

remote. Such means are the following: (a) religious instruction must be taken outside of school, as in special week-day classes, Sunday school, home study, etc.; (b) special attention must be given to the strengthening of faith on those points that are attacked or slighted in the neutral school; (c) parents, guardians, or others responsible must see that the reading and the associates of their wards in the neutral schools are good, and that they are faithful to their religious duties.

871. Is attendance at non-Catholic schools sometimes unlawful, even when there are serious reasons in its favor?

(a) It is unlawful, if the schools are sectarian, and then no excuse can justify such attendance; for, in addition to scandal and coöperation in false worship, there is present a proximate danger to faith that is not made remote. Parents or guardians who knowingly send their children to schools for education in a non-Catholic religion are suspected of heresy and incur excommunication *ipso facto*, reserved to the Ordinary (see Canon 2319). Example: Titus sends his daughter to a sectarian academy because it is nearer and cheaper than the Catholic academy. He claims that she is old enough not to lose her religion, that opposition will make her faith stronger, etc. Titus' arguments are fallacious and his conduct gravely sinful.

(b) Attendance at non-Catholic schools is unlawful, if the schools are neutral in theory, but so dangerous in practice that loss of faith is practically certain if one attends. Example: Balbus sends his son to an undenominational university which is regarded as a hotbed of atheism, and whose students practically to a man lose all religion.

872. Absolution should be denied in some cases to those who send their children to non-Catholic schools, if they refuse to change.

(a) Absolution should be denied on account of lack of faith in the parents themselves, if they send their children to non-Catholic schools on account of their own ideas that are contrary to the teachings of the Church. Example: Sempronius refuses to send his children to parochial schools, because he thinks each

one should judge about religion for himself, and not receive it from instructors.

(b) Absolution should be denied on account of the danger caused to the faith of the children, when the children are sent to sectarian schools, or when they are sent to neutral schools and sufficient efforts are not used to counteract the evil influence there felt.

(c) Absolution should be refused on account of scandal or coöperation in evil, if, while the parents themselves are sound in faith and prevent all danger of perversion of their children, they send them to non-Catholic schools without sufficient reason, to the grave disedification of others, or the great assistance of unchristian education.

873. Absolution should not be denied in the following cases: (a) when the parents have a sufficient reason for sending their children to non-Catholic schools (*i.e.*, a reason approved by the local Ordinary as sufficient). It belongs only to the Ordinary to decide in what circumstances and with what precautions attendance at such schools is allowable (Canon 1374; for application to the United States, see Holy Office, 24 Nov., 1875; Council of Baltimore, III, n. 199, in regard to elementary and high schools. As to colleges and universities, see *S.C. Prop. Fid.*, 7 Apr., 1860; *Fontes*, n. 4649, Vol VII, p.381; n.4868, Vol. VII, p.405; also *S.C. Prop. Fid.*, 6 Aug., 1867); (b) when the parents have no sufficient reason, but there is no lack of faith on their part, no danger of perversion of the children, no grave scandal or sinful co-operation in evil.

874. The presence of Catholics as teachers in non-Catholic schools is beneficial, since it lessens to some extent the evil influence of such schools; but there is also the danger that it may cause scandal or create the impression that attendance at Catholic schools is not necessary. Hence, it has been permitted by the Church in certain cases but only when danger of scandal or wrong impression is absent. (a) The *secular sciences* may be taught by laymen in non-Catholic schools of higher or lower education, if there is no scandal, no unlawful coöperation, and

no immediate danger of perversion. (b) *Christian doctrine* may be taught by priests to Catholic students of neutral schools, either in the school building or elsewhere (as in a church), and certain priests may be appointed as chaplains for this work (Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office to Bishops of Switzerland, March 26, 1866).

**875. Dangerous Marriages.**—The following kinds of marriage are dangerous to the faith of Catholics: (a) marriage with non-Catholics, unbaptized or bigoted persons (mixed marriages); (b) marriage with fallen-away Catholics (that is, with those who have given up the Catholic religion, although they have not joined another), or with those who belong to societies forbidden by the Church.

**876.** The danger to faith in the aforesaid kinds of marriage are serious and proximate, and hence such unions are forbidden *by divine law*, as long as the danger is not removed or made remote through the use of precautions. The dangers are for the Catholic party and the children.

(a) The *Catholic party* is in serious danger of losing the faith (*i.e.*, of joining the religion or sharing the ideas of the other party), or of doubting the truth of the Church, or of taking refuge in Indifferentism. For, if domestic life is peaceful, the Catholic may easily be led in time to regard with favor the other party's religion or views; if it is not peaceful, the Catholic through fear or annoyance may make compromises or sacrifices in matters of faith, or else suffer temptations that could have been avoided.

(b) The *children* born are in serious danger of being deprived of the faith (*i.e.*, of not being brought up as Catholics), or of having their faith weakened by the example of parents who do not agree in the matter of religion. If the non-Catholic or fallen-away Catholic interferes with the religion of the children, their baptism, religious education, attendance at church, etc., will be forbidden or impeded; if that party does not interfere, there will be at least the example during impressionable years of one parent who does not accept the Catholic faith or who disregards

its requirements. Statistics indicate that one of the chief sources of leakage in the Church today is mixed marriages.

**877.** Dangerous marriages are also forbidden *by the law of the Church*. (a) Lack of baptism in the non-Catholic party causes the diriment impediment of disparity of worship (Canon 1070); (b) membership of the non-Catholic party in an heretical or schismatical sect causes the prohibitive impediment of mixed religion (Canon 1060); (c) unworthiness of one of the parties, on account of notorious apostasy or affiliation with forbidden societies (see 945 sqq.), prevents the pastor from assisting at the marriage without permission from the Ordinary (Canon 1065).

**878.** No one may enter into any of the dangerous marriages here considered, unless the requirements of the natural and ecclesiastical laws be complied with. (a) The natural law requires under pain of grave sin that the danger of perversion be removed, that no non-Catholic ceremony take place, and that the Catholic spouse work prudently for the conversion of the other party. (b) The ecclesiastical law requires under grave sin that guarantees be given that the requirements of the natural law shall be fulfilled (Canons 1061, 1071); that there be grave and urgent reasons for the marriage (*ibid.*); that dispensations from the impediments be obtained, or permission, in the case of unworthiness of one of the parties, to assist at the marriage be granted by the Ordinary (Canons 1036, 1065).

**879.** The canonical consequences of dangerous marriages illegally contracted are as follows: (a) Those who knowingly contract a mixed marriage without dispensation are *ipso facto excluded from legitimate ecclesiastical acts*, (*e.g.*, the office of godparent), and from the use of sacramentals, until a dispensation has been obtained from the Ordinary (Canon 2375). Marriage contracted with the impediment of disparity of worship is invalid, whether the parties are in ignorance or not (Canon 1070, §16). (b) Catholics who enter into marriage before a non-Catholic minister acting in a religious capacity or who contract marriage with the implicit or explicit understanding that any

or all of the children will be educated outside the Church incur excommunication *latae sententiae* reserved to the Ordinary (Canon 2319).

880. The prenuptial guarantees required by church law in case of mixed or other dangerous marriages are as follows: (a) According to the Code, no dispensation for mixed marriages will be granted unless the non-Catholic party gives a guarantee that the danger of perversion for the Catholic party shall be removed, and both parties promise that all the children shall be baptized and brought up only in the Catholic faith. There must be moral certainty that the promises will be kept, and as a rule they should be demanded in writing (Canons 1061, 1071). The permission for marriage with fallen-away Catholics is not granted until the Ordinary has satisfied himself that the danger to the Catholic and the children has been removed (Canon 1065, §2). (b) The pre-Code legislation further required that both parties promise that there would be no non-Catholic ceremony and that the Catholic promise to work for the conversion of the other party. Canons 1062-1063 speak of these obligations, but do not exact promises.

881. Remedies against mixed and other dangerous marriages are the following: (a) Before engagement Catholics should be instructed and encouraged to marry those of their own faith. Thus, confessors can discourage company-keeping with non-Catholics, parents can provide their children with opportunities for meeting suitable Catholics, and, above all, pastors should frequently speak and preach to old and young on the evils of mixed marriages. (b) After engagement to a non-Catholic has been made, the non-Catholic should be persuaded to accept the Catholic religion, if he or she can do this with sincerity; otherwise, the Catholic should be warned of the danger of the marriage, and the pastor should refuse to seek a dispensation unless there is a really serious cause (see Canon 1064; II Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 336; III Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 133).

882. **Dangerous Communication.**—Mixed marriages are mentioned specially among the communications with non-Cath-

lies that are dangerous to faith, because marriage is a lifelong and intimate association. But there are other communications with unbelievers that can easily corrupt faith, the less dangerous being communication in matters that are not religious, and the more dangerous being communication in religious matters. (a) *Non-religious* or civil communication is association with non-Catholics in secular affairs, such as business, social life, education, politics. (b) *Religious* communication is association with non-Catholics in sacred services or divine worship.

883. Non-religious communication is sinful as follows: (a) It is sinful according to *natural law*, when in a particular case it would be a proximate danger of perversion freely chosen, or an involuntary danger against which one does not employ sufficient precaution. Examples: Titus chooses infidels and free-thinkers for his friends and intimates, understanding their character and bad influence. Balba on account of her poverty is obliged to work in a place where all her companions are unbelievers who scoff at religion and try in every way to win her over to their errors; yet she is not concerned to arm herself more strongly in faith.

(b) According to *ecclesiastical law*, civil communication is forbidden with those who have been excommunicated as persons to be avoided (Canon 2267). Such persons are those who lay violent hands on the Roman Pontiff (Canon 2343), or who have been excommunicated by individual name and as persons to be avoided through public decree or sentence of the Apostolic See (Canon 2258). Exception is made, however, for husband and wife, children, servants, subjects, and for others in case of necessity.

884. Religious communication is sinful on account of danger in the following cases:

(a) If it is a *proximate and voluntary* occasion of sin against faith. Examples: Sempronius goes to a non-Catholic church to hear a minister who attacks the divinity of Christ and other articles of the Creed. The purpose of Sempronius is to benefit himself as a public speaker, but he knows that his faith suffers,

because he admires the orator. Balbus chooses to listen over the radio to attacks on religion and Christianity, which cause serious temptations to him.

(b) If it is a *necessary* occasion of sin and one does not employ sufficient precautions against it, religious communication becomes sinful. Example: Titus, a prisoner, has to listen at times to a jail chaplain, who teaches that there are errors in the Bible, that man evolved from the ape, etc. Titus feels himself drawn sympathetically to these teachings, but makes no effort to strengthen his faith.

885. Communication with unbelievers that is a remote occasion of sin, is not sinful, for "otherwise one must needs go out of this world" (I Cor., v. 9). On the contrary, reasons of justice or charity frequently make it necessary and commendable to have friendly dealings with those of other or no religious conviction. (a) Reasons of justice. It is necessary to cooperate with non-Catholic fellow-citizens in what pertains to the welfare of our common country, state, city, and neighborhood; to be just and fair in business relations with those outside the Church, etc. (b) Reasons of charity. Catholics should be courteous and kind to all (Heb., xii. 14), and be willing to assist, temporarily and spiritually, those outside the Church. Thus, St. Paul, without sacrificing principle or doctrine, made himself all things to all men, in order to gain all (I Cor., ix. 19). Indeed, the mission of the Church would suffer, if Catholics today kept aloof from all that goes on about them. The Church must teach, by example as well as precept, must be a salt, a light, a leaven, an example of the Gospel in practice; and surely this ministry will be weakened if her children aim at complete isolation and exclusivism.

886. Societies that are purely civil or profane—*e.g.*, social clubs, charitable organizations, temperance societies, labor unions, that are not identified with any church and are neutral in religion—may be dangerous to faith. (a) There may be danger on account of the membership, even when the nature of the society is purely indifferent or good. Example: It would be

dangerous to faith to join a convivial society whose members were mostly aggressive infidels, even though the purpose of the organization was only recreation. (b) There may be danger to faith on account of certain methods or principles of the society. Example: A Boys' or Girls' Club whose purpose is to train young people for good citizenship is dangerous to faith, if it acts as though the natural virtues were sufficient, or as though moral education belonged to itself exclusively or principally.

887. **The Sin of Blasphemy.**—So far we have spoken of the sins of unbelief that are contrary to the internal act of faith. We now come to the sins that are contrary to the external act, or profession of faith. These sins are of two kinds: (a) The less serious sin is that of ordinary *denial* of the faith, that is, the assertion that some article of faith is false, or that some contrary error is true. This sin will be treated below in 913 sqq. on the commandments of faith. (b) The more serious sin is *blasphemy*, that is, the denial to God of something that is His, or the ascription to God of what does not belong to Him. Of this sin we shall speak now.

888. Blasphemy etymologically is from the Greek, and signifies damage done to reputation or character; theologically, it is applied only to insults or calumnies offered to God, and is threefold according to the three stages of sin described above (see 168). (a) Blasphemy of the *heart* is internal, committed only in thought and will. So "the wicked man said in his heart: There is no God" (Ps. xviii. 1), and the demons and lost souls blasphemed God without words (Apoc., xvi. 9). (b) Blasphemy of the *mouth* is external, committed in spoken words, or in their written or printed representations. (c) Blasphemy of *deeds* is also external, committed by acts or gestures. The action of Julian the Apostate in casting his blood towards heaven was intended as a sign of contempt for Christ.

889. Internal blasphemy does not differ from unbelief or disrespect for God. We are concerned here, therefore, only with external blasphemy, which is contrary to the external profession of faith. External blasphemy is opposed to faith either

directly (by denying what is of faith) or indirectly (by showing disrespect to what is of faith), and hence it is either heretical or non-heretical.

(a) *Heretical blasphemy* affirms about God something false, or denies about Him something true. The false affirmation is made directly, when some created imperfection is attributed to God, or indirectly, when some divine perfection is attributed to a creature. Example: It is heretical blasphemy to affirm that God is a tyrant or the cause of sin, or that man is able to overcome God. It is also heretical blasphemy to deny that God is able to perform miracles, that His testimony is true, etc.

(b) *Non-heretical blasphemy* affirms or denies something about God according to truth, but in a mocking or blaming way. This sin is opposed, therefore, to reverence rather than to faith, and will be treated later among the sins against the virtue of religion (see Vol. II). Example: A person in anger at God says scornfully: "God is good!"

890. The nature of heretical blasphemy will better appear, if we compare it with other kinds of speech disrespectful to God.

(a) It differs from maledictions or curses, (e.g., "May God destroy you!"), because the one directly offended in blasphemy is God Himself, while in a curse it is some creature of God.

(b) It differs from non-heretical blasphemy, from perjury and disregard of vow, from vain use of the name of God, because none of these necessarily proceeds from a lack of faith, as does heretical blasphemy. Non-heretical blasphemy proceeds from hatred or contempt of God, perjury from presumption, disregard of vow from disobedience, vain use of the Divine Name from irreverence.

(c) Heretical blasphemy differs from temptation of God (e.g., "God must help me now if He can," said by one who exposes himself rashly to danger), for, while temptation of God implies doubt, it is directly an act of irreverence by which one presumes to put God Himself to proof, whereas heretical blasphemy is directly an act of denial of truth.

891. Heretical blasphemy calumniates God, either in His own attributes and perfections, or in those created persons or

things that are specially His by reason of friendship or consecration. Thus, we have: (a) blasphemy that attacks the Divine Being Himself, as was explained above; (b) blasphemy that attacks what is especially dear to God, which consists in remarks or acts derogatory to the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, the Sacraments, the crucifix, the Bible, etc.

892. Unlike God, creatures are subject to imperfections, moral or physical, and thus it is not always erroneous or blasphemous to attribute imperfections to the Saints or sacred things.

(a) If sacred persons or things are spoken ill of precisely on account of their relation to God, or in such a way that the evil said of them reverts on God Himself, blasphemy is committed. Example: It is blasphemous to say that the Mother of God was not a Virgin, that St. Peter was a reprobate, that St. Anthony and St. Simeon Stylites were snobbish or eccentric, that the Sacraments are nonsense, that relics are an imposture, etc.

(b) If sacred persons or things are criticized precisely on account of their human or finite imperfections, real or alleged, the sin of irreverence is committed, when the criticism is prompted by malice or levity. No sin at all is committed, if one is stating facts with due respect for the character of the persons or things spoken of. Examples: To call a Doctor of the Church an ignoramus out of anger at a theological opinion defended by him, would be of itself a serious sin of disrespect. To speak of a Saint as a dirty tramp or idle visionary, if the intention is to insult, is also a serious sin of disrespect. But, if one were to say in joke that St. Peter was a baldhead, St. Charles Borromeo a big nose, the sin of irreverence would be only slight. No sin would be committed, if one, describing a religious painting from the artistic standpoint, called it an abomination.

893. Heretical blasphemy is expressed not only by sentences that are complete and in the indicative mood, but also by phrases or interjections, by wishes, commands, or even signs.

(a) Blasphemy is expressed optatively, imperatively, or interrogatively. Examples: "Away with God!" is equivalent to the assertion that God is not eternal. "Come down from the

cross, if Thou be the Son of God" (Matt., xxvii. 40), is equivalent to the statement that Christ is not the Son of God. The question put to the Psalmist, "Where is thy God?" (Ps. xli. 4.), meant in the mouth of the Psalmist's enemies that Jehovah did not exist, or was powerless.

(b) Blasphemy is expressed even by short words, or by a grunt or snort of contempt. Example: To utter the name of our Lord in a contumelious way signifies that one regards Him as of no account. The word "hocus-pocus" is sometimes used in derision of the Mass or other sacred rites.

(c) Blasphemy is expressed by acts that signify disbelief and dishonor, for example, to spit or shake one's fist at heaven, to turn up the nose or make a wry face at the mention of God, to trample in the dust a crucifix, etc.

#### 894. Rules for Interpreting Cases of Doubtful Blasphemy.—

(a) Custom or usage is a better guide than etymology or grammar in discovering whether a blasphemous meaning is contained in certain common expressions of an ambiguous character. Examples: According to signification the phrase, "Sacred name of God," is harmless and might be a pious ejaculation, but according to the sense in which it is taken in French it curses God and is blasphemous. According to signification, the expression "Ye gods" in English, "Thousand names of God" in French, "Thousand Sacraments" in German, are blasphemous; but according to the sense in which they are used by the people they merely express surprise, and are at most a venial sin of irreverence. The English language as a whole is singularly free from blasphemous expressions, just as English classic literature as a whole is singularly free from obscenity.

(b) The dispositions or feelings of the user are a better index of the presence or absence of blasphemy than the mere words, if the latter are capable of various senses. If doubt persists about the sense of an ambiguous expression that could be blasphemous, it may be held that no blasphemy was intended. Examples: Titus, a good man, is so annoyed trying to correct his children that he exclaims: "Why did the Lord ever send me such pests?" Balbus, who is a hater of religion, answers him: "Who is to

blame if they are pests?" Since Titus is habitually religious and Balbus habitually irreligious, the question of the former sounds like irritation, the question of the latter like blasphemy. Claudius is a very religious-minded man, but he meets with a series of calamities which so stun him that he exclaims: "I must be only a step-child of God. Certainly, He cares little for me. Why did He ever create me?" The sentiment seems to be one of grief and wonder rather than of insult to God. Balbus is very devoted to his mother, and often addresses her in hyperbolic language, saying that he adores her, that she is the goddess at whose shrine he worships, his supreme beauty, etc. Taken literally, these expressions are blasphemous, but as used by Balbus they are harmless.

895. The Sinfulness of Blasphemy.—(a) From its very nature (*i.e.*, from the importance of the rights it attacks and the goods it injures), blasphemy is a *mortal sin*, since it outrages the Majesty of God, and destroys the virtues of religion, love of God, and frequently faith itself. In the Old Testament it was punished with death (Lev., xxiv. 15 sq.), and Canon 2323 of the Code prescribes that blasphemy be punished as the Ordinary shall decide. It is also a crime at common law and generally by statute, as tending to a breach of the peace and being a public nuisance or destructive of the foundations of civil society; when printed, it is a libel.

(b) Unbelief is the greatest of sins after hatred of God (see 820). But blasphemy is the *greatest of the sins against faith*, since to inner unbelief it adds external denial and insult.

(c) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on *account of the smallness of the matter involved*, for even slight slander or scorn becomes great when its object is God Himself. Example: It is blasphemous to say that our Lord was not above small or venial imperfections, or to show contempt for even one of the least of the Saints as such.

(d) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on *account of unpremeditation*, if at the time it is committed one is aware of its character, just as murder does not become a venial sin, because one killed another in a sudden fit of anger. Example: Sem-

pronius has the habit when driving his refractory mules of shouting at them: "You creatures of the devil!" A priest on hearing this admonishes Sempronius that the expression is blasphemous. But Sempronius continues to use it whenever the mules irritate him, making no effort to improve.

896. There are some cases in which blasphemy is only a venial sin or no sin on account of the lack of deliberation.

(a) If there is no advertence or only semi-advertence to the act itself, the blasphemy pronounced, unless it be voluntary in its cause (see 102, 196), is not a mortal sin. In the former case, there is no sin at all, for the act is not human (see 33); in the latter case there cannot be mortal sin, for there is no full reflection on the deed (see 175). Example: Balbus now and then catches himself humming blasphemous songs that he heard years ago, but he always stops as soon as he thinks of what he is saying. Titus, coming out of the ether after an operation, makes a few blasphemous remarks, but he is so dazed that he hardly knows who is speaking. Sempronius makes himself drunk, foreseeing that he will blaspheme while out of his senses. Balbus commits no sin, Titus may be guilty of venial sin, but Sempronius is guilty of mortal sin in blaspheming.

(b) If there is no advertence or only semi-advertence to the malice of the act, the blasphemy pronounced, if it is not voluntary in its cause, is not a mortal sin; for one is not responsible for more than one knows or should know (see 99-100, on imputability). Examples: Titus, a foreigner, has been taught to repeat certain blasphemous phrases, whose real meaning he does not suspect. Balbus has the habit when angry of blaspheming at his mules, but he is doing his best to use more suitable language. Sempronius unawares gets into a tipsy condition in which he realizes his acts, but is confused about moral distinctions, and hence uses blasphemous expressions which he would abhor if he were in his normal state. Caius, a boy, blasphemes, thinking that he is committing only a venial sin of "cussing."

897. Different kinds of blasphemy must be noted with reference to the duty of confession.

There are three distinct *species* of blasphemy—*non-heretical*,

which is opposed to the virtue of religion; *heretical*, which is opposed to religion and faith; *diabolical*, which is opposed to religion, faith and the precept to love God. These species should be distinguished in confession. Examples: Titus, angered because his Patron Saint did not obtain a favor for him, ironically turns the Saint's picture to the wall, saying: "You have great influence with God!" (non-heretical blasphemy). Balbus in similar circumstances said: "I have lost all faith in Saints" (heretical blasphemy). Sempronius, whose child has just died, rebels against God and calls Him a cruel monster (diabolical blasphemy).

(b) Circumstances may *aggravate* the malice of blasphemy. Blasphemy that is directly against God Himself is worse than blasphemy against the Saints; blasphemy against the Blessed Virgin is worse than blasphemy against other friends of God; blasphemy that ascribes evil to God is greater than blasphemy that denies Him some perfection; blasphemy that excuses itself or boasts is worse than blasphemy that is more concealed; blasphemy that expressly intends to dishonor God is graver than blasphemy that only implicitly intends this. Some authors require that aggravating circumstances be mentioned in confession, but others say this is not necessary (see Vol. II).

898. According to the causes from which they proceed (see 250), blasphemies are divided into three kinds: (a) blasphemy *against the Father*, which is contumely spoken against God out of passion or weakness, as when one being annoyed uses what he knows to be blasphemy; (b) blasphemy *against the Son*, which is contumely against God spoken out of ignorance. Thus, St. Paul said of himself that he had been a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and contumelious, but that he obtained mercy, because he did it ignorantly in unbelief (I Tim., i. 12, 13); (c) blasphemy *against the Holy Ghost*, which is contumely against God spoken out of sheer malice. Such was the sin of the Jews, who attributed the divine works of Christ to the prince of demons (Matt., xii. 31).

899. To the Holy Ghost are appropriated the supernatural gifts of God that prevent or remove sin; and, as these can be re-

duced to six, there are also six sins against the Holy Ghost (*i.e.*, six kinds of contemptuous disregard of spiritual life). The expression of this inner contempt is a blasphemy.

(a) Man is kept from sin by the hope mingled with fear which the thought of God, as both merciful and just, excites in him. Hence, *despair* and *presumption* which remove these divine preventives of sin are blasphemies against the Holy Ghost.

(b) Man is kept from sin, next, by the light God gives him to know the truth and by the grace He diffuses that all may perform good. Hence, *resistance to the known truth* and *displeasure at the progress of God's kingdom* are also sins against the Spirit of truth and holiness.

(c) Man is kept from sin by the shamefulness of sin itself and the nothingness of the passing satisfaction it affords; for the former inclines him to be ashamed of sin committed, or to repent, while the latter tends to make him tire of sin and give it up. Hence, the *resolve* not to grieve over sin and *obstinate adherence* to such a resolve are also sins against the Holy Ghost.

900. There is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this life. How then does our Lord say that the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in the world to come (Matt., xii. 31)?

(a) The sins against the Holy Ghost are *unpardonable* according to their nature, just as some diseases are incurable according to their nature, because not only do they set up an evil condition, but they also remove or resist those things that could lead to betterment. Thus, if one despairs, or presumes, or resists truth or good, or determines not to abandon error or evil, one shuts out the remedy of repentance, which is necessary for pardon; whereas, if one sins through passion or ignorance, faith and hope remain and help one to repentance.

(b) The sins against the Holy Ghost are *not unpardonable*, if we consider the omnipotence of God. Just as God can cure miraculously a disease that is humanly incurable, so can He pardon a sin which, according to its nature, is unpardonable; for He is able to bring hope and repentance to those who were in

despair, for example. Hence, we repeat, there is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this life.

901. Does one arrive at the state of malicious sin or blasphemy suddenly or gradually? (a) Malice in sin (*i.e.*, the willing choice of evil by one who is not weakened by ignorance or passion) is sometimes due to a disorder in the will itself which *has a strong inclination towards wrong*, as when long-continued habit has made sin attractive. It is clear that in such cases one does not arrive at blasphemy suddenly. Example: Titus blasphemes with readiness and without remorse. This argues that he is an adept and not a beginner, for readiness and strong attachment are signs of practice. (b) Malice in sin is sometimes due to the fact that the will *has lost certain protections against sin*, and hence chooses sin readily and gladly, as happens when a sin against the Holy Ghost has been committed. Generally, the contempt of God's gifts contained in sins against the Holy Ghost does not come suddenly, but follows as the climax of a progressive deterioration (Prov., xviii. 3); but, since man is free and sin very alluring, it is not impossible that one should suddenly become a blasphemer, especially if one had not been careful before in other matters. It is next to impossible, however, that a religious-minded man should all at once become a blasphemer or malicious sinner.

902. Remedies Against Blasphemy.—(a) Those who blaspheme *maliciously* should be admonished of the enormity of their sin, as well as the absurdity of defying the Almighty (Ps. ii. 1, 4). Prayers and ejaculations in praise of God are a suitable penance for them. (b) Those who blaspheme *through habit or out of sudden anger or passion* should be told that at least they cause great scandal, and make themselves ridiculous. A good practice for overcoming habit or sudden outbursts is that some mortification or almsdeed or litany should be performed each time blasphemy is uttered.

903. Absolution of Blasphemers.—(a) If blasphemy is not heretical, no censure or reservation is incurred under the general law, and every confessor may absolve; (b) if blasphemy



is heretical, excommunication is incurred under the conditions given above in 834, and absolution may be granted as explained there.

**904. Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness.**—After the sins against faith itself come the sins against the Gifts of the Holy Ghost that serve faith (see 808): (a) against the Gift of Knowledge is the sin of ignorance; (b) against the Gift of Understanding are the sins of blindness of heart and dullness of understanding.

**905.** Ignorance (as explained in 28 and 249) is a cause of sin—of material sin, if the ignorance is antecedent, of formal sin, if the ignorance is consequent. But ignorance is also a sin itself, in the sense now to be explained.

(a) Ignorance may be considered *in itself* (i.e., precisely as it is the absence of knowledge), and in this sense it is not called a sin, since under this aspect it is not opposed to moral virtue, but to knowledge, the perfection of the intellect.

(b) Ignorance may be considered *in relation to the will* (i.e., precisely as it is a voluntary defect), and in this sense it is a sin, since under this aspect it is opposed to the moral virtue of studiosity (i.e., the part of temperance which moderates the desire of learning and keeps the golden mean between curiosity and negligence). This sin of ignorance pertains to neglect, and is twofold: it is called *affected* ignorance, if the will is strongly desirous of the lack of due knowledge, and is called *careless* ignorance, if the will is remiss in desiring due knowledge. Affected ignorance is a sin of commission, careless ignorance a sin of omission.

(c) Ignorance may be considered *in relation to obligatory acts* (i.e., precisely as it makes one voluntarily incapable of fulfilling one's duties), and in this sense it partakes of various kinds of sinfulness, inasmuch as he who is voluntarily ignorant of his duty is responsible for the mistakes he will make. Thus, he who is sinfully ignorant in matters of faith, will fail against the precepts of that virtue; he who does not know what his state of life as judge, lawyer, physician, etc., requires, will fail against jus-

tice; he who does not know what charity demands of him, will sin against charity.

**906.** The malice of the sin of ignorance in matters of faith is as follows: (a) Vincible ignorance of the truths one is obliged to know, whether the obligation be of means or of precept (see 360, 786 sqq.), is a *grave sin*, for faith in these truths is commanded under pain of losing salvation (Mark, xvi. 15, 16). (b) The sin committed is but one sin, regardless of length of time, and is *incurred at the time one omits due diligence* in acquiring knowledge, as is the case with other sins of omission. Hence, he who remains in culpable ignorance of Christian doctrine for a year commits one sin, but the length of time is an aggravating circumstance.

**907.** Culpable ignorance regarding truths of faith, as a distinct sin, is as follows:

(a) It is not distinct from its cause (i.e., negligence), for ignorance is not a sin at all, except in so far as it proceeds from negligence. Hence, one would not be obliged to accuse oneself of the sins of omission in regard to instruction in Christian doctrine and of ignorance in Christian doctrine, for these are but one sin.

(b) Culpable ignorance is not distinct from its effect (i.e., from a sin committed on account of the ignorance), if the truth one is ignorant of has to be known only on account of some passing duty that must be performed here and now; for in such a case the knowledge is required, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the duty. Hence, ignorance of fact or of a particular law is not distinct as a sin from the sin that results from it. Examples: Titus knows that he should not take money that belongs to another; but through his own carelessness he is ignorant of the fact that the money before him belongs to another, and takes the money. Balbus knows that the precept of the Church on fasting is obligatory; but through his own negligence he is unaware that today is a fast day, and does not fast. Titus and Balbus committed one sin apiece.

(c) Culpable ignorance is distinct from its effect, if the truth

one is ignorant of has to be known for its own sake; for in such a case one sins against the virtue of studiosity (see 905) by not knowing something which one should know habitually, and also against some other virtue by violating its precepts as a result of one's sinful ignorance. Truths one is obliged to know for their own sake are the mysteries of faith, the Commandments of the Decalogue, the Precepts of the Church, and the duties of one's own state. Examples: Sempronius through his own carelessness does not know the mystery of the Incarnation, and as a result blasphemes Christ. Titus does not know that stealing is a sin, and therefore he steals. In both cases two sins are committed, the sin of ignorance and the sin that resulted from ignorance.

908. Cases in which ignorance in matters of faith is not culpable are the following: (a) if one has used sufficient diligence to acquire knowledge, one is not responsible for one's ignorance; (b) if one has not used sufficient diligence to acquire knowledge, one is not responsible for one's ignorance, if the lack of diligence is not one's fault.

909. Sufficient diligence is a broad term and has to be understood with relation to the mental ability of the person and the importance and difficulty of the truth in question. What is sufficient diligence in an illiterate person, or with regard to a matter of minor importance, would be insufficient in a learned person, or in a matter of greater importance. However, the following general rules can be given:

(a) To be sufficient, diligence need not be as a rule *supreme* (i.e., it is not necessary that one employ every possible means to acquire instruction), for even the most conscientious persons feel they have used sufficient diligence when they have employed the usual means for obtaining religious instruction;

(b) To be sufficient, diligence should *equal that which is employed by good people in similar circumstances*. Thus, the unlearned who consult the learned or frequent the instructions provided for them, the learned who devote themselves to study as ordered and who seek assistance in doubts, are sufficiently diligent.

910. One who has not used sufficient diligence is sometimes responsible, sometimes not responsible.

(a) A person is *not responsible* for his ignorance and lack of sufficient diligence, if he conscientiously desires to have the proper amount of instruction, and has not even a suspicion that his studies and knowledge are not sufficient. Example: Titus, having gone through a very small catechism, thought that he understood Christian doctrine sufficiently and had done all that was required. But some years later he discovered, when examined, that he was ignorant of many important matters, and had entirely misunderstood others.

(b) A person is *responsible* for his lack of diligence and knowledge, if at heart he does not care to know, even though no fears or doubts about his ignorance disturb him. Examples: Balbus always felt religion a bore. At Sunday school he was daydreaming; now during sermons on Sunday he falls asleep. The result is that he has many infidel ideas, but doesn't know it, and is not much concerned. Caius secured for himself an office, for which he is unfitted on account of his ignorance. But he enjoys his position so much, and cares so little about its responsibilities, that he does not even dream of his incompetence, and would not try to change things if he did.

911. Similar to negligence about the truths of faith itself is negligence about truths connected with faith. (a) An unbeliever is guilty of negligence when against conscience he fails to pray for light and to inquire or inform himself about the credentials of religion, revelation, and the Church; (b) a believer is guilty of negligence if he fails to seek answers to objections against faith, when thrown much in the company of objectors.

912. Like to sins of ignorance are the two sins opposed to the Gift of Understanding. (a) *Dullness of understanding* is a weakness of mind as regards spiritual things which makes it very difficult for one to consider or understand them. It is sinful inasmuch as it arises from over-affection for carnal things, especially the delights of eating and drinking. (b) *Blindness of mind* is a complete lack of knowledge of divine things due to the fact that one refuses to consider them lest one feel obligated

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to do good, or to the fact that one is so wedded to passion that one gives it all one's attention (Ps. xxv. 4). Blindness is sometimes a punishment (Is., vi. 10; Wis., ii. 21); it is a sin when it is voluntary—that is, when carnal delights, especially lust, make one disgusted or negligent as to the things of faith. Abstinence and chastity are two means that greatly aid spiritual understanding, as is seen in the example of Daniel and his companions (Dan. i. 17).

**Art. 3: THE COMMANDMENTS OF FAITH**

(*Summa Theologica*, II—II, q. 16.)

**913.** Unlike the commandments of justice, which are summed up in the Decalogue, the commandments of faith are not given in any one place of Scripture; but they may be reduced to three: (a) one must acquire knowledge and understanding of one's faith according to one's state in life and duties; (b) one must believe internally the truths of faith; (c) one must profess externally one's belief.

**914. The Commandment of Knowledge.**—The first of the foregoing commandments includes three things. (a) The doctrines of faith must be taught and must be listened to—“These words thou shalt tell to thy children” (Deut., vi. 6), “Teach ye all nations” (Matt., xxviii. 19), “He that heareth you heareth Me, and he that despiseth you despiseth Me” (Luke, x. 16). (b) One must apply oneself to understand what one hears—“Thou shalt meditate on these words, sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising” (Deut., vi. 7), “Meditate upon these things, be wholly in these things. Take heed to thyself and doctrine” (I Tim., iv. 15, 16). (c) One must retain what one has learned—“Thou shalt bind the words of the law as a sign on thy hand, and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write them in the entry and on the doors of thy house” (Deut., vi. 8, 9); “Have in mind in what manner thou hast received and heard” (Apoc., iii. 3).

**915.** The means of communicating a knowledge of the faith to unbelievers are as follows:

(a) The *remote* means is to get a hearing from those who have not the true faith, and this supposes that one secure their good will through edifying example and charity towards them: “Be without offense to the Jews and the Gentiles, and to the church of God; as I also in all things please all men, not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many that they may be saved” (I Cor., x. 32, 33); “Let us work good to all men” (Gal., vi. 10).

(b) The *proximate* means of communicating a knowledge of faith is the declaration of the faith to non-Catholics who are willing to hear, through missionaries sent to foreign countries, Catholic literature given to those who are well-disposed, invitations to Catholic instructions, public lectures on the faith, the question box at missions, etc. (see Canons 1350, 1351). Cooperation with Catholic schools and publications, foreign and home missions, etc., makes one a sharer in the work of the apostles who are bearing the burden of the day.

**916.** The means appointed by the Church for communicating the doctrines of faith to Catholics are as follows:

(a) *For the Laity.*—From childhood religious and moral training should have the first place in education, and should not be confined to elementary schools, but continued in secondary and higher schools (Canons 1372, 1373). Pastors are obliged to give catechetical instructions, and parents must see that their children attend them (Canons 1329-1336).

(b) *For the Clergy.*—Aspirants to the priesthood must follow the courses prescribed for preparatory and higher seminaries or houses of studies (Canons 1352-1371, 587-592), and no one is admitted to Orders who has not passed canonical examinations (Canons 996, 997, 389, §2). The faculties for hearing confessions and preaching also presuppose examinations (Canons 1340, 877), and no one is to be promoted to ecclesiastical offices, such as that of parish priest, unless he is judged competent in knowledge (Canons 459, 149). The clergy are encouraged to take university studies and degrees (Canons 1380, 1378).

**917.** A person applies himself sufficiently to the understand-

ing of the teaching of faith when he takes care that, both extensively or in quantity and intensively or in quality, his knowledge is all that is required of him.

(a) *Extensively*, the knowledge should be such as to include at least all those truths that have to be known, because explicit faith in them is necessary; (b) *intensively*, the knowledge should be more or less perfect according to the greater or less intelligence, rank or responsibility of the person.

918. The truths that have to be known by all capable of the knowledge are as follows:

(a) All must know, from the necessity of the case (necessity of means), that they have a supernatural destiny and that Christ is the Way that leads to it; for one cannot tend to a destination, if one is unaware of its existence and of the road that will bring one there. Hence, all must know the four basic truths: God our Last End, the Trinity, the Incarnation, God the Remunerator (see 787).

(b) All must know, from the will of Christ (necessity of precept), the other truths to which He wishes them expressly to assent, and the duties, general or particular, that He wishes them to fulfill (Mark, xvi. 16); that is, they must know the doctrine contained in the Creed, the commandments and ordinances of Christ concerning the Sacraments and prayer, and the special obligations of each one's particular state or office.

919. As to the degree of knowledge that one must possess *intensively* (i.e., as to its quality and perfection), it is clear that knowledge ought to be more perfect in those who are more intelligent or whose duties call for a more excellent learning.

(a) Knowledge of the truths that should be known by all the faithful ought to be of a more developed kind in those whose minds are more mature. A scientific and theological understanding of religion is not required in any lay person; nor should we expect the same knowledge in a child as in an adult, or in a subnormal person as in one who is normal mentally. Examples: No religious instruction is necessary for an idiot (i.e., a grown-up person who has the mind of a two-year-old child), for such a one cannot reason. A child of seven or an

imbecile (i.e., a grown-up person whose mentality is on a par with that of a child of seven) may be received to Communion, after such a child or imbecile has learned in a simple way that the God-Man is received in the Eucharist and that it is not common food. A child who is between ten and twelve and a moron (i.e., a grown-up who is not mentally such a child's superior) should receive more instruction than an imbecile.

(b) Knowledge of sacred doctrine naturally should be greater in priests than in the laity; for in religious things priests are the teachers, the people their pupils (Mal., ii. 7). A mediocre knowledge of theology in a priest is not sufficient, especially in these days when the laity are educated, when theological questions are debated on all sides, and when so many outside the Church as well as in it are looking for help and light. A profound knowledge of abstruse questions, however, is not demanded of all priests in an equal degree: more is expected of a bishop than of his parish priests, more of a parish priest than of one who has not the care of souls or office of teaching, more of one who has to speak to or write for the better educated than of one who has to do these things for those who are less educated, etc. Knowledge should include not only learning, but also prudence (i.e., good judgment and practical ability to use learning well), for a priest learns, not for his own sake alone, but also for the benefit of others.

920. Scientific or complete knowledge is not required of those who are not theologians, as was said about the four basic truths (see 790). It suffices for lay persons that they know in a simple way, according to their age and capacity, the substance of the truths they must believe. Thus, they should know:

(a) *The Creed*.—One should know about God, that He is but one and that there are three divine Persons, Father, Son and Holy Ghost; that God is the maker of the world, and that He will reward everyone according to his deeds: One should know about Christ, that He is the Son of God and God Himself; that He was miraculously born of the Blessed Virgin Mary; that He suffered and died for our salvation; that He rose from the dead and by His own power ascended into glory and will come again after

the general resurrection to judge all. One should know about the Church, that it is the one true Church founded by Christ, in which are found the communication of spiritual goods and the forgiveness of sins.

(b) *The Decalogue*.—One should know the general meaning of the Commandments so as to be able to regulate one's own conduct by them. It is not necessary that a child should know all the kinds of crimes and vices that are forbidden by the Commandments. In fact, it is better for such not to know much about evil. Nor is it required that a layman should know how to make correct applications of the Commandments to complicated situations that require much previous study.

(c) *The Virtues*.—One should know enough to be able to apply to one's own life, for ordinary cases, what a virtuous life demands. It is not necessary that a child should know the requirements of prudence as well as an experienced person, or that a layman should be able to settle doubts of conscience as well as a priest. But each should know enough to fulfill what is required of one of his age and condition. Both old and young should know in substance the acts of faith, hope, charity and contrition; for to these all are bound. The young should know the laws of the Church that apply to them (*e.g.*, the law of abstinence); the older people should understand the law of fasting which they are bound to observe, etc.

(d) *The Sacraments*.—One should know substantially the doctrine of the Sacraments that are necessary for all, namely, Baptism, Penance and the Eucharist. Since all the faithful have the duty of baptizing in case of necessity, all should know how to administer lay Baptism properly and fruitfully. When the time comes for receiving a Sacrament, the recipient should know enough to receive it validly, licitly, and devoutly, although less knowledge is required in children and in the dying who cannot be fully instructed (see Canons 752, 854, 1330, 1331, 1020)

(e) *Special Duties*.—One should know the essentials of one's condition or state of life and the right way to perform its ordinary duties. Children should understand the obligations of pupils

and of subjects; the married, religious and priests should know the duties of their respective states; citizens, the loyalty owed to the community; officials, judges, lawyers, physicians, teachers, etc., the responsibilities to the public which their own professions imply.

(f) *The Lord's Prayer*.—The substance of this form of prayer should be known by all, namely, that God is to be glorified, and that we should ask of Him with confidence goods of soul and body and deliverance from evil. Though Christ is the only necessary Mediator (I Tim., ii. 5), it is most suitable that all should know substantially the Hail Mary, namely, that we should ask the intercession of her who is the Mother of God and our Mother (John, xix. 27).

921. Is a person guilty of sin who does not know what to do in some manner that pertains to his state of life? (a) If he is blamably ignorant of the nature of a state he has undertaken or of the ordinary duties that it imposes, he is guilty of sin; for he is, in a sense, unjust to himself by obligating himself to what he does not understand, and to others by promising what he cannot fulfill. Examples: A young person who marries without understanding the meaning of the contract, or becomes a religious without knowing the meaning of the vows, would be ignorant of the nature of the state embraced. A priest occupied in the ministry, who does not know how to administer the Sacraments validly, how to explain the Gospels correctly, how to judge usual cases in confession rightly, etc., would be ignorant of the ordinary duties of his office. A ruler who habitually acts beyond his authority, a lawyer who regularly gives wrong advice, and a teacher who makes mistakes in the elements of his specialty, would also be ignorant of their ordinary duties.

(b) If a person understands the nature of his state and his everyday duties, but is ignorant of recondite points or extraordinary cases, he is not guilty; otherwise, no one could undertake with a safe conscience the office of pastor, physician, judge, etc.; for, even when a person has devoted a lifetime to a calling, he has to admit that he finds difficulties or problems that he cannot solve offhand. Example: Father Titus gave an incorrect solu-

tion about a case of restitution, because he had to express an opinion at once, and there were so many angles and circumstances that some of them were overlooked.

922. The means appointed by the Church for the retention of knowledge in matters of faith are:

(a) *For the Laity.*—The course of Christian doctrine should not be discontinued with the parochial school or Sunday school, but should be continued in the higher schools (Canon 1373). Moreover, for adults catechetical instruction is given on Sundays and feast days (Canon 1332), and the people are exhorted to attend sermons on matters of faith and morals that are preached at parochial Masses (Canons 1337–1348).

(b) *For the Clergy.*—The clergy are admonished not to give up study after ordination (Canon 129), and the law requires that the junior clergy should take examinations annually during the first three or five years after ordination to the priesthood (Canons 130, 590), and that all the clergy should take part in theological conferences several times a year (Canon 131).

923. What has been learned by heart is more easily retained in the memory, and hence the common practice of committing the Catechism to memory is to be recommended. Some believe that it is obligatory to memorize the Creed and other points mentioned above (see 920); but this is unlikely, since even the form of the Decalogue and of the Lord's Prayer is not identical in different parts of Scripture. In the early centuries the catechumens were obliged to learn the Creed and the Lord's Prayer by heart before Baptism, but there is no general law that requires this at the present time.

(a) According to *positive* law, one is not obliged to memorize the words and order of the Creed and other formulas, and it may be considered an indication that a person has retained sufficiently what was learned, if he is able to reply correctly to questions put to him (*e.g.*, to explain the first article of the Creed by stating the direct and simple signification of its terms, and so on with the rest).

(b) According to *natural* law, one is obliged to learn by rote the formulas of faith, if this is possible and there is danger of

spiritual detriment when it is not done. There is hardly anyone who cannot by practice commit to memory the Our Father, the Apostles' Creed, and short forms of acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition; and, if none of them is thus known, it is practically certain that the grave duty of prayer will be neglected. Hence, it seems that there is a serious obligation of memorizing at least the Our Father. Feeble-minded persons are not obliged to memorize, or even to know, the truths of faith, if they are incapable.

924. Confessors should examine in religion penitents who show signs of ignorance (*e.g.*, in the manner of making their confession), and should grant or deny absolution according to the case.

(a) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary as a means of justification (see 790), the penitents should be dealt with as explained in 792.

(b) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary because commanded and there is urgent need of absolution (*e.g.*, on account of mortal sin committed), the penitent may be absolved, if he is truly contrite and promises to repair his negligence by studying his religion, attending Sunday school, instructions, etc.

(c) If the ignorance is about the truths necessary because commanded, and there is no urgent necessity of absolution, the penitents may be sent away without absolution. Thus, children who have no serious sins to confess and who do not know how to say the act of contrition or other prayers, or who cannot answer simple questions of the Catechism, should be sent away with a blessing and told to study these things and return when they know them better.

925. **The Commandment of Internal Acts of Faith.**—The second commandment of faith mentioned above (see 913) is both negative and affirmative. (a) As *negative*, it forbids at any time disbelief or doubt concerning that which God proposes for faith. This aspect has been treated above in discussing the sins against faith (see 813 sqq., 840 sqq.). (b) As *affirmative*, it commands that one at certain times should give assent to the

truths revealed by God. This aspect of the commandment will be considered now.

926. The existence of the command that one should elicit a positive act of assent to divine truth is taught in both Testaments. (a) In the Old Testament, implicit faith in all Scripture was required; for lawgivers, prophets, and inspired writers spoke as delivering a message from God. Moreover, explicit faith in God and His Providence was commanded (see 788). (b) In the New Testament, implicit faith in all revealed doctrine is required, whether delivered in writing or as tradition (II Thess., ii. 15). Moreover, there is a command of explicit faith in the Gospel: "This is His commandment that we should believe in the name of His Son, Jesus Christ, and love one another, as He hath given commandment unto us" (I John, iii. 23).

927. This commandment obliges adults under grave sin as to all revealed truths. (a) The *primary* truths of revelation, truths of faith and morals to which all are commanded to give assent (*i.e.*, to believe explicitly), are so important that those who refuse to believe them merit condemnation (Mark, xvi. 16). (b) The *secondary* truths of revelation—*i.e.*, those that were made known by God, not for their own sake, but on account of their relation to the primary truths (*e.g.*, the names of the patriarchs, the size of Saul, the complexion of David and thousands of similar facts)—need not be known by all, for that is impossible. But all are seriously obliged to believe that everything contained in the Word of God is true, and to be ready to give assent even to the truths that are not known. Hence, the minor truths of revelation must be believed under pain of grave sin—implicitly, if they are not known, explicitly, when they become known.

928. The obligation of explicit faith in the primary truths or articles of faith is not grave with reference to every detail contained in those truths. (a) Some details, on account of their difficulty, oblige to explicit faith only under venial sin. Such are (in the Creed) the descent into Limbo, the procession of the Holy Ghost, the mode of the Communion of Saints. (b) Other details, on account of less importance, do not oblige to explicit faith under any sin. Such are the facts that it was Pilate under

whom Christ suffered, that it was the third day when Christ rose from the dead.

929. An affirmative commandment "obliges *at* all times, but not *for* all times" (see 371). Hence, the question: How often or when must one give internal assent to the teachings of faith, in order to fulfill the law? Before answering this question, let us distinguish three kinds of laws that may oblige one to an act of faith: (a) the divine law expressly prescribing an act of faith; (b) the divine law prescribing an act of some other virtue, which presupposes an act of faith; (c) human law prescribing something that at least presupposes or includes an act of faith.

