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**THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO SOCIETY
IN THE LIGHT OF CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES
AS EXPOUNDED BY THE ANGELIC DOCTOR**

A STUDY IN THOMISTIC THEOLOGY

BY

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TO HIS EXCELLENCY
THE MOST REVEREND WILLIAM O. BRADY, S.T.D.,
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FOREWORD

This dissertation has been in manuscript since 1938 and any subsequent development of the subject is beyond its scope.

The writer takes this occasion to acknowledge, posthumously and prayerfully, his debt of gratitude, in the first place, to Archbishop John Gregory Murray for the opportunity to pursue graduate study, and secondly, to Father Paul De Rooy O.P., for invaluable assistance and suggestions in preparing this thesis.

To his Ordinary and one-time seminary professor, The Most Reverend William O. Brady (S.T.D., Angelicum '26), the writer is profoundly grateful for the formation and guidance which led him into the area of advanced study. Finally he wishes to express his appreciation to The Master General of The Order of Preachers, The Most Reverend Michael Browne, his professor, counselor and friend at the Angelicum.

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
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
The works of St. Thomas are cited according to the Roman Leonine Edition.

The Citations of Holy Scripture are according to the Rheims-Douay Version.

The quotations of Aristotle's *Politics* are taken from the English translation by Benjamin Jowett, Oxford, 1905 ff. (Impression of 1926) while those of the *Ethics* are from the translation by D. P. Chase 1847 ff. (Revised edition, 1911).



PART ONE
AN ORIENTATION OF THE PROBLEM



CHAPTER I.

SACRED SCIENCE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

1. *Theology.* — Three questions, namely, the what, the whence and the why of all existence have disturbed man from the very beginning. They have ever agitated the thinking creature and the search for their answers has built up the edifices of science, philosophy, and theology.

Man was able to investigate his surroundings and thus to answer the first of these questions for himself. In so doing he raised monuments of science.

As to the whence of it all, however, he could learn nothing by merely looking at things. Fortunately he had a higher faculty than mere sensory perception to help him. Endowed as he was with intelligence, he was able to pass judgments upon the facts that he had observed. He made deductions and arrived at conclusions. This is how the mansions of philosophy were constructed. This is how he found that the whence, the cause of it all, must of necessity be of an order altogether different from the natural phenomena that he could observe. He reasoned to the existence of God. Beyond this point he could not go.

By his natural powers of perception he could make scientific observations and gather data. By his natural intelligence he could pass philosophical judgments on the data he had gathered and thus arrive at the existence of the supernatural. But in no way was it possible for him to explore the supernatural by the use of merely natural means. Yet, since the origin of himself and all other things was in the supernatural, the reason why they existed was to be sought in the

supernatural. Hence a divine revelation was a positive necessity if man were to know the why of his existence, if he were to know his supernatural end. (1) That in fact man received such a supernatural revelation has been amply proved. (2)

So using, firstly, the data of science, secondly, the principles of philosophy and, thirdly, the truths of revelation, man built up the branch of learning that is called Theology, the *λόγος* of the *θεός*, which is to say, the science of God.

As its name indicates, God Himself is the subject of the study known as theology. Its investigations reveal His infinite goodness and show that He is the creator of the whole universe and of all that is in it as a consequence of His excellence. It is in the very nature of goodness to diffuse itself, *bonum est diffusivum sui*, and, accordingly, His perfection was communicated to, and manifested, in the creation.

Since He created the universe to manifest His goodness, He is the ultimate end of all creation. Creatures, including man, exist primarily to manifest and glorify the perfection of God.

Each creature is oriented in the plan of creation to an end proper to itself and proportionate to its nature. In achieving this end the creature reflects the perfection of God and renders Him glory. The end of the rational creature is to know and to love God and it behooves man to tend to this end in all that he does.

We may sum up the whole consideration of man and God by saying that Theology teaches that God is the first cause and the last end of man and the relationship of man to God thus elucidated settles upon man certain moral obligations.

This brings into relief the two major divisions of Sacred Science. The part that teaches the dogma of the relation of man to God is called Dogmatic Theology while the systematic study of the moral obligation that attend upon that teaching is called Moral Theology.

(1) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. I, art. 1.

(2) Garrigou-Lagrange, P. Fr. Reg., O.P., *De revelatione*, p. 399 ff.

Thus we see that moral theology is a study based upon the relationship of man to God. Moreover, we see that man is of his very nature an integral part of this relationship and, as such, he can never be considered apart from it.

We must bear in mind, however, that it is not only one man who is thus oriented to God. It is rather the orientation of many men simultaneously. For this reason St. Thomas says that the end of many taken together is the same as the end of one man. (3) God is the ultimate end of human society as well as of each human life in the same way that the whole army as well as the individual soldier is oriented to the military leader. (4)

The first obligation that this relationship settles upon the individual soldier is submission to the leader and the second obligation is coordination and cooperation with the other soldiers. (5) In like manner the obligations that the God and man relationship settles upon the individual man are twofold. The first concern directly man's personal duties to God while the second concern his coordination with society.

