

which for Aristotle is the characteristic mark of the whole. (34)

4. *Another Cosmos.* — A term that expressively characterizes the universe as multiplicity of parts and a true unity of order is « Cosmos. » And because a prodigious number of individual parts or cells are regulated and ordered with such precision that they make a unity of order that we call the human body, the term cosmos has been applied to the human organism analogously. It is a microscopic reproduction of the order of the universe and, accordingly, it is referred to as the microcosmos in contradistinction to the cosmos proper which for greater clarity is spoken of as the great or *macro* cosmos.

St. Thomas says that man is called a « little world. » « Homo dicitur minor mundus. » (35) But he goes even further than that. He applies the concept of the cosmos to the whole human race. « Sic igitur consideremus totum humanum genus, sic totam rerum universitatem. » (36)

Reference has already been made to the various grades of being that comprise the universe. (37) The primary division of them according to their perfection is into orders or kingdoms, « inanimata . . . plantae . . . animalia . . . irrationalia . . . intellectus substantiae. » (38) The intellectual creatures, it is to be noticed, is one of these « kingdoms. » The « totum humanum genus » stands as one order in the midst of the other orders. (39)

Since the « totum humanum genus » is one of the orders that constitute the universe it, like the other orders, is subject

(34) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, XII, 10, 1075 a; Cf. also St. Thomas, II Sent., Dist. IX, qu. I, art. 6 ad 1.

(35) *Sum. Theol.*, , qu. 91, at. 1.

(36) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 23, art. 5 ad 3.

(37) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 65, art. 2 ad 3; I, qu. 47, art. 2 ad 3.

(38) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 97.

(39) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 75.

to the laws that govern the universe. « Tam in rebus humanis, quam in rebus naturalibus hoc communiter invenitur quod potestas particularis gubernatur et regitur a potestate universali. » (40) The same laws operate in the social cosmos and in the natural cosmos. « In omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentiae quae respiciunt fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in politicis. » (41)

Like all the parts of the universe, it is ordered to God as to final goal. « Totum universum cum singulis suis partibus ordinatur in Deum, sicut in finem; in quantum in eis per quamdam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei. » (42) There is, in this regard, only one distinction between the *intellectus substantiae* and the other orders. All the parts of the universe render material glory to God « in quantum in eis per quamdam imitationem divina bonitas repraesentatur ad gloriam Dei. » Over and above this ordination to God of the whole universe with all its parts, the rational creatures are ordered to their final end in a very special way. In addition to the material glory given to God they alone of all creatures render him formal glory. This consists in knowing and in loving Him. « Quamvis creaturae rationales speciali quodam modo supra hoc habeant finem Deum, quem attingere possunt sua operatione cognoscendo et amando. » (43)

As for the *ordo ad invicem* of the parts of the human race, St. Thomas the direct comparison to the order found in the universe. He follows his accustomed method of comparing the individual man, the *minor mundus*, to the universe, and then making the analogy between the social cosmos, and the cosmos of all nature. He says: « Quia vero homo habet et intellectum et sensum et corporalem virtutem, haec in

(40) *Sum Theol.* I, qu. 110, art. 1.

(41) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 82, art. 4.

(42) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 65, art. 2.

(43) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 65, art. 2.

ipso ad invicem ordinantur. secundum divinae providentiae dispositionem, ad similitudinem ordinis qui in universo invenitur: . . . Ex eadem autem ratione. et inter ipsos homines ordo invenitur. »(44)

A true order of unity is the human race. It is a whole according to the analogy of the universe and it is a whole within the whole of the universe. It is like a circle within a circle.

(44) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III. cap. 81.

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CHAPTER IV.

THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SOCIAL COSMOS

1. *The Ultimate and the Proximate Ends of Man.* — The captain of a ship at sea has two primary concerns; one is to bring his boat safely into the port for which it is bound and another is the care of the vessel itself. St. Thomas employs this analogy to bring into relief the two primary concerns of man. (1) Like the ship, man is destined to a goal beyond himself, namely God, but, at the same time, he must take proper care of himself. These two objectives are called, in theology, the ultimate and the proximate ends of man respectively.

In the case of the ship the task of caring for the vessel itself is not assumed by the captain directly but is left to others, such as the ship's carpenter, the purser, and so on. (2) So in the case of man, the care of him insofar as the needs of this life are concerned, which St. Thomas likens to the

(1) *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, caput 14: « Si ... aliquid ad finem extra se ordinetur, ut navis ad portum, ad gubernatoris officium pertinebit non solum, ut rem in se conservet illaesum, sed quod ulterius ad finem perducatur. »

(2) *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, caput 14: « ... quod ad extrinsecum ordinatur, multipliciter cura impeditur a diversis. Nam forte alius erit qui curam gerit, ut res in suo esse conservetur; alius autem, ad altiorem perfectionem perveniat, ut in ipsa navi, unde gubernationis ratio assumitur, manifeste apparet. Faber enim lignarius curam habet restaurandi, si quid collapsum fuerit in navi, sed nauta sollicitudinem gerit, ut navem perducatur ad portum: sic etiam contingit in homine. »

care of the vessel itself, is entrusted to civil authority (3) but the charge of directing him to his final end is upon the ministers of the Church of Christ. (4)

2. *The Good of Man in Social Philosophy.* — If, however, there should exist some thing with no end extraneous to itself, the only care that it would require would be the conservation of itself (5) and this is the key to all of Aristotle's moral and social philosophy in contradistinction to Christian theology.

His moral philosophy does not consider anything beyond those things necessary for human life. (6) And, since the political society has the care of all things necessary for the conservation and amelioration of human life, he, logically enough, holds that « the state or political community . . . is the highest of all . . . embraces all the rest » and « aims, in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good. » (7)

In keeping with this his idea of virtue is not virtue in the Christian sense. It is what we would call civic virtue inasmuch as it is directed to civil life only. (8) And in this light his

(3) *Ibidem*, caput 15: « Rex legem . . . divinam edoctus, ad hoc praecipuum studium debet intendere, qualiter multitudo sibi subdita bene vivat . . . Sic igitur bona vita per regis officium in multitudine constituta, consequens est ut ad eius conservationem intendat. »

(4) *Ibidem*, caput 14: « Si . . . aliquid esset, cuius finis non esset extrinsecum, ad hoc solum intenderet gubernatoris intentio, ut rem illam in sua perfectione conservaret illaesum . . . Sed est quoddam bonum extraneum homini quamdiu mortaliter vivit, scilicet ultima beatitudo, quae in fruitione Dei expectatur post mortem. . . Unde homo . . . indiget alia spiritualia cura per quam dirigatur ad portum salutis aeternae; haec autem cura per ministros Ecclesiae Christi fidelibus exhibetur. »

(5) *Ibidem*.

(6) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber VIII, lect. 1: « Moralis enim philosophia habet considerationem circa omnia quae sunt necessaria vitae humanae. »

(7) Aristotle, *Politica*, I, 1, 1252 a.

(8) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber VIII, lect. 1: « tota moralis philosophia videtur ordinari ad bonum civile; » *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 161, art. 1 ad 5: « Dicendum quod Philosophus intendebat agere de virtutibus secundum quod ordinatum ad vitam civilem. »

moral philosophy is nothing but a subdivision of politics, the first elements of the political science, as it were. (9) Nevertheless, all virtue, says St. Thomas, is directed to some good (10) but the important point is that not all of the virtues are directed to the same good.

The Angelic Doctor then goes on to show that the good proper to one thing differs from the good proper to something else. What is good for man is not necessarily good for a horse. (11)

3. *The Theological Distinction Between the Good of Man in the Role of a Citizen and the Good of Man as Man.* — Due to a fact that we pointed out early in our inquiry, namely, that man may be considered under many different aspects corresponding to the diverse roles that he may play, what may be good for man under one aspect may not be advantageous for him in another role. (12)

We demonstrated our point by several examples. We said that man may be considered as a member of a football team, as a citizen of some particular state, as a soldier or as a sailor. The *bonum* that he seeks in any one of these roles is not the same as that to which he tends in another capacity. The football player aims at victory on the field of sport. As a citizen man seeks help in carrying on his existence and

(9) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 1: «Dicit autem ad Politicam pertinere considerationem ultimi finis humanae vitae de quo tamen in hoc libro determinata quia doctrina huius libri continet prima elementa scientiae politicae.»

(10) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 55, art. 4: «Virtus... est habitus semper se habens ad bonum.» *Quaestiones Disputate de Virtutibus in Communi*, qu. 1, art. 9: «manifestum est quod virtus uniuscuiusque rei est per quam operationem bonum producit.»

(11) *Quaestiones Disputate de Virtutibus in Communi*, qu. 1, art. 9: «Bonum... proprium uniuscuiusque rei est aliud ab eo quod est proprium alterius: diversorum enim perfectibilium sunt diversae perfectiones: unde et bonum hominis est aliud a bono equi et a bono lapidis.»

(12) *Ibidem*, «Ipsius etiam hominis secundum diversas sui considerationes accipitur diversimode bonum.»

peace in the pursuit of happiness. The thing that man strives for in the capacity of a soldier is not the same end that he would seek as a sailor.

This is exactly the same idea that St. Thomas brings out here and to demonstrate his point he shows the difference between the good of man insofar as he is a citizen of a state and the good of man insofar as he is a man, that is to say, a rational creature destined for eternal glory. The good of man insofar as he is a man consists in the perfection of his intellect in the beatific vision. On the other hand, all the good that is proper to man insofar as he is a citizen is to be derived from civil society. (13) Consequently, the end of man insofar as he is a man is God (14) but the end of man insofar as he is a citizen is the civil society. (15)

4. *The State is a Unity of Order.* — Now the reason why man as man is not ordered to civil society (16) is to be found in the fact that civil society is a unity of order in contradistinction to a unit pure and simple. In virtue of the fact that it is not one and indivisible, it is composed of many parts each of which has its own existence independent of and apart from the existence of the whole. Consequently each part may have operations or actions which are independent of and apart from the operation of the whole. (17)

(13) *Ibidem*, « Non enim idem est bonum hominis in quantum est homo, et in quantum est civis; nam bonum hominis in quantum est homo, est ut ratio sit perfecta in cognitione veritatis... nam homo habet quod sit homo per hoc quod sit rationalis; bonum autem hominis in quantum est civis, est ut ordinetur secundum civitatem quantum ad omnes. »

(14) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 21, art. 4 ad 3: « totum quod homo est et quod potest et habet, ordinandum est ad Deum. »

(15) *Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus in Communi*, qu. 1, art. 9: « bonum... hominis in quantum est civis, est ut ordinetur secundum civitatem quantum ad omnes. »

(16) *Sum. Theol.* I-II, qu. 21, art. 4 ad 3: « homo non ordinatur ad communitatem politicam secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua. »

(17) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 1: Hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo vel domestica familia, habet solam unitatem ordinis, secundum quam

In the reverse order this also holds true. The unity of order may have operations which cannot be performed by parts in themselves. St. Thomas demonstrates this by using the familiar example of the army. He considers the military conflict to be the operation of the whole rather than of the parts. In like manner the parts can operate independently of the whole inasmuch as the man who is a soldier has certain activities which are proper to him as a man but which have no connection with his military service. Insofar as he is a soldier he is a part of the unity of order that is the army, but it is not the whole man that is oriented to the army.

St. Thomas says that civil society, like an army, is an unity of order. Hence its parts, that is to say, its citizens, may have activities which are completely independent of the whole. Therefore St. Thomas readily admits that man in his role as a citizen is oriented to the civil society (18) to the extent that a soldier is ordered to the army. But just as it is not the whole man that is ordered to the army so it is not the whole man that is ordered to civil society. Man as man, and the whole of man, is oriented to one end, one goal, only. That goal is God. (19)

5. *The Framework in Outline.* — With this passage from Aquinas we feel that we have reached the climax of this part of our investigation. At the very outset we said that « it is

non est aliquid simpliciter unum. Et ideo pars eius totius potest habere operationem, quae non est operatio totius, sicut miles in exercitus habet operationem quae non est totius exercitus. Habet nihilominus et ipsum totum aliquam operationem, quae non est propria alicuius partium, sed totius; puta confictus totius exercitus. Et tractis navis est operatio multitudinis trahentium navem.» This is the passage that De Wulf, in our opinion, misinterpreted and the one to which we referred, in that connection, earlier in our treatise.

(18) *Quaestiones Disputate de Virtutibus in Communi.* qu. 1. art. 9: « in quantum est civis... ordinetur secundum civitatem. »

(19) *Sum. Theol.* I-II, qu. 21, art. 4 ad 3: « homo non ordinatur ad civitatem politicam secundum se totum, et secundum omnia sua... Sed totum quod homo est, et quod potest et habet, ordinandum est ad Deum. »

well nigh meaningless to speak of an individual part without reference to the whole to which it corresponds. » Subsequent inquiry revealed that the individual part that corresponds to the whole of creation is the creature while man is the ultimate division of humanity.

Our last few pages exposed the Thomistic concept of civil society. We saw that its end was not the same as that of the *totum humanum genus*. The latter is ordered to a supernatural end in contradistinction to the natural end of the former, and the line of demarkation between the two is made decisive by the words of St. Thomas to the effect that societies are differentiated according to their ends, « *secundum diversa ad quae perficienda societas ordinatur, oportet societates distingui.* » (20)

Now then, we have three « wholes » in reference to which we can speak of individual parts. The individual part of the whole of creation is the creature. Anything at all, regardless of whether it be a stone, a plant, an animal or a man is an individual part of the universe so long as it can be classed as a creature, so long as it possesses one feature, namely, that it has been created.

The human being is the individual part of the whole that is humanity. Any man, whether he be white or colored, tall or short, sinner or just, in sickness or in health, is a part of this *totum*. The single factor upon which depends membership in the human society is humanity. This is the only feature that the part and the whole must have in common for the part to correspond to the whole and the whole to the part.

The third whole that we have seen is the civil society, the *civitas*, and we have seen that the citizen is the individual part that corresponds to this whole. Its relationship to the human race can be seen more easily if we take some one country, the United States of America, for example.

Not every man on earth is a citizen of the American republic.


(20) *Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*, cap. III, circa med.

lic. It may be likened to a circle within the circle representing the human race. Every being within the inner circle is a man because it lies wholly within the circle that symbolizes humanity. But not every man within the outer ring is a citizen of The United States because it is not all of them that are embraced by the inner circle.


The common denominator of the part and the whole in the case of the smaller circle is American citizenship, whereas the denominator common to the part and the whole of the larger circle is, as we have seen, humanity. Hence, it is clear that the American citizen is a part of the American civil society in so far as he is an American citizen but not in virtue of the fact that he is a man. Here have force the words of Goethe, « Above all nations is humanity. »

Inasmuch as we have already likened the human race to a circle within a circle representing the whole of creation, and we have compared the civil society to a still smaller circle lying within the circle of the human race, we can clearly recognize three distinct wholes or unities. St. Thomas considers each of these wholes or collectivities in turn and points out the relation of the part to the whole in each case.

While it is clear that every American citizen is a man and that every man is a creature, according to our diagram, it is equally plain, by the same token, that not every creature is a man and not every man is a citizen of the United States. Therefore, for accuracy and precision in terminology, we will use the term « creature » to indicate the individual part that corresponds to the whole of creation, the term « man » in reference to mankind, and the term « citizen » in connection with civil society only.



PART THREE
THEORY



CHAPTER V.

ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY

1. *The Individual.* — Although Confucius had formulated some social rules for the Chinese (1) and the social question loomed large in the religions of all Oriental peoples (2), it remained for the culmination of ancient cultures in the Periclean Age to produce the first philosophy of society, properly so called, in Plato's *Republic*.

The motif running all through the Platonic philosophical system denies the real existence of individual beings. Individuals are but so many reflections or shadows of one being called the universal which alone has real existence. Plato derives the individual from the universal. The latter is his starting point. (3)

With his pupil, Aristotle, however, a reaction set in. The pupil maintained that all philosophical speculation must start with the individual. It is, he says, only the individual of which we have any knowledge at all. As for the universal, we must derive our knowledge of it from the individual. Quite naturally then, we may expect the social thought of Aristotle to bear some contrast to his master's philosophy of society at least insofar as the mooted question is involved.

(1) Cf. Hasting's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, under « Confucius. »

(2) Cf. Turner, William, *History of Philosophy*, Boston (Ginn) 1903, ff., p. 11 f.

(3) *Ibidem*.

Accordingly in Plato's *Republic*, « there is complete subordination of the individual to the State. » (4) Plato's view of society « denies the reality of the parts. For him the individual is nothing, the State everything. The individual is absolutely sacrificed to the State. » (5)

Aristotle on the contrary maintains that nothing but the individual has substantial existence. He « combats the state absolutism of Plato. » (6) He attributes to the individual man an intrinsic worth. Man, he says, dominates the earth and the lower orders of creation are all oriented to him.

The author of the *Politics*, says that plants exist for the sake of animals « and that the other animals exist for the sake of man; the tame for use and food; the wild, if not all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals and plants for the sake of man. » (7)

Man, however, exists for the sake of nothing but himself. All other things have their end in him but his end he possesses in himself. This follows from the fact that for Aristotle the Intellect is the part of man that « is most truly man » (8) and « the Working of the Intellect . . . , is thought . . . to aim at no End beyond itself. » (9)

2. *The End of Man.* — Even the virtue of which the Stagirite speaks is not directed to an end outside of and superior

(4) Wallis, Wilson D., *An Introduction to Sociology*, New York (Knopf) 1927, p. 51.

(5) Stace, W. T., *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy*. London (Macmillan) 1924, p. 322.

(6) Turner, William, *History of Philosophy*, Boston (Ginn) 1903 ff., p. 155.

(7) Aristotle, *Politics*, (translation by Benjamin Jowett, Oxford, 1905 ff.) I. 8. 1256 b.

(8) Idem, *Ethics*. (translation by D. P. Chase, 1847 ff. — all citations are from the revised edition of 1911 (Everyman's Library) X. 7, 1177 b.

(9) Idem, *ibidem*.

to man. It is not based upon the relationship of man to God that we considered in our discussion of Christian theology. It is love of self that characterizes the virtuous man.

To explain this seeming paradox we must resort to the Aristotelian syllogism which we frame thusly: The virtuous man gratifies his intellect; but the intellect is man's « self; » therefore the virtuous man gratifies himself.

The import of the major premise is made clear when Aristotle says that « the good man and he who lives under a sense of honour will be obedient to reason; and the baser sort . . . grasp at pleasure. » (10) Again he declares that, « the good man does what he ought to do, because all Intellect chooses what is best for itself and the good man puts himself under the direction of the Intellect. » (11) Finally he points out that « a man . . . anxious to do, more than other men. acts of justice, or self-mastery, or any other virtuous acts, and, in general, . . . to secure to himself that which is abstractedly noble and honourable. . . gratifies that Principle (i. e., intellect) of his nature which is most rightfully authoritative, and obeys it in everything. » (12)

The minor of our syllogism, namely, that the intellect is man's « self » flows from the fact that the intellect « is characteristic of man. » (13) Aristotle says that « Man has reason . . . and man only. » (14) To be sure, he is called the « rational animal » in contradistinction to the brute with which he has all other things in common. Hence man is man insofar as he has intelligence and, accordingly, Aristotle says that « this Principle is most truly Man. » (15) « In fact this Principle would seem to constitute each man's 'Self'. » (16)

The conclusion that the good man gratifies himself and

(10) Idem, *Ethics*, X, 9, 1180 a.

(11) Idem, *ibidem*, IX, 8, 1169 a.

(12) Idem, *ibidem*, IX, 8, 1168 b.

(13) Idem, *Politics*, I, 2, 1253 a.

(14) Idem, *Ibidem*, VII, 13, 1332 b.

(15) Idem, *Ethics*, X, 7, 1178 a.

(16) Idem, *Ibidem*.

that virtue is a form of self-love is summed up thusly: « he is most truly Self-loving who loves and gratifies this Principle.

« Again, men are said to have, or fail of having, self-control, according as the Intellect controls or not, it being plainly implied thereby that this Principle constitutes each individual; and people are thought to have done of themselves, and voluntarily, those things specially which are done with Reason.

« It is plain, therefore, that this Principle does, either entirely or specially, constitute the individual man, and that the good man specially loves this. For this reason then he must be specially Self-loving, in a kind other than that which is reproached, and as far superior to it as living in accordance with Reason is to living at the beck and call of passion, and aiming at the truly noble to aiming at apparent advantage. (17)

Aristotle assumes that happiness is « the one end of all human things. » (18) But « happiness is the realization and the perfect exercise of virtue. » (19) Therefore « the one end of all human things » is « the realization and perfect exercise of virtue. » (20)

But since virtue, as we have seen, is not directed to any end other than man himself, man's final end is in himself. Thus Aristotle's moral system is systematic selfishness.

Thus we clearly see the importance of man, nay more, of the individual man, in Aristotelian moral and social philosophy. While the order of intellectual beings is the *raison d'être* of all the other orders, each individual intellect aims « at no end beyond itself. » Not only physical but also moral

(17) *Idem, Ethics*, IX, 8, 1168 b. and 1169 a.

(18) *Ethics*, X, 6, 1176 a.

(19) *Politics*, VII, 13, 1332 a; see also: *Ibidem*, VII, 9, 1328 b: « happiness cannot exist without virtue; » *Ibidem*, 1329 a; *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1323 b: « each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise actions. »

(20) *Gf. Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1324 a: « the best life... is the life of virtue. »

values are appraised according to this norm insofar as man's virtue is not inspired by love of God but by love of self; it aims at no end beyond man himself. Aristotle's world is anthropocentric.

Indeed, to portray St. Thomas as an individualist, on the basis of the importance of the individual, it seems hardly necessary to make the Angelic Doctor part « company altogether with Aristotle. » (21)

Again, those who stress the Thomistic principle that only the individual has substantial existence (22) are only revealing the close bond between the Stagirite and Aquinas inasmuch as this principle is characteristic of the Aristotelian system as opposed to Platonic universalism.

Moreover, those who base their conclusions regarding the relation of the individual to society on the patent fact that for St. Thomas only the individual has substantial existence are shooting wide of the mark because, as our development of the subject will reveal, this principle is not the focal point of the question.

3. *The End of the State.* — Happiness, says Aristotle, « cannot exist without virtue. » (23) He claims that « each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. » (24) In fact, for him, « happiness is the realization and perfect exercise of virtue. » (25) Hence it follows that « the best life . . . is the life of virtue. » (26).

Man, however, is so constituted by nature that he cannot

(21) Cf. Riedl, Clare, « The Social Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, » in *The Philosophy of Society*, p. 14.

(22) Cf. De Wulf, Maurice, « L'Individu et le groupe dans la scolastique du XIII^e siècle, » in *Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie*, XXII, Nov. 1920, p. 384.

(23) Aristotle, *Politics*, VII, 9, 1328 b; *ibidem*, VII, 1329 a.

(24) *Idem*, *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1323 b.

(25) *Ibidem*, VII, 13, 1332 a.

(26) *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1324 a.

lead the best life in isolation inasmuch as « man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice is the more dangerous. » (27) « He is the Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one, ' whom Homer denounces — the outcast who is a lover of war. » (28) Since he « is by nature a political animal » (29) « in the natural order of things, those may be expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best manner. » (30)

Accordingly, he says that « a state exists for the sake of a good life, not for the sake of life only: . . . Nor does a state exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice, nor yet for the sake of mutual intercourse . . . virtue must be the serious care of a state which truly deserves the name . . .

« It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of crime and for the sake of exchange . . . Then end is the good life . . . And the state is the union of families and villages having for an end a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honourable life.

« Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. » (31) In fact, the Stagirite defines the state as a group of human beings who are living together for the purpose of leading « the best life possible. » (32)

There can be no doubt that the state exists in order to help man to lead a virtuous life and, since man's happiness depends upon his virtue, the ultimate end of the state is to enable man to be happy. (33)

(27) *Ibidem*, I, 2, 1253 a.

(28) *Ibidem*, I, 2, 1253 a.

(29) *Ibidem*.

(30) *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1323 a.

(31) *Ibidem*, III, 9, 1280 a-1281 a.

(32) *Ibidem*, VII, 8, 1328 a: « a state is not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible. »

(33) Cf. Turner, William, *History of Philosophy*, Boston (Ginn) 1903 ff. p. 155: « Aristotle starts with the principle that man is by nature a social

4. « *The End of Individuals and States is the Same.* » — We have thus far seen Aristotle's theory of the end of the individual man and also his conception of the end of society. That they are the same is the next point that the Stagirite proposes to establish. « We ought, » he says, « to ascertain, first of all, which is the most generally eligible life, and then whether the same life is or is not best for the state and for individuals. » (34)

As we have already seen, he not only found that the life of virtue was most eligible for the individual but he also determined that « political society exists for the sake of noble actions. » (35)

« Assuming, » he continues, « that enough has been already said in exoteric discourses concerning the best life, we will now only repeat the statements contained in them. » (36) and there follow such statements as:

« Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. » (37)

« Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue. » (38)

That « the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state . . . no one denies. » (39)

We have only to recall that he had said that happiness is « the one end of all human things » (40) to follow his train of argument to his conclusion that « the end of individuals and of states is the same. » (41)

being . . . and is forced to depend upon the social organization for the attainment of happiness. » The mission of the « state is consequently . . . the advancement and development of its subjects. »

(34) *Politics*, VII, 1, 1323 a.

(35) *Ibidem*, III, 9, 1251 a.

(36) *Ibidem*, VII, 1, 1323 a.

(37) *Ibidem*, 1323 b.

(38) *Politics*, VII, 1, 1323 b.

(39) *Ibidem*, 1324 a.

(40) *Ethics*, X, 6, 1176 a.

(41) *Politics*, VII, 15, 1334 a.

5. *The Relation of the Individual to the State.* — We have already seen that Aristotle combats the universalism of Plato in general and Platonic state absolutism in particular. Whereas the author of the *Republic* denies the reality of the parts of society, Aristotle attributes to them great importance even to the point of making man the sole object of virtuous acts.

Yet, in the face of this individualism, the Stagirite says that it is « more noble and godlike » « to discover and preserve » the good of the community than to serve the good of the individual. (42)

He reasons as follows: « grant that this (the good) is the same to the individual and to the community, yet surely that of the latter is plainly greater and more perfect to discover and preserve: for to do this even for a single individual were a matter of contentment; but to do it for a whole nation, and for communities generally, were more noble and godlike.» (43)

Here Aristotle seems to make two extremes meet. Take, for example such statements as these: « it is to himself that each individual wishes what is good, » (44); « each man desires good for himself most of all, » (45); and « the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain. » (46)

The inference would seem to be that man is acting contrary to nature when he sacrifices an immediate and personal advantage for the good of a friend or for his country but Aristotle says, « No », even such apparent sacrifice is an expression of self-love.

« Of the good man, » Aristotle says, « It is true that he does many things for the sake of his friends and his country, even to the extent of dying for them, if need be: for money

(42) Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, 2, 1094 b.

(43) *Ibidem*.

(44) Aristotle, *Ethics*, IX, 3, 1166 a.

(45) *Ibidem*, VII, 7, 1159 a.

(46) Aristotle, *Politics*, II, 5, 1263 b.

and honours, and in short, all the good things which others fight for, he will throw away while eager to secure to himself the *kalòn*: he will prefer a brief and great joy to a time and enduring one . . . And this is perhaps that which befalls men who die for their country and friends; they choose great glory for themselves: and they lavish their own money that their friends may receive more, for hereby the friend gets the money but the man himself the *kalòn*: so, in fact, he gives to himself the greater good . . .

« In short, in all praiseworthy things the good man does plainly give to himself a larger share of the honourable. » (47)

It is obvious that the full import of this statement hinges upon the meaning of the Greek word *kalòn* and we doubt that an accurate equivalent is to be found in the English language. However, in this context it is used to signify a thing of spiritual beauty in contradistinction to that which has mere material worth. It corresponds with the gratification of the intellect which we have just discussed. Although it is not supernatural reward in the Christian sense, it is, nevertheless, a spiritual reward and more precious than material goods.

He says that « it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them. » (48)

Hence, it is that the common good is « greater and more perfect to discover and preserve » than private good. For a man to perform noble acts even to the point of giving his life « even for a single individual were a matter of contentment; but to do it for a whole nation, and for communities generally, were more noble and godlike. » (49)

(47) Aristotle, *Ethics*, IX, 8, 1169 a.

(48) *Idem*, *Politics*, VII, 1, 1323 b.

(49) *Idem*, *Ethics*, I, 2, 1094 b; the explanation of the term « godlike » is to be found in Aristotle's idea that man's intellect « is in him a divine Principle » and « so too will life in accordance with it be divine » (*Ethics*, X, 7,

6. *The Articulation of the Individual into Society.* — He articulates the individual into the social framework on the principle that « the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. » (50) The reason why man needs society, is, as we have already seen, to lead a good life. But « the best life, both for individuals and for states, is the life of virtue » (51) and since, as we have likewise seen, the good of the community is to be preferred to the good of the individual, it follows that « the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of the whole. » (52) Hence « The citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government under which he lives. » (53) Lest some may consider themselves exceptions to this rule. Aristotle says that it must not be supposed « that any one of the citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. » (54) He says: « the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole . . . A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but when separated from law and justice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which may use for the worst ends. » (55)

1177b). He is comparing what is divine with that which is more divine. He makes a distinction between *bonum commune materialiter sumptum* and *bonum commune formaliter sumptum*. Materially considered the good of the community is the same as the good of the individual, but formally considered the former is more « god-like. »

(50) *Idem, Politics, I, 2, 1253 a.*

(51) *Ibidem, VII, 1, 1324 a.*

(52) *Ibidem, I, 13, 1260 b.*

(53) *Ibidem, VIII, 1, 1337 a.*

(54) *Ibidem.*

(55) Aristotle, *Politics, I, 2, 1253 a.*

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(56) *Ibidem*

(57) *Ibidem*

With reason then does he say that the isolated « may be compared to an unprotected piece in the game of draughts.» (56) And that « the care of each part is inseparable from the care of the whole. » (57)

(56) *Ibidem.*

(57) *Ibidem.*

CHAPTER VI.

ARISTOTLE IN THE LIGHT OF
CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES

1. *The Question of Happiness.* — Aristotle says that happiness consists in activity (1) and St. Thomas agrees with him. Nay more, Thomas cites the « Philosopher » in this connection. (2)

« Now if Happiness is a Working in the way of Excellence, » the Stagirite continues, « of course that Excellence must be the highest, that is to say, the Excellence of the best Principle, » and « the working of this in accordance with its own proper Excellence must be the perfect Happiness. » In this opinion too, Aquinas concurs. He says that the highest happiness of man consists in his highest activity. (3)

That « the Intellect is the highest of our internal Principles » (4) Thomas further agrees with Aristotle (5) with the

(1) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 6, 1177 a: « Happiness stands not in . . . pastimes but Workings in the way of Excellence, as has also been stated before ».

(2) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 2: « Philosophus dicit, quod ' felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam ' . . . necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit operatio. »

(3) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 7, 1177 a.

(4) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 12, art. 1: « ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat. »

(5) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 7, 1177 a.

result that they both hold that the essence of happiness consists in intellectual activity. (6)

Whereas Aristotle's « conception of the gods is that they are above all blessed and happy » (7) St. Thomas maintains that beatitude in the highest degree is proper to God. (8)

By a process of elimination the Stagirite arrives at the conclusion that intellectual activity is especially characteristic of the gods (9) while the Angelic Doctor holds that the very essence and existence of God is His intellectual activity. (10)

« God . . . » Aristotle rightly concludes, « is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in himself and by reason of his own nature, » (11) and in keeping with this St. Thomas declares that God is blessed of His very essence. (12)

Men, however, are not happy and blessed of themselves as is God. The only beatitude that man enjoys is a certain participation in the divine beatitude. This is the Thomistic concept (13) which is not unlike that of Aristotle who says

(6) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 5: « optima . . . potentia est intellectus; » *ibidem*, II-II, qu. 182, art. 1: « vita contemplativa convenit homini secundum illud quod est optimum in ipso, scilicet secundum intellectum. »

(7) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 7, 1177 b: « the Working of the Intellect » is the « highest Happiness, » the « perfect Happiness. » *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 4: « essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit » and *Ibidem*, I, qu. 12, art. 1: « ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus. »

(8) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 26, art. 1: « beatitudo maximae convenit Deo. »

(9) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 8, 1178 b: « everyone believes that they live, and therefore that they work because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like Endymion: now if from a living being you take away Action, still more if Creation, what remains but Contemplation? »

(10) *Sum. Theol.* I, qu. 14, art. 4: « cum ipsa sua essentia sit etiam species intelligibilis, ut dictum est, ex necessitate sequitur, quod ipsum eius intelligere sit eius essentia et eius esse. »

(11) Aristotle, *Politics*, VII, 1, 1323 b: Cf. also *Ethics*, X, 8, 1176 b.

(12) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 1 ad 1: « Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam. »

(13) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 2: « Ostensum est . . . quod esse unius hominis, qualecumque sit, non est hominis beatitudo: solius enim Dei Beatitudo est suum esse: » *Ibidem*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 1 ad 1: « Deus est beatitudo per essen-

that life is blessed « to men insofar as there is in it some copy of » the activity of the gods. (14)

That such a life is difficult of attainment in this world Aristotle readily admits. He says that « such a life will be higher than mere human nature, because a man will live thus, not insofar as he is a man but insofar as there is in him a divine Principle: and in proportion as this Principle excels his composite nature so far does the Working thereof excel that in accordance with any other kind of Excellence: and therefore, if pure Intellect, as compared with human nature, is divine, so too will the life in accordance with it be divine compared with man's ordinary life.

« Yet we must, so far as we can, make ourselves like immortals and do all with a view to living in accordance with the highest Principle in us. » (15)

Again the words of St. Thomas (16) run parallel to those of Aristotle. He says that God is blessed and happy in His very essence inasmuch as His essence is His intellectual activity. He derives His happiness not from some source outside of Himself but from Himself. He is unique in this respect.

tiam suam: non enim per adeptionem, aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati . . . per participationem; sicut et dii per participationem dicuntur: » *Ibidem*, I, qu. 26, art. 2: « In Deo . . . non est aliud esse, et intelligere secundum rem, sed tantum secundum intelligentiae rationem. Attribuenda ergo est Deo beatitudo secundum intellectus, sicut et aliis beatis, qui per assimilationem ad beatitudinem ipsius beati dicuntur. »

(14) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 8, 1178 b.

(15) Aristotle, *Ethics*, X, 7, 1177 b and 1178 a.

(16) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3, art. 2: « in Deo est beatitudo per essentiam; quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, quia non fruitur alio, sed seipso. In angelis autem beatitudo est ultima perfectio secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato; et haec operatio est in eis unica et sempiterna. In hominibus autem secundum statum praesentis vitae est ultima perfectio secundum operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo. Sed haec operatio nec sempiterna, nec continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia operatio interscissione multiplicatur; et propter hoc in statu praesentis vitae perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest. »

Angs derive their beatitude from Him. They see Him constantly and their contemplation of Him is incessant. In this way they are united to Him for all eternity and hence their beatitude is everlasting and complete.

Men too may participate in the divine beatitude but this participation is difficult in this life inasmuch as they do not see God face to face and they are not permanently and finally united to the source of their happiness. Hence, in this present life man's happiness is far from perfect.

At this point St. Thomas once more pauses to remark that he and Aristotle are in agreement. (17) He says that the latter, in treating of man's happiness in this life, comes at length to the conclusion that it can never be perfect. But this is the last time that we find St. Thomas giving his assent to Aristotle in this connection because we have now reached the parting of their ways. That they walk no more together is, however, not due to any ill will but simply to the fact that the Stagirite does not go any farther; he has reached his stopping place.

2. *The Inconsistency of Aristotle.* — Aristotle says: « we are unwilling to pronounce the living happy by reason of their liability to changes, and because, whereas we have conceived of happiness as something stable and no way easily changeable, the fact is that good and bad fortune are constantly circling about the same people: for it is quite plain, that if we are to depend upon the fortunes of men, we shall often have to call the same man happy, and a little while after miserable, thus representing our happy man 'Chameleon-like and based on rottenness.' » (18)

(17) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 3 art. 2: « Unde Philosophus, ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens: ' Beatos autem dicimus ut homines ' » The whole of chapter X of the first book of Aristotle's *Ethics* is on this matter and the words that Aquinas quotes here are the concluding ones of that chapter.

(18) Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, 10, 1100 b.

At length he asks the question: « Are we then to call no man happy while he lives, and, as Solon would have us, look to the end? And again, if we are to maintain this position, is a man happy when he is dead? or is not this a complete absurdity, specially in us who say Happiness is a working of a certain kind? » (19)

He then goes on to explain that Solon does not mean to say that a dead man is happy in a positive sense but merely in a negative sense insofar as a dead man is forever « out of the reach of evils and misfortunes. » (20) But even in this pessimistic version, the opinion of Solon, according to Aristotle, « admits of some dispute, since it is thought that the dead has somewhat both of good and evil. » (21) He maintains that it is absurd « to pronounce the man blessed » after death. (22) At all vents, the « future is dark to us » (23) he says.

Although men can never be truly happy, nevertheless he chooses to « call them among the living blessed who have and will have the things specified » (24) elsewhere in his treatise as conducive to happiness. His last words on this point are a reminder of the fact that he is speaking only of imperfect happiness. He deigns to call some blessed only with the specification that they are « blessed as men. » (25)

But St. Thomas, holding fast to the basic Aristotelian principle that « nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, » (26) follows the train of Aristotelian thought to its logical conclusion. He argues that it is contrary to reason to suppose that the desire for happiness has been implanted

(19) Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, 10, 1100 b.

(20) *Ibidem*.

(21) *Ibidem*.

(22) *Ibidem*.

(23) *Ibidem*, 1101 a.

(24) *Ibidem*.

(25) Aristotle, *Ethics*, I, 10, 1101 a.

(26) *Idem*, *Politics*, I, 8, 1256 b et passim; *Ethics* passim.

by nature in vain; that it was given only to be frustrated. (27) But, as we have just seen, to say that man can never be permanently and perfectly united to the source of his beatitude by means of the operation of his intellect, as are the angels, is to suppose that the desire for happiness has been implanted by nature in vain. Therefore such a statement is contrary to reason.

Yet Aristotle stands helpless in this situation. He is able to discuss happiness as it is to be found in this life but when it comes to the question of happiness in the future life he is lost for the simple reason that, as St. Thomas points out, human reason cannot investigate the happiness of the next life. (28) This point we made at the very beginning of this treatise.

3. *An Application of Divine Revelation.* — We have now come to the practical application of this fact to the question at hand. «Aristotle's view was . . . scientific in the best sense.» (29) His basic principles, not excluding the one that would have nature make nothing in vain, are data obtained by actual observation of these principles at work in the natural order. In this respect he employs the empirical method throughout.

Aristotle found that although «nature makes nothing

(27) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 12, art. 1: «hoc inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, si numquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel numquam beatitudinem obtinebit . . . Si igitur intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae.» For a discussion of the natural desire for happiness see Darrigou-Lagrange, P. Reg., O.P. *Le Réalisme du Principe de Finalité*, Paris, Desclée De Brouwer et Cie 1932, Chapter V. «La finalité de la Volonté et son Réalisme,» pp. 260-284.

(28) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber 1, lect. 9: «loquitur in hoc libro . . . de felicitate qualis in hac vita potest haberi. Nam felicitas alterius vitae omnem investigationem rationis excedit.»

(29) Hankings, Frank Hamilton, «Sociology» in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*. H. E. Barnes, ed. p. 274.

incomplete and nothing in vain, » nevertheless all the happiness that he could observe on this earth was far from being a perfect fulfillment of man's natural desire for happiness. The logical conclusion, then, is that man's ultimate happiness is to be found elsewhere. But Aristotle did not look elsewhere because without a supernatural revelation, he could not. The future, he said, « is dark to us. » (30)

Turning to divine revelation we find that just as Aristotle had said that « the future is dark to us » so St. Paul says: « We see now through a glass in a dark manner. » (31) But here he does not falter or stumble in the dark as does Aristotle. In the light that came to him on the road to Damascus, he walks sure-footedly. There is no trace of indecision in his assurance that we shall, in the hereafter, see God « face to face. »

As Matthew says, we « shall be as the Angels of God in heaven » (32) and, thus united to God for all eternity as are the angels, we shall participate in His beatitude to the full extent of our capacity. Hence our inborn desire for happiness shall be fulfilled.

Truly can the philosophy of Aristotle be called a *Praeparatio Evangelica*, a preparation for the Gospel of Christ. (33) The logical conclusion of Aristotle's moral philosophy is that man must be assimilated to the beatitude of God in order to perfectly realize his natural desire for happiness, as we have already shown. This is exactly what divine revelation tells us, as we have just seen.

Accordingly, St. Thomas concludes that man in heaven will attain to perfect happiness by means of the intellectual operation which is contemplation of God. This beatitude will be without interruption and eternal inasmuch as man will be

(30) Aristotles, *Ethics*, I, 10, 1101 a.

(31) *I Corinthians*, XII, 12.

(32) *Mathew*, XX, 30.

(33) Cf. Turner, William, *History of Philosophy*, p. 215.

permanently joined to God. (34) The results of this conclusion are far reaching.

4. *The End of Individuals and of Society.* — We saw in the last chapter, that for Aristotle the end of the individual and the end of the state are one and the same. Now, in the light of Christian principles, we find that this Aristotelian idea retains its validity and St. Thomas employs it in order to determine the proper end of civil society. The validity of this point rests on the fact that civil society is an unity of order, an ens ordinis, as Peter Lumberras de Alvernia points out. (35)

St. Thomas concludes that since any society is in its very nature a group of people co-operating in pursuit of a common goal, the end of the society is the same as the end of each co-operator. They are merely working together in order to achieve a goal that is common to all of them. (36)

The good that men seek by forming a society may be of any kind but, whatever the good is, it will determine the nature of the society. For example, workmen form labor unions as a means of co-operating in pursuit of better wages and working conditions and their societies are characterized by these objectives. Now the purpose for which civil society was formed is a better life for each man than would be

(34) *Sum. Theol.*, I- II, qu. 3, art. 2: « Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta, quando erimus sicut angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII, 30. Quantum ergo ad illam beatitudinem perfectam cessat obiectio quia una et continua et sempiterna operatione in illo beatitudinis statu mens hominis Deo coniungitur. »

(35) Petrus Lumberras de Alvernia in Comment V in Pol. VII, lect. 1: « finis optima reipublicae sumitur ex optimo fine hominis, quia respublicae nihil aliud est quam ordo civitatis. »

(36) *De Regimine Principum*, liber, 1, caput 14. Idem autem oportet esse iudicium de fine totius multitudinis et unius. Si igitur finis hominis esse bonum quodcumque in ipso epistens et regendae multitudinis finis ultimus esset similiter ut tale bonum multitudo acquireret et in eo permaneret. »

possible to any single one living alone (37) and this is in keeping with what we found Aristotle to hold. Moreover, he says with Aristotle, that a good life is a life of virtue. (38) Consequently Thomas and Aristotle agree in the conclusion that human society exists for the sake of virtuous living. (39)

That men live in communion with each other not that they might live but that they might live well, St. Thomas (40) proves by making his own the words of Aristotle: « a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state. » (41)

Although he follows the Stagirite closely, he does not hold that virtuous living finds its end in man himself but maintains that a virtuous life is the means whereby man is directed to a further end, namely the contemplation of God. (42) St. Thomas says that human society is oriented to God as to its end in the same way that an army is ordered to the commanding officer as to its end. (43)

Now it is plain that the individual soldier, insofar as he is a soldier, is ordered to the commanding officer as to his end. But he is not the only one who is so ordered. The fact

(37) *De Regimine Principum*, liber 1, caput 14: « Videtur... finis esse multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem. Ad hoc enim homines congregantur, ut simul bene vivant, quod consequi non posset unusquisque singulariter vivens; bona autem vita est secundum virtutem; virtuosa igitur vita est congregationis humanae finis. »

(38) *Ibidem*.

(39) *Ibidem*.

(40) *De Regimine Principum*, liber 1, caput 14: « Huius autem signum est, quod hi soli partes sint multitudinis congregatae, qui sibi invicem communicant in bene vivendo. Si enim propter solum vivere homines convenirent, animalia et servi essent pars aliqua congregationis civilis. »

(41) Aristotle, *Politics*, III, 9, 1280 a.

(42) *De Regimine Principum*, liber 1, caput 14: « Non est ergo ultimus finis multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem, sed per virtuosam vitam pervenire ad fruitionem divinam. »

(43) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 100, art. 6: « Finis autem humanae vitae et societatis est Deus... sicut etiam in exercitu, qui ordinatur ad ducem sicut ad finem. »

that he and many others are so ordered is what makes the army what it is. The one soldier and the many have the same end. So using the analogy of the army, Aquinas says that the end of both man's existence and that of society is God. (44)

5. *Christian Love of Neighbor.* — The Angelic Doctor denounces the notion that man should seek only his own good as being repugnant no less to Christian charity than to right reason. (45)

As St. Paul says, charity « seeketh not her own. » (46) « Let no man seek his own, but that which is another's (47) he admonishes the Corinthians.

As to himself, the Apostle says: « As I also in all things please all men, not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that the many be saved. » (48)

Hence in view of the Christian principle of charity St. Thomas can say with the Stagirite that the common good is superior to private good.

Moreover, in sayings this, he would have the support of no less an authority than St. Augustine who finds this implication in the words of St. Paul; « charity.. seeketh not her own. » (49) And in general it appears that the statement that

(44) *Ibidem.*

(45) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 47, art. 10: « sicut Philosophus dicit, quidam posuerunt quod prudentia non se extendit ad bonum commune sed solum ad bonum proprium; et hoc ideo quia existimabant quod non oportet hominem quaerere nisi bonum proprium. Sed haec aestimatio repugnat charitati, quae non quaerit quae sua sunt, ut dicitur I, Cor. XIII, 5. Unde et Apostolus de seipso dicit: Non quaerens quod quod mihi utile sit, sed quod multis, ut salvi fiant. Repugnat etiam rationi rectae. »

(46) I, *Corinthians*, XIII, 5.

(47) *Ibidem*, X, 24.

(48) *Ibidem*, X, 33.

(49) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 26, art. 4 ad 3: « sicut Augustinus dicit [The reference to St. Augustine is: « In regula, tom. I. »] cum dicitur: 'Charitas non quaerit quae sua sunt, sic intelligitur quod communia propriis anteponit.' Semper autem commune bonum est magis amabile unicuique quam proprium;

the common good is superior to private good is completely at home in Christian theology. We have seen the justification of the statement made early in our investigation to the effect that Thomistic theology supplements and perfects social philosophy.

sicut etiam, ipsi parti et magis amabile bonum totius quam bonum partiale sui ipsius. >

PART FOUR

AN APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE
TO THE FRAMEWORK



CHAPTER VII.

THE RELATION OF THE PART TO THE WHOLE IN THOMISTIC THEOLOGY

1. *The Universe.* — In the universe, the relation of the part to the whole lends itself to syllogistic elucidation thusly: the less perfect parts of the universe exist for the more perfect; (1) but the most perfect of all created things is the order of the universe; (2) therefore the parts of the universe exist for the order of the whole universe. (3) This will become more apparent upon a closer examination of pertinent passages in St. Thomas. According to the Thomistic concept, the order of the universe is, before all else, an order of finality. (4) Not only is creation in its totality oriented to a transcendental goal, namely God, but design runs all through its individual parts from the lowest on up to the highest. In every instance the less perfect is oriented

(1) *Sum Theol.*, II-II, qu. 64, art. 1: « In rerum autem ordine imperfectoria sunt propter perfectoria... Et ideo si homo utatur plantis ad utilitatem animalium, et animalibus ad utilitatem hominum, non est illicitum... »

(2) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber II, cap. 42: « Optimum in rebus creatis est perfectio universi. »

(3) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 65, art. 2: « Singulae autem creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi. »

(4) Cfr. Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des M. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 71: « Der organisch geschaute ordo universi ist vor allem ein ordo finium. »

to the more perfect as to its end (5) and the inferior is subject to the superior. (6)

As we have already had occasion to mention in connection with the order of the universe, plants could not grow without the mineral kingdom while they themselves provide food for and thus sustain the animal kingdom. Just as animals make use of plants men make use of animals. The less perfect exists for the more perfect. (7)

But the most perfect of all created things is the universe itself. (8) Thomas never tires of emphasizing the superiority of the universe over its parts. (9) He refers to it as the supreme good of the created order. (10) He says that its goodness outweighs the goodness of any particular thing in the same way that the good of a whole people preponderates that of one man. (11) God, he declares, prefers this good to any particular one. (12) The ultimate end of divine volition is, in fact, goodness itself, and the closest approach to it that

(5) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 66, art. 1: « semper enim imperfectiora sunt propter perfectiora. »

(6) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 59, art. 6 ad 3: « ut Augustinus dicit, ' inferiora quodam ordine reguntur a Deo per superiora. ' »

(7) *Ibidem*, II-II, qu. 64, art. 1: « In rerum autem ordine imperfectiora sunt propter perfectiora, ... ita etiam ea quae tantum vivunt, ut plantae, sunt communiter propter animalia; omnia autem animalia sunt propter hominem ... inter alios autem usus maxime necessarius esse videtur ut animalia plantis utantur in cibum, et homines animalibus, quod sine mortificatione eorum fieri non potest. Et ideo licitum est et plantas mortificare in usum animalium, et animalia in usum hominum, ex ipsa ordinatione divina ... »

(8) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, lib. II, cap. 44: « Optimum in rebus creatis est perfectio universi; » efr. also *ibidem*, lib. II, cap. 42.

(9) Linhardt, ROBERT, *Die Sozial-Principien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 68: « Thomas ermüdet nicht, das Uebergewicht des Universum über seine Teile zu betonen. »

(10) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 64: « maxime bonum in rebus causatis est bonum ordinis universi, quod est maxime perfectum. »

(11) *II Sent.*, Dist. 29, qu. 1, art. 3 ad 4: « bonum universi praeponderat bono particularis rei, sicut bonum gentis est divinus quam bonum hominis, ut in I. Eth. c. 1 Philosophus dicit. »

(12) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber I, cap. 84: « Deus principalius vult bonum universitatis suorum effectum quam aliquid bonum particulare. »

can be found in the created order is the good to be found in the order of the whole universe. (13)

The reason for this superiority of the universe over its parts hearkens back to a principle mentioned earlier in our investigation, namely, that creatures exist to represent and to reflect the perfection of God. The more perfect the creature the more perfectly it represents the goodness of God. The universe in its totality participates in the divine goodness more abundantly than any particular creature and perforce it represents that goodness more extensively than single creatures. (14)

The parts of the universe are only relatively good and that goodness is through relation to the whole. God has coordinated each creature to the whole. (15) The single creature is good in itself but that goodness is fully realized only to contribute to the goodness of the whole created order. (16) Every particular good of this or of that thing is ordered to the good of the order of the whole universe as to an end just as the less perfect is oriented to the which is more perfect. (17)

Even the imperfections of the individual parts, in fact all the evil that exists in the world, find their explanation, the reason of their being, in the perfection, the greater good and the beauty of the universe. If we may call an imperfection or an evil a *part*, it is a part that exists for the good of the whole. St. Thomas explains this in his *Summa Theologi-*

(13) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 64: «Ultimus autem finis divinae voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis totius universi.»

(14) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 47, art. 1: «Perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et repraesentat eam totum universum quam alia quaecumque creatura.»

(15) *Ibidem*, I, qu. 56, art. 2 ad 4: «Deus unamquamque creaturam facit proportionatam universo.»

(16) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 69: «singula sunt in seipsis bona, simul autem sunt optima propter ordinem universi.»

(17) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 64: «cum ad ipsu (bonum ordinis totius universi) ordinetur, sicut ad finem, omne particulare bonum huius vel illius rei, sicut minus perfectum ordinatur ad id quod est perfectius.»

ae (18) in his *Summa Contra Gentiles* (19) and in *De Regimine Principum*. (20)

Therefore, the part of the universe is found to exist for the whole of the universe. (21) « The part for the whole, the less perfect for the more perfect: that » says Linhardt, (22) « is the everlasting refrain » of the Angelic Doctor.

In one passage, Aquinas says that the universe is constituted of creatures as a whole is composed of parts. He compares the relation of part and whole to the relation of matter and form. He affirms that parts exist for the perfection of the whole and in particular that creatures exist for the perfection of the universe. (23) This thought recurs many times in St. Thomas. (24)

(18) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 48, art. 2: « perfectio universi requirit inaequalitatem esse in rebus, ut omnes bonitatis gradus impleantur... Sicut igitur perfectio universitatis rerum requirit ut non solum sintentia incorruptibilia, sed etiam corruptibilia; ita perfectio universi requirit ut sint quaedam quae a bonitate deficere possint: ad quod sequitur ea interdum deficere. In hoc autem consistit ratio mali. »

(19) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber II, caput, 44: « Optimum... in rebus creatis est perfectio universi, quae consistit in ordine distinctarum rerum: in omnibus enim perfectio totius praeminet perfectioni singularium partium... eum bonum totius sit melius quam bonum partium singularium, non est optimi factoris diminuere bonum totius ut aliquarum partium augeat bonitatem: non enim eadifactor fundamento tribuit eam bonitatem quam tribuit tecto, ne domum faciat ruinosam. Factor igitur omnium, Deus, non faceret totum universum in suo genere optimum, si faceret omnes partes aequales: quia multi gradus bonitatis in universo deessent, et sic esset imperfectum. »

(20) *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, caput 9: « Maius autem et divinius est bonum multitudinis quam bonum unius: unde interdum malum unius sustinetur, si in bonum multitudinis cedat... Et ipse Deus mala esse in mundo non sineret, nisi ex eis bona eliceret ad utilitatem et pulchritudinem universi. »

(21) *Ibidem*, « unde et quaelibet pars invenitur esse propter suum totum. »

(22) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozial-Prinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 68: « pars propter totum, imperfectum propter perfectum: das ist der ewige Refrain. »

(23) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 65, art. 2: « ex omnibus creaturis constituitur totum universum, sicut totum ex partibus... omnes partes sunt propter perfectionem totius, sicut et materia propter formam; partes enim sunt quasi materia totius... Singulae autem creaturae sunt propter perfectionem totius universi. »

(24) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 65, art. 2: I-II, qu. 2, art. 8 ad 2, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, lib. II, cap. 42 and cap. 44; lib. III, cap. 64 and cap. 112.

2. *The Social Cosmos.* — Turning to the social order we can discover the status of the part in regard to the whole if we but have recourse to the Thomistic analogy between the social cosmos and the universe.

On the basis of this analogy, Linhardt says that, « like the universe itself, humanity on the whole . . . , is an order of unity ruled for feature by the same laws that regulate the universe. There is the same plurality and diversity of individual parts, the same real relation between the parts, the same ‘*partes ordinari ad perfectionem totius*’ in the form of ‘*dirigere ad bonum commune*’ . . . the same submission of the particular orders under the universal social order. . . And finally, there runs all through the same social plan: ‘*bonum commune est eminentius quam bonum singulare, sicut bonum gentis est eminentius quam civitatis vel familiae vel personae.*’ (The common good is superior to individual good in the same way that the good of an entire nation comes before that of a city or that of a family or that of a person). » (25)

That this idea, namely, that the common good comes before the good of the individual, runs all through Thomistic literature is emphatically reaffirmed by Kurz (26) who claims that it is to be found therein no less than sixty times. He

(25) Linhardt, Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 75. « Wie das Universum selbst, ist auch die Menschheit im Ganzen wie im Einzelnen eine unitas ordinis, Zug für Zug von den gleichen Gesetzen wie das Universum beherrscht. Die gleiche Vielheit und Verschiedenheit der Individuen, die gleiche relatio realis zwischen den Individuen, das gleiche partes ordinari ad perfectionem totius in der Form des dirigere ad bonum commune . . . die gleiche Unterordnung der particulares ordines unter den sozialen universalis ordo . . . und schliesslich quer durch alles dieses hindurch die gleiche Gemeinschaftsidee: bonum commune est eminentius quam bonum singulare, sicut homum gentis est eminentius quam civitatis vel familiae vel personae. » Translation given above is our own.

(26) Kurz, P. Edelbert, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 47: « Diese . . . Stelle bringt der hl. Thomas in etwa der Form ‘*bonum commune (multitudinis) est maius (melius) et divinius quam bonum unius (bono privato)*’ wörtlich oder in Anwendung etwa sechszigmal in seinen Werken, in S. Th. einundzwanzigmal, S. e. G. siebenmal, Sent. neunzehnmal . . . »

says that it appears twenty-one times in the *Summa Theologiae*, seven times in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and nineteen times in the Commentary on the Sentences. The other pertinent passages are scattered.

Sometimes it is to be found only implicitly as, for instance, in one place where St. Thomas says that the more widespread or diffused a good is the more godlike it is. (27) In most instances, however, Aquinas is quite explicit.

He says definitely that the common good is better than the good of one person (28) and he cites Holy Scripture to prove his contention. He quoted the words of St. Paul in the First Epistle to the Corinthians: « Charity . . . seeketh not her own » (29) and he points out that St. Augustine interprets these words of the Apostle to mean that the common good comes before one's own good. (30) He considers the principle to be either so well established or so patently true that he employs it in theological argument time and again.

In proving that the good of the universe preponderates the good of individual parts, he takes it for granted that this principle is valid in the social order and he proceeds to apply it to the order of the universe. (31)

The problem of capital punishment is solved by an application of the same principle in this manner: He says that parts exist for the whole in the way the less perfect exists for the more perfect. In the case of the human body, if a member is corrupt and is in a way to spread its corrup-

(27) *II. Sent.*, Dist. XI, qu. 1, art. 2, 4; « Quanto bonum est communius, tanto est divinius, secundum Philosophum . . . »

(28) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 47, art. 10: « bonum commune sit melius, quam bonum unius. »

(29) *I Corinthians*, XIII, 4 and 5, cited by St. Thomas in *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 47, art. 10; *ibidem*, qu. 26, art. 4 ad 3.

(30) St. Augustine in *Regula*, tom. 1, cited by St. Thomas in *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 26, art. 4 ad 3.

(31) *II Sent.*, Dist. XXXI, qu. 2, art. 2: « Sicut bonum gentis divinius est quam bonum unius hominis . . . ita etiam bonum universi. »

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tion to the whole body, it is both salubrious and praiseworthy to amputate it. But the individual person is compared to the whole community as a part to a whole and, accordingly, if some man should be a peril to the community and a source of corruption because of his evil doing, it is praiseworthy to kill him to the end that the commonweal might be served. (32) And this same rule obtains also in the governing of the universe inasmuch as God inflicts punishments not for His own satisfaction but out of love for His creatures. Since the good of the universe consists in its order, those who would disrupt that order are penalized. (33)

The principle that the common good is more divine than private good is the norm that St. Thomas uses in measuring the comparative value of the virtues. He holds that the more a virtue tends to the good of the multitude the better it is. Accordingly, the virtue of temperance, which tends solely to the moderation of concupiscence and pleasure, pertains solely to the man who practices the virtue and, in consequence, is not as great a virtue as justice or fortitude. The virtue of fortitude will dispose a man to undergo the perils of war to save the community while justice regulates his dealings with the other members of the community individually and collectively. (34)

(32) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 64, art. 2: « omnia pars ordinatur ad totum ut imperfectum ad perfectum; et ideo omnis pars naturaliter est propter totum. Et propter hoc videmus quod si saluti totius corporis humani expediat praeciso alicuius membri, puta cum est putridum vel corruptivum aliorum membrorum, laudabiliter et salubriter abscinditur. Quaelibet autem persona singularis comparatur ad totum communitatem sicut pars ad totum. Et ideo si aliquis homo sit periculosus communitati, et corruptivus ipsius propter aliquod peccatum, laudabiliter et salubriter occiditur, ut bonum commune servetur. »

See also: *De Regimine Principum*, liber I, caput 9.

(33) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 144: « Est autem concedendum quod poenae inferuntur a Deo non propter se, quasi Deus in ipsis delectetur, sed propter aliud: scilicet propter ordinem imponendum creaturis, in quo bonum universi consistit. »

(34) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 141, art. 8: « Sicut Philosophus dicit, 'bonum multitudinis divinius est quam bonum unius;' et ideo quanto aliqua virtus

In fact it is this principle that is the basis of the Christian teaching that a man should defend his country in a just war. Such a war has for its end the conservation of the state and since the good that is common to many men is more divine than the good of one man, it follows that it is a virtuous act for a man to risk his life for the common good whether that good be of the spiritual or of the temporal order, as St. Thomas puts it. (35) Nay more, the good of the civil society is the supreme good outside of the supernatural. (36) Patriotism is a virtue, inasmuch as the doctrine that one ought to put the good of many before one's own good has its basis in the Christian principle of charity. (37)

The teaching on almsgiving likewise involves the same principle inasmuch as a man is never obliged to deprive himself or his dependents of the necessities of life in order to give alms to another unless that other be one upon whom the common good of many people depends, for example, a sovereign ruler. If such an important person should be in dire circumstances it would be laudable for a man to give not only of his external goods but of life itself, if need be,

magis pertinet ad bonum multitudinis, tanto melior est. Iustitia autem et fortitudo magis pertinent ad bonum multitudinis quam temperantia: quia iustitia consistit in communicationibus, quae sunt ad alterum; fortitudo autem in periculis bellorum, quae sustententur pro salute communi; temperantia autem moderatur solum concupiscentiae et delectationes eorum quae pertinent ad ipsum hominem. Unde manifestum est quod iustitia et fortitudo sunt excellentiores.»

(35) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 31, art. 3 ad 2: « bonum multorum commune divinius est quam bonum unius. Une pro bono communi reipublicae vel spirituali, vel temporali, virtuosum est quod aliquis etiam propriam vitam exponat periculo... communicatio in bellicis actibus ordinetur ad conservationem reipublicae. »

(36) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 124, art. 5 ad 3: « bonum reipublicae est praecipuum inter bona humana. Sed bonum divinum... est potius quam humanum. »

(37) *De Regimine Principum*, liber III, caput 4: « amor patriae in radice charitatis fundatur, quae communia propriis, non propria communibus anteponeat, ut beatus Augustinus dicit exponens verbum Apostoli de charitate. »

because the good common to many takes precedence over private good. (38)

This idea becomes clearer when St. Thomas says that a civil authority can, in a sense, be said to hold the common welfare in himself. The Angelic Doctor points out that there is a certain human good which does not consist in the community itself but pertains, rather, to one person. It is a good that this person holds, however, not for his own use or benefit but for the use of all the people. (39) Such a good pertains to any person in authority and the measure in which it pertains to him is in direct proportion to his rank in the hierarchy of authorities. Naturally then, a sovereign to whom the custody of a whole people is entrusted takes precedence over all others. (40)

We could go on in this way for many pages (41) but we think that we have cited a sufficient number of cases where

(38) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 32, art. 6: « si aliquis in articulo necessitatis constitutus haberet solum unde posset sustentari, et filii sui vel alii ad eum pertinentes; de hoc enim necessario eleemosynam dare, est sibi et suis vitam subtrahere. Sed de hoc dico nisi forte casus immineret, ubi subtrahendo sibi, daret alicui magnae personae, per quam Ecclesia vel respublicae sustentaretur; quia pro talis personae liberatione seipsum et suos laudabiliter periculo mortis exponeret; eum bonum commune sit proprio praeferendum. »

(39) *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber III, cap. 80: « Est etiam aliquod humanum bonum quod non in communitate consistit, sed ad unum aliquem pertinet secundum seipsum, non tamen uni soli utilia, sed multis » — « in rebus humanis est aliquod bonum commune, quod quidem est bonum civitatis vel gentis (I Eth., II, 8; 1094 b) quod videtur ad Principatum ordinem pertinere. » The brackets are as found in the text.

(40) *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 113, art. 3: « quanto agens fuerit universalis, tanto est superius. Sic igitur custodia humanae multitudinis pertinet ad Principatum. »

(41) The following passages would permit of lengthy elucidation: *Sum. Theol.*, I, qu. 48, art. 2; qu. 113, art. 3; I-II, qu. 90, art. 3 ad 3; qu. 105, art. 3 obj. 5; II-II, qu. 26, art. 4 ad 3; qu. 31, art. 3 ad 2; qu. 32, art. 6; qu. 134, art. 1 ad 3; qu. 185, art. 2; — *Summa Contra Gentiles*, liber II, cap. 44; liber III, cap. 80 et 144 — *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 2; liber III, lect. 14; liber X, lect. 11. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Cf. Kurz, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft*, p. 46 ff.

St. Thomas unequivocally accepts as valid the Aristotelian principle that the good common to many is more important than a good proper to one person and that the part exists for the sake of the whole as the less perfect exists for the more perfect.

Not only does this idea apply to human society but, as we have seen, it runs all through Thomistic theology. It is, as Linhardt (42) says, « the everlasting refrain. » As St. Thomas points out, St. Augustine accepts the principle, and the latter in turn, interprets the teaching of St. Paul on charity in this light.

3. *The One Condition upon Which the Principle's Validity depends.* — There is only one condition that the Angelic Doctor lays down for the application of this rule. He simply asks us to be logical. We can apply the principle only when the same kind of good is predicated of the one and of the many. And in a number of instances St. Thomas demonstrates that the principle is not valid if that one condition is not observed.

On the strength of the principle that the good common to many is more important than the good of one person, the following objections are set down in the *Summa Theologiae* :

The Eucharist is a sacrament that benefits the one who receives it, but the sacrament of matrimony is directed to the common good, namely the perpetuation of the human race. Therefore the sacrament of matrimony excels the Eucharistic sacrament. (43) And, by the same token, virginity, which is

(42) Linhardt, Robert, *Die Sozialprinzipien des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 68.

(43) *Sum. Theol.*, III, qu. 65, art. 3, obj. 1: « Videtur quod sacramentum Eucharistiae non sit potissimum inter sacramenta. Bonum enim potius est quam bonum unius, ut dicitur. Sed matrimonium ordinatur ad bonum commune speciei humanae per viam generationis; sacramentum autem Eucharistiae ordinatur ad bonum proprium sumentis. Ergo non est potissimum sacramentorum. »

ordained to the betterment of the one who practices it, is a state inferior to the married state. (44)

The grace of union is proper to Christ alone but habitual grace is common to Christ and men, therefore habitual grace is greater than the grace peculiar to the Divine Person. (45)

The justification of a sinner is centered in one man but the good of the universe is better than the good of one being and therefore the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of a sinner. (46)

St. Thomas says that all of these objections are invalid because in each case the two things compared are not in the same genus. Matrimony, he points out, is directed to the *corporal* common good while the Eucharist contains within itself the *spiritual* good common to the whole church. (47) And likewise, virginity which is dedicated to God is not to be compared with carnal fecundity. (48) As for the grace of union proper to Christ, it is above all genus as is the Divine Person Himself. (49) And finally, the order

(44) *Ibidem*, II-II, qu. 152, art. 4, obj. 3: « bonum commune potius est bono privato... Sed coniugium ordinatur ad bonum commune... virginitas autem ordinatur ad bonum speciale... Ergo virginitas non est potior continentia coniugali.

(45) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 7, art. 13, obj. 3: « commune est prius proprio. Sed gratia habitualis est communis Christo et aliis hominibus: gratia autem unionis est propria Christo. Ergo prior est secundum intellectum gratia habitualis quam ipsa uni. »

(46) *Sum. Theol.*, I-II, qu. 113, art. 9, obj. 2: « iustificatio impii ordinatur ad bonum particulare unius hominis. Sed bonum universi est maius quam bonum unius hominis. Ergo maius opus est creatio caeli et terrae, quam iustificatio impii. »

(47) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 65, art. 3, ad 1: « matrimonium ordinatur ad commune bonum corporaliter; sed bonum commune spirituale totius Ecclesiae continetur substantialiter in ipso Eucharistiae sacramento. »

(48) *Ibidem*, II-II, qu. 152, art. 4 ad 3: « bonum commune potius est bono privato, si sit eius dem generis; sed potest esse quod bonum privatum sit melius secundum suum genus. Et hoc modo virginitas Deo dicata praefertur foecunditati carnali. »

(49) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 7, art. 13 ad 3: « quod commune est prius proprio si utrumque sit unius generis; sed in his quae sunt diversorum generum, nihil

of grace is above the order of nature and accordingly the grace of one man is of greater importance than the natural good of the whole universe. (50)

These instances and others that can be cited in Thomistic theology (51) show that for St. Thomas the idea that the common good is more important than private good always carries with it the condition either explicit or implied, that the two things compared be of the same kind. Therefore, to say that man exists for the state would be as great an error as to say that the married state is superior to vowed virginity or that the sacrament of matrimony is greater than the Eucharistic sacrament, because, as we have already shown, the good of man as a man is not in the same genus as the good of civil society.

One who would say, moreover, that man's spiritual welfare should be subordinate to the state would make the same error as one who would say that the work of creation is greater than the justification of a human soul, because, as we have also seen, men's spiritual welfare is not the charge of the state.

However, in view of the facts that « civil society » and « citizen » are in the same genus and that man, insofar as he is a citizen, is a part of the whole that is society, we can say that man insofar as he is a citizen exists for the civil society.

Man as man, however, is, as we pointed out earlier in our work, wholly independent of the unity of order that is civil society and the good of man insofar as he is man is super-

prohibet proprium esse prius communi. Gratia autem unionis non est in genere gratiae habitualis; sed est supra omne genus, sicut et ipsa divina persona. Unde hoc proprium nihil prohibet esse prius communi; quia non se habet per additionem ad commune, sed potius est principium et origo eius quod est commune. »

(50) *Ibidem*, I-II, qu. 113, art. 9, ad 2: « bonum universi est maius quam bonum particulare unius, si accipiatur utrumque in eodem genere. Sed bonum gratiae unius maius est quam bonum naturae totius universi. »

(51) *Cfr. Ibidem*, II-II, qu. 185, art. 2, obj. 1 and ad 1.

natural in contradistinction to the temporal well-being that man seeks in the role of a citizen.

Now St. Thomas points out that when the private good is not of the same genus as the common good nothing prohibits the private good from a position of priority over the common good, (52) and in such a case if it so happens that the private good is of a higher genus than the common good it is in fact, in virtue of its genus, superior to the common good. (53)

Therefore, the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on the relation of the individual to society may be stated thusly: the private good of the citizen is subordinate to the good that is common to all of the citizens but the good that is proper to man, considered as man and apart from his role as a citizen, is above and beyond the state.

(52) *Ibidem*, III, qu. 7, art. 13 ad 3: « in his quae sunt diversorum generum, nihil prohibet proprium esse prius communi. »

(53) *Ibidem*, II-II, qu. 152, art. 4 ad 3: « potest esse quod bonum privatum sit melius secundum suum genus. »

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CONCLUSION

We launched upon our investigation by examining the framework or skeleton upon which the Thomistic social theory is constructed. We saw that for Aquinas the whole of creation is one great collectivity and that the individual parts of this unity of order are the creatures. Again we saw that the human race is a whole and that its individual parts are men. Finally we saw that the citizen is the only part that corresponds to the whole called the *civitas*, the civil society or the state.

After we had determined these facts we proceeded to search out the theory of the Angelic Doctor and we applied this theory to the framework that we had previously exposed. The application of the theory to the whole of Thomistic theology may be summed up thusly:

Creatures exist for the good common to creation, which is the perfection of the universe and the objective glory of God.

Man exists for the good common to mankind, which is the Beatific Vision and the formal glory of God.

The citizen exists for the good common to the civil society, which is the good life in the natural order.

Our conclusion that the citizen exists for the city will, no doubt, ring with a note of novelty in the ears of many because more familiar is the conclusion that the state exists for the citizen and not the citizen for the state. (1)

(1) De Wulf, Maurice, « L'Individu et la groupe dans la Scolastique du XIII^e Siècle » in *Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie*, (XXII, Nov. 1920) p. 342: « L'Etat est pour le bien du citoyen, et ce n'est pas inversement le citoyen qui est pour l'Etat. »

A Thomistic text (2) is often quoted in support of this conclusion. However, in this passage St. Thomas points out that in so far as a man is a soldier and in so far as man is a citizen he is a part of the whole that is the army and the city respectively. Yet both the army and the city are merely unities of order and the significance of this fact is that, inasmuch as a unity of order is made up of individual parts that have, each of them, an existence that is independent of the whole, man has an existence that is independent of both the army and the state.

The fact that both the army and the state are unities of order makes it possible for man as man to be superior to the army and the state but at the same time to be subordinate to them in so far as he is, respectively, a soldier or a citizen. (3) Hence, it is perhaps better to say that the state exists for *man* than to say that the state exists for the *citizen*.

Although, in passing, we have touched upon such questions as patriotism and the duty of defending one's country, nevertheless, the formal consideration of particular problems that attend upon the relation of the individual to society is beyond the scope of this treatise. But we rest confident that all such problems can be solved by the application of the principle that the good common to many is to be preferred to the good proper to one provided that both the common good and the private good are of the same kind or genus. And, on the other hand, we believe that the difficulties that now exist are largely due to a failure to recognize this rule.

Not a new rule in any sense is this. It finds its origin not in St. Thomas but in the words of Christ Himself: « Render

(2) *In X Libros Ethicorum*, liber I, lect. 1: «Hoc totum quod est civilis multitudo ... habet solum unitatem ordinis, secundum quam non est aliquid simpliciter unum. Et ideo pars eius totius potest habere operationem quae non est operatio totius.»

(3) Cfr. *Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus in Communi*, qu. 1, art. 9; «bonum ... hominis in quantum est civis, est ut ordinetur secundum civitatem quantum ad omnes.» See also *Sum. Theol.* qu. 21, art. 4, ad 3.

to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's. »

As for Aristotle's connection with it, it seems hardly fair to condemn him for having taught only the half of it, namely, « Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's » without adding « and to God the things that are God's. »

We feel that the fight waged by some against Aristotelian social thought is a bit quixotic. They are making an enemy of the Stagirite after fashion of Don Quixote's riding forth to do battle with a windmill.

Now we see that the Christian doctrine of charity supplements and perfects Aristotle's teaching on the relation of the individual to Society. St. Augustine says: « Charitas non quaerit quae sua sint, sic intelligitur quod communia propriis antepont. » To this St. Thomas adds: « commune bonum est magis amabile unicuique quam proprium. » (4)

We have shown that it is not a question of antithesis between social philosophy and theology. Our efforts have not been to disown Aristotelian social thought, which is acknowledged to be « a fountain head of scientific knowledge concerning the state, » (5) but rather to fill up what was void in it and in general to perfect that great heritage. Granted that it is good, Christian principles make it better.

The chief difference between Aristotle and St. Thomas seems to lie in a fact that Kurz points out. (6) For the former the ideal state where man can attain to happiness is but a dream, but for Thomas the kingdom of heaven is a reality.

(4) *Sum. Theol.*, II-II, qu. 26, art. 4 ad 3: « sicut Augustinus dicit, cum dicitur: « Charitas non quaerit quae sua sint, sic intelligitur quod communia propriis antepont. » Semper autem commune bonum est magis amabile unicuique quam proprium; sicut etiam ipsi parti est magis amabile bonum totius quam bonum partiale sui ipsius. »

(5) Shephard, Walter James, « Political Science » in *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, p. 396.

(6) Kurz, P. Edelbert, O.F.M., *Individuum und Gemeinschaft beim hl. Thomas von Aquin*, p. 105.