930. The divine law expressly prescribing an act of faith (about which we spoke in 925), obliges in the following cases: (a) at the time when the commandment is first presented to one, and one recognizes its obligation: "Preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be condemned" (Mark, xvi. 16); (b) it also obliges at other times during life; for "the just man liveth by faith" (Rom., i. 17). The Church has rejected the Jansenistic teaching that an act of faith once in a lifetime suffices (see Denzinger-Banwart, nn. 1101, 1167, 1215).

931. The commandment of internal belief is brought before one for the first time, either of one's whole life or for the first time after loss of faith, as follows:

(a) It is brought before a person for the first time in his life, when he first hears the truths of faith, or first realizes his duty of accepting them. Examples: A Catholic child who has just reached the age of reason and has been told in Sunday school that he must believe the Creed and other truths he has been taught; an adult Catholic who hears for the first time of transubstantiation, or of some other dogma just defined by the Church; a non-Catholic who has just perceived the truth of the Catholic Church.

(b) The commandment of internal belief is brought before one for the first time after loss of faith, as soon as the duty of returning to belief occurs to the mind.

932. Does this commandment require that, as soon as the

obligation of faith dawns on one, one is obliged without an instant's delay to make a formal and explicit act of faith?

(a) As regards children, on account of the imperfection of their understanding, it can easily happen that they do not perceive that the obligation binds them there and then, or that it binds under sin, and thus some time may elapse after the use of reason, or after knowledge of the command of faith, before the omission of the act of belief would become a sin. Practically every child of Catholic education complies with the command when, having learned the truths that must be known, he says devoutly the act of faith, either in his own words or according to the form given in the Catechism.

(b) As regards adults, while the entrance of converts into the Church admits of some delay for necessary preparation, the act of faith itself should not be postponed for an instant, once the necessity of making it is perceived as certain.

933. As to its frequency or the times when the act of faith should be renewed, there are various opinions, but in actual life the question presents no difficulty.

(a) As to theory, the theologians are divided, some holding that the act of faith should be made at least once a year, others holding for once a month, still others for all Sundays and holydays. There is no solid support for any of these opinions, and it seems that the time and frequency of acts of faith are not determined by divine law.

(b) As to practice, the theologians agree that one who fulfills the usual religious duties of a Catholic, has also fulfilled the command to renew the act of faith. Thus, those who attend Mass and receive the Sacraments, as the law of the Church prescribes, make acts of faith in doing so, which satisfy the divine law of faith.

934. Those who omit to make an act of faith in time of temptation against faith, are also guilty of sin, if the omission is through sinful neglect.

(a) If the act of faith is the only means by which the temptation can be overcome (a rare contingency, outside the danger of death), one is of course gravely bound to elicit the act. The

sin committed by one who would neglect the act of faith in such a circumstance is by some considered as opposed to the negative command, that one do not dissent; by others as opposed to the affirmative command, that one assent to faith. Example: Caius is very much tempted to blasphemy, and finds that the best remedy is an act of faith in the Majesty of God.

(b) If the act of faith would be harmful, as prolonging or intensifying the temptation (a thing that is not infrequent), it is better to struggle against the temptation indirectly by turning the attention to other matters (see 257, 844).

935. Other cases in which one is obliged to make an internal act of faith are as follows:

(a) By reason of a divine commandment of some virtue other than faith, it is sometimes necessary to make an act of faith also. Examples: When a sinner is preparing himself for the state of grace, of which faith is the prerequisite; when one is tempted against hope, justice, etc., and needs to call on faith to resist the tempter; when one is near to death and must make an act of charity in preparing to meet God. In these cases there are divine precepts of repentance, hope, justice, charity, and virtually of faith, which is presupposed.

(b) One must at times make an internal act of faith by reason of a human commandment enjoining some external act or virtue which supposes faith. Examples: The command to swear on the Bible, or by some mystery of religion, supposes an act of faith. The commands to receive Communion at Easter (Canon 859), to make meditation and spiritual retreats (Canons 125, 126, 595, 1001), to apply the intention of Mass (Canons 339, § 1, 466, § 1), all include virtually the command of an act of faith, for the things required (Communion, retreat, Mass) cannot be rightly performed without such an act.

936. The act of faith is either formal or virtual, according as it is made in itself, or in the act of another virtue that supposes it.

(a) The act of faith is *formal*, when one mentally accepts the truths of revelation on account of divine authority, even though one does not express the assent in words or according to any set



formula. This kind of act of faith is necessary when one passes from non-belief or unbelief to belief, for none of the acts prior to faith contains supernatural assent to revelation. Hence, the commandment of faith requires in children or in converts from unbelief a formal act.

(b) The act of faith is *virtual*, when one elicits the act of some other supernatural virtue without thinking expressly about faith; for faith is presupposed by all other supernatural virtues, since one cannot wish what one does not believe. Thus, the acts of hope, charity, and contrition are virtually acts of faith. It seems that commandments of other virtues and of the renewal of faith itself do not require that one make a formal act of faith, although of course this would be the better thing to do. Thus, to fulfill the Easter precept of yearly Confession and Communion well, it is not required that one make a formal act of faith before Confession, since faith is included in the act of contrition. It is not necessary, then, that the penitent should say: "I believe in the forgiveness of sins, etc.," for in his purpose to receive forgiveness he makes a virtual act of faith in the tenth article of the Creed and in the Sacrament of Penance, as well as in the other mysteries of faith.

937. Practically, there is no difficulty for confessors about the violation of the commandment regarding internal acts of faith.

(a) If penitents are instructed and practical Catholics, they have made at some time a formal act of faith, even though they do not remember the time, for the act of faith precedes the acts of other virtues they are exercising. True, this act of faith may not have been made as soon as the age of reason was attained or the duty of faith perceived, but invincible ignorance excuses those who were in good faith about the matter. Regularity in prayer and other duties is an index that the act of faith is being renewed in such a way as to comply with the commandment. Hence, there is no necessity of questioning this class of penitents about the act of faith.

(b) If penitents are very ignorant Catholics (e.g., young children), it is clear that they have not made an act of faith as

they should, for no one believes what he does not know. They should, therefore, be instructed that it is their duty to acquire more knowledge, and to make an act of faith along with their other prayers. Regarding absolution, see 924.

(c) If penitents are instructed but not practical, the confession that they have neglected prayer, Mass, and the Sacraments, means that they have also neglected the command of making acts of faith. It is not necessary, therefore, that the confessor interrogate or instruct them about this command, and he may absolve them, if they are resolved to amend. It is well, however, to recommend daily acts of faith, hope, charity and contrition to careless Catholics, especially to those who cannot attend Mass or receive the Sacraments often.

938. **The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.**—The third commandment of faith given above (see 913) is both negative and affirmative: (a) as *negative*, it forbids denial of the faith or profession of error opposed to faith; (b) as *affirmative*, it commands that one make open profession of one's faith.

939. The existence of a prohibition against denial of the faith or profession of error is taught in Scripture and the sinfulness of such denial is clear from its nature. (a) "He that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before My Father who is in Heaven" (Matt., x. 33). Denial of Christ is a grievous sin, for it entails denial by Christ. (b) He who denies the faith is a heretic or infidel, if he means what he says; he lies, if he does not mean what he says, and his lie is a grave injury to God, whose truth is called into question, and against the neighbor, who is scandalized.

940. With reference to its voluntariness, denial of faith is either direct or indirect. (a) It is *direct*, when one intends to deny the faith; (b) it is *indirect*, when one does not intend to deny the faith, but wills to use words, acts, etc., which either from their signification or use, or from the meaning that will or may be given them by others, will in the circumstances express a denial of the faith. Examples: A convert from paganism conceals a crucifix in the idol of a temple and then joins the pagans in their customary bows of reverence, while intending

only adoration to Christ crucified and detesting the idol. Titus takes off his hat when passing any church, as a mark of respect for the good they do. Balbus, a convert from Nestorianism, recites the names of Nestorius and Dioscurus at Mass, intending only to honor the patron Saints of those two heresiarchs.

941. There are three ways of denying the faith: (a) by *words*, spoken or written, as when one says: "I am not a Catholic," "I do not believe in miracles"; (b) by *acts*, as when one dissuades persons of good faith from entering the Church, or moves them to abandon it, or refuses to genuflect before the Blessed Sacrament, or studiously excludes scapulars, pictures and all religious symbols; (c) by *omission*, as when one fails to answer calumnies against faith, which one could profitably answer, or fails to protest when another speaks of oneself as a non-Catholic.

942. There are various ways in which error opposed to faith is professed: (a) by *words*, as when one says that one is a free-thinker or Christian Scientist; (b) by *acts*, as when one offers incense to an idol, or receives the Lord's Supper in a Lutheran church, or cheers an anti-religious address; (c) by *signs*, as when one uses the Masonic grip, wears the robes of a Buddhist bonze, takes a Mohammedan or pagan name, etc., in order to pass oneself off as a non-Catholic; (d) by *omission*, as when one is silent when introduced as a Rationalist, or makes no protest when Indifferentism is being advocated by one's companions.

943. The following are not a denial of faith or profession of error:

(a) Words that deny, not one's allegiance to religion, but one's acceptance of it as qualified by some calumnious designation. Examples: Titus denies that he is a "Papist," because he wishes his questioner to use a term that is not intended to be an insult. Balbus, entering a pagan region where the name Christian has the meaning of criminal or enemy on account of crimes committed there by white men in past times, says to the tribesmen that he is not a Christian, but a follower of Jesus and a Catholic.

(b) Words that conceal one's rank or state in the Church, are not against faith, because one can hold the faith without being

in a certain rank or state in the Church. Thus, St. Peter's denial that he was a follower of Jesus, that he had ever known Him, etc., was, according to some authorities, not a denial of the Divinity of Jesus or of the truth of His teaching. Example: A Catholic who hides or denies his character of priest or religious, his membership in a Catholic family, organization, race, does not thereby necessarily deny his faith.

(c) Deeds that are contrary to practices of religion, but not to the profession of faith, are not denial of belief; for one may be very much attached to one's religion, even ready to fight for it, but not willing to follow its requirements. Example: Caius is careless about church duties, misses Mass, eats meat on Fridays, and never goes to the Sacraments; but he always calls himself a Catholic and wishes to be considered one.

(d) Signs that have some association with non-Catholic religion, but do not necessarily represent it (since they are indifferent in themselves and have other and legitimate uses), do not deny the faith, when not used as symbols of false religion. Similarly, the omission of signs that are associated with Catholicity, but which are optional, is not a denial of the faith. Examples: Titus, when travelling in the Orient, makes use of the national salutation of the pagan peoples among whom he lives. Balbus builds a church with architectural features borrowed from pagan temples. Caius wears a fez or turban in Mohammedan regions where it is not looked on as a religious headgear. Sempronius practises circumcision as a hygienic measure. Claudius does not say grace at meals when dining in public, and does not wear scapulars when bathing at the seashore.

(e) Omission of profession of faith, when it is not obligatory, is not a denial of faith; for no one is bound to make known his affairs and convictions to every acquaintance. Example: Titus works in an office where most of the clerks are non-Catholics. But no one ever speaks about religion, and hence it is not known that he is a Catholic.

944. **Dangers of Profession of Unbelief.**—The principal dangers of making external profession of false religion, if not of losing faith itself, are the following: (a) membership in for-

bidden societies; (b) communication in sectarian services; (c) coöperation in activities whose tendency or principles are erroneous.

**945. Forbidden Societies.**—Societies are forbidden by the Church when they are intrinsically or extrinsically evil. (a) A society is *intrinsically* evil, when it has an evil purpose, or uses evil means to obtain even an honest end. Thus, societies or parties that conspire against Church or State, or that seek to undermine Christian doctrines or morals, have an evil purpose; while those that demand absolute secrecy or oaths of blind obedience to unknown persons, that favor cremation, use a sectarian ritual, promote evil literature, etc., are employing evil means, no matter what may be the end in view. (b) A society is *extrinsically* evil, when its end and means are good, but membership in it is dangerous to faith or morals on account of circumstances (e.g., on account of the bad type of individuals who make up the society or control it).

**946.** The Code (Canon 684) mentions the following kinds of societies as banned for Catholics:

(a) *secret societies*, that is, those which demand of members that certain things which the society considers secrets be told absolutely to no one outside the society, or certain degrees of the society, not even to those who may legitimately inquire about them, such as the bishop or civil superior in the external forum, parents with regard to their children not emancipated, pastors and confessors in the internal forum. Those societies are also secret which demand blind and absolute obedience to unknown leaders;

(b) *condemned societies*, that is, such as have been censured by the Church, or simply forbidden. Canon 2335 decrees *ipso facto* excommunication reserved to the Holy See against all those who join Masonic or similar associations which plot against the Church or lawful civil authority. Among the societies forbidden without censure are: various Biblical societies, societies for the promotion of cremation, the Knights of Pythias, the Odd Fellows, the Sons of Temperance, the Independent Order of Good Templars, Theosophical societies, the Y. M. C. A. Female societies

affiliated with these are also condemned, since they are branches of the main society—for example, the Rebeccas, the Eastern Star, the Pythian Sisters;

Worthy of detailed consideration is the condemnation of the Communist Party and the penalties attached to membership in, or defense, or propagation of the Party. The following questions were asked of the Holy Office:

1. Whether it is licit to join the Communist Party or to favor it?

*Reply:* In the *negative*; for Communism is materialistic and anti-Christian; and the leaders of the Communists, although they sometimes verbally profess that they are not attacking religion, in fact, nevertheless, by doctrine and action show themselves to be enemies of God and of the true religion and the Church of Christ.

2. Whether it is licit to publish, propagate, or read books, periodicals, daily papers, or sheets which promote the doctrine or action of Communists, or to write in them.

*Reply:* In the *negative*: for they are forbidden *ipso iure* (see Canon 1399).

3. Whether the faithful who knowingly and freely do the acts mentioned in 1 and 2 can be admitted to the sacraments.

*Reply:* In the *negative*, according to the ordinary principles governing the refusal of the sacraments to those who are not properly disposed.

4. Whether the faithful who profess the materialistic and anti-Christian doctrine of Communists, and especially those who defend or propagate it, incur *ipso facto* as apostates from the Catholic faith the excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See.

*Reply:* In the *affirmative* (Decree of the Holy Office, July 1, 1949).

The sanction of excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See was imposed also upon those who teach boys and girls in associations set up by the Communists to imbue youth with principles and training which are materialistic and contrary to Christian morality and faith. The associations themselves are

subject to the sanctions of the decree of July 1, 1949. Moreover parents or guardians who send their children to such associations, and the children themselves, as long as they have part in these associations, cannot be admitted to the reception of the sacraments (*Monitum* of the Holy Office, July 28, 1950).

(c) *sedition* societies, that is, those organizations, even though not secret, which aim at the overthrow of family and property rights;

(d) *suspect* societies, that is, those whose principles or methods have the appearance of being unsound. On January 11, 1951 the Holy Office in response to the question: "Whether Catholics may join the 'Rotary Club'?" issued the following decree: "It is not licit for clerics to join the Association 'Rotary Club' or to be present at its meetings; the laypeople are to be urged to preserve the prescript of Canon 684." The decree seems to have taken many English-speaking people by surprise, one paper describing it as "a bewildering document." The surprise flowed from personal experience of Rotary Clubs as social clubs dedicated to *bonhomie* and community improvement. Nevertheless, the decree was in accord with the general trend of Church policy in regard to undenominational societies. They are not approved; they are not condemned as Masonry has been condemned. What is their position? The response that layfolk are to be exhorted to observe Canon 684 is indicative of the attitude of the Church in regard to such societies. The canon instructs them to "beware of secret, condemned, seditious and suspect societies." Since Rotary Clubs are seldom considered to be secret and never as condemned nor as seditious, the implication is that they are suspect. Such was the interpretation of the decree given in the *Osservatore Romano* of Jan. 27, 1951.

In regard to clerics, the effect of the decree was to make illicit what was formerly simply inexpedient; for the Sacred Consistory had replied on February 4th, 1929, that it was not expedient for Ordinaries to permit clerics to join Rotary Clubs, or to take part in their meetings. Moreover, as the *Osservatore* article indicates, the prohibition is limited to meetings of members only and does not extend to meetings at which non-members

may be present, provided the purpose of such meetings befits priestly activity.

The exhortation to layfolk in regard to "Rotary" simply reaffirms the Church's general attitude to all secular associations. As early as November 5, 1920 the Holy Office, referring specifically to Y.M.C.A., warned the Ordinaries that the note of "suspicion" attaches to all secular societies. Their efforts to promote good works and good moral standards independent of religious authority tend to foster the spirit of religious indifference and moral naturalism. Both the Spanish hierarchy (1929) and the Dutch hierarchy (1930) have so judged Rotary.

However, the degree of suspicion to be attached to each Rotary Club is a question of fact to be determined in specific instances by the proper local Ordinary. Where evidence of suspicion is available, exhortations not to join the clubs must be made; in the lack of such evidence, the ordinaries may maintain discreet silence.

(e) societies that aim to elude the lawful vigilance of religious authority.

947. The following organizations fall under the censure against Masonic societies:

(a) all varieties and degrees of Freemasonry, for all the Masonic sects are included in the Canon. The fact that American, English and Irish Masons have many excellent individuals in their ranks, and lack the irreligious and revolutionary character of the Masonry of Continental Europe or Latin countries, does not exempt them from the censure.

(b) all organizations similar to Masonry, that is, secret societies that conspire against lawful authority. Such are societies like the Carbonari, the Fenians, anarchists and nihilists.

948. The sin committed by membership in forbidden societies is grave, since the purpose of the law—*viz.*, the safeguarding of faith against serious danger—is itself grave. Such membership is interpreted also as a profession of false religion, when one joins oneself to a body which in its branches or degrees has a false creed of its own. (a) Even though the branch or degree to which one belongs does not require assent to such a creed,

membership expresses a *fellowship* with those who do accept it; (b) similarly, *participation in the ritual* of the lodges is a communication in ceremonies expressive of false religion; for, though their externals may appear good or even Christian, the internal meaning known to the adepts is anti-Catholic or anti-Christian.

**949. Absolution of Those Who Belong to Forbidden Societies.**—(a) The *sin* cannot be absolved unless there is repentance, and hence absolution cannot be granted those who without sufficient reason refuse to withdraw from membership, or who refuse to discontinue participation in false rites.

(b) The *excommunication* is not incurred by those who joined forbidden societies in ignorance of the law or of the penalty, provided the ignorance was not crass or supine. If the censure was actually incurred, the mode of absolution will depend on the nature of the case: if the case is *occult* (i.e., if it is not known and not likely to become known that the penitent belonged to a society forbidden under pain of excommunication), the Ordinary may absolve or grant faculties to absolve (Canon 2237); if the case is a *public* one, and it would be very inconvenient to await faculties from Rome, absolution is given under the condition of recourse to the proper authority within a month (Canon 2254). Many Ordinaries have by Indult faculties to absolve members of secret societies.

**950.** Nominal membership and temporary attendance at meetings may be permitted as an exception when there are sufficient reasons.

(a) Nominal membership means that one leaves one's name on the roster of the society and continues to pay its assessments, but does not communicate with the society or attend its meetings. In 1896 the Holy Office replied to the American Bishops that this kind of membership in the Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance and Knights of Pythias might be permitted under certain conditions, if there was a sufficient reason (*viz.*, that grave material loss would be incurred by withdrawal). (b) Temporary attendance at meetings means that for a short time, and not for longer than absolutely necessary, one is present at gatherings of the society, but takes no active part in its false cult.

**951.** The following conditions were laid down for permission of nominal membership in the Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance, etc.: (a) that the penitent joined the society in good faith, before knowing that it was condemned; (b) that there be no danger of scandal, or that it be removed by the declaration that membership is only nominal and only for the purpose of avoiding temporal losses; (c) that there be no danger of perversion of the party himself or of his family, in case of sickness or of death, and no danger of a non-Catholic funeral.

**952.** Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who has incurred excommunication on account of membership in the Masons or other like society should be as follows: (a) the faculty to absolve must be obtained (see 949); (b) the following promises must be exacted from the penitent—that he will withdraw entirely from the sect and that he will repair, as well as he can, the scandal he may have caused; (c) the penitent must be required to renounce the sect, at least in the presence of the confessor, and to deliver over to him the books, manuscripts, insignia, and other objects that are distinctive of it (the confessor should give these objects to the Ordinary as soon as he prudently can, but, if grave reasons prevent this, he should burn them); (d) a salutary penance should be given and frequent confession urged.

**953.** Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who belongs to the Odd Fellows or other society forbidden by name, but without censure, should be as follows: (a) if the penitent is contrite and promises to leave the society, he can be absolved without special faculties; (b) if the penitent is contrite but wishes to retain nominal membership, the case must be referred to the Archbishop of the Province or to the Apostolic Delegate; (c) if the penitent wishes to retain full membership, he is not repentant and cannot be absolved.

**954.** Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who belongs to a society not condemned by name, but which the confessor himself regards as evil should be as follows: (a) if the confessor is certain that the society is one of those condemned implicitly by the Church, because it exacts inviolable secrecy or blind

obedience to its leaders, or has Masonic characteristics, etc., he should treat it in the same way as the societies condemned by name; (b) if the confessor is certain that the society is condemned by natural law for the penitent before him (*e.g.*, on account of the evil associates and moral dangers it contains), he should treat it as any other occasion of sin, but it should be noted that no priest or local Ordinary has authority to condemn publicly and by name any society not condemned by the Church; (c) if the confessor is in doubt, he should proceed according to the rules for an uncertain conscience (see 678, 679, 742), and for the prudent administration of the Sacraments (see Vol. II).

955. As one of the chief remedies against evil societies is the formation of Catholic societies, the Code (Canon 684) praises those of the faithful who enroll as members in associations established or recommended by the Church. Catholic societies distinct from religious Orders or Congregations are of two kinds.

(a) Distinctly religious societies are those instituted for the purpose of promoting a more Christian life among their members, or of fostering works of piety and charity, or of contributing to the solemnity of public worship. Such are the Secular Third Orders, Confraternities of the Blessed Sacrament and of Christian Doctrine, and other pious unions.

(b) Societies that are not distinctly religious, but whose membership and spirit are Catholic, are of many kinds. Such are the Knights of Columbus, Ancient Order of Hibernians, Catholic Daughters of America, Volksverein, Young Men's Institute, etc.

956. **Communication in Worship.**—Communication with non-Catholics (as was said above in 882) is either religious or non-religious. It is clear that communication in non-religious matters does not contain a profession of error, but the same cannot be said of communication in religious services, since these are not only acts of worship, but also expressions of faith in the creed of a certain religion. We must distinguish, however, between private and public communication.

(a) Communication is *private*, when a Catholic and non-Catholic offer together the Lord's Prayer or other similar prayer

as a private devotion, not as an act of official worship. Private devotion is not the expression of a sectarian creed, and, if there is nothing false in it and no danger of scandal or perversion from communication between Catholic and non-Catholic in such devotion, this kind of communication is not unlawful. In the following paragraphs there will be question of public communication.

(b) Communication is *public*, when the rites performed are the official services of the Catholic Church or of some non-Catholic sect (*e.g.*, the Mass, the Lord's Supper of the Lutherans, the Evensong of the Anglicans, the prayer-meeting of other sects). Thus, public communication takes place either when non-Catholics take part in Catholic worship, or Catholics take part in non-Catholic worship.

957. Participation of non-Catholics in Catholic services is either by mere presence, or by reception or performance of Catholic rites.

(a) *Mere presence* consists in a purely material attendance at a service, as when non-Catholics assist at Mass and sit, rise and kneel with the congregation or remain seated throughout. There is no objection whatever to this kind of participation; on the contrary, non-Catholics should be invited to Catholic sermons and services, and made to feel welcome, for in what better way can the divine command of working for their conversion be complied with? Only excommunicated persons are excluded from the offices of the Church (Canon 2269, §1). It is also allowed that Catholic bishops and clergy accompany a non-Catholic ruler to the church, and assign him and his escort an honorable place therein.

(b) *Reception of Catholic rites* is had when non-Catholics, without performing any liturgical function, receive some spiritual favor through the rites of the Church, as when a non-Catholic receives a priest's blessing.

(c) *Performance of Catholic rites* exists when a non-Catholic exercises some office in a liturgical function of the Catholic Church, as when a Protestant acts as sponsor at a Catholic Baptism.

958. Cases of reception of Catholic rites by non-Catholics permitted by law are the following:

(a) *Reception of Sacramentals*.—Since the purpose of these rites and objects is to implore graces and temporal favors with a view to the illumination and salvation of the recipient, and since our Lord Himself blessed and cured even the pagans, the Church permits blessings and exorcisms to be conferred on non-Catholics (Canons 1149, 1152). Similarly, blessed candles, palms, ashes and other real sacramentals may be given to them. Examples: The Church has permitted priests to visit the homes of Mohammedans to bless and pray over the sick, and also to bless the houses of schismatics, provided they were summoned and avoided all communication in prayer.

(b) *Reception of Sacraments*.—Since it is possible that the salvation of a dying person may depend on absolution, good moralists, relying on decisions of Roman Congregations, hold that conditional absolution may be given to a heretic or schismatic who is dying and unconscious, or even to one such who is dying and conscious, provided he is in good faith and contrite, and danger of scandal has been removed.

(c) *Reception of Fruits of the Mass*.—Since Christ died for all, there is nothing in the nature of things to prevent the application of Mass to any persons who are living or in Purgatory; and from Canon 809 it appears that Mass may be offered for any living person, and also for any deceased person about whose salvation we may entertain hope. Hence, neither the divine nor the ecclesiastical law forbids the application of Mass for heretics, schismatics, or infidels. The Church also permits Mass to be said privately, all scandal removed, for excommunicated persons. Under these same conditions, then, Mass may be said for non-Catholics, both living and dead (Canon 2262, §2, n. 2).

(d) *Reception of the Suffrages of the Church*.—Since God wishes all to be saved and public peace to be maintained (I Tim. ii), and since the Church desires that Ordinaries and pastors should have at heart the conversion of non-Catholics (Canon 1350), public prayers for the prosperity of non-Catholic rulers and officials—likewise sermons, missions and other works for

the conversion of unbelievers—are not only allowed, but recommended and required.

959. Non-Catholics have not the same right as Catholics to receive the rites of the Church, and hence when they are admitted to them, there are certain restrictions to be observed.

(a) *Restrictions as to Sacred Things*.—As admission of non-Catholics to sacramentals, etc., is a favor, not a right, it should be confined to cases allowed by the Church. Thus, it is forbidden to grant indulgences or to give the nuptial blessing to non-Catholics, and only in very exceptional cases may any ceremonies be permitted at mixed marriages (Canons 1102, 1109). Non-Catholics may not receive the Pax; may not be invited to take part in the solemn services of receiving ashes on Ash Wednesday, palms on Palm Sunday and candles on Candlemas Day; may not receive ecclesiastical burial (Holy Office, June 8, 1859). Children sent by their parents to non-Catholic services may not be confirmed (Holy Office, August 28, 1780); a Catholic priest is not allowed to supply for a non-Catholic minister, by accompanying the body of a non-Catholic from the home to the graveyard, even though the body be not brought to Church, nor the bell tolled (Holy Office, January 26, 1886). It is not permissible to lend a Catholic church to non-Catholics for their services.

(b) *Restrictions as to Persons*.—As superstition and irreverence have to be avoided, the sacramentals may not be administered or given at all to non-Catholics about whose good faith and purpose there is doubt.

(c) *Restrictions as to Mode*.—The Church, while she wishes to help and benefit non-Catholics, must avoid anything that would cause scandal or have the appearance of equal recognition of believers and unbelievers. Thus, when Mass is offered for outsiders, the same publicity and pomp is not permitted as when there is question of Catholics.

960. As regards the performance of Catholic rites by non-Catholics, the Church disapproves of every kind of such participation, but does not refuse to tolerate the more remote kind, when there is grave necessity and no scandal is caused.

(a) By more remote participation we understand such as

scarcely differs from passive assistance (*e.g.*, to act as witness at a marriage), or such as carries with it no recognition as an official of the Church (*e.g.*, to act as substitute or temporary organist). Hence, the Church has permitted this kind of participation in particular cases, when the authorities decided that there was urgent necessity and no scandal. Examples: Moralists hold that, when a heretic or schismatic has been designated as sponsor at Baptism and cannot be refused without grave offense, he may be allowed to act as witness. The Holy Office has also declared that heretics should not be used as witnesses at marriage, but may be tolerated as such by the Ordinary, when there is a grave reason and no scandal (August 18, 1891); that a non-Catholic organist may be employed temporarily, if it is impossible to secure one who is a Catholic, and no scandal is caused (February 23, 1820); that in certain special circumstances girls belonging to a schismatical sect might be allowed to sing with the Catholics at church functions, especially at Exposition and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament (January 25, 1906).

(b) *Proximate participation* is the exercise of functions connected with a sacred rite (*e.g.*, to act as server at Mass), or that imply a recognition of the religion of the one who participates (*e.g.*, to act as representative of some sect at a funeral and receive liturgical honors). The Church has always refused to tolerate this kind of participation. Examples: Non-Catholics may not act as sponsors at Baptism or Confirmation under pain of invalidity of sponsorship (Canons 765, 795), nor chant the Office in choir (Holy Office, June 8, 1859), nor be employed as singers of the liturgical music (Holy Office, May 1, 1889), nor carry torches or lights in church ceremonies (Holy Office, November 20, 1850). Likewise, non-Catholics may not become members of Catholic confraternities, nor assist at Catholic services as official representatives of some sect or sectarian society.

961. Participation of Catholics in non-Catholic services may happen today in so many ways, and it is so difficult at times to draw the line between lawful and unlawful communication, that it is well before considering these cases to state the general rules that apply here.

(a) It is lawful to perform an act from which two effects follow, one good and the other bad, if the act in itself is good or indifferent, if there is a sufficiently grave reason for performing it, if the evil effect is not intended, and if the evil effect be not prior to the good effect (see 104).

(b) Circumstances vary in different localities and countries, and communication that would signify unity of belief in a place where Catholics and non-Catholics are very unequal numerically might be very harmless in a place where there is no great numerical difference. Offense to non-Catholics should not be given needlessly.

(c) In doubtful cases the decision whether or not a particular kind of communication is lawful or unlawful pertains to the Ordinary (Canon 1258).

962. Participation of Catholics in non-Catholic services is either active or passive. (a) Participation is *active* when one takes a part or fulfills some function in an act that is an official expression of the worship and belief of a sect, even though this takes place outside a church, or is not open to the general public. (b) Participation is *passive*, if one merely assists as a spectator, and not as a worshipper, at something pertaining to non-Catholic worship.

963. Sacred things in which communication is possible are of three classes:

(a) the chief acts of divine worship (*i.e.*, Sacrifices, Sacraments, sacramentals);

(b) the secondary acts of divine worship (such as prayers, processions, vows, oaths, the Divine Office, hymn singing, Scripture reading, etc.). In the Protestant denominations some one or other of these is, as a rule, the central or distinctive service, although some have other proper features of their own, such as the silent meeting of the Quakers, the seance of the Spiritualists, the march of the Salvation Army, the charity kiss of the Dunkards;

(c) places (*e.g.*, churches, lodge rooms, cemeteries), times (*e.g.*, days of feast or fast), and objects (*e.g.*, images, badges, aprons, banners, robes), pertaining to divine worship.

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964. It is unlawful for Catholics in any way to assist actively at or take part in the worship of non-Catholics (Canon 1258). Such assistance is intrinsically and gravely evil; for (a) if the worship is non-Catholic in its form (*e.g.*, Mohammedan ablutions, the Jewish paschal meal, revivalistic "hitting the trail," the right hand of fellowship, etc.), it expresses a belief in the false creed symbolized; (b) if the worship is Catholic in form, but is under the auspices of a non-Catholic body (*e.g.*, Baptism as administered by a Protestant minister, or Mass as celebrated by a schismatical priest), it expresses either faith in a false religious body or rebellion against the true Church.

965. It is unlawful for Catholics to simulate active assistance in the worship of non-Catholics, for, while the non-Catholic rite would be avoided, something which appeared to be that rite would be done, and thus profession of faith in it would be given.

(a) Hence, it is not lawful to do an indifferent act which bystanders from the circumstances will have to conclude is an act of false worship. Thus, Eleazar would not eat lawful meat which was put before him in order that he might pretend to eat the meat of sacrifice after the manner of the heathen (II Mach., vi).

(b) It is not lawful to accept a false certificate of participation in false worship. Hence, the early Church condemned as apostates the Libellatics (*i.e.*, those Christians, who, to protect themselves in time of persecution, obtained by bribery or otherwise a forged or genuine magistrate's certificate that they had sacrificed to the heathen gods).

966. It is unlawful for Catholics to assist passively at non-Catholic worship, unless there are present the conditions requisite for performing an act that has two results, one good and the other evil (see 104); for even passive assistance frequently involves sin.

(a) Hence, the assistance itself must be really *indifferent*, that is, it must be a merely passive presence without any active participation in the service. Examples: A person who stands in the rear of a Quaker meeting house as an onlooker assists passively; but one who sits quietly among the others present, as if in

meditation, assists actively. A person who sits in a pew during a revival in order to see what is going on, assists passively; but, if he joins with the congregation in bowing, groaning, etc., he assists actively.

(b) The evil effect that may result from assistance (such as scandal and danger of perversion) *must not be prior to the good effect*; otherwise, evil would be done for the sake of good. Examples: Titus, a non-Catholic, goes to Mass as a spectator, with his Catholic friend Balbus. He then asks Balbus to assist as a spectator at the services of his denomination, and thus see for himself that the latter is better. Balbus, in order to be courteous, consents. Here Balbus aims to show politeness, which is good, but the means he uses—namely, the impression he gives that he is not convinced of the superiority of his own religion—is bad.

(c) The evil effect (*i.e.*, remote danger of perversion, unavoidable scandal) *must not be intended or approved*, but only permitted. Example: Caius, a Catholic public official, has to attend funerals and weddings in Protestant churches as a mark of the public respect for notable persons. He knows that a few will take scandal at his action, but he wishes only to do his duty as an official, and not to offend anyone (see on Scandal).

(d) The cause of assistance must be in proportion to the kind of assistance. Hence, a greater reason is required for assistance on several occasions than on one, for assistance at infidel than at heretical services, for assistance at the primary than at the secondary act of worship, for assistance by a priest than for assistance by a layman, etc. Example: Graver reason would be necessary to justify assistance at a non-Catholic funeral, if there were signs of anti-Catholicism manifested (*e.g.*, flower designs and regalia of a hostile sect placed on the coffin), than if the service contained nothing offensive.

967. Cases of communication in false sacrificial rites are as follows: (a) Active participation is had in such acts as the slaying and offering of victims, the burning of incense before idols, the eating of sacrificial banquets; (b) Passive participation is had when one merely watches the rite of sacrifice without taking any part therein.

968. Cases of communication in the Sacrifice of the Mass are as follows: (a) Active participation is had in such acts as taking the part of deacon in a schismatical Mass, assisting at a schismatical Mass with the intention of hearing Mass formally (*i.e.*, of offering it with the priest). If on Sunday, one is where there is only a schismatical church, one is excused from the obligation of hearing Mass, and may not hear Mass in that church (Holy Office, December 5, 1608; August 7, 1704). (b) Passive participation is had when one is present merely as a spectator, kneeling before the Blessed Sacrament, but giving no other signs of religious devotion. This is permissible under the conditions mentioned above (see 966), if there is no scandal or danger of perversion (Holy Office, April 24, 1894).

969. Cases of participation in the Sacraments or sacramentals, real or reputed, are as follows: (a) Active participation takes place when one receives a Sacrament from a non-Catholic minister, or offers one's child to receive a Sacrament from such a minister, or contracts marriage in the presence of such a minister, or acts as sponsor at a non-Catholic baptism or confirmation or as the religious witness at a non-Catholic marriage, or answers in public non-Catholic prayers, or takes ashes blessed by schismatics. (b) Passive participation is had when one merely looks on at the administration of a Sacrament or sacramental by a non-Catholic minister, without signs of approval or union in what is being done.

970. There are certain cases that seem to be active participations in Sacraments with non-Catholics, and yet are permitted by the Code. In reality, however, there is no active communication in those cases.

(a) Canons 886 and 905 allow the faithful to receive communion and absolution according to a Rite different from their own, so that one who belongs to the Latin Rite may lawfully receive in Communion a Host consecrated according to the Greek Rite, or go to confession to an Oriental priest. But in these Canons there is question of different Rites within the Catholic Church, not of those of non-Catholics.

(b) Canons 742 and 882 allow those who are in danger of

death to receive Baptism and absolution from an heretical or schismatical minister, and theologians apply the same principle to Extreme Unction and the Viaticum. But there is no communication in non-Catholic ceremonies in these cases, for the Sacraments belong to the Catholic Church, and for the sake of the dying she authorizes non-Catholic ministers to act as her representatives, provided there is no scandal or danger of perversion.

971. Cases of participation in non-sacramental rites are as follows:

(a) *Oaths and Vows*.—Participation is active when one swears in words or by other signs which, according to local usage, manifest belief in the creed of some sect; it is not active, when the manner of the oath does not signify adherence to a false creed. Example: If one is required to swear, by touching or kissing the non-Catholic Bible, as a sign of approval of Protestantism or Masonry, one may not consent. But, if the Government presents a non-Catholic Bible with no thought of Protestantism, there is no approval of Protestantism in the one who swears on that Bible, although, if the custom is not general, there might be scandal if no protest were made. A Catholic may bring his own Bible with him, or ask for a copy of the Catholic Bible.

(b) *Services*—Participation is *active* when one marches in an Anglican procession, plays the organ or sings at Y.M.C.A. services, joins in the prayers or responses offered in a Protestant church, etc. (Holy Office, July 6, 1889).

Participation is *passive* if one looks on during a rare visit, or listens by radio to the musical program broadcast from Protestant services, or if one is obliged to attend non-Catholic services habitually, not as a profession of faith, but as a matter of civil duty or of domestic discipline, as happens with soldiers or with inmates of public institutions. Participation is not active if one adores the Blessed Sacrament carried in a schismatical procession which one meets by chance and unavoidably. Examples: Titus belongs to the honorary guard of a state ruler, and has to accompany the latter to non-Catholic services on certain state occasions. Balbus is tutor in a non-Catholic family, and is expected to take his charges to their church and back home on Sun-

days. Claudia is a maid in a non-Catholic family, and is ordered to hold one of the children while it is being baptized by the non-Catholic minister. In all these cases the presence at the services is purely passive, since the intention of the Catholic present is not to perform any religious duty, but only some civil or domestic service (see IV Kings, v. 18). But, on the other hand, the martyrs during the reigns of Elizabeth and her successors refused to attend the Anglican services, because this was required by law as a sign of conformity to the Established Church—that is, an active presence was prescribed.

972. Cases of participation in religious places, times and objects are as follows:

(a) *Places*.—Participation is active when one orders one's body to be buried in a sectarian graveyard, when one enters a schismatical or heretical church privately in order to visit the Blessed Sacrament or pray, when one offers up Catholic services in a non-Catholic temple, if these things are looked upon by the public as indications of identity of belief between Catholics and non-Catholics. Participation is merely passive, if one visits non-Catholic places of worship out of curiosity in order to look at the pictures, hear the music or listen to or take part in a political lecture or debate. In case of necessity, the Church permits Catholic services to be performed in the same building as that wherein non-Catholic rites are held, *e.g.*, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem which is used by various denominations (Holy Office, 12 April, 1704).

(b) *Times*.—Participation is active if one observes new moons, sabbaths, and days of fast as prescribed in the Old Law.

(c) *Objects*.—Participation is active if one wears the uniform of a condemned society, the ring or other emblem of Freemasonry, etc., or makes use of other insignia whose sole purpose is to indicate membership in some sect, unless it be evident that these are used for some other purpose (*e.g.*, in order to act a certain part in a play).

973. Cases of participation through attendance at non-Catholic religious instructions are as follows:

(a) Active participation in worship is had when one listens

to a preacher, Sunday school teacher, etc., and signifies approval by joining in "Amens" or other acclamations.

(b) Participation is merely passive, if at church or over the radio, one listens out of curiosity, or in order to be able to refute errors, or for the sake of perfecting oneself in diction or eloquence, or of showing respect to a person whose funeral oration is being delivered, etc. But, even though there be no active participation, it will usually be unlawful to listen to these sectarian discourses on account of the danger of perversion to the listener or of scandal to others. Catholics who are scientifically trained and staunch in faith may for good reasons hear sectarian sermons, but the greater number would be disturbed or unsettled (see the principles given above on dangerous books and schools, 854-857, 868). Moreover, even those who have a right to listen to non-Catholic religious talks have to be on their guard against scandal, for outsiders may regard their attention as approval of doctrine or participation in cult, and Catholics not sufficiently instructed may regard their example as an encouragement to imitate (*cf.* 979, 981).

974. Participation in non-Catholic assemblages or occasions whose character is of a mixed kind (partly religious and partly non-religious) are permitted by the Church, when due regard is had for avoidance of scandal, perversion, denial of faith, etc.

(a) Some of these occasions are chiefly religious, but are also looked on as family or civic solemnities, such as christenings, weddings, funerals. Hence, it is allowed to assist at the religious part of the occasion in a passive way for the sake of courtesy, or to exercise some function which is looked upon as belonging to the non-religious part of the occasion. Caution must be taken to ensure that the particular sect involved does not consider the exercise of the particular function as participating in the religious aspect of the ceremony. Likewise, on condition that the possibility of scandal, perversion, etc., has been removed, the following functions may be performed. One may act as a witness at the christening of a near relative who is not a Catholic; however, it is forbidden to be a sponsor, even by proxy, at baptisms performed by a heretical minister (Holy Office, *decr.*, May 10,

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1770). To be pallbearer or undertaker at a funeral, to be an usher at a wedding, to be an extra bridesmaid, etc., may be permitted. (If the function of best man or maid of honor be considered as merely attendants to the bride or groom, such participation in itself would not be illicit; but since the danger of scandal might often be present, such participation is dangerous. It is lawful for a Catholic pastor to attend the funeral of a non-Catholic friend or relative, provided he does not wear his sacred garb and takes no part in the ceremonies. Canon 1258, §2 establishes the general norm regulative of these cases: a passive or merely material presence may be, for a serious reason, tolerated as a mark of esteem or social courtesy at funerals, weddings, and similar functions, provided there is involved no danger of perversion or scandal; in a doubtful case, the serious reason for this presence must be approved by the local Ordinary.

(b) Other occasions are chiefly non-religious in character, but are also partly religious, or have the appearance of being religious. Such are, for example, the coronation, birthday, wedding, or funeral of a ruler, school commencements, political conventions, patriotic meetings, civil marriage before a magistrate who is also a non-Catholic minister. When these exercises are chiefly non-religious or entirely civil, even though conducted in non-Catholic churches or by non-Catholic ministers, the Church grants permission to participate in them to some extent, if there is sufficient reason.

975. Among the mixed occasions just mentioned are not included such as have an anti-Catholic or anti-religious spirit, such as funerals from which all manifestations of religion are excluded on account of hatred of religion, entertainments held by forbidden societies in which the members are present in regalia, picnics under the auspices of the Orangemen, etc.

976. **Coöperation in Religious Activities.**—A third danger of making external profession of a false religion is coöperation in activities whose tendency or principles are erroneous (see 944). Coöperation in a false religion is of two kinds, immediate and mediate. (a) Coöperation is *immediate*, when one takes a part in an act of a false religion itself (e.g., by worshipping an idol).

This kind of coöperation was discussed above, as participation or communication (see 956-975). (b) Coöperation is *mediate*, when one takes part, not in an act of a false religion, but in some other act which is a preparation for a help to the act of a false religion. This is the kind of coöperation we are now considering.

977. Mediate coöperation is of various kinds. (a) It is proximate or remote, according as the preparation or help afforded to a false religion is near to or far from the religious act. Thus, to make ready the lights, incense, flowers, etc. in front of an idol is *proximate* coöperation; to give money to an idolatrous priest or bonze is *remote* coöperation. (b) Mediate coöperation is material or formal, according as the intention of the coöperator is to share in or help error itself, or merely to help those who are in error, while disapproving of their error. Thus, if one prepares a pagan temple for worship or contributes money towards its maintenance because one's sympathies are with its idolatry, one's coöperation is *formal*; if one does these things only in order to make a living or to show friendship to an individual pagan, one's coöperation is *material*. It is clear that formal coöperation is a grave sin against faith, and hence we shall speak now only of material coöperation.

978. The principles governing the lawfulness of material coöperation will be treated at length below in their proper place among the sins opposed to charity. But since, on account of the mixed conditions of society today, there are innumerable cases of material coöperation in religion, it will be useful to state in advance in this place the principles bearing on material coöperation and their application to cases on religion and worship. The principles are the same as those given for an act that has two effects, one good and the other bad. Hence, material coöperation is not lawful, except when the following conditions are present:

(a) The action of him who coöperates *must be good in itself or at least indifferent*, for of course, if it is evil, it is not lawful. Thus, if a person were to give to one pagan temple objects he had stolen from another temple, his action would be intrinsically sinful on account of the theft. Similarly, if a person were to

contribute to a collection list as "sympathizer" with a school for the propagation of atheism or as "beneficiary" from the sacrifices to be offered an idol, his act would be intrinsically sinful as being a promotion of error or superstition, even though he were not really a sympathizer with atheism or a believer in idols.

(b) The intention of him who coöperates *must be good*; for, if he wills to help a false religion, he is guilty of formal coöperation; if he wills some other wrong end, he is guilty of some other species of sin. Thus, if one who does not believe in idolatry contributes to it on account of sympathy with anti-Christian movements, he is guilty of enmity to the truth.

(c) There must be a reason for the coöperation *proportionate* to the gravity of the sin which will be committed by others, to the proximity and necessity of the coöperation, and to the obligation which one has of preventing the sin of others. Examples: To contribute to a sect which plots the downfall of legitimate authority is never lawful, for there is no reason of temporal or private good that can be a compensation for the destruction of the public good. To contribute to the building of a Mohammedan mosque does not require so serious a reason as to contribute to the building of a pagan temple, for mosques are not used for idolatry. A graver reason is needed to justify ringing the bell or ushering the people to their seats for a service of false worship than to justify sweeping and dusting the temple the day before the service, for in the former case the coöperation is closer. A greater reason is required to build a house of false worship, when there is no one else to build it, than when there are many others who will gladly build it if one refuses, for in the former case one's coöperation is so necessary that without it the false worship cannot take place, but not so in the latter case. A much more serious reason would be required to justify parents conducting their children to a place of false worship than would be required to justify a public chauffeur in taking passengers thither; for the parents have a special duty to guard the religion of their children.

979. The above principles on mediate coöperation are clear

enough, but it is frequently very difficult to apply them on account of the uncertainty as to whether or not a particular act of coöperation is indifferent in itself, or whether a particular reason for coöperation is sufficient. But the following rules will help:

(a) An act is indifferent or good, when it does not tend to evil from its very nature or the circumstances, but has purposes that are not bad. It is bad when either intrinsically (*i.e.*, from its nature) or extrinsically (*i.e.*, from circumstances) it tends necessarily to evil. Examples: A derisory image of Christ and the manual of an obscene cult are intrinsically evil, inasmuch as they necessarily convey error or immorality. To draw up plans for a temple of idolaters in a Christian country would have the appearance of favoring the propagation of idolatry; to work on the construction of a temple in a pagan country where the lending of one's labor is regarded as a sign of acceptance of paganism, to help build a meeting house for a sect that plots the overthrow of government or religion—all these acts are indifferent in themselves (for one may also draw plans and put up walls for good or indifferent purposes), but from the circumstances they are evil in the cases given.

(b) Reasons for coöperation may be ranked as great, greater and greatest according to the kinds of goods that are at stake, and their sufficiency or insufficiency may be determined by measuring them with the gravity of the coöperation that is given. Great reasons are: fear of serious suffering, or of the wrath of husband or other superior, or of loss of an opportunity to make a considerable profit. Greater reasons are: fear of loss of position, or of notable detriment to reputation or fortune, or of severe imprisonment. Among the greatest reasons for coöperation in the worship of a false religion are the following: danger of loss of life or limb, of perpetual imprisonment, of great dishonor, of loss of all one's earthly possessions, of disturbance of the public peace.

980. Cases of coöperation in false religion that occur most frequently are: (a) contributions made to schools, churches, institutions; (b) labor given to buildings and objects of worship or instruction; (c) labor given to acts of worship or instruction.

981. Contributions to false worship are unlawful, even apart from scandal, danger of perversion, and the bad intention of the coöperator in the following cases:

(a) When on account of circumstances the contributions are *signs of sympathy* with religious errors. Examples: Titus gives many stipends for Masses to a schismatical priest. Balbus, when asked, contributes liberally to a fund for the building of a hall under the auspices of atheists. Caius, without being asked, gives a small donation towards the erection of a pagan temple. Claudius sends in a subscription to the treasury of a political organization whose purpose is anti-religious, and promises to support their ticket.

(b) Contributions, even though they manifest no sympathy with religious error, are unlawful, when there is *no reason for the coöperation*, or only an insufficient reason. Examples: Caius contributes to a pagan temple for no other reason than that he has not the heart to refuse anyone. Titus advertises constantly in an antireligious paper in order to help his business (cf. 1530).

982. If there is no bad intention on the part of the contributor, and if the danger of scandal or perversion is excluded, contributions are permitted under the following conditions, of which both must be present:

(a) The contribution must not be a mark of sympathy with religious error. This condition will be fulfilled more readily in countries of mixed religion, where Catholics and non-Catholics have been long associated together, and where non-Catholic denominations are engaged in many things other than the preaching of their doctrines, such as works of benevolence. Example: Balbus contributes at times to the building or maintenance of Protestant orphan asylums, hospitals, and schools, in a locality where these institutions are open to all and a contribution is not regarded as a sign of agreement with sectarian purposes.