The study of this coordination, then, forms a subdivision, as it were, of moral theology, to which we can apply the name, « social moral theology » and as such it is to be distinguished from social moral philosophy.

2. *Social and Moral Philosophy.* — A good example of moral philosophy is Aristotle's *Ethics* and by the same token his *Politics* is a classic of social philosophy. These two works are so intimately connected that they may be taken as one treatise because, as St. Thomas points out, the doctrine of the books of ethics contains the first elements of political

(3) *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, cap. 14: « Oportet eundem finem esse multitudinis humanae qui est hominis unius ».

(4) *Sum. Theol.* I-II, qu. 100, art. 6: « Finis... humanae vitae et societatis est Deus... sicut etiam in exercitu, qui ordinatur ad ducem sicut in finem, primum est quod miles subdatur duci... secundum vero ut aliis coordinetur ».

(5) *Ibidem*.

science. (6) The former is a sort of an introduction to the latter.

We see, even now, at least one difference between social moral theology and Aristotelian moral and social philosophy. In the former case social questions are but a subdivision of the study of morals whereas in the latter instance morals are considered as a subdivision of political science, a difference that Kurz considers to be of moment. (7)

In his *Ethics* Aristotle discusses man's happiness but he does not speak of happiness in the future life. He is concerned solely with such happiness as is to be found in this life. (8) Likewise he speaks of virtue but he refers to such virtues as are directed to civil life. (9) For him the important thing is to be a good citizen.

In short, Aristotelian social and moral philosophy considers only man's proximate end, the needs of this life, temporal happiness, civic virtue and the like. (10) Theology, however, looks beyond such things to man's ultimate end, the union with God. Whereas social and moral philosophy is

(6) *In X libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 2: « Dicit autem ad Politicam pertinere consideratione ultimi finis humanae vitae de quo tamen in hoc libro determinat quia doctrina huius libri continet prima elementa scientiae politicae ».

(7) Kurz, P. Edelbert, O.F.M., *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin*, München (Kösel and Friedrich Pustet) 1932, p. 30: « will man hier einen Unterschied zwischen Thomas und Aristoteles sehen, so liegt er darin, dass für Aristoteles die Politik das Umfassende ist und die Ethik ein Teil der Politik, dass Thomas aber die Politik unter die 'moralis philosophia' einordnet und nach der Behandlung der Ethik gleichsam nur 'ad complementum philosophiae' noch zur Politik weiterschreitet. »

(8) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber VIII, lect. 1: « Est notandum quod Philosophus non loquitur hic de felicitate futurae vitae sed de felicitate praesentis vitae. »

(9) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 161, 1 ad 5: « Dicendum quod Philosophus intendebat agere de virtutibus secundum quod ordinantur ad vitam civilem, in qua subiectio unius hominis ad alterum secundum legis ordinem determinatur et ideo continetur sub iustitia legali. »

(10) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber VIII, lect. 1: « Moralis enim philosophia habet considerationem circa omnia quae sunt necessaria vitae humanae... tota moralis philosophia videtur ordinari ad bonum civile. »

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content to hold that society enables man to lead a virtuous life, theology goes further and declares that by leading a virtuous life man is oriented to an ulterior end which consists in the enjoyment of heavenly things. (11)

Aristotle does not take heavenly things into account in his social-moral philosophy because the scope of philosophy is limited to such things as can be examined in the light of natural reason alone and the supernatural can never be explored by purely natural means. (12) Theology, on the other hand, considers things not only in the light of human reason but also in the light of divine revelation and in this way it is empowered to treat of the supernatural.

If we were to limit our considerations to sciences that treat of purely human affairs and their proximate ends we could perhaps agree with Aristotle that social philosophy occupies the preeminent position among them. But, in a larger sense, the science that treats of the ultimate end of the whole universe, namely theology, surely holds a still higher place, as St. Thomas rightly maintains. (13)

It is not a question of antithesis between social science and sacred science. It is rather a case of the one being of a higher order, more comprehensive and more perfect. Sacred

(11) *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, cap. 14: «Sed quia homo vivendo secundum virtutem ad ulteriorum finem ordinatur, qui consistit in fruitione divina... : Oportet eundem finem esse multitudinis humanae qui est hominis unius. Non est ergo ultimus finis multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem, sed per virtuosam vitam pervenire ad fruitionem divinam.»

(12) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 9: «Loquitur in hoc libro... de felicitate qualis in hac vita potest haberi. Nam felicitas auterius vitae omnem investigationem rationis excedit.» cf. also Garrigou-Lagrange, P., *Fr. Reg.*, O.P., *De Revelatione*, 2nd edit., Rome, 1932, p. 399 ff.

(13) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 9: «Sciendum est autem quod politicam dicit esse principalissimam, non simpliciter sed in genere activarum scientiarum quae sunt circa res humanas quarum ultimum finem Politica considerat. Nam ultimum finem totius universi considerat scientia divina quae est respectu omnium principalissima. Dicit autem ad Politicam pertinere considerationem ultimi finis humanae vitae de quo tamen in hoc libro determinat quia doctrina huius libri continet prima elementa scientiae politicae.»

science does not shut out social science but on the contrary it includes or absorbs and elevates it. Whereas social science depends entirely upon human reason, whether it be deductive as in Plato or inductive as in Aristotle, sacred science employs not only the data of empirical science and the principles of philosophy but in addition it brings revealed truth to the aid of human effort, to supplement and to perfect it. The one widens the perspective of the other by adding divine revelation to the human outlook; it widens the scope to include not only man's proximate end but also his ultimate end.

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CHAPTER II.

THE PROBLEM

1. *The Basic Social Question.* — We have seen that the whole of moral theology is based upon the relation of man to God. We have seen that once this relationship has been established certain moral obligation arises spontaneously and follow as a necessary consequence.

It is in exactly the same way that social obligations depend upon the relation of the individual to society. As Robert Linhardt says in his notable work, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des heiligen Thomas von Aquin*, the relation of the individual to society is the basic question of all social ethics. (1) All other social questions are found upon it. They spring from it and are consequential to it. The « very definition of society itself, » according to Charles Miltner, is dependent upon this relationship. (2)

(1) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des heiligen Thomas von Aquin*, Freiburg im Breisgau (Herder) 1932, p. 132: « ' Individuum und Gemeinschaft, ' diese soziaethische Grundfrage taucht immer wieder auf, wenn man das System der christlichen Soziaethik entwickeln und die Probleme der christlichen Gesellschafts- und Staatslehre lösen will. » In the next sentence he refers to it as the « Grundfrage aller übrigen soziaethischen Fragen. »

(2) Miltner, Charles C. S. S., Ph. D., « Scope of a Realistic Philosophy of Society, » in *Philosophy of Society*, Charles A. Hart, Ed., Philadelphia, (Dolphin Press) 1934, p. 3: « A paramount question in any social philosophy has always been the relation of the individual to society. The answer whatever it may be, will obviously enter into and modify one's theory of law, and hence of rights and duties, of the origin of moral obligation and the extent of civil power, and so ultimately of the very definition of society itself ».

To be sure, a question so basic should have the status of a postulate rather than that of a problem but unhappily that has not been the case. Not only was it a problem for Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, et al., but it has been a bone of contention in Catholic circles. The stormy début of the social formula of Heinrich Pesch, S.J., known as « Solidarismus, » is a case in point.

As in all problems of this kind, every solution offered claims support in authoritative sources. Thus E. Troelsch (3) read in the Gospels a noteworthy individualism only to be contradicted by O. Schilling. (4)

St. Thomas, however, has been the stormy petrel of the whole affair. The long and bitter controversy over Spann's theory known as « Universalismus, » received its greatest impetus when the support of the Angelic Doctor was claimed by Spann. (5)

Now, a question that evokes so much discussion naturally produces a rich literature and as a result the works on the social theory of St. Thomas, Thomistic state-philosophy, and philosophy of rights are legion. Yet in this mass of literature the most basic of all social questions remains confused, as Kurz (6) has shown in his careful orientation of the problem. He arraigns forty-four competent opinions and classifies them.

The first classification is of sixteen opinions branding St. Thomas as an individualist. The second, which is a sort of a subdivision of the first, comprises five quotations. To these should be added two more opinions which P. Kurz discusses elsewhere in his book and which brings up to twenty-three the number of those that see individualism in Aquinas.

(3) Troelsch, E., *Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen*, 3rd. ed., Tübingen, 1923, p. 39 ff.

(4) Schilling, Otto, *Die christlichen Soziallehren*. München, 1926, p. 14 f.

(5) Spann, Othmar, *Gesellschaftslehre*, 3rd ed., Leipzig, 1930, p. 46; cf. also Von Nell-Breuning, Oswald, S.J., *Reorganisation of Social Economy*, Milwaukee (Bruce) 1936, p. 86, footnote 1.

(6) Kurz, P. Edelbert, O.F.M., *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim H. Thomas von Aquin*, München (Joseph Kösel und Friedrich Pustet) 1932, p. 9 ff.

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The third division has only two citations. They hold that a rugged individualism characterized primitive Christianity which, however, did not perdure into the middle ages.

Ten quotations of those who find the bond of society strongly emphasized in the middle ages gives us a fourth group while nine citations from those who steer a middle course constitute the fifth classification.

What conclusion is to be drawn from such facts? One group says that the Angelic Doctor is an individualist while an other group says just the opposite. Nay more, as Kurz points out, often the two opinions are to be found, unreconciled yet side by side, in the same author. (7)

It is unreasonable to believe that such contradictions could exist in the mind of any one man and a fortiori it is hard to believe that they existed in one of the greatest minds of all time. Such confusion must be the product of many minds, for St. Thomas has had many spokesmen.

The atmosphere, however, has cleared somewhat of late. Catholic opinion is fairly well unified and today no one would attempt to espouse a theory that would subordinate man to the state. The question of the day is not so much « Where do we stand? » as « Why? »

Watkins answers the question thusly: « since only individuals can in the strict sense contemplate, the primacy of contemplation involves a primacy of the individual over the society, » (8) while others seize upon the Christian exaltation of the human being as the solution to be problem. (9) These

(7) Kurz, P. Edelbert, O.F.M., *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 18: « Diese Übersicht über einschlägige Äusserungen in der Literatur über Thomas und in den von Thomas beeinflussten Werken zeigt uns nur, dass das Rätsel bestehen bleibt. Die einen sehen Individualismus, die anderen sein Gegenteil; oft stellen die gleichen Autoren die beiden Anschauungen unvermittelt nebeneinander hin oder man glaubt in versöhnlicheres Miteinander behaupten zu dürfen. »

(8) Watkins, E. I. *A Philosophy of Form*. London (Sheed and Ward) 1935, p. 167.

Cf. Haas, Francis, *Man and Society*, New York (Century Co.) 1930, chapter II, « Human personality. »

answers are good as far as they go. But, granted that the human race is composed of rational creatures who have a supernatural end, there still remains the question of the relation of one individual man, so endowed and so destined, to the collectivity of men who enjoy the same prerogatives. (10)

De Wulf, (11) on the other hand, displays a fine appreciation of the problem. He strikes directly at the heart of the question of the relation of the part to the whole. He argues that since only the individual has substantial existence and since St. Thomas holds that the civil society is merely an unity of order, the state has no existence apart from the individuals that compose it. Its existence depends upon and exists for the citizen.

But the tendency to sacrifice society to the individual is equally as disastrous as modern efforts to sacrifice the individual to society, as De Rooy points out. (12) And we must remember that attempts to sever the bonds that tie the individual to the state are at the same time gnawing away at the strands that bind the state to the individual. If we free one of all obligation we automatically free the other and the individual is cut adrift.

The letter is the error of modern individualism which Jacques Maritain has so well portrayed. He writes: « What is modern individualism? A misunderstanding, a blunder; the exaltation of individuality camouflaged as personality, and the corresponding degredation of true personality.

« In the social order, the modern city sacrifices the *person* to the *individual*; it gives universal suffrage, equal rights, liberty of opinion, to the *individual*, and delivers the *person*,

(10) Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber I, cap. 78.

(11) De Wulf, Maurice, « L'Individu et le groupe dans la Scolastique du XIII^e siècle », in *Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie*, (XXII, Nov. 1920): « L'Etat est pour le bien du citoyen, et ce n'est pas inversement le citoyen qui est pour l'Etat ».

(12) De Rooy, R.P., Paul, O.P., « La Nature de la Société selon St. Thomas » in *Angelicum*, VI, Rome, 1929, pp. 483-496.

isolated, naked, with no social framework to support and protect it, to all the devouring powers which threaten the soul's life, to the pitiless actions and reaction of conflicting interests and appetites, to the infinite demands of matter to manufacture and to use. To all the greeds and all the wounds which every man has by nature, it adds incessant sensual stimuli, and the countless hords of all kinds of errors, sparkling and sharpened, to which it gives free circulation in the sky of intelligence. And it says to each of the poor children of men set in the midst of this turmoil: You are a free individual; defend yourself, save yourself, all by yourself'. It is a homicidal civilization. » (13)

2. *Purpose of this Treatise.* — The fact that there are so many answers at variance with each other, seems to justify our humble effort to establish the theological basis for the Catholic teaching on the relation of the individual to society according to St. Thomas. To the best of our knowledge, such an investigation of Thomistic theology has not as yet been made.

De Wulf has done well with a philosophical approach. In the magnificent work of Linhardt, *Die Sozialprinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, (14) the question is buried beneath a mass of other considerations. Kurz, has succeeded in bringing to light a grand array of pertinent Thomistic texts but that he has done much more than that is to be doubted.

As Welty points out, (15) the book of Kurz spontaneously

(13) Maritain, Jacques, *Three Reformers*, London (Sheed and Ward) 1936, p. 21.

(14) Linhardt, Dr. Robert, *Die Sozialprinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, Freiburg im Breisgau (Herder) 1932, p. 132 ff.

(15) Welty, Eberhard, *Gemeinschaft und Einzelmensch*, Salzburg-Leipzig (Verlag Anton Pustet) 1935, the fifth foot-note accompanying the introduction to be found on p. 392: « Wir glauben dass gerade die Schrift von Kurz den Wunsch wach werden lässt nach einer ergänzenden Arbeit, die weniger den Textbefund als den Gedankengang und die Gedankenentwicklung in den Vordergrund bringt. »

creates the demand for a supplementary work which should be not so much a table or catalogue of texts as a development of the Thomistic thought process that covers the situation. This is necessitated, he points out, (16) by the fact that the solution to the problem does not rest full-blown and ready to be picked from some page of the writings of Aquinas. Inasmuch as Thomas has nowhere expressly treated our question as such, his teaching on it is something that must be formed and fashioned, built up, so to speak, out of the raw material of Thomism. It is not merely a matter of reading off texts. Conclusions must not flow from isolated passages but rather from the Thomistic system as a whole. It is necessary to orientate the question in the system.

Welty says that Kurz quotes passages from St. Thomas concerning the relation of the individual to society which sound surprisingly conclusive but which are, in reality, Aristotelian phrases that Thomas is quoting in their original wording. That, he protests, does not mean that Aquinas always makes the sense of these words entirely his own. He maintains that Thomas will neither volatilize nor disown the pregnant metaphysical ideas of his doctrine as a whole by the repetition and taking over of Aristotelian words. (17)

This observation is, we feel, a happy one inasmuch as the

(16) *Ibidem*, « Thomas hat unsere Frage nicht ausdrücklich und unmittelbar gestellt, wenigstens nicht in der allgemeinen Form, die uns heute so sehr interessiert . . . Die thomistische Lösung unserer Frage liegt in den Schriften des Aquinaten nicht fertig vor; sie braucht nicht nur abgelesen zu werden; sie muss aus den Gedanken des Aquinaten entwickelt werden. »

(17) *Ibidem*, p. 393 (foot-note): « Ganz sicher will Thomas durch die Wiederholung und Übernahme aristotelischer Worte die tragenden metaphysischen Ideen seiner Gesamtlehre weder verflüchtigen noch leugnen. Die von Aristoteles übernommenen Sätze, die Verhältnis von Gemeinschaft und Einzelmensch betreffen, klingen überraschend ausschliesslich und 'total'. Thomas zitiert die Sätze in ihrer ursprünglichen Fassung, d.h. in jenem Wortlaut, in dem sie sich bei Aristoteles finden. Damit ist nicht gesagt, dass Thomas sich auch immer (oder überhaupt) den Sinn dieser Worte restlos zu eigen macht. Wir glauben, dass Kurz nicht immer scharf genug darauf geachtet hat. »

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idea seems to persist in some quarters that St. Thomas must either take Aristotle or leave him. Some do not seem to have grasped the idea of reconciliation at all. They completely miss the point of St. Thomas' connection with the Stagirite. And those who think that St. Thomas abandons Christian theology to follow pagan philosophy are as much in error as those who think that he parts company altogether with Aristotle. Reconciliation is the keynote of Christian Aristotelianism and Thomistic social moral theology must be studied in the light of this reconciliation, and, to that end, our immediate concern is to discover how St. Thomas articulates Aristotelian moral and social philosophy into his theology.

3. *Method of Procedure.* — It is well nigh meaningless to speak of an individual part without reference to the whole to which it corresponds. As Jacques Maritain has so well said, « The word individual is common to man and beast, to plant, microbe and atom. » (18)

Naturally we are concerned with the term only insofar as it applies to man but even here caution must be observed due to the many and various roles that he may play. As a football player, for instance, he is an individual part of the whole that is called a team. Insofar as he is a citizen, he is the ultimate division of the whole that is termed the state. The soldier is the indivisible part of the army and the sailor is a separate part of a ship's crew.

So before we can speak of the individual part intelligently we must have a clear notion of the whole. In the words of Von Nell-Breuning: « We cannot conceive the individual as he really is unless we consider, at the same time, the society of which he is a member. The double relationship of the individual to society and of society to the individual, has

(18) Maritain, Jacques, *Three Reformers*: p. 20; also, Garrigou-Lagrange, P. Reg. O.P., *Les Sens Communs*, Paris, 3rd Edition, 1922, p. 333.

been intended by the Creator, and we must not only recognize it but make it the basis of scientific investigation. » (19)

Accordingly, we must first of all find out just what St. Thomas means by the part and the whole. We must investigate and expose the framework upon which he constructs his social theory.

Perhaps no one has delineated this framework so concisely and yet so accurately as has E. F. Jacobs. He writes: « the universe is regarded as a single whole, mankind as a single society. Every being, whether an individual or a joint-being (i. e. a community), is an integral part, an organic member of the whole; its action is determined by the final cause of the universe; but at the same time it is also a whole in itself, a diminished copy or microcosm of the larger world, the macrocosm. Thus the unified world is not sharply unified; it is a community made up of communities, articulated and organized in the most diverse fashion, each of value to the whole, each essential to the larger existence. » (20)

We may say that here is a sort of a scheme for the next phase of our investigation, not only as to the factors to be considered but also as to the order in which they are to be seen. This study will comprise the following (i. e. the second) division of our treatise.

The third part of our work will be devoted to a study of the principles involved in the doctrine of the relation of the individual to society. And in this connection we must remember that « The chief function of Scholasticism was to reconcile the teachings of Aristotle, ' The Philosopher ' with those of Christianity » (21) and we cannot grasp the signi-

(19) Von Nell-Breuning, Oswald, S.J., *Die Soziale Enzyklika*, Köln (Katholische Tat-Verlag) 1932 — English translation entitled *Reorganization of Social Economy*, by Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J., Milwaukee, (Bruce) 1936, p. 207.

(20) Jacob, E. F., « Political Thought » in *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, edited by C. G. Crump and E. F. Jacob, Oxford, 1926, ff., p. 517.

(21) Hankins, Frank Hamilton, « Sociology » in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, H. E. Barnes, Ed., New York, (Knopf) 1925, p. 274.

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
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ficance of any reconciliation before we see what was to be reconciled. To this end we must subdivide this phase of our investigation. The first subdivision will be given over to an analysis of Aristotle's development of the question, while the second subdivision will be an examination of Aristotle's theory in the light of Christian principles as exemplified in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Inasmuch as « The thought of the Middle ages was . . . essentially theocentric and the great medieval thinkers were one and all of them theologians » (22) the second subdivision will be an observation of the process of articulating Aristotelian social philosophy into Thomistic theology.

The fourth and final part of our treatise will be the application of the principles to the frame-work. It will be a process of clothing the skeleton in flesh, as it were.

(22) Harris, C. R. S., « Philosophy » in *The Legacy of the Middle Ages*, edited by C. G. Crump and E. F. Jacob, Oxford, 1926 ff., p. 227.



PART TWO
THE FRAMEWORK

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CHAPTER III.

THE ANALOGY OF THE UNIVERSE

1. *The Notion of Collectivity.* — The notion of a collectivity according to St. Thomas involves two points, namely, a plurality of individual beings, *pluralitas suppositorum*, and a certain unity, *quaedam unitas*. (1) It is essentially a plurality and hence cannot be one, a unit pure and simple, *simpliciter*. Nevertheless, in virtue of the fact that it has some sort of unity, *quaedam unitas*, it is a unit at least to the extent to which it is united, *secundum quid*.

A number of separate and distinct stones is obviously a plurality. Yet, if we place these stones close enough to each other to form a pile, then in virtue of their relative positions, or the order of them, *secundum ordinem*, they are a unity of order, *unitas ordinis*. According to the *accident* of position, *secundum accidens*, they are one despite the fact that they remain separate substances and hence are a plurality *secundum substantiam*.

St. Thomas expresses this idea more concisely and with greater clarity than we could ever hope to unfold it and accordingly we shall let him speak for himself. He says: « Quae vero sunt diversa secundum substantiam, et unum secundum accidens, sunt diversa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid; sicut multi homines sunt unus populus, et multi lapides sunt unus acervus, quae est unitas compositionis aut ordinis. » (2)

(1) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 31, art. 1 ad 2.

(2) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 17, art. 4.

Thus St. Thomas gives us the first hint of his concept of society. He says that many men are one people and many stones are one pile in virtue of their unity which is a unity of composition or order. Yet this is only a hint. We cannot jump at some conclusion based on the idea that society is to be given no more consideration than a pile of stones. Both are unities of order, it is true, but society is that and much more than that.

The true Thomistic concept of society cannot be found in any isolated sentence or paragraph. According to those who appear to have made the most serious investigation on this point, we must have a bird's-eye of the universe and of all things in it as the work of God before we can understand St. Thomas when he speaks of any part of the universe and when he speaks of human society as a part of the universe.

Edelbert Kurz says that for St. Thomas human society is a whole within the whole of the universe, « *die menschliche Gemeinschaft* » is a « *Totum innerhalb des Ganzen des Universums.* » (3)

Lindhardt says that for Aquinas the plan of the universe is the plan of human society. He refers again and again to the parallel between the macrocosmos and the socialcosmos. « *Parallelcharakter zwischen Naturkosmos und Sozialkosmos.* » (4)

The Thomistic concept of society can be found only in the theology of St. Thomas. It is only in the light of his theology concerning the creation that we see his social moral theology. Linhardt develops this idea at length in his notable work, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin* under the general heading of « *Die Sozialbedeutung des philosophisch-theologischen Weltbildes.* » (5)

(3) Kurz, P. Edelbert, O.F.M., *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin*, München (Kösel und Friedrich Pustet) 1932, p. 37.

(4) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, Freiburg im Breisgau (Herder) 1932, p. 76.

(5) Linhardt, op. cit., loc. cit.

2. *The Universe.* — When we turn our attention to the Thomistic universe the first thing that strikes us is that it, like the heap of stones, is an « ordo unitatis ». « Totum universum est unum unitate ordinis » are the words of St. Thomas. (6) But that does not mean that the order of the universe which has fascinated and staggered the greatest minds of all times is the same as the order existing in a heap of stones. There are obviously varying degrees of order. The order that we have seen in the stones is the simplest and poorest form of order. It is mere position. The order of the universe is quite another thing.

That the universe is a *pluralitas suppositorum* there can be no doubt. Not only is the variety of creatures incredible but also their number is beyond all reckoning. Yet in the face of such overwhelming multiplicity there is no confusion. The earth swings with measured cadence in its orbit around the sun; the harmony of the spheres suffers no discord, whereas without order all would be chaos. « Ubi est pluralitas sine ordine, ibi est confusio. » (7) The only thing that renders the forces of creation good and useful rather than evil is the order that pervades them. « Bonum universi in quodam ordine consideratur. » (8)

The existence of order leads the Angelic Doctor to another consideration because things that are diverse do not come together in orderly fashion of themselves. They must be put together. « Quae autem diversa sunt, in unum ordinem non convenirent, nisi ab aliquo uno ordinarentur. » (9) « Manifestum est enim quod plures multa et concordare non possunt, nisi ipsi aliquo modo uniatur. » (10) He says that the order of things manifestly demonstrates the existence of some governing or ruling power. « Ipse ordo rerum manifeste demonstrat gubernationem mundi, sicut si quis intraret domum

(6) *Quodlibet*, VI, art. 19.

(7) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 42, art. 3.

(8) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber I, cap. 85.

(9) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 11, art. 3.

(10) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 103, art. 3.

bene ordinatum. » (11) He brings out this idea vividly by means of the analogy borrowed from Aristotle. He compares the universe to an army. As the army is ordered to its general so the universe is ordered to an objective outside of itself. « Totum universum ordinatur ad id quod est extra mundum, sicut exercitus ordinatur ad ducem. » (12) Naturally, the ruling and directing force *extra mundum* to which he refers is God.

The theological explanation of the ordination of each and every part of the universe to God starts with the axiom *bonum est diffusivum sui* which St. Thomas borrows from Pseudo-Dionysius. (13) Since it is in the very nature of goodness to diffuse itself and the goodness of God is infinite, it behooved Him to communicate and manifest His goodness by means of the creation. (14).

Since He created the universe to manifest His goodness, He is the ultimate end of all creation. Creatures, including man, exist primarily to manifest and glorify the perfection of God. (15) « I have created him for my glory. » (16) God is at once the first cause and the last end, He is « Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end. » (17)

Each creature is ordained in the plan of creation to an end proper to itself and proportionate to its nature. This is the perfection of itself, *bonum creaturarum*. When this goal has been attained the creatures, in virtue of their own perfection, concur in the perfection of the whole created order of which they are a part, and in so doing they give glory to God. (18) « All the earth is full of His glory. » (19) The earth

(11) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 103, art. 1.

(12) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber I, cap. 78.

(13) *Ibidem*, liber III, cap. 24.

(14) *Ibidem*, *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 44, art. 4; *Vatican Council*, Session 3, Chapter 1, canon 1, (Denziger 1733).

(15) *Ibidem*.

(16) *Isaias*, XLIII, 7.

(17) *Apocalypse*, XXII, 13.

(18) *Sum. Theol.* I, qu. 65, art. 2.

(19) *Isaias*, VI, 3.

and the other planets whirling in space, the vegetation that grows upon the earth, the animals that feed upon the vegetation, all manifest the perfection of God. Each, according to its own nature and capacity, renders him glory. (20) « The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of His hands. » (21)

Hence, in the same way that the army is ordered to the leader the parts of the universe are ordered to God. « Omnia creatura ordinatur in Deum. » (22) He Who is the highest in the order of being and in the order of causation is naturally the highest in the order of government. « Omnium entium rector exstat est igitur perfectus in essendo et causando, ita etiam et in regendo perfectus. » (23) He calls the « tota communitas universi » a « communitas perfecta » governed by the « lex aeterna » of God. (24) The order of the universe, he points out, demonstrates the justice of God. « Ordo universi qui apparet in rebus naturalibus quam in rebus voluntariis, demonstrat Dei iustitiam. (25)

3. *Duplex Ordo.* — But in addition of the ordination of the whole universe to God there is another ordination of the parts of the universe to each other. Even though an army were ordered to its leader or general it would be nothing but an unwieldy mob were it not for the order of its parts to each other. The soldiers must be formed into ranks and each warrior have his part to play, a special function to perform, if the whole army is to be of any real service to its leader. So the classic analogy of the army is made to include this idea. The complete text of this analogy is as follows: « Duplex bonum ordinis invenitur in universo: unum quidem, secundum quod totum universum ordinatur ad id quod est extra mun-

(20) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 65, art. 2; Gf. Linhardt. *op. cit.*, p. 72.

(21) *Psalms*, XVIII, 2.

(22) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 21, art. 1, ad 3.

(23) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 1.

(24) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 91, art. 1.

(25) *ibidem*, I, qu. 21, art. 1.

dum, sicut exercitus ordinatur ad ducem; aliud secundum quod partes universi ordinantur ad invicem, sicut et partes exercitus; secundus autem ordo est propter finem primum. » (26)

St. Thomas calls the *ordo ad invicem* of the parts of the universe a *mirabilis connexio*, which indeed it is. First of all there are many grades of being. The classic triple division of beings into the mineral, the plant and the animal kingdom is well known. But within each of these kingdoms there is also a gradation of being so that the differences between the highest forms of plant life and the lowest forms of animal life are hardly discernible. There is a perfect continuity of beings running from the lowest and simplest on up to the highest and most complex.

The Angelic Doctor says: « Hoc autem modo mirabilis rerum connexio considerari potest. Semper enim invenitur infinium supremi generis contingere supremum inferioris generis: sicut quaedam infima in genere animalium parum excedunt vitam plantarum, sicut ostrea, quae sunt immobilia, et solum tactum habent, et terrae in modum plantarum adstringuntur; unde et beatus Dionysius dicit, in VII cap. de Div. Nom., ‘ quod divina sapientia coniungit fines superiorum principiis inferiorum. ’ » (27)

The *connexio rerum*, however, is more than mere continuity. In addition to the various grades of being there is a causal relation between grade and grade. The lower grade exists for the higher grade. Plants could not grow without the mineral kingdom but the primary purpose of plants and herbs is to provide food for and thus to sustain the life of the animals. « Semper imperfectiora propter perfectiora sunt » (28) and hence the lower are subject to the higher, « Inferiores quodam ordine reguntur a Deo per superio-

(26) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber I, cap. 78.

(27) *Ibidem*, liber II, cap. 68.

(28) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 66, art. 1.

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res, » (29) and by the same token the material is governed by the spiritual. « Sic creaturae sunt spirituales creaturae, quod a creaturam corporalem aliquem ordinem habent et toti creaturae corporali praesident. » (30) « . . . haec autem unitas ordinis attenditur secundum quod quodam ordine reguntur corporalia per spiritualia et inferiora per superiora, ut Augustinus dicit in De Trin. 3. » (31)

The parts of the universe are ordained to help one another. « Omnes autem partes huius mundi inveniuntur ordinatae ad invicem secundum quod quaedam a quibusdam iuvantur. » (32) And that this ordination has a cohesive force that tends to make a unit of this universe is expressly mentioned by Aquinas. He says, « ordo rerum habent quanto aliquid est superius, tanto habet virtutem magis unitam et ad plura se extendentem. » (33)

Indeed the sense, the *secundum quid*, in which the universe is a united whole is a very real sense. There is a continuity of the grades of being according to which the lower serve the higher and the higher, in turn, dominate the lower, making each dependent upon and helpful to the other. In addition to this mutual helpfulness and effective relationship of one part to the other there is the relationship of the totality to one common goal. This is what St. Thomas meant when he said that a « Duplex bonum ordinis invenitur in universo. »

Now, if a collectivity is a unit *secundum quid* in virtue of *quaedam unitas*, namely the mere position of its parts, a fortiori a double ordination of the parts results in greater unity and deeper coherence. To be sure the universe is not *unum simpliciter*, for it is a plurality, but the *secundum quid*, or the sense in which it is a unit, is more effective than the *secundum quid* of the pile of stones. It has the duplex ordo

(29) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 59, art. 6 ad 2.

(30) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 61, 4.

(31) *Quodlibet* VI, art. 19.

(32) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber I, cap. 6.

(33) *Sum. Theol.* I, qu. 57, art. 2.

which for Aristotle is the characteristic mark of the whole. (34)

4. *Another Cosmos.* — A term that expressively characterizes the universe as multiplicity of parts and a true unity of order is « Cosmos. » And because a prodigious number of individual parts or cells are regulated and ordered with such precision that they make a unity of order that we call the human body, the term cosmos has been applied to the human organism analogously. It is a microscopic reproduction of the order of the universe and, accordingly, it is referred to as the microcosmos in contradistinction to the cosmos proper which for greater clarity is spoken of as the great or *macro* cosmos.

St. Thomas says that man is called a « little world. » « Homo dicitur minor mundus. » (35) But he goes even further than that. He applies the concept of the cosmos to the whole human race. « Sic igitur consideremus totum humanum genus, sic totam rerum universitatem. » (36)

Reference has already been made to the various grades of being that comprise the universe. (37) The primary division of them according to their perfection is into orders or kingdoms, « inanimata . . . plantae . . . animalia . . . irrationalia . . . intellectus substantiae. » (38) The intellectual creatures, it is to be noticed, is one of these « kingdoms. » The « totum humanum genus » stands as one order in the midst of the other orders. (39)

Since the « totum humanum genus » is one of the orders that constitute the universe it, like the other orders, is subject

(34) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 10, 1075 a; Cf. also St. Thomas, II Sent., Dist. IX, qu. I, art. 6 ad 1.

(35) *Sum. Theol.*, , qu. 91, at. 1.

(36) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 23, art. 5 ad 3.

(37) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 65, art. 2 ad 3; I, qu. 47, art. 2 ad 3.

(38) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 97.

(39) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 75.

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to the laws that govern the universe. « Tam in rebus humanis, quam in rebus naturalibus hoc communiter invenitur quod potestas particularis gubernatur et regitur a potestate universali. » (40) The same laws operate in the social cosmos and in the natural cosmos. « In omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentiae quae respiciunt fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. » (41)

Like all the parts of the universe, it is ordered to God as to final goal. « Totum universum cum singulis suis partibus ordinatur in Deum, sicut in finem; in quantum in eis per quamdam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei. » (42) There is, in this regard, only one distinction between the *intellectus substantiae* and the other orders. All the parts of the universe render material glory to God « in quantum in eis per quamdam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei. » Over and above this ordination to God of the whole universe with all its parts, the rational creatures are ordered to their final end in a very special way. In addition to the material glory given to God they alone of all creatures render him formal glory. This consists in knowing and in loving Him. « Quamvis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quem attingere possunt sua operatione cognoscendo et amando. » (43)

As for the *ordo ad invicem* of the parts of the human race, St. Thomas the direct comparison to the order found in the universe. He follows his accustomed method of comparing the individual man, the *minor mundus*, to the universe, and then making the analogy between the social cosmos, and the cosmos of all nature. He says: « Quia vero homo habet et intellectum et sensum et corporalem virtutem, haec in

(40) *Sum Theol.* I, qu. 110, art. 1.

(41) *Ibidem.* I, qu. 82, art. 4.

(42) *Ibidem.* I, qu. 65, art. 2.

(43) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 65, art. 2.