or at least that explanation which was more widely received. In considering their doctrine on *haeresim sapiens*, therefore, we are being presented with what they deem to be the opinion which enjoys the greatest authority. Considering the role which is played by authority in the interpretation of these theological censures, and taking into account that authority which the Salmanticenses themselves enjoy, their opinion as to what constitutes *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* will be of great importance.

From the point of view of guidance from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, the Salmanticenses were in the same position as Suarez and Lugo. Their tract on faith was written in 1676 and first published at Lyons in 1679 A. D. However, the first official use of the censure *haeresim sapiens* by the Church took place in 1690¹, and both *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* were not applied and distinguished in the same dogmatic condemnation until 1713².

A. The Salmanticenses on *haeresim sapiens*³

At the beginning of their exposition of this censure, the Salmanticenses give the following definition⁴:

"Talis (i. e. *haeresim sapiens*) vero appellatur, quae etsi non sit, aut manifeste non appareat haeresis, affert tamen eius saporem ob convenientiam saltem in vocibus, aut accidentibus alicui haeresi peculiaribus."

In analysing this definition, we see that, for the Salmanticenses, the proposition which is censurable as *haeresim sapiens* may in itself be capable of a true Catholic sense; "*quae etsi non sit, aut manifeste non appareat haeresis*". It is to be noted, however, that there is a big difference between this statement and the doctrine of Alphonsus de Castro, who held that every proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* must be capable of a Catholic sense. The use of the word '*etsi*' in the

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

² Ibid., no. 8.

³ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 9, dub. 4, no. 50.

⁴ Ibid.

definition brings out this difference. Furthermore, later on when explaining this definition, the Salmanticenses expressly state that it is possible to have a proposition *haeresim sapiens* which is absolutely incapable of even a metaphorical Catholic sense¹. Accordingly, a proposition censurable in this way may or may not be capable of a Catholic interpretation. In this respect, the Salmanticenses are in agreement with Cano and Banez against Castro who held that such propositions must always be capable of two senses, one heretical and the other Catholic.

With regard to the second part of the definition quoted above, the Salmanticenses here embody all the doctrine of Cano and Banez on the important role which circumstances play when a proposition is to be judged *haeresim sapiens*. The material proposition, considered in itself, may or may not be censurable as *haeresim sapiens*. In the last analysis, however, we must rely on the different circumstances for guidance².

To illustrate this description of *haeresim sapiens*, the Salmanticenses give the following example: "*fides justificat*". This sentence, when considered in Sacred Scripture, has a perfectly Catholic sense. When found in the writings of the Lutherans, however, it arouses suspicion of the heresy which states that faith alone justifies. Consequently, ever since the rise of this heresy, the sentence must be qualified as follows: "*fides justificat dispositive, sive ut radix et fundamentum justificationis*".

We have seen that the doctrine of the Salmanticenses on *haeresim sapiens* is identical with that which Cano had put forward to explain

¹ Ibid. "... non negamus dari aliquas propositiones, quae ex seipsis saporem haeresis afferant. Talis est illa quam pro exemplo huius censurae affert Cano: Ridiculum est circumferre Sacramentum Eucharistiae per vias publicas. Quia licet opposita propositio: Decet, et oportet circumferre Sacramentum Eucharistiae per publicas vias, non sit immediate de fide, nec esset conclusio theologica, nec alia assertio ex principiis fidei certo moraliter deducta..., nihilominus propositio illa affinitatem quandam importat cum haeresi vel negantium realem praesentiam Christi in Eucharistia, vel impugnantium sacros ritus, et caeremonias Ecclesiae."

² Ibid. "Ad qualificandum vero aliquam propositionem isto censurae gradu non semper sufficit considerare propositionem secundum se acceptam, sed necessariat attendere plures circumstantias, ex quibus dependet, quod aliquod profertur."

the same censure. Like Banez, the Salmanticenses succeed in making a definition of *haeresim sapiens* according to Cano's mind, in spite of the fact that Cano himself was bitterly opposed to any definition or rules which might govern this censure. We note that the Salmanticenses do not state that they are following Cano in this matter. They give us the doctrine which, in their opinion, enjoys the greatest authority among the theologians. We recognise this as the interpretation which was originally suggested by Cano, and later upheld by Banez and Lorca.

We note that the Salmanticenses make no mention of Suarez' interpretation of this censure, and when they give their opinion on the censure *errori proxima*, they do not state that the interpretation which they suggest is identical with that which Suarez had originally put forward to explain the censure *haeresim sapiens*¹.

B. De haeresi suspecta

We have already seen that neither Cano, Banez nor Suarez mentioned a distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, and that Lugo was the first to suggest this, placing a difference of degree between the two censures. The Salmanticenses endorse this distinction of Lugo, and select it as the doctrine which enjoys the greatest authority among the different opinions. They do not state that their opinion in this matter is that which was originally suggested by Lugo. However, on reading their description of *de haeresi suspecta*, there cannot be the slightest doubt but that it is identical with Lugo's doctrine. They place the same difference of degree between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* — a difference which depends on the greater or less suspicion which may be aroused by circumstances².

The doctrine of the Salmanticenses on these two censures, therefore, tells us nothing which we have not already known before. They

¹ Ibid., no. 49.

² Ibid., no. 51. "Sed non negamus, quod aliquo modo differant: nam sicut suspicio importat leve fundamentum, sapor vero affert grave indicium secundum experientiam; ita ut propositio sit suspecta, minus requiritur, quam ut sapiat haeresim, sed ad hoc posterius desideratur plurium circumstantiarum concursus. Unde non eo ipso, quod in aliquo auctore catholico notetur aliqua propositio ut suspecta, notatur etiam ut haeresim sapiens, sed alia considerari debent. Quod legentium, aut qualificantium prudenti iudicio relinquimus."

depend on Cano for their interpretation of *haeresim sapiens*, and on Lugo for their interpretation of *suspecta*. However, it is to be carefully noted that they do not put forward their opinion as a mere repetition of the doctrine of these theologians — in fact, they do not so much as mention these authors — but as that which, in their opinion, enjoys the greatest theological authority.

ARTICLE VI

The Opinion of Antonio de Panormo
1709 A. D.

When considering the development of the censure of *error*, we noticed that Antonio de Panormo was somewhat influenced by the doctrine of de Lauria (1673), at least with regard to the examples which he brought forward to illustrate the erroneous proposition. Before considering the doctrine of Panormo on *haeresim sapiens*, therefore, we shall briefly examine Lauria's exposition of this censure, and see if there is a similar dependence in this case.

A. Lauria on *haeresim sapiens* (1673)

Lauria identifies the censures *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, saying that they are synonymous terms¹. By way of argument for this, he points to the fact that these censures have never been applied in the the same dogmatic condemnation. Whenever *haeresim sapiens* has been used, *suspecta* has been omitted, and vice versa².

According to his own interpretation of the censure, the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* (or *suspecta*) is that which is equivocal, capable

¹ Cf. LAURENTIUS BRANCATUS DE LAURIA, *Commentaria in Tertium Librum Sententiarum Mag. Fr. Joannis Duns Scoti*, t. 3, par 1, disput. 16, art. 2, no. 59. Romae (1673), p. 857 "Doctrina sapiens haeresim, eadem est ac suspecta de haeresi; ita quod synonymae sunt."

² Ibid., no. 60. "In neutra damnatione facta a Concilio Constantiensi, neque in damnatione facta a Pio et Gregorio, reperiuntur notae istae tamquam diversae, immo in prioribus non reperitur *suspecta*, aut *sapiens haeresim*, in postrema vero reperitur *suspecta tantum*; neque aliam video authenticam damnationem doctrinarum factam ab Ecclesia, in qua reperiuntur tamquam notae diversae, ut reperiuntur coeterae."

of both a Catholic and an heretical sense¹. Lauria makes no mention of the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* which was introduced by Lugo (1647), nor does he make any reference to the important role played by circumstances in this censure, a point emphasized by Cano. Lauria's doctrine resembles that of Castro, in so far as he demands a double sense for the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*. However, it differs in one respect. For Castro, the heretical sense is the proper interpretation, while the Catholic sense is merely metaphorical. For Lauria, however, there is no question of a metaphorical interpretation, and he seems to hold that both the Catholic and heretical senses are proper, thus giving a purely equivocal proposition.

B. Panormo is influenced by Lauria

At the beginning of his exposition of *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta*, Panormo considers the problem of distinguishing these two censures². He reviews the whole situation and briefly describes the distinction which was introduced by Lugo, and afterwards held by others³. At the same time, he notes that no such distinction was

¹ Ibid., no. 58, p. 857. "Et quidem mihi videtur tunc maxime apparere suspectam, quando aliquo modo, etsi aliquid aequivoco convenit cum formula, seu modo dicendi haereticorum, in ea materia. Quod si talis doctrina non sit expresse haeretica; quia non in omnibus similis, cum modo dicendi haereticorum; neque sit contraria conclusioni theologicae, necessario deductae ex una de fide et alia naturaliter evidente; remanet cum sola nota suspectae de haeresi."

To illustrate this censure, Lauria takes seven condemned propositions of Baius. Cf. Dz 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1007, 1009. Immediately after giving these examples (loc. cit., no. 62, p. 857), Lauria states: "Haec propositiones et aliae plures ex illis 75 Baii, ut legenti patet, non sunt immediate contra Sacram Scripturam, neque contra conclusionem theologicae necessario deductae ex una revelata et alia evidenti naturaliter; ideo nec haereticae nec erroneae dici possunt. Sed quia affinitatem et connexionem aliquam habent cum doctrina Pelagii ac Coelestii; licet ad sensum bonum possent reduci, dicuntur suspectae de haeresi, vel sapientes haeresim."

² Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 6, art. 1.

³ Panormo (loc. cit., no. 5) states that Lugo's doctrine in this matter was later upheld by Vinc. Ferre O. P. († 1682). Hurter (N. L., t. 4, p. 360) remarks that the *tractatus theologici* of this theologian have now become very rare works. However, we have the following quotation from tract. 2, q. 16, parag. 5, no. 24, which is to be found in Panormo. In this, Ferre's doctrine on the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* is clearly expressed.
"Sapere haeresim et redolere haeresim determinate ducit intellectum ad con-

placed by Suarez and the earlier theologians. He himself falls into line with this conservative view¹, and brings forward the same argument which we have seen Lauria applying above: there is no evidence of such a distinction in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, but quite the contrary; whenever the censure *haeresim sapiens* is applied, *suspecta* is omitted, and vice versa².

In spite of the fact that Panormo does not mention the name of Lauria in this respect, it is obvious that he is depending on him when he gives the same argument to prove that no distinction exists between the two censures. For both these theologians, this argument was valid at the time. It was quite true that *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* had never been applied in the same dogmatic condemnation, and considering the way the theologians depended on such condemnations for guidance in interpreting the censures, this was a very forceful argument. Four years after the publication of Panormo's *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, however, such a distinction was made in the condemnation of the errors of Quesnel (1713)³. Thus was the doctrine of Lugo, the Salmanticenses, Ferre, and others vindicated. Panormo's conservatism in this matter may be considered only as a step backwards.

ciendum aliquid quod habeat affinitatem cum haeresi, hoc enim est habere saporem haeresis habere affinitatem, seu aliqualem participationem haeresis, et ad hoc concipiendum determinate ducit propositio sapiens haeresim. At propositio suspecta de haeresi non ducit intellectum determinate ad aliquid, quod vel sit essentialiter haeresis, vel solum participative, sed tantum concipientem ducit ad suspicandum quod illud, quod ipsa profert, haeresis est, vel quod eam proferens, haeresim aliquam habeat: et licet multoties aliqua propositio ex hoc, quod haeresim sapiat, ducat concipientem ad dubitandum, vel vehementer suspicandum de haeresi, non tamen idem est formaliter, esse suspectam et haeresim sapere. Tum quia suspecta per hoc tantum definitur, quod suspicionem ingerat de haeresi, sapiens autem haeresim, quamvis suspicari de haeresi faciat, non tamen per hoc definitur, sed tantum per hoc, quod significet aliquid affinitatem habens cum haeresi. Tum secundo quia suspecta tantum est illa, quae potest suspicionem generare in audiente illam; sapiens autem haeresim potest tantum, et tam magnum habere saporem haeresis, quod possit etiam inducere ad aliquam probabilitatem quod aliqua haeresis lateat, vel in illa, vel in proferente. Ex quo credendum, propositionem sapientem haeresim majorem gravitatem habere, saltem per non repugnantiam, quam habeat propositio suspecta, quia potest pervenire ad generandam probabilitatem de haeresi, ad quod suspecta, ut talis, pervenire non valet."

¹ Cf. PANORMO, loc. cit., no. 6. Romae (1709), p. 337 "Quaestionis propositae opinionem identitati faventem ducimus seligendam, cum communiori theologorum..."

² Ibid., no. 7, p. 338.

³ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8.

C. Panormo rejects Cano's interpretation

After deciding that *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* are synonymous terms, Panormo goes on to explain the censure. Before giving his own interpretation, however, he examines the opinions of Castro (1547) and Cano (1563). He dismisses the doctrine of Castro by referring to the way it was refuted by Suarez. He makes a more detailed study of Cano's opinion.

So far, we have seen Cano's explanation of *haeresim sapiens* becoming more and more popular among subsequent theologians. Banez and Lorca agreed with it wholeheartedly. Lugo was also in agreement, but supplemented it with his distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*. The Salmanticenses combined the doctrine of Cano and Lugo in 1679 A. D., judged this to be the opinion which enjoyed the greatest authority. We recall that Cano vehemently attacked the definition of Castro which demanded a double sense for the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*. According to the latter, a proposition censurable in this way is that which has an heretical meaning at first sight, but which, nevertheless, may be metaphorically interpreted in a Catholic sense. We remember Cano's famous example regarding the public cult of the Blessed Eucharist¹. He pointed to this as a perfect illustration of the censure *haeresim sapiens*, and showed that it is incapable of any pious or metaphorical interpretation. In this way, Cano rejected the definition of Castro which demanded a double sense for the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*. Since then, with the exception of Lauria, we have seen no other theologians requiring this double sense. We have already pointed out that Panormo also rejects the doctrine of Castro, but this does not make him agree with Cano, as we shall presently see.

Panormo notes that according to Cano's doctrine, it is possible to have a proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*, and which is incapable of any Catholic interpretation. He rejects this, on the grounds that the example which Cano used to prove it is not, in fact, an example of *haeresim sapiens* but of the censure of *error*². Therefore, he abandons

¹ The example which Cano used is as follows: "Ridiculum est Eucharistiae sacramentum solemniter per vias publicas circumferre."

² Cf. PANORMO, loc. cit., art. 2, no. 4, p. 345. "Fortius admittere non possumus

Cano's doctrine on this censure. He does not mention, nor does he seem to realise, that this opinion has gained considerable authority since it was first put forward. We have already seen how it was taken up by such theologians as Banez, Lorca, Lugo and the Salmanticenses. Panormo now rejects it because he is displeased with the example.

D. Panormo gives his own interpretation of *haeresim sapiens*

On reading Panormo's explanation of this censure, we very soon find the reason for his great concern in rejecting the doctrine of Cano. He holds that the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* (or *suspecta*) must be capable of two senses, one Catholic and the other heretical¹. This reminds us of the explanation of Castro, who also held for a double sense. However, there is this difference, that while Castro held that the Catholic sense of such a proposition is a merely pious and metaphorical interpretation, Panormo holds it to be a proper (as distinct from metaphorical) sense. Thus, according to Panormo, *haeresim sapiens* indicates a proposition which is capable of two proper senses, one Catholic and the other heretical, in other words, an equivocal proposition.

In this we recognise the doctrine of Lauria which we have examined above. Panormo does not refer to him here, but there can be no

doctrinam Cani, qui propugnet non esse attendendum sensum improprium alicuius propositionis, ut ea sapiens haeresim inscribatur, adversus resolutionem supponere videtur posse aliquam propositionem nota praefata dignam autumari, quin ullius Catholici sensus, quatumvis improprie sit capax. . ."

After this, Panormo gives Cano's example regarding the public cult of the Blessed Eucharist, and notes that Lugo (de fide, disput. 20, sect. 3, no. 89) regarded it as being heresy. Panormo, however, makes it out to be an example of the censure of *error*. "Adhuc propositio sapiens haeresim non est dicenda, sed erronea, ac, ut talis, ad minus a Tridentino proscripta, cum ex ea per necessariam illationem cogi valeat proferens ad negandam fidei propositionem, qua Christus in Eucharistia credi debet adorandus, etiam cultu externo adoratione latriae."

The exact decree of the Council of Trent, here referred to by Panormo, is to be found in Dz 888. "Si quis dixerit, in sancto Eucharistiae sacramento Christum unigenitum Dei Filium non esse cultu latriae etiam externo adorandum, atque ideo nec festiva peculiari celebritate venerandum, neque in processionibus secundum laudabilem et universalem Ecclesiam sanctae ritum et consuetudinem solemniter circumgestandum, vel non publice, ut adoretur, populo proponendum et eius adoratores esse idololatrias: A. S."

¹ Cf. PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 6, art. 2, no. 6, p. 345.

doubt but that he depends on him for this interpretation, just as he depended on him when explaining the censure of *error* and when identifying *haeresim sapiens* with *suspecta*. With the exception of Lauria, we have seen no other theologian since Castro to require a double sense for the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*. We must admit, therefore, that this opinion carries very little theological weight. Panormo just states this doctrine, and neither cites authorities nor gives any theological reasons.

Though Panormo depends on Lauria in interpreting this censure, he goes much further in explaining his position. There is no question of a purely equivocal proposition, because this, at the most, could merit only the censure *male sonans*. Panormo has to show, therefore, how such a proposition can come into range of the censure *haeresim sapiens*. He does this with the aid of a distinction and utilizing Cano's doctrine on the importance of external circumstances when any doctrine is to be censured in this way.

According to Panormo, there are two types of equivocal propositions. Firstly, there is the purely equivocal proposition which admits of two proper senses, neither of which can be preferred to the other¹. Understood in this way, such a proposition will merit, at the most, the censure *male sonans*. In the second type of equivocal propositions, while the heretical and Catholic senses are both proper, the former has more weight by reason of different circumstances². Understood in this way, the equivocal proposition in matters relating to faith

¹ Ibid., no. 9, p. 347. "Aliae sunt propositiones aequivocae, quae duplicem involvunt sensum quorum quilibet sit ipsi proprius, ut neuter sit alteri praefendus, et quidem nedum eis in seipsis inspectis, sed etiam attento earumdem usu, ac etiam omnibus consideratis circumstantiis, virtute quarum alteruter eorumdem vim prae alio habeat, et promiscue aequae in uno, ac in alio sensu usurpari solent. Et hae propositiones non sunt in rigore absolute ulla prava nota censurabiles, nisi ex proferentium, vel operum, aut librorum, in quibus extant, qualitatibus, innotescat eas in pravo sensu prolatas aut scriptas."

² Ibid., no. 10. "Aliae sunt propositiones aequivocae, quae, etsi utriusque capaces proprie sint sensus, sani et pravi, attamen sensum pravum praevalemtem involvunt; sive quod verba earumdem, habeant potius, et majori cum proprietate exprimerent sensum pravum, quam sanum, sive ob extrinsecas circumstantias, praecisa proferentium conditione, ut patet in propositione: Unus de Trinitate est crucifixus, . . . quae cum vigeret error Severianorum passionem Divinitati est tributum, erat suspecta de haeresi non quod prolata esset a Severiano, sed simpliciter, quia sic a Severianis explicabatur, et alias dictus sensus ei minime repugnabat."

becomes the subject matter of the censure *haeresim sapiens*. It is to be noted that distinctions such as these were not made by Lauria in his description of this censure.

When examining the different interpretations of the censures *error* and *haeresi proxima*, we noticed that in each case there was a gradual development after Cano, which culminated in the exposition of Panormo. We have seen a similar development with regard to the censure *haeresim sapiens*, but unfortunately it culminates in the doctrine of the Salmanticenses (1679) and goes no further. We recall how the Carmelite theologians set out to find the interpretation which bore the greatest theological authority, and the result was a combination of the doctrines of both Cano and Lugo. If Panormo had continued in the same vein, all doubts regarding the correct interpretation of this censure would have vanished. Instead of this, he chose an entirely different interpretation for which he cited no authority. The only other theologian we have seen to give an explanation of *haeresim sapiens* which resembles that given by Panormo, is Laurentius de Lauria. However, he is a poor substitute for the combined forces of Cano, Banez, Lorca, Lugo and the Salmanticenses.

ARTICLE VII

Recapitulation and Conclusion

The two censures, *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*, were not applied in the same dogmatic condemnation until 1713 A. D. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was a considerable amount of confusion as to their distinction before this date. We have seen that the earlier theologians used these terms indiscriminately as if they were synonymous. Lugo (1647) was the first to suggest that they were distinct, and we recall the difference of degree which he placed between them, a difference based on circumstantial evidence. After Lugo, this interpretation became very popular among the theologians, and in 1679, the Salmanticenses combined it with Cano's doctrine on *haeresim sapiens* and judged this to be the opinion which enjoyed the greatest authority.

Not all subsequent theologians agreed with Lugo's distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*. Lauria and Panormo opposed it on

the grounds that there was no evidence for it in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. They also pointed out that whenever either of these censures was used in an official condemnation, the other was omitted. This omission seemed deliberate and pointed to identity. It must be admitted that before 1713 this constituted a very forceful argument. However, the condemnation of Quesnel vindicated the distinction which was first suggested by Lugo, so now this question is settled, and all arguments to the contrary are useless.

We have seen only one explanation of this distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* — that which was suggested by Lugo. There is no choice then, but to accept this. Accordingly, these two censures differ only in degree. If the circumstances allow a probable judgement that the assertor of the proposition in question is imbued with heresy, then the censure *haeresim sapiens* is to be applied. However, if the circumstances are not so great as to warrant this, but serve only to arouse suspicion, then the censure *suspecta* is to be preferred.

Of the three opinions which existed before Cano, there was only one which was not obviously false — the opinion of Castro. We have seen this examined again and again by subsequent theologians, so now we may safely disregard it as untenable. Suarez' refutation of this doctrine was the most cogent. We recall that he pointed out that a merely metaphorical Catholic sense will not save an heretical proposition from the censure (heresy) which it deserves. Furthermore, he pointed to the Council of Basle which condemned "*Christus quotidie peccat*" as erroneous, in spite of the fact that it can be metaphorically interpreted in a Catholic sense — referring to the Mystical Body. We may disregard, therefore, any interpretation of this censure which was put forward before Cano (1563).

We have seen that almost all the authorities agreed that circumstantial evidence plays a major role whenever the censures *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* are to be applied. There was no such unanimity, however, with regard to the material proposition considered in itself, i. e. apart from circumstances and context. All agreed that such a proposition may be capable of a Catholic as well as an heretical sense, (e. g. *fides justificat* and *Pater major me est*) but the question at issue was the possibility of having a particular doctrine censurable as *haeresim sapiens* and incapable of any Catholic or orthodox interpretation. Let us briefly reconsider the evidence and arguments for and against.

Cano, in his refutation of Alphonsus de Castro, was the first to raise this question. We recall his famous example which stated that it is ridiculous to take the Blessed Sacrament in solemn procession through the public streets. For Cano, this statement was a good example of *haeresim sapiens*, in so far as it aroused grave suspicions that its assertor was imbued with the Lutheran heresy which denied the Real Presence. Relying on the authority of this example, Cano was adamant in holding that doctrine which is *haeresim sapiens* does not necessarily have to be capable of a Catholic sense. This view was later upheld by such authorities as Banez, Lorca and the Salmanticenses. Lugo was not explicit on the matter since he was preoccupied with the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*.

The main upholder of the opposite opinion was Antonio de Panormo who held that all doctrine censurable as *haeresim sapiens* must be capable of a Catholic as well as an heretical interpretation. In his view, the circumstances are the deciding factor as to whether the censure should be applied or not. He had not much authority to support this peculiar stand. Lauria was the only other theologian we saw to be of the same mind, and his doctrine on the matter was anything but explicit. Panormo's sole argument was that the example originally suggested by Cano was, in fact, an example of *error* and not *haeresim sapiens*. It is quite true that this doctrine concerning the cult of the Blessed Sacrament was considered and censured by the Council of Trent. Likewise, it may be true that Cano's example is, in fact, an erroneous proposition, in so far as there is an indirect denial of the dogma which states that the cult of *latria* is due to Christ in the Blessed Sacrament. However, this does not prohibit it from being *haeresim sapiens* as well. This proposition, even though erroneous, conforms to the very name of *haeresim sapiens*, in so far as it "tastes" of the heresy which denies the Real Presence. It arouses the strongest suspicion which will permit of a probable judgement that the assertor is imbued with heresy. Consequently, we think that Cano had every reason for giving it as an example of this censure. If we consider it, as Panormo did, in relation to the dogma which states that the cult of *latria* is due to Christ in the Blessed Sacrament, then it is an erroneous proposition. If, however, we consider it in relation to the dogma of the Real Presence, then it is a good example of *haeresim sapiens*. In view of all this, we cannot accept Panormo's

stand saying that every proposition censurable as *haeresim sapiens* must be capable of both a Catholic and heretical interpretation. It is true that the majority of examples, such as '*fides justificat*', are capable of a double interpretation. Nevertheless, we judge that the doctrine of Cano which states that this double sense is not necessary, enjoys the greater authority. In later years, a number of theologians gave Panormo's doctrine on *haeresim sapiens* almost verbatim. However, this does not change our opinion, since there were others who expressly held for Cano and the Salmanticenses, while the majority did not go into this minute problem of the double or single sense of the proposition which is *haeresim sapiens*¹.

More than in any other theological censure, circumstances play a vital role when doctrine is to be censured as *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta*.

¹ The following are examples of the way the censures *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* were interpreted after Panormo (1709).

a) GOTTI O. P., *Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica*, t. 1, in primam partem, q. 1, dub. 5, no. 12. Bononiae (1727), p. 44.

"Propositio sapiens haeresim, (quae non in alio videtur differre a propositione haeresis suspecta, nisi quod illa cum majori, ista cum non adeo magna, multa tamen probabilitate iudicatur haeretica) illa est, quae saporem et suspicionem haeresis ingerit; vel quia in se ad haeresim videtur accedere, vel haeresim redolere. Vel quia licet in aliquo sensu tolerari posset, tamen ex circumstantia personae, loci et temporis adjunctam habet gravem, vel gravissimam suspicionem, aut saporem haeresis."

This description of Gotti is in agreement with the doctrine of the Salmanticenses, and all our own conclusions.

b) MONTAIGNE, *De Censuris, seu Notis Theologicis, et de Sensu Propositionum*, in Migne, T. C. C., t. 1, col. 1179-1182.

Montaigne faithfully follows Panormo, and gives lengthy quotations. He differs only in distinguishing *haeresim sapiens* from *suspecta*. (Note: This work of Montaigne was first published in 1732.)

c) TOURNELY, *Continuatio Praelectionum Theologicarum*, t. 6, *Appendix de Propositionibus ad moralem disciplinam spectantibus*, Parisiis (1745), p. 682.

"Propositio haeresim sapiens ea est quae licet sensus sani et pravi capax sit, attamen sensum pravum, sive ratione sui, sive ratione circumstantiarum, loci, temporis, et personarum, praevalentem involvit, vi cuius nata est grandem suspicionem et probabile iudicium de haeresi ingerere."

"Propositio de haeresi suspecta, est ea, quae licet catholici et heterodoxi sensus capax sit, praebet tamen sive ratione sui, sive ratione circumstantiarum, fundamentum sufficiens non quidem ad iudicandum probabiliter quod auctor sit haereticus, sed solum ad id prudenter et sine temeritate suspicandum."

In this description of the censures, Tournely embodies all the doctrine of Lugo and the Salmanticenses regarding the distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*. In both cases he states that the proposition is capable of a Catholic

thoritative interpretation of *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*. There are certain points in Panormo which we have rejected, such as his identification of these two censures and his doctrine that every proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* must be equivocal. We do not deny, however, that most propositions censurable as *haeresim sapiens* are, in fact, equivocal. In this respect, Panormo's consideration of such propositions is of great importance¹, and supplements the exposition of the Salmanticenses.

¹ Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 6, no. 9-10. Romae (1709), p. 347.

CHAPTER FOUR

Male Sonans — Piarum Aurium Offensiva

In the different treatises on the theological censures, we usually find *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* being explained immediately after *haeresim sapiens*. One may be inclined to wonder why the theologians attached such importance to these two censures and why they took such pains to explain them? At their face value, these censures do not seem to indicate any great deviation from orthodoxy. Indeed, it is difficult to understand why doctrine which is merely "wrong-sounding" and "offensive to pious ears" should be theologically considered at all. In spite of this, in almost all the treatises on the theological censures, we find these concepts being explained immediately after *haeresim sapiens*. Likewise, in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, they appear quite frequently. We find, for instance, that the Council of Constance applied *piarum aurium offensiva* to the articles of Huss. Perhaps it was this early use of the censure in such an important condemnation, which aroused the interest of the theologians as to its meaning.

As we shall presently see, there is no lack of opinions regarding the interpretation of these two censures. Indeed, almost all the theologians who try to explain them preface their remarks by admitting a considerable amount of confusion regarding the nature and correct explanation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*.

We recall that in the preceding chapter, we treated of two censures together; *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*. For quite a long time after the Council of Constance, these were identified by the theologians. There was no evidence from the condemnations of the Church to show they were distinct. On the contrary, when one was applied, the other was omitted, and such an omission gave every sign of being deliberate. Now, with regard to *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, we

shall see the same difficulties all over again. A long period elapsed after the Council of Constance before these two censures were applied in the same dogmatic condemnation and thus distinguished from each other. For this reason we shall treat of them together, and follow the same procedure of investigation as in the previous chapter.

ARTICLE I

“Male Sonans” and “Piarum Aurium Offensiva”
as Applied in the Dogmatic Condemnations of the Church

The use of these two censures in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church may be outlined in the following points:

1° In 1329 A. D., certain errors of Ekard were condemned as “*male sonantes, temerarios et suspectos de haeresi*”¹. This is the only reference either to *male sonans* or *piarum aurium offensiva* which we have been able to find in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church before the Council of Constance. We have never seen this condemnation being referred to by later theologians.

2° The Council of Constance (1415) condemned some of the articles of Huss as being offensive to pious ears². However, it makes no mention of *male sonans*.

3° In 1520 A. D., Pope Leo X applied *piarum aurium offensiva* to the errors of Luther, but made no mention of *male sonans*³.

4° Likewise, in 1567 A. D., Pope S. Pius V applied a cumulative censure to the errors of Baius. Once again *piarum aurium offensiva* is used, but no mention is made of *male sonans*⁴.

5° When the Holy Office condemned the errors of Molinos in 1687 A. D., once again there was mention of *piarum aurium offensiva*, but *male sonans* was omitted⁵.

¹ Cf. Dz 501-529. The exact words of the condemnation are to be found in no. 529.

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1, b.

³ Ibid., no. 2.

⁴ Ibid., no. 3.

⁵ Ibid., no. 4.

6° In 1690 A. D., certain propositions of the Jansenists were condemned by the Holy Office, and here, for the first time in the post-Constance period, we see the censure *male sonans* being applied. It is to be noted, however, that in this condemnation there is no mention of *piarum aurium offensiva*¹.

7° Twenty-three articles of Fénelon were condemned in 1699 A. D., and here, for the first time, the two censures *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* were applied in the same dogmatic condemnation and thus distinguished from each other².

8° In 1713 A. D., these two censures appeared once again in the same dogmatic condemnation, when a hundred and one propositions of Quesnel were censured by Pope Clement XI³.

From this outline we note that the official distinction between the two censures was not made by the Church until as late as 1699 A. D. We shall not be surprised, therefore, to meet many conflicting opinions on this point. In the previous condemnations, whenever one of these censures was applied, the other was omitted. All this pointed to identity, especially when we consider that the very names of these censures, *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, seemed to convey the same concept.

ARTICLE II

Period of Identity

As already pointed out, the censures *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* were not officially distinguished in the condemnations of the Church until the year 1699. However, the theologians did not wait for this decree to suggest possible distinctions. As we shall see later on, Suarez (1621) was the first to do so, and this was his greatest contribution towards the correct interpretation of these two censures.

In this article, we wish to examine the different opinions which existed before Suarez. Cano, of course, is our greatest authority in this period, but we shall also outline the different interpretations which preceded and followed him.

¹ Ibid., no. 6.

² Ibid., no. 7.

³ Ibid., no. 8.

A. Different interpretations before Cano

1° Turrecremata (1489) identified both *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* with *scandalosa*, and treated these three censures as if they were one. In his explanation, he states that a proposition which is censurable in this way gives occasion of spiritual ruin to its hearers. Then he goes further and states that such propositions smack of heresy, even though by a slight modification they may be rendered in a Catholic sense¹.

This description of the threefold censure is, in fact, a description of *haeresim sapiens*. However, there is no contradiction for Turrecremata in this, since he identified *haeresim sapiens* with what later became known as the censure of *error*. Likewise, he may be excused for identifying *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, because he was at a great disadvantage writing at such an early date. However, we cannot easily explain his identification of these two censures with *scandalosa*. The Council of Constance, in its condemnation of the articles of Huss, had distinguished between propositions which were scandalous and those which were offensive to pious ears². If Turrecremata had examined this decree, he could not but see his mistake. In view of all this, we are forced to abandon his opinion on these two censures, even at this early stage.

2° Alphonsus de Castro (1547) identified *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens*³, and *piarum aurium offensiva* with *scandalosa*⁴. Regarding

¹ Cf. TURRECREMATA, *Summa de Ecclesia*, lib. 4, pars 2, cap. XI. Venetiis (1561), p. 384. "Propositio scandalosa aut male sonans sive piarum aurium offensiva, dicitur propositio quae occasionem ruinae praebet auditoribus, ut propositiones multae licet cum modificatione adjuncta sint verae, per se tamen et absolute sine modificatione prolatae videntur favere propositionibus haereticilibus, ut si quis assereret simpliciter patrem majorem filio, et Deum in incarnatione factum creaturam, et similes quae iuxta doctores magis sunt exponendae quam extendendae."

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1. b.

³ Cf. ALPHONSUS DE CASTRO, *De Justa Punitioe Haereticorum*, lib. 1, cap. 3. (Opera Omnia, Parisiis 1571, col. 1054 B.) "Propositio haeresim sapiens, aut male circa ea quae ad fidem pertinent, sonans, est illa, quae in prima significatione quam verba prima facie ostendunt, sensum habet hereticum: quamvis pie intellecta, sensum aliquem habeat verum."

⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1055 D. "Propositio scandalosa, aut piarum aurium offensiva, est propositio quae auditoribus piis, occasionem ruinae praebet."

the latter, there was no excuse for Castro since, as we have seen in the case of Turrecremata, the Council of Constance had clearly distinguished between these two censures. It seems that Cano was the first theologian to make an adequate study of the dogmatic condemnations in relation to the theological censures. He made full advantage of every bit of evidence he could glean from this official source. On the contrary, the theologians who preceded him did not take much pains to do this, as is obvious in the case of Turrecremata and Castro.

3° Simancas, in the first edition of *Institutiones Catholicae* (1552), follows Castro to the letter in interpreting these two censures¹. However, as we shall afterwards see, in the second edition of this work (1575), he changed his doctrine considerably to bring it into line with Cano's teaching in *De Locis* which had appeared in the meantime (1563).

We have now outlined the three opinions which Cano had for reference in his description of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*. Out of this confusion he had to bring some clear-cut ideas and some definite notion of the censures. We shall now see if he succeeded in doing this.

B. The Interpretation of Melchior Cano (1563)

For Cano, *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* constitute the fourth theological censure, which he examines immediately after *haeresim sapiens*². When considering his doctrine regarding this latter censure, we noticed that he took up a peculiar position in refusing to lay down any rules and to give any definition, saying that it was a matter for the *gustus* and prudence of a wise theologian rather than for rules and definitions. Now, when he comes to treat of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, he takes a similar stand³, which makes it rather difficult to ascertain his mind on the subject.

¹ Cf. SIMANCAS, *Institutiones Catholicae*, cap. 52, no. 6-7. Vallisoleti (1552), p. 191.

² Cf. CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. XII, cap. 9. (Migne, T. C. C., col. 620-622).

³ *Ibid.*, col. 621. "Itaque, ut semel finiamus, cum non sit cuiusvis male sonantem propositionem a bene sonante distinguere, prudentissimi theologi, quod iam iterum ac saepe dixi, consulendi a iudicibus Ecclesiae sunt, nisi volunt in harum rerum iudiciis vehementer errare. Et quamvis nullam nos quidem comprehensionem habeamus, definitionem nullam, qua iudices valeant singulas in specie male sonantes propositiones iudicare."

From the very first line of his exposition, it is clear that for Cano *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are synonymous terms, indicating one and the same theological censure — “*Idem vero de propositione male sonante, SEU piarum aurium offensiva dixerim.*” Throughout, he uses both names indiscriminately, and does not even hint at any possible distinction. It is true that both these terms are very similar, in so far as they convey the same idea: any doctrine which has a *malus sonus* will certainly offend pious ears. Likewise, Cano had no evidence from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church to guide him on this point. The decrees of the Council of Constance¹ and the bull “*Exurge Domine*” of Pope Leo X² had applied the censure *piarum aurium offensiva*, but made no mention of *male sonans*. Furthermore, it must be remembered that there was very little authority to go on from the explanations advanced by earlier theologians. Taking these circumstances into consideration, there is every excuse for Cano in identifying these two censures.

We have pointed out that at least two of the three opinions which existed before Cano identified *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens*. Cano takes special pains to counteract this error, showing how these two censures differ. As usual, he does not mention the names of the theologians who caused this confusion, but we have no difficulty in recognizing the doctrine of Castro and Simancas which we have outlined above.

The term *male sonans*, he states, may be considered in a generic or specific sense. In its generic signification, it may be applied to heresy, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*, in so far as all these are wrong-sounding and offensive to pious ears. However, in its specific signification the term *male sonans* indicates a particular censure which is distinct from all others. It concerns doctrine which is expressed with a crudity of language offensive to pious ears, but which does not err against faith in the same way as heresy, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*³. Further down in his explanation, Cano makes a more particular com-

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1, a, b, c.

² Ibid., no. 2.

³ Cf. CANO, loc. cit., col. 620. “*Dupliciter ergo de propositione male sonante loqui possumus, uno modo generaliter, quo omnis propositio fidei contraria fidelium aures offendit, eoque magis, quo apertius illam vident fidei catholicae esse contrariam; alio modo specialiter, quo gradum quemdam propositionum constitimus ab illo haeticarum supremo distantem.*”

parison between *haeresim sapiens* and *male sonans*, and notes that the latter censure is less serious since it indicates nothing unorthodox in relation to divine faith, but errs only in so far as it conveys a certain *sonus* which is not in keeping with *sana doctrina*¹.

From these comparisons which Cano makes between *male sonans* and other censures, we have gleaned some definite points regarding the nature of doctrine which is wrong-sounding. It contains no error against faith, not even in the same way as *haeresim sapiens* which merely smacks of heresy. However, it errs against sound doctrine. He does not tell us the precise way in which it errs, but uses such phrases as: “*absonum nescio quid atque absurdum*” and “*sonum tamen quemdam absurdum et peregrinum referunt*”. We must determine more exactly what he means by these words.

At the very beginning of his exposition of *male sonans*, Cano states that doctrine which is censurable in this way may, in fact, be quite true. Nevertheless, it falls under the censure because it is confusedly expressed — *inconditis verbis*². According to Cano's mind, therefore, it seems that whether the proposition in question be true or false is of secondary importance. The censure *male sonans* is first and foremost concerned with the material words used in the expression of Catholic doctrine.

This incongruous expression is also offensive to pious ears. (We recall that for Cano, *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are synonymous terms.) He discusses this question of “*pious ears*” at length, and waxes eloquent in denouncing false piety and pharisaic scandal. He stresses the fact that the ears of the crowd (*turba*) cannot be a criterion in this matter. They must be refined, delicate and

¹ Ibid., col. 621. “*... huiusmodi propositionum duos esse gradus, unum earum quas ante diximus haeresim sapere; videlicet, quae fidelium gustui male sapiunt, eadem male sonant auditui... alter gradus male sonantium propositionum est, quae licet haeresim non sapiant, sonum tamen quemdam absurdum et peregrinum referunt, qui a doctrina sana, sinceroque et solido Ecclesiae sermone discrepare videatur.*”

² Ibid., col. 620. “*Quemadmodum autem non solum res falsae atque perabsurdae, sed graves quoque ac verae sententiae inconditis verbis elatae offendunt aures, acres praesertim et acutas; sic theologorum aures teretes et religiosae non a sententiis modo falsis et haeticis, sed ab iis etiam abhorrent, quas intelligenti iudicio percipiunt male atque absurde sonare, quamvis nullam in eis falsitatem haereseos deprehendant.*”

prudent ears. Piety must be taken in the strict sense, and not the false common piety which easily suffers offence¹.

To end his description of *male sonans*, Cano gives some examples of the censure, most of which are taken from the condemnations made by the Council of Constance. As these examples raised much comment in later years, we shall note them here².

- 1° Graduationes et magisteria universitatum esse vana gentilitate introducta, et tantum prodesse Ecclesiae quantum diabolum.
- 2° Sylvestrum et Constantinum errasse Ecclesiam dotando.
- 3° Ecclesiam Romanam esse synagogam Satanae; electionem papae a cardinalibus per diabolum fuisse introductam.
- 4° Papam non debere dici sanctissimum propter officium: alioquin diabolus diceretur sanctus, quia est officialis Dei.
- 5° Plures Romae nunc salvari ex conjugatis quam ex clericis.
- 6° Monachatum non esse pietatem.
- 7° Romani episcopi monarchiam post divi Hieronymi tempus exortam esse.
- 8° Phocam instituisse, Romanam Ecclesiam omnium esse Ecclesiarum caput.

After considering Cano's doctrine on *male sonans*, we now have some definite points to go on. This censure does not concern doctrine which errs in any way against divine faith. Thus it differs from heresy, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*. In fact, doctrine which is wrong-sounding need not necessarily be false, since this censure is primarily concerned with the mode of expression rather than the sense. If the expression is incongruous, so as to be injurious to sound doctrine, the censure *male sonans* is to be applied. It is true that Cano identified *male sonans* with *piarum aurium offensiva*, but he is easily excused for this mistake. At the same time, however, he clearly distinguished these censures from *haeresim sapiens* and *scandalosa*, and established order out of the confusion which existed before him.

Cano does not cite any authority for his interpretation of *male sonans*. There was little or no evidence to be found in the official decrees of

¹ Ibid., col. 621. "... necessarium est, si res has recte et sapienter dijudicare volumus, aurium habere sensum politum, tersum, subtilem, prudentem." And a little further down, he states: "Non est igitur habenda ratio vulgi promiscui, imbecilli, perturbati, imprudentis, sed prudentis, sinceri, pii, incorrupti. Nec theologia modo requirenda est, sed pietas et prudentia, sine qua nullae aures possunt consentaneos sonos abhorrentesque discernere."

² Ibid., col. 622.

the Church, and, as we have seen, the opinions of earlier theologians tended only to confuse the matter. It must be noted, however, that besides the official condemnations made by the Church, these theological censures were applied by the universities and the inquisitors. Perhaps Cano relies on these latter sources for his interpretation of this censure.

C. Influence of Cano on subsequent opinions

Cano's logical explanation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* gave later theologians some definite authority to work on in their efforts to interpret these two censures. We can see the influence of Cano's doctrine on the following three opinions which appeared after the publication of *De Locis Theologicis* (1563) and before Suarez' exposition appeared in 1621 A. D.

1° JACOBUS DE SIMANCAS (1575). We have already noted that in the first edition of his *Institutiones Catholicae* (1552), Simancas followed Castro in identifying *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens*, and *piarum aurium offensiva* with *scandalosa*. In the second edition, which appeared in 1575 A. D., (twelve years after the publication of Cano's *de Locis*) we notice a slight change in Simancas' doctrine. He no longer identifies *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens* — Cano is undoubtedly responsible for this — but links *male sonans*, *piarum aurium offensiva* and *scandalosa* together, and considers them as one censure¹. Even though this latter position is far from being correct — Constance had distinguished *scandalosa* as a separate censure — it is, nevertheless, nearer the truth than the first, which identified *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens*.

2° BANEZ (1584) summarises and approves of Cano's doctrine, and then makes a rather long examination of his examples. He notes that Cano was subsequently criticised for suggesting these propositions to illustrate *male sonans*, since they merit a far more serious censure. Banez himself agrees with the criticism, and states that Cano definitely

¹ Cf. SIMANCAS, *Institutiones Catholicae*, tit. 54, no. 10. Romae, (1575), p. 425. "Propositio male sonans et pias aures offendens est, quae auditioribus, sive lectoribus piis, scandalum et occasionem ruinae praebet."

erred in this respect¹. He points out that the first two propositions are good examples of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, but the remaining six merit a graver censure. It is interesting to note that even though Banez agrees with this criticism of Cano — *et iudicio nostro, merito* — he takes each example in turn and interprets it in a much milder way than it appears at first sight. Then he suggests that perhaps Cano understood these propositions in this mild way. Thus, the faithful disciple makes every effort to justify and excuse his old master!

³⁰ PETRUS DE LORCA (1614) notes that the terms '*male sonans*' and '*piarum aurium offensiva*' are generally accepted by the theologians to be synonymous, indicating the same theological censure. He himself agrees with this, saying that it is according to the mind of the Church since these two terms have never appeared in the same dogmatic condemnation². He then examines the different opinions and points out that some theologians identified this censure with *haeresim sapiens*, while others identified it with *scandalosa*. He finally selects the doctrine of Cano as being the most likely interpretation of the censure, and remarks that it is not only the sense of a proposition which may be censured, but also the very words in which it is expressed³.

This outline suffices to show the popularity and effect of Cano's interpretation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* on later theologians. At the time, it was in perfect conformity with all the dogmatic condemnations of the Church.

¹ Cf. BANEZ, in *Secundam Secundae*, q. XI, a. 2. Lugduni (1588), col. 449. "De huiusmodi censura harum propositionum, quod scilicet, tantum sint male sonantes vel sapientes haeresim, reprehensus est Magister Cano. Et iudicio nostro merito. Quoniam eius censura fuit nimis levis et mitis, non justa."

² Cf. LORCA, *Commentaria et Disputationes in Secundam Secundae Divi Thomae*, disput. 40, no. 13. Matrili (1614), p. 262.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 15. "... quia non solum sensum, sed et modum loquendi Catholicum, et Catholicis auribus accomodatum observare debemus, et non solum mente, sed verbis etiam veram fidem tenere."

ARTICLE III

Period of Distinction

In the preceding article, we considered different opinions ranging from Turrecremata (1489) to Petrus de Lorca (1614), and we saw that the great weight of authority in that period held that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are identical. In this present article, we shall examine another group of theologians, all of whom placed a distinction between these two censures. The three great authorities in this period are Suarez (1621), Lugo (1646) and the Carmelites of Salamanca (1679). It is to be noted that none of these theologians had ever seen these censures being officially distinguished by the Church. That did not take place until 1699 A. D.¹

A. Suarez introduces a distinction (1621)

The greatest contribution which Suarez made towards the correct interpretation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* was in suggesting that a distinction existed between them. He admits that these two censures are very much akin and that the distinction is very slight. Nevertheless, he states that there is a difference in *piarum aurium offensiva*, in so far as it implies an element offensive to the virtue of religion². It is interesting to note that Suarez is completely unaware that he is introducing something new with this distinction. He even says that it is common doctrine, and quotes Cano as an authority. We have already analysed the doctrine of Cano and have seen that he does not even hint at such a distinction, and uses both terms indiscriminately throughout his exposition. As for Suarez' judgement

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 7.

² Cf. SUAREZ, de fide, disput. 19, sect. 2, no. 19. "In quinto gradu ponitur propositio piarum aurium offensiva, quae certe parum differt a praecedenti; nam, quod male sonat, aures offendit. Dum vero additur piarum aurium, per pietatem maxime intelligitur vera fidei doctrina. Quia vero pietas ad religionem pertinet, aliquid speciale in hoc gradu addi videtur per ordinem ad religionem; nam specialiter offendit pias aures, quando aliquid indecens vel indignum in materia religionis sentitur vel profertur, et ita videtur hic gradus communiter intelligi, ut in Cano et in aliis videri potest."

regarding the common doctrine, we point to Lorca (1614) who had written a few years earlier. Not only was he silent on any distinction but set about proving from the condemnations of the Church that there was none.

We have stated that this distinction of Suarez was his greatest contribution towards the correct interpretation of these two censures. In fact, it was his only contribution. That which Suarez explained as the censure *male sonans* was what the majority of other theologians regarded as *haeresim sapiens*¹, and what we have explained as such in the preceding chapter. There was no contradiction for Suarez in this, since his interpretation of *haeresim sapiens* corresponded to what the other theologians considered as *errori proxima*. We recall that Suarez' doctrine on *haeresim sapiens* was soon abandoned and hardly ever again referred to.

B. Lugo determines the distinction of Suarez (1646)

Throughout his exposition of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, Lugo constantly refers to Hurtado (i. e. Petrus Hurtado de Mendoza S. J. † 1651) whom he closely follows. Unfortunately, we have been unable to check his references to this author and to determine exactly to what extent Lugo depends on him. However, the fact that Lugo upholds this opinion is much more important than knowing that he depends on Hurtado. Lugo is one of our greatest authorities on the theological censures, and has always been recognised as such by the theologians who came after him.

At the outset, Lugo examines different opinions and various errors regarding these two censures². All of these opinions we ourselves have

¹ Ibid., no. 18. "Et explicatur (male sonans) optime modo supra tacto, de propositione aequivoca, quae in proprio aliquo sensu potest esse haeretica, et in alio etiam proprio catholica; nam illa absolute, et sine distinctione vel declaratione prolata, merito dicitur male sonans. In quo distinctio alia adhiberi potest; nam quaedam propositio dicitur ab extrinseco male sonans, alia ab intrinseco. Ab extrinseco vocatur, quando suspicio vel malus sonus, non ex propositione nude sumpta, sed cum circumstantiis personae, loci aut temporis oritur, ut haec propositio: *Fides justificat*, absolute prolata, olim non male sonabat, nunc autem, ortis haeresibus, male sonat; et similiter prolata a persona suspecta, multo pejus sonabit, quam prolata a persona de cuius doctrina et catholica fide satis constat, quae quidem pro foro externo multum observanda sunt."

² Cf. Lugo, de fide, disput. 20, sect. 3, no. 91.

already considered, so there is little use in discussing them again. There is one interesting point, however, in Lugo's outline of opinions: he notes Suarez' position on *male sonans*, and states that Cano's doctrine is the same. It seems obvious from this remark that Lugo had not read *De Locis Theologicis* but quoted Cano from secondary sources. We have seen that Cano widely differs from Suarez on this censure. What Suarez considers as *male sonans*, Cano would place as *haeresim sapiens*. We recall that when treating of this latter censure we noted a similar instance which led us to suspect that Lugo had not first hand knowledge of Cano's exposition of the theological censures¹.

Following Hurtado, Lugo holds that the censure *male sonans* is primarily concerned with the words used to express Catholic doctrine: there is no error in them against faith, and the sense of the proposition is unquestioned. However, this sense is expressed in an incongruous and untraditional manner, and solely because of this the censure is prescribed². As an example, Lugo gives the following: "*In Deo sunt tres essentiae relativae*". This proposition, he states, does not arouse any suspicion of heresy, and nobody would doubt that what the author wishes to say is; "*In Deo sunt tres subsistentiae relativae*". Notwithstanding this, the censure *male sonans* is to be applied since the word "essence", (which is always reserved by the theologians to signify that which is common to the Three Divine Persons) is used in an untraditional way.

This opinion of Hurtado, which is here endorsed by Lugo, is nothing else but Cano's doctrine put forward in different words. We have already considered all the points mentioned in the above description of *male sonans* in Cano's exposition of the same censure. The curious fact about all this is that Lugo, having linked Cano with Suarez and cited both of them as holding erroneous opinions, unknowingly foliowed Cano in his interpretation of this censure. Lugo quoted Hurtado as giving the correct explanation, but he was totally unaware that

¹ Cf. supra, ch. 3, art. 4.

² Cf. LUGO, loc. cit. "Denique Hurtado (de fide, disput. 81, parag. 33) dicit male sonantem esse, quae sensum habet congruentem fidei, verba autem incongrua, ita ut malitia huius censurae non sit in sensu verborum, nec sit argumentum animi infidelis, sed solum in verbis, quia sunt in ea significatione parum aut nihil usitata, ob quod absonant auribus, unde ortum est illud adagium, *ex verbis inordinate prolatis enascitur haeresis*."

Hurtado had based his doctrine on Cano's opinion. Here is further proof that Lugo had not consulted *De Locis Theologicis* on the theological censures.

After giving his opinion on *male sonans*, Lugo goes on to discuss *piarum aurium offensiva*. He notes that many theologians made no distinction between these two censures while Suarez placed a special nuance in the latter; an element which is contrary to the virtue of religion. Lugo also notices that Hurtado further determined the distinction of Suarez, saying that the proposition which is offensive to pious ears is none the less true, but expresses something which is disrespectful to God and the saints.

After this outline of the different opinions regarding *piarum aurium offensiva*, Lugo becomes more precise and gives his own explanation. He states that there is a total distinction between *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* — *differre in rigore*. To prove this, he merely describes each censure, and shows how one totally differs from the other. *Male sonans* is concerned with the abuse of words in so far as they are used with an untraditional signification which is apt to bear an incorrect meaning. On the contrary, there is no such abuse of words in a proposition which is offensive to pious ears. In this case, words are used in their traditional and proper signification, but they express something which is best left unsaid, or express it in such a crude fashion as to be offensive to the piety and reverence of the faithful¹.

We may sum up Lugo's distinction as follows: *male sonans* is concerned with the words which are used to express a certain object, while *piarum aurium offensiva* is concerned with the object which is expressed.

To illustrate the censure *piarum aurium offensiva*, Lugo conjures up the following situation. Let us suppose that someone who has been

¹ Ibid., no. 94. "Ego existimo, hanc censuram differre in rigore a male sonante, quia male sonans abutitur vocibus extra communioem significationem, eas applicando ad minus usitatam; quare eius indecentia consistit in usurpatione vocum, quae habent malam significationem, et falsam, licet non usurpentur ad illam, sed ad aliam veram. At vero propositio, quae solum offendit pias aures, usurpat voces in sola propria, et usitata earum significatione, et nihil falsum dicit, nec vocibus habentibus aliam significationem falsam, sed tamen dicit id, vel tali modo, ut fidelium pietatem, et reverentiam, si non extinguat, ad minus ex se tepidiorum reddat: et ideo aures piae horrore huius imminentis tepiditatis, auditis iis vocibus offenduntur."

publicly excommunicated by the Church has died for the faith before receiving absolution in the external forum. Furthermore, let us assume that this person has been declared a martyr and his feast is now being celebrated each year. On the recurrence of this feast, Lugo states, if one were to say, "We honour and celebrate the feast of one publicly excommunicated", this statement, though true, would be offensive to pious ears. This example is certainly rather far-fetched, but it brings out the idea which he is trying to explain — the expression of things which are best left unsaid since they are obnoxious to piety and religion. Another example which Lugo suggests is the following; "*Magdalena meretrix, Matthaeae usurariae et avarae, Petre perjure et apostata, orate pro nobis*"¹.

Having distinguished *male sonans* from *piarum aurium offensiva*, we may now ask which is the graver censure? Lugo deals with this problem, and following Hurtado states that objectively speaking, *male sonans* is the more serious because of the danger of misrepresentation in matters concerning faith. However, from the subjective and moral point of view, *piarum aurium offensiva* is graver, since a proposition which is censurable in this way necessarily presupposes subjective dispositions which are not in keeping with the virtue of religion².

To conclude our examination of Lugo's doctrine, we note again the main points of interest. Following Hurtado, he agreed with Cano's interpretation of *male sonans*. He was unaware that this explanation already enjoyed such authority, and actually listed Cano with Suarez as holding the same erroneous opinion on this censure. Regarding the distinction between *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, Lugo went much farther than Suarez who almost identified these two censures, placing a trifling distinction between them. For Lugo, there is a total distinction, — *in rigore* — just as much as there exists between any other two theological censures. His description of *piarum aurium offensiva* is precise and clear-cut, and not just a vague statement such as we have seen in Suarez. Having thus clearly described this censure, it was all the easier to distinguish it from *male sonans*.

¹ Ibid., no. 95.

² Ibid., no. 93. "... quamvis hic gradus culpae minor sit, quam male sonantis, quod attinet ad falsitatem, quia sine falsitate et sine incongrua significatione vocis potest propositio offendere pias aures; in genere autem moris esse gravio-rem, quia procedit ab animo procaci, et effrenata lingua."

C. The Salmanticenses select the most authoritative interpretation
1679 A. D.

Once again we state our reasons for considering the doctrine of the Salmanticenses on the theological censures. It is true that they are not often cited as authorities in this respect, and their exposition, at first sight, seems to be devoid of all originality. Nevertheless, in our estimation the Carmelites of Salamanca constitute a first class authority on the interpretation of the censures. They do not set out to be original, since they judge that the correct interpretation of these censures is a matter of authority and common opinion. Consequently, they seek out the explanation of each censure based on the greatest authority among the theologians¹. It will be interesting, therefore, to see the results of their investigations regarding the two censures, *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*.

In a few words, the Salmanticenses tell us the interpretation of *male sonans* which, in their judgement, is the most authoritative; "*Propositio male sonans est, quae habet sensum congruentem fidei, verba autem non congrua*"². This short definition is in perfect agreement with Lugo's doctrine on this censure. The Salmanticenses even give the same example; "*In Deo sunt tres essentiae relativae*".

There is one important point regarding *male sonans* which the Salmanticenses make explicit, and which we have not seen stressed before this. Even though this censure is primarily concerned with the words rather than the sense of a proposition, it is not merely a question of grammar but a true theological censure. The use of untraditional and incongruous terminology in theology is not a merely grammatical fault. It constitutes a danger to faith in so far as it opens the way for error and misrepresentation. Because of this, *male sonans* must be considered as a theological and not a merely grammatical censure³. They point to different places in Saint Thomas where this idea is made clear⁴. Perhaps it was from this source that the censure *male sonans* was originally conceived.

¹ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, de fide, disput. 9, dub. 4, no. 42.

² Ibid., no. 52.

³ Ibid. "Quae inordinatio non est mere grammaticalis, sed etiam contra bonam theologiam, atque ideo aliquo modo contra fidem, cui illa innititur..."

⁴ Cf. S. T., 1. q. 31, a. 2, "Respondeo dicendum quod, quia ex verbis inordinate

Regarding *piarum aurium offensiva*, the Salmanticenses once again follow Lugo's interpretation, and in a well constructed definition, they include all his doctrine on this censure¹.

(Propositio *piarum aurium offensiva*) est quae licet verum dicat, tamen vel dicit illud quod taceri oportet ob reverentiam ad sancta; vel dicit eo modo, qui illa in contemptum venire facit.

When considering Lugo and Suarez on these two censures, we noticed that there was a difference of opinion regarding the distinction between *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*. Lugo held for a total distinction, while Suarez placed a mere nuance in *piarum aurium offensiva*, and this was the only differentiating factor. The Salmanticenses do not explicitly go into this question of distinction, but it would appear from the context that they are more in agreement with Suarez than with Lugo. When introducing the censure *piarum aurium offensiva*, they seem to imply that it pertains to the same category as *male sonans* and differs only in so far as it contains a special element which is offensive to religion². In all probability, the Salmanticenses judged that the doctrine of Lugo, regarding the total distinction, had not gained sufficient authority amongst later theologians. We must also remember that before Suarez, these two censures had been commonly identified. In light of this, we can understand why the Salmanticenses, who set out to find the common doctrine and the most authoritative interpretation, were unwilling to accept Lugo's total distinction which was, as yet, comparatively new.

We have now examined this second period, i. e. the period of distinction, which took place in the development of the censures *male*

prolatis incurritur haeresis, ut Hieronymus dicit, ideo cum de Trinitate loquimur, cum cautela et modestia est agendum: quia, ut Augustinus dicit, in 1 de Trin., 'nec periculosius alicubi erratur, nec laboriosius aliquid quaeritur, nec fructuosius aliquid invenitur'."

Cf. 3, q. 16, a. 8. "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Hieronymus dicit, 'ex verbis inordinate prolatis incurritur haeresis'. Unde cum haereticis nec nomina debemus habere communia: ne eorum errori favere videamur."

¹ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, loc. cit., no. 53.

² Ibid. "Ad praecedentis propositionis qualitatem reducitur propositio *piarum aurium offensiva*; nam eo ipso, quod propositio habeat dissonantiam proximae explicatae, opus est quod offendat aures pias, seu catholicas. Sed quia pietas ad religionem pertinet, videtur hanc censuram aliquid speciale addere ad religionem spectans, nempe aliquid indecens, vel indignum, quod aures pietati assuetas offendit."

sonans and *piarum aurium offensiva*. Regarding the censure *male sonans*, we have seen nothing new. The explanation of Cano was held by the majority of theologians, and though accidental changes may have taken place, the basic concepts remained the same. One important point which was made explicit by the Salmanticenses was that this censure, though primarily concerned with the use of words, is not merely grammatical but theological. The untraditional use of terminology contravenes good theology and prepares the way for error and misrepresentation in matters of faith.

In this period, most of the evolution took place concerning *piarum aurium offensiva*. We have seen it first being gradually separated from *male sonans*, and then in the exposition of Lugo, being made a separate censure, specifically distinct from all others. The Salmanticenses, though retaining Lugo's concept of *piarum aurium offensiva*, did not endorse his doctrine regarding the complete distinction. However, it must be admitted that Lugo based this doctrine on a very solid argument. *Male sonans* is concerned with the abuse of words, in so far as Catholic doctrine is expressed in an incongruous fashion. On the contrary, *piarum aurium offensiva* is not concerned with the abuse of words. A proposition which is censured in this way uses words in their correct and traditional signification, but errs in so far as it expresses something which, though true, is best left unsaid. This description of either censure constitutes a very solid argument for Lugo's specific distinction.

Once again we recall that none of the theologians whom we have consulted in this article had ever seen *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* being applied in the same dogmatic condemnation and thus being officially distinguished by the Church. From the opinions which we have just considered, however, it seems that there was a definite trend towards this doctrine. Nevertheless, we shall presently see that the controversy was not yet finished. After the Salmanticenses, and even after the official distinction was made by the Church, there were still some theologians who held that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are synonymous terms, indicating one and the same theological censure.

ARTICLE IV

Second Period of Identity

In the preceding article, we considered a development in the interpretation of the censures *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, in so far as a distinction was made between them. We recall that there was no unanimity regarding the nature of this distinction, but the important point is that such a distinction was made and different sets of examples were given to illustrate either censure. The official distinction was not made by the Church until the year 1699¹, but, as we have seen, this was anticipated by a number of theologians. It would not be correct to say that in this condemnation the Church was influenced by Suarez, Hurtado, Lugo, the Salmanticenses and others. We must consider the situation from a different point of view, and say that these theologians were so well acquainted with the mind of the Church, as to be found in the right when the official distinction was eventually made. We must always remember that in the everyday life of the Church, these censures had been considered and applied by the inquisitors and universities. Consequently, apart from the dogmatic condemnations, there was this general interpretation which could have influenced and guided the individual theologians.

Before this distinction between *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* was generally accepted, another stage took place in the development of these two censures. This third stage was by way of reaction to the second one, in so far as it was adamantly held once again that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are synonymous terms. In the present article, we are about to examine this third period which we call 'the second period of identity'. In this there was a great step backwards, and we shall presently describe in detail how it came about. It must be remembered that the opinions which we are now about to consider cannot have the same authority as those we examined in the preceding article. Underlying each explanation is the basic principle that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are identical. This will certainly have a great influence on each interpretation.

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 7.

We begin our study of this second period of identity with Laurentius Brancatus de Lauria (1673). Chronologically, his opinion should have been considered in the preceding article since he wrote before the Salmanticenses and after Lugo. However, because of his influence on Antonio de Panormo (1709), we consider him as the precursor of the second period of identity. When considering Panormo's doctrine on *error* and *haeresim sapiens*, we noticed how he depended on Lauria. There is a similar dependence regarding the censures now under consideration. Lauria influenced Panormo who, in turn, was followed by a great number of later theologians.

We note that Lauria wrote his exposition of these censures before the official distinction was made by the Church. On this account, he may be excused for his error. However, it will be difficult to excuse the other opinions which we are about to consider, seeing that they all appeared after 1699 A. D., when *male sonans* was for the first time distinguished from *piarum aurium offensiva* in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church.

A. Laurentius Brancatus de Lauria (1673)

For Lauria, *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are just different names for the same censure, which he describes as follows¹:

Nota malae sonantis propositionis, et piarum aurium offensivae pro eadem haberi possunt, et consistunt in hoc, quod res fidei aut morum exprimentur, seu pronuncientur per verba aequivoca ad bonum et malum significatum; vel, quod quaedam dicta in re, vera pro aliquo statu ac tempore, in alio statu et tempore, sint male prolata.

He firmly denies that there is any distinction between *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, and his main argument is that nowhere in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church are these two censures applied together and thus distinguished. He examines several of these condemnations and points out that when one of these two censures is applied, the other is omitted. This procedure constitutes a good argument that according to the mind of the Church, the terms *male*

¹ Cf. LAURENTIUS BRANCATUS DE LAURIA, *Commentaria in Tertium Librum Sententiarum Mag. Fr. Joannis Duns Scoti*, t. 3, pars 1, disput. 16, art. 2, no. 76. Romae (1673), p. 860.

sonans and *piarum aurium offensiva* are synonymous¹. Lauria also points out that these two names convey the same idea. Anything which is *male sonans* is offensive to pious ears, and vice versa.

Lauria is not clear as to the notion of this censure. From his description which we have quoted above, it seems that he puts forward two concepts: one concerning faith and morals which is equivocally expressed, and the other concerns the utterance of something which, though once true, is now "wrong-sounding" because of the change of circumstances. He does not seem to realize that the first of these concepts is identical with his interpretation of *de haeresi suspecta* (or *haeresim sapiens*)². The second concept is the same as Lugo's explanation of *piarum aurium offensiva*.

He gives a number of examples of the censure, and repeats most of those examples which we have already seen given by Lugo to illustrate doctrine which is offensive to pious ears; *Petre perjure, ora pro nobis*, and *Sancta Maria uxor fabri, ora pro nobis*. Lauria makes a slight difference with regard to these examples, in so far as he states that they must not be uttered *ad injuriam* but because of some other motive. Presumably, he would consider them as meriting a graver censure if they were uttered with intent to be disrespectful. Besides these examples he also points to a number of articles which were condemned by the Council of Constance, and which, in his opinion, merit the censure *male sonans-piarum aurium offensiva*³.

The main point of this exposition is Lauria's insistence on the identity of these two censures. Curiously enough, the arguments which he advanced to prove this were, at the time, very solid. It is obvious that Lauria took pains to examine the dogmatic condemnations of the Church which, in his estimation, are a more authoritative guide than the opinions of other theologians. In spite of this, however, he failed to ascertain the mind of the Church which was soon to be made explicit in the condemnation of Fénelon, 1699 A. D.

¹ Ibid., no. 77. "Si ergo isti, qui sunt regulae fidei, differentiam hanc malae sonantiae ab offensione piarum aurium non agnoscunt, signum est pro eadem utramque habuisse."

² Ibid., no. 58, p. 857. "Et quidem mihi videtur, tunc maxime apparere suspectam, quando aliquo modo, etsi aliquantulum aequivoco convenit cum formula, seu modo dicendi haeticorum, in ea materia."

³ Cf. Dz 590, 601, 613, 619, 649, 654.

B. Panormo depends on Lauria (1709 A. D.)

Panormo's monumental work, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, was first published at Rome in 1709 A. D., ten years after the condemnation of Fénelon in which *male sonans* was for the first time officially distinguished from *piarum aurium offensiva*¹. Panormo shows himself to be completely unaware of this condemnation. We shall see him stating that these two censures had never been applied in the same dogmatic condemnation and thus officially distinguished. It is difficult to admit that Panormo could have overlooked such an important condemnation. A possible explanation could be that this work, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, had been written many years previously, and publication was delayed until 1709 A. D. Even in this hypothesis, it is still difficult to understand why he did not make the necessary corrections.

At the beginning of his exposition of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, Panormo considers the problem of distinction. In all this he quotes and follows Lauria. He notes that no distinction had ever been made by such authorities as Turrecremata, Castro, Cano, Simancas and others². Finally he points to Lauria, and proceeds to give the same arguments to prove that no such distinction exists.

Panormo refers to the same condemnations as Lauria, and points out that whenever one of these censures was applied, the other was omitted. In his estimation, this constituted a very probable argument for identity³. Again following Lauria, he states that the very names of these two censures convey the same idea⁴.

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 7.

² Cf. ANTONIO DE PANORMO, *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, cap. 7, art. 3, no. 1, p. 429.

³ *Ibid.*, no. 6, p. 431. "... probabile habemus argumentum Brancati (i. e. Lauria) indicatum pro identitate male sonantis et piarum aurium offensiva, dummodo ita corroboretur, ut ipsius vis, non ex solis pendeat Constantienti Concilio, et Piana ac Gregoriana constitutionibus, sed a quibuslibet similibus conciliaribus aut pontificiis diplomatibus, nec non et a Patrum, quatenus ad rem extent, locutionibus, in quibus de praedictis censuris, ita sit sermo, ut quoties male sonantis nota exprimitur, toties altera piarum aurium offensivae silentio obducitur, et e contro."

Immediately Panormo goes on to say that he used the same argument to prove that there is no distinction between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta*; "... eo ducti principio, quod in causis praecisus sicuti affirmationis est causa, ita et negatio negationis, si debita, et plena, singulosque comprehendens casus, fiat inductio, vi cuius patet non esse universaliter verum quod argumentum ab autoritate negativa non sit conveniens."

⁴ *Ibid.* "Cum praesertim ad praesens neque vocabulorum proprietates distinc-

All these arguments are now useless, and even when they first appeared in Panormo's doctrine they were useless, since the condemnation of Fénelon's doctrine in the year 1699 had thrown them all overboard. It is unfortunate that Panormo followed Lauria so blindly, or that he did not take sufficient care to correct his exposition before publication. As it stands, there is the basic principle of identity underlying his interpretation of these two censures. This lessens its authority.

C. Panormo gives his own explanation of the censure

It seems, at first sight, that Panormo's interpretation of *male sonans* (and *piarum aurium offensiva*) coincides with his explanation of *haeresim sapiens*. He states that a proposition which is censurable in this way is capable of an orthodox and unorthodox sense. However, either by reason of the intrinsic nature of the doctrine in question or by reason of the external circumstances, the unorthodox sense is prevalent, and because of this, the proposition is to be censured as *male sonans* or *piarum aurium offensiva*¹. Thus far, this description coincides with his explanation of *haeresim sapiens*². Panormo is aware of this, and goes on to point out a difference. In the case of *haeresim sapiens*, he states, the censurable proposition is in respect of *credibilia*, and the unorthodox sense, considered in itself, is heretical. In the case of *male sonans*, however, there is question of *agibilia*, or if there should be question of *credibilia*, the unorthodox sense is not heretical but indicates an error less than heresy. This difference suffices to make a distinction between the two censures³. In this way, Panormo avoids the pitfall of Lauria who unwittingly identified *male sonans* with *haeresim sapiens*. However, in spite of Panormo's care to avoid such confusion, we cannot

tioni praedictarum censurarum favens ullatenus appareat, quod non minus una, quam altera in ordine ad aurium organum per nobilem metaphoram concipiatur."

¹ *Ibid.*, no. 7. "Quae nempe consistat in eo, quod aliqua propositio ita formetur, ut quamvis in bonum sensum valeat explicari, nihilominus pravus ipsius sensus, sive ex intrinseca natura, sive ex circumstantiis extrinsecis sano praeponderans aures piis offendat, malumque sonum praeseferat."

² Cf. supra, ch. 3, art. 4.

³ Cf. PANORMO, loc. cit., "... hoc solo discrimine hic prae oculis habito, quod suspecta de haeresi, aut haeresim sapiens materiae respiciat credibilia, circa quam sensus praevalens sit penitus haereticus, male sonans vero, aut piarum aurium offensiva, afficit, vel materiam agibilia, vel si materiam credibilia non ita ut sensus praevalens sit simpliciter haereticus, sed aliqua infra haeresim pravitate infectus, quod sufficit, ut inter unam et aliam admittatur distinctio."

admit his interpretation of *male sonans*, for reasons which we shall now explain.

Apart from Panormo himself, this interpretation enjoys very little authority. Before his time, we have never seen this notion advanced as an explanation of *male sonans* or *piarum aurium offensiva*. Secondly, this explanation has an inherent contradiction. According to Panormo, a proposition is censurable as *male sonans* when it is capable of two proper (as distinct from metaphorical) senses. The unorthodox sense, while not being heretical, contains an error less than heresy. In this way it differs from *haeresim sapiens*. Let us assume that the unorthodox sense is an erroneous proposition, taking *error* in its strict theological signification. In such a hypothesis, should not the proposition in question be called *errorem sapiens* and not *male sonans*? This follows by way of analogy. In the case of *haeresim sapiens*, the unorthodox sense is heresy and the proposition is censured as *haeresim sapiens*. It should follow that in similar circumstances, when the unorthodox sense is *error*, the proposition should be censured as *errorem sapiens*. For these reasons we cannot admit Panormo's explanation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*. Firstly, he identified these censures even after an official distinction had been made by the Church. Secondly, his interpretation departed from all tradition, in so far as he rejected the doctrine which was becoming more and more popular since the time of Cano (1563). Thirdly, Panormo's explanation contains an intrinsic contradiction.

We have taken special care to consider and analyse Panormo's doctrine on these two censures, because of his great reputation on this whole problem of theological censures. We shall presently see that there were later theologians who blindly depended on him concerning the interpretation of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, just as he blindly depended on Lauria. Having totally rejected Panormo's exposition of these censures, it will not be necessary to examine it again when it appears in the writings of later theologians.

D. Montaigne is influenced by Panormo (1732)

Next to Panormo's famous *Scrutinium Doctrinarum*, the most popular treatise on the theological censures is that of Claude L. Montaigne († 1767), *De Censuris seu Notis Theologicis, et de Sensu Propositionum*.

Apart from this work, Montaigne wrote very little himself. However, he edited most of Tournely's works in compendium form, all of which were attributed to Tournely himself for quite a long time. When editing Tournely's *De Opere Sex Dierum*, Montaigne attached his own treatise on the censures as an appendix. This appendix is often attributed to Tournely, but, in fact, it is Montaigne's original work and perhaps his greatest contribution to theology¹. Montaigne's treatise on the censures was later incorporated in Migne, *Theologiae Cursus Completus* (t. 1).

Throughout his treatise on the censures, Montaigne depends on the *Scrutinium Doctrinarum* to a considerable extent. Even though he considers all the more important opinions on the individual censures, Montaigne invariably ends by endorsing the doctrine of Panormo. It is to be noted that his treatise on the censures was first published in 1732 A. D., thirty-three years after the condemnation of Fénelon in which *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* were for the first time officially distinguished by the Church, and nineteen years after the promulgation of the dogmatic constitution "*Unigenitus*", in which the censures were officially distinguished for the second time². In spite of all this evidence, Montaigne blindly follows Panormo in stating that these two censures were never distinguished in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. He goes through all Panormo's examples to prove that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* are identical³. Just as Panormo blindly follows Lauria on this question, so also does Montaigne blindly follow Panormo. Needless to say, this accounted for some confusion in later years.

Not only does Montaigne follow Panormo on the question of identity, but he also repeats his doctrine regarding the nature of the censure, word for word⁴.

We have now considered this second period of identity, and in our estimation, sufficiently proved that it is not to be taken seriously. It was imperative for us to consider and analyse it in detail, because of the great authorities who brought it about. The names of Lauria,

¹ Cf. HURTER N. L., t. 5, p. 59; LEVESQUE, DTC, t. 10, col. 2337-8.

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8.

³ Cf. C. MONTAIGNE, *De Censuris, seu Notis Theologicis, et de Sensu Propositionum*, in Migne T. C. C., t. 1, col. 1183.

⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1184.

Panormo and Montaigne bear great weight regarding this question of the interpretation of the censures. If it could not be sufficiently proved that they were wrong on this particular point, then we should never have any certainty regarding the nature of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*. In later years, the opinion which was popularised in this second period of identity, was, from time to time, advanced by theologians who did not take the trouble to make adequate investigation on this matter¹.

ARTICLE V

Final Distinction: Jos. Gautier S. J.
(1756)

In the preceding article, we saw how a considerable amount of confusion was caused by some theologians who did not take sufficient care to bring their doctrine into line with the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. Fortunately, this situation did not last long afterwards. The first theologian we have seen to detect and correct the mistake was Jos. Gautier S. J.²

In his exposition of the censure *male sonans*, Gautier follows Lugo to the letter, not mentioning the explanation which had been advanced by Panormo and Montaigne. He states that this censure is concerned with the abuse of words in the expression of Catholic doctrine. When such words are applied with a signification other than that which has been sanctified by tradition, they are apt to open the way for misrepresentation and erroneous doctrine³.

¹ As an example, cf. KILBER S. J., *Institutiones Catholicae*, de virtutibus theologicis, disput. 3, cap. 3. Wirceburgi (1751), p. 585. "Male sonans est, quae duos habens sensus proprios, alterum catholicum, alterum haereticum vel quacunque censura damnabilem, sed in sensu damnabili frequentius sumitur, et nihilominus absque explicatione vel exceptione profertur."

² Cf. GAUTIER, *Prodromus ad Theologiam Dogmatico-Scholasticam*, dissert. 2, cap. 2, art. 7. Coloniae et Francofurti (1756), p. 133 et seqq.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 133. "At vero, quis sit propositionis malesonantis, hoc sensu acceptae, conceptus ab aliis praecisus, non est una omnium istorum auctorum opinio. Magis cohaerenter ad hucusque dicta loqui mihi videntur, qui vel cum Cardinali Lugone dicunt, illam esse quae peccat in abusu vocum, a communi usu, quo solent a fidelibus usurpari, discrepantium; esto sanum sensum admittere possit: vel

When examining the doctrine of the Salmanticenses on this same censure, we noticed that they too agreed with the interpretation of Lugo, and judged it to be the most authoritative of all the explanations. However, they made one important contribution themselves, in so far as they pointed to certain texts in S. Thomas where the notion of *male sonans* is clearly expressed. We now find Gautier making a similar observation, pointing to a text in the opusculum, *Contra Errores Graecorum*, which excellently describes this censure¹.

... multa quae bene sonant in lingua graeca, in latina fortassis *bene non sonant*, propter quod eandem fidei veritatem aliis verbis Latini confitentur et Graeci. Dicitur enim apud Graecos recte et catholice, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres hypostases; apud Latinos autem *non recte sonat*, si quis dicat, quod sunt tres substantiae; licet hypostasis sit idem apud Graecos, quod substantia apud Latinos secundum proprietatem vocabuli. Nam apud Latinos substantia usitatus pro essentia accipi solet, quam tam nos quam Graeci unam in divinis confitemur. Propter quod, sicut Graeci dicunt tres hypostases, nos dicimus tres personas...

Of all the authors we have considered so far, Gautier is the only one we have seen pointing to this very important text of S. Thomas. Here, not only does S. Thomas accurately describe the notion of this censure, but almost calls it by its name — *non recte sonat*. It is to be noted that he does not say that the use of the Greek terminology would be heretical, but merely "wrong-sounding". By drawing attention

cum aliis apud Cardinalem Gotti, quibus Eminentissimus hic videtur tacite consentire, quae incongrue et inordinate theologice loquitur; ita ut, licet verum sensum habeat, theologice tamen male sonet."

In this citation, Gautier refers to Gotti. For the exact words of the latter on this point, cf. Gotti, *Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica*, t. 1, q. 1, dub. 4, no. 19. Bononiae (1727), p. 46. "Male sonans propositio, licet a Magistro Cano conjungatur cum offensiva piarum aurium, ab aliis tamen ab ea secernitur, et dicitur illa, quae incongrue et inordinate theologice loquitur; ita ut licet verum sensum habeat, theologice tamen male sonet. Quare si quis diceret, in Deo sunt tres essentiae relativae, sensus catholicus esset, sed inordinate, quia uteretur nomine *essentiae* ad significandum relativum, quo Divinae Personae distinguuntur, contra bonam theologiam, eo utentem solum ad significandum absolutum et naturam, in qua sunt unum."

¹ Cf. S. THOMAS, *Contra Errores Graecorum*, prooemium. (Parmae 1864, t. 15, p. 239.) In the first chapter of this opusculum, S. Thomas describes how the Greek Fathers used the term *causa* in the same sense as the Latins used the term *principium* in explaining the procession of the Son from the Father, and the procession of the Holy Ghost from both the Father and the Son.

to this text, Gautier undoubtedly contributed to consolidating the interpretation of Cano, Lugo, the Salmanticenses and others.

Regarding the nature of *piarum aurium offensiva*, Gautier endorses the opinion which was popularised by Suarez, Lugo and the Salmanticenses. Doctrine which is offensive to pious ears, he states, contains an element contrary to the virtue of religion. It is not necessarily false doctrine, but it expresses something indecent and disrespectful to God and the saints¹.

Gautier has no difficulty in distinguishing *piarum aurium offensiva* from *male sonans*. He simply points to the bull *Unigenitus*² (1713) where these two censures were applied together and thus distinguished. He notes with surprise that Montaigne emphatically stated that these censures never appeared together in the same dogmatic condemnation³. We have already considered this error on Montaigne's part, and shown how he was misled by Panormo.

We consider Gautier's exposition of *male sonans* and *piarum offensiva* as constituting the last stage in the development of these two censures. He was not influenced by Lauria, Panormo and Montaigne, because

¹ Cf. GAUTIER, loc. cit., p. 135. "Itaque, ut observat Suarez, etsi malesonans: propositio etiam aures offendat, dum tamen additur, quod sit *piarum aurium offensiva*, per ly *piarum* denotatur ordo quispiam ad religionem, ad quam pietas in hoc sensu proprie pertinet; consequenter propositio quae dicitur *piarum aurium offensiva* aliquid speciale videtur in hoc gradu continere in ordine ad religionem, propter quod aures piis offendat. Hinc describi potest, quod sit ea, quae si falsa non sit, tamen in materia religionis enuntiat, aut praesefert aliquid absonum, indecens, vel indignum, ac indecorum subjecto de quo loquitur, et per quod fidelium merito offendantur. Sicut, inquit Gotti, si de partu Virginis loquens, aliqua indecora misceret; vel actiones humanas Christi, aut partes et membra corporis turpibus explicaret vocibus."

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8. It is interesting to note that we have seen no theologian referring to the earlier distinction made in 1699 A. D., when Fénelon's errors were condemned by Pope Innocent XII. (Cf. outline of condemnations, no. 7.)

³ Cf. GAUTIER, loc. cit., p. 134. "Propositionem *piarum aurium offensivam* haud pauci denuo confundunt cum propositione *malesonante*, praecipue ex eo, quia, inquit Tournelius, non solum Synodus Constantiensis et SS Pontifices Pius V et Gregorius XIII, sed et generatim quaecumque alia concilia, quilibet Pontifices et Patres, quoties *malesonantis* notam exprimunt, toties de altera, *piarum aurium offensiva*, silent, et viceversa. At profecto hic aliquid humanitus ab errore memoriae passus est Tournelius, vel eius continuator: etenim in celebri bulla "Unigenitus", duae hae censurae divisim enumerantur, diversisque verbis exprimuntur, perinde ac caeterae. Quapropter enitendum nobis est, ut cum aliis naturam huius propositionis, et a praecedente discrimen paucis exponamus."

he saw that their doctrine did not tally with the evidence available from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church. He went back to the earlier theologians, and we have seen how he depended on Lugo. This was the same interpretation which was originally suggested by Cano, and later endorsed by the Salmanticenses.

We do not claim that there was unanimity of opinion after Gautier. In fact, few subsequent theologians took this problem of the theological censures very seriously, and consequently did not take any great pains to seek out the most authoritative interpretations. Regarding the nature of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, however, there was less confusion and more agreement in later years, than in the case of the other censures¹.

ARTICLE VI

Recapitulation and Conclusion

We have now examined the development of *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva*, and seen that there was no dearth of opinions regarding the interpretation of these two censures. In spite of this diversity, there is not much difficulty in selecting the correct explanation. In the preceding articles we have already done this by a process of elimination. We shall now take a synthetic view of all the conclusions we have reached so far, and of the different stages through which these two censures passed before their interpretation was finally established.

Before Cano, we discovered nothing but confusion regarding the nature of these two censures. They were identified with *haeresim sapiens* and with *scandalosa*, and no attempt was made to establish them as separate categories, distinct from all others. Out of this confusion, Cano brought order. It is true that he considered *male sonans*

¹ In the following authors, we find more or less the same ideas as those here expressed by Gautier: FRANZELIN S. J., *Tractatus de Divina Traditione*, sect. 1, expressed by Gautier: FRANZELIN S. J., *Tractatus de Divina Traditione*, sect. 1, th. XII, scholion 2. Romae (1875), p. 162; MAZZELLA S. J., *De Virtutibus Infusis*, disput. 2, art. 10. Romae (1879), p. 283; DE GROOT O. P., *Summa Apologetica*, q. 10, art. 5. Ratisbonae (1906), p. 384; PESCH S. J., *Praelectiones Dogmaticae*, t. 1, pars 2, sect. 5. Friburgi Brisgoviae (1909), p. 378; SCHULTES O. P., *De Ecclesia Catholica*, cap. 9, art. 70. Parisiis (1931), p. 640.

and *piarum aurium offensiva* as synonymous terms indicating the same theological censure, but in his description of this censure he put forward a notion which distinguished it from all others. From the point of view of previous explanations, this notion of Cano was absolutely new. *Male sonans* (or *piarum aurium offensiva*), he stated, concerns the mode of expression of Catholic truth rather than the sense. If doctrine is confusedly expressed — *inconditis verbis* — and if terminology other than that which is sanctified by tradition is used, then there is a certain deviation from orthodoxy, in so far as the way is prepared for misrepresentation. Cano was careful to point out that there is no question of error against faith. However, incongruous terminology constitutes a danger, and errs against sound doctrine — *sana doctrina*.

We saw this concept of Cano becoming more and more popular with later theologians. In the course of time, it was clarified and made more precise. We recall, for instance, how the Salmanticenses stressed that even though *male sonans* is primarily concerned with words used in the expression of Catholic truth, it is not a merely grammatical censure. Incongruous expression, they stated, errs against good theology and consequently merits a theological censure.

After Cano, the greatest development regarding this basic concept was the separation of *piarum aurium offensiva* from *male sonans*. For Cano, the two censures were identical and the element of offense to pious ears was included in the concept of *male sonans*. We saw how this distinction was gradually introduced by Suarez, Lugo and the Salmanticenses, and how it was later vindicated by the official condemnations of the Church. Even in the interpretation of these later theologians who distinguished these two censures, Cano's doctrine was still upheld. His explanation of the quality of the "pious ears" was corroborated, but now this concept was separated from *male sonans* and applied to *piarum aurium offensiva* as a separate censure.

Apart from the few dissenting theologians whose doctrine we have analysed and rejected, Cano's basic interpretation was never abandoned. It was clarified and developed in later years, but fundamentally it remained the same. There is very little in the doctrine of Lugo, the Salmanticenses and Gautier, which is not to be found at least implicitly in the original exposition of Cano.

We have already stated that from the point of view of previous

attempts to describe these censures, Cano's doctrine was absolutely new. However, from another point of view, his doctrine was old and sanctified by tradition. In the course of our investigations we saw different theologians pointing to texts in S. Thomas where this concept of Cano is clearly described. In his opusculum, *Contra Errores Graecorum*, S. Thomas examines the terminology used by many Greek Fathers, and explains that in spite of the fact that such terminology is quite orthodox for the Greeks, it sounds wrong to Latin ears. We noted the exact words of S. Thomas — *non recte sonat*. All this goes to show that Cano was not quite original in explaining the nature of *male sonans* as would appear at first sight. It would be more correct to say that he sought out the traditional explanation. We have already explained that the theological censures were in constant use in the everyday life of the Church. In all probability, this was Cano's source, and not any individual theologian.

The great difficulty which presented itself to most of the theologians who tried to explain *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* was the problem of identity or distinction. We have seen that it was comparatively late before the Church made the official distinction in the dogmatic condemnations. In fact, until the year 1699 it would seem that the mind of the Church, at least tacitly, held for identity, because each time one of these censures appeared in a dogmatic condemnation, the other was omitted. It must also be remembered that the names of these two censures do seem synonymous. In light of all this, it is not surprising that the earlier theologians did not hesitate to identify them. Before the official distinction was made by the Church, however, a number of theologians succeeded in separating *male sonans* from *piarum aurium offensiva*.

We have rejected the different opinions which were in vogue before Cano. Likewise, we have rejected the doctrine of the theologians who constituted the 'second period of identity', i. e. the interpretation of Lauria, Panormo and Montaigne. There is no alternative, therefore, but to accept the explanation which was originally advanced by Cano and subsequently clarified in the writings of later theologians. This is briefly expressed in the two definitions given by the Salmanticenses: "*Propositio male sonans est quae habet sensum congruentem fidei, verba autem non congrua*", and "*Propositio piarum aurium offensiva est quae licet verum dicat, tamen vel dicit illud quod taceri oportet ob reverentiam*"

ad sancta; vel dicit eo modo qui illa in contemptum venire facit." In the first case, the censure is concerned with the abuse of words used outside their traditional signification, and there is no question of the doctrine or the object expressed. In the second case, however, words are used in their correct and traditional sense, and the censure is concerned with the object expressed. This suffices to show the difference between the two censures.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

We have now completed our examination of the different interpretations of the theological censures, which were advanced in the post-Tridentine period. (1563-1709 A. D.). In accordance with the principles laid down in the introduction, we made a critical analysis of each opinion, and by a process of elimination, sought out the most authoritative doctrine in each case.

As may be seen from the preceding chapters, we did not confine ourselves strictly to this post-Tridentine period. In the case of each censure, we reviewed the main opinions which were put forward between the Council of Constance and Melchior Cano (1418-1563 A. D.), and found abundant proof of the confusion which we mentioned in the introduction. Likewise, we often had occasion to examine the opinions which appeared in the modern period, i. e. after 1709 A. D., and here there was nothing but mere repetitions of doctrine which had already appeared in the post-Tridentine period. The modern opinions differed according to the authority which was followed in each case. In light of all this, we think that our selection of the post-Tridentine period for special investigation has been clearly justified.

We have seen the theologians discussing the doctrine of one another, and in each case the particular opinion which the theologians thought important enough to examine, we ourselves had already analysed. This vindicates our selection of the important opinions which appeared both in the post-Constance and post-Tridentine periods.

We shall now conclude by giving a description of each censure according to the conclusions we have reached in the preceding chapters and according to the most authoritative sources. Although this has already been done in great detail, we shall repeat it in a general fashion, concentrating on the essentials. In this way, we hope to present the results of our investigations in a more tangible and concrete manner.

A. The censure of error
according to the most authoritative sources

1° In the very first of the cumulative condemnations which were issued by the Council of Constance, the censure of *error* was applied. In these decrees, the erroneous proposition was distinguished from heresy and the other lower theological censures¹.

2° In the majority of dogmatic condemnations which were issued between Constance and the year 1713, the censure of *error* is enumerated immediately after heresy. Though this constitutes a sign that *error* is the next gravest censure after heresy, it is not a definite argument. There are some dogmatic condemnations in which this order is not observed².

3° Though it cannot be argued with certainty from the dogmatic condemnations that the censure of *error* is the next gravest after heresy, there is ample proof of this from other sources. All the main theologians who wrote on the doctrinal censures between the Council of Constance (1418) and the year 1713, even though they differed in their opinions regarding the nature of the erroneous proposition, were unanimous on this one point — that the censure of *error* is the next gravest after heresy³.

4° The censure of *error* was also referred to as *error in fide*. This terminology was the main obstacle which impeded the earlier theologians from finding a satisfactory explanation of the censure and sufficiently distinguishing it from heresy. Error in matters of faith and morals seemed to be synonymous with heresy⁴.

5° The term '*error*', however, may be understood in either of two ways. Firstly, in its broad, generic sense it merely signifies falsity. Understood in this way, the term may embrace heresy and every other form of deviation from orthodoxy. It is clear that the Council of Constance and the other dogmatic condemnations did not intend the

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 1.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 1-4.

³ Cf. *sup.*, pp. 81-82.

⁴ Cf. *sup.*, pp. 9-11, esp. p. 10 note 1; p. 14.

word to be taken in this broad sense, otherwise its distinction from heresy in the dogmatic decrees would be absurd.

The second mode of interpreting the term '*error*' is in a restricted signification, in such a way as to be specifically distinct from heresy and all the other theological censures. It often happens that the name of a genus is given to the lowest component species — as in the case of *dispositio* (genus) in relation to *habitus* (species) and *dispositio* (species). This also is true of *error* (genus) in relation to *haeresis* (species) and *error* (species). While there is a merely mental distinction between *error* (genus) and *haeresis* (species), there is a real and specific distinction between *haeresis* (species) and *error* (species). It must be admitted that the decrees of Constance and the other dogmatic condemnations used the term '*error*' in this restricted sense, otherwise these decrees would seem absurd in distinguishing *error in fide* from heresy¹.

6° Having determined that the word '*error*', as applied in the dogmatic condemnations, is to be taken in a specific and restricted sense, we now enquire as to the different significations this term may have in everyday use. When the word '*error*' is applied in a scientific sense, it implies a certain type of falsity. In philosophy, for instance, an opinion is said to be erroneous when it contradicts the very principles of the science. In other words, something certain and commonly taken for granted is denied.

If we transfer this concept to theology, it follows that the censure of *error* concerns the denial of principles (i. e. doctrine of faith), or something so certain that it is commonly taken for granted. We cannot say that the erroneous proposition is in direct opposition to doctrine of faith, since this would confuse it with heresy. Consequently, some other explanation must be found which will distinguish the erroneous from the heretical proposition, and yet retain some kind of opposition to doctrine of faith².

7° After the direct and immediate opposition to faith which heresy implies, the next gravest type is mediate opposition which is entailed by the denial of a theological conclusion³. After doctrine of faith,

¹ Cf. CANO, *sup.*, p. 17 et seqq.; SUAREZ, p. 39.

² Cf. SUAREZ, *sup.*, pp. 39-40.

³ Cf. PANORMO, *sup.*, p. 69.

the next grade of certainty which any doctrine may enjoy is that of the theological conclusion. Such conclusions are said to be *mediately* revealed, and their denial will entail a mediate denial of faith ¹.

Granted that the theological conclusion enjoys the next grade of certainty after doctrine of faith and that the censure of *error* is the next gravest censure after heresy, it follows that the erroneous proposition in theology is that which contradicts a theological conclusion; in other words, that which is in mediate opposition to principles of faith ².

8° The theological conclusion which is associated with the censure of *error* is the strict theological conclusion, i. e. that which is deduced by means of one premise of faith and another premise known by the light of natural reason ³.

9° The intrinsic connection between any proposition and doctrine of faith may not always be evident. However, if such a proposition is universally regarded as being a theological conclusion, its denial is censurable as erroneous. In such a case, the weight of extrinsic authority supplies for the lack of intrinsic evidence ⁴.

10° Conclusions deduced by means of two premises of faith are not theological conclusions in the strict sense of the term. The object enunciated by such conclusions is already within the pale of immediate revelation, and consequently its denial may be censured as heretical ⁵.

11° If we take into consideration all the theologians who wrote on the theological censures between the Council of Constance and the year 1709, the theory which correlates the censure of *error* to the denial of a strict theological conclusion may be judged *the more common opinion*. However, if we exclude the earlier theologians who were misled by the name of this censure — *error in fide* — and who consequently failed to distinguish sufficiently the erroneous from the heretical proposition, then we may call the theory which relates the

¹ Cf. CANO, sup., pp. 21, 28; LUGO, pp. 50, 53; SUAREZ, p. 42.

² Cf. BANEZ, sup., pp. 32-33; SUAREZ, p. 42 et seqq.; LUGO, p. 53; SALMANTICENSIS, p. 56; PANORMO, p. 62 et seqq.

³ Cf. SUAREZ, sup., p. 42; LUGO, p. 53; SALMANTICENSIS, p. 58; PANORMO pp. 63-64.

⁴ Cf. PANORMO, sup., pp. 69-70.

⁵ Cf. SUAREZ, sup., p. 44; LUGO, p. 53; SALMANTICENSIS, p. 57; PANORMO, p. 63.

censure of *error* to the denial of a strict theological conclusion, the *common opinion* ¹.

12° There is no direct transition between *error* (as such) and heresy. That which is merely mediate revealed cannot enter into the pale of immediate revelation. The Church cannot make new revelations, but only declares that which is already immediately revealed ².

13° There is one possible mode by which the erroneous proposition may become heresy in the course of time. However, this is not a direct transition of *error* (as such) to heresy, but rather a transition of implicit heresy to the state of explicit heresy. For instance, a particular doctrine which is, in fact, latent heresy may be considered as a denial of a theological conclusion with regard to some other dogma. In this state, the denial may be censured as erroneous. If in the course of time, however, the said doctrine should become explicit heresy in its own right, then it may be censured as heretical. It is to be noted that this transit is accidental, and not a direct transit of *error* (as such) to the state of heresy ³.

14° The censures of heresy and *error* are not incompatible. A particular doctrine may be simultaneously heretical and erroneous under two different aspects. A proposition which is censured as heretical may also be considered as the denial of a theological conclusion in relation to some other dogma. It is impossible for the same proposition to be immediately and mediate opposed to the same dogma. However, there is nothing to prohibit it from being immediately opposed to one dogma, and mediate opposed to another ⁴.

15° The principles underlying the foregoing explanation of the censure of *error* are the following:

- a) The censure of *error* is the next gravest after heresy.
- b) Doctrine which is mediate revealed, i. e. the strict theological conclusion, enjoys the next grade of certainty after doctrine which is immediately revealed, i. e. doctrine of faith.

¹ Cf. SALMANTICENSIS, sup., pp. 56-57.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSIS, sup., p. 50; PANORMO, p. 65.

³ Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 67.

⁴ Cf. PANORMO, sup., pp. 67-68.

B. The censure *haeresi proxima*
according to the most authoritative sources

1^o It was comparatively late before the Church began to apply the censure *haeresi proxima* in dogmatic condemnations. The first official use of this censure was in the condemnation affixed to the Jansenistic propositions by the Holy Office, in 1690 A. D.¹ Here, the words '*haeresi proxima*' are definitely intended to signify a separate censure, distinct from heresy, *error*, *haeresim sapiens*, and other lower theological censures.

2^o Owing to the late appearance of *haeresi proxima* in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church, the earlier theologians did not consider it as a separate censure. Lugo may be said to be the first authority on this censure, and even he had never seen it being officially used in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church.²

3^o In the different treatises on the censures which appeared before Lugo, there are many references to *haeresi proxima* and the notion which later became associated with this censure. However, careful analysis proves that in most cases the words '*haeresi proxima*' are used in a material sense, and not meant to indicate a special censure. When describing the erroneous proposition, for instance, Cano and Suarez said that it is *haeresi proxima* in the sense that it is the next censure after heresy. Accidental references such as these were the cause of considerable confusion. Consequently, all references to the censure *haeresi proxima* in the writings of theologians who preceded Lugo are not to be taken seriously. Likewise, the authority of later writers who depended on these theologians for their interpretation of *haeresi proxima*, is of little value.³

4^o The name of this censure — *haeresi proxima* — seems to indicate that it is the next gravest after heresy. However, as we have seen in the case of *error*, nothing can be definitely argued from the names of these censures. The erroneous proposition has a greater *sapor haeresis*

¹ Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 6.

² Cf. sup., pp. 83, 104.

³ Cf. sup., pp. 83-90.

than the doctrine which may be specifically censured as *haeresim sapiens*. Likewise, the censure of *error* comes closer to heresy than the censure which is specifically known as *haeresi proxima*. The point to be kept in mind is that the names of these censures may be understood in a generic and specific signification. In the generic sense, these terms may be freely applied to a number of censures. However, in the specific or restricted sense, they indicate one censure, distinct from all others¹.

5^o The theological note corresponding to *haeresi proxima* is *fidei proxima*. The nature of the censure is best explained by an examination of the corresponding theological note.

Doctrine is said to be *fidei proxima* when the majority of theologians hold it to be immediately revealed and doctrine of faith. We say the 'majority' of theologians because there are some dissenting views which exclude absolute certainty. However, those theologians who are not in accord with the the majority are not 'grave theologians', and their arguments for the contrary opinion are devoid of all probability. Nevertheless, the dissenting views of these authors are capable of casting some shadow of doubt on the opinion which holds that the doctrine in question is of faith. Seeing that doubt of any kind is incompatible with the virtue of faith, the doctrine is consequently said to be *fidei proxima*, and the corresponding censure is called *haeresi proxima*, instead of simple heresy².

6^o We have noted that in the case of *haeresi proxima*, the opinion of theologians is almost unanimous in holding that the censurable proposition is outright heresy. We were careful to state that the dissenting theologians are not 'grave theologians' and that their doctrine is devoid of all probability. This is an important condition as otherwise the censure *haeresi proxima* will be confused with probable heresy. If the few theologians who hold the opposite view are grave theologians, and if their doctrine is in any way within the realm of probability, then no censure can be applied, since the Church does not condemn probable opinions.

The notion of probable heresy does not indicate a theological censure,

¹ Cf. sup., p. 105.

² Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 100.

but represents a private judgment without any intention to censure the upholders of the doctrine in question. On the contrary, when *haeresi proxima* is applied it means that an opinion is *condemned*. As already stated, probable opinions are never condemned by the Church, and it can be taken as a general rule that when any doctrine is censured, it is devoid of all probability¹.

7° Generally speaking, each theological censure indicates a special mode of heterodoxy which is intrinsic to the censurable proposition. For instance, heresy implies immediate opposition to doctrine of faith, and *error* entails mediate opposition or the denial of a theological conclusion. In this respect, *haeresi proxima* differs from the other theological censures — there is no intrinsic mode corresponding to it. Considered in itself, the doctrine which is censured as *haeresi proxima* is either heretical or not. The censure does not so much concern the objective denial as the great weight of authority which is repudiated by that denial. In other words, it is concerned with extrinsic authority rather than with intrinsic evidence.

It is to be noted that in the case of *fidei proxima* the majority of theologians hold it to be of *faith* and its denial heretical. There is no question of these theologians holding it to be *fidei proxima*.

Because of this characteristic which is peculiar to *haeresi proxima* (and *errori proxima*), the censure is said to be extrinsic to the doctrine which it affects².

8° Besides the name of this censure — *haeresi proxima* — there are other aspects which indicate that it is the next gravest censure after heresy. The only difference between *haeresi proxima* and outright heresy is the opinion upheld by a few dissenting theologians whose doctrine is devoid of all probability. Taking all these considerations into account, it would seem that in the hierarchy of doctrinal censures *haeresi proxima* comes immediately after heresy.

Notwithstanding this, the common opinion of theologians holds that the censure of *error* comes immediately after heresy and is the next

¹ Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 98 et seqq.; LUGO, while considering *haeresi proxima* as a distinct censure, confused it with *probable heresy*. — Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 90 et seqq.

² Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 92 et seqq.

gravest censure. As we have seen, there were many and varied views as to what constitutes an erroneous proposition. However, there was no discord regarding this fundamental principle, that *error* is the next gravest censure after heresy¹.

Doctrine which is *haeresi proxima* may certainly be heresy in substance. However, that is not necessary. It may happen that the opinion of the majority of theologians may be wrong in this respect. This is very improbable, but nevertheless possible, and consequently the proposition which is *haeresi proxima* has a merely contingent connection with heresy. This contingency may be described as the contingency of mere possibility or of metaphysical non-repugnance. Nevertheless, it is contingency and rules out a necessary connection with heresy.

On the contrary, the erroneous proposition entails a *necessary* connection with heresy. Denial of a theological conclusion *necessitates* a denial of faith. In the strict theological conclusion, the reasoning and the natural premise are evident, and consequently cannot be denied. The denial of the conclusion, therefore, necessitates an indirect denial of the premise of faith. Because of this, the erroneous proposition may also be called mediate heresy.

Seeing, therefore, that the censure of *error* entails a necessary connection with heresy, it follows that it comes closer to it and constitutes a more serious censure than *haeresim proxima* which implies a merely contingent connection with heresy².

Another proof that the censure of *error* is more serious than *haeresi proxima* is that in the external forum, the obdurate avowal of an erroneous proposition more easily leads to the presumption of heresy than doctrine which is *haeresi proxima*³.

9° While it may be taken as a general rule that the censure of *error* is graver and comes closer to heresy than *haeresi proxima*, nevertheless there are certain circumstances in which the latter censure is more serious. It may happen that a particular doctrine is in the ultimate stages of being defined as of faith. There is no longer any controversy or the least shadow of doubt among the theologians, and

¹ Cf. sup., p. 93.

² Cf. LUGO, supra, p. 93 et seqq.; PANORMO, p. 101.

³ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 95.

all the necessary conditions are at hand for the formal declaration by the Church. In circumstances such as these, *haeresi proxima* may be described as '*propositio haeretica definitibilis*'. The word '*haeretica*' indicates immediate opposition to faith, an element which *haeresi proxima* in these circumstances has in common with outright heresy. The word '*definitibilis*', however, indicates how it differs from formal heresy, i. e. in so far as it becomes known to us by way of an inferior medium. Formal heresy is known by a solemn medium — the rule of faith which tells us explicitly what is heretical and what is not. Regarding *haeresi proxima* in the circumstances described above, the rule of faith is not quite so explicit. As yet, the solemn magisterium has not intervened so that the most that can be said of *haeresi proxima* at this stage is that it is an unauthentic heretical proposition. Once the solemn magisterium intervenes, however, that which was formerly material heresy becomes authentic or formal heresy in the full canonical sense.

In the circumstances just described, the element of uncertainty and contingency is removed from *haeresi proxima* which now has a certain and necessary connection with heresy, in the same way as the erroneous proposition. Understood in this way, *haeresi proxima* comes closer to heresy and constitutes a graver censure than *error*. However, these are exceptional circumstances and it may be taken as a general rule that *error* is the more serious censure¹.

10° The principles which we have laid down for the interpretation of *haeresi proxima* may also be applied to *errori proxima*, *mutatis mutandis*. The censure *errori proxima* may be applied when the majority of theologians hold that the doctrine denied is a theological conclusion, or mediately revealed. There are a few dissenting theologians who hold that the doctrine in question is not a theological conclusion, but their authority is of little weight, and their opinion devoid of all probability. However, they serve to cast sufficient doubt on the opinion held by the majority so that the censure of *error* cannot be applied².

¹ Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 101 et seqq.

² Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 100.

C. Haeresim sapiens — de haeresi suspecta according to the most authoritative sources

1° The Council of Constance made no mention of either *haeresim sapiens* or *suspecta* in its dogmatic condemnations. In the condemnation of the errors of Baius by Pope S. Pius V (1569), the censure *suspecta* was applied for the first time in the post-Constance period. In this condemnation, however, there was no mention of *haeresim sapiens*. When certain articles of the Jansenists were condemned by the Holy Office in the year 1690, the censure *haeresim sapiens* was applied for the first time ever in a dogmatic condemnation. However, in this decree there was no mention of *suspecta*. The two censures were not used together and distinguished from each other in the same dogmatic condemnation, until the year 1713. It is not surprising, therefore, that many theologians considered *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta* as synonymous terms. It must be admitted that the two names sound alike. However, against the combined authority of all the theologians who held that these two censures are identical, we have the official distinction which was made by the Church. There is no doubting the fact that if the theologians who held the opposite view had seen the dogmatic condemnation in which this distinction was made, they would certainly have brought their doctrine into line with it¹.

2° Even those theologians who treated of *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* as distinct censures placed very little difference between them. Consequently, it is much easier to treat of both censures together than to treat of them separately.

3° The words '*haeresim sapiens*' (and '*de haeresi suspecta*') imply a deviation from Catholic truth which is less serious than heresy. Doctrine which is *haeresim sapiens* merely 'tastes' of heresy — or gives certain indications of heresy. However, we must be on our guard against depending too much on the name of the censure when exploring its nature. The erroneous proposition, for instance comes very close to heresy and may certainly be said to 'taste' of it. In fact, of all the theological censures, *error* indicates the greatest '*sapor haeresis*'. In

¹ Cf. sup., pp. 110-111.

spite of this, it is evident from the dogmatic condemnations of the Church that *haeresim sapiens* (and *de haeresi suspecta*) is a separate censure, distinct from *error*. Once again, we recall that the names of the theological censures may be taken in a generic and specific signification. '*Haeresim sapiens*', understood in its wide and generic sense, may be applied to the erroneous proposition. There must be some restricted sense which indicates a separate and lower censure; otherwise the distinction made by the dogmatic condemnations would seem absurd ¹.

4° Doctrine is said to be specifically *haeresim sapiens* when it cannot be proved to be heresy, *error*, or *haeresi proxima*: nevertheless, the said doctrine gives certain indications by way of different circumstances or the particular words used in its expression that the assertor is imbued with heresy which influences the proposition under scrutiny ².

5° Although it is possible for a proposition which is *haeresim sapiens* to be capable of a pious or Catholic interpretation, this is not necessary. The following proposition, '*Ridiculum est Eucharistiae sacramentum solemniter per vias publicas circumferre*' smacks of the Lutheran heresy which denies the Real Presence, and yet it cannot be interpreted in any pious sense ³.

6° As a general rule, however, doctrine which is *haeresim sapiens* is usually capable of both an orthodox and unorthodox interpretation — like the proposition which states, '*fides justificat*'. In this case, circumstances will decide whether the Catholic sense is intended or not ⁴.

7° More than in the case of any other theological censure, circumstantial evidence is all important when the censure *haeresim sapiens* (or *de haeresi suspecta*) is to be applied. As already stated, there is no blatant deviation from orthodoxy in the censurable proposition which may be capable of even a pious and Catholic interpretation. It will be the circumstances which will decide, therefore, as to whether

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, sup., p. 118.

² Cf. BANEZ, sup., pp. 115-116; SALMANTICENSES, p. 125.

³ Cf. CANO, sup., pp. 113-114; BANEZ, p. 116; SUAREZ, p. 119; LORCA, p. 116; SALMANTICENSES, p. 125; pp. 136-137.

⁴ Cf. PANORMO, sup., p. 133; pp. 139-140.

or not the assertor is imbued with heresy, and whether or not such heresy influences the doctrine under scrutiny ¹.

8° As already stated, the two censures, *haeresim sapiens* and *de haeresi suspecta*, have very much in common. All the observations we have made so far may be equally applied to either censure ².

9° The difference between *haeresim sapiens* and *suspecta* is one of degree rather than of species. In either case, the circumstantial evidence gives sufficient cause of fearing latent heresy. This cause, however, is not something indivisible which does not admit of greater and less degrees. If the circumstantial evidence is so great as to warrant a *probable judgment* that the assertor of the proposition under scrutiny is imbued with heresy, then the censure *haeresim sapiens* is to be applied. On the other hand, if the circumstantial evidence does not warrant such a probable judgment, but only serves to arouse suspicion to this effect, then the censure *de haeresi suspecta* is to be applied ³.

10° If all the foregoing principles are applied to the erroneous proposition — *mutatis mutandis* — we have a description of two other theological censures, *errorem sapiens*, and *de errore suspecta* ⁴.

D. The censure *male sonans* according to the most authoritative sources

1° It was not until the year 1699, when twenty-three articles of Fénelon were condemned by Pope Innocent XII, that *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* appeared in the same dogmatic decree and were thus officially distinguished by the Church. Before this, whenever one of these censures appeared in a dogmatic condemnation, the other was omitted ⁵. It is not surprising, therefore, that many theologians, and especially the earlier ones who wrote on the theological censures, regarded *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* as syn-

¹ Cf. CANO, sup., p. 115; BANEZ, p. 116; LUGO, p. 123; SALMANTICENSES, p. 126; p. 135, pp. 137-139.

² Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 122.

³ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 123; SALMANTICENSES, p. 127; pp. 134, 135.

⁴ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 124.

⁵ Cf. sup., pp. 142-143.

onymous terms¹. Against their authority, however, we have the official distinction which was made by the Church in the condemnation of the articles of Fénelon². If all the theologians who held for the identity of these two censures had been aware of this condemnation, they would certainly have brought their doctrine into line with it. As it was, they were misled by the names '*male sonans*' and '*piarum aurium offensiva*' which seemed to indicate the same idea, and by the fact that in all the dogmatic condemnations which took place before the year 1699, these two censures never appeared together.

2° The term '*male sonans*' is capable of a wide and generic signification, and when understood in this way, may be applied to heresy, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*. Doctrine which is heretical or erroneous may well be called 'wrong-sounding'. However, the use of the words '*male sonans*' in the dogmatic condemnations of the Church proves that they are meant to indicate a separate censure which is specifically distinct from heresy, *error* and *haeresim sapiens*³.

3° The name of this censure — *male sonans* — is misleading in the sense that it does not seem to imply any great deviation from orthodoxy. However, the vast majority of theologians thought the censure important enough to be listed immediately after *haeresim sapiens*⁴.

4° Doctrine which is *male sonans* does not err against faith in any way like heresy, *error*, *haeresi proxima*, or even *haeresim sapiens*. In fact, when a proposition is censured as *male sonans*, it is taken for granted that the sense of the doctrine in question is quite orthodox. This censure primarily concerns the material words used in the expression of Catholic truth. If these words are applied with an untraditional and incongruous signification, then the proposition may be rightly censured as *male sonans*, even though there is abundant proof that no unorthodox meaning is intended⁵.

¹ The following theologians identified *male sonans* with *piarum aurium offensiva*: TURRECREMATA (sup., p. 144), CANO (p. 146), BANEZ (p. 149), LORCA (p. 150), LAURIA (p. 161), PANORMO (p. 162), MONTAIGNE (p. 165.)

² Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 7.

³ In the condemnation of the articles of Quesnel (1713), *male sonans* was distinguished from all these censures, including *piarum aurium offensiva*. Cf. outline of condemnations in introduction, no. 8. Also, cf. CANO, sup., p. 146.

⁴ Cf. sup., p. 141.

⁵ Cf. CANO, sup., pp. 146-148; LUGO, p. 153; SALMANTICENSES, p. 156; GAUTIER, p. 166.

5° The following is a good illustration of doctrine which is *male sonans*. If, for instance, a Catholic theologian were to state, '*In Deo sunt tres essentiae relativae*', this proposition could be censured as *male sonans*. All the circumstances indicate that what the author intends to say is, '*In Deo sunt tres subsistentiae relativae*'. Nevertheless, in substituting the word '*essentia*' for '*subsistentia*', he departed from the traditional usage, and consequently the doctrine may fall under the censure¹.

6° In spite of the fact that *male sonans* is concerned with the abuse of words applied in the expression of otherwise sound doctrine, it cannot be said to be a merely grammatical censure. The use of untraditional and incongruous terminology in theology is not a merely grammatical fault. Such abuse of words constitutes a danger to faith in so far as it prepares the way for misrepresentation. Consequently, *male sonans* is a theological and not a merely grammatical censure².

7° The first theologian we saw to describe the censure *male sonans* in any way resembling the outline we have so far given, was Melchior Cano († 1560). Cano's exposition of this censure was very original in so far as he departed from the mass of confused ideas which were put forward by his predecessors to explain *male sonans*³. However, from another point of view, his doctrine was old and sanctified by tradition. We have seen several texts in S. Thomas which describe the idea of *male sonans*⁴. Above all, in his opusculum *Contra Errores Graecorum* S. Thomas examines the terminology used by many Greek Fathers, and explains that in spite of the fact that such terminology is quite orthodox for the Greeks, it sounds wrong to Latin ears. We noted the exact words of S. Thomas; '*non recte sonat*'⁵. All this goes to show that Cano was not quite as original when treating of the nature of *male sonans*, as would appear at first sight. Cano's interpretation was

¹ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 153; SALMANTICENSES, p. 156.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSES, sup., p. 156.

³ Cf. sup., p. 169; pp. 144-145.

⁴ Cf. S. T., 1, q. 31, a. 2; 3, q. 16, a. 8.

⁵ Cf. S. THOMAS, *Contra Errores Graecorum, prooemium*. (Parmae 1864, t. 15, p. 239.) We have already quoted in full, supra, p. 167.

later endorsed and clarified by such authorities as Banez¹, Lorca², Lugo³, the Salmanticenses⁴, and Gautier⁵.

8° We conclude by giving the concise definition composed by the Salmanticenses; '*Propositio male sonans est quae habet sensum congruentem fidei, verba autem non congrua*'⁶.

E. Piarum aurium offensiva

according to the most authoritative sources

1° As already stated, it was comparatively late before *male sonans* and *piarum aurium offensiva* were applied in the same dogmatic condemnation and thus officially distinguished by the Church. It is not surprising, therefore, that these two censures were identified by very many theologians⁷.

2° The ears of the crowd (*turba*) cannot be taken as a criterion when the censure *piarum aurium offensiva* is to be applied. They must be refined, delicate, and prudent ears. There is no question of that common and false piety which easily suffers offense and takes pharasaic scandal⁸.

3° As is evident from the name of this censure, doctrine which is censurable as *piarum aurium offensiva* contains some element which is contrary to the virtue of religion⁹.

4° Doctrine which is offensive to pious ears is not necessarily false. However, it expresses something which is best left unsaid, since it is disrespectful to God and holy things¹⁰.

¹ Cf. sup., p. 149.

² Cf. sup., p. 150.

³ Cf. sup., p. 153.

⁴ Cf. sup., p. 156.

⁵ Cf. sup., p. 166.

⁶ Cf. SALMANTICENSES, sup., p. 156.

⁷ Cf. sup., pp. 142-143.

⁸ Cf. CANO, sup., p. 147.

⁹ Cf. SUAREZ, sup., p. 151.

¹⁰ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 154; SALMANTICENSES, p. 157; GAUTIER, p. 168.

5° The following is an example of an expression which is offensive to pious ears; '*Magdalena meretrix, Matthaeae usurariae et avarae, Petre perjurae et apostatae, orate pro nobis*'¹.

6° This censure may be defined as follows; '*Propositio piarum aurium offensiva est quae licet verum dicat, tamen vel dicit illud quod taceri oportet ob reverentiam ad sancta; vel dicit eo modo, qui illa in contemptum venire facit*'².

7° Unlike *male sonans*, the censure *piarum aurium offensiva* is not concerned with the abuse of words. On the contrary, the proposition which is offensive to pious ears contains words used in their ordinary traditional sense, but errs in so far as it expresses something which is best left unsaid. *Male sonans* is concerned with the words used in the expression of Catholic truth, while *piarum aurium offensiva* is concerned with the object itself which is expressed. This suffices to show the difference between the two censures which were for so long identified by the theologians³.

8° Objectively speaking, *male sonans* is a more serious censure than *piarum aurium offensiva* since it implies a danger of error and misrepresentation in matters of faith. However, from the subjective and moral point of view, *piarum aurium offensiva* is the more serious censure, since doctrine which is censurable in this way necessarily presupposes subjective dispositions which are contrary to the virtue of religion⁴.

¹ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 155.

² Cf. SALMANTICENSES, sup., p. 157.

³ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 154.

⁴ Cf. LUGO, sup., p. 155.