(b) There must be a sufficient reason for making the contribution, such as the common good or great private necessity. Examples: Claudius contributes to the building of a non-Catholic church, in order that Catholics may thus obtain exclusive use of

a church till then used by Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Titus buys tickets for bazaars, lawn fêtes, oyster suppers, dances, picnics and other entertainments held for the benefit of non-Catholic churches, since, if he does not do this, he will lose trade and his business will be injured.

983. The building of houses of false worship, the production and sale of articles used in false worship, are unlawful also in two cases:

(a) when, on account of circumstances, they are a mark of approval of the false worship. Examples: Christians of Japan were forbidden by the Church to coöperate in the erection of altars or temples to idols, even if threatened with death or exile, and the reason of the prohibition seems to have been in each instance that such work was looked on and demanded as a profession of faith in paganism. Similarly, the construction of non-Catholic edifices in a Catholic country, of a pagan temple in a Christian country, or of an atheistic hall, would be signs of approbation of error. It is difficult to see how one who sells idols to those who request them for purposes of idolatry does not show favor to false worship, although he might be excused if, under threat of great harm, he delivered them with a protest that he was acting under compulsion;

(b) when there is no reason, or no sufficient reason, for coöperation with false worship. Example: Balbus helps to build non-Catholic places of worship for no other reason than that he is asked to do so, or that he receives good pay.

984. Building non-Catholic temples or furnishing the appurtenances of worship, scandal and other evil being avoided, are lawful under two conditions as above:

(a) the work must not be regarded as a sign of approval of false worship. Examples: The Church has permitted Christians to assist in the construction of Mohammedan mosques, when this was done unwillingly by them and under compulsion. The manufacture of statues of Buddha or of other idols is not a sign that one approves of idolatry, because these objects have legitimate uses, such as adornment of palaces or art galleries. Similarly, the production and distribution of emblems of a non-Catholic

sect or secret society is regarded as being in itself an indifferent act, on account of the various uses to which such objects may be put;

(b) there must be a reason sufficiently grave for doing this kind of work. Hence, a greater reason is needed to build a pagan temple than a Mohammedan mosque, and graver reason to build a mosque than an heretical place of worship; likewise, greater reason is required to coöperate as architect than as hirer and supervisor of labor, greater reason to coöperate as supervisor of labor than as stonecutter, bricklayer, etc.; greater reason is required to justify selling than making idols; greater reason to justify selling altar cloths and breads for the Lord's Supper than for selling pews and stained glass windows. Examples: Since lights, benches, bells, tables, cloths, etc., are not necessarily intended for direct use in acts of worship, a sufficient reason for selling them to non-Catholic churches is the profit that will be made. But, since vestments and chalices pertain directly to worship, a more serious reason is required for selling them than business gains.

985. Making the preparations for non-Catholic services is unlawful in the two cases given above, that is, when there is approval or insufficient reason.

(a) If the work manifests an approval of the services, it is unlawful. Such positions as sexton, sacristan, usher, beadle, church-warden, and trustee, imply recognition of the worship or membership in the congregation, although the same does not seem to be true of membership in the civil corporation of a church, nor of external offices such as janitor, caretaker, and attorney. Examples: Balba, an Anglican who is sick, wishes her minister to bring her communion. She asks her nurse, Titia, who is a Catholic, to telephone the minister to bring communion, and also directs Titia to prepare an altar and assist the minister on his arrival by lighting the candles, making responses, etc. Titia may not consent, for such immediate coöperation would mean approval of and participation in Anglican rites. Claudius, a Catholic, is hired by the minister of a Protestant church to take care of the yard and garden about the church and parsonage.

Sometimes the minister asks Claudius to play the chimes in his church tower which call the people to the services. The gardening work is indifferent, but the playing of the chimes seems at least an unlawful coöperation, since it is an invitation to non-Catholic worship.

(b) If there is no sufficient reason for the work, it is unlawful. Examples: Caia, a Catholic, acts as scrubwoman and cleaner in a schismatical church for no other reason than friendship for members of the altar society. On certain feast days her husband, Caius, a Catholic, takes pilgrims to the schismatical church in a bus, only because he makes considerable profit.

986. Making preparations for non-Catholic services, scandal and other danger being avoided, is lawful when the two conditions given above are present.

(a) Hence, the preparations must contain no indication of approval of the services. Examples: If Titia, the nurse mentioned in the previous paragraph, called in an Anglican nurse to receive and fulfill the orders of Balba, she would show that she did not herself approve of the rites, and her act would be indifferent in itself. If she could not avoid telephoning the minister without serious consequences, it would not be unlawful for her to tell him that Balba wished him to call. She might even in great necessity prepare the table herself, but could take no part in the rite. The acts of telling the minister that a visit from him was desired and of preparing the table would not be, in the circumstances, approving of the rite that followed. If Claudius mentioned in the foregoing paragraph wound up the clock in the church tower, or rang the bell at certain times to indicate the hour of the day, his acts would be indifferent, since they have no necessary reference to worship.

(b) There must be a reason sufficiently grave for engaging in the work that prepares for the services. Examples: If Caia mentioned in the preceding paragraph were in great poverty and could find no other employment, this would be a sufficient reason for her coöperation. Likewise, if her husband drove a bus that carried passengers to whatever destination they desired, and he could not refuse to let them off at the church without being

dismissed or causing other like inconveniences, he would have sufficient reason for his coöperation.

**987. The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.**—The third commandment of faith (mentioned in 918) has been considered so far in its negative aspect—that is, as a prohibition against the denial of truth or the profession of error. It remains to consider it in its affirmative aspect—that is, as a precept of profession of faith or of denial of error.

**988.** The ways of making profession of faith are various:

(a) It is made implicitly, if one performs acts that suppose faith; explicitly, if one declares in words one's internal belief. Thus, a Catholic professes his faith *implicitly* by observing the precepts of the Church; *explicitly*, by reciting before others an act of faith or the Creed.

(b) The declaration of one's faith in words is made in *ordinary* ways, if one affirms it to others, privately or publicly, or if one teaches it or defends it in debate; it is made *solemnly*, if it is recited according to a prescribed form as a ceremony. Thus, a Catholic who answers to a questioner that he is a Catholic, or who explains the truths of faith to an inquirer, or who replies to the objections of an unbeliever, makes an ordinary profession of faith; one who reads before the bishop or other designated authority a formula prescribed by the Church, makes solemn profession of faith. The solemn profession of faith is usually made before the altar, on which candles are lighted; and he who makes profession of faith kneels before the authority who receives it. Sometimes witnesses are present and the profession is signed.

(c) The solemn profession of faith is sometimes an *abjuration* (*i.e.*, a declaration of one's adherence to the faith of the Church and a recantation of previous errors); sometimes it is a *declaration or oath* that one rejects errors or accepts truths. Thus, converts before reception into the Church abjure the errors they formerly held; officials in the Church before assuming authority make a profession of faith in which they reprobate Modernism and express their belief in the Creed and the teachings of the Church.

**989.** The existence of a divine precept of profession of faith is proved from revelation and intrinsic reasons, as follows:

(a) "If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God hath raised Him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation" (Rom., x. 9, 10). This precept obliges under grave sin, since it is required for salvation.

(b) The first reason for external profession of faith is the *honor of God*; for it is a mark of disrespect to God to be ashamed or afraid to acknowledge oneself as a believer in His Word or a witness to its truth, on account of what others may think or say or do.

(c) A second reason for the external profession of faith is *one's own good*. It is well known that faith is strengthened by external acts, and that it grows weak and decays among Catholics who have no priests or churches or means of practising their faith.

(d) A third reason for profession of faith is the *good of others*, for the confession of faith is an encouragement to those who are strong in faith, an example to those whose faith is weak, and a light to those who have not the faith.

**990.** The divine precept of profession of faith, since it is affirmative, does not call for fulfillment at every moment. It obliges only at those times when the honor of God, the Revealer of Truth, or the needs of our neighbor, who is called to the truth, demand that one declare externally one's internal belief. (a) The *honor of God* demands a confession of faith, when a refusal to give it signifies that one does not accept the truths revealed by God, that revelation contains error, etc. (b) The *needs of our neighbor* demand a confession of faith, when a refusal to give it will prevent another from embracing the faith, or will cause him to lose it or give up its practices, etc.

**991.** The honor of God or the good of the neighbor calls for an external profession of faith at the following times: (a) when a person is joining the Church or returning to it, for the Church is a visible society and membership in it should be vis-



ible; (b) when a Catholic is interrogated about his faith, for here the honor of God and the good of others require that he be not ashamed of Christ or His Words (Luke, ix. 26), and that he should cause his light to shine before men (Matt., v. 16); (c) when a Catholic is in the company of others who are ridiculing or calumniating the faith, and a protest is looked for from him on account of his authority, knowledge, etc.

992. The profession of faith made by one who is joining the Church must be external, but the same publicity is not necessary for every case.

(a) *Secret* profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert is known only to himself and the priest who received him. This is permitted only in grave necessity, when the spiritual good of the convert requires it, and no injury is done to the honor of God or the welfare of the neighbor. Example: Titus is dying and wishes to be baptized, but for an important reason he is unwilling to have the fact of his conversion disclosed. Father Balbus, therefore, baptizes without witnesses.

(b) *Private* profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert is made before the priest and two witnesses, but the fact of the conversion is not made known to others on account of circumstances. This is permitted only for a short time and for serious reasons (see 932, 993), as the task of concealing one's faith for a long time is most difficult and is dangerous to faith itself. Example: Caius is a pagan who wishes to become a Catholic, but is kept back on account of dangers from his fellow-pagans, who will persecute him as an apostate. He, therefore, asks to be received as a secret Christian, with liberty to profess no religion externally. This may be permitted for a time, until Caius can move to some other place, but it cannot be permitted permanently.

(c) *Public* profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert is made before the priest and two witnesses, and the convert thereafter makes it known that he is a Catholic by attending Mass, receiving the Sacraments, etc. This kind of profession of faith is ordinarily required, but there is no law making it necessary for a convert to publish the news of his conversion.

993. A difficult case occurs when one who wishes to become a convert is unable to make public profession of Catholicity without suffering very great detriment, and is unable to make private profession without continuing in external practices of the non-Catholic religion. An example of this would be a non-Catholic girl who is threatened with destitution by her parents if she becomes a Catholic openly, and who knows that she will be forced to go to church with them if she becomes a Catholic privately. There are three courses in such a case: (a) *public profession* of Catholicism at once could be advised if the party showed signs of a special divine call and of a heroism equal to the difficulties the public profession would entail; (b) *private profession* of Catholicism could be tolerated for a time, if the party was of such age and circumstances as to appear able to cope successfully with the temptations and perplexities that beset this course; (c) *delay of Baptism* until things take a better turn would be the most prudent plan, if the deprivation of spiritual advantages would in the long run prove a lesser evil than the inconveniences of public or private profession of Catholicism.

994. Examination about one's religious status refers either to one's faith, or to something not necessarily connected with faith. (a) When a person is examined about his faith (*e.g.*, whether he is a Catholic, whether he believes in the doctrine of the Real Presence, or in Papal Infallibility), profession of faith is obligatory, if its omission is equivalent to denial. (b) When he is examined about something not necessarily connected with faith, denial or concealment of the truth would not be denial of faith, and concealment might be lawful, if the question were unfair. Evasion would be sinful, if the denial or concealment contained a lie or caused scandal. Examples: If a missionary in England or Ireland in the sixteenth century had refused to admit that he was a priest or religious, or a layman had refused to confess that he had harbored a priest in his house or had assisted at Mass, these denials would not necessarily contain a denial of the faith.

995. Examination about one's faith is made either by a private person or by public authority.

(a) When a person is questioned about his religious belief by a *private person*, he is not bound by reason of the question itself to make a profession of his faith, for a private person has no authority to call upon one in the capacity of a solemn and public witness; but he is bound to make a profession of faith by reason of circumstances, if the honor of God or the good of his neighbor requires that he declare his belief. Examples: Titius is known as a very inquisitive and meddling character, who is continually asking others about their personal affairs and putting silly questions. Wherefore, those who know him are accustomed to pay no attention to his questions, or to tell him to mind his business, or to give him some humorous reply. One day Titius asked Balbus, whom he knew very well to be a Catholic: "What is your religion?" Balbus retorted: "What is yours?" and left him. Caius is studying Christianity with a view to embracing it, and asks Sempronius' opinion on miracles. Sempronius, fearing the ridicule of some others present if he admits belief in miracles, says that he knows nothing about that subject. Balbus had a right to deny an answer to his questioner; but Sempronius should have replied for the edification of Caius and the honor of God.

(b) When a person is questioned about his religious belief by *public authority*, his obligation to make a profession of faith is certain, if the questioner has the right according to law to ask the question, and if it is made to one individually and out of hatred of the faith; for to this case apply the words of Christ: "You shall be brought before governors and kings for My sake, for a testimony to them and to the Gentiles" (Matt., x. 18).

996. In the following cases, one is not bound to confession of faith on account of the public authority that puts the question, although one may be bound on account of the circumstances:

(a) When the question is not put to an individual, but to a whole community, by a law which requires them in time of persecution to deliver themselves up as Christians or Catholics, there is no obligation to comply with this law, since it is unjust, and neither the honor of God nor the good of others requires one to make the profession of faith it demands (see 377, 552).

(b) When the question is put to an individual by one in authority but contrary to the law of the land, there is no obligation to answer. Thus, if according to civil law the magistrates have no right to examine about matters of conscience and one of them should nevertheless do so, the party questioned could treat the question as out of order and deny any answer.

(c) When the question is made according to law, but does not proceed from hatred of the faith, one is not obliged positively to profess one's faith, unless the omission would seem to those present to be a denial of faith. Thus, a person might remain silent, or say that he did not wish to answer, that he did not wish to say what his belief was, etc., and in the circumstances it would seem that he would not be denying his faith, but merely for some reason refusing to discuss it when he thought there was no necessity.

997. The third case mentioned above (see 991), in which one is obliged to profess one's faith publicly, is when the faith is being attacked in one's presence. The honor of God and the good of the neighbor then require one to speak out. (a) Thus, if the doctrines of the faith are being blasphemed or ridiculed, one should defend them, if one is able. Otherwise, one should protest or leave the company, if this will be advantageous to religion. (b) If sacred things are being profaned, one should resist physically, if one is able to prevent what is going on.

998. Debates on religion between Catholics and non-Catholics are not in themselves wrong, but as a rule they are useless and inexpedient.

(a) That such debates are not essentially wrong, is clear from the fact that a suitable defender of the faith is able by argumentation to show the misconceptions that are entertained about the faith and the fallacious objections that are made against it. This is honorable to God and profitable to the neighbor: "Saul commended the Jews that dwelt at Damascus, affirming that this is the Christ. . . . He spoke also to the Gentiles and disputed with the Greeks" (Acts, ix. 22, 29).

(b) That controversy is generally unprofitable is a matter of experience. Religious debates often lead to bitterness, and sel-

dom effect conversions. There is, moreover, an ever-present danger that the sophistry or eloquence of an adversary may give him the appearance of victory to the discredit of the faith, for even a foolish person can raise difficulties which only a wise man can answer.

999. Consequently the rule governing religious disputations is that they should be avoided, unless ecclesiastical authority deems them useful at times. (a) If no provocation is offered, or if no good seems likely to result from a debate, it should be avoided. (b) If one is attacked and it seems that the honor of God and the good of souls will be served by a debate, then capable and prudent speakers are permitted by the Church to defend the faith, provided permission is secured from the Holy See, or, in case of urgency, from the local Ordinary (Canon 1325, §3). The prescriptions of this Canon were reaffirmed recently by the Holy Office and applied especially to "ecumenical" conventions convoked to promote church unity. Catholics, both lay and clerical, may in no way be present at such meetings without the previous consent of the Holy See (Holy Office, *Monitum*, June 5, 1948). See Appendix II.

1000. The divine precept of profession of faith so far considered obliges *on account of the virtue of faith itself*, that is, on account of the external honor or service due to the Word of God. There is also a divine precept of profession of faith which obliges *on account of other virtues* that may require such a profession of faith to be made (e.g., on account of charity or justice). The omission of the profession of faith in these cases, however, is not a sin against faith, but against the other virtues, and should be confessed as such.

(a) *Justice* requires a profession of faith when, by reason of his office, a person has the duty of teaching others in the faith, for to teach the faith is to manifest one's own belief in it. Hence, bishops and other pastors are obliged to preach: "Woe is unto me, if I preach not the Gospel" (I Cor., ix. 16); and their teaching is a manifestation of faith: "Having the same spirit of faith, as it is written: I believed, for which cause I have spoken; we also believe, and therefore we speak also" (II Cor., iv., 13).

(b) *Charity* requires a profession of faith when a person has not the office of teacher, but has a suitable opportunity to impart instruction to one who is in great ignorance about religion. For, as charity requires one to perform corporal works of mercy for the suffering and destitute, so it requires one to perform spiritual works of mercy for the spiritually indigent, such as to instruct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful. Thus, a lay person who can prudently do so (the circumstances of time, place, person, etc., being duly considered), ought in charity to instruct in faith and morals the neglected children around him.

1001. One is not bound to give instruction about matters of faith or morals when this would lead to more harm than good; but misrepresentation must be avoided.

(a) The purpose of instruction is to fulfill the will of God and to benefit others; therefore, if these ends are not obtained but rather defeated by an instruction, it should be omitted. The truth is always good in itself, but its communication may not be expedient on account of the recipient, who, being immature, may be harmed by the wrong impression he will receive, or who, being badly disposed, may use knowledge as a means to wrongdoing. Strong meat should not be given to infants (Heb., vi. 11-14); pearls should not be cast before swine (Matt., vii. 6). Examples: The mysteries of the faith (e.g., transubstantiation), should be explained with caution to those who are not well instructed, lest they be overwhelmed with the brightness and misunderstand. Difficult matters (such as predestination) or dangerous subjects (such as sex duties) should not be discussed indiscriminately with all kinds of persons. It is not right to instruct those who are in ignorance of their duty, if this is not absolutely necessary and one foresees that instruction will not prevent them from continuing in evil ways but will only add to their guilt. It is wrong to put the Bible into the hands of those who will use it for bad purposes.

(b) Misrepresentation or suppression is a lie, and in matters of doctrine a denial of faith; hence, it is never lawful. The rule to be followed, therefore, in teaching the faith is that one communicate the same doctrine to all, but according to the capac-

ity of his hearers—to some in outline and to others more fully. This was the method of Christ, who “with many parables spoke to them the word, according as they were able to hear” (Mark, iv. 33).

1002. The Church has the duty not only of keeping the faith untarnished among Catholics, but also of spreading it among non-Catholics, Protestants, Jews and infidels, as far as circumstances will allow. For God “will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (I Tim., ii. 4). Those, therefore, who assist missionary work for unbelievers at home or abroad, do a work thrice blest, for (a) it is a thanksgiving offering to God, testifying our appreciation of the gift of faith which we have received from Him, (b) it is a work of charity to ourselves, for by helping others to receive the faith we strengthen our own faith, and (c) it is an act of supreme mercy to those who are sitting in darkness and the shadow of death.

1003. In addition to the divine precepts, there are also ecclesiastical laws prescribing profession of faith.

(a) Ecclesiastical precepts of profession of faith for various officials are contained in Canon 1406 and in the *Sacrorum Antistitum* of Pius X (September 1, 1910), and Canon 2403 decrees that those who contumaciously refuse to make the profession of faith of Canon 1406 may be deprived of their office. Converts to the faith who are received without absolute Baptism make an abjuration (Holy Office, July 20, 1859), and persons who have incurred excommunication on account of apostasy, heresy or schism are absolved in the external forum after juridical abjuration (Canon 2314).

(b) The *purpose* of these ecclesiastical laws is to prevent the acceptance of spiritual or temporal jurisdiction or authority in the Church, or the commission of teaching or the benefits of membership by those who are unbelievers. Hence, the purpose is grave, and the laws themselves are held to bind under grave sin.

(c) The *persons* bound by these ecclesiastical laws are both ecclesiastics and laymen, namely, those who are about to be received into or reconciled with the Church, and those who are about to be admitted to some dignity, order, office or function

(such as candidates for the ranks of Cardinal, bishop, canon, parish priest, religious superior, professor, preacher, confessor, doctor, etc).

(d) The *form* of the profession of faith is the Tridentine or Piana given in the Bull of Pius IV, *Injunctum Nobis*, of November 13, 1564, with additions referring to the Vatican Council. The oath against Modernism prescribed in the *Sacrorum Antistitum* of Pius X, of September 1, 1910, is also obligatory.

(e) The *times* when these professions of faith must be made are at admission into the Church and at the reception or renewal of an office.

1004. The affirmative precepts of profession of faith, divine and ecclesiastical, oblige only at the proper time and place, and therefore on other occasions one is not obliged to make profession of faith. (a) Hence, one may avoid a profession of faith by evading interrogation in time of persecution—for example, through the payment of money to be exempted from examination or through flight. As these acts indicate that the person is unwilling to deny his faith, but has reasons for wishing to preserve his life or to avoid the danger of apostasy, they are not of themselves unlawful, and may be a duty. (b) One may omit a profession of faith by concealing one's religion, when prudence calls for concealment rather than publication.

1005. Flight in time of persecution is lawful or unlawful according to circumstances, since in itself it is something indifferent, being simply the act of moving from one place to another.

(a) Flight is *unlawful*, if one's circumstances are such that one will do an injury to justice or charity by departure. Hence, a pastor would sin against justice if he fled in time of persecution, leaving his flock who stood in need of his presence: “The good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep. But the hireling and he that is not the shepherd, seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth” (John, x. 11, 12). Hence also, one who has no care of souls but whose presence is necessary to a persecuted community should prefer out of charity their spiritual good to his own bodily safety: “We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren” (I John, iii. 16).

(b) Flight is *necessary*, if one's circumstances are such that one will do an injury to justice or charity by remaining. Hence, if a pastor's life is necessary for his flock, while his absence can be supplied by others who will take his place, justice to his subjects requires that he save his life for their sake. Thus, for the good of souls St. Peter escaped from prison (Acts, xii. 17 sqq.); St. Paul fled from Damascus (Acts, ix. 24, 25); our Lord Himself hid when the Jews took up stones to cast at Him (John, viii. 59). Similarly, if a person is very fearful lest his courage may fail him if he is brought before the persecutors, charity to self requires that he take flight so as to escape the danger of apostasy.

(c) Flight is *permissible*, if there is no duty to remain and no duty to depart: "When they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another" (Matt., x. 23). Hence, if one's presence is useful but not necessary in time of persecution, it is lawful for one to flee. Some authorities hold that the desertion of Jesus by the disciples during the Passion was not sinful flight.

1006. To refuse to flee when flight is permissible, is usually not advisable, for this is dangerous for most persons. It would be advisable, however, if a person had strong and prudent confidence of his victory, had the right intention, and used the means to prepare himself for the struggle.

1007. Concealment of one's faith is lawful, if the requisite conditions are present.

(a) Thus, it is not lawful to conceal one's faith at times when a profession of it is called for by divine or ecclesiastical law (see 991, 1003); at other times it is lawful. Example: Titus is travelling in a country where there are no Catholic churches, and where no one ever asks him about his religion. He never tells anyone what he is.

(b) It is not lawful to conceal one's faith from a dishonest motive. Example: If Titus conceals his religion in order not to be unjustly discriminated against, his motive is good; but if he wishes to be taken for a non-Catholic, his motive is evil.

(c) It is not lawful to conceal one's faith in a sinful way. Example: If the means of concealment employed by Titus imply

deception or denial of the faith (such as lying about his origin and active participation in non-Catholic worship), he is guilty of sinful concealment. But, if the means employed are permissible (such as silence about himself, omission of grace before and after meals, eating meat on Fridays in virtue of dispensation, etc.), his method of concealment is not sinful.

1008. Generally speaking, concealment of one's religion is not advisable. (a) The reasons for concealment are often imaginary, rather than real. We see that Catholics who are not ashamed of their religion, or afraid to have it known that they practise it, are respected for their sincerity and conscientiousness even in bigoted regions, while on the contrary those who are apologetic or who do not live up to their religion are looked down on as cowards or hypocrites. (b) The means employed for concealment will cause endless doubts and scruples, for it is often difficult to decide what means are lawful and what unlawful.

#### Art. 4: THE VIRTUE OF HOPE

(*Summa Theologica*, II—II, qq. 17-22.)

1009. **Definition.**—The word "hope" is variously used. (a) In a wide and improper sense, it signifies the expectation of some wished-for evil, or desire without expectation. Hence, colloquially one hopes for misfortune to another (hope of a future evil), or that another has succeeded or is in good health (hope of past or present good), or that some unlooked-for fortune will turn up (hope without expectation). (b) In its strict and proper sense, hope signifies the expectation of some desired good in the future. Thus, one hopes to pass an examination, or to recover from illness.

1010. Hope, strictly understood, is of various kinds. (a) It is an *emotion* or an *affection*, according as it proceeds from the sensitive or the rational appetite. The emotion of hope is an inclination of the irascible appetite to possess some object known through the senses and apprehended as good and attainable, and is found both in man and in the brutes. The affection of hope is

a spiritual inclination, tending to good as known through the reason.

(b) Hope is either *natural* or *supernatural*, according as it tends either to goods that are temporal and within the power of man to acquire, or to goods that are eternal and above the unaided powers of creatures. It is in this latter sense that hope is now taken.

1011. Supernatural hope is understood, sometimes in a wide sense, sometimes in a strict sense. (a) In a *wide sense*, it is used objectively to designate the object, material or formal, of hope. Thus, St. Paul is speaking of the material object of hope (*i.e.*, of the things hoped for), when he says: "Hope that is seen is not hope" (Rom., viii. 24), "Looking for the blessed hope" (Tit., ii. 13); while the Psalmist is speaking of the formal object of hope (*i.e.*, the motive of hope), when he says: "Thou hast been my hope, a tower of strength against the face of the enemy" (Ps. lx. 4). (b) In a *strict sense*, hope is used subjectively to designate the act or habit of hope. The act of hope is spoken of in the following texts: "We are saved by hope" (Rom., viii. 24); "Rejoicing in hope" (Rom., vii. 12). The habit of hope is indicated in these verses from Job and St. Paul: "This my hope is laid up in my bosom" (Job, xix. 27); "There remain faith, hope, charity, these three" (I Cor., xiii. 13). Hope is now taken in the strict sense, as a virtue or infused habit, from which proceed supernatural acts.

1012. The virtue of hope is defined: "An infused habit, by which we confidently expect to obtain, through the help of God, the reward of everlasting life."

(a) It is "an infused habit." These words express the genus to which hope belongs, and they set it apart from the emotion and the affection of hope, as well as from any acquired habit of hoping for purely natural goods. A natural virtue of hope, strengthening the will with reference to natural happiness, is not necessary in any state of man, fallen or unfallen, for the will does not stand in need of a superadded virtue with respect to those things that fall within its proper sphere of action.

(b) Hope is a habit "by which we expect, etc." These words

express the specific subjective elements of hope, that is, the powers of the soul in which it resides and the kinds of acts it performs.

(c) "Through the help of God." These words express the formal object or motive of hope.

(d) "The rewards of eternal life." These words express the material object of hope, that is, the thing that is hoped for.

1013. There is a general similarity between the virtue of hope and natural hope as regards their objects and acts.

(a) Natural hope is the result of a *love* of some *good*, and so differs from fear, which is the dread of some evil. Similarly, the virtue of hope springs from a love of heavenly goods (Rom., viii. 24, 25).

(b) Natural hope has to do with a good that is *absent*, and it is therefore *desire*, not enjoyment. Similarly, the virtue of hope looks forward to goods not as yet attained: "We hope for that which we see not, we wait for it with patience" (Rom., viii. 25).

(c) Natural hope, unlike mere desire, seeks a good whose attainment is *not certain or easy*, and hence it presupposes *courage*. Similarly, the virtue of hope demands strength of soul: "Do ye manfully and let your heart be strengthened, all ye that hope in the Lord" (Ps. xxx. 25).

(d) Natural hope tends towards an objective, which, while difficult, is *not impossible*; hence, it expects with *confidence*, for, when an object of desire is impossible, one does not hope for it, but despairs. The virtue of hope also is confident: "Hold fast the glory and confidence of hope unto the end" (Heb., iii. 6).

1014. Christian hope is superior to natural hope, because it is a supernatural virtue.

(a) It is a *virtue*, since its acts are commanded by God, and through it the will is directed to its beatitude and the secure means of realizing its lofty aspirations: "I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications for ever, for the reward" (Ps. cxviii. 112); "Trust in the Lord, and do good" (Ps. xxxvi. 3).

(b) Christian hope is a *supernatural* virtue, since through it man is sanctified and saved: "I (Wisdom) am the mother of holy

hope" (Eccles., xxiv. 24); God "hath regenerated us into a lively hope" (I Pet., i. 3); "We are saved by hope" (Rom., viii. 24); "Everyone that hath this hope in Him sanctifieth himself" (I John, iii. 3).

1015. Though hope seeks its own reward, it is not therefore mercenary or egotistic. Experience shows that hope produces idealism and self-sacrifice, while the lack of it leads to engrossment in the things of time and sense and to selfishness. (a) Thus, the hope of the *just* man is not separated from charity, and hence he loves God above all, and his neighbor as himself: "I have inclined my heart to do Thy justifications forever, for the reward" (Ps. cxviii. 112). (b) The hope of the *sinner* is a preparation for charity, since he must desire charity as a means to the beatitude he wishes: "He that hopeth in the Lord shall be healed" (Prov., xxviii. 25).

1016. Just as faith is divided into living and dead faith, so hope is divided into animated and inanimated hope. (a) *Animated* hope is that to which is joined the state of grace and charity, and which is thereby perfect as a virtue and meritorious. This hope is stronger, because we hope more confidently from friends. An act of animated hope is more perfect when commanded by the virtue of charity, less perfect when not so commanded—that is, he who makes an act of hope out of love of God performs a better work than he who makes an act of hope out of some other motive (such as self-encouragement). (b) *Inanimated* hope is that to which the state of grace and charity is not joined, and which therefore is an imperfect virtue and not meritorious.

1017. The following divisions of hope made by the Quietists are not admissible:

(a) The division of hope into *natural* hope (which seeks its own good, and which is permitted to the ordinary faithful) and *supernatural* hope (which is entirely disinterested, and which is necessary for the perfect) contains Rigorism; for since natural hope is of no avail towards justification or for merit, it would follow that without disinterested love of God one could not obtain forgiveness, nor could an act be meritorious.

(b) The division of hope into two supernatural species, the one *disinterested* (which desires heavenly goods for the glory of God alone) and the other *interested* (which desires heavenly goods for the advantage of self), is useless; for acts of disinterested love belong to charity, not to hope (*Denz.*, 1327-1349).

1018. **The Object of Hope.**—By the object of hope we mean three things: (a) the good that is hoped for (material object, the end *which* is intended); (b) the person for whom that good is hoped (the end *for whom*); (c) the ground or foundation of hope (formal object).

1019. The material object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary object, which is desired for its own sake, and the secondary, which is desired on account of the primary object.

(a) The *primary* object of hope is God Himself, the infinite good, considered as our Last End and Beatitude (Ps. lxxii. 25). Connoted in this object is the beatific vision, the finite act by means of which the creature attains to the possession of God. The primary object of our hope is the imperishable crown (I Cor., ix. 25), glory (Col., i. 27), the glory of the children of God (Rom., v. 2), salvation (I Thess., v. 8), eternal life (Tit., i. 2), entrance into the holy of holies (Heb., x. 19, 23), the inheritance incorruptible and undefiled that cannot fade, reserved in heaven (I Pet., i. 4), the vision of God (I John, iii. 3). It is this object especially that distinguishes supernatural from natural hope (I Cor., xv. 19). "From God," says St. Thomas (II—II, q. 17, a. 2), "we should expect nothing less than God Himself."

(b) The *secondary* object of hope embraces all those created things that assist one to attain one's Last End. We may hope for all those things for which we may pray, as St. Augustine remarks.

1020. The primary object of hope includes: (a) essential beatitude, that is, the beatific vision; (b) accessory beatitude, that is, all resultant joys, such as glory of soul and body, the companionship of the Saints, security from harm, and the like.

1021. The secondary object of hope includes: (a) spiritual goods, such as graces; (b) temporal goods, such as health and the means that will enable us, at least indirectly, to work for the

life to come and acquire merit; (c) deliverance from evils that would hinder spiritual goods; (d) all that promotes one's salvation, such as labors for God.

1022. The person for whom eternal life is hoped may be either oneself or one's neighbor. (a) Absolutely speaking (*i.e.*, apart from the supposition of friendship towards a neighbor), a person can hope only for himself; for the salvation of others is not attained by him, but by them; and thus, if there is no bond of affection, it cannot arouse in him that feeling of courageous confidence which belongs to hope. (b) Accidentally (*i.e.*, on the supposition of friendship or charity towards others), one can hope for them; for love makes a person regard the good of others as his own. Thus, St. Paul is hopeful for the perseverance of the Philippians (Phil., i. 6), and he labors for the Corinthians that his hope for them may be steadfast (II Cor., i. 7).

1023. The formal object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary object, which is the principal cause that effects our salvation, and the secondary object, which is a secondary or instrumental cause of salvation. (a) The *primary* motive of hope is God Himself, the Author of salvation, and hence it is said: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man" (Jer., xvii. 5). (b) The *secondary* motive of hope are creatures by whom one is assisted in obtaining the means for salvation (such as the Saints, who aid us by their intercessions). Thus, in the *Salve Regina*, our Lady is addressed as "our hope." The merits of Christ and our own merits, since they are instruments used by God, are motives of hope.

1024. On what divine attribute is the virtue of hope based? (a) *Essentially*, hope is based on God's character of omnipotent helper; for the specific and differentiating note of this virtue is its courageous confidence, and this, in view of the surpassing height one expects to attain and the feebleness of all created efforts, must rely on the assistance of One who is equal to the task: "The Lord is my rock and my strength. God is my strong One, in Him will I trust" (II Kings, xxii. 2, 3); "You have hoped in the Lord Mighty forever" (Is., xxvi. 4); "The name

of the Lord is a strong tower; the just runneth to it and shall be exalted" (Prov. xviii. 10).

(b) *Secondary* (*i.e.*, as regards acts that it presupposes, or that are connected with it), hope is concerned with other divine attributes. Thus, a person does not hope unless he first believes that God has promised beatitude and that He is true to His promises, unless he regards beatitude as something desirable; and so he who hopes has placed his dependence on the *loyalty* of God to His given word, and on the *desirability* of God as the prize of life's efforts: "Let us hold fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for He is faithful that hath promised" (Heb., x. 23); "Unto the hope of life everlasting, which God, who lieth not, hath promised before the times of the world" (Tit., i. 2); "The Lord is my portion, therefore will I wait for Him" (Lam., iii. 24); "Fear not, I am thy reward, exceeding great" (Gen., xv. 1). Just as faith presupposes a beginning of belief and a pious inclination towards it, so does hope presuppose faith and the love of God, as He is our beatitude.

1025. Omnipotent divine help as the foundation of hope can be understood in two senses:

(a) It may be taken for some *created* help, that is, for some gift of God possessed by us (such as habitual or actual grace, merits, virtues, etc). It is not in this sense that divine help is called the motive of hope; for even a sinner can and should hope, and the just man's merits, while they are dispositions for beatitude, are not a principal cause that will conduct him to it.

(b) This divine help may be taken for *uncreated* help, that is, for the act by which God confers His gifts upon us. In this sense only is divine aid the basis of hope. For if a person is asked why he is confident of salvation, he will not answer, "Because I am in the state of grace and do good works," but "Because I know that God will help me."

1026. The divine perfections included in the title of helper now given to God are:

(a) *essentially*, the almighty power of God; for this is the immediate and sufficient reason for the confident expectation



that one will at last possess the same object of felicity as God Himself. The higher and more difficult the goal one sets before oneself, the greater must be the resources on which one counts for success;

(b) *secondarily*, these perfections include the infinite kindness of God; for it is the goodness of God that prompts Him to employ His omnipotence in assisting creatures to attain their Last End. Man has hope, therefore, of attaining supreme felicity, because he relies on supreme power to aid him, while this supreme power aids him, because it is directed by infinite goodness and mercy. Thus, the Psalmist says: "I have trusted in Thy mercy" (Ps. xii. 6). Just as faith rests proximately on the reliability of God and remotely on His perfection of being, so hope rests proximately on God's almighty power and radically on His goodness and perfection.

**1027. The Excellence of Hope.**—Hope is a theological virtue, and is therefore superior to the moral virtues.

(a) It is a theological virtue, inasmuch as it tends immediately to God Himself. As was said above (see 1019, 1023), we hope for God and we hope in God: "In God is my salvation and my glory. He is the God of my help, and my hope is in God" (Ps. lxi. 8); "What is my hope? Is it not the Lord?" (Ps. xxxviii. 8); "In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped" (Ps. xxx. 1). Hence, the Apostle numbers hope along with the other theological virtues (I Cor., xiii. 13). "By faith the house of God receives its foundations, by hope it is reared, by charity it is completed" (St. Augustine, *Serm. xxvii.*, 1).

(b) The two moral virtues that most resemble hope are long-suffering and magnanimity, for the former is the expectation of good that is distant, while the latter is the readiness to encounter difficulties in the quest of high ideals. But these two virtues belong to courage, rather than to hope; for the goods they seek are finite, and the difficulty they encounter is external struggle, whereas the good which hope seeks is infinite, and the difficulty lies in the very greatness of that good.

**1028.** There are various points of view from which virtues may be compared one with another.

(a) One virtue is prior to another *in duration*, when it precedes the latter in time. Thus, the natural virtues that pagans have before their conversion are prior in duration to the supernatural virtues that are received in Baptism.

(b) One virtue is prior to another *by nature*, or in the order of generation, when it is the necessary preparation or disposition for that other, which essentially presupposes it. Thus, the intellectual virtues are naturally prior to justice, for a man cannot will to give others their due, unless he first knows that this is his duty.

(c) One virtue is prior to another virtue *in excellence as a habit*, when it has an object that is more elevated and comprehensive, and when it is fitted to be the guide of the other virtue. For the standard of comparison of habits must be taken from the objects to which they tend, and from which they derive their specific character (see 134). Thus, the habit of philosophizing is in itself more noble than the habit of accumulating wealth, for truth is better than money.

(d) One virtue is prior to another *in excellence according to the general concept of virtue*, when it does more to set the will right. For the standard of comparison then is to be taken from the influence exercised on one's acts (as the word "virtue" or "power" intimates), and the will is the motor power that sets the other faculties in motion. Thus, for one who has debts to pay, it is better that he give his time to earning money than to storing his mind with the lore of scientists; justice has more of a claim on him than knowledge.

**1029. Comparison of Hope with Faith.**—(a) These virtues are not the same, for, while faith makes us cling to God as the giver of truth and assent to what is obscure to us, hope makes up turn to Him as the author of beatitude and strive for that which is difficult for us.

(b) Faith and hope are normally equal in duration, since as a rule they are infused at the same time (as in Baptism). Accidentally, however, faith may precede hope, as when one who preserves his faith loses hope on account of despair, and later recovers it.

(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, faith being prior to hope, since both glory and grace—the objects of hope—must be known through faith (Heb., xi. 6).

(d) They are unequal in their excellence as habits, faith being superior to hope, as the intellectual habits are superior to the moral; for faith is regulative and directive of hope, and has an object more abstract and universal.

(e) They are unequal in their excellence according to the general concept of virtue, hope being superior to faith, as the moral virtues are superior to the intellectual (see 156). For hope includes a rightness of the will towards God that is not included in the concept of faith, which is chiefly intellectual, and it is the will that moves the other powers to action.

1030. **Comparison of Hope with Charity.**—(a) These virtues are not the same, for, while faith and hope adhere to God as the principle from which one derives truth or goodness, charity adheres to God for His own sake. Hope tends towards God as our good, from whom beatitude and the means thereto are to be expected; but charity unites us to God so that we live for God rather than for self.

(b) Hope and charity are normally equal as to duration, but accidentally hope may precede charity, as when one commits a mortal sin, but retains his hope of salvation, and later recovers charity. There is question now only of the habits, because the acts of the sinner leading up to charity—faith, fear, hope, contrition, etc.—are for the most part successive, although in a sudden conversion hope may be virtually included in charity.

(c) They are unequal as to natural precedence, hope being prior to charity, for, just as fear naturally leads to interested love such as is contained in hope, so does this interested love prepare one for a higher love that is disinterested: "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart" (I Tim., i. 5). We speak here of hope unanimated by charity; for animated or living hope trusts in God as a friend, and hence presupposes charity.

(d) They are unequal in excellence, for hope proceeds from imperfect love, which desires God for the sake of the one who

loves, while charity is perfect love and desires God for His sake.

1031. Hope, as said above (see 1015–1017), is good and virtuous even when separated from charity, or when exercised without the actual motive of charity. But imperfect or less perfect hope must not be confused with the following acts, which have only the appearance of hope: (a) acts that remove the material object of hope, which are such as look for all beatitude in something different from God (*e.g.*, in secondary joys of heaven); (b) acts that do injury to the objects of hope, such as those that subordinate them to lesser goods (*e.g.*, hope which puts self above God or delight above virtue).

1032. Three types of the latter kind of pseudo-hope may be distinguished:

(a) *Egotistical* hope is that which places the end for which beatitude is hoped (*i.e.*, self, as was said in 1022) above the end which is beatitude (*i.e.*, God the Last End, as was said in 1019 *sqq.*), or which places subjective beatitude (*i.e.*, the act of intuitive vision by which beatitude is attained) above objective beatitude (*i.e.*, God as the object in which beatitude consists). Just as the intellect is in error when it mistakes the conclusion for the premise, so is the will in disorder when it takes a means for the end. Hence, while there is nothing inordinate in a man's hoping for food on account of eating and in his eating on account of health (since in reality health is the purpose of eating, and eating the purpose of food), it is extremely inordinate to hope for God on account of the beatific vision or on account of self, since God is the End of all, and the beatific vision is only the condition for attaining to this Last End, and self merely the subject to whom God and the beatific vision are to be given for its perfection through them.

(b) *Epicurean* hope is that which places pleasure above the other elements that pertain to subjective beatitude. The subjective happiness of man consists essentially in the act that is highest and distinctly human—namely, in the act of the intellect seeing God intuitively; hence, pleasure—even the chief spiritual pleasures—should be esteemed as something secondary and consequent.

(c) *Utilitarian* hope is that which places reward above virtue, as if the latter were merely a means, as when one says: "If there were no heaven, I would practise no virtue." There are three kinds of good: (i) *useful* good, or that which is desirable only because it serves as a means to something else (e.g., bitter medicine, which is wished, not for its own sake, but for the sake of health); (ii) *moral* good, or that which is desired for its own sake, as being agreeable to the rational nature of man (such as virtue); (iii) *delightful* good, that is, the repose or satisfaction of the will in possession of that which is desirable for its own sake. It is a mistake, therefore, to regard virtue as merely a useful good, something that is disagreeable in itself and cannot be practised on account of its inherent goodness. It is also a mistake to consider heaven as something above and apart from virtue; for eternal life is the perfect flowering and fruitage of the moral life that has been planted and developed here on earth. The things of this world are only means to virtue, and virtue reaches its climax in the beatific vision. The delights of heaven are results of that vision, not its end.

1033. Hope, therefore, must seek God as the chief good; it must not prefer the lesser to the greater, and it must not hold virtue as good only in view of the reward. But, on the other hand, hope seeks God as *its own good*, and it need not be joined to disinterested love, in order to be a true virtue.

(a) Hence, it is not necessary that one hope with the proviso that, in the impossible hypothesis that God were unwilling to reward virtue, the reward would not be expected; for it is not necessary to consider chimerical cases.

(b) It is not necessary that hope be elicited by the act of charity (i.e., that one always direct one's desire of salvation to the end that God may be glorified), for thus the motive of hope would cease to be active, and the lesser virtue would be absorbed in charity.

(c) It is not necessary that hope be commanded by the act of charity (i.e., that one hope for salvation as one's own good, only when a previous act of charity has bidden that this be done as a mark of love towards God), for to desire that which God wishes

one to desire is in itself good and laudable, and stands in need of no other act to justify it.

1034. Discouragement and aridity occur even in the lives of great Saints, and at such times, when pure love of God seems almost impossible, hope comes to the rescue by offering encouragement and spurring on to activity. Hence, the importance of this virtue in the spiritual life; for (a) hope is an anchor of the soul in times of tempest, since it offers reasons for patience and good cheer (Heb., vi. 19; Ecclus., iii. 9; Rom., xii. 12, viii 25; I Thess., v. 8); (b) hope gives wings to the soul in times of weariness, since the motives it presents are inducements to courage and good works (Is., xl. 31, xxx. 15; Ps. cxviii. 32; Heb., x. xi).

1035. The following means are recommended for growth in hope: (a) to ask this from God: "Grant us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and charity" (Missal, 13th Sunday after Pentecost); (b) to meditate on the rewards of heaven and the motives of hope, and to make corresponding acts (II Cor., iv. 18; Ecclus., ii. 11-13); (c) to have recourse to God in all our needs, casting all our care on Him (I Pet., v. 7); (d) to work courageously for salvation and to preserve purity of conscience (Ps. xxvi. 14; I John, iii. 21, 22).

1036. **The Subject of Hope.**—By the *subject* of hope we mean the power of the soul to which this virtue belongs and also the persons who are capable of hope. (a) The faculty of the soul in which hope resides is the will, for this virtue seeks the good, not the true. (b) The persons capable of hope are all those who have not yet received their final reward or punishment.

1037. The virtue of hope does not remain in the blessed. (a) They cannot hope for the principal object of bliss, since they already enjoy it: "Hope that is seen is not hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" (Rom., viii. 24). (b) The blessed can desire secondary objects, such as the continuance of their state, the glorification of their bodies, the salvation of those who are still on earth, etc.; but this desire belongs to the virtue of charity, since with the blessed there is no longer the strug-

gle and expectation of the future that is contained in the desire of hope. Moreover, the desire of objects other than God does not constitute the theological virtue of hope, which tends directly to God.

1038. As to the departed who are not in heaven, we must distinguish between those in hell and those in purgatory.

(a) Those who are in hell, whether demons or men, cannot hope; for it is part of their punishment that they know their loss is eternal (Matt., xxv. 41; Prov., xi. 7). Dante expresses this truth when he says that on the gates of hell it is written: "Hope abandon ye that enter here." Only in an improper sense can the lost be said to hope, inasmuch as they desire evils, or things other than heaven. Unbaptized infants either do not know their loss, or else are not tormented by the thought that heaven is for them unattainable, realizing that its privation has resulted from no personal fault of their own.

(b) Those who are in purgatory have hope; for, although they are certain of their salvation, it still remains true that they must ascend through difficulties to their reward. Hence, in the Mass the Church prays for the departed "who sleep the sleep of peace"—that is, who are secure about their salvation. The Fathers in limbo also had hope before their introduction into heaven: "All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off and saluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on the earth. . . . They desire a better, that is to say a heavenly country" (Heb., xi. 13, 16).

1039. As to those who have not yet passed from this mortal life, some have hope, others have it not.

(a) Those who have no hope are unbelievers and those believers who have rejected hope. Unbelievers have no theological hope, since faith is "the substance (*i.e.*, basis) of things to be hoped for" (Heb., xi. 1). Hence, even though one accepts the Article of the Creed, "I look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come," one's hope is not real, if one culpably rejects some other Article; for then one expects the end without the necessary means (Heb. xi. 6). Believers who de-

spair of salvation, or who do not look to God for it, have not the virtue of hope; for, just as faith is lost if its object or motive is not accepted, so also hope perishes if its object is not expected or its motive is not relied on.

(b) Those who have hope are all believers not guilty of a sin contrary to hope. Sinners cannot expect to be saved if they continue in sin, but they can expect through the grace of God to be freed from sin and to merit eternal life; indeed, they are bound to believe that God wishes their salvation and to hope for it.

1040. The certainty of hope does not exclude the uncertainty of fear; on the contrary, man must both hope and fear, as regards his salvation.

(a) If a person looks to *the motives of hope* (*i.e.*, God's power and mercy), he has the assurance of faith that God can and will help him to attain salvation; and thus there arises in him a firm and unshaken hope: "I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him, against that day" (II Tim., i. 12; *cfr.* Heb., vi. 18; Ps. xxiv. 2; Ps. xxx. 2; Rom., xiv. 4)

(b) But, if a person looks to *his own frailty* and remembers that others have hoped and yet have been lost, he is not certain that he will coöperate with God and be saved, and hence he must fear (Eccles., ix. 1 sqq.; I Cor., iv. 4, ix. 27). The Council of Trent declares that no one can promise himself with absolute certainty that he will persevere (Sess. VI, Cap. 13). Therefore, it is written: "He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall" (I Cor., x. 12); "With fear and trembling, work out your salvation" (Phil., ii. 12).

1041. **The Gift of Fear of the Lord.**—The Gift of the Holy Ghost that perfects the virtue of hope is Fear of the Lord (see 159 sqq.); for (a) hope is the root from which the Gift of Fear is derived, since hope joins the affections to God, and fear acts upon the soul that is thus tending towards its beatitude—we fear to lose what we hope for; (b) fear assists hope, since it makes us dread, not the loss of beatitude or of divine help, but the lack of coöperation on our own part with the assistance given by God.

1042. Not every kind of fear pertains to the Gift called Fear of the Lord. In the first place, we must distinguish between physical and moral fear. (a) Fear, physically considered, is the emotion treated above (see 41 sqq., 120), which manifests itself in aversion, bashfulness, shame, dismay, alarm, horror, etc. This kind of fear, like the other passions (see 121), is morally indifferent in itself. (b) Fear, morally considered, is a dread of imminent evil as leading one to God or away from Him. In this sense fear is now discussed.

1043. The object of fear is always some evil, for the good does not repel, but attracts. The motive of fear, however, is something good; for one dreads evil on account of some good one wishes to obtain or retain. By reason of the motive, then, fear may be divided into two moral species, namely, fear of the world and fear of God.

(a) Fear of the world is that which dreads creatures more than God, because it sets more store by the things of time than by those of eternity. Thus, St. Peter's denial of Christ was prompted by fear of the world. When the object of this fear is loss of the esteem of men, it is called *human respect*.

(b) Fear of God is that which dreads the Creator more than creatures, because it prizes Him above all. Thus, St. Peter's death for Christ proceeded from his fear of God.

1044. Fear of the world is always sinful, because it makes one offend, or be willing to offend, God for the sake of escaping some temporal evil. It is forbidden by our Lord: "Fear ye not them that kill the body and are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear Him that can destroy both body and soul in hell" (Matt., x. 28). Elias (or Eliseus) is praised because of his freedom from fear of the world: "In his days he feared not the prince" (Eccles., xlviii. 13). We should note, however, the distinction between habitual fear, on the one hand, and actual or virtual fear, on the other hand.

(a) *Habitual* worldly fear is a state, not an act—that is, the conditions of those who are in mortal sin, and have therefore preferred self to God as the supreme end of life. It is a matter

of faith that not all the acts of sinners or unbelievers are bad, for they are able to seek certain particular or natural goods.

(b) *Actual* fear of the world is a deliberate choice of sin out of fear of some temporal evil; *virtual* fear is a deliberate act proceeding from such a choice though without advertence to the choice or fear. In both these kinds of fear there is sin, for actual fear commands evil, virtual fear executes it. Examples: Semp-ronius internally resolves to be guided by his fear of imprisonment rather than by the law of God against perjury (actual fear). He then proceeds to perjure himself, adverting to what he says, but not thinking about his previous fear (virtual fear).

1045. The species of sin to which worldly fear belongs are as follows:

(a) The *theological* species of this sin depends on the disposition of the person. He sins mortally, if on account of fear he is ready to offend God seriously; he sins venially, if on account of fear he is prepared to commit only a venial sin. Examples: Titus, in order to escape imprisonment or exile, swears falsely. Balbus, having been absent from his office without leave, tells a little lie to escape reproof for this misdemeanor. Titus' fear is a grave sin, that of Balbus a venial sin.

(b) The *moral* species of worldly fear is, as a rule, the same as the species of the sin to which it leads, so that but one sin is committed and need be confessed. The reason is that generally the object of fear is something that deserves to be dreaded, and that the aversion from it is not wrong except in so far as it is carried to the extreme of using sin as a means of escape. Example: Caius is wrongly suspected of theft. To free his reputation he swears falsely about a circumstance that appears incriminating. His fear of losing his good name is not a sin in itself, and hence he is guilty of the one sin of perjury.

1046. There are exceptional cases when fear is a distinct sin from the sin to which it leads.

(a) If the fear of losing some temporal good is so great that one is prepared to commit any sin to escape the loss, and if later by reason of this fear one swears falsely, two sins are committed

—one against charity, because a temporal good was preferred to God, and the other against religion, because God was called on to witness to falsehood.

(b) If the fear is that one will not be able to commit one kind of sin, and this induces one to commit another kind of sin, evidently two sins are committed. Example: Balbus wishes to calumniate Caius, but is not able to do so himself. Fearing that Caius will escape his vengeance, he steals money and offers it to Sempronius as an inducement to calumniate Caius. The two sins, calumny and theft, are committed.

1047. Not every fear of man or of temporal evil falls under worldly and sinful fear. (a) To fear or reverence man in those things in which he represents the authority of God is a duty: "Render to all men their dues . . . fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor" (Rom., xiii. 7). (b) To fear temporal evils (such as loss of life, reputation, liberty, property) in a moderate and reasonable manner, is good. Hence, our Lord bids us pray for deliverance from evil.

1048. Fear of God is of two specifically distinct kinds, according as the object one dreads is offense of God or punishments from God. (a) *Servile* fear, that of a servant with regard to his master, dreads sin because of the punishment it entails; (b) *filial* fear, that of a son with regard to his father, dreads sin because of the offense to God that is contained in it.

1049. Servile fear may be considered either as to its substance or as to its accidents. (a) The substance or essence of servile fear is derived from its object (see 71), that is, from the evil of penalty which it entails; (b) the accidents of servile fear are its circumstances (see 72), such as the state of the person who has the fear, the manner in which he fears, etc.

1050. Servile fear *in itself* is good and supernatural.

(a) That servile fear is good, is a dogma of faith defined in the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, Can. 8; Sess. XXIV, Can. 5). Our Lord recommends this fear when he says: "I will show you whom ye shall fear. Fear ye Him who after He hath killed hath power to cast into hell. Yea, I say to you, fear Him"

(Luke, xii. 5). The object of this fear is penalty, which is an evil, and consequently something that ought to be dreaded.

(b) That servile fear is supernatural, follows from the fact that its acts are supernatural. It comes from the Holy Ghost that man may prepare himself for grace; it is "the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. cx. 10), because through it the wisdom of faith first becomes effective as a rule of action, causing man to depart from sin on account of the justice of God which it makes known to him. Servile fear is thus far superior to that natural fear of pain and suffering which all have.

1051. Though servile fear is good, useful and praiseworthy, it is not perfect. (a) It is inferior to filial fear; for, while servile fear looks upon God as a powerful master who cannot be offended with impunity, filial fear regards Him as a loving Father whom one does not wish to offend. Hence, the Old Law, given amid the thunder of Sinai and with many threats against transgressions, is less perfect than the New Law, which relies more on love than on fear (Rom., viii. 15; Heb., xii. 18-25; Gal., iv. 22 sqq.). (b) Servile fear, although it is regarded by some theologians as an infused habit, is not a Gift of the Holy Ghost, since it may coexist with mortal sin. It seems that it is not even a virtue, since it turns man away, not from moral, but from physical evil; but a number of authorities consider it as a secondary act of the virtue of hope.

1052. Servile fear, *as to its circumstances*, may be evil. (a) The circumstance of the state of the person who has servile fear is good, when the person is a friend of God; it is evil, when that person is an enemy of God. (b) The circumstance of the manner in which servile fear is elicited is good, if punishment is not feared as the greatest evil; it is bad, if punishment is feared as the greatest evil, for then one makes self the principal end of life, and would be disposed to sin without restraint, were there no punishment.

1053. The effect of evil circumstances on servile fear itself is as follows:

(a) Servile fear is not rendered evil because of the evil state of the person who fears. Just as a person who is habitually fool-

ish may actually say or do something wise, so a person who is habitually wicked may perform virtuous acts. Mortal sin is no more a defect of servile fear in a sinner than it is a defect of faith or hope in one who has faith or hope without works; neither faith nor hope nor fear is to be blamed for the state of mortal sin, but the person who has those gifts of God is at fault. True, the sinner, by reason of his lack of love of God, does not put fear of sin above fear of punishment. But from this it does not follow that he puts fear of punishment above fear of sin, for he may fear punishment absolutely (*i.e.*, without making any comparison between the evil of sin and the evil of punishment). The fear which makes no comparisons is good, or else we must say that only filial fear avails, which, as said above, is not true.

(b) Servile fear is rendered evil as to the manner in which it is performed, when one compares sin and punishment, dislikes only the latter, and avoids sin only to escape punishment. This kind of fear is *slavish*, for it makes one do something good unwillingly, like a slave forced to labor against his wishes, whereas God is pleased only with service that comes from a willing spirit (I Par., xxviii. 9).

1054. Hence, we must distinguish the following cases of servile fear:

(a) Fear of punishment is purely servile when it makes a person avoid sin, but does not make him put away his love of sin.

(b) Fear of punishment is not purely servile, when it causes a sinner not only to cease from sin, but to give up his affection for sin; this fear is distinct from charity, but prepares for it: "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin" (Ecclus., i. 27).

(c) Still less is the fear of punishment purely servile, when it leads a just man, who already detests sin as an offense against God, to detest it as involving punishment from God. This fear exists along with charity, for the love of God and the right love of self are not exclusive. But, as charity increases, servile fear must decrease; the more a person loves God, the less is he concerned about his own good, the more confidently does he hope in God, and hence the less does he fear penalty.

1055. There are two degrees of filial fear to be distinguished:

(a) *Initial* fear is that of beginners in charity. On account of past sins, they fear punishments from God; on account of their present love of God, they fear they may be again separated from Him. The second fear is stronger with them, and it commands that the first fear be aroused to hold the will more firmly against whatever might separate from love. Of this fear it is said: "The fear of God is the *beginning* of His love" (Ecclus., xxv. 16).

(b) *Perfected* fear is that of those who are established in charity. The more the love of God sways the heart, the more is every other love, that of self included, subjugated to the love of God, and the less is one troubled by the thoughts of evils that may befall self. Even in this present life some souls are so strong in the love of God that all servile fear disappears: "I am sure that neither death nor life . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God" (Rom., viii. 38, 39); "Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain, and he that feareth is not perfected in charity" (I John, iv. 18).

1056. The perfected fear of God has two acts:

(a) In the present life, where it is possible that one may offend God and lose His friendship, one dreads the commission of offense and the loss of friendship. This fear should be always with us: "Keep His fear and grow old therein" (Ecclus., ii. 6). With the growth of charity there is a corresponding growth in the fear of separation from God, because the more ardently God is loved, the more one realizes the greatness of the loss sustained through sin.

(b) In eternal life, where sin and separation from God are impossible, the blessed do not fear these evils: "He that shall hear Me, shall rest without terror, and shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils" (Prov., i. 33). But in the presence of the Divine Majesty the Angels and Saints are filled with awe and reverence: "I saw them that had overcome the beast, singing: Who shall not fear Thee, O Lord, and magnify Thy name?" (Apoc., xv. 3, 4); "The pillars of heaven tremble and dread at His beck" (Job, xxvi. 11); "Through whom (Christ) the Angels

praise Thy majesty, the Dominations worship it, the Powers are in awe" (Preface of the Mass). This holy fear is unending, for the infinite distance between God and His creatures, His incomprehensibility to them, will never cease: "The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring forever and ever" (Ps. xviii. 10).

1057. The filial fear of God is identical with the Gift of Fear of the Lord, spoken of in Scripture: "He shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord" (Is., xi. 3). The function of the Gifts is to make the soul docile to the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, and to supplement or serve the habits of virtue, and both these benefits are conferred by filial fear.

(a) This fear makes the soul ready to follow impulses prompted by God, for through it we subject ourselves to God as our Father, revering His wondrous majesty and fearing to stray from Him. Indeed, this is the first of the Gifts, for the realization of one's nothingness before God is the starting-point of promptitude in receiving His teaching and guidance.

(b) Filial fear is a principle from which proceed acts of all the moral virtues, inasmuch as the reverence for God's surpassing majesty and respect for His almighty power and justice incline one to lay aside pride, intemperance, and every vice, and exercise good works that are pleasing to Him: "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, and the branches thereof are long-lived" (Ecclus., i. 27).

(c) Filial fear is especially and primarily related to the virtue of hope, for these two complement each other, as do the emotions of hope and fear. Hope aspires to conquer the heights of heaven, and feels that God is on its side; fear reminds one of the greatness of God and of the dangers of over-confidence. Each then is necessary to balance the other: "The Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear Him, and in them that hope in His mercy" (Ps. cxlvi. 11).

1058. To the Gift of Fear correspond the first Beatitude and the fruits of modesty, continency and chastity. (a) Filial fear makes one realize that all but God is as nothing, and hence that true greatness must be sought, not in the self-esteem of pride, nor in the external pomp of riches and honors, but in God alone;

"Some trust in chariots, and some in horses; but we will call upon the name of the Lord our God" (Ps. xix. 8). This is the disposition of soul to which is promised the first Beatitude: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" (Matt., v. 3). To the first of the Gifts, in the order of preparation, corresponds the first of the Beatitudes.

(b) Filial fear makes one dread the thought of separation from God, and hence it leads one to use temporal things with moderation, or to abstain from them entirely. To it, then, pertain the Fruits of the Spirit, which St. Paul names "modesty, continency, chastity" (Gal., v. 23).

1059. **The Sins Against Hope.**—There are two sins contrary to hope: (a) despair, which is the opposite of hope by defect; (b) presumption, which is the opposite of hope by excess.

1060. Since hope has many elements of which it is composed, despair—or the falling short of hope—may happen in various ways. (a) Hope is a turning of the soul towards beatitude, and so the omission of the act of hope may be called despair (negative despair). (b) Hope regards beatitude as its good, and so aversion from divine things may be called despair (despair improperly so-called). (c) Hope pursues a good that is difficult of attainment, and so he who is dejected by the difficulty is said to despair. (d) Hope firmly believes that its goal may be reached, and hence one who doubts the possibility of success in the quest of heaven is in despair. (e) Hope has the expectation of one day entering into eternal life, and hence he is guilty of despair who admits that salvation will be secured by others, but denies that he himself should expect it.

1061. **Definition of Despair.**—Leaving out of consideration negative despair and despair improperly so-called, the sin we are now considering may be defined as follows: "Despair is an act of the will by which one turns away from the beatitude one desires, not under the aspect in which it appears as good, but because one apprehends it as impossible, or too difficult, or never to be realized, and under this aspect as evil."

(a) Despair is an "act of the will," and as such it differs from the intellectual sin of unbelief. The Novatians, who rejected



the forgiveness of sins, and a heretic who denies the future life are guilty by these acts of sin against faith, though of course one who disbelieves must also despair (see 1029, 751).

(b) Despair is a positive "turning away from beatitude." It differs, therefore, from the mere omission of the act of hope or from an act of feeble hope, as well as from the sins against the moral virtues, which consist primarily in a turning towards some created good.

(c) Despair turns away "from God," and thus it differs from despondency about other things.

(d) Despair turns away from God "apprehended as good and desired as the beatitude of man," for no one is said to despair of what he considers evil or undesirable. Hence, despair differs from aversions and fears, such as hatred of God (which regards Him as evil) or fear of God (which thinks of Him, not as a rewarder, but as the author of chastisement).

(e) Despair, however, does not reject God, because He is good and desirable, but because He is apprehended as a "beatitude that is impossible," or too difficult for one, or as a good that one will never attain to. For a person does not turn away from that which he regards as the object of his happiness, unless he considers that there is some inconvenience in seeking after it.

1062. Is despondency about things other than God a sin? (a) It is the sin of pusillanimity, when it makes a person abandon hope of something which he is capable of attaining and which he should aim at, as when students, on account of the labor required, give up hope of learning a certain subject which they have been assigned. This sin will be treated in the section on Fortitude. (b) It is no sin, if a person gives up the expectation of something about which he has no reason to hope, or which he is not obliged to hope for. Examples: Caius gives up the hope of getting an education, because he lacks money to pay the expenses. Balbus ceases to pray for health, because he thinks it is not God's will to grant that request. Titus abandons the expectation of a long life, and even at times wishes for death.

1063. To wish for death may include despair of salvation or other sin.

(a) If this wish means that one has no desire for any kind of existence (as when one desires extinction), manifestly eternal life is not looked for, and hence there is despair. It should be noted, however, that such expressions as, "Would that I had never been born!" "Would that I were out of existence!" often signify nothing more than weariness of life on earth, or disgust with conditions.

(b) If the wish is not for annihilation, but only that God send death, it is not a sin of despair; but if the wish is inordinate, some other species of sin is committed—for example, if the person wishing to die is not resigned or submissive to God's will in the matter, he is guilty of rebellion against Providence, and his sin is grave, if there is sufficient reflection and consent.

(c) If the wish is merely for death and is not inordinate, it may be an act of virtue, as when, out of a longing for heaven, one deliberately desires to be taken from this world, if this be pleasing to God. Thus, St. Paul said that he desired "to be dissolved and to be with Christ" (Philip., i. 23).

1064. Certain acts of fear or sadness must not be mistaken for despair: (a) acts that are praiseworthy, like servile and filial fear spoken of above (see 1048 sqq.), grief over sin, etc.; (b) acts that are a trial from God, such as spiritual desolations in holy persons, scruples about forgiveness of sins, anxieties about predestination, perseverance, or the Judgment; (c) acts that are sinful, such as worldly fear, fear of God that is purely servile, timidity (i.e., an excessive dread of death or other evils). Those who fear that, on account of their frailty, they may not acquire a good habit or overcome an evil one, are guilty of pusillanimity. Those who, on account of sadness, neglect prayer are guilty of spiritual sloth.

1065. There are two species of despair, namely, the despair of unbelief and the despair that is found even in those that have faith.

(a) The despair of unbelief arises from a judgment contrary to faith, as when one holds as general principles that salvation is impossible, that God is not merciful to sinners, that all sins or certain sins cannot be forgiven. Thus, St. Paul designates the

pagans who do not accept the Final Resurrection as those "who have no hope" (I Thess., iv. 12).

(b) The despair of believers arises from a judgment formed by them which is not directly opposed to faith, but which is erroneous, and is induced by some wicked habit or passion. Example: Titus lives a very disorderly life, and so thinks that he is predestined to hell, or that he is too weak to repent and persevere. Since his predestination and perseverance are not matters of faith, he is not guilty of unbelief by his judgment about them, but the judgment itself is wrong, and one which he has no right to form or act on.

1066. Signs which indicate that a penitent suffering depression has not been guilty of despair are: (a) if he retains the faith and has not abandoned the usual practices of religion and piety; (b) if he retains the faith, but has given up some of its practices through discouragement or weakness, but intends to repent. His sin is sloth or cowardice or attachment to some vice.

1067. Hence, the erroneous judgment that precedes despair is similar to that which precedes every act of sin, namely, it is always practically erroneous, though not always speculatively so.

(a) Judgment is speculatively erroneous with regard to duty, when one decides that in general something is lawful which is unlawful; or vice versa, as when one thinks that lying is pleasing to God. It is clear that this kind of error need not precede sin, or else all sinners would err against the faith.

(b) Judgment is practically erroneous about duty, when a person decides that here and now he should do something which in fact he should not do, as when he knows well that lying is displeasing to God, and yet makes up his mind that, all things considered, he ought to tell a lie. It is clear that this kind of error precedes every sin, for no one wills something unless his judgment has first told him that he ought to will it. The sinner first judges in a particular case that he should prefer the good of pleasure or of utility to the good of virtue, or he first neglects to consider the right manner in which he should act: "They err that work evil" (Prov., xiv. 22).

1068. The Malice of Despair.—(a) Despair is a sin, for Holy Scripture declares woe to the fainthearted, who trust not God and lose patience (Eclus., ii. 15, 16), and it holds up the despair of Cain and Judas for reprehension. The malice of despair appears in this, that it is based on a perverse judgment that one ought not to labor for salvation in confident expectation, despite God's promise and command to the contrary. (b) It is a mortal sin according to its nature, for it destroys the theological virtue of hope, turns man away from God his Last End, and leads to irreparable loss.

1069. In the following cases despair is not a mortal sin, nor at times even a venial sin. (a) When there is not sufficient reflection, despair is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who are ignorant of the sinfulness of despair, those who on account of great discouragement or fear do not fully advert to their despair of amendment, do not sin gravely. Despair is often a result of insanity. (b) When there is not full consent of the will, despair is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who, on account of a melancholy disposition, inclination to pessimism, past sins, etc., are tempted to give up the hope of salvation, are not guilty of sin, provided they fight against these suggestions of the mind or imagination.

1070. The gravity of despair as compared with other sins is as follows:

(a) Despair is a greater sin than offenses against the moral virtues, for the chief inclination of despair is aversion from God, whereas the chief inclination of the latter kind of sins is conversion towards creatures. Thus, a person who drinks excessively does not primarily intend offense against God, but his own enjoyment or escape from certain worries.

(b) Despair *in itself* is less serious than the sins of unbelief and hatred of God; for, while despair is opposed to God as He is our good, the other two sins are opposed to God's own truth and goodness.

(c) Despair is more serious than the sins of unbelief and hatred of God *with reference to the danger* it contains for the

sinner; for it paralyzes effort and resists remedies: "Why is my sorrow become perpetual and my wound desperate, so as to refuse to be healed?" (Jer., xv. 18); "If thou lose hope, being weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished" (Prov., xxiv. 10). Despair is, therefore, a sin against the Holy Ghost, a sort of attempt at spiritual suicide. But (see 900) it is not unpardonable and may be overcome by divine grace.

1071. It is important to know the causes of despair, for this knowledge enables us to distinguish it from the mystical state known as "the dark night of the soul," and to prescribe suitable remedies. Despair comes from one's own fault, whereas mystical purgation from God is a preparation for a higher state of divine union. The causes of despair can be reduced to two, luxury and sloth.

(a) The secondary characteristic of a hopeful pursuit of heaven is *courage*, the adventurous spirit which foregoes ease and comfort for the sake of higher things, despising the danger and difficulty. Hence, the vice of lust, since it makes one love bodily delights and disregard or underestimate those that are spiritual, is a cause of despair, as well as of other sins opposed to the spiritual life (Gal., v. 17).

(b) The chief and most distinctive characteristic of hope is its *cheerful confidence* of success. Hence, the vice of sloth, since it is sadness weighing down the soul and making it unwilling to think rightly or to exert itself, is the principal cause of despair (Prov., xvii. 22).

1072. The apparent despair that is a trial to holy persons can be distinguished, therefore, from the sin of despair, especially by two signs: (a) though they are spiritually desolate and find no joy in religious practices, these persons do not turn to unlawful delights for consolation, but retain their dislike for lower pleasures; (b) though overcome with dismay at the thought of their own imperfection and of God's holiness, they do not so lose heart as to give over their exercises of piety (cf. St. John of the Cross, *The Dark Night*, Bk. I, c. 9 ff.).

1073. Spiritual writers make the following recommendations for cases of spiritual desolation: (a) the afflicted persons should

understand that the deprivation of former sensible devotion is a sign of God's love and has been experienced by the Saints, and should, therefore, possess their souls in peace, leaving to God the time and manner of His heavenly visitation; (b) they should not burden themselves with new and heavier mortifications, lest they be overcome by too great sorrow, but should go on with their accustomed good works, and realize that, though bitter to them, these works are now all the more pleasing to God (*Ibid.*, c. 10).

1074. **Some Remedies for the Sin of Despair.**—(a) If the cause is lust, one should learn that spiritual joys are nobler and more enduring than the joys of the flesh, and should take the means to sacrifice the lower in favor of the higher.

(b) If the cause of despair is spiritual sloth, one should meditate on the greatness of God's power, mercy and love, and should avoid whatever fosters undue sadness, "lest he be swallowed up with over-much sorrow" (II Cor., ii. 7). Thus, those who are tormented by the thoughts of past sins or future temptations must subject their scruples to direction, and remember the mercy shown to the good thief, to Magdalene, and other penitents; those who have lost courage because they read spiritual books of a rigorous or terrifying nature, or have been advised to attempt that for which they were unsuited, should seek more prudent instruction and counsel; those who are naturally nervous or melancholy, should employ such therapeutical or preventive measures as are useful or necessary. All should follow the direction of St. Peter to labor the more, that by good works they may make sure their calling and election (II Pet., i. 10).

1075. **Presumption** is the name given to certain acts of the intellect. (a) Sometimes it signifies an arrogant self-esteem, as when an ignorant person thinks he is able to dispute with a learned scholar. (b) Sometimes it is a judgment about the affairs of others made rashly or out of fear: "A troubled conscience always presumeth grievous things" (Wis., xvii. 10). (c) Sometimes it is a conclusion based on probable evidence, and which by jurists is called violent, strong, or weak presumption according to the evidence (see 658).

1076. Presumption is also a name given to various acts of the will. (a) It is used, in a good sense, to signify an excellent confidence or hope, which seems rash according to human standards, but is really well founded, since it rests on the immensity of the divine goodness. Thus, Judith prayed: "O God of the heavens, Creator of the waters and Lord of the whole creation, hear me a poor wretch, making supplication to Thee, and *presuming* on Thy mercy" (Jud., ix. 17). Thus, too, Abraham hoped against hope (Rom., iv. 18). (b) Generally, however, the word "presumption" is applied to acts of the will in a bad sense, and indicates the purpose to do what exceeds one's powers.

1077. Here we are concerned only with presumption as it is an act of the will choosing to do what exceeds one's power. "Power" may be understood in three ways, and thus there are three kinds of sins all bearing the name of presumption.

(a) If a person chooses to overstep his moral power (*i.e.*, his right of action), he is guilty of the *general* sin of presumption, which is not a special category of sin, but a circumstance common to any kind of sin in which one acts with full knowledge, and without subjection to any fear or coercion. Hence, in Canon Law it is said in various places: "If anyone shall presume to transgress" (*i.e.*, if anyone shall coldbloodedly transgress).

(b) If a person wishes to accomplish by his own efforts something so great and difficult that it surpasses his physical powers, he is guilty of the special sin of presumption that is opposed to the moral virtue of magnanimity or greatness of soul, which attempts great things for which it is suited. Thus, he is presumptuous who undertakes a profession, when he has no sufficient knowledge of its duties (*cf.* Luke, xiv. 28 sqq.). This may be called the *moral* sin of presumption.

(c) If one wishes to obtain through divine aid something that surpasses even the divine power to confer, one is guilty of the special sin of presumption that is opposed to the theological virtue of hope, which expects from God only such things as are worthy of God and as God has promised. Thus, he who looks forward to a free admission into eternal bliss, without

repentance or obedience, does injury both to the character of God and to the virtue of hope. It is this special sin of presumption that we are now considering. It may be called the *theological* sin of presumption.

1078. **Definition of Presumption.**—The theological sin of presumption may be defined as follows: "An act of the will by which one rashly expects to obtain eternal happiness or the means thereto." (a) It is an act of the will, and hence is distinct from intellectual sins, such as disbelief in the justice of God or the necessity of repentance. (b) It is an act of pleasing expectation, and so differs generically from fear, which is an act of dreadful expectation. (c) It is a rash expectation, and so is specifically opposed to hope, which is well-founded expectation.

1079. The objects of presumption are material and formal.

(a) The *material* object is eternal happiness and the means thereto, such as forgiveness of sin, observance of the Commandments, etc. This object by extension would include also such extraordinary supernatural gifts as the hypostatic union, equality in glory with the Mother of God, etc.; for it would be rash to expect against His will what God has made unique privileges.

(b) The *formal* object, or motive, of presumption is divine mercy not joined with justice, or divine power not regulated by wisdom, as when one hopes for heaven because one reasons that God is too merciful to be a just judge of sinners. The motive by extension would include also the unaided power of human nature relied on as equal to the task of working out salvation, as when a man feels so confident of his own virtue and his security against temptation that he thinks he can dispense with prayer and all appointed means of grace and yet save his soul. Similarly, a person is presumptuous if he feels that it is absolutely impossible for him to be lost, because he has received Baptism or other Sacraments.

1080. Presumption is rash, therefore, for the following reasons: (a) because it leads one to expect what is impossible according to the absolute or ordinary power of God (*e.g.*, to share in some divine attribute, to sit at the right hand of Christ in glory), or (b) because it makes one expect to obtain supernatural

goods in ways other than those ordained by God (*e.g.*, to obtain forgiveness without repentance, to obtain glory without merits or grace).

1081. The nature of presumption as compared with temptation of God and blasphemous hope is as follows: (a) they are alike, inasmuch as all three wrongly expect something from God; (b) they differ, for presumption looks towards salvation and one's own happiness, whereas temptation of God seeks rashly some sign from God as a proof that He is wise, good, powerful, etc., or that the person is innocent, holy, etc., and blasphemous hope expects that God will help one in working revenge or committing other sin.

1082. **The Malice of Presumption.**—(a) It is a sin, because it is an act of the will agreeable to false intellectual judgments, namely, that God will pardon the impenitent or grant eternal life to those who have not labored for it. (b) It is a mortal sin, since it does grave injury to the divine attributes. We cannot hope too much in God, but we can expect what a perfect God cannot grant; in this latter respect—that is, in its contempt of God's majesty and justice—consists the offense of presumption. (c) It is a sin against the Holy Ghost, because it makes one despise the grace of God, repentance, etc., as if they were not necessary.

1083. The gravity of presumption as compared with other sins, is as follows:

(a) It is graver than sins against the moral virtues, because it is directly against God. Thus, theological presumption, being injurious to the power of God, is a more serious offense than moral presumption, which is an exaggeration of the power of man.

(b) It is less grave than despair, for, while presumption is a disregard of God's vindictive justice, despair is a disregard of His mercy, and God's vindictive justice is due to the sins of man, His mercy to His own goodness.

(c) Presumption is less grave, therefore, than unbelief and hatred of God, which, as said above, are more wicked than despair (see 1070).

1084. **Presumption and Unbelief.**—(a) Presumption is joined with unbelief whenever it proceeds from a speculatively false judgment about matters of faith. Persons, however, who are in error (*e.g.*, Pelagians, Lutherans, Calvinists, etc.), may be in good faith, and hence guiltless of the formal sin of presumption. Examples: Caius expects to win heaven by his own unaided efforts (Pelagian presumption). Balbus expects to be equal in glory to the greatest Saints, and to be saved by the merits of Christ without repentance or observance of the Commandments (Lutheran presumption). Titus expects to be saved on the strength of wearing scapulars, practising certain devotions, or giving alms, while he wholly disregards church duties and important Commandments (Pharisaic presumption). Sempronius thinks that all members of his sect are predestined, and hence concerns himself little about the Commandments, being persuaded that all must end well with the elect (Calvinistic presumption).

(b) Presumption is committed without unbelief, when it proceeds from a practical judgment that one should act as if salvation were obtainable without merits or repentance, or as if natural efforts were alone sufficient, although speculatively one does not accept such errors (see 1067). The same is true when presumption springs from a failure to consider the divine justice or the established means of obtaining salvation.

1085. **Presumption and Loss of the Virtue of Hope.**—(a) Presumption properly so-called (*i.e.*, hope of the impossible) takes away the virtue of hope, for it removes the motive and reasonableness of the virtue; now, the essence of true hope is a reasonable expectation, just as the essence of faith is assent to divine authority. Hence, he who expects future blessedness unreasonably (*i.e.*, through his own efforts alone or through exaggerated mercy exercised by God), is not hopeful, but presumptuous.

(b) Presumption improperly so-called (*i.e.*, hope of the uncertain) does not take away the virtue of hope, since it does not remove the motive of hope. Thus, one who commits sin, trusting to go to confession and to make restitution after he has

enjoyed the benefits of wrongdoing, is presumptuous in the sense that he puts himself in a state of sin, for it is uncertain whether the time to repent will be granted him. However, he is relying on the mercy of God, which never abandons man during life, and not on his own efforts, or on pardon given freely. He is guilty of a want of charity towards self, and of injustice to his neighbor, rather than of a want of hope.

1086. Presumption properly so-called is a sin rarely committed by Catholics. For (a) the presumption of unbelief is excluded by their faith in the justice of God and in the necessity of repentance and good works; (b) the presumption that is not the offspring of erroneous doctrines is also unusual, because even those who go on sinning with the expectation of being saved in the end, generally have the purpose of repenting at some future date.

1087. Is a sin worse because committed with the hope that later it will be pardoned? (a) If, at the moment of sin, a person has the intention to continue in sin, though he hopes for pardon, he is guilty of presumption, and his sin is made worse. (b) If he has the intention of sinning, but hopes for pardon, and is resolved to repent later on as a means to pardon, he is not guilty of presumption. The intention not to continue in sin diminishes the sin, for it shows that one is not so strongly attached to evil.

1088. The intention to sin now and repent later varies in malice according to circumstances.

(a) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is concomitant as regards the sin now committed—that is, if one sins with the hope, but not because of the hope of pardon—one is less guilty. Example: Titus while on a tour indulges in much drunkenness, because he has the opportunity and is not known; but he intends to repent on his return home.

(b) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is antecedent as regards the sin—that is, if one sins because of the hope of pardon—one is more guilty. Example: Balbus stays away from Mass most Sundays, because he reasons with himself that God is kind and it will be easy to obtain pardon. Caius, when urged

to repent, always replies that it will be a simple matter to turn over a new leaf at the hour of death. Sempronius goes on multiplying sins from day to day, because he argues that it is just as easy to be pardoned late as early, just as easy to repent of a hundred sins as of ten.

1089. In the following cases presumption is not a grave sin: (a) no mortal sin is committed, if there is not sufficient reflection; for example, a person who is invincibly ignorant of the seriousness of presumption, or who on account of immaturity has exaggerated ideas of his own strength, does not sin gravely if he presumes on God's mercy or his own power; (b) no mortal sin is committed, if there is not full consent of the will. For example, Titus is a self-made man, and hence is inclined at times to feel that he can work out even his salvation without any assistance, but he rids his mind of this presumptuous thought as soon as he takes notice of it.

1090. Are there cases in which presumption and despair are transformed into venial sin, not on account of the imperfect knowledge or consent of the subject, but on account of the slightness of the matter involved? (a) If there is question of presumption and despair properly so-called, they are never venial on account of the lightness of the matter, for the matter, man's eternal destiny, must always be an affair of the utmost moment. (b) If there is question of presumption and despair in a wider sense, these sins may be venial on account of smallness of matter; for they may be understood with reference to things other than salvation. Examples: Titus despairs of his success in overcoming a habit of arriving late for his meals or of talking too much. Balbus imprudently trusts to his own efforts to get up promptly in the morning, or to fight against some slight distraction in prayer.

1091. The causes of presumption are as follows: (a) the presumption which depends too much on one's own powers arises from vainglory, for, the more one desires glory, the more is one inclined to attempt things that are above one, especially such as are new and will attract applause; (b) the presumption that depends rashly on divine assistance seems to result from

pride, for a person who desires and expects pardon without repentance, or heaven without merits, must have a very exaggerated opinion of his own importance.

**1092. The Commandments of Hope and of Fear.**—Since hope is a necessary preparation for justification, and since man should tend towards the supernatural beatitude prepared for him by God, we cannot be surprised that Scripture in many places inculcates the duty of hope.

(a) In the first legislation, given in the Decalogue, neither faith nor hope are enjoined by distinct Commandments, for, unless man already believed and hoped in God, it would be useless to give him commandments from God. Hence, in the Decalogue faith and hope are presupposed, faith being enjoined only in so far as it is taught, as when the law begins with the words: "I am the Lord thy God" (Exod., xx. 2), and hope being prescribed only in so far as promises are added to the precepts, as in the First and Fourth Commandments.

(b) In the later laws there are given distinct commandments about hope, in order to remind man that he must observe not only the law, but also that which the law presupposes. Thus, we read: "Hope in Him, all ye congregation of people" (Ps. lxi. 9); "Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in the living God" (I Tim., vi. 17)).

**1093.** Since acts of hope are obligatory for all adults in this life, the Quietists were in error when they defended disinterested love and absolute holy indifference (*Denzinger*, 1221 ff., 1327-1349). (a) Hence, man can at times make acts of pure love of God, in which self is not thought about, or even acts of renunciation of beatitude on condition that that were possible and necessary; but the habitual state of pure love, in which self-interest is entirely lost sight of, cannot be admitted (Philip, iii. 14; II Tim., iv. 8). (b) Indifference to the happenings of life, sin excluded, is good; but it is not lawful to be indifferent about one's own salvation, or the means thereto. Indifference about salvation is not holy, but unholy.

**1094.** Is it lawful to desire to surrender beatitude for the

sake of another's spiritual good? (a) If there is question of beatitude itself, this is not lawful. The prayer of Moses that he be stricken from God's book (Exod., xxxiii. 31, 32), and of St. Paul that he suffer loss of Messianic benefits (Rom., ix. 3), were only velleities or hyperbolic expressions of their great love for their race. (b) If there is question, not of beatitude itself, but of something that refers to it (such as the time of receiving it, present certainty about its possession), one may be willing to sacrifice this good for the benefit of his neighbor. Thus, St. Martin of Tours was willing to have his entrance into heaven delayed for the sake of his flock (cfr. Philip., i. 22 sqq.), and St. Ignatius Loyola would have preferred to remain uncertain of salvation and labor for souls, rather than to be certain of salvation and die at once.

**1095.** At what times does the commandment of hope oblige?

(a) In its negative, or prohibitory aspect, this commandment obliges for all times and at all times (see 371). Hence, it is not lawful to despair, even when things are darkest, nor to presume, even when they are brightest. (b) In its affirmative, or preceptive aspect, this commandment obliges for all times, but not at all times. Hence, the law of hope remains always in force, but one is not obliged at every instant to make acts of hope.

**1096.** By reason of the virtue of hope itself (*i.e.*, on account of the response one should make to the promises of God concerning eternal life), an act of hope is obligatory on the following occasions:

(a) Such an act is obligatory at the beginning of the moral life, that is, at the time when one first realizes that one must choose between God and creatures as the object of one's happiness. This moment occurs for all when the age of reason is attained, and to it we may apply in this connection the words of Christ: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice" (Matt., vi. 33). This moment occurs for those who are in the state of sin as soon as they perceive the necessity of turning from creatures towards God: "Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and defer it not from day to day" (Ecclus., v. 8).

(b) During the course of the moral life, one is also bound to

renew the act of hope: "The grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men, instructing us that we should live soberly, and justly, and godly in this world, looking for the blessed hope" (Titus, ii. 11, 12); "Serving the Lord, rejoicing in hope" (Rom., xii. 11, 12); "He that plougheth, should plough in hope" (I Cor., ix. 10). Even those who are more perfect must have on "the helmet of hope" (I Thess., v. 8), for by hope all are saved (Rom., viii. 25).

(c) It seems that at the end of life one is especially bound to elicit an act of hope, as on that moment eternity depends (Heb., iii. vi). But, if one has received the Last Sacraments or is otherwise well prepared for death and undisturbed by temptations to despair, there is no manifest need of making an express act of hope (cfr. 930).

1097. How frequently should acts of hope be made during life? (a) About the theoretical question, there is the same diversity of opinion as with regard to the act of faith (see 933). (b) But, practically, there is agreement among theologians that the commandment is fulfilled by all those who make an act of hope when this is necessary to preserve the virtue on account of danger of presumption or despair, and who comply with the duties of a Christian life, such as attendance at Mass and the reception of the Sacraments.

1098. How should the act of hope be made? (a) The act is made *explicitly*, when one expresses one's confident expectation, the objects expected and the basis of the expectation, as when one prays according to the formulas of the Catechism or prayer books: "O my God, relying on Thy all-powerful assistance and merciful promises, I firmly hope to obtain pardon for my sins, obedience to Thy commandments, and life everlasting." This form of the act of hope is recommended, since it expresses the essential elements of the virtue. (b) The act of hope is made *implicitly*, when one offers petitions to God as one ought; for the confidence that accompanies every good prayer makes it an expression of hope of God and of hope in God. Thus, the words, "Thy Kingdom come," utter the soul's expectation of bliss and its reliance on God. The implicit act of hope satisfies the com-

mandment, and hence those who comply with the duty of prayer, comply also with the duty of hope.

1099. By reason of some virtue other than hope (cfr. 935), there also arises at times an obligation of making an act of hope. (a) If another virtue will be lost or endangered without the assistance of hope, one is bound to make an act of hope. Examples: Titus is so discouraged by the difficulties of his duties that he will not perform them, unless he stirs up his will by thinking of the reward. Balba, on account of aridity, finds prayer so hard that she will give it up, unless the motive of future blessedness is before her mind. (b) If another commandment presupposes an act of hope, one is bound to the act of hope, although it may be made virtually or implicitly, as being contained in another virtue. Example: Sempronius is in the state of sin, and therefore obliged to repentance. Since repentance presupposes hope of pardon as a means to salvation, Sempronius must not only grieve over his sins, but must also have confidence in the divine mercy.

1100. Do those persons sin against hope by omission who wish they could remain in the enjoyment of the present life forever?

(a) If those persons are so disposed that they would willingly forego heaven for earth, they are guilty of a neglect of the precept of hope (I Tim., vi. 17). Hope requires that God be the chief object of our desires, but these persons give the first place to creatures (see 1019, 1031).

(b) If such persons are not willing to relinquish heaven, and their wish to remain here forever merely denotes an over-fondness for life or its goods or an exceeding dread of death, hope is not excluded, but they are guilty, slightly or seriously according to the case, of inordinate love of creatures.

(c) If such persons mean by their wish only that they are very much attached to something of earth and wish to retain it as long as God will allow, there is no sin committed. Thus, man and wife happily mated or other friends sometimes express the wish that both might live forever, meaning only that the thought of any separation is unpleasant.



1101. So far we have spoken of the necessity of precept of the act of hope. But there is also a necessity of means, as was said above about faith (see 785, 918), as regards both the act and the habit of hope.

(a) The *act* of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all adults. The unjustified man cannot prepare himself for pardon unless he hopes in God's mercy; he cannot resolve on amendment of life unless he relies on the necessary divine help. The justified man must earn heaven by his works and must pray to God in his necessities—things that are impossible without the firm confidence of hope (Rom., vi. 23).

(b) The *habit* of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all, infants included. For it is by justification, in which the soul and its various powers are sanctified (Rom., v. 6), that one is elevated to the supernatural sphere and made ready for the beatific vision.

1102. The habit of hope is not lost by every sin against hope.

(a) It is not lost by sins of omission, for it depends on divine infusion, not on human acts (see 745).

(b) It is not lost by sins of commission that do not remove its formal object or motive, such as sins against charity and the moral virtues. For it is possible for one to expect external happiness and at the same time not love God for His own sake, or not regulate one's conduct conformably to the happiness desired, just as it is possible for one to believe and yet not practise one's belief (see 1016, 1030).

(c) Hope is lost by sins of commission that remove its foundation or its formal object. Hence, sins of unbelief (since they remove the foundation of hope) and sins of desperation and despair (since they take away the formal object of hope) are destructive of this virtue. It should be noted, however, that sins which only in a wider sense are named presumption and despair, do not remove the object, nor consequently the virtue of hope. Examples: Titus does not believe in a future life, and hence does not expect it. Claudius believes in a future life, but he is so weak in virtue that he has given up all expectation of its rewards for himself. Balbus, on the contrary, is living on stolen prop-

erty and intends to continue to do so, but he hopes that somehow all will turn out well in the end. Sempronius, who is associated with Balbus, intends to make a deathbed repentance and restitution. The sins of the first three are ruinous to hope, since by reason of them there is no expectation of salvation, or only an expectation that is not based on divine power. The sin of Sempronius is presumptuous, since it risks a most grave danger imprudently; but it is not theological presumption, since it expects forgiveness through divine power and in a way that does not exceed divine power. It is not contrary to, but beyond theological hope.

1103. **Divine Commandments Concerning Fear.**—(a) Servile fear was not commanded in the Decalogue by any distinct precept, for fear of punishment is supposed in those who received the law; it was, however, commanded there implicitly, inasmuch as penalties were attached to transgressions. Later, in order to keep man more strictly to the law already given, instructions or commandments about the necessity of fear were given. Thus, Job says: "I feared all my works, knowing that Thou didst not spare the offender" (Job, ix. 28); and the Psalmist prays: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments" (Ps. cxviii. 120); our Lord commands: "Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt., x. 28).

(b) Filial fear, on the contrary (*i.e.*, reverential love of God), since it is the principle from which proceed the external acts of respect and homage enjoined in the Decalogue, was inculcated at the time the first law was given. "What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and serve the Lord thy God?" (Deut., x. 12).

1104. As to the times and frequency of obligation, the principles and conclusions given above for hope can be applied also to fear.

## Art. 5: THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY

(Summa Theologica, II—II, qq. 23-27.)

**1105. Definition.**—The word “charity” (*carum*, what is held dear, highly esteemed) is used either in a more general, or in a particular sense.

(a) In its *more general* sense, it is applied to acts or feelings of a kindly nature towards others, whether or not God be concerned in them as the object or motive. Thus, it is applied to kindly judgments about others, to a benevolent disposition towards their welfare, to gratuitous relief of the needy or suffering, to the bestowal of gifts for public benefit, and the like. In Scripture the word is sometimes applied to friendship: “It is better to be invited to herbs with charity than to a fatted calf with hatred” (Prov., xv. 17).

(b) In its *particular* sense, charity refers to divine love, that is, to the love of God for man or the love of man for God. Here we are considering charity as the virtue by which the creature loves God for His own sake, and others on account of God.

**1106.** Love in general is the inclination towards a suitable good, or what is considered as one’s good. It is the root of all appetites of the soul, and hence the importance that the object of love be a true good.

(a) Every *attraction* is based on the recognition of some suitability in a certain good that attracts, and so is based on love. Example: Love may result from desire, as when from a desire of money springs love of the giver of money; but in the last analysis it will be found that the desire itself came from a previous love, for a person would not wish for money, unless he saw in it some advantage which inclined him towards its possession.

(b) Every *repulsion* is based on the fact that a certain thing is opposed to that which is suitable for self, and hence results from love. Example: Love sometimes is an effect of hate, as when one loves A because he hates A’s enemies; nevertheless, hate

is basically always the result of some love, for one hates only those things that impede or destroy what one loves.

(c) Every *satisfaction* is due to the possession or presence of something helpful or congenial, and so it presupposes love. Example: A particular satisfaction may cause love, as when one loves a person because his company is entertaining; but the satisfaction is due to the love one has of being entertained.

**1107.** The effects of love are two: (a) union of affection, for the lover regards the object of love as another self and desires its presence; he delights to think of it and wishes what it wishes; (b) separation from other things, for the lover’s thoughts are on the object of his love, and he is jealous of anything that might take it from him.

**1108.** Several degrees of love may be distinguished:

(a) Natural love is the tendency of things to their ends which results, not from knowledge, but from nature, and which is found in the irrational and inanimate as well as in higher forms of being. Thus, we may say that fire loves to burn, that every being loves its own existence;

(b) Sense love (*amor*) is the attraction that follows on knowledge obtained through the senses, and that exists in the brutes as well as in man. Thus, a dog loves bones, a cat loves fish. Sex-attraction is a species of sense love;

(c) Rational love (*dilectio*) arises from the reflection of the mind, and is a choice based on the judgment of the reason concerning the worth of the beloved object.

**1109.** Rational love is of two kinds: (a) love of desire (*amor concupiscentiæ*), which is affection for an object which one desires for oneself or for another, in such a way that good is not wished for the object, but the goodness of the object is wished for something else (thus, one loves food or money with the love of desire, because one does not wish good for them, but from them); (b) love of benevolence (*amor benevolentiæ*), which is had for an object to which one wishes good (thus, one loves a poor person with the love of benevolence when one wishes to give him food or money).

**1110.** The love of benevolence is called friendship when the

following conditions exist: (a) when the love is mutual, for, if one party who is loved does not reciprocate the other party's affection, they are not considered friends; (b) when the love is based on some similarity which is a bond of union, for friendship supposes that the parties have common interests and that they delight in each other's company, which is impossible without congeniality (see *Ecclus.*, xiii. 19). Thus, there is friendship of relative for relative, of citizen for citizen, of soldier for soldier, of scholar for scholar. True, those who belong to the same state in life are often enemies; but this is due, not to the similarity of their life, but to some individual dissimilarity, as when one is successful and the other unsuccessful, one rich and the other poor. Aristotle remarked that potters never got along together, and *Proverbs*, xiii. 10, says that between the proud there are always quarrels; for each potter saw in the other potter one who took away profits, and each proud man sees in another proud man an obstacle to personal glory. Unfriendly feeling may exist, then, among those who are alike, but friendship is impossible when the parties have nothing special in common.

1111. Two kinds of friendship must be distinguished. (a) The friendship of utility or of pleasure is that by which one desires good for one's friend, not for the friend's sake, but for one's own advantage or gratification. Hence, friendships of this kind contain some love of benevolence, but they are prompted by love of desire. On account of this admixture of selfishness, they fall short of friendship in the truest sense. Examples: Titus cultivates the friendship of Balbus, because the latter is wealthy and will patronize his business; Balbus, on his part, returns the friendship of Titus, because he finds his prices cheaper (a friendship of convenience or utility). Caius and Claudius associate together much and help each other gladly, but the only thing that draws them together is the amusement they get out of each other's companionship (a friendship of pleasure).

(b) The friendship of virtue is that by which one desires good for another, and by which the cause of attraction is the virtue of the friends. This is true friendship, because it is unselfish and has the highest motive; it is naturally lasting,

since it is built on moral goodness, the real good of an intelligent being (*Ecclus.*, vi. 14-16). Example: David and Jonathan became friends because each recognized the other's virtue.

1112. Charity is a true friendship between God and His intellectual creature, for in Scripture the just are called the friends of God (*John*, xv. 15; *James*, ii. 23; *Ps.* cxxxviii. 17), and the conditions of true friendship are affirmed about their relation to God. (a) There is a mutual love of benevolence between God and the just: "I love them that love Me" (*Prov.*, viii. 20); "He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him" (*John*, xiv. 21). (b) There is a common bond; for, while according to nature God and man are infinitely distant, according to grace man is an adopted son of God and the heir to glory in which he will share happiness with God.

1113. Charity is twofold, namely, uncreated and created. (a) *Uncreated* charity is God Himself. The entire Trinity is called charity, just as It is also called truth, wisdom, etc.: "God is charity, and he that abideth in charity, abideth in God" (*I John*, iv. 8). The Holy Ghost especially is called charity, because He proceeds in the Trinity as love. Hence, in the *Veni Creator* He is addressed as "Fount of life, fire, charity, and spiritual anointing." (b) *Created* charity is a supernatural habit added to the will, inclining it to the exercise of love of God and enabling it to act with promptness and delight: "The charity of God is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us" (*Rom.*, v. 5). We are concerned here only with created charity.

1114. Created charity is defined: "A supernatural virtue infused by God, through which we love with friendship God, the author of our beatitude, on account of His own goodness, and our neighbor, on account of God." Charity is given with sanctifying grace, but differs from it, inasmuch as grace is a principle of being and makes man himself holy, whereas charity is a principle of acting and makes acts holy.

1115. **The Excellence of Charity.**—Human friendship of the lower kind is not a virtue, while that which is higher is rather the extension or result of virtue than a virtue in itself. The

divine friendship, however, constitutes the theological virtue of charity.

(a) Thus, charity is a virtue, since through it our acts are regulated by their supreme standard and our affections united to the divine goodness.

(b) Charity, although it exercises a sway over the other virtues, is distinct from them; for it has its own proper object, namely, the divine goodness, all-perfect in itself: "These three: faith, hope and charity" (I Cor., xiii. 13).

(c) Charity, although it includes our neighbor as well as God among the objects of love, is but one virtue, since it has but one end (*i.e.*, the goodness of God), and it is based on but one fellowship (*i.e.*, the beatific vision to be bestowed by God).

1116. Charity is less perfect than the act of the intellect by which God is seen intuitively in the beatific vision, but it is preëminent among the virtues of this life. (a) Thus, it is superior to the normal virtues, for while they regulate actions by the inferior rule of reason, charity regulates them by the supreme rule, which is God Himself. (b) It is superior to the other theological virtues, since it tends to God in Himself, whereas faith and hope tend to God as He is the principle whence we derive truth and blessedness: "The greatest of these is charity" (I Cor., xiii. 13).

1117. The other virtues require charity for their perfection.

(a) Without charity the other virtues are either false virtues, or true but imperfect virtues; for they are then directed, not to the universal and last End, but at most to some particular and proximate good end. Nor are they meritorious without charity, for "if I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing" (I Cor., xiii. 3).

(b) With charity the other virtues become true and perfect virtues. Examples: Titus gives alms to the poor in order to win them to infidelity (false charity). Caius avoids drunkenness, not because he dislikes it, but because he is a miser and dislikes to spend money (false temperance). Balbus has no religion, but is very faithful to his family duties (imperfect justice).

Claudius discharges his duties to his family and neighbors out of love for God (perfect justice).

1118. The influence of charity on the other virtues is expressed by various titles.

(a) Charity is called *the informing principle* of the other virtues. This does not mean that charity is the type on which the other virtues are modelled, or the internal character that makes them what they are; otherwise, all the virtues would be absorbed in the one virtue of charity. It means, then, that the other virtues derive the quality of *perfect* virtue from charity, through which they are directed to the Last End.

(b) Charity is called the *foundation and root* of virtues (Eph., iii. 17), not in the sense that it is a material part of them, but in the sense that it supports and nourishes them.

(c) It is also spoken of as *the end and the mother* of the other virtues, because it directs the other virtues to the Last End, and produces their acts by commanding their exercise: "The end of the commandment is charity" (I Tim., i. 5).

1119. Charity causes the other virtues, *negatively* by forbidding evil, *affirmatively* by commanding good (I Cor., xiii. 4-7).

(a) It forbids that evil be done the neighbor, either in desire or in deed: "Charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely."

(b) It forbids evil passions by which one is injured in oneself, such as pride, ambition, greed, anger: "Charity is not puffed up, is not ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger."

(c) It forbids that one harm one's own soul by thoughts or desires of wrong: "Charity thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity."

(d) It commands that good be done the neighbor, bears with his defects, rejoices over his good and bestows benefits upon him: "Charity is patient, is kind: rejoiceth with the truth, beareth all things."

(e) It commands that good be done towards God by the practice of the theological virtues of faith and hope, and by continuance in them: "Charity believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things."

**1120.** Direction is given by charity to the other virtues that makes them perfect and meritorious.

(a) *Actual* direction—that is, the intention here and now to believe, or hope, etc., out of love for God—though more perfect, is not required for merit in faith, hope and other virtues: otherwise, merit would become extremely difficult and rare.

(b) *Habitual* direction—that is, the mere fact that one has the habit of charity, though it in no way influences an act of faith, or of hope, etc. now made—does not suffice; otherwise, it would follow that an act of faith recited by a person in the state of charity, but here and now unconscious, is meritorious, which would make merit too easy.

(c) *Virtual* direction—that is, the influence of an intention, once made and never retracted, of acting out of love for God, which continues, though it is not adverted to, while one believes, hopes, etc.—at least is necessary; otherwise, one would make oneself deserving of the Last End, without ever having desired it, for the other virtues do not tend to the Last End in itself. In practice, however, there is no person in the state of grace who does not perform all his acts that are human and virtuous under the direction of charity, actual or virtual.

**1121. Production of Charity.**—The virtue of charity belongs to the appetitive part of the soul, but supposes a judgment by which its exercise is regulated. (a) Thus, the power of the soul in which charity dwells is the will, for its object is good apprehended by the intellect; but (b) the judgment by which it is regulated is not human reason, as is the case with the moral virtues, but divine wisdom (Eph., iii. 19).

**1122. The Origin of Charity.**—(a) Charity is not caused by nature, nor acquired by the powers of nature. Natural love of God, indeed, is possible without grace; but charity is a supernatural friendship based on a fellowship in the beatitude of God. (b) It is introduced or begotten by other virtues, in the sense that they prepare one to receive it from God (I Tim., i. 5).

**1123.** The cause of charity, then, is God, who infuses it into the soul: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us" (Rom., v. 5). The meas-

ure according to which God infuses the gift of charity depends on His will and bounty.

(a) The Angels received charity at their creation, according to their natural rank, so that those who were higher excelled those who were lower, both in nature and in grace.

(b) Those who receive charity through infant baptism have it according "to the measure of the giving of Christ" (Eph., iv. 7; cfr. John, iii. 8; I Cor., xii. 2).

(c) Those who receive charity through repentance, have it, "everyone according to his proper ability" (Matt., xxv. 15), that is, according to the disposition with which he has prepared himself. But the preparation itself depends on the grace of God (Col., i. 12).

**1124.** Charity may be increased: "I pray that your charity may more and more abound" (Philip., i. 9). It must, however, be noted that: (a) the increase is not in the motive of charity, for the goodness of God is supreme and incapable of increase, nor is it in the objects of charity, for even the lowest degree of this virtue extends to all those things that must be loved on account of God; (b) the increase, then, is in the manner in which charity exists in the soul, in that it becomes more deeply rooted and takes stronger hold of the will, whose acts of love become correspondingly more intense and fervent. Just as knowledge grows as it becomes clearer and more certain, so does charity progress to higher degrees as it exists more firmly in its subject.

**1125.** With reference to the increase of charity, acts of love are of two kinds: (a) the less fervent are those that do not surpass the degree of charity one already possesses; (b) the more fervent are those that surpass the degree of charity one has. Example: If one has ten degrees of habitual charity, an act of five degrees is less fervent, an act of fifteen degrees is more fervent.

**1126.** Every act of charity, even the less fervent, contributes to an increase of the charity one already possesses. This is true whether the act be elicited by charity (*i.e.*, an act of love of God), or commanded by charity (*i.e.*, an act of some other virtue performed out of love for God). Every act of charity merits from

God an increase of the habit of charity (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Can. 32). Even a cup of cold water given in the name of a disciple shall not go without its reward (Matt., x. 42).

1127. As to the manner and time in which the increase takes place, there are various opinions, but the following points sum up what seems more probable:

(a) The increase of the habit of charity merited by a more fervent act is conferred *at once*, for God confers His gifts when one is disposed for their reception. Example: Titus, who has habitually ten degrees of charity, makes an act of charity whose degree is fifteen; he thereby merits the increase of the habit, and it is conferred at once.

(b) The increase of the habit of charity merited by less fervent acts is not conferred until the moment one enters into heaven or purgatory, for there is no time during life on earth when one has a disposition equal to the added quantity contained in less fervent acts, since, as just said, more fervent acts are rewarded at once by the increase that corresponds to them, while less fervent acts do not dispose one for an increase then and there. But the increase must be conferred when one enters into glory; otherwise, one would lose the degree of beatitude one merited during life. Hence, those who make many—even though less fervent—acts of charity during life, will receive a very high degree of reward for them hereafter.

1128. The increase of charity will come to an end in the future life, when one has attained the degree of perfection to which one was predestined by God (Philip., iii. 12). But, as long as a person lives here below, he may continually grow in charity, for each increase makes him capable of receiving from the infinite power of God a further participation in the infinite charity, which is the Holy Ghost (II Cor., vi. 11).

1129. Charity is absolutely perfect, when it loves God in the same degree in which He is lovable—that is, infinitely; but it is clear that so great charity is possible only to God. Charity is relatively perfect, when one loves God as much as one can. This relatively perfect charity is possible to man (Matt., v. 48; I John, ii. 5, iv. 12, 17); but it has three degrees:

(a) The perfect charity of heaven, which is not possible in this life, consists in this, that one is constantly occupied in thinking of God and loving Him.

(b) The perfect charity of earth, which is special to some of the just, consists in this, that one gives all one's time to divine things, as far as the necessities of mortal existence allow.

(c) The perfect charity of earth that is common to all the just, consists in this, that habitually one gives one's whole heart to God, permitting no thought or desire opposed to the divine love.

1130. Those who are growing in charity are divided into three classes: (a) the *beginners*, or those whose chief care is freedom from sin and resistance to what is contrary to divine love; (b) the *proficients*, or those who must still fight against temptation, but whose chief attention is given to progress along the way of virtue; (c) the *perfect*, or those who are progressing in holiness, but whose chief desire is to reach the end of the journey and be with the object of their love (Philip., i. 13).

1131. **The Decline of Charity.**—(a) Actual charity can decline, in the sense that subsequent acts can be less fervent than those that preceded (Apoc., ii. 4). (b) Habitual charity cannot grow less in itself. The only causes that can be supposed for a decline in habitual charity are omission of the act of charity and commission of venial sin; the former, however, cannot lessen charity, since this habit, being infused, does not depend on human acts; the latter, which is a disorder about the means to the end, does not contradict charity, which is the right order of man with reference to his Last End itself. Thus, charity differs from human friendships, which grow cold through neglect or slights. (c) Habitual charity can be lessened, first, with reference to the disposition that makes for its preservation and increase (as when one commits numerous and dangerous venial sins), and secondly, with reference to itself (as when one rising from sin has less charity than he had before). But in neither of these cases does the same numerical habit decrease.

1132. **The Loss of Charity.**—(a) The charity of the blessed cannot be lost, because they see God as He is, and are constantly

occupied in loving Him. But the charity of earth, since it proceeds from a less perfect knowledge and is not always in use, may be surrendered by man's free will (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 12, 13, 14, Can. 23). (b) The habit of charity is lost, not only by any sin against the love of God, but by any other mortal sin opposed to other virtues (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 15). Every mortal sin is a turning away from the Last End, and so is incompatible with charity, which is a turning to God, the Last End: "He that hath My commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth Me" (John, xiv. 21). Venial sin diminishes the fervor of charity, but does not remove charity itself.

**1133. The Object of Charity.**—There is a threefold object of charity: (a) the *formal* object, that is, the reason for love, which is the infinite amiability of God in Himself, as known from the supernatural illumination of faith; (b) the *primary material* object, that is, the chief thing which charity loves, which is God (*i.e.*, the divine Essence, the divine Persons, the divine attributes): "Thou shalt love the Lord, Thy God. This is the greatest and the first commandment" (Matt., xxii. 37, 38); (c) the *secondary material* object, that is, the thing loved because of God, which is self and the neighbor: "And the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (*ibid.*, 39).

**1134.** The love of creatures is not always an act of the virtue of charity. (a) Sinful love of creatures, by which one loves them more than God or inordinately, destroys or deviates from charity. Hence, St. John says: "Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world" (I John, ii. 15). (b) Natural love of creatures, by which one loves them on account of reasons apart from love of God (such as the benefits one derives from them or the excellences they possess), is not charity, even though good. Thus, gratitude which sees in another only a benefactor, friendship which sees in another only a congenial spirit, and philanthropy which sees in another only a fellow-man, differ from charity, although they are good in themselves. (c) Supernatural love of creatures, by which one loves them on account of the divine that is in them, inasmuch as they are friends of God or made

for the glory of one's divine Friend, does not differ specifically from love of God, for in both loves there is the same motive (*viz.*, the amiability of God Himself).

**1135.** Since charity is friendship, it does not include among its objects those things that are loved with the love of desire (see 1109), that is, those things whose good is desired, but for another. (a) Hence, charity itself is not an object of charity, for it is loved not as a friend, but as a good that one wishes for one's friends. The same applies to other virtues and to beatitudes. (b) Irrational creatures are not objects of charity, for a fellowship with them in friendship, and especially in the beatific vision, is impossible. We can love them out of charity, however, inasmuch as we desire their preservation for the sake of those whom we love with charity (*e.g.*, desiring that they be preserved for the glory of God or the use of man).

**1136.** Love of self is of various kinds.

(a) Sinful self-love is that by which a person loves himself according to his lower and corrupt nature, and not according to his higher or rational nature, or loves himself egotistically to the hurt of others. Of those who indulge their passions it is said: "In the last days shall come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves" (II Tim., iii. 1, 2); of those who love themselves selfishly it is said: "All seek the things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ's" (Philip., ii. 21); whereas charity seeketh not her own (I Cor., xiii.) to the exclusion of others, but desires what is for the advantage of the neighbor (I Cor., x. 33).

(b) Natural self-love is that necessary desire which each one has for his own good, happiness, existence, etc. (II Cor., v. 4), or any desire for reasonable self-improvement that is not prompted by a supernatural love of God. This love is stronger than love for another, for it implies not merely union, but unity. It is not friendship, but the root of friendship, for one is said to be friendly towards another when one holds him as another self.

(c) Supernatural self-love is that love which one has for God, and consequently for self as a friend of God.

1137. If by "self" we understand the substance and nature of man, as composed of soul and body, then both good and bad understand aright the meaning of self and desire its preservation. But if by "self" we mean principally the inward man and secondarily the outward man (II Cor., iv. 16), then only the good understand what self is, and have a true love for it, whereas the wicked hate their own souls (Ps. x. 6). For the five marks of true friendship are shown to the inner man by the good, to the outward man by the sinner: (a) the good are solicitous for the life of the soul, the wicked for that of the body; (b) the good desire spiritual treasures for the soul, the wicked carnal delights for the body; (c) the good labor to provide for the needs of the soul, the wicked work only for the needs of the body; (d) the good are pleased to converse with their souls, finding there thoughts of past, present and future good things to delight them, while the wicked seek to distract themselves from wholesome thought by pleasure; (e) the good are at peace with their souls, whereas the wicked are troubled by conscience.

1138. Supernatural love of self, which pertains to charity, extends not only to the soul, but also to the body; for (a) according to its nature, the body is good, since it is from God and may be employed for His service (Rom., vi. 13), and hence it may be loved out of charity with the love of desire on account of the honor it may give to God and the service it may render in good works; (b) according to grace, the body is capable of sharing in secondary beatitude, through glorification with the soul, and hence it may be loved with charity and with the love of benevolence, inasmuch as we desire for it a share in beatitude: "We would not be unclothed, but clothed over, that that which is mortal may be swallowed up by life" (II Cor., v. 4); (c) according to the consequences of sin that are in it, the body is a drag on the soul, or a hindrance to it, and one should not love but rather desire the removal of its imperfections. Hence, St. Paul desired to be freed from the body (Rom., vii. 24; Philip., i. 23), and the Saints have shown their hatred of the body's corruption by the mortifications to which they subjected it (John, xii. 25).

1139. Love of neighbor is of three kinds: (a) sinful love,

which is all love that is excessive, irregulated, or directed to what is evil in others; (b) natural love, which is all love that is attracted by some excellence of a human or created kind, such as knowledge or skill; (c) supernatural love, which is that by which one is drawn towards another on account of the divine in him, such as his gifts of grace and of heavenly calling.

1140. Hence, it seems that there is no such thing as a special and distinct virtue of human friendship. (a) Thus, friendships of utility or of pleasure are clearly not virtues, since they are not caused by attraction towards moral good. (b) Virtuous friendships are the consequences of virtues rather than virtues, for the attraction one has for one's friend arises from the attraction for the virtue one sees in him. Thus, friendship for another because he is not the slave of passion, is an exercise of the virtue of temperance. (c) Supernatural friendships are not distinct from the virtue of charity, for the gifts and graces which evoke them are participations of God's goodness, which is the object of charity.

1141. The neighbors whom we are to love according to charity are all those who can have with us the relation of supernatural friendship, that is, all rational creatures. (a) Hence, the Angels are objects of this love, and in the resurrection men will be fellow-citizens with them (Heb., xii. 22); (b) our fellow-men are objects of this love, for they also are called to the heavenly companionship (*ibid.*, 23).

1142. Charity for Sinners.—Should we love with charity those who are sinners and enemies of God? (a) If we consider sinners precisely as enemies of God, we may not love them, for their sin is an evil, an offense to God and a hurt to themselves. On the contrary, we should hate even in those who are nearest to us whatever is opposed to love of God (Luke, xiv. 26). (b) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of God, we may not love them with charity or as friends, if they are demons or lost souls; for in their case fellowship with us in beatitude is out of the question. We may, however, love their nature out of charity towards God, desiring that it be preserved by Him for His glory. (c) If we consider sinners precisely as crea-



tures of God, we may love them with charity or as friends, if they are still in the present life; for we should wish that God may be glorified in them by their conversion and salvation. The commandment of love of neighbor was not restricted to loving the just.

**1143.** If sinners be considered precisely as they are enemies of God, is it lawful to hate them and wish evil to them? (a) It is lawful to hate the evil that is in sinners, but not their persons. He who hates their sin, loves themselves, for their sin is against their own interests. In this way the Psalmist hated sinners (Ps. cxviii. 113, cxxxviii. 32). (b) It is lawful to wish that punishment overtake sinners, if one is actuated, not by a spirit of malevolence, but by love of justice (Ps. lvii. 11; Wis., i. 13; Ps. x. 8). It is also lawful to wish that the sinfulness that is in them may be destroyed, that they themselves may be saved. In this sense we may understand some of the imprecations that are met in Scripture (Ps. ciii. 35). Thus, a judge sentences a criminal, not because he hates the man before him, but because he wishes to reform him, or to protect society, or to do an act of justice.

**1144.** The evils of punishment or of destruction of sin are in a broader view not evils, but goods. But the following punishments may not be desired: (a) that anyone living lose his soul and be condemned to hell, for charity requires that we desire the salvation of sinners; (b) that a sinner be punished by blindness of heart and go from bad to worse. He who wishes sin approves of the offense to God; but it does not seem unlawful to wish that God permit a person to fall into sin, as a means to a spiritual awakening.

**1145. Association with Sinners.**—(a) It is never lawful to associate with sinners in their sins, for thus one becomes a sharer in their guilt. Hence, St. Paul says: "Go out from among them and be ye separate" (II Cor., vi. 17). (b) It is not lawful to associate with sinners even in matters indifferent or good, if one is weak and apt to be led away by them into sin (see 258 sqq.). (c) It is lawful to associate with sinners in things not forbidden, if one is not endangered, and if one aims to convert

them to better ways. Thus, our Lord ate with sinners, because He came to call them to repentance (Matt., ix. 10-13).

**1146. Friendship with Sinners.**—(a) If this means that we like and dislike the same things as the sinners, it is an evil friendship, and it should be discontinued; (b) if it means that we seek to bring the sinner to imitate our good likes and dislikes, the friendship pertains to charity (Jer., xv. 19).

**1147.** Should one continue to show signs of special regard to a friend who has taken to ways of sin? (a) As long as there is hope of betterment, one should not deny the other the benefits of friendship. If it would be wrong to desert a friend because he was perishing from starvation, much more would it be wrong to desert him because he was perishing morally. (b) But if all hope of betterment has gone, one should give up a companionship which is not profitable to either party, and may prove harmful.

**1148. Charity towards Enemies.**—Enemies can be considered in two senses: precisely as enemies, or precisely as human beings destined for beatitude. (a) If considered as enemies, they are not to be loved with charity—that is, it should be displeasing to us that they are enemies and opposed to us, for it would be contrary to charity to love in a neighbor that which is evil in him. (b) If considered as human beings, enemies should be loved with charity—that is, their nature created by God and capable of receiving grace and glory should be pleasing to us, for love of God should make us love all that belongs to Him, even that which is not well disposed towards ourselves.

**1149.** The precept of love of enemies did not originate with the law of Christ. (a) It pertains to the natural law, for (i) it follows from the natural principle: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," and (ii) it was known by natural reason (e.g., Plato and Cicero knew it). (b) Love of enemies was commanded in the Old Law, being the second great commandment of that law (Matt., xxii. 39), and was taught in various Old Testament books (Lev., xix. 17, 18; Exod., xxiii. 4, 5; Prov., xxv. 21, 22). (c) It was renewed by Christ, who corrected

the false interpretation of Leviticus, xix. 18, given by the Scribes and Pharisees, who taught: "Thou shalt love thy friend and hate thy enemy." In the Sermon on the Mount our Lord declares: "I say to you: Love your enemies: do good to them that hate you: that you may be the children of your Father who is in heaven" (Matt., v. 44, 45).

1150. The following examples of love of one's enemies are found in the Bible: (a) in the Old Testament, Joseph forgave his brethren who had sold him into Egypt, David spared the life of his persecutor Saul and wept over the ungrateful Absalom, and Moses prayed for the people who had rebelled against him; (b) in the New Testament our Lord mourned over Jerusalem which had rejected Him, and on the Cross prayed for His enemies.

1151. What kind of love must we entertain for enemies?  
(a) A general love of enemies is that which extends to all neighbors for the love of God, no exception being made as regards enemies. This kind of love is required. Example: Caius makes an act of love in which he declares his love for his neighbor, but mentions no names. Titus makes this act of love: "I love all except Caius." The act of love made by Caius is sufficient, that of Titus is insufficient.

(b) A special love of enemies is that which extends to them in particular, not as included in the human race or the community, but as individuals, as when one expressly mentions the name of an enemy in his act of love. This kind of love of enemies is not required at all times.

1152. Is there an obligation of special love of enemies? (a) In cases of necessity (*e.g.*, when the omission of a special love would bring on hate), one is bound to special love. (b) Outside of cases of necessity, one is bound to be willing to love an enemy in particular, if the necessity should arise. (c) Outside of necessity, one is not bound to love an enemy in particular, for it is impossible to give such attention even to all those who are not enemies. But to give an enemy more love than is required is a sign of perfect charity.

1153. The principles just given as to internal love of enemies apply also to external love, or to the signs by which internal

love is manifested. For St. John says: "Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth" (I John, iii. 18).

(a) Hence, it is not lawful to deny to an enemy the common signs of charity (*i.e.*, such benefits as are bestowed on his community or class as a whole), for to do so would be to signify a desire for revenge (Lev., xix. 18). Consequently, he who excludes his enemies from prayers offered for his neighbor sins against charity.

(b) In cases of necessity, as when an enemy is in great need as to life, fame, fortune or salvation, one is bound to show special signs of charity, such as salutation, conversation, assistance, etc. Thus, we are told: "If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he be thirsty, give him to drink" (Prov., xxv. 21).

(c) Outside of cases of necessity, one is bound to be ready to assist an enemy, should there be need.

(d) Outside of necessity, one is not bound actually to manifest particular love for an enemy, by speaking to him, trading with him, visiting him, etc. Hence, David, although he had pardoned Absalom, would not meet him (II Kings, xiv. 24). To confer special benefits on an enemy when there is no obligation is a counsel of perfection: "Do good to those that hate you" (Matt., v. 24). This heaps coals of fire upon the head of the enemy, curing him by the salutary pain of repentance, and so overcomes evil by good (Rom., xii. 20, 21).

1154. The common signs of charity are not limited to those that are shown to all mankind, but include also such as are usually shown by one Christian to another Christian, by one citizen to a fellow-citizen, by a relative to a relative, etc. Thus, to make a social call, though it would be a sign of special regard in the case of one not a relative, might be only a common sign of charity in the case of a relative.

(a) Hence, it is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that are customarily shown to all men. Example: Titus dislikes Balbus, and therefore refuses to sell to him, does not return his salutations, speaks to all others in company, while ignoring Balbus, and will not even answer if Balbus addresses him.

(b) It is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that are commonly shown to all those to whom one is similarly related. Examples: Claudia calls on her other children frequently and makes them presents, but she keeps away from one daughter, even when the latter is sick and poor and she is calling next door. Sempronius habitually invites to his house for family festivities all his relatives except his brother.

(c) It is against charity to deny to an enemy some benefit not commonly shown, but which one has bestowed out of liberality on the group to which the latter belongs. In such a case a special sign of charity becomes common. Example: Titus prepares a banquet for a neighboring institution, and purposely sends no invitation to two members whom he dislikes.

1155. The rule that common signs of charity must be shown does not apply, if some higher or more urgent duty requires that they be omitted: however, internal charity must persist all the while.

(a) Thus, by reason of charity owed to self or to the better interests of an offender, one should at times omit the common signs of charity. Examples: Caius avoids Balbus, with whom he has had a quarrel, because he knows well that Balbus is seeking some pretext to get revenge. Titus has a surly way of speaking, and his mother, in order to cure him, does not answer until he has spoken civilly.

(b) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should sometimes be denied as a punishment. Examples: Claudia punishes her children, when they are disobedient, by refusing them for a time privileges given the other children. For the same reason she refuses to call on a daughter who ran away from home and married a worthless fellow.

(c) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should be refused, when this is required for the protection of one's own rights. Example: Titus goes about defaming Sempronius and his family, but appears very affable when he meets Sempronius; the latter knows all this, and hence is very cool with Titus, to show that the injuries are not held as light.

1156. The following are the rules for judging whether (apart from scandal to others) sin has been committed through refusal of the signs of charity:

(a) If internally there is hatred (*i.e.*, a contempt for one's neighbor, as if he were unworthy of common charity), or malevolence (*i.e.*, a will to exercise spite), then one is guilty of grave uncharitableness, unless the smallness of the matter makes it only a venial sin.

(b) If externally the denial of charity is such that in the judgment of a prudent man it indicates real hatred, and the injured party perceives this and is scandalized or hurt thereby, the sin of uncharitableness is committed, even though there be no internal hatred. The gravity depends on the scandal or offense caused the other party. Example: Claudius and Balbus, once very friendly, have had a disagreement. Now, when Claudius sees Balbus coming in his direction, he turns off by a side street, not to show hatred, but to avoid a meeting. If Balbus does not know this, or does not care, no sin—or at most only a venial sin—is committed; but if Balbus is deeply wounded or scandalized by this conduct, Claudius sins seriously against charity.

1157. **Refusal of Greetings.**—(a) To refuse to exchange a bow or salutation (such as "Good morning") indicates a want of charity, when such mutual courtesy is expected according to custom; not, however, when custom does not require it. Example: In Balba's office the girls employed usually salute one another on arrival and departure, but Balba never salutes Titia, and hence is regarded as her enemy. On Caius' street the neighbors are of a very mixed kind, and it is not customary to speak to everybody. Hence, the fact that Caius never salutes certain neighbors, whom he dislikes, does not signify any uncharitableness on his part.

(b) To refuse to salute another first, where custom expects this, is a mark of uncharity, unless one has a sufficient excuse. Examples: Claudius has a grudge against Sempronius, an elderly man who is much his senior, and says he will never salute him as others do. Titus refuses to greet Balbus, his acquaint-

tance, when they meet, because in the past Balbus has treated his greetings with contempt, and shows that he does not care to notice Titus.

(c) To refuse to return a salutation sincerely given indicates a want of charity.

**1158. The Order of Charity.**—Charity not only requires that we love God, ourselves, and our neighbors, but it also obliges us to love these objects according to a certain order, some being preferred to others.

(a) God must be loved above all, more than self (Matt., xvi. 24), more than father and mother (Matt., x. 37; Luke, xiv. 26), for He is the common good of all, and the source of all good.

(b) Other things being equal, one should love self more than one's neighbor, for the love of self is the model for the love of neighbor (Matt., xxii. 39), and nature itself inclines to this in accordance with the saying: "Charity begins at home."

(c) Among neighbors those should be loved more who have more of a claim on account of their greater nearness to God or to ourselves.

**1159.** Love can become greater in two ways: (a) *objectively*, when the person loved is esteemed as of greater worth, or has more titles to affection, or has a more enduring right to be loved; (b) *subjectively*, when the person loving is more touched and moved in his feelings, even though the object be not more amiable in itself.

**1160. The Character of our Love of God.**—(a) It must be supreme *objectively*, since He is infinite perfection and has the highest of all claims on our love. Hence, one should be disposed to suffer any loss rather than abandon God. (b) It must be supreme *subjectively*, in our desire, that is, realizing that God is the highest good, we should at least wish to give Him the utmost of our fervor and ardor. (c) It need not be supreme *subjectively*, in fact; for we are not always masters of our feelings, and things that are nearer to us affect us more than those that are more important, but remote from sense. Hence, it is not against charity that one should be more moved sensibly at the thought

of a dear human friend than at the thought of God, provided the will places God above all.

**1161.** Regarding the love of God for the sake of reward, we must note: (a) If there is question of the eternal reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of reward, provided one makes the reward the end of one's service, but not the end of God; for salvation is really the end of our faith (I Pet., i. 9), but God is the end of all, and He is to be preferred to all. This love of God for the sake of reward coexists with charity, for one may love a friend for his own sake, and at the same time expect benefits from the friendship, provided the love of benevolence is uppermost. (b) If there is question of a temporal reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of the reward, not in the sense that spiritual things are made a means and temporal things their end, but in the sense that one hopes one's service of God will be so blessed that one will have health, strength and opportunity, so as to be enabled to continue and progress in that service.

**1162.** Regarding the love of self (*i.e.*, of the inner man, or our spiritual nature), we should note: (a) *Objectively*, one esteems others who are higher in sanctity than oneself (*e.g.*, the Blessed Virgin), as more worthy of love. But one may desire for self according to charity such progress in virtue that one will pass some others who are now better than oneself; for the virtue of charity is given us that we may perfect ourselves. (b) *Subjectively*, one holds self as being nearer than other persons, and thus loves oneself with a greater intensity.

**1163.** Is it lawful to sacrifice one's own spiritual goods for the benefit of a neighbor?

(a) One may not sacrifice necessary spiritual goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of any one, not even of the whole world; for in so doing one inflicts a wound on one's own soul and prefers the good of others to one's own spiritual welfare. Hence, it is not lawful to wish to be damned in place of another; to commit sin, mortal or venial, to prevent another from sinning; or to expose oneself to the certain and proximate danger of sin for the sake of another's spiritual progress.

(b) One may, however, sacrifice unnecessary or less necessary spiritual goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of a neighbor; for, by doing this, one chooses the course which God wishes, and does not lessen but rather increases one's own profit. Thus, a priest should interrupt his devotions to hear the confession of a penitent; a daughter should give up the idea of becoming a nun as long as her parents need her; a lay person should stay away from Mass on Sunday, if an invalid has to be cared for, or a dying person must be baptized; it is laudable to make the heroic act of charity, by which one transfers the satisfactory value of one's good works to the souls in purgatory; one may expose oneself to a remote danger of sin in order to perform a great service of charity, as in waiting on a sick person who on account of irritability is a great temptation to anger; one may wish that one's entrance into heaven be delayed, so that one may labor longer for souls (Philip., i. 23, 24).

**1164. The Love of the Body.**—(a) One should prefer the spiritual welfare of one's neighbor to one's own bodily welfare, for our neighbor is called to be a partaker with us in the beatific vision, while the body will share only in accidental glory. (b) One should prefer one's own bodily welfare to that of another, all other things being equal, for it has more of a claim on one.

**1165.** There are three kinds of spiritual necessity in which a neighbor may be placed, and in which one might be called on to sacrifice one's bodily welfare for the other's good (cfr. 1236). Thus, there is: (a) *extreme* spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor will perish eternally unless help is given him, as when an infant is about to die without baptism; (b) *grave* spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor runs grave danger of losing his soul unless help is given, as when a dying person, who is in mortal sin, asks for a confessor, because he is scarcely able to make an act of perfect contrition; (c) *ordinary* spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor is in remote danger of damnation, or in proximate danger of sin, but can easily help himself, as is the case with those who from choice live in occasions of sin.

**1166.** For a neighbor who is in extreme spiritual need, one should risk death (I John, iii. 16) or lesser evils, if the following

conditions are present: (a) if there is a good prospect of success in helping the needy one (*e.g.*, a mother is not obliged to undergo an operation dangerous to her life, in order to secure the baptism of her child, if it is uncertain that the baptism can be administered); (b) if there is no one else who can and will give the needed help; (c) if there is no reason of public good that stands in the way; thus, if by helping one in extreme need a person would lose his life, and so deprive of his aid a large number who are also in extreme need, he should prefer to help the many rather than the one.

**1167.** For a neighbor who is in grave spiritual necessity, the same risk is not required of all. (a) The risk of death itself is required of pastors of souls (John, x. 11), since they have bound themselves to this. Hence, a pastor who would refuse to go to a parishioner dying of pestilence and needing absolution and Extreme Unction, would offend against justice, while another priest who would go to such a dying person would practise the perfection of charity; for the dying person can help himself by an act of contrition, and the strange priest is not bound by office to care for him. (b) The risk of some great corporal evil (such as a sickness or impairment of health) should be taken even by those who are not pastors of the person in need, if there is no one else to help. Thus, if a pastor were sick, another priest ought to visit a dying person, even at the risk of catching a severe cold.

**1168.** For a neighbor who is in ordinary spiritual necessity charity requires that something be done (Ecclus., xvii. 12). (a) But it does not require the risk of life or of serious bodily loss, for the person in danger can easily and better help himself. Thus, it is not necessary that one should penetrate into the haunts of criminals and endanger one's life, in order to drag away one who chooses to go to such places. (b) It does require that one be willing to undergo a slight bodily inconvenience or deprivation. Thus, an ordinary headache or the loss of a meal ought not to stop one from counselling another in order to keep him away from bad company.

**1169.** If only corporal good (life, health, liberty, etc.) is

compared with corporal good of the same kind, then, as said above, one should prefer one's own good to that of another. Thus, it is not lawful to offer oneself as substitute for a condemned criminal, or to put one's family into bankruptcy to save another family from bankruptcy. But, if a neighbor's corporal good is of a more important kind or is connected with higher goods, then one may sacrifice one's own good for that of another.

(a) Thus, one may prefer a greater corporal good of a neighbor to a lesser corporal good of one's own. Examples: One may weaken one's health to save another's life. One may give of one's blood for a transfusion to assist another who is in danger of death.

(b) One may prefer an equal corporal good of a neighbor to an equal corporal good of one's own, if the common good requires this; for the good of all is preferable to that of an individual. Thus, one may expose oneself to the peril of death in order to protect a public person whose life is very important to the nation. Thus, policemen and firemen, soldiers and sailors, are daily imperilling their own safety for the safety of the public.

(c) One may prefer an equal corporal good of another, who is only a private individual, to one's own equal good, if the intention is to practise virtue, to assist a person in need, or to give edification. At least, it is more probable that this is lawful, for the good of virtue is a higher good than the good of the body, and the Fathers praise holy men who sold themselves into slavery, or who gave themselves as hostages to barbarians, for the liberation of captives; and they hold up for admiration Damon and Pythias, each of whom was ready to die for the other. Hence, it is not against the charity owed to self to jump into a river and risk one's life in order to rescue a drowning person, for heroic charity is a better adornment to self than mere, ordinary charity. Similarly, if two explorers in a wilderness have only enough provisions for one to reach civilization, one of them may surrender his rations to the other, that both may not be lost.

1170. There are two exceptions to the rules just given: (a) A person should not risk his life for another's life, if he thereby endangers his own salvation (*e.g.*, if he is in a state of sin and

cannot reconcile himself to God). But this case is theoretical, for it is admitted that one who makes the supreme sacrifice of giving his life with a virtuous intention, has not only charity, but the perfection of charity (John, xv. 13), which will certainly purify him even from a multitude of sins. (b) One should not risk one's life for the life of another, if a third party has a higher claim on him. Thus, a married man, who has a dependent wife and children, may not throw away his life for the sake of a friend.

1171. The order of charity between different neighbors is as follows: (a) as to good in general (*e.g.*, the attainment of salvation), we should love all neighbors alike, for we should desire salvation for all; (b) as to good in particular (*e.g.*, the degree of beatitude), we should love some more than others. Thus, we should desire a higher degree of glory for the Blessed Virgin than for the Saints.

1172. The reasons for loving one neighbor more than another can be reduced to two. (a) One neighbor may be nearer to God than another, and hence more deserving of love—for example, a saintly acquaintance may be nearer to God than a sinful relative. (b) One neighbor may be nearer to ourselves on account of relationship by blood or marriage, friendship, civil or professional ties, etc. Thus, a cousin is nearer by nature to his cousin than another person who is not a relative.

1173. The order of charity as between those nearer to God and those nearer to self is as follows:

(a) *Objectively*, we should esteem more those who are better, and desire for them that higher degree of God's favor which belongs to their merits. But we may desire for those nearer to ourselves that they will finally surpass in holiness those now better than they are, and thus attain to a greater beatitude. Moreover, while we prefer in one respect (*i.e.*, that of holiness) a saintly person, who is a stranger, we prefer in many respects (*e.g.*, on account of relationship, friendship, gratitude) another who is less holy.

(b) *Subjectively*, the love for those nearer to self is greater, that is, more intense, more vividly felt. The preferences for

those nearer to self, therefore, far from being wrong or the expression of mere natural love, are expressions of charity itself. For it is God's will that more love should be shown to those who are nearer to us: "If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel" (I Tim., v. 8). Hence, charity itself inclines one to have more love for one's own, and it supernaturalizes filial piety, patriotism, and friendship.

1174. The order to be followed in the manifestation of charity will correspond with the order of charity itself. (a) To those to whom greater objective love is due, on account of their holiness, more respect due to their excellence should be shown. (b) To those to whom greater return of love is due on account of the benefits they have shown (as parents, friends, etc.), more assistance should be given spiritually and temporally. That is, if one had to choose between helping either a relative or a stranger who was more virtuous, one would have to decide in favor of the relative. (c) To those to whom greater subjective love is due, more signs of affection (such as visits) should be given.

1175. Exceptions to the above are the following cases, in which the good of the better person should be preferred:

(a) if the common good requires such a preference. Thus, public interest demands that in conferring positions, making appointments, or voting for candidates, one should not be guided by family affections or private friendships, but only by the common welfare; and one should decide in favor of the better man;

(b) if the person nearer to self has forfeited his claims to preference. Thus, a son who has treated his father with contempt and is a wastrel, may be deprived of his share of the family goods in favor of strangers who are self-sacrificing and who promote some holy cause.

1176. The order of charity between various kinds of natural relationships is as follows: (a) the relationship that arises from consanguinity is prior and more stable, since it arises from nature itself and cannot be removed; (b) the relationship of friendship, since it arises from one's own choice, may be more congenial and

may be preferred even to kinship, when there is question of society and companionship (Prov., xviii. 24).

1177. In practice, other things being equal, one should manifest more love to a relative in those things that belong to the relationship.

(a) To those who are related by blood, corporal or temporal assistance is more due. If one has to choose between helping one's indigent parents or an indigent friend, one should rather help one's parents.

(b) To those who are spiritually related (*e.g.*, pastor and parishioner, director and penitent, god-parent and god-child), more spiritual assistance in instruction, advice and prayer is due. Thus, a pastor is supposed to be more solicitous about instructing his congregation than his relatives who belong to another congregation.

(c) To those who are related by some special tie, political, military, religious, etc., more is due in things political, military, religious, etc., than to others. Thus, a soldier owes obedience to his officer, and not to his father, in matters that pertain to army life; a priest owes deference to an ecclesiastical superior in clerical matters, not to his parents.

1178. Kinship, as being an older and more fundamental relationship, should have precedence in assistance over any other kind of private relationship in case of conflict and extreme necessity. (a) Thus, as regards spiritual matters (*e.g.*, calling a priest to give absolution), if a parent and a spiritual father were both in extreme necessity, one's first duty would be to one's parent. (b) As regards temporal matters, if one has to choose between assisting one's needy parents and remaining in some relationship in which one cannot help them, one should give up the relationship, if possible. Thus, a Religious is allowed to return to the world, if his parents require his support.

1179. The order of charity as between kinsfolk gives preference of course to the nearer relatives—parents, children, wife. Between these nearer relatives there is also an order of preference, as follows: (a) *objectively* (or with reference to the greater or less claim to respect and honor), the order is: father, mother, wife,

children; (b) *subjectively* (or with reference to the greater or less intensity of affection), the order is the reverse, namely: children, wife, parents.

1180. The following should be noted about this order of preference between the members of one's family: (a) the basis of preference given is only kinship, and hence there may be other considerations to change the order given (*e.g.*, a pious mother is rightly more respected and honored by her children than a worthless father); (b) there is no notable excess in the claim of one member of the family over that of another, and hence those whose affections do not follow the order given are not guilty of serious sin.

1181. The order in which relatives have a claim on assistance when several are in equal need is as follows: (a) in cases of ordinary need the order is, first, the wife, for a man leaves his parents for his wife (Gen., ii. 24); second, the children, for ordinarily parents must provide for children, and not children for parents (II Cor., xii. 14); third, parents; after these come in order, brothers and sisters, other relatives, friends, fellow-citizens of the same locality or country, all others; (b) in case of extreme need, however, parents are to be preferred to all others, even to wife, children or creditors, since one receives life from parents.

1182. The order of charity is also observed in heaven. (a) Thus, God is loved above all, not only objectively, but also subjectively, for His amiability is better understood and is not for a moment neglected. (b) Self is loved less, objectively, than those who are higher, and more, objectively, than those who are lower in glory; for the state of the blessed is fixed, and each of them desires that which God wills. But, subjectively, each loves self with a more intense love, since charity itself inclines that one first direct self towards God, and then wish the same for others. (c) Among neighbors, since love of them will be entirely divine, the reason of earthly preferences (such as dependence of one on another) having ceased, those who are more perfect in holiness will be loved with deeper appreciation and affection than those who are nearer by kinship or friendship.

1183. **The Acts of Charity.**—The principal act of the virtue of charity is *love*. It is sometimes spoken of as *benevolence*, but in reality the love of charity includes more than mere benevolence. (a) Thus, benevolence wishes well to another according to a right judgment, and so it pertains to charity, which rejoices in the perfections of God and wishes beatitude to man; but (b) love is a union of affection with another, which makes one regard him as another self, and so it pertains to charity, which, as said above, is a supernatural friendship. One can be benevolent towards a stranger and for a passing moment, but love is intimate and lasting, from its nature.

1184. *Exercise of the Act of Love.*—(a) From benevolence proceed gladness at the perfections of God (I Pet., i. 8), zeal for His external glory (I Pet., iv. 11), grief over sin committed against Him (Ps. lxxii. 3), obedience to His commandments (John, xiv. 15, 21, 23). (b) From the union of affection proceed a warmth of inclination and a personal interest in the things of God, so that one rejoices over the divine perfections, not merely because one knows that this is a duty, but because one feels the attachment of a friend for all that pertains to God.

1185. Charity loves God: (a) for His own sake; (b) immediately; (c) entirely; (d) without measure.

1186. We love God *for His own sake*, in the sense that there is nothing distinct from God that causes Him to be loved. (a) Thus, there is no ulterior end on account of which He is loved, for He is the Last End of all; (b) there is no perfection different from His nature that makes Him lovable, since He is perfection itself; (c) there is no source of His goodness on account of which He is loved, since He is the Primal Source.

1187. We may love God for the sake of reward (see 1161), on account of benefits, and for fear of punishment, in the following senses: (a) the eternal reward is the proximate end of our love of God: "Receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls" (I Pet., i. 9); but the end of salvation itself, and the Last End of love of God, is God Himself; (b) temporal rewards, benefits received, and the wish to avoid punishment, are dispo-



sitions that lead up to love of God, or to progress in His love; but they are not the end of the act of love.

1188. Charity loves God *immediately*, and so differs from natural love of God. (a) Thus, natural love of God rises from love of neighbor whom we see to love of God whom we do not see, just as natural knowledge rises from the creature to the Creator. (b) Charity, on the contrary, tends to God first, and by reason of Him includes the neighbor in its love.

1189. Charity loves God *entirely*. (a) But this does not mean that the creature's love is adequate to the amiability of God, for God is infinite, whereas love in the most perfect creature must be finite. (b) It means, with reference to the object of love, that charity loves everything that pertains to God—each of the Divine Persons, all of the divine perfections. (c) It means, with reference to the person who loves, that he loves God to the best of his ability, by subordinating all else to God and preferring His love to other loves. On earth, charity gives to God the greatest objective love; in heaven, it also gives Him the greatest subjective love (see 1129): "Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with thy whole heart" (Deut., vi. 5).

1190. Charity loves God *without measure*, as St. Bernard says (*De diligendo Deo*, cap. 1). God has fixed a degree of perfection in charity beyond which a soul will not progress, but no one should set a limit for himself, for love has to do with God, who is not measured, but is the measure of all things.

(a) Hence, in the internal act of love, there is no possibility of excess, since the Object is infinitely amiable and the End of all, and so the greater the charity, the better it is.

(b) In external acts proceeding from charity, however, there is a possibility of excess, since these acts are a means to an end, and have to be measured by charity and reason. Thus, it would be excessive to give more to strangers than to one's needy parents, for this act would not be according to the rule of charity. It would also be excessive to perform works of charity, when one ought to be attending to household duties, for reason requires that everything be done at its proper time and place.

1191. The love of an enemy may be a better act than the love

of a friend, when there are special excellencies in the former love that are not found in the latter. (a) Thus, if the enemy, all things considered, is a better person than the friend, and if he is for that reason objectively preferred, this is as it should be (see 1173). (b) If the parties are of equal merit, an act of love towards the enemy on account of supernatural charity is better than an act of love towards the friend on account of natural affection: "If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this?" (Matt., v. 46).

1192. If all other things are equal, the love of the friend is essentially better, while the love of the enemy is better in some minor respects. (a) Thus, the love of the friend has a better object, for the friend who loves us is better than the enemy who hates us; it has also an object that has a greater claim on charity, as being nearer to self. Hence, it is essentially a better and more meritorious act. (b) The love of the enemy is more difficult, and may thus be a more convincing sign that one really loves God. But the fact that an act is more difficult does not suffice to make it more meritorious, or else we should have to say that the love of neighbor is more meritorious than the love of God.

#### Art. 6: THE EFFECTS OF CHARITY

(*Summa Theologica*, II—II, qq. 28-33.)

1193. **Internal Effects of Charity.**—There are three acts of the soul that result from love, *viz.*, joy, peace, mercy. (a) The *joy* of charity is a repose or delight of the soul in the perfections of God and in the union of self and the neighbor with Him: "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy" (Gal., v. 22). (b) The *peace* of charity is the harmony of man with God, self and the neighbor: "There is much peace to those that love Thy law" (Ps. cxviii. 165). (c) *Mercy* is an inclination of the will to relieve the misery of another; it follows from charity, for love of the brotherhood "weeps with them that weep" (Rom., xii. 10, 15).

1194. **Joy.**—The precept of charity includes a precept of joy,

and hence the Apostle says: "Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I say, rejoice" (Philip., iv. 4, 5). This joy of charity has the following properties: (a) it is about good, not about iniquity, and it is not unrestrained; it rejoices "in the Lord"; (b) it should not be discontinued or interrupted by sin, but should rejoice "always." It may, however, be mixed with sorrow over sin or the delay of entrance into the presence of God (Rom., xii. 15; Ps. cxix. 5), for only in heaven will joy be filled (John, xv. 11). St. Paul spoke of himself as "sorrowful, yet always rejoicing" (II Cor., vi. 10).

**1195. Peace.**—The precept of charity also includes a precept of peace, and our Lord commands: "Have peace among yourselves" (Mark, ix. 49). Peace, like joy, has two properties: (a) it should be genuine (*i.e.*, it should be a contentment and agreement based on right), for there is a false peace, of which Christ says: "I am not come to bring peace" (Matt., x. 34), which rests in a good that is only apparent, and which does not exclude great evil and anxiety (Wis., xiv. 22); (b) peace is constant, for, as long as charity remains, there are friendly relations with God and man, and order in the interior of the soul. Perfect tranquility, it is true, is found only in heaven. On earth, disturbances may arise in the lower part of the soul, or from without, but the will continues in the peace of God (II Cor., i. 4).

**1196.** Reconciliation of a sinner to God is effected through an act of perfect charity: "He who loves Me, will be loved by My Father and I will love him" (John, xiv. 21). (a) Thus, sin is washed away, even before Baptism or absolution, when the sinner makes an act of love of God joined with a desire, at least implicit, of receiving the Sacrament of Baptism or Penance. The act of love is not the cause, but the final disposition introducing justification. (b) The punishment of sin is forgiven, when one makes an act of love, or performs a good deed out of love of God; but the degree of remission corresponds to the fervor of the charity.

**1197.** Does the precept of peace demand unanimity of judgments?

(a) In matters of greater importance, there should be agreement in judgments; else, there will not be that harmony of wills,

desiring the same things and disliking the same things, which constitute peace. In necessary things, therefore, there should be unity of judgments: "I beseech of you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you, but that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment" (I Cor., i. 10).

(b) In matters of slight importance, difference of opinion does not remove friendship, for each one thinks that his judgment will better serve the good that is sought alike by all. We find that even very holy men have disagreed on matters of opinion—for example, Paul and Barnabas on the question whether or not Mark should be taken on the second missionary journey (Acts, xv. 37), Jerome and Augustine on the status of Mosaic observances after the death of Christ. Disputes may offend against charity, however, if they become too personal or too heated, as sometimes happens even to minds occupied with heavenly things (*e.g.*, theologians, spiritual writers).

**1198.** Reconciliation with enemies is necessary, in order that peace may be maintained. It includes: (a) *internally*, the putting away of thoughts and feelings contrary to concord; (b) *externally*, signs of renewed charity, if there has been an open breach.

**1199.** The duty of reconciliation does not necessitate the forgiveness of every kind of wrong suffered from an enemy—that is, it does not always oblige one freely to remit the consequences of an enemy's acts. There are three kinds of wrong: (a) *offenses*, which are such contradictions offered to the will of another as do not trespass on any strict right or occasion any damage. Example: Balbus, who is in great distress, asks his friend Titus to secure employment for him. Titus could easily do this favor, but he refuses; (b) *injuries*, which are violations of the strict right of another, but without damage. Example: Claudia addresses Caia in very disrespectful language when no witnesses are present; (c) *damages*, which are the taking from another of what is his, or harm done to him as regards his soul, his life, his fame, or his fortune. Examples are theft, scandal, assault and slander.

1200. Whether an offender asks pardon or not, one is obliged to forgive the offense—that is, to put aside all aversion, indignation and hatred: “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us” (Matt., vi. 12). But, granting that one desires salvation for the offender as for others, shows the common signs of charity, and is not prompted by hatred, the following are not required: (a) that one so pardon the offense as to take the offender back to the same special friendship as may have existed before; (b) that one overlook an injury so as not to require satisfaction (and hence, without acting against charity, Caia may insist on an apology from Claudia for the disrespectful language used by the latter); and (c) that one renounce restitution or reparation for damage done one. No one is obliged to give to another what is one’s own, and, if there is no other way of securing one’s rights, one may have recourse to court. If the result of prosecution will be punishment of the offender rather than restitution (as in case of libel or slander), it is not uncharitable to prosecute the offender, if one’s motive is the fulfillment of justice, the prevention of the same wrong to others, or the honor of one’s family (Lev., xix. 17).

1201. There are cases, however, in which charity requires one to forgive a debt of satisfaction or restitution, namely, when this would impose too heavy a burden on the offender, compared with the benefit that would be derived therefrom. (a) Thus, restitution should not be insisted on, when the offender is repentant and can ill afford to pay the debt, and the party offended can easily get along without the payment. (b) Punishment should not be insisted on, if the harm done the offender or his family will be out of proportion to any good that may result. (c) Prosecution should not be used, if a wrong can be amicably adjusted out of court (I Cor., vi. 1).

1202. Who should make the advances towards reconciliation after a rupture of charitable relations? (a) If only one party was the offender, he should normally make the first move towards reconciliation. It is of counsel, but not of precept, that the innocent party ask for reconciliation, unless the circumstances require that he should do so, as when the offended party can much more

easily make the advances, or when great scandal will arise, or when the offender will become hardened in hate and lose his soul, if the party offended does not make efforts for peace. (b) If both parties were offenders, he who offended more seriously should make the advances. (c) If both offended equally, he who was first to disturb the peace should also be first to work for its restoration. (d) If it does not appear which of the parties was more to blame in any of the foregoing ways, both are equally bound.

1203. The manner of seeking reconciliation is as follows: (a) Reconciliation can be sought either in person, or through an intermediary who is a friend to both parties. (b) It can be sought either explicitly (by expressing regret and asking pardon), or implicitly (by a friendly conversation or favors shown). Generally speaking, an inferior (*e.g.*, a child) should explicitly request reconciliation with a superior (*e.g.*, a parent); but it will suffice for a superior to seek forgiveness from an inferior implicitly.

1204. The time for seeking reconciliation is the earliest possible moment: “If thou offer thy gift at the altar, and there thou remember that thy brother hath anything against thee, leave there thy offering before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother, and then coming thou shalt offer thy gift” (Matt., v. 23, 24). (a) Thus, internal reconciliation (*i.e.*, repentance on the part of the offender and forgiveness on the part of the one offended) should not be delayed, and should precede any sacred action, such as offering a gift to God, if this latter is to be acceptable and meritorious. (b) External reconciliation (*i.e.*, asking pardon and making satisfaction) and the manifestation of forgiveness should be attended to as soon as the circumstances of time and place permit. The resolve to be reconciled externally is included in internal reconciliation, but prudence dictates that one wait for the suitable occasion, lest precipitation make matters worse.

1205. *Mercy.*—From charity results mercy, for he who loves his neighbor as a friend in God, must grieve over the latter’s sorrows as if they were his own. Our Lord commands: “Be ye

merciful, as your Heavenly Father is also merciful" (Luke, vi. 36). But not all compassion is true mercy or supernatural.

(a) Thus, as regards the object that causes sorrow, true mercy grieves over the evils that befall another against his will, such as sickness, failure in an enterprise, or undeserved misfortune. But wilful evil, such as sin, provokes not mercy, but rather indignation, although one may compassionate sinners on account of the ills their sins bring on them (Matt., ix. 36).

(b) As regards the internal cause of sorrow or sympathy, supernatural mercy arises from the love of charity for the one suffering; natural mercy, from the fear one has that a similar evil may overtake oneself, or that oneself may suffer loss on account of another's misfortune.

(c) As regards the act of mercy, it is to be noted that it proceeds from the will, regulates the emotions, and is itself regulated by reason. Thus, mercy differs from the sensible distress a refined person experiences at the sight of suffering, which, though good in itself, may never lead to a wish to alleviate sorrow. Thus, also, it differs from unregulated sympathy, which bestows help or forgiveness indiscriminately, without thought of the greater evils that may result; it differs from sentimentality, which does not restrain tears and other emotional expressions within due bounds. The virtue of mercy has a care for the interests of justice, but mere pity, like prejudice, blinds the mind to what is true and right.

1206. The causes of an unmerciful spirit are: (a) lack of charity towards one who is in misery; (b) pride or too much prosperity, which makes one feel that others suffer justly, or that one is above their condition (Prov., xxviii. 4); (c) great misfortunes or fears that have hardened one's disposition, or made one self-centered.

1207. *Mercy Compared with the Other Moral Virtues.*—(a) Mercy, if taken for the emotion of sympathy as regulated by reason, is inferior to prudence and justice, which are perfections of the higher powers of the soul (*i.e.*, of the intellect and will). (b) Mercy, if taken for an act of the will disliking the misery

of another and moving one to remove that misery, surpasses the other moral virtues; indeed, it may be said to be something divine, and hence more than a virtue. Certainly, it is the greatest of the virtues that have to do with the neighbor, for of its nature it implies freedom from some defect and the relief of that defect in others, which is not the case with other virtues. Thus, while prudence directs acts and justice renders to others their due, these do not of themselves remove ignorance or destitution in a neighbor.

1208. *Mercy Compared with Charity.*—(a) In itself (*i.e.*, considered precisely as to its essential notes of freedom from misery and relief given to the miserable), mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For, carried to its highest development, freedom from defect means infinite perfection; while relief of defect in others means that, out of infinite love for the Supreme Good, relief is poured out by God on His creatures. Thus, in God mercy is an extension of the love God has towards His own goodness, for the benefit of creatures, and is greater than charity: "The mercy of God is above all His works" (Ps. cxliv. 9).

(b) In its subject (*i.e.*, considered precisely as to the perfection it brings to its possessor), mercy is inferior in creatures to charity. For it is better to be united by love to the Supreme Good than to remove evil in a creature: "Above all these things have charity" (Col., iii. 14). Mercy is the sum of the Christian religion as far as external works are concerned, but charity is the sum of Christianity as regards internal acts.

1209. *The Obligation of Mercy.*—(a) The natural law itself inculcates mercy, but those not influenced by divine revelation have not highly esteemed it or practised it. Thus, Plato wished that all the poor might be sent into exile. Virgil thought that freedom from pity was a sign of wisdom; Seneca called mercy a vice of the soul; Nietzsche taught that compassion has no place in the morality of the superman.

(b) The divine law commands mercy, especially in the New Testament. Assistance of the poor, the widows, the orphans, the sick, the captives, the slaves and other unfortunates is every-

where insisted on: "I will show thee what the Lord requireth of thee: verily to do justice, and to love mercy, and to walk solicitous with thy God" (Mich., vi. 8).

**1210. External Effects of Charity.**—Three external effects of charity will now be considered—beneficence, almsgiving and fraternal correction. These are not distinct virtues, but only separate acts pertaining to the virtue of charity and proceeding—like love, joy and peace—from the same motive of love of God. (a) Thus, beneficence naturally results from charity, since one of the acts of friendship is to do good to one's friend; (b) almsgiving is one of the special ways in which beneficence is exercised; (c) fraternal correction is a species of spiritual almsgiving.

**1211. Beneficence.**—Not every act of helping others is virtuous, nor is all virtuous assistance called beneficence. (a) Thus, to assist others in evil is maleficence, nor is it virtuous to help them with an evil purpose. Examples: To give money to criminals to help them defeat the law is participation in crime. To give presents to others in order to receive a return of favor from them is cupidity (Luke, xiv. 12). (b) To assist others or to give to them out of compassion for misery, is mercy; to do so out of a sense of obligation, is justice; to do so out of love of God, is beneficence.

**1212. Beneficence is a duty, and like charity should be universal:** "While we have time, let us work good to all men" (Gal., vi. 10); "Do good to them that hate you" (Matt., v. 44). But this does not mean that no discrimination is to be used in beneficence, or that impossibilities are required.

(a) Not every kind of activity in which others are engaged is deserving of assistance, not every kind of suffering of others may be removed. Examples: Criminals or enemies of the State are not to be assisted in their wrongdoing, but one may attempt to bring them to better conduct; one who has been justly sentenced to prison may not be aided to escape, but he may be visited and consoled and given religious assistance.

(b) Not all can be helped individually; even the richest and most generous person can benefit only a small percentage of

those who are deserving. Charity requires, however, that one be so disposed that one would help all individually, if it were possible, and that one does help all generally, by praying for both Catholics and non-Catholics.

**1213.** Since it is impossible to help all individually, beneficence should be regulated by the order of charity (see 1174 sqq.), and particular good should be done to those with whom on account of conditions of time or place one is more closely associated. Hence, the following general rules are given:

(a) In benefits that pertain to a particular kind of relationship, one should give the preference, other things being equal, to those with whom one has that relationship. Examples: To make a banquet for another is a benefit pertaining to friendship, and hence should be shown to one who is a friend, rather than to one who is a business associate, but not an intimate. To support another person is a benefit pertaining to kinship, and hence should be shown to a parent, rather than to a stranger.

(b) In benefits given to those with whom one has the same kind of relationship, one should give the preference, other things being equal, to those nearer in relationship. Example: In dispensing alms, one should help one's own family rather than distant relatives.

**1214.** If other things are not equal, the foregoing rules must sometimes be reversed.

(a) When the common good is involved, preference should be given those who represent it, even though others are nearer to one as regards private good. Hence, a citizen should help the fortunes of his adopted country rather than those of his mother country; in a civil war one should aid rather one's comrades than one's kinsmen who are on the opposite side.

(b) When a supreme good of a private person is at stake, one should prefer to help him, even if a stranger, rather than another who is a friend, or relative, but who is not in the same distress. Example: One should give one's loaf to a man dying of starvation rather than to one's own father, who is hungry but not starving.

(c) When the means with which a benefit is bestowable be-

long to another, one must prefer to give back what belongs to the other, even if this person is a stranger, rather than use it for the good of a friend or relative. Thus, if a person has stolen money or has borrowed money from a stranger, he must return it to the owner, rather than make a present of it to his own wife. An exception would be the case in which the wife was in dire necessity, whereas the owner was not; but the duty of restitution would remain for the future.

1215. No general rule can be laid down for all cases in which one party is nearer to self and the other party more in need, and many such cases have to be decided according to prudent judgment in view of all the circumstances. It should be noted that, though wife and children are nearer to one than parents, the latter have a greater claim on charity when they are in equally extreme necessity, on account of the supreme benefit of life received from them. But ordinarily one is bound rather to provide for one's children (II Cor., xii. 14).

1216. **Almsgiving.**—Almsgiving is defined: "Assistance to one who is in need, given out of compassion and for the love of God." Hence, this act pertains to various virtues. (a) It is elicited by the virtue of mercy, which means that compassion for misery is the immediate principle which produces almsgiving. (b) It is commanded by the virtue of charity, which means that love of God is the remote principle or end of an alms, for, as said above (see 1205), mercy itself is an effect of charity (I John, iii. 17). (c) Secondly, it may also be commanded by other virtues. Thus, if a person gives an alms to satisfy for his sins, he performs an act of justice; if he gives in order to honor God, he performs an act of religion; if he gives without undue grief over the loss of what he gives, he practises liberality.

1217. **Qualities Recommended for Almsgiving.**—(a) Alms should not be given ostentatiously (Matt., vi. 2 sqq.), though it is often edifying that they receive publicity (Matt., v. 16); (b) they should be given cheerfully (II Cor., ix. 7).

1218. **Forms of Almsgiving.**—(a) In the strict sense, an alms is a gift made without any obligation of payment or return; (b)

in a wide sense, almsgiving includes selling on credit as a favor to a poor customer, a loan granted at a low rate of interest or without interest, help in securing employment, etc. Thus, if a poor man is sufficiently helped by the use of an article, there is no need of making him a present of it.

1219. Almsgiving is to be distinguished, also, from mere giving. (a) Thus, assistance given the poor out of a bad motive (*e.g.*, to lead them away from their religion, to induce them to crime) is sinful; (b) assistance given the poor out of a merely natural good motive (*e.g.*, pity for their sufferings) is philanthropy, but not charity (I Cor., xiii. 3), and may coexist with the state of hatred of God.

1220. Corporal alms, in the form of bodily necessities given freely in themselves or in their money equivalent, are of as many kinds as there are bodily needs. (a) Hence, the common necessities of food, drink, clothing and shelter should be provided as alms to the starving and to those who lack sufficient clothing, or who are without a home. (b) Special necessities, whether internal (such as sickness) or external (such as persecution or imprisonment), should be relieved or assuaged by remedies, visits, protection or relief. (c) The necessity of the body after death is that it be cared for with the honor which the memory of the deceased deserves, and hence burial of the dead is numbered among the corporal alms.

1221. Thus, there are seven corporal works of mercy. (a) Those that pertain to the needs of the body during life are mentioned by our Lord in Matt., xxv. 35, 36. (b) The burial of the dead is praised in Scripture as a good work, as we see in the cases of Tobias (Tob., i, ii, xii), and of those who buried our Lord (Matt., xxvi. 12, xxvii. 57 sqq.).

1222. Spiritual alms, consisting of assistance given those who suffer want in mind or spirit, are either prayers, by which divine aid is asked for them, or various acts by which human aid is conferred. These acts are also of two kinds, and constitute seven spiritual works of mercy.

(a) The defects from which a soul suffers, and which are not

moral, include ignorance in the intellect, doubt in the practical judgment, and sadness in the affections; and hence the acts of almsgiving for such cases are instruction, counsel, and comfort.

(b) The defects of soul which are moral are the guilt of sin and its consequences—that is, the offense given and the burdens that result for the sinner or others. The corresponding spiritual alms are admonition against sin, pardon of the offense done to self, patience in bearing with the difficult ways of others, especially if they err through infirmity, or willingness in helping them to bear the consequences of their errors (Rom., xv. 1).

1223. The giving of spiritual alms may suppose superiority or authority in the giver over the receiver, or a certain procedure to be followed; hence, in the administration of spiritual benefits, the due order of time, place and persons has to be remembered. (a) Thus, in the instruction of the ignorant, it is not every kind of ignorance that is a defect, but only the ignorance of things one must know; and it is not every person who is to give the needed instruction. (b) In the correction of sinners, it is not every kind of reproof that is to be used, but gentleness and secret admonition should be employed where possible (Prov., xxvii. 6).

1224. *Comparison of Corporal and Spiritual Alms.*—(a) Spiritual alms are better, because their nature is higher and they are of greater benefit to the recipient, even though he appreciates them less. Thus, it is better to enjoy peace of mind than to feast sumptuously. (b) Corporal alms are sometimes more necessary in a particular case, and hence they should be attended to first. Thus, for one suffering from hunger food is more necessary than words of comfort (James, ii. 15, 16).

1225. Though corporal alms are not spiritual in the assistance they give, they are spiritual in their effects. (a) Thus, they bless the recipient corporally, by relieving his hunger or other need; (b) they bless the giver spiritually, since God will reward his charity (Ecclus., xxiv. 13, 14), and the person helped will pray for his benefactor (*ibid.*, 15).

1226. *The Duty of Giving Alms.*—(a) The natural law re-

quires that we do to others as we would be done by, and there is no one who does not wish that help be rendered him if he falls into need. Moreover, the common welfare requires that the rich assist the poor, for otherwise there will be discontent and disorder. Hence, even unbelievers are not exempt from the obligation of almsgiving. (b) The divine law, in both Old and New Testaments, commands almsgiving: "Give alms out of thy substance, and turn not away thy face from any poor person" (Tob., iv. 7); "Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, for I was hungry, and you gave Me not to eat" (Matt., xxv. 41-42); "Let us love, not in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth" (I John, iii. 18). Tobias, Doreas, Cornelius, and Zacheus are praised for their charitable gifts.

1227. Almsgiving, being an affirmative commandment, does not oblige for every moment of time, but only when right reason calls for it on account of the state of the giver or of the receiver.

(a) The state of the giver requires him to give alms only when he has a superfluity of goods, for no one is bound to deprive himself of what is necessary for his own use (see 1164, 1169). John the Baptist said to the people: "He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath none; and he that hath meat, let him do in like manner" (Luke, iii. 11). "That which remaineth," says our Lord, "give as alms" (Luke, xi. 41).

(b) The state of the receiver gives him a claim on charity, when he is in necessity and unable to help himself. Temporal goods, according to the will of God, are for the benefit of the whole human race; and, while the ownership of particular goods belongs to the rightful possessor, he should not withhold the use of them from those who are in need, when he has more than he needs for his own use. Neither is it necessary that one be asked for an alms; one is obliged to give it when one knows that one's neighbor is in want, though unable or ashamed to beg for help.

1228. It is not a precept, therefore, but only a counsel, that one give alms in other cases. (a) Thus, when one is in equal need oneself and has no superfluous goods, one may give to

another; (b) when one's neighbor is not in need, or is able to help himself, one may still give to him out of charity, if he is deserving (see 1169).

1229. Superfluities are those goods that remain over and above what are necessary for life, or the maintenance of one's state of life justly acquired and socially useful.

(a) Necessaries of life are the goods one must have to provide food, clothing and home for oneself and one's family. Among necessaries of life we may include what one has to set aside for old age, sickness, increase of family, and the future sustenance of dependents who will need it (II Cor., xii. 14). But they should not be extended to include imaginary cases, or all the possible cases of personal need that may arise in the future; otherwise, one is guilty of that exaggerated solicitude for the morrow which our Lord forbids (Matt., vi. 34).

(b) Necessaries of state are the goods a person must have to keep up his position and that of his family according to the standard of living of his class. This includes provision for the education and advancement of one's children, for hospitality, adornment of home, and the care and improvement of one's business; but it does not include provision for excessive pleasures or luxuries, or improbable future opportunities of bettering one's condition; otherwise, even the wealthiest person might say that all his money was tied up and that he had no superfluous goods.

1230. What is necessary for the decency of particular stations in life? (a) This does not consist in any fixed amount, for, even when considerable additions to or subtractions from a person's wealth have been made, he may retain and support the same social rank. (b) It consists, therefore, in the amount sufficient for him to maintain, according to the opinion of prudent men, what is becoming in one of his class. Thus, one's position may require that one do much entertaining or keep up an expensive household, or it may require only that one live moderately.

1231. The giving in alms of goods for which the giver himself has need is governed by the following rules:

(a) Necessaries of life should be given away to another, as a matter of precept, if the common good is bound up with the life

of that other, but not with one's own life; they may be given away to another, as a matter of counsel, when the common good does not require it, but the higher good of virtue invites one to sacrifice one's life for one's neighbor (probable opinion). Examples: One should give away one's last loaf to save the life of a leader on whom the salvation of his people depends. One may make the same sacrifice, if one is single and without dependents, and another is married and has a dependent family. But one may not give away what is necessary for the life of one's family (I Tim., v. 8).

(b) Necessaries of state, at least in part (see 1251), should be given away to another, as a matter of precept, if the public good or the life of a private individual are at stake, or if that which is given in alms can be easily recovered and will now prevent a very grave calamity; they may be given away, as a matter of counsel, if the higher good of virtue invites one to embrace voluntary poverty: "If thou wouldst be perfect, go sell all that thou hast and give to the poor" (Matt., xix. 21). Examples: One should offer one's fortunes in support of one's government, if in some crisis the nation cannot otherwise be saved. One may give up riches and become poor in order to follow Christ in the religious life.

1232. Superfluities of one's state are the goods from which the precept of almsgiving requires that assistance ordinarily be given. But the mere fact that one has a superfluity does not oblige one to give alms. As in every virtuous act, so also in almsgiving there must be not only an object according to reason, but also circumstances according to reason. Hence, one who has a superfluity is bound to give alms only when the proper conditions of time, place, person, etc., are present. (a) As regards time, a person is not obliged to devote to almsgiving the time that is needed for other duties. (b) As to persons, a person is not obliged to give alms, if there is no needy person known to him.

1233. As to need, we may distinguish three classes of persons:

(a) Those in apparent need are such as pretend poverty, sickness, or misfortune, in order to get sympathy and financial



aid (*e.g.*, professional beggars). Alms should not be given persons of this kind, since they take what would be given to the really poor and needy. Rather they should be exposed and punished.

(b) Those in real need through choice should not be helped, if they take to begging because they are too lazy to work, or find it profitable to live off others; for they have no right to beg, being able to help themselves, and it would be wrong to encourage them in idleness and an imposition on others (II Thess., iii. 10). But those who are voluntarily poor for Christ's sake, whether they belong to a religious order or not, are worthy of respect and it is meritorious to assist them.

(c) Those who are in real need against their will, should be assisted; for, even though they became destitute through their own fault, they are in fact unable to help themselves now.

1234. Regarding money obtained under the false pretense of poverty and the duty of restitution, the following rules may be given: (a) If a person obtains considerable alms by pretending to be blind, disabled, in great want, etc., and he is not afflicted or in need, he should give back the money to the donors or, if this is impossible, to the poor, since the donors wished to help the poor, not to encourage idlers. (b) If one obtains only a small amount under a false pretense of poverty, some moralists say there is no duty of restitution, since the donor may be presumed to give unconditionally in the case of minute sums; likewise, if a beggar is really poor but exaggerates his need, it does not seem that he is bound to restitution, for those who give alms expect a certain amount of romancing from tramps and other professional beggars.

1235. What is one's duty in cases of doubtful need? (a) Minute inquiries are inexpedient, since the really deserving are often unwilling to publish their needs; (b) refusal of alms except in cases where one is certain of the need, is not a good general rule to follow, since it is a less evil that an unworthy person be helped than that a worthy one be refused.

1236. There are three degrees of corporal need (*cf.* 1165). (a) A person is said to be in *extreme need*, when he is in manifest

danger of losing his life, if help is not given him at once. This does not mean, however, that a person is not in extreme need until he is breathing his last breath; for at that moment he is beyond the reach of human aid. (b) A person is in *grave need*, when he is in probable danger of death, or is in manifest danger of some very serious misfortune, such as severe sickness, amputation of some member, long and bitter imprisonment, insanity, loss of good name, reduction from wealth to poverty, destruction of home by fire, etc. (c) A person is in *common need*, when he suffers the inconvenience of poverty, such as being obliged to beg, to deprive himself of many things, to wear poor clothes or to eat ordinary victuals, but is not in danger of any serious loss.

1237. *Rules on Giving Alms from the Superfluities of One's State.*—(a) To those who are in extreme or grave necessity alms must be given *in each individual case*, for these cases are rare, and the persons in need have a personal claim on one's charity when this is the sole means of saving them from death or other great evil. Example: Last year Titus saved a mother from death and her child from disease by giving his money and services free of charge. This would not exempt him from the duty of doing a like charity, if a like necessity presents itself now.

(b) To those who are in common necessity alms must be given *from time to time*—now to one, now to another, as prudence dictates—but there is no obligation for an individual case. Even the richest man could not give to all who are in common need, and their want is not so pressing that any one of them can be said to have an individual claim.

1238. *Gravity of the Obligations to Give Alms.*—(a) For cases of extreme and grave necessity, the obligation of almsgiving is grave. There is general agreement among theologians on this point, since the loss suffered by the neighbor is serious and the withholding of help indicates a lack of charity (I John, iii. 17). Example: The priest and the levite who passed by the wounded man on the road to Jericho were guilty, from the nature of their act, of mortal sin.

(b) For cases of common necessity, the obligation of alms-

giving, as it appears, is also grave; for it seldom happens that one is called on to assist those who are in extreme or grave necessity, whereas almsgiving is inculcated as an ordinary duty, and the reasons given by our Lord in Matt., xxv. 41-46, for exclusion from heaven seem to be neglect of alms in common necessity. But some theologians hold that the obligation is only light, since the need is light; and, since these authorities are numerous and of repute, a confessor could not refuse absolution to a rich man who refused on principle to give anything to those in common necessity. Such a one should be advised, rather than reproved, on this point.

1239. From what was said above, the following conclusions may be drawn about the gravity of the sin of refusing alms: (a) It is certainly a mortal sin to refuse alms to one in extreme or grave need, and probably also a grave sin to refuse ever to give alms to those in common need. (b) It is not a mortal sin to refuse an alms in a particular case, if one is not sure of the obligation (e.g., if there is doubt about one's ability to give the alms or the other's need), or if it seems that others will give assistance, or that the need will disappear, or that one will suffer some serious inconvenience by giving, etc.

1240. *Refusal of Alms and Restitution.*—(a) The mere refusal of an alms does not oblige one to make restitution. For restitution is the giving back to another of what strictly belongs to him, and it cannot be said that a poor person has a strict right to a gift from another. A violation of charity may be gravely sinful, and yet not oblige to restitution. (b) The refusal of an alms, if joined with injustice, does oblige one to make restitution. Thus, if by threats or force one prevents a starving man from taking the food that has been denied him, injustice is committed; for in extreme necessity one has the strict right to take what is necessary, and reparation should be made if this is prevented.

1241. Alms given from ill-gotten goods are sometimes lawful, sometimes unlawful.

(a) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because they belong to another and the present possessor has no right to keep them, it is not lawful to give them as alms, for they must be

returned to the owner. An exception would have to be made, however, for the case of extreme necessity, for in such a case the person in danger of death would have a right prior to that of the owner not in need. Example: It is unlawful to give stolen money as an alms to the poor, when one is able to restore it to the rightful owner.

(b) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because both giver and receiver acted against law and forfeited their rights to possession, the former has no claim to restitution, nor the latter to retention, and the goods ought to be devoted to alms. Example: If a simoniacal transaction is forbidden under pain of loss of the price paid and received, the receiver is obliged to give the money to the poor.

(c) If the acquisition was not unlawful, but the manner through which it was made was unlawful, the gain is shameful, but still it belongs to the one who has earned it, and may be devoted to alms. Example: Titus hired Balbus to work on Sundays. The violation of the Sunday law was a sin, but the labor given was serviceable to Titus and difficult to Balbus. Hence, the latter is not bound to give back the money, but may keep it and use it for a good purpose.

1242. Though shameful gain may be used for almsgiving, it should not be devoted to sacred purposes, when this will cause scandal or be irreverent to religion. Thus, the chief priests would not accept the "blood money" of Judas for the use of the temple (Matt., xxvii. 6), because the law forbade the offering of gifts that were an abomination to the Lord (Deut., xxiii. 18; Eccclus., xxxiv. 23).

1243. *The Proceeds of Gambling and Almsgiving.*—(a) Profits made from gambling may not be used for alms, when one is bound to restore them to the loser. Thus, according to natural law he who wins money at cards or similar games from a minor or other person who has not the right to dispose of money, or who wins through fraud, must give back the winnings. Likewise, restitution is due according to some, if the civil law makes such aleatory contracts null and void; but others deny this. (b) Profits made from gambling may be devoted to alms, when ac-

ording to law one has a right to them, as when one has played for recreation, with moderation and with fairness to the loser.

**1244.** Persons who may give alms are all those who have a right to dispose of goods as gifts. Others who have no such general right (*e.g.*, religious, wives, children and servants), may also give alms as follows: (a) They may give alms from any goods that belong to them, and of which they have the control. Thus, a wife may give alms from money which is her own, by inheritance, earnings, etc. (b) They may give alms from such goods as are placed in their charge and dispensation. Thus, the procurator of a religious house has the right to give alms with permission of his superior and according to his Constitution (Canon 537). A religious who is a parish priest may administer and dispense parish alms (Canon 630, §4). (c) They may give alms with express or implied permission. Thus, children may give articles of food to the poor, when their parents consent. (d) They may give alms without permission in a case of extreme need. Thus, a wife could make use of her husband's money without his consent, if this should be necessary to save a life.

**1245.** The right of a wife to give alms from her husband's earnings is as follows: (a) from the money given her for the support of herself and the family, the wife may give reasonable alms; (b) from the common money of the family she may give alms with her husband's express or presumed consent. But, if he is miserly and unwilling to give alms, she may nevertheless use what is reasonable according to the family resources for almsgiving (*e.g.*, in helping her impoverished parents).

**1246.** The right of servants to give alms from the goods of their employer is as follows: (a) the rule is that servants have no right to give away anything that belongs to their employer without his express permission, for, if permission could be presumed, the property of employers would not be safe; (b) an exception to the rule is made for such things as are to be thrown away (*e.g.*, leavings of the table), since if they are given in alms the proprietor suffers no loss.

**1247.** Since charity should be universal, no class of persons, such as strangers, unbelievers or sinners, may be excluded from

the benefit of almsgiving (Matt., v. 45). However, charity is also well ordered, and hence there is a preference to be observed, as follows:

(a) Other things being equal, one should favor those who are nearer to oneself by bonds of kinship, friendship, etc., since their claim on one's charity is greater. Charity begins at home.

(b) If other things (such as worthiness, need or public utility) are on the side of those not related by kinship, friendship, etc., the order of preference may be reversed. Thus, if a person had to choose between helping a distant relative for whom he was not specially responsible, and who was a worthless fellow, or who was not in great need or who was not of great value to the community, and helping a stranger, who was most deserving, or in dire distress, or of great value to the community, the latter should be assisted rather than the former.

(c) In case of two strangers in equal poverty, one should help first the one who is more worthy or who feels his distress more. Thus, a person who is poor through misfortune is more deserving than one who gambled his money away; those who were once wealthy feel the sufferings of poverty more than those who are inured to a life of privation.

**1248.** Is it permissible for one appointed to distribute alms to keep some himself, if he is really poor? (a) If the persons are designated to whom the alms are to be given, the distributor must give only to them; (b) if it is left to the discretion of the distributor, he may keep a reasonable alms for himself.

**1249.** The amount that should be given in alms has to be measured according to the income of the giver and the need of the receiver.

(a) As to the income of the giver, he should give in proportion to his income: "According to thy ability be merciful. If thou have much, give abundantly; if thou have little, take care even so to bestow willingly a little" (Tob., iv. 9). A rich man who spends more in the barber shop on cosmetics, etc., than he gives to the poor, and a poor man who gives more towards alms than to the feeding of his own family, are not giving according to their means.

(b) As to the need of the receiver, a person should give his share towards providing for the case before him. Thus, if there is no one else who can or will give, and a neighbor is in grave necessity, a charitable person will bear the whole expense, as was done by the good Samaritan. But if the necessity is ordinary (as in the case of street beggars), or there are others who will help, a smaller alms suffices. Steady employment is a better charity than temporary doles, inasmuch as it gives permanent assistance.

1250. Hence, in the following cases alms are excessive: (a) When, outside the instances given in 1231, one gives away all the necessaries of one's life or station. The poor widow who gave all her living (Luke, xxi. 1-4) is praised, but doubtless she was able somehow to obtain enough to provide for her own life. (b) Alms are excessive when one gives from one's superfluities so much that the recipients are spoiled and encouraged to do nothing for themselves. For the purpose of almsgiving is not that those who have wealth be impoverished and others enabled to live in luxury, but that the poor be relieved of suffering and the rich gain the merit of charity (II Cor., viii. 13).

1251. Regarding the obligation of giving *all* the goods of one's station in life or of one's superfluities, the following points should be noted:

(a) Some theologians hold that, in a case of extreme necessity, one is bound to give all the goods necessary to one's state of life, since a neighbor's life is a more important good than one's own position in life. Others deny this on the ground that one is not bound, even for preserving one's own life, to have recourse to extraordinary means and so lose the rank and style of living one has. Thus, a self-supporting workingman would not be obliged to reduce himself to beggary in order to prolong the life of a dying person. A well-to-do person is not obliged to sell his office, conveyance, books, and other things needed for his business or profession, in order to rescue a captive held for ransom by bandits.

(b) There are theologians who hold that one is bound to give away all one's superfluous wealth in alms, even apart from cases

of extreme or grave necessity; but others teach that, while this is of counsel, it is not obligatory, since the needs of the poor will be sufficiently relieved if all who have means give something from their superfluities. Moreover, the retention of some superfluous goods is necessary for the promotion of industrial and commercial enterprises, and, by increasing national wealth, this policy indirectly benefits the poor.

1252. Ecclesiastical law, however, requires all clerics who enjoy a benefice to give *all* that remains over and above from the returns of the benefice, after they have provided for their own decent maintenance, to the poor or to pious causes. This obligation is held as grave. It will be treated below when we come to the special duties of the clergy.

1253. Is there any definite amount or percentage, then, which should be contributed to alms?

(a) For a case of extreme or grave necessity, one should contribute enough, according to one's ability, either in conjunction with others or alone (if others will not help), to give relief. Thus, if a neighbor is about to die of starvation, a charitable man will give food free of charge. If a poor man is about to be treated unjustly, a charitable lawyer will give him advice without charge. But it is not necessary that one provide extraordinary remedies or helps—for example, that one pay the expenses of a trip to Europe for a poor person whose health would be benefited by the travel.

(b) For cases of common necessity, St. Alphonsus held that one should give two per cent of what remains from the yearly income after the necessities of life and station have been taken care of. But other moralists believe that today the amount cannot be fixed mathematically, and that only the general direction can be given that one should be generous according to one's means, and regulate one's yearly alms according to the prevalence of poverty.

1254. Is it better to give a little to many, or much to one person in need? (a) If the one person is in great need, and others are only in slight need, it is better to give to the one in great need. Example: If one has ten dollars to give in alms,

it is better to buy an overcoat for Titus who is shivering from the cold, than to give ten one-dollar bills to ten men who need new collars and neckties. (b) If the need is equal, it is better to divide the alms, for thus more distress is alleviated and the danger of spoiling a recipient with overmuch bounty is avoided. Example: Caius has \$30,000 to give in charity and there are three deserving institutions of charity known to him, all of which are in great need—a hospital, an orphan asylum and a school. He ought to divide his money between the three.

1255. *The Time for Giving Alms.*—(a) One should give at one time all the amount of one's alms for a certain period, if one is able to do this, and there is a need that calls for it—"He gives twice who gives quickly" (Prov., iii. 28)—for the poor may perish or may be driven to acts of desperation or violence, if help is postponed. (b) One may distribute one's almsgiving if there is no urgent call for it—that is, one may make partial contributions at various times, retaining meanwhile money for almsdeeds in order to invest it for future charities, or to await greater needs to which it may be applied, etc.

1256. *The Manner of Giving Alms.*—(a) One gives alms directly when one ministers relief personally to the needy, giving food to the starving and medicine to the sick, helping to put out a fire, etc. (b) One gives alms indirectly when one pays taxes for the support of alms-houses, public hospitals, orphan asylums, homes for the aged, the insane, etc.; when one contributes to charitable collections or drives or to organizations for relief (such as the St. Vincent de Paul Society); when one assists or promotes movements for the free education of those who cannot pay, for the betterment of living and working condition of laborers, for security against loss of employment, pensions for the aged, etc.

1257. Public charity done by the State is useful and necessary under the conditions of modern life, but it does not and cannot take the place of charity done by the Church or by private individuals.

(a) State-administered charity does not reach all, or even the most deserving, cases of need. Hence, those who pay their taxes

for the support of state charities are not thereby exempted from the obligation of contributing to cases they may meet, especially of extreme or grave necessity. The payment of these taxes, however, diminishes need, and so it also diminishes the amount one is bound to give in alms.

(b) State charity provides for the corporal needs of the recipient, and it is imposed as compulsory on the giver. Hence, it cannot take the place of alms given by the Church or by individuals that will care for both soul and body, and that are given cheerfully and received gratefully.

1258. *Fraternal Correction.*—Fraternal correction is defined: "An act of charity and mercy by which one uses suitable words or other means in order to convert one's neighbor from sin to virtue."

(a) Thus, it is an *act of charity*, for it is a love of our neighbor and the desire of his spiritual welfare that prompts this correction. Hence, the admonition of a sinner for his own good differs from a correction administered to a wrongdoer for the good of another or of the public; the former is fraternal correction and is an act of charity, while the latter is judicial correction and is an act of justice.

(b) Fraternal correction is an *act of mercy*, for, just as feeding the hungry and other corporal alms remove bodily misery, so does admonition of sinners remove spiritual misery.

(c) Fraternal correction uses *suitable words or other means*, for while it proceeds from charity and mercy, it must be regulated by prudence. It is not an easy matter to correct another successfully, and hence the need of good judgment as to the means to be employed, whether they shall be words or equivalent signs (*e.g.*, sad looks, a gesture of disapproval, a change of subject of a sinful conversation, or refusal of help), and whether one shall use reproof, instruction, counsel, or warning.

(d) Fraternal correction aims at *turning a neighbor from sin to virtue*. It is the proper remedy for sins of negligence, as judicial correction is for sins of malice. It is applied, also, chiefly to the cure of sin that has already been committed; but it should be extended so as to include the prevention of sin in the

future, since there is no less an obligation of preventing than of removing sin. Hence, those who are in dangerous occasions receive fraternal correction when a charitable warning is given.

(e) Fraternal correction is given to a *neighbor* (i.e., to an individual), and so it differs from the general censure of vice that is given by preachers, whose duty it is to correct sins that are prevalent, provided this be done prudently, in such a way as to effect good and not harm. Unpopularity or other such handicaps do not excuse a preacher from the duty of correction.

1259. Fraternal correction is a grave duty, and more important than that of almsgiving. (a) The natural law requires that a person should do unto others as he would wish them to do unto himself, and everyone ought to wish that, if he needs correction, it will be given him. Even the pagans proclaimed the need of correction. Seneca desired to have a monitor who, by advice and reproof, would guard him against the dangers of evil examples and conversations; and Plautus said that a friend who refuses to chide the faults of his friend is himself worthy of blame. (b) The divine positive law also commands that one should correct one's brother in order to save him from another offense (Eccles., xix. 13, 14), and to win him back to good (Matt. xviii. 15), that the spiritual should instruct with mildness those who have committed some transgression (Gal., vi. 1), that a sinner should not be treated as an enemy, but admonished as a brother (II Thess., iii. 15).

1260. Does the duty of fraternal correction oblige one to go out and seek a person who is living a life of sin? (a) If the sinner is under one's care, so that one is responsible for him, there is a duty to seek him as long as there is hope of amendment; for the good shepherd goes after the lost sheep (Matt., xviii. 12, 13). Hence, parents, pastors and superiors must try to win back their subjects from the ways of sin. (b) If the sinner is not under one's care, there is no duty to seek him out; for obligations that are owed to our neighbor in general, but not to any determinate person, do not require that we go out to look for the persons to be aided, but only that we aid those whom we meet. Hence,

a private person is not obliged to frequent the haunts of vice and crime in order to reform those who are there; but the community at large has duties regarding such cases.

1261. Since the precept of fraternal correction is affirmative, it does not oblige for every time and place; acts of virtue must be so performed that not only the object and the motive shall be good, but the circumstances also should be suitable. But the object and motive of correction (*viz.*, the conversion of a sinner) are primary, and the circumstances of time, place, etc., secondary considerations. (a) Hence, correction is good and a duty when it will serve to convert or improve a sinner, now or later, although it may be imperfect as to some of the circumstances. (b) Correction is not good, nor a duty, when it will not serve to convert the sinner, even though other circumstances would seem to call for it (Eccles., xxxii. 6). Consequently, a person ought not to correct when either he or the other person is under the influence of anger, lest matters be made worse. This, of course, is said of fraternal, not of judicial correction; for a judge or other superior must condemn even when the culprit will not be made better, in order to restrain him from evil and to provide for the common good, the protection of justice, and the avoidance of scandal.

1262. In the following cases fraternal correction defeats its own purpose: (a) when the sinner will not be bettered by the correction, for his continuance in sin will become graver by reason of his rejection of the admonition; (b) when the sinner will become hardened and embittered by correction, and as a result commit more numerous or more serious sins. Thus, if one knows that a blasphemer is only made worse by scolding or remonstrances, it is a sin to attempt to correct him as to those ways: "Rebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee" (Prov., ix. 8).

1263. The duty of fraternal correction depends, therefore, on the knowledge or opinion one has about the success it will have. Hence, the following cases may occur: (a) If one is *certain* that the correction will be beneficial, one should give it; if one is *certain* it will not be beneficial, one should omit it. (b) If it is *likely* that the admonition will be profitable, and *certain* that

it will not be positively harmful, it should be given, for a physician in order to help a sick person should give a remedy that is harmless, even though only probably beneficial, if there is nothing else that can be done. (c) If it is doubtful whether the admonition will do any good, and also doubtful whether it will do harm (e.g., when one is dealing with a stranger, whose character one does not know), one should weigh the good and the evil and decide accordingly, as will be explained in the next paragraph.

**1264.** Cases of doubt concerning the advantage of a fraternal correction may occur as follows: (a) If the good expected is superior to the evil that is feared, one should give the correction. Example: If it seems that a sinner, if admonished, may suffer great confusion or be for a time estranged, but may also be finally converted, the good result of conversion is to be preferred to prevention of confusion or estrangement. If it seems doubtful whether correction will help or hurt a dying man, the good of his salvation should be preferred to the good of freedom from a new sin. (b) If the good expected and the evil feared are about equal, the correction should be omitted, since the negative precept of not injuring a neighbor outweighs the affirmative precept of doing him a service.

**1265.** When is sin committed by omitting fraternal correction? (a) If the correction is omitted *out of charity*, the omission is good and meritorious. Example: Titus omits to correct Sempronius, because he thinks the reproof would do harm to the latter or to others, or because he awaits a more favorable occasion. (b) If the correction is omitted *contrary to charity* (i.e., because a person hates his neighbor or disregards his spiritual welfare), the omission is a mortal sin. Example: Caius neglects to correct Sempronius, because he prefers to see Sempronius go to ruin rather than lose his friendship or incur his enmity. (c) If the correction is omitted *in spite of charity*, the omission is a venial sin. Example: Balbus, who is not a superior, fails to correct Sempronius, because through frailty he fears to give offense, or to be considered over-bold, but he prefers the latter's spiritual

welfare to his own human fears and interests, and would give the correction, if he felt that it was absolutely necessary.

**1266.** The sin committed by delaying fraternal correction is to be judged according to the rules just given about omission of correction. But is it lawful to put off correction in the hope that the sinner, through experience of the evil effects of sin, may become more tractable? (a) If there is hope of present amendment through correction, this should not be delayed; otherwise, one is careless about the honor of God, the edification of others, and the possible hardening of the sinner or his death in the midst of his sins. (b) If there is no probability of present amendment through correction, one can only wait in the hope that the experience of the evils of sin may bring the prodigal back to God.

**1267.** It is not often necessary for one who is not a superior to make fraternal correction, since there are many conditions that must exist before one is obliged to it. These conditions include the purpose to be attained, of which we have just spoken, and the proper circumstances, which are as follows: (a) the fault to be corrected should be a known and serious sin; (b) the person to give the correction should be one who has the right and duty to correct; (c) the manner of giving the correction should be such as will promote the end in view.

**1268.** One should not attempt to correct a fault, unless one is morally sure that a fault has been committed, or is about to be committed. For this reason the scrupulous, who are inclined to suspect or see evil where there is none, are generally excused from the duty of making corrections. Reasons why doubt, fear, suspicion or rumor do not suffice, are: (a) correction is not pleasant to the one corrected, and, if his guilt is not provable, he will be able to argue with the corrector, and so quarrels and enmities will result; (b) charity bids us to give the benefit of the doubt to a neighbor, and, if this is not done, the one who is being corrected will be able to correct the corrector on account of uncharitable suspicions.

**1269.** Is one obliged, therefore, to make inquiries into the conduct of those whom one suspects of wrongdoing?

(a) If there is question of judicial correction, the public authority is bound in justice to examine juridically into matters of doubt before acting.

(b) If there is question of fraternal correction, a parent or other superior is bound in charity to make paternal inquiries into the conduct of his subjects; for, as a father does not wait until his children ask for corporal goods but inquires about their needs, so neither should he wait until their spiritual distress is brought to his attention. The superior here should avoid the extremes of suspicion, on the one hand, which will lead him to act rashly and win for him the hatred of his subjects, and of over-trustfulness, on the other hand, which will foster all kinds of secret irregularities. Likewise, he should not betray a special watchfulness about one individual that will be harmful to the latter's reputation.

(c) If there is question of fraternal correction, private individuals should not inquire into the affairs of others. Those who go about spying on or shadowing others, even if their purpose is to reform, are acting against charity to themselves and to the persons they wish to improve; their own affairs will suffer, since the number who need reformation is large, and the person who is being investigated will be annoyed or otherwise injured: "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest" (Prov., xxiv. 15).

1270. The kinds of faults that call for fraternal correction are as follows: (a) grave sins should be corrected, for otherwise one allows a soul to perish that might have been saved (Matt., xviii. 14, 15); (b) slight sins or transgressions of rules should also be corrected, when they are the occasion of grave scandal or disorder in a community, and superiors who are negligent about this commit mortal sin; (c) slight sins or transgressions should not be corrected in ordinary cases, for these faults are so numerous that, if one had to correct them, an intolerable burden would be laid on everyone. Persons who scold and lecture over every trifling misdeed are regarded as pests and do more harm than good.

1271. The purpose of fraternal correction is to save one who

is in danger of losing his soul. Hence, it should not be restricted to those sins that are an offense to the corrector, but it should extend also to sins that are against God, the neighbor, or the offender himself.

1272. Since fraternal correction is given for the purpose of converting a sinner from the evil of his ways, it is not called for when one's neighbor is not a sinner, strictly speaking, or has already reformed. Thus, there is no need of this correction in the following cases: (a) when a person sins through ignorance and is not guilty of formal sin; (b) when a person who was a sinner in the past has given up his old ways.

1273. A person who sins from vincible ignorance should not be corrected unless the two following conditions are present: (a) there must be hope of amendment, otherwise the admonition would only aggravate the sinner's guilt; (b) there must be no greater evil that will result from the admonition and correction.

1274. A person who sins from invincible ignorance is not guilty of formal sin, and hence, as said above, he is not a subject for fraternal correction. But charity often requires that he be instructed especially by superiors, confessors, etc., with a view to the prevention of various evils. These evils are of the following kinds: (a) injury to God, as when a person unacquainted with the language uses expressions that are blasphemous; (b) injury to self, as when a child not understanding the power of liquor becomes intoxicated; (c) injury to the neighbor, as when a person who does not know that it is a fast day causes scandal by not keeping the fast.

1275. If there is hope that the instruction will have a good result, one should instruct the invincibly ignorant in order to prevent injury to God, themselves, or their neighbor; but, if it seems that an instruction will do only harm or more harm than good, it should be omitted. The duty of instruction rests especially on superiors, such as parents, teachers, confessors. These principles are applied to various cases as follows:

(a) A material sin may have been committed in the past. Titus through inadvertence ate meat on a day of abstinence, but gave no scandal; Balbus did the same thing, and this caused



considerable scandal. Now, there might be an obligation of telling Balbus what he did in order to repair the scandal, but no such obligation would exist in the case of Titus. Sempronius and Caius both married invalidly, but are in good faith. If Sempronius is told about his marriage, matters can be easily rectified; but if Caius is informed that his marriage is null, he will abandon his putative wife and his family, and there will be serious disorders and scandals. Hence, Sempronius should be told, but not Caius.

(b) Material sin may be about to be committed against the natural or divine law. Titus is about to destroy what he thinks is an abandoned and useless picture, but which is in reality a very valuable work of art belonging to Balbus. Caius is going to the altar to be married; Claudius knows of a diriment impediment to the marriage, but cannot make it known without causing a scene and giving great scandal. Titus should be instructed, but it is a duty to say nothing to Caius.

(c) Material sin may be about to be committed against human law. Sempronius sees Claudius and others eating meat on a day of abstinence, which they have forgotten. He also sees Father Balbus, who has forgotten to put on an alb or a chasuble, going to the altar to say Mass. There is no obligation to call the attention of Claudius to the day of abstinence, but for the sake of respect to divine worship the attention of Father Balbus should be directed to the missing vestments.

1276. Certain past sins do not demand fraternal correction: (a) those sins that have been repented of, especially if there is no danger of a relapse (*e.g.*, a wife should not be always reminding her now sober husband that he was addicted to drink before he met her); (b) those sins that will in all probability be remedied shortly without one's intervention. Hence, it is not necessary to reprove Titus because he drank too much, if he is not careless about his salvation and will soon approach the Sacraments, or if his parents or wife are better fitted to make the correction and will not fail to do so.

1277. To what persons may correction be given? (a) Judicial correction can be given only to one's subjects, since it sup-

poses authority; (b) fraternal correction can be given, not only to inferiors and equals, but also to superiors. For charity should be shown to all those who are in need of assistance, and, the higher the office, the greater the danger. Superiors who are giving scandal or doing harm to others should be remonstrated with by their equals, or, if need be, by their subjects. Fraternal correction among the clergy is especially advantageous.

1278. When fraternal correction is given to a superior: (a) the superior should take a proper correction with gratitude and humility, imitating St. Peter when reproved by St. Paul (Gal., ii. 11); (b) the inferior should give the correction without boldness or harshness, but respectfully and mildly: "An elderly man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father" (I Tim., v. 1). It is better that the person giving the correction be himself of some standing, lest the act seem to proceed from contempt, and so only embitter the superior who is at fault. Example: Children should plead with parents who steal, get drunk or neglect religion, to mend their ways.

1279. What persons may administer correction? (a) Judicial correction as just said can be given only by a superior; (b) fraternal correction may be given by any person who is not so unfitted that a correction from him will necessarily be useless or harmful. It is not required, however, that one be immaculate, for if immunity from all sin were necessary in a corrector, who could reprove delinquents (I John, i. 8)?

1280. The fact that a person is known to be a sinner, or not in the state of grace, or guilty of the same things he reproveth, does not unfit him for giving a fraternal correction; because, in spite of his own sinfulness, he may retain a right judgment and so be able to correct wrongdoing. In the following cases, however, correction made by a sinner is reprehensible, on account of circumstances other than that of the person: (a) the motive of the correction is sinful, when the sinner corrects only in order to distract attention from himself, to conceal bad deeds by good words, to practise revenge, etc.; (b) the mode of the correction is sinful when the sinner corrects with pride, as if he himself were above correction: "Wherein thou judgest another thou

condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest" (Rom., ii. 1); (c) the consequences of correction made by a sinner are an evil circumstance, as when scandal results. Thus, if a person who is guilty of far greater sins corrects his neighbor, this has a demoralizing effect, when the impression is given that good words rather than good deeds are important.

1281. One who prefers his neighbor's conversion to his own deviates from the right order of charity, since he should love himself more. But a person may without any transgression against the precept of fraternal correction seek to correct his neighbor before he has corrected himself.

(a) Thus, from the nature of correction itself or from the provisions of the commandment, there does not seem to be any obligation of correcting self before correcting others; for a humble correction made by a sinner with acknowledgment of his unworthiness to censure others, or by a sinner who is thought to be good or to have reformed, may be just as efficacious as a correction made by a truly virtuous man. But it is of counsel that one correct oneself as a means towards the better correction of another.

(b) Because of special reasons, a person may be otherwise obliged to correct himself before he attempts to correct another, as when self-correction is the only means towards obtaining some necessary end. Thus, a superior who cannot enforce discipline because he is unobservant himself, the friend of a dying man who cannot convert the latter unless he gives evidence of his own conversion, a person who cannot repair the scandal he has given unless he manifests repentance—all these should begin by correcting themselves. One should take the beam out of one's own eye, if otherwise one cannot remove the mote from a neighbor's eye (Matt., vii. 5).

1282. All suitable persons, then, are bound by the duty of fraternal correction: "He gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor" (Eccles., xvii. 12). But the duty rests more heavily on some than on others. (a) Thus, bishops and other pastors are held out of justice to fraternal correction, and even at the peril of life. (b) Other prelates, confessors,

parents, husbands, masters, teachers and guardians, are held to fraternal correction from charity and by reason of their office; but they are not held to this duty when there is grave personal danger to themselves. (c) Private persons are held out of charity, but their obligation is less than in the case of those whose office requires them to make corrections.

1283. A person is not bound to make a correction for the sole reason that he is able to make it successfully. For he is excused: (a) if correction by him is not necessary, as when parents or others better able than himself will attend to the matter; (b) if his correction will bring on himself evils which he is not obliged to incur.

1284. An obligation of making a correction even when this will cause an injury to the corrector, exists in the following cases: (a) If the correction is necessary to avert extreme spiritual evil (i.e., damnation), one should be prepared to make a sacrifice, even of life itself, to give the correction (see 1165). Example: Titus is dying of a contagious disease, and will lose his soul, if Balbus does not come to advise him. (b) If the correction is necessary to avert grave spiritual evil, a pastor should be willing to risk his life, and another person should be willing to risk the loss of money, and even some injury to health. But a subject is not bound to correct his superior, when this will bring on him persecutions; a scrupulous person is not bound to correct, for this would cause him worries and suffering.

1285. The manner of making a correction is as follows:

(a) The internal dispositions should include charity towards the one corrected and humility as regards one's own fitness. For fraternal correction is not opposed to the commands of bearing with the weaknesses of others (Gal., vi. 2), and of not proudly preferring self to others (Philip., ii. 3). One should correct inferiors paternally, equals kindly, and superiors respectfully. In every correction there should be seriousness mingled with mildness.

(b) The external order to be followed is that given by our Lord in Matt., xviii. 15-18, namely, that, when possible, admonition should be given privately, and that one should not proceed

to accusation before superiors until other means, such as the calling in of witnesses, have proved unavailing. The order to be followed in fraternal correction is not only of the positive divine law, but it is also of the natural law. For the natural law requires that we do for others what we wish done for ourselves, and there is no one who does not desire that correction be given him in such a way that the least possible injury be done to his feelings and to his good name.

1286. In what cases should secret admonition be used?

(a) For *public* sins (*i.e.*, real sins known or soon to be known to the larger part of the community), no secret admonition is required, since the guilt is already publicly known; a public correction, on the contrary, is necessary to remedy the scandal: "Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have fear" (I Tim., v. 20).

(b) For *occult* sins that are against the common good or the good of a third person no secret admonition is required, but one should denounce them immediately; for the spiritual or corporal welfare of the multitude or of an innocent private individual is a greater good than the reputation of the guilty person. Exception should be made, however, for the case in which one is certain that by a secret admonition one can correct the sinner and prevent the harm that threatens others. Examples: If Titus knows that there is a plot to rob the house of Balbus, and that any effort to dissuade the criminals would only bring him into danger, he ought to warn Balbus or the authorities. If Claudius knows that in his school a certain student is teaching the other boys to steal and become drunk, he should make this known, and hence cannot be absolved if he refuses. But the seal of the confessional must be observed.

(c) For *occult* sins that are not against the common good or that of a third person, one should have recourse to secret admonition before making the sins known. This will save the sinner from loss of reputation and from consequent hardness in sin; it will also save others from a share in his infamy, or from the scandal caused by publicity.

1287. What is the obligation of reporting an occult sin that is doing harm in a community, when the person who reports will suffer for telling what he knows? (a) If harm to the community will result from silence, one is obliged even at the cost of great inconvenience to speak (see 1284). Example: Claudius knows that a fellow-student has a bad influence over his companions, and is leading more and more of them into stealing, with the result that a large number will be corrupted and the institution disgraced. But he cannot speak without serious harm to himself, because he also has been implicated, or because informers are regarded and treated as traitors. (b) If some private harm will result from silence, one is not bound at the cost of great inconvenience to speak. Example: If Claudius knows that only one or two are being led astray, he is not bound to implicate himself or to incur the ignominy of being regarded as a spy.

1288. There are exceptional cases in which occult faults, not injurious to others, are reprovved publicly, without previous private admonition. (a) God as the supreme ruler has the right to publish hidden sins, although He admonishes men secretly through the voice of conscience or through external preaching or other means. St. Peter, in making known the sin of Ananias and Saphira, acted as the instrument of God's justice and in virtue of a revelation given him (Acts, v. 3, 4, 9). (b) Members of a society who are agreed to remind one another publicly of transgressions of their regulations, do not violate the order of fraternal correction given by Christ, if there is nothing defamatory in these reminders. Example: The proclamations made in the chapter of faults in religious orders.

1289. May a prelate (*e.g.*, in a visitation) oblige his subjects to carry to him, without a previous secret admonition of the person to be accused, information about the secret sins of fellow-subjects that are not harmful to others?

(a) If a sin is entirely secret, and the subjects have not renounced their right to reputation in the sight of the prelate, the latter has no right to give orders that he be informed at once, since the rule given by Christ requires that a fraternal correc-

tion be first given. A subject would be bound, therefore, if such orders were given, to obey the divine injunction, rather than that of the prelate (Acts, v. 3, 4, 9).

(b) If a sin is entirely secret, but subjects have renounced their right to receive first a private admonition, a prelate may require that information be brought to him at once. This is the rule in certain religious societies; but even in them a sin should not be reported to the prelate if the sinner has already amended, nor should the higher superior be informed if the immediate superior can take care of the matter sufficiently. These religious have a right to their reputation.

(c) If a sin is not entirely secret, because there are some indications (such as ill-repute or grounds for suspicion), a prelate may require that information be brought to him immediately.

1290. If, after several private admonitions have been made, there is no hope of success by this method, what should be done? (a) If it appears that the other means prescribed by our Lord will be successful, they should be tried, just as a physician has recourse to new remedies when old ones have failed. (b) If it appears that any further efforts will do harm rather than good, the attempt to correct a private sin that harms only the sinner should be given up.

1291. The order to be followed in fraternal correction, after personal reproof or remonstrance has failed, is as follows:

(a) One should enlist the services of one or two others to assist in making the brotherly correction. The conversion of the culprit is more important than his reputation with these others; whereas their knowledge of the matter safeguards the corrector from the charge of being a mischievous talebearer, should things go further, and it should arouse the culprit to the need of correcting himself, before his case is brought before the superior for correction.

(b) When other things have failed, recourse should be had to the superior of the person at fault, if there is hope that this will prove successful. If the superior is imprudent or given to wrath or is known to dislike the person to be corrected, or if the latter would only be enraged by a reproof from this superior, charity

would urge one to say nothing about the matter. Example: Titus makes himself intoxicated from time to time. Balbus is the only one who knows this, and he tries to correct Titus. But, as the latter denies the accusation, Balbus asks Caius and Sempronius, friends of Titus, to be witnesses; and all three of them make an effort to convert Titus. This correction also has no effect, and so Balbus and the other two make the matter known to the parents of Titus, that they may watch their son more carefully and keep him away from occasions of drink.

1292. What are the duties of a superior to whom a subject has been reported for fraternal correction? (a) He should try to discover the truth of the matter. Means to this end are a consideration of the character and motives of the accuser, the reply which the accused makes in his own defense, and in case of necessity a confrontation of accuser and accused, a cross-examination, etc. (I Cor., i. xi; Dan., xiii. 5). Those who make a practice of gladly carrying tales to superiors are disturbers of peace, and they should be given to understand that their accusations are not wanted, and that they should mind their own business.

(b) If the superior has reason to believe that the accusation in question is true, he should use moderate remedial measures, while at the same time preserving the good name of the person to be corrected. For the information has been brought before him, not as judge, but as father of the person accused, and hence public punishments or corrections injurious to reputation must be avoided. Removal from an office, a change of place and special vigilance may be used, when this can be done prudently.

1293. Cases in which a subject may be reported to his superior for fraternal correction without previous admonitions are not impossible; for the law given by Christ concerning the order to be followed is affirmative, and hence obliges only under the proper circumstances. (a) Thus, if previous admonitions would be harmful, whereas an admonition by the superior will be beneficial, recourse should be had at once to the superior. (b) If an admonition by the superior will be more advantageous, the other admonitions may be omitted. Thus, if the superior is more

revered by the person to be corrected and will be listened to more readily, or if there is danger of delay in making previous admonitions, it is better that the matter be brought before the superior at once. What is said of the superior can be applied also to some other pious and prudent person from whom a correction would be better received.

1294. The obligation of fraternal correction by private individuals may be summed up as follows: (a) One is bound to correct when one is certain about a grave sin which will not be corrected except by oneself, and when one has good reason to hope that the correction will be profitable to the sinner and not unreasonably harmful to the corrector. Those who interfere when these conditions are not present are meddling or imprudent, rather than charitable. (b) One is bound to report to a superior when one is certain about a grave sin which is harmful to the community or which cannot be corrected so well by private admonition, if one believes that it will not be reported except by oneself, and that one's report will be for the good of others and not an undue detriment to oneself. Those who report of their own choice when these conditions are not existent, are malicious tale-bearers or rash news-carriers, rather than charitable accusers.

#### Art. 7: THE SINS AGAINST LOVE AND JOY

(*Summa Theologica*, II—II, qq. 34-36.)

1295. The sins against charity and its subordinate virtues can be reduced to the following: (a) hatred, which is opposed to love; (b) sloth and envy, which are contrary to the joy of charity; (c) discord and schism, which are opposed to the peace of charity; (d) scandal, which is the opposite of beneficence and fraternal correction.

1296. **Hate.**—Hate is an aversion of the will to something which the intellect judges evil, that is, contrary to self. As there are two kinds of love, so there are also two kinds of hate. (a)

Hatred of dislike (*odium abominationis*) is the opposite of love of desire, for, as this love inclines to something as suitable and advantageous for self, so hatred of dislike turns away from something, as being considered unsuitable and harmful to self. (b) Hatred of enmity (*odium inimicitiae*) is the opposite of love of benevolence, for, as this love wishes good to the object of its affection, so hatred of enmity wishes evil to the object of its dislike.

1297. **Hatred of God.**—A thing cannot be hated unless it is looked upon as evil, and hence God cannot be hated except by those who regard Him as evil to themselves.

(a) Thus, those who see the Divine Essence (*i.e.*, the blessed), cannot hate God, for His Essence is goodness itself, and, therefore, the blessed can see in God only reasons for love. (b) Those who see God obscurely through the things made by Him (*i.e.*, wayfarers on earth), cannot hate God considered as the author of effects that are in no way displeasing to the will, such as existence, life, intelligence; but they can hate God as the author of effects displeasing to their will, such as law and punishment. Thus, no one can hate God because God has given him being, for existence of itself is something good and desirable; but a depraved will can hate God for having forbidden sin, or for inflicting chastisements, or for permitting some evils to accompany the blessings of life. That hatred of God is not a mere possibility, the Scriptures in many places attest: "The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth forever" (Ps. lxxiii. 23); "Now they have seen and hated both Me and My Father" (John, xv. 24).

1298. It should not be inferred from what has just been said that it is not *God in Himself* that is hated, but only His works; nor that it is a sin against God to dislike evils or even divine punishments.

(a) Thus, God Himself is not the principle or motive cause of the hatred directed against Him, for in God there is no evil that can produce dislike; but God is the term or object of the hatred aroused in the sinner by the divine effects that displease him, as the texts given above from Scripture indicate. For example, a man hates his neighbor on account of certain defects

he perceives or thinks he perceives; the defects are the principle, but the neighbor is the term of the hatred.

(b) Dislike of the evils that are in the world, or of chastisements sent by God, is not dislike of God Himself, since God does not ask us to love evil, but only to endure such evils as cannot be cured. Even murmurs against Providence are usually manifestations of impatience, not of hatred of Providence. It is only the sinner that dislikes God Himself for permitting or inflicting evils, who is guilty of hatred of God.

1299. Hatred of God of various kinds. (a) As regards the intention, it is either interpretative or formal. *Interpretative* hatred is aversion that is not intended directly or for its own sake, but only indirectly and by reason of something else whose love is preferred. *Formal* hatred is an aversion that is intended directly and expressly in itself. Every mortal sin is an act of interpretative hatred of God, since mortal sin consists in placing one's own pleasure or interest above the friendship of God; but it is only the special sin which attacks God directly that constitutes formal hate. Thus, he who murders his enemy does not directly intend dislike of God, but revenge; whereas the condemned murderer who blasphemes God, because he is to be executed, directly dislikes God. (b) As regards the degree of malice it contains, formal hatred of God is either dislike or enmity. *Dislike* of God is the sin of those who do not like some attribute of God; *enmity* towards God is the sin of those who wish some evil to God. Thus, one who deliberately wishes that God would sanction injustice dislikes the divine attribute of justice, while an unjust man who wishes he might be rid of God and His judgment is guilty of enmity to God.

1300. Hatred of God as a Special Sin.—(a) Interpretative hatred of God is not a special sin but a general circumstance of every mortal sin; but formal hatred is a special sin, and indeed one that is comparatively rare, and that must be specially mentioned in confession. This is a sin which is distinct, not only from the sins against the other theological virtues (*e.g.*, unbelief, despair), but also from the sins against the other objects of charity (*e.g.*, hatred of the neighbor).

(b) Formal hatred of God is not a special sin against the Holy Ghost (see 899); but its malice pervades every such sin, and it is thus a general sin against the Holy Ghost. For example, presumption is a dislike of God's law which requires that one must attain salvation through the observance of the commandments; rejection of the known truth is a dislike of God's revelation.

1301. The Gravity of Hatred of God.—(a) It is a mortal sin from its nature, and can never be venial on account of the smallness of the injury, but only on account of lack of deliberation or consent. Dislike of even one attribute of God is a grave injury, for everything pertaining to God is perfect and infinitely lovable. (b) Hatred of God is the worst of all mortal sins; for it is directly opposed to God (the supreme good) and to charity (the most excellent virtue in a creature), whereas other mortal sins offend against these goods only indirectly.

1302. The comparison just made between hatred of God and other sins supposes that the other sins do not include hatred of God, for it is clear that simple hatred of God existing in the will is less serious than a composite sin, such as external blasphemy uttered to manifest internal hatred of God. (a) Thus, hatred of God without unbelief is worse than unbelief without hatred of God; (b) hatred of God without hatred of the neighbor is worse than hatred of the neighbor without hatred of God.

1303. Degrees of Malice in Hatred of God.—(a) A new species of sin is added to hatred of God, when out of hatred one proceeds to sin against creatures, or to commit other offenses against God Himself. Example: Titus hates God, and therefore persecutes those who believe in God, and also blasphemes God. (b) A new degree of malice is added to hatred of God when one proceeds from dislike to enmity, or when the circumstances of person, place, manner, etc., aggravate the malice. Example: Hatred of God outwardly manifested adds the evil of scandal; not so hatred of God that is concealed.

1304. Hatred of Creatures.—All dislike of God is sinful, because there is nothing in God that merits dislike. But in creatures imperfections are found as well as perfections.

(a) Hence, dislike of the imperfections of our neighbor (*i.e.*,

of all that is the work of the devil or of his own sinfulness), is not against charity, but according to charity; for it is the same thing to dislike another's evil as to wish his good. Thus, God Himself is said to hate detractors, that is, detraction (Rom., i. 30), and Christ bids His followers hate their parents who would be an impediment to their progress in holiness, that is, the sinful opposition of those parents (Luke, xiv. 26). Only when dislike is carried beyond reason is it sinful. Thus, a wife who dislikes her husband's habit of drunkenness so much that she will not give him a necessary medicine on account of the alcohol it contains, carries her dislike to extremes.

(b) Dislike of the perfections of nature or of grace in our neighbor (*i.e.*, of anything that is the work of God in him), is contrary to charity. Thus, God does not hate the detractor himself, nor should children ever hate the person of a parent, or the natural relationship he holds to themselves, no matter how bad the parent may be. As St. Augustine says: "One should love the sinner, but hate his vices."

1305. The same principles apply to dislike of self. (a) Thus, one should dislike one's own imperfections, for they are the enemies of one's soul. So, contrition is defined as a hatred and detestation of one's vices, and it is a virtue and an act of charity to self. (b) One should not dislike the good one has, except in so far as it is associated with evil. Thus, one should not regret one's honesty, even if by reason of it one loses an opportunity to make a large sum of money; but one may regret having married, if one's choice has been unfortunate and has made one's life miserable.

1306. Should a person dislike in others their opposition to himself? (a) If their opposition is unjust, he should dislike it, for it is then a sin in them and an injury to himself, and charity to them and to self requires that he should dislike what is harmful to all concerned. (b) If their opposition is just, he should like it, for it is virtuous in them and beneficial to himself: "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy" (Prov., xxvii. 6).

1307. Direct enmity to self is not possible, for nature inclines each one so strongly to love of self that it is impossible for anyone to wish evil to himself as evil: "No one hateth his own flesh" (Ephes., v. 29). But indirectly a person may be at enmity with himself, inasmuch as he wishes evil under the guise of good; and hence St. Augustine, commenting on the words, "He that loveth his life shall lose it" (John, xii. 25), says: "If you love self wrongly, you hate it; if you hate self rightly, you love it." This indirect enmity to self happens in two ways. (a) A person sometimes wishes himself what is not a true, but only an apparent good, as when he chooses the satisfaction of revenge rather than that of pardon of injuries. (b) A person sometimes chooses what is good, not for his true, but for his lower self, as when he decides to gratify the body at the expense of the soul.

1308. Is it ever lawful to wish evil to self or to others? (a) It is not lawful to wish anyone evil as evil, for even God in punishing the lost does not will their punishment as it is evil to them, but as it contains the good of justice. Hence, it is contrary to charity to wish that a criminal be put to death, if one's wish does not go beyond the sufferings and loss of life the criminal will endure. (b) It is lawful to wish evil as good, or, in other words, to wish misfortunes that are blessings in disguise. Thus, one may wish that a neighbor lose his arm, if this is necessary to save his life.

1309. One may easily be self-deceived in wishing evil to one's neighbor under the pretext that it is really good one desires, for the true intention may be hatred or revenge. Hence, the following conditions must be present when one wishes evil as good:

(a) On the part of the subject (*i.e.*, of the person who wills the evil), the intention must be sincerely charitable, proceeding from a desire that the neighbor be benefitted. Thus, it is lawful to wish that a gambler may meet with reverses, if what is intended is, not his loss, but his awakening to the need of a new kind of amusement. St. Paul rejoiced that he had made the Corinthians sorrowful, because their sorrow worked repent-

ance in them (II Cor., vii. 7-11). Of course, the desire of a neighbor's good does not confer the right to wrong him, for the end does not justify the means.

(b) On the part of the object (*i.e.*, of the evil which is wished to another), it must be compensated for by the good which is intended. It is not lawful to desire the death of another on account of the property one expects to inherit, for the neighbor's life is more important than private gain; but it is lawful to wish, out of interest in the common welfare, that a criminal be captured and punished, for it is only by the vindication of law that public tranquillity can be secured (Gal., v. 12).

1310. Is it lawful to wish the death of self or of a neighbor for some private good of the one whose death is wished? (a) If the good is a *spiritual* one and more important than the spiritual good contained in the desire to live, it is lawful to desire death. Thus, it is lawful to wish to die in order to enter into a better life, or to be freed from the temptations and sinfulness of life on earth. But it is not lawful to wish to die in order to spare a few individuals the scandal they take from one's life, if that life is needed by others as a source of edification (Philip., i. 21 sqq.). (b) If the good is a *temporal* one but sufficiently important, it does not seem unlawful to desire death. Thus, we should not blame a person suffering from a painful and incurable disease, which makes him a burden to himself and to others, if, with resignation to the divine will, he prays for the release of death; for "death is better than a bitter life" (Eccles., xxx, 17). But lack of perfect health or a feeling of weariness is not a good reason for wishing to die, especially if one has dependents, or is useful to others.

1311. Is it ever lawful to wish spiritual evil to anyone? (a) Spiritual evil of iniquity may never be desired, for the desire of sin, mortal or venial, is a sin itself (see 242), and it cannot be charitable, for charity rejoiceth not with iniquity (I Cor., xiii. 6). It is wrong, therefore, to wish that our neighbor fall into sin, offend God, diminish or forfeit his grace, or lose his soul. On the contrary, we are commanded to pray that he be delivered from such evils. (b) The good that God draws out of

spiritual evil may be desired. Some are permitted to fall into sin, or be tempted, that they may become more humble, more charitable, more vigilant, more fervent. It seems that the permission of sin in the case of the elect is one of the benefits of God's predestination, inasmuch as God intends it to be an occasion of greater virtue and stronger perseverance. It is not lawful to wish that God permit anyone to fall into sin, but it is lawful to wish that, if God has permitted sin, good will follow after it.

1312. Gravity of the Sin of Hatred of Neighbor.—(a) Hatred, whether of dislike or of enmity, is *from its nature* a mortal sin, since it is directly opposed to the virtue of charity, which is the life of the soul.

(b) Dislike, if enmity is not joined to it, is rarely *in fact* a mortal sin. Aversions and antipathies for others usually are either indeliberate, or have to do with what are real or fancied defects in others. Dislike is a mortal sin only when one despises another so much that one deliberately loathes even that which is of divine provenance in the other, or dislikes a real imperfection so immoderately as to inflict serious injury (*e.g.*, by refusing pardon or the common signs of charity, by giving grave scandal, etc.)

(c) Enmity *in fact* is often only a venial sin, either because one wishes only a small harm (*e.g.*, the loss of a small sum of money), or because one wishes harm, even a great harm (*e.g.*, the commission of mortal sin), without full deliberation. Enmity is a mortal sin, however, when one deliberately wishes a grave evil (*e.g.*, mortal sin or the loss of reputation) to one's neighbor.

1313. Hatred Compared with Other Sins Against the Neighbor.—(a) Hatred is a graver sin than other internal sins against the neighbor, such as envy, anger; for, while each of these latter attacks some particular kind of good of the neighbor or only to a limited degree, hatred may be directed against any good and knows no measure. Thus, covetousness is directed against the external goods or possessions of a neighbor, while hate may extend to either internal or external goods. Envy is opposed to the neighbor's good relatively, in so far as it is considered an



obstacle to one's own glory, but hate detests another's good absolutely. The hater finds his satisfaction, not in any profit derived for self, but in his aversion for another's good, and the harm that is wished his neighbor. This comparison here made should be understood, other things being equal, so that hatred of another's life is contrasted with envy of his life, etc.; for, if the goods are not the same, hatred may be a lesser sin, as when hatred of a neighbor's temporal good is compared with envy of his spiritual good. (b) Hatred of a neighbor is a more serious sin than external offenses done against him, for hatred sets the will wrong, and it is in the will that sin takes root: "He who hates his brother is a murderer" (I John, iii. 15). The external act, on the contrary (*e.g.*, killing an innocent man), is not a formal sin when the will is guiltless. (c) Hatred is a less harmful sin to the neighbor than external offenses; for example, internal dislike and malevolence will not break any bones, as may happen from a severe blow.

1314. Why is hatred not numbered among the capital vices? As was said above (see 269), a capital vice is one from which naturally and usually other species of sin take their origin. Now, hatred of God or the neighbor, in the natural and usual course of sin, does not precede, but rather follows other sins. Hence, hatred is not a capital sin. This will appear more clearly if we distinguish two kinds of hatred:

(a) Hate of that which is truly *evil* and opposed to the true good of man (*e.g.*, hate of vice), is naturally prior to other disinclinations, since rational nature first inclines one to love its good and hate its evil (see 1106).

(b) Hate of that which is *not evil* (as hate of God or of the neighbor), is naturally subsequent to other sins, for it is only a nature already corrupt that detests true goodness. This does not mean, however, that the whole catalogue of lesser sins must have been committed before hatred is arrived at, nor that in individual cases a sinner has not the freedom to hate before he has committed less grave sins.

1315. In a certain wide sense, however, it may be said that

hatred of the neighbor goes before all other sins against the neighbor, just as was remarked above (1299) concerning sins against God.

(a) Hence, interpretative hate—*i.e.*, a feeling against another that makes one act in effect as if there were hatred—does precede the other sins. Thus, if Titus, who bore no ill-will to Balbus, becomes enraged against him and inflicts death, the murder is traced back to anger, but this anger may be called hate, inasmuch as dislike of the life of Balbus is included in the desire of revenge.

(b) Formal hate—*i.e.*, dislike of another that is absolute, and not modified by such considerations as desire of revenge or sorrow over one's own inferiority—does not precede, but rather follows the other sins, as was explained in the previous paragraph. It is only this sin of formal hate that is a special sin. Titus in the example murdered Balbus, not because he had an absolute dislike for him, but because the thirst for revenge made Balbus displeasing to him.

1316. The causes of the sin of hatred are as follows: (a) causes that dispose one to hate are anger and envy, for to desire evil to another, for revenge or on account of one's own glory, prepares the way to desire evil to him absolutely, which is hatred. Envy, however, disposes to hate more than anger, since it is more akin to hatred: anger wishes evil to another as something owed to justice, but both envy and hatred look upon the neighbor's good as a thing distasteful. (b) The cause that induces sinful hatred of the neighbor is envy; for one cannot hate that which is good unless one regards it as in some way disagreeable, and it is the vice of envy that makes one regard one's neighbor's good as one's own evil. Hatred of God also indirectly results from envy, for, while the creature does not envy God, his envy of his neighbor breeds hatred of his fellow-man, and this in turn may produce hatred of God.

1317. Various Species of the Sin of Hatred.—(a) Hatred of God and hatred of the neighbor are sins specifically distinct, and hence to be declared specifically in confession. They are opposed

to the same virtue of charity, but, on account of the generical difference of sin against God and sin against the creature, they must be classed as different species of sin.

(b) Hatred of the neighbor in itself is but one species of sin, since all its acts have this one essential character in common, that evil is wished to a neighbor *as evil*—that is, one wishes another evil in general or every kind of evil, but does not specify particular evils, such as damnation or death.

(c) Hatred of the neighbor on account of its circumstances or results may be connected with sins of other species. Thus, he who hates his neighbor because the latter is pious, adds irreligion to his hatred; he who out of hatred wishes the death of his neighbor, adds the guilt of murder to hatred; he who out of hatred wishes to destroy his neighbor's property, adds the guilt of injustice to his hatred: he who hates his parents, adds impiety to uncharitableness; he who calls down a curse on another, adds malediction to hate.

1318. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred often have in mind a sin specifically distinct from the sin of hatred, or an act not sinful at all.

(a) Thus, "hatred of God" is sometimes used to signify a want of resignation to the divine will.

(b) "Dislike of the neighbor" is sometimes used to signify uncongeniality on account of difference of character, etc., or positive disapproval of qualities or acts that deserve dislike or censure. Thus, a penitent who always feels ill at ease in the company of a neighbor on account of some natural incompatibility or of some fear which he himself does not understand, or who dreads meeting an individual whose manners are boorish or whose conversation is distasteful, may accuse himself of sinful dislike.

(c) "Wishing evil to the neighbor" is sometimes used to signify one's desire that justice take its course or that the order of charity be observed. Thus, a penitent who wished for the common good that a criminal be punished, or according to charity that his friend would defeat others in competition for a prize,

may accuse himself that he wished harm to the criminal or bad luck to the competitors against his friend.

1319. Circumstances of hatred should be mentioned in confession as follows: (a) when they add a new species—thus, the person hated (*e.g.*, one's father) or the evil wished (*e.g.*, a fall into mortal sin, loss of reputation, death, etc.) may add a new sin to that of hate; (b) when they multiply the number of sins within the species of hate, as when one hates a large number of persons (see 219).

1320. **The Sin of Sloth.**—Sloth is a sadness or dejection of the will about the divine good one possesses, and arises from a want of esteem for one's Last End and the means thereto.

(a) Sloth is a sadness of the *will*. Hence, the sin of sloth differs from the passion of sadness, and also from bodily weariness. The passions (as said in 121) are not evil in themselves, but become evil when exercised immoderately, or turned to an evil object. Weakness or weariness of body is not sinful, but it disposes one for the passion of sadness, and this in turn may tempt the will to sloth, when duties owed to God are to be attended to.

(b) Sloth is a sadness about *good*, and so it differs from sadness about the smallness of one's good. Humility demands that one be sensible of one's own shortcomings and of the greater merits of those who are better. But it is not humility but ingratitude and sloth to depreciate and grieve over the good which one has received from God, such as the gift of faith, membership in the Church, etc.

(c) Sloth is sadness about the *divine good*, which is loved by charity. Thus, the sin of sloth differs from the circumstance of sloth, which is found in every sin. There is no sin that does not contain a sadness or disgust about the act of the opposite virtue; the very thought of moderation is depressing to the glutton, and religion is associated with gloom by the irreligious. But what is special to the sin of sloth is, that it grieves about that divine good itself over which charity rejoices, and which is the end of all the other virtues.

(d) Sloth is a sadness about the divine good as *shared by self*, that is, about the end offered oneself and the means thereto, such as eternal beatitude, the friendship of God, the Sacraments, the Commandments, good works and other divine gifts which should be esteemed and received with gladness. Sloth thus differs from hatred of God, which is a sadness over God's own goodness; and from envy, which is a sadness over the good of the neighbor.

(e) Sloth is a sadness over the divine good, which is *considered by one as an evil*. The sin of sloth looks upon the joys of heaven or the practice of virtue with contempt; it directly spurns them as unworthy of love (cfr. Num., xxi. 4). Hence, sloth differs from laziness or idleness, for this latter sin dislikes the exercise of virtue, not because it considers virtue as evil, but because it has a dread of the labor and exertion which virtue entails, and is overmuch in love with repose and ease.

**1321.** Sloth is a sin. (a) It is forbidden by God: "Bow down thy shoulder and bear wisdom, and be not grieved with her bands" (Eccles., vi. 26). (b) It is an evil sorrow, for it grieves over good. (c) It has evil effects, since it keeps man from his duty, swallowing him up with overmuch sorrow (II Cor., ii. 7).

**1322. Qualities of the Sin of Sloth.**—(a) Sloth is a special sin, since, as explained above, its individual objects differentiate it from the general slothfulness that is found in every sin, as well as from hatred, envy and laziness. But it is a sin, by comparison, rarely committed. (b) It is a mortal sin, from its nature, since it is a horror and detestation for the divine good. It is implicitly forbidden in the Third Commandment. (c) It is a capital sin (*i.e.*, a vice naturally productive of others), for sadness inclines man to many evils as means of escape from sorrow or of consolation in sorrow.

**1323.** In the following cases sloth is not a mortal sin. (a) It is not a mortal sin if in the object there is not grave matter. When a person is grieved at the thought that he will be forced to some spiritual good which is not of precept but of counsel, he does not sin thereby, for one does not sin by not choosing the counsels. Strictly speaking, however, this grief is not the sin of sloth, which is a sorrow over the divine good that one is bound

to accept with joy. (b) Sloth is not a mortal sin, if in the subject there is not sufficient reflection or full consent. Hence, mere bodily weariness in serving God, is no sin at all, and a feeling of disgust for spiritual things, not consented to, is only a struggle of the flesh against the spirit, and at most a venial sin.

**1324. Sins that Spring from Sloth.**—(a) To escape his sadness about divine things, the slothful man avoids or flees the things that sadden him—his last end (sin of despair) and the means thereto (sins of cowardice and carelessness). He also attacks the causes of his grief—the persons who would lead him to God (sin of rancor) or the spiritual things themselves (sin of malice). (b) To console himself for the want of joy in spiritual things, he seeks comfort in forbidden things: his mind is unquiet and curious about that which does not concern him, his talk is excessive, his bodily movements are restless, and he must be continually moving from place to place.

**1325. The Conquest of Sloth.**—(a) Flight is a suitable form of resistance to temptation, whenever the temptation grows stronger by thinking over the matter, as is the case with temptations against purity (I Cor., vi. 18). (b) Attack is a suitable form of resistance, when the temptation becomes weaker as one thinks over the matter (see 257). This is the case with sloth, for, the more one gives oneself to the consideration of spiritual things, the more pleasing do they become.

**1326.** Laziness, as distinct from the capital vice of sloth, is a generic name given to a number of sins or circumstances of sin, and hence it will be treated in several places.

(a) Thus, negligence is a want of prompt decision about duties to be performed. It is opposed to the virtue of diligence or solicitude, which pertains to prudence. Hence, negligence will be considered among the sins against prudence.

(b) Sluggishness (*pigritia*) is a tardy performance of duty, and will be considered among the sins opposed to diligence.

(c) Carelessness (*torpor*) is a perfunctory discharge of duties, without thought or love. It is one of the consequences of sloth given above (see 1324), and hence it is a sin against charity.

(d) Indolence is an excessive dislike of labor or exertion, caused by an inordinate love of recreation or bodily rest. It will be considered when we treat the sin of softness or delicacy, which is opposed to fortitude.

(e) Idleness is the actual omission of one's duty on account of indolence, and hence it is considered among the sins against the various precepts. Thus, under the precepts of charity and of justice will be discussed the omission of labor to which one is bound.

1327. The sin of carelessness about the service of God is also known as tepidity or lukewarmness. It consists in a want of fervor, and causes one to live in spiritual languor, wishing on the one hand to live holily and avoid sin, but fearing on the other hand the effort and generosity required for the practice of virtue and the struggle against evil. It is, therefore, most dangerous.

(a) Even if it is only internal, it may be more dangerous to the one concerned than grave sin itself, since threats and promises that move a sinner are often unavailing with one who is tepid and moving on to grave sin. Thus, we read: "I know thy works, that thou art neither cold, nor hot. I would that thou wert cold or hot. But because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold, nor hot, I will begin to vomit thee out of my mouth" (Apoc., iii. 15, 16).

(b) If it is external, this sin is a danger to others who witness the disrespectful way in which one prays or exercises other duties owed to God.

1328. **The Sin of Envy.**—Envy is a sadness at the good of a neighbor, which one considers as a detriment to one's own excellence or glory, and therefore as an evil to self.

(a) Envy is a species of *sadness*, that is, it is a displeasure of the will at the presence of what one regards as an evil. In this way envy differs from the sin of rejoicing at the evils of others, which, as will be said below (see 1342), is one of the consequences of envy, although both are of the same species. Thus also, envy differs from pride and vainglory (which are not

aversions but inclinations), and from covetousness (which is the desire of what belongs to another).

(b) Envy is about some *good*, especially about those goods from which men obtain the esteem and honor of others, such as virtue, ability, rank, success, prosperity. Thus, envy differs as virtue, ability, rank, success, prosperity. Thus, envy differs from sorrow about evil or the evil effects of good, such as repentance for one's sins, regret that one is not as good as others, displeasure at the bad use that men make of health or wealth.

(c) Envy is about the good of a *neighbor*, for only an insane person would feel chagrin at the superiority of God, and self-envy is a contradiction in terms. Thus, envy differs from sorrow at the good of God (hatred of God), and from sorrow at the good of self (sloth). A person may be said, however, to envy God in the sense that he is mortified at the external glory of God, if he feels himself an antagonist of that glory. In this way the devil is said to envy the attributes of God, because they overcome his efforts to promote impiety, and man is said to envy the Holy Ghost, when he is discontented at the progress of holiness in the souls of men.

(d) The envious man considers his neighbor's good as a *detriment* to his own good. This is the distinctive trait of envy which sets it apart from other forms of repining at another's good fortune. Thus, displeasure at the excellence or glory of another without reference to detriment to self is not envy, but hatred; with reference to the unworthiness of another, it is not envy, but indignation.

(e) Hence, envy looks on the neighbor's prosperity as a calamity to self, as a sort of punishment and the contradiction of one's own desires. Here envy stands in contrast with mercy, for, while the merciful regard the misfortunes of neighbors as the misfortunes of themselves, the envious regard the prosperity of others as their own misfortune.

1329. **The Objects of Envy.**—(a) The material objects are many, but they are reduced to *excellence* and *glory*. Excellence includes every kind of desirable quality. Glory is the honor, fame

and praise that follow on public knowledge of one's excellence. As a rule, envy is concerned with the excellence of glory, but it may also be about internal or objective excellence. Thus, if two disputants are alone, the less able will perhaps envy the greater knowledge of the more able; but, if there is an audience, the more able will perhaps envy the greater applause received by his less able opponent.

(b) The formal object of envy is one, namely, the detriment to the excellence or glory of self which the envious person sees in the excellence or glory of another. Detriment must not be understood absolutely here, as if the envious person lost something or failed to obtain something on account of the other person. It must be understood relatively, in the sense that the envious person feels that the situation between himself and the other person is no longer the same, that the latter has gained on him or passed him, and has thus lessened his excellence.

**1330. The Subjects of Envy.**—(a) The persons most inclined to envy are of two quite different types, namely, the *ambitious* and the *pusillanimous*. The ambitious man ardently covets honors, and he is correspondingly saddened when others surpass him, especially if he already enjoys repute or is not far removed from the object of his desires. The pusillanimous man, being petty, holds every small advancement of others as great and as a blow to his own prestige. He is, therefore, filled with intense envy, where a different person would see little or no cause for such a feeling. On the contrary, those who recognize their own unsuitability for what is above them, and those who are great of soul, are not so much inclined to envy. There are few, however, even among the most perfect, who are not tempted to envy in some form.

(b) The persons who are most likely to be envied are those who in some way or other are one's likes or equals, for one does not feel that one is thrown into the shade by a person who is always far above one, or by those who are far removed in time, place, age, etc. Thus, a beggar will envy a fellow-beggar who becomes a millionaire, but not those acquaintances who were always rich, and still less the fortunate persons whom he knows

only from hearsay. The elder son envied his brother, not his father (Luke, xv. 28). Many exceptions to this are only apparent. Thus, persons sometimes are envious of those far above them, but it is because these have advanced at their expense, as when a poor person envies those who have the property he once owned. Persons are sometimes envious of their equals who have not surpassed them, but it is because these latter have obtained with little or no effort what they themselves have gained only by hard work. Persons are sometimes envious of their inferiors, but this is because they make a comparison from some viewpoint in which there is equality, as when an old man envies a youth the advantages that were not enjoyed in his own youth, or the present promotion that surpasses his own.

**1331.** It was said above (see 1313) that hatred differs from other sins against charity, inasmuch as it dislikes another's good unqualifiedly, whereas these other sins dislike his good with some qualification. Hence, envy differs from hate, because envy is a qualified displeasure. It differs from other kinds of displeasure over the prosperity of others, because the qualification in each case is different.

(a) Thus, emulation is displeased at the thought of a neighbor's prosperity, not because it does not like his success, but because it dislikes the unsuccess of self. Example: Titus is grieved when he thinks of the virtue of Balbus, because he himself lacks virtue.

(b) Fear dislikes the prosperity or superiority of another, not on account of the prosperity or superiority in itself, but on account of the evil results it apprehends from that prosperity. Example: Caius is displeased at the elevation of Claudius, because he knows the latter is his enemy and will persecute him. He is also displeased that, in spite of his own greater learning and soundness, he has not the influence possessed by Balbus, who misleads many by long-winded sophistry.

(c) Indignation (*nemesis*) is displeased that a neighbor has a certain good, of which he is unworthy. Example: Sempronius is angry because Titus, who is dishonest, succeeds in business.

(d) Envy grieves over a neighbor's prosperity, not because

it thinks this prosperity will actually bring about a lessening of the honor of self, but because it regards the very fact of that prosperity, in itself and apart from any consequences, as a change in one's relationship to the neighbor, and to that extent an obscuration of the glory of self. Example: Balbus is grieved at the prosperity of Claudius, because he knows Claudius will use his resources to defame him. Caius is grieved at Claudius' prosperity, because he regards it as a reflection on his own fame, since he is less prosperous. Balbus fears, Caius envies.

1332. Is emulation a sin? (a) If emulation is about spiritual things, it is not sinful, but praiseworthy. St. Paul encourages a holy rivalry among the Corinthians for the higher gifts of God (I Cor., xii. 31). St. Jerome writes to Læta that her daughter should be associated with other girls as fellow-pupils, that the progress of the latter and the praises they receive may act as a spur to the daughter not to be outdone. One who equals or surpasses the virtue or knowledge of another does not take away or lessen the other's good, but improves his own good; and thus emulation is not harmful, but beneficial in spiritual matters. (b) If emulation is about temporal things, it is also lawful to be sorry at their absence. But, if the desire is inordinate, then emulation is sinful. Example: Sempronius is not inferior in ability to Titus, and hence, while not desiring monopoly or disliking competition, he is sorry that he has not attained an equal success in business. Balbus is very deficient in education, in initiative and in character, while Caius excels in all these qualities; and yet Balbus is discontented that he does not hold the responsible position of Caius, or one of equal importance. The emulation of Sempronius is reasonable, that of Balbus is unreasonable.

1333. Rivalry is called *jealousy*, when it proceeds from a love so ardent that it wishes to have exclusive possession of the object loved. This jealousy is lawful or unlawful, according as the person who loves has or has not exclusive rights.

(a) Jealousy is unlawful in a mother who is vexed because her child loves his father as well as herself. The child ought

to love both parents, and it is an evil jealousy that makes the mother grieve when the child does this.

(b) Jealousy is lawful in a wife who grieves because her husband gives to others the affection he promised would be hers alone. Scripture speaks of God Himself as jealous of the fidelity of His creatures, and declares that He will suffer no rival, but must have sole dominion over the heart (Josue, xxiv. 19 sqq.); and St. Paul tells the Corinthians that he is jealous of them, with the jealousy of God, because they have not been faithful to his preaching, but have been friendly to false teachers (II Cor., xi).

1334. Is grief at the prosperity of another a sin, when it is caused by fear of the harm he will do?

(a) If it is clear that the other will use his prosperity to act against justice or charity or the like, it is not a sin to grieve over the prosperity. For, since it is right to deprive a neighbor of the means of sinning when one has the power to do so, it is not wrong to wish that he lacked those means. Thus, it is not a sin to grieve over the election of an official who will promote lawbreakers and persecute the law-abiding: "When just men increase, the people shall rejoice; when the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn" (Prov., xxix. 2). St. Gregory the Great declares that, as it is not uncharitable to rejoice at the downfall of an enemy, neither is it envious to be saddened at his success; since his downfall is a blessing to the oppressed, while his success means injustice to many.

(b) If it is clear that the other will use his power, wealth, or other goods to inflict evils that are deserved or not unjust, it is wrong to be sorry that he has the power, wealth, etc., just as it would be wrong to deprive him of them. Thus, it is wrong to grieve over the election of an honest official who will correct abuses and punish lawbreakers. It is not unlawful, however, for a lawbreaker to be sorry for himself at the prospect of the penalty he will receive.

(c) If it is uncertain whether the other will use his prosperity to do injury to oneself or to others, it is lawful to fear

and to be on one's guard, but it is not lawful to grieve unconditionally at the prosperity, just as it is not lawful in the circumstances to deprive the other of his prosperity.

1335. Is grief at the prosperity of another sinful, when it is caused by his unworthiness of prosperity? (a) If the indignation could be about *spiritual* things, of course it would be sinful; but this is not possible, for it is precisely spiritual goods (such as virtues) that make one deserving. Indignation, then, is about temporal goods, which are enjoyed by the bad, as well as the good. (b) If the indignation is about *temporal* things owned by the wicked, and one grieves that they have prosperity, sin is committed. For it is God who distributes to the underserving the goods they have; His purpose is just, namely, that these goods may be for the correction or the punishment of the wicked; those who grieve over the prosperity of the unworthy overlook the fact that eternal goods are a reward to man, temporal goods only a trust to be administered. Hence, the Psalmist says: "Be not emulous of evil-doers, nor envy them that work iniquity, for they shall shortly wither away as grass" (Ps. xxxvi. 1).

1336. Two special cases of sorrow over the prosperity of the wicked must be considered. (a) If one sorrows precisely because the prosperity is had by an underserving person, and is not thinking of the divine cause and purpose in human affairs, it does not seem that one sins; for, abstracting from Divine Providence, there does appear an unsuitability in the prosperity enjoyed by the wicked, and hence it is something to be sorry about. But such sorrow is at least a preparation for the sin spoken of in the previous paragraph, and so it should be shunned: "My feet were almost moved, my steps had well-nigh slipped, in anger at the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners" (Ps. lxxii. 2, 3). (b) If one sorrows precisely because the sinner will use his prosperity in such a way as to become more wicked and to incur chastisement, the sorrow is not uncharitable, but charitable.

1337. Sorrow at being surpassed by another on account of the relative loss of glory to self, with the wish that the other had not the good that makes him superior, is envy, as explained above. This sorrow is a sin. (a) Thus, it is condemned in

Scripture: "Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, envying one another" (Gal., v. 26); "The patriarchs through envy sold Joseph into Egypt" (Acts, vii. 9); "Charity envieth not" (I Cor., xiii. 4). (b) It is not reasonable to be grieved at the prosperity of others, since prosperity is something good and an object of joy rather than of sorrow.

1338. From its nature envy is a mortal sin. (a) Thus, it is directly opposed to the principal acts of charity, which are love of the neighbor, desire of his good, and joy over his prosperity; and charity is the life of the soul (I John, iii. 14). Secondary acts of charity, such as kissing the sores of a leper, may be omitted without loss of love, but envy destroys love itself. (b) Envy is directly contrary to mercy; for, while mercy grieves at the evil of others, envy grieves at their good. The envious are not merciful, neither are the merciful envious.

1339. Envy is a greater sin than the other kinds of sorrow at a neighbor's good. (a) Thus, envy grieves over the neighbor's good (even if he is worthy), and is greater or less in proportion to that good; (b) emulation grieves over one's own deficiency, fear over the consequences of the other's good, indignation over the prosperity of one who is unworthy.

1340. Envy is not a mortal sin in the following cases: (a) if the object is not grave, as when one is envious about some trifle (such as good looks); (b) if the subject does not give sufficient reflection or full consent, as when infants are jealous of one another, or adults feel the stirrings of envy. Even holy men are not above the first movements or inclinations towards envy, and very many envious thoughts are not mortal, because not fully adverted to.

1341. Degrees of Gravity in Sins of Envy.—(a) There are no different species of envy of the neighbor, for all acts of envy have the one essential trait that they are sorrow over the excellence of another, viewed, not absolutely in itself, but relatively as a lessening of one's own excellence. We should distinguish, however, the envy which is a sin against God (*viz.*, envy at another's spiritual good, or sorrow at the diffusion of grace) from the envy which is a sin against the neighbor.

(b) There are different degrees of envy within the species, according to the greater or less excellence of the good which is envied. Thus, it is a greater sin to be envious about spiritual things (e.g., another's influence for good) than about temporal things (e.g., another's ability to get money); it is a greater sin to be envious about the wellbeing of the body than about dress, style, etc.

1342. Envy is one of the capital vices, that is, it is an evil tree which from its very nature yields the evil fruits of other sins. The fruits of envy are progressive in evil.

(a) Thus, in the beginning of envy, one tries to diminish the glory of the person one envies, either secretly (sin of whispering) or openly (sin of detraction).

(b) In its progress, envy rejoices at the adversity of the neighbor, if its attempt to injure succeeds; or it sorrows over his continued prosperity, if its effort at blackening has failed. Rejoicing at a neighbor's adversity is not different specifically from envy; but the affliction over the neighbor's prosperity now spoken of is of the same species as the vice which sought to undermine the neighbor. Thus, if the envious person resorted in vain to detraction, his grief at the failure of his efforts is in guilt a sin of detraction.

(c) In its consummation, envy becomes hatred, as was said above on the causes of hate (see 1316).

1343. Envy is not the first of the seven capital vices. (a) Thus, it is caused by pride, for one who inordinately desires his own excellence will easily grieve over what he regards as the lessening of that excellence by the excellence of another. (b) It is caused by vainglory, for one who inordinately longs for fame and honors, will easily be grieved over the fame and honors enjoyed by others.

1344. In what way is envy preëminent among sins? (a) Envy is not the most enormous vice, for, as said above (see 1301), hatred of God is from its nature the worst of all sins. But there is one kind of envy—namely, envy of a brother's spiritual good—which has a place among those gravest offenses called "sins against the Holy Ghost" (see 899).

(b) Envy is most like to the sin that brought all woe into the world, for "by the envy of the devil death entered the world" (Wis., ii. 24). It was sorrow at the gifts bestowed upon our first parents that moved the demon to tempt them, and accordingly his envy led to their fall and to the loss of original justice by the whole race.

1345. Useful Considerations against Envy.—(a) Envy is useless, since it does not obtain that on which one's heart is set, or obtains it only by the sacrifice of charity, which is something better. (b) Envy is harmful, since it carries its own torment with it (Gen., iv. 5; Wis., vi. 25; Prov., xiv. 30), and brings on many sins against the neighbor. Through envy the first murder was committed (Gen., iv. 8), and it was envy that brought about the crucifixion of Christ (Matt., xxvii. 18).

1346. Useful practices against envy are: (a) the uprooting of its causes, pride and vainglory; (b) the cultivation of an unselfish charity and of emulation of what is best in others: "So that by all means, whether by occasion, or by truth, Christ be preached, in this I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice" (Philip., i. 18); "Let us consider one another, to provoke unto charity and to good works" (Heb., x. 24).

#### Art. 8: THE SINS AGAINST PEACE

(*Summa Theologica*, II—II, qq. 37-42.)

1347. The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a) discord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or quarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (c) schism, war, fights and sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.

1348. *Discord*.—As here understood, discord is a disagreement in the wills of two or more persons in matters pertaining to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor, and concerning which charity requires that they be in agreement.

(a) *Discord* is a *disagreement in wills*, that is, in wishes and desires. Hence, it is not the same as difference of opinion (see 1197), which is a disagreement in judgments.



(b) It is about matters *in which agreement is necessary*, that is, in which the law of God requires that all wish the same things, and have but one heart and soul. Thus, discord differs from disagreement about matters of supererogation. Examples: Titus and his wife are at variance, because Titus is unwilling to give any alms. Balbus and his wife are at variance, because she wishes him to give away in alms more than is strictly necessary. In the first husband there is discord, but not in the second.

(c) Discord is *opposed to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor*. Thus, it differs from a disagreement with another who is attacking the divine good or the good of the neighbor. The standard of concord is the divine will, and he only of the persons at variance is discordant who is not in harmony with the divine will.

(d) Discord is confined to those matters in which *charity* calls for agreement. If it be some other virtue that demands unanimity (*e.g.*, justice), the disagreement is not discord in the special sense now employed. Thus, he whose will refuses consent to the command of a superior is disobedient; he whose will refuses to pay the debt due a creditor is dishonest.

1349. There are two kinds of discord: (a) intentional discord, which is the act of one who knowingly and purposely contradicts in a matter about which charity requires that he agree; (b) unintentional discord, which is a disagreement between persons, who both intend the divine good or the good of the neighbor, but who are divided in opinion as to what that good here and now requires.

1350. **Sinfulness of Intentional Discord.**—(a) From its nature, this species of discord is a mortal sin, since it directly excludes charity. Hence, those who are guilty of discord shall not obtain the kingdom of heaven (Gal., v. 21). (b) From the lack of sufficient reflection or consent, the first impulses towards discord are not mortal sins.

1351. **Sinfulness of Unintentional Discord.**—(a) From its nature, this kind of discord is not opposed to charity, nor is it sinful; for the concord of charity consists in a union of wills, not in a union of opinions. Thus, the disagreement between Paul and

Barnabas about John Mark (Acts, xv. 39) was not sinful, although the difference of judgment indicated their human limitations. (b) From its circumstances, this kind of discord may be sinful, as when it is caused by culpable ignorance in matters of faith, or is carried on with obstinacy.

1352. By whom is the sin of discord committed? (a) It is committed sometimes by one party only, as when one knowingly resists the will of another who wishes to perform a necessary act of charity. (b) It is committed at other times by both parties, as when each in defending his own good infringes knowingly on the charity due the other.

1353. Is it lawful to promote divisions, when one's purpose and the result will be good? (a) To promote division that takes away the concord of charity is never lawful, but a mortal sin: "There are six things the Lord hates, and a seventh which His soul detests, a sower of discord among brethren" (Prov., vi. 16, 19). (b) To promote division that takes away a concord of malice is lawful and praiseworthy. Thus, St. Paul introduced a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, who had been in agreement against him (Acts, xxiii. 6, 7). But the intention of the Apostle was to win the Pharisees to the defense of the Resurrection and of himself, not to incite the Sadducees to a denial of the Resurrection, and so there was no question of his using evil means for a good end.

1354. **The Origin of Discord.**—(a) The disagreement with the will of a neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as good. (b) The preference of one's own will and persistence in it are due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not take what he regards as a position of inferiority.

1355. **Contention.**—Contention is discord carried into words or equivalent signs, (*i.e.*, a dispute or altercation), in which one denies what the other affirms. It is divided as follows: (a)

by reason of the *intention*, it is either an investigation of the truth, a defense of the truth, or an attack on the truth; (b) by reason of the *manner* in which it is conducted, it is either suitable or unsuitable to the persons and the matter in question.

1356. Contention whose aim is the discovery of the truth is lawful as follows. (a) Such contention is lawful and useful in itself, for it is a means of acquiring useful knowledge, of seeing both sides of a question, and of sharpening the mind for the refutation of error. Hence, a contest in a court of justice, a controversy in a scientific journal, a public debate on some important matter, and a theological disputation are according to their nature lawful, and may be necessary. Even to argue against the truth, for the sake of practice in discussion or to bring out the truth more clearly and forcibly, is, apart from danger, scandal, or prohibition, not unuseful.

(b) Debate is unlawful in its manner when a disputant does not argue according to the rules, appeals to prejudice or ignorance, uses an insulting tone or unparliamentary language, etc.

1357. **The Sin of Contention.**—Contention is a sin when its aim is the concealment or discomfiture of the truth. (a) From its nature this kind of contention is a mortal sin, for it is the external expression of internal discord in matters about which charity requires concord and the same speech. Hence, the Apostle numbers contention among the works of the flesh that exclude from the kingdom of God (Gal., v. 20). (b) From the lightness of the matter or the imperfection of the consent, this kind of contention is very often, if not usually, only a venial sin, or no sin at all. Examples: A person argues against what he knows is true, but the matter is trivial (*e.g.*, his weight); or he is distracted by the heat of dispute or the tactics of the other party.

1358. Mortal sin is not committed by contention, therefore, unless the truths against which one contends are of a serious kind. Such truths are: (a) truths of a religious or moral character, such as the doctrines of faith and the commandments of God; (b) natural truths of a universal character, the knowledge of which pertains to the perfection of the intellect, such as first

principles; (c) natural truths of a particular character in which important rights are involved. Example: An historian who writes against some deservedly revered person of the past, or a lawyer who attempts to prove against an accused what he knows is not a fact, are guilty of the sin of contention.

1359. Hence, one may be defending one kind of truth and contending against another kind of truth at the same time. St. Paul, accordingly, makes the distinction between announcement of the truth out of charity and announcement of the truth out of contention (Philip., i. 15 sqq.). (a) The truth is defended out of charity when one does not use truth as a means for the defense of error; (b) it is defended out of contention when one makes use of it as a means for the propagation of error. Thus, while St. Paul was imprisoned at Rome in 61, certain personal enemies preached Christ, but at the same time spoke or hinted falsehoods against St. Paul in order to undermine his authority or add to the bitterness of his captivity. Similarly, if one defends the truth to make oneself appear different or better than one is, one speaks from contention.

1360. Ways in which one is guilty of the mortal sin of contention: (a) when one contends formally against the truth, that is, when one knows the truth and intends to overcome it or suppress it; (b) when one contends virtually against the truth, that is, when one is so bent on carrying one's point that one does not care whether it is true or false. Thus, the Sophists aimed to win, right or wrong.

1361. When the aim of contention is the overthrow of error: (a) in itself, such contention is good and praiseworthy, and at times necessary; (b) by reason of circumstances, it may be a venial or a mortal sin. Examples: A dispute on a matter that is unbecoming, such as which of the disputants is greater (Luke, xxii. 24); dispute with greater warmth than the case requires; a dispute that leads to scandal or other evil consequences, as in religious controversies (I Tim., ii. 14).

1362. **The Causes of Sinful Contention.**—(a) The cause of that which is principal in contention—namely, the departure from the truth held by another and the stand made for error—

is envy, pride and vainglory, as said above (see 1354) concerning discord. (b) The cause of that which is secondary in contention—namely, the wrangling or bawling manner and the shouts or screams of the contenders—is anger.

1363. The sins *in act* against the peace of charity are the following: (a) schism which is opposed to the peace of the spiritual society, the Church; (b) war, which is opposed to international peace, and sedition, which is opposed to national peace; (c) fighting, which is opposed to peace between individuals.

1364. **Schism.**—Schism (etymologically, a *split, rent*) is defined: "A voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church."

(a) Schism is a *voluntary* separation, that is, a separation intended for its own sake. Every sinner in a sense separates himself from unity, for sin divides one from God (Is., lix. 2); but it is only the schismatic who expressly intends separation as such. Other sinners expressly intend some inordinate gratification. Moreover, schism is not the same thing as the state of the unbaptized, who have not separated themselves from unity, or of the excommunicated, whom the Church herself rejected from her body on account of some sin other than schism.

(b) Schism is a *separation* from unity, and so it differs from disbelief in unity (heresy) and dislike of unity (hatred). One may separate oneself from unity, although one believes in it. One may hate unity, and yet not separate oneself from it. Further, schism does not necessarily include affiliation with some schismatical body or the setting up of such a body.

(c) Schism is a separation of *oneself* from unity—that is, schism does not deprive the Church of the note of unity, but separates the schismatic himself from that unity which is in the Church. The schismatic may wish to take away the unity of the Church, but he accomplishes only the loss of union of himself with the Church.

(d) Schism is a separation from *unity*, that is, from fellowship in the mystical body of Christ (I Cor., xii). It is a refusal to recognize the authority of the head of the Church, or to communicate with those subject to him. Thus, schism differs from

disobedience to the head of the Church or to particular prelates in the Church, for one may disobey orders and still recognize the authority of him who gives the orders.

(e) Schism is a separation from the unity of the *Church*, that is, of the spiritual kingdom of Christ on earth. Hence, rebellion in matters purely civil against a churchman who has civil authority, is not schism, but is unjust war or sedition. Schism is possible only in the Church Militant, for the members of the Church Suffering and the Church Triumphant cannot fall away from unity.

1365. The Principal Schismatical Movements.—(a) In Apostolic times there were local factions and dissensions, though not real schisms, at Corinth (I Cor., i. 10 sqq.) and in Asia Minor (III John, i. 10). (b) In post-Apostolic times there have been numerous schisms, such as that of the Novatians at Rome in the third century, that of the Meletians in Egypt in the fourth century, that of the Donatists in Africa in the fourth century, that of the Acacians in the East in the fifth century. The most lamentable of all the schisms, because of the number of those whom it led away from unity, was the Eastern Schism, begun by Photius in the ninth century and made permanent under Michael Cærolarius in the eleventh century.

1366. Schism is voluntary in two ways: (a) *directly*, when one intends schism itself, wishing to separate oneself from the head or members of the Church; (b) *indirectly*, when one intends to do that from which schism follows. Thus, a person who prefers to act as if he were not a member of the Church rather than desist from his design of calling or presiding over an unauthorized Council, is guilty of schism, even though he does not directly intend separation from the Church. His case is similar to that of one who does not wish to kill his neighbor, and yet is determined to do something from which the neighbor's death will surely result.

1367. There is a threefold unity of the Church, as follows: (a) unity in the theological virtues and in the Sacraments. All the faithful have the same faith, hope, charity, Sacraments, and thus there is a unity of similarity; (b) unity between head and

members. There is but one head of the Church, Christ in heaven and the Vicar of Christ on earth. Thus, there is a unity of subordination; (c) unity between the members of the Church. All the faithful form but one society, and all are parts of one great whole. Thus, there is a collective unity.

1368. The sin of schism is committed in two ways (Canon 1325, n. 2). (a) It is committed by separation from the head of the Church on earth and the keystone of unity, that is, the Pope (Col., ii, 18, 19). The mere fact that a man is in rebellion against his bishop does not make him a schismatic, if he continues to acknowledge subjection to the Holy See. But such rebellion is often the first step towards schism. (b) The sin of schism is also committed by separation from the members of the Church. Thus, one who refuses to communicate with Catholics in matters of faith or worship, choosing to act as an independent in those things, is a schismatic.

1369. Rejection of a decision or command of the Pope can happen in three ways:

(a) The reason for rejecting the decision may be the *thing commanded*, and not the one who gave the command, as when a person refuses to keep a fast or make a restitution commanded by the Pope, because he considers it too difficult. In this case the person is guilty of disobedience, but not of schism, even though he persists in his refusal; for he rejects a commandment of the Church, not the head of the Church.

(b) The reason for rejecting the command may be the one who gave the command, considered as a *private individual*. As the Pope in his personal relations is not above human weakness, he may be swayed by hatred, prejudice or impulsiveness in issuing commands to or forming judgments about individual subjects. Hence, if we suppose that it is reasonably certain that a Pope is unfavorable to an individual, and that the latter accordingly is unwilling to have a case in which he is concerned fall under the immediate decision of that Pope, neither schism nor any other sin is committed; for it is natural that the person should wish to protect his own interests against unfairness.

(c) The reason for rejecting the Pope's judgment may be

the one who gave the command considered *in his official capacity as Pope*. In this case the person is guilty of schism, since he disobeys, not because the thing ordered is difficult or because he fears that the individual will be unjust, but because he does not wish to recognize the authority of Pope in him who issued the judgment.

1370. **Comparison of Heresy and Schism.**—(a) These sins are not the same, since heresy is opposed to faith, schism to charity. A person who really believes that the Church is one in its head and its body, may nevertheless out of pride, hatred, ambition, interest, self-sufficiency, etc., decide not to recognize the authority of the head, or not to communicate with the body.

(b) There is an intimate union between heresy and schism, since every heretic separates himself from the unity of faith, while schism is always found to adopt some heresy as a justification for its separation (I Tim., i. 6). Thus, the Eastern Schism soon trumped up charges of heresy against the Church, and history shows that schism almost invariably leads to a denial of papal primacy.

1371. **The Opposition between Schism and Charity.**—(a) *Charity in itself* is a spiritual bond of unity between the soul and God, for love is unitive. One who sins against this unity by offending God or his neighbor, is not thereby a schismatic, since one may hate an individual, for example, without hating the Church. (b) *Charity in its effect* is the communion of all the faithful in one mystical body of Christ, for charity inspires the desire to love, not only individuals, but also the spiritual society formed of individuals in the entire world. One who sins against the unity and peace of the Church is a schismatic.

1372. **The Sinfulness of Schism.**—(a) Schism has a special seriousness, since it is opposed to the union and peace of mankind as a whole in the universal spiritual society which is the Church. It seems to be the greatest sin against the neighbor; for other sins are against the individual or against the multitude in temporal things, while this sin is against the multitude and in spiritual things. Scripture (cfr. I Cor., i. 10) and Tradition (e.g., St. Clement of Rome, St. Ignatius of Antioch, St. Irenæus,

St. Cyprian, St. Augustine) energetically condemn the sin of schism.

(b) Objectively, it is not as serious as unbelief, since unbelief is against God, schism against the neighbor; but subjectively, or in its consequences, it may be greater than unbelief, as when a schismatic sins with greater contempt than an unbeliever, or is an occasion of more danger to others.

1373. Schism, like heresy, may be either formal or material (see 828). (a) *Formal* schism is that described above, in which one wishes to separate oneself from the unity of the Church, and is in culpable revolt. It is a mortal sin. (b) *Material* schism is that in which one is in fact separated from the unity of the Church, but is in good faith. An example is the Great Schism of the West (1378-1417), when there were rival claimants for the Papacy, and invincible ignorance among the people as to who was the true head. This kind of schism is not a mortal sin.

1374. **The Spiritual Powers of Schismatics.**—(a) The power of Orders is not lost through schism, for that power is conferred through a consecration, and the consecrations of the Church are permanent. Hence, a schismatical priest can perform validly the acts that pertain to the power of Orders, such as the celebration of Mass and administration of the Sacraments; but he does not perform those acts lawfully, unless the Church permits, for the power of Orders should not be used by an inferior except as permitted by the superior.

(b) The power of jurisdiction may be lost through schism, for that power depends on a commission received from a superior, which may be withdrawn by him. Hence, a schismatical priest deprived of jurisdiction could not absolve, excommunicate, grant indulgences, or perform other acts that pertain to the power of jurisdiction.

1375. The law of the church on the powers of schismatics is as follows:

(a) All schismatics incur *ipso facto* excommunication, as well as various inhabilities and penalties (Canon 2314). It is fitting that those who separate themselves should be declared

outside the communion of the faithful, and this is what Moses commanded to be done at the time of the schism of Core: "Depart from the tent of these wicked men and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sin" (Num., xvi. 26).

(b) The excommunicated are forbidden the celebration of Mass and the active use and administration of the Sacraments and sacramentals, except when the faithful apply to them or when there is danger of death, as declared in Canon 2261.

(c) The excommunicated are denied the power of jurisdiction except in certain cases where the Church grants it for the sake of the common good. Thus, they may give absolution in danger of death (Canon 882), or in common error (Canon 209), or at request, if they are not *vitandi* or sentenced (Canon 2261). It is the teaching of learned authorities that the Roman Church for the good of souls has allowed ecclesiastical jurisdiction to remain in the schismatic Oriental Churches for the conferring of the Sacraments.

1376. **War.**—War is defined as a state of conflict between two or more sovereign nations carried on by force of arms.

(a) It is a *state* of conflict, and so differs from passing conflicts, such as battles, skirmishes, campaigns. The enemy in war is not only those with whom one is actually fighting, but all those who side with them, as counsellors, helpers, etc.

(b) War is between *sovereign nations*, and so differs from civil war, sedition, riots, duels. Moreover, war is made by nation against nation, not against particular individuals or groups of individuals within a nation.

(c) It is *carried on by force of arms*, and so differs from trade war, rivalry in preparedness for war, embargo, blockade, breach of diplomatic relations, etc.

1377. There are two kinds of war, just and unjust. (a) War is just when undertaken for a right cause (*e.g.*, the independence of the nation); (b) it is unjust when undertaken for a wrong cause (*e.g.*, the enslavement of a nation).

1378. Just war is either offensive or defensive. (a) Offensive war is attack made on an enemy in order to avenge an injury or enforce a right (*e.g.*, invasion of the enemy's territory to

obtain compensation for damages inflicted by him); (b) defensive war is resistance to unjust attack made or menaced by an enemy (*e.g.*, war made on the invader of one's country).

1379. Just war is called defensive in two senses. (a) In the strict sense, it is defensive when the nation whose rights are unjustly attacked does not initiate hostilities, that is, does not declare or begin the war. (b) In a less strict sense, it is defensive when the nation unjustly attacked declares war or strikes the first blow. Thus, if the innocent nation knew that the enemy was secretly preparing war against its independence, it would be on the defensive, even though it declared war.

1380. War is not against the law of God. (a) Under the law of nature Melchisedech blessed Abraham returning from victory over the four kings (Gen., xiv. 18-20). (b) Under the written law, God many times ordered or approved of war, as can be seen from Exodus and following books in numerous places. (c) Under the New Law, John the Baptist acknowledged the lawfulness of the soldier's profession (Luke, iii. 14), a centurion was praised by Christ (Matt., viii. 10), Acts, x. 2, speaks of the officer Cornelius as a religious man, and St. Paul lauds warriors of the Old Testament such as Gedeon, Barac, Samson, etc. (Heb., xi. 32-34). Our Lord Himself used physical force against evil-doers (John, ii. 14 sqq.).

1381. Certain sayings of our Lord—for example, that those who take the sword shall perish by the sword (Matt., xxvi. 52), and that one should not resist evil (Matt., v. 39)—are not an endorsement of extreme pacifism, but are respectively a condemnation of those who without due authority have recourse to violence, and a counsel of perfection, when this serves better the honor of God or the good of the neighbor. Moreover, these words of Christ were addressed, not to states, which are responsible for the welfare of their members, but to individuals. The Quakers have done excellent service for the cause of world peace, but their teaching that all war is contrary to the law of Christ cannot be admitted. The spirit of the Gospel includes justice as well as love.

1382. War is not against the law of the Church. (a) The

Church has never condemned war as such. She has always labored for the promotion of peace or for the lessening of the evils of wars that could not be prevented; but her official declarations and the writings of the Fathers and Doctors show that she recognized that recourse to arms by nations is not necessarily sinful. (b) The Church has put her approval on some wars as necessary and laudable. Thus, the Crusades, to which the salvation of Christian civilization is due, were promoted by the Church; military orders for the defense of the Holy Sepulchre were instituted by her, and she has raised to the honors of the altar soldiers like Sebastian, Maurice, and Martin of Tours.

1383. War is not against the law of nature. (a) As the law of nature allows even a private individual to use force to drive off an unjust aggressor, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to have recourse to defensive war when its rights are invaded. (b) As the law of nature allows the individual to seek satisfaction for injury and restitution for loss, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to make offensive war when another nation will not make reparation, unless compelled to it by force. If physical coercion were unlawful, a conscienceless nation would take advantage of this at the expense of other nations, and thus a premium would be set on iniquity.

1384. Like every other act, war is not morally good, unless its object, its purpose and its circumstances are in accord with right. War is not lawful, therefore, unless the three following conditions exist:

(a) Hostilities must be *authorized by the public authority*, for the care of the State against internal and external disturbances has been committed to the ruler (Rom., xii. 4; Ps. lxxxii. 4), and the individual or the subject state can have recourse for protection of its rights to the higher authority.

(b) There must be a *just cause* for war, that is, some fault on the side of the other nation; for, if a nation may not use force against its own subjects without sufficient reason, much less may it do so against those who are not its subjects.

(c) There must be a *right intention*, that is, the desire to obtain some good or to ward off some evil. Even if war is de-

clared by the proper authority and there is a sufficient reason for it, those who take part in the war are guilty of sin if they have evil motives, such as the exercise of cruelty, revenge, pride, or avarice. To delight in war because one loves excitement or wishes to show one's skill or get promotion, is not a right frame of mind.

1385. What public authority has the right to declare war?

(a) Ordinarily, only the sovereign power—that is, the person or body in whom the chief authority is vested according to the constitution of the nation—can make war. War is an act of the nation, and hence only the authority that represents the nation can make war. Subordinate bodies in a confederation or union of states have the right to make war, if custom or law allows it.

(b) In extraordinary circumstances, an inferior power can authorize war, as when war is necessary and it is impossible to await a declaration from the sovereign power. Thus, if a province were suddenly invaded, it would be lawful for the head of the province to make war on the invaders at once. It seems, indeed, that the head of a province could justly authorize the invasion of a neighboring state, to protect such province against aggressions, if the central authority would do nothing; for such a war would be really defensive.

1386. In order that the cause of war be just, it is necessary that the enemy nation has done or now menaces an injury which cannot be repaired without war, and which is so serious that the evils of war are less than that of toleration.

(a) Thus, a serious *injury* or grave dishonor inflicted by another nation is the only just cause for the armed conflict which constitutes war, for war is exercised as a punishment or a compulsion, and these are unjust if no grave and formal fault is supposed.

(b) Only an injury that *cannot be otherwise repaired* is a just cause for war, because a state has no right to use force against another sovereign state except as a last resort. Hence, if the country at fault has already made satisfaction or has promised to make satisfaction, war should not be declared.

(c) Only an injury so grave that it *outweighs* the risks and losses of war is a justification for making war, for when two effects, one good and one evil, follow from an act, there must be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect before acting (see 104, 105). It would be wrong to avenge some small insult or some isolated injury at the expense of immense treasure and enormous loss of life. Modern warfare is so devastating that only the gravest reasons known to society can authorize it. For, according to scientists, a single H-bomb may cause death and destruction over a wide area, perhaps the space of a hundred square miles. In view of the havoc which is foreseen to outweigh the benefits of victory, it could happen that a nation with justice on its side and the potential to wage war would nevertheless not be justified in waging war (see 1410). This destructive power of modern weapons, however, need not imply a sweeping condemnation of all warfare. Spiritual values, *e.g.*, freedom from tyranny, freedom to worship God, still hold primacy over material values and can be deemed so precious as to outweigh the great loss of lives and property involved in defending them or recovering them through modern warfare. "A people menaced by, or already victims of unjust aggression, if it desires to think and to act in a Christian manner, cannot remain in passive indifference" (Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948).

1387. In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of war, one should take into consideration, not only the losses oneself will suffer, but also the losses that will be suffered by others. (a) Thus, if the enemy nation will be ruined as the price of one's obtaining some small right, charity would urge that one abstain from war. (b) If the world in general or posterity will suffer greater evils materially or spiritually than a nation is now suffering from the denial of some non-essential right, charity at least should rule out a declaration of war.

1388. Is there a just reason for war, when a fault has been committed on both sides? (a) If the injuries are about equal and still in being, there is no reason for war, for neither nation is in a position to accuse the other of injustice. (b) If the

injuries are quite unequal or one nation has shown a willingness to cease from injury, the less guilty nation has a right to make war; but it should first clear itself of injustice, before it proceeds to chastize injustice in the other.

1389. Sufficient causes for making war are: (a) grave injury to the honor of a nation, such as insult to its ruler or ambassadors (II Kings, x.); (b) injury to the *natural* right of the nation to existence, self-preservation, property, free action within its own sphere; thus, a people may make war to defend their independence (I Mach., iii. 59), to recover territory taken from them unjustly, to resist a violation of neutrality (II Kings, viii. 5), to protect their own citizens and commerce; (c) injury to the rights of the nation under *positive* law. Thus, a nation may make war to uphold important international agreements, to enforce the observance of treaties, and the like.

1390. Injury done to a third nation or to the subjects of a third nation may also be a sufficient reason for war. (a) Thus, out of justice, a nation is obliged to help its allies in a just war; for to help those with whose interests one's own interests are involved is only self-defense. (b) Out of charity, a nation that has the right of intervention may lawfully go to war to protect a weaker nation against a stronger and bullying nation, to assist a government unjustly attacked by its subjects, or to help innocent subjects who are tyrannized over by their government.

1391. Is it lawful to go to war over religion or morality?  
(a) Error in the religion or immorality in the practices of another people is not a sufficient reason for making war on them. No one can be forced to believe, says St. Augustine; and it is likewise true that no one can be forced to love virtue, whereas external conformity without conviction or love is hypocritical. Moreover, a nation has no authority to correct the sins of those not subject to it. Hence, it would not be right to attack a people for the sole reason that it was pagan or polygamous.  
(b) Interference, however, with the religious rights of others or sinful practices that are injurious to others are a sufficient reason for war. No war ever had a more legitimate cause than the

Crusades, which were undertaken to defend the Christian religion against the unspeakable atrocities of infidels. The cause of humanity justifies a war to put an end to such evils as cannibalism or human sacrifice.

1392. Is it lawful to make war on another nation in order to bring to it the benefits of modern civilization? (a) If the uncivilized nation lacks a government and suffers from disorder, it is an act of charity for a civilized nation to set up a government there which will act for the benefit of the people of the country. It is also lawful to make war on those who resist the government thus established. (b) If the uncivilized nation has its own orderly form of government and is at peace, no other nation has the right to interfere under pretext of introducing a higher type of government. Colonial expansion is not a sufficient reason for war in such circumstances.

1393. The following causes for war are not sufficient:

(a) Motives clearly sinful are such as do not suppose any injury done by the other nation, but rather some evil passion of pride, greed, jealousy, suspicion, or selfishness on one's own side. Hence, it is not lawful to go to war for the glory of a ruler or of the nation, for the enlargement of one's territory, for the advantage that may be gained over a commercial rival, for the preservation of the balance of power, or for the prevention of difficulties at home.

(b) Motives apparently just, but really sinful, are injuries done by another, if one has secretly provoked them in order to have a pretext for war. It is not right to make war on a people because of attacks made by their citizens, if these attacks were purposely caused by one's own citizens.

(c) Motives of displeasure with another nation are not sufficient as motives for war, if the other nation has violated no right of justice, but only acted in a way not consonant with charity or friendship. Thus, the fact that one nation denies another financial assistance or the tariff advantages granted to a third nation is not a *casus belli*; for in matters of benevolence or privilege there is no strict claim or title, and hence no right to have recourse to arms.



1394. Is war lawful when the justice of the cause is doubtful? (a) The government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that right is on its side. The consequences of war are so dreadful, and the use of force against another nation is such an extreme measure, that one should refrain from hostilities as long as one's moral right is uncertain.

(b) Volunteers not already enlisted may not offer their services to a belligerent, unless they are morally certain that his cause is just. They participate in war from choice, and they should assure themselves that their choice is correct.

(c) Subjects called to the colors should fight for their country, even if they are in doubt about the justice of the cause, for the presumption is on the side of the government. This does not mean, however, that one should be willing to fight for one's country, right or wrong, nor that one would be obliged to fight for a cause manifestly unjust, or to obey an order flagrantly wrong.

1395. What is the meaning of "moral certitude" in the previous paragraph? (a) Some moralists believe that a high degree of probability of the righteousness of his cause suffices in order that a ruler may take steps towards war. (b) The greater number of moralists, however, hold that no degree of probability suffices. The justifying reasons must be clearer than day, and the state which goes to war must not entertain a single doubt that its cause is right. This opinion we prefer; for, if a jury may not sentence an accused to death as long as there is a reasonable doubt of his innocence, neither ought a nation to pass what is really a death sentence on hundreds or thousands of citizens as long as there exists a doubt of a compelling reason for such a course. It should, however, be observed that a ruler who has only probable evidence that an injury has been done already, may have certainty that it will be done, if it is not prevented by war.

1396. Is it possible that the cause of war should be just on both sides? (a) Materially or objectively, the cause of war is just only on one side, for, if one nation has the right to demand satisfaction or restitution, manifestly the other nation has no

right to refuse or resist. (b) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just only on one side, if the facts and obligations are known to both disputants, for the nation that knows the right of the other side and yet opposes it, does not act in good faith. (c) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just on both sides, if the nation that is objectively in the wrong is subjectively persuaded that it is in the right. And, even though a government is in bad faith, its people as a rule will be in good faith as a result of not understanding the facts or merits of the controversy.

1397. It is possible that there should be objective justice and injustice on the same side. (a) Thus, the side which is just as regards the cause of the war, may be unjust in its conduct of the war on account of the unlawful means it employs to win, or its continuation of a hopeless struggle. (b) The side which was just as regards the original cause of the war, may be unjust as regards a new cause that appears. Thus, a nation which goes to war to regain a lost territory, but which continues to fight for the sake of conquest after the legitimate end has been achieved, contends for a just cause at the beginning, but for an unjust cause later on. (c) The side whose grounds are justifiable from the immediate point of view may be in the wrong if causes are traced farther back.

1398. What are the duties before the beginning of war, according to natural law?

(a) *Examination of the Cause of War.*—It is clear that those charged with the declaration of war are bound to examine diligently and prayerfully into the dispute, weighing the reasons on both sides, and asking light from on high. To this end they should seek the counsel, not of a few, but of many—not merely among those who are experts in the diplomatic, legal, economic, and military aspects of the question, but also among those who will look at the matter from its ethical side and who are guided by fairness and justice. Since it is the people who have to bear the burdens of war, it seems that many wars in the past would have been prevented, had the wishes of the people been consulted.

(b) *Judgment about the Merits of the Controversy.*—It is

also clear that those who have to decide for war or peace should be impartial in their judgment. Hence, they have to be on their guard against jingoism, yellow journalism, and war interests, as well as against the pacifist or the favorer of a foreign country at the expense of his own. They should not proceed to offensive war, if their cause remains doubtful, unless the other side provokes war by refusing peaceful settlement; but, if they are in possession, they have the right to make defensive war.

(c) *Judgment about the Feasibility of War.*—Prudence demands that, even when a nation is convinced that it has a just cause to make war, it should nevertheless refrain from this, unless it has a well-grounded expectation that war will improve matters (Luke, xiv. 31, 32). Statesmen who plunge their people into adventures whose end they cannot at all foresee, are criminals.

(d) *Efforts at Peaceful Solution.*—Even if the cause is just and the war feasible, hostilities should not be resorted to except as a last means. Hence, pacific means—such as direct negotiation, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or pressure through trade embargoes, boycotts, breach of diplomatic intercourse, etc.—should be tried in the first place.

1399. *The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International Law.*—(a) Before war is declared, an ultimatum should be issued to the other nation, offering it final terms and a last opportunity to make apology or satisfaction. (b) Foreigners who are in one's territory should be given an opportunity to settle their affairs and leave the country within a reasonable time. (c) Ambassadors and other representatives of the enemy should be provided with passports.

1400. In itself, as said above (see 1380 sqq.), war is not unlawful. But in the light of the conditions required for a just war and of circumstances as they are today, can war at the present time be ever justifiable? (a) If the supreme interests of a nation are at stake (such as its independence, the policies or interests vital to its existence, its obligations under covenant or treaty of peace), war can still be lawful today, for a nation cannot surrender its right to self-defense, or betray its solemn engagements

of cooperative defense. (b) If less than supreme interests are at stake, war today seems unjustifiable, for what proportion is there between the minor interests of a single or several nations and the enormous destruction of modern war and the dislocation of international security? Efforts of statesmen to secure a world pact, outlawing or renouncing war as a means of national policy, indicates progress for this view.

1401. What are the duties during war? (a) One should use every lawful means, according to one's position, to secure victory for one's country. Fighting to gain only a "stalemate," in itself, is immoral. (b) One should avoid such means as are opposed to natural or international law.

1402. It is not true that all is fair in war, for even a just cause cannot sanction unjust means. The commandments of God and the laws of nations retain their force even amid the clash of arms. Examples of acts of war that are unlawful, as being opposed to the natural law are the following: (a) acts of irreligion, such as wanton destruction of churches or monasteries; (b) attempts to seduce enemy soldiers from the obedience or loyalty owed their commanders; (c) murder, that is, the direct killing of innocent and unarmed persons, as when one refuses quarter to soldiers who wish to surrender, fires on an officer bearing a flag of truce, sinks passenger ships not engaged on errands of war, massacres the civil population by raids from the air, places a defenceless population at the mercy of savages or criminals employed as soldiers; (d) the dishonoring of women, the establishment of brothels for soldiers; (e) stealing, such as the unauthorized pillage of a town or countryside; (f) lying, such as breaking treaties, not keeping faith with the foe, entering into perjured agreements, circulating false stories of atrocities, forging of documents, etc.

1403. Just war is resistance to unjust aggression, and so the same means are lawful in warfare as are lawful in private aggression. (a) Thus, the means used against an aggressor must not be evil in themselves, as when a person protects himself against a murderer by making an innocent person a shield. Hence, in war one may not use any means that is opposed to the law of

God, or to human contracts or other obligations. (b) The means employed must be such as are really necessary for overpowering the aggressor. Thus, it is not lawful to kill a burglar when wounding him will suffice for the protection of one's property. Likewise, in war it is not lawful to exterminate or depopulate an enemy, if the end of war can be attained by depriving the enemy of his weapons.

**1404.** The principal classes of acts of war from the moral standpoint are: (a) acts in which violence is done to things connected with religion; (b) acts of violence against persons; (c) acts of violence against property; (d) acts used to conceal truth.

**1405. Acts of War and Sacred Times.**—(a) It is lawful to carry on warfare, offensively or defensively, on feasts, when this is necessary, just as it is lawful to do servile work on those days in case of necessity (I Mach., ii. 41; John, vii. 23). (b) But if a suspension of hostilities can be arranged for feast days (especially for the greater ones, such as Christmas and Easter), warfare should be discontinued at those times.

**1406. Acts of War and Sacred Places.**—(a) It is lawful to attack a church building, if it is certainly being used for military purposes. It is also lawful to attack fortifications, and thus unintentionally to harm adjacent church buildings. (b) It is not lawful, apart from these reasons of real military necessity, to injure sacred places or edifices.

**1407. Acts of War and Sacred Persons.**—(a) It is lawful for clerics to coöperate in a just war in spiritual ways, as by exhortations, prayers, and religious ministrations. Moses prayed for the armies of Israel during battle (Exod., xvii. 8 sqq.), the priests accompanied Josue around the wall of Jericho (Jos., vi. 4), and St. Bernard and other holy men preached crusades. (b) It is not lawful, apart from necessity (as in case of conscription), for clerics to take part in actual fighting. Warfare is unbecoming in a cleric, because he is enrolled for a spiritual warfare (II Tim., ii. 4), and because his leader, Christ, shed His own blood, not that of others (Matt., xxvi. 52). Hence, the Church forbids clerics to volunteer as soldiers (Canon 141).

**1408.** The persons to whom violence is done during war are:

(a) Combatants, that is, all those who are engaged in the actual promotion of the war. Direct combatants are the fighters, such as the officers and privates of army, navy, and air force; indirect combatants are the unarmed auxiliaries of the soldiers in military ways, such as makers of munition, transporters of supplies, and those in the communication service. (b) Non-combatants are enemy subjects who are neither fighters nor auxiliaries of the armed forces, such as chaplains and members of the medical service in the army, persons in civil life and occupation, old men, women, and children. (c) Neutrals are those who are not subject to either of the warring contenders, and who take no part in the hostilities, although they may sympathize with one side.

**1409. The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants.**—(a) According to natural law, it is lawful to kill or wound the enemy in battle, or to starve him by blockade, just as it is lawful in self-defense to kill or wound an unjust aggressor. (b) According to international law, it was expressly forbidden to attack in ways that make war more cruel, without hastening the decision.

**1410. The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants.**—(a) The indirect killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is unintentional and unavoidable) is lawful, according to the rules given for double effect (see 103, 104). Hence, it is lawful to bombard the fortifications, arsenals, munition works, and barracks of a town, to sink passenger liners that are carrying arms or stores to the enemy, to cut off food supplies from a town or country in order to starve out its troops, although these measures will entail the deaths of some civilians as well as of combatants. Humanity requires, however, that an effort be made to spare the non-combatants, when possible, as by serving warning of attack, so that they may be removed to safety.

When it is a question, however, of the use of modern weapons (the atom, hydrogen or cobalt bombs) on military targets in the vicinity of large cities, where it is foreseen that many thousands of civilians will be killed or severely wounded, then the principle of double effect seems to rule out the lawfulness of using such devastating weapons. The immediate evil effect, the slaughter of the innocents, could hardly be called incidental and only reluc-

tantly permitted. Concretely, the inevitable results of the use of such weapons would have to be intended directly, if not as an end, at least as a means.

(b) The direct killing of non-combatants (*i.e.*, killing which is intentional) is unlawful and constitutes the sin of murder. Obliteration bombing, the dropping of H-bombs or atom bombs on a residential section of a city containing no military objectives, are of this character; for they are attacks on civilians. It can not be argued that such an attack would probably break down the morale of the citizens to such an extent that they would force their rulers to make peace and so save many thousands of lives. For this argument is based on the principle that a good end justifies evil means.

Occasionally it is argued that modern "total" warfare demands that all citizens contribute to the war effort and that consequently everyone is a combatant. The argument can hardly be sustained, for Catholic doctrine insists that those whose participation is only remote and accidental are not to be classified as combatants. In a well-documented article on "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," by John C. Ford, S.J. (*Theological Studies*, V, 1944, pp. 261-309), the validity of the distinction between combatants and innocent non-combatants, even in the condition of modern war, is upheld. Fr. Ford shows that in an industrial city, as found in the United States, three-fourths of the population belong to the non-combatant category, and he lists more than a hundred trades or professions which, according to the natural law, exclude their members from the category of combatants. Direct attacks on such a population clearly would constitute unjustifiable killing or wounding of non-combatants.

**1411. *The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes.***—(a) It is lawful to sentence to death persons guilty of international crime, such as those who approach when warned to halt, civilians who fire on the troops, guerrillas, pirates, spies and deserters. (b) It is not lawful to sentence to death persons not guilty of international crime. Thus, a private soldier should not be executed because under orders he killed a non-combatant; a hostage, not

guilty of any capital crime, should not be put to death, because his fellow-citizens for whom he is held rebel or break faith.

**1412. *Imprisonment and Restraint.***—(a) Combatants may be made prisoners of war, non-combatants are subject to the restrictions of military rules when their territory is occupied, and in very exceptional cases they may be transported behind their enemy's lines. (b) Prisoners of war and inhabitants of occupied territory are to be treated as human beings, but not better than the soldiers of one's own army. They may not be reduced to slavery, held as hostages, tortured or starved to death, or placed in front trenches as a shield to one's own forces.

**1413. *The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War.***—(a) The military property of the enemy nation or of its subjects may be confiscated or destroyed, just as an individual has the right to destroy the weapon of an unjust aggressor. Hence, a commander may demolish fortifications, war factories, airships, warships, weapons and artillery; he may cut off or seize supplies and provisions of money, food or drink.

(b) The public, non-military property of the enemy may be occupied by a successful invader. He may appropriate movable goods (works of art and some others are excepted by international law), and he may use immovable goods (public places of worship, museums, etc., are excepted by law).

(c) As to private property of enemy subjects on land, international law requires that immovables generally be respected, and movables can be seized only for some necessary purpose of war. Requisitions and contributions may be exacted and soldiers may be billeted in the homes of citizens, but only so much may be levied as is needed for army maintenance and civil administration, and compensation must be made, or a receipt be given for future compensation. War is made, not against private persons, but against the state.

(d) As to private property on sea, the usage has been that the merchant ships of the enemy may be captured and made a lawful prize.

(e) The property of neutrals on land must not be molested,

unless it is not really neutral, as when it is being used by the enemy. As regards the ships and shipping of neutrals on the high seas, they are not up to the present protected by international agreement. Rather the naval powers are divided between the theories of command of the seas and freedom of the seas. Thus, Great Britain claims the right to search, seize and hold the vessels or cargoes of neutrals who carry contraband or attempt to trade with the enemy in the face of a blockade.

1414. It is an axiom that booty taken in war belongs, not to the private soldiers, but to their government. Hence, the question arises: Are private soldiers, who take the goods of citizens without authorization from their officers, bound to make restitution? (a) If they take what is necessary for their own sustenance, they act against military discipline, but not against justice, and are not bound to restore. (b) If they take other things, they are bound to restore, since international agreements make this a duty of justice. But, if neither of the belligerents observed this agreement, the obligation of restitution cannot be insisted on as grave.

1415. Is it lawful to give over a city to be looted by the soldiery? (a) In ancient times, this was sometimes permissible, as when compensation and victory in a just war was otherwise impossible. (b) In modern times and according to present international law, looting is strictly forbidden. Violation of agreements by city heads gives no right to attack the property of the citizens who are not responsible, and valiant defense of the city by its troops does not forfeit the rights of the inhabitants to their goods.

1416. *Stratagems in War.*—(a) It is lawful to use various artifices for concealing one's plans from the enemy, such as camouflage, smoke screens, censored reports of engagements, etc. Thus, Josue by command of the Lord prepared an ambush for the citizens of Hai (Jos., viii. 2). (b) It is lawful also to conceal one's identity by wearing the uniforms of the enemy in order to obtain information about his plans. The Lord commanded Moses to send out men to spy on the land of Chanaan (Num., xiii. 1). While it is not lawful to tell or signify untruth, it is

lawful to conceal the truth from those who have no right to know it.

1417. Reprisals are acts of retaliation by which one replies to unlawful aggressions of the enemy by equivalent aggressions against him. Their morality depends on circumstances. (a) Thus, if the act of the enemy is opposed only to international law, it is not unlawful to use the same act against him, for, since he has broken faith, the treaty obligation no longer binds the other side. For example, if the enemy, contrary to agreement, uses poison gas in warfare, it is lawful to use poison gas against him. Reprisals should not be made, however, without authorization from the proper authority. (b) If the act of the enemy is opposed to natural law, it is not permissible to retaliate by the same kind of acts. Two wrongs do not make a right. But one may retaliate in lawful ways, or else issue a protest and await compensation at the conclusion of the war. Thus, if the enemy murders the civil population, this does not justify one in murdering enemy citizens who are in one's power.

1418. *Duties of the Nation Victorious in War.*—(a) The victorious nation must not prolong the war after victory has been gained, or after the enemy has sued in good faith for peace or armistice. (b) It must not exact from the defeated foe more than it has a just right to.

1419. *The Rights of the Victor.*—(a) If the cause of the victorious nation was unjust, its victory gives it no claim, for might does not make right. On the contrary, it may be obliged to make restitution to the defeated nation for the losses it has suffered. (b) If the cause of the victor was just, the victorious nation has a claim to three things: (i) to the satisfaction or restitution for the sake of which the war was undertaken; (ii) to compensation for damages caused by the enemy during the war, and (iii) to guarantees against a recurrence of the former injury. Supervision of peace treaties by an impartial tribunal has much to recommend it, since victors are prone to disregard charity and justice when treating with a conquered foe, and to extort from him forced agreements.

1420. *The Obligation of a Victor Whose Cause was Unjust.*—

(a) If the victorious nation fought in good faith, and only later perceived the injustice of its cause, it is bound to restore only those things which it has not consumed, and which make it better off than it was before the war. (b) If it fought in bad faith, it should restore all. Victory does not prove that one was right, but only that one was stronger. It does not make a bad cause good.

**1421. *The Obligation of a Victor Who Fought Without Due Authorization, or with a Wrong Purpose.***—(a) Soldiers who inflict damage on the enemy against the orders of the commanders (e.g., by burning dwellings, robbing private citizens, murdering, etc.), are obliged to restitution for those injuries, for such acts are not war, but brigandage. (b) Soldiers who fight with a wrong motive (e.g., out of hatred), are not obliged to restitution, since they have not committed injustice; for similarly a judge, who sentences a convicted criminal, sins if his motive is hate, but he is not held to restitution.

**1422. *What Indemnity may be Imposed on the Vanquished?*** (a) According to justice, one may exact compensation for the losses and expenses one has sustained on account of war, since the enemy is responsible for these. (b) According to charity, one may be obliged to relinquish part of what is owed, or to grant easier terms of payment, or to cancel a debt, as when the enemy is greatly impoverished, or cannot easily pay at present.

**1423.** In cases of doubt, as when counter claims are made and neither party is entirely victorious, or when a vanquished nation denies its ability to pay what is demanded, recourse may be had to other ways of settlement. (a) Thus, in the former case a compromise or mutual condonation of claims, especially if both sides are exhausted by the war, seems the reasonable solution. (b) In the latter case submission to an impartial tribunal of arbitration would benefit the victors as well as the vanquished, since in the long run it is not to the advantage of the former that the latter be deprived of its goods and productivity.

**1424. *Guarantees for the Future.***—(a) One may insist on such guarantees as will insure against a probable renewal of the offense committed by the conquered nation. Hence, one may

require that it destroy or deliver over fortifications and munition plants, sink warships, reduce its military force, punish certain individuals, or depose certain rulers.

(b) One may not insist on such guarantees as will make a renewal of war by the enemy, now or in the future, absolutely impossible. As said above, a nation has the right to go to war to defend itself against aggression, but it has no right to work at destroying equality or competition on the part of other nations. Hence, it is not lawful to demand that the conquered nation surrender its independence or the management of its affairs, or that one be allowed to annex all the territory taken during war, if one's rights or reasonable security does not require these conditions. Subjugation or temporary occupation are lawful, however, if there is no other way of obtaining redress or securities.

**1425. *Punishment of Enemy Soldiers for Crimes Committed during War.***—(a) Special crimes committed during war (e.g., massacres of non-combatants) may be punished, but the punishment should be visited on those responsible, not on those who merely executed orders. (b) The crime of the war itself should not be revenged on private soldiers, for it is unjust to punish subjects for the madness of their officers and rulers. As to the latter, moral guilt is not easily established. The Nuremberg trials held commanders and high officers responsible for crimes against humanity, and not without precedent.

**1426. *Preparation for Future Wars.***—(a) Reasonable preparedness is not only lawful, but a duty of the state to its own people. A nation should have such a military establishment or such alliances as will safeguard its right against probable attack. (b) Unreasonable preparedness is unlawful since it burdens the people and prepares the way for war. Examples of unreasonable preparations: maintenance of an army or navy far in excess of those nations of similar rank; oppressive military expenses or burdens; maneuvers offensive to other governments or too dangerous for the troops engaged; ruinous competition in armaments.

**1427.** Preparation for peace or against war is a duty no less obligatory than preparation for defensive war. Two chief ways

of preparing for peace: (a) will for peace; (b) work for peace.

(a) The will for peace is promoted when the nations educate their people to a realization of the brotherhood of man, of the wrongfulness and folly of a narrow nationalism, of the sinfulness of war which has not all the conditions of a just war in its favor. Without the will for peace, conferences and treaties will effect little.

(b) Work for peace is done by all who give their service to practical plans for the prevention of war and the preservation of lasting world amity. Among these plans are agreements among nations to substitute moral right for material force, to abolish conscription and armaments, to establish international tribunals, associations and world courts, to make arbitration of disputes among themselves compulsory, to codify international law. History bears witness to the many and great services to humanity which the Popes have rendered by acting as arbiters between nations that were on the point of war. If jealousies prevent agreement among governments, the peoples of the world should nevertheless continue to work for peace and by constitutional means make their wishes prevail among the governments. With the Church we should pray: "From pestilence, famine and war, deliver us, O Lord."

**1428. Fighting.**—Fighting is an angry conflict between two or more persons carried on by means of physical violence.

(a) Thus, it is an *angry* conflict, and so differs from contests of strength or skill made for the sake of sport, amusement, recreation, health, exercise and training. Hence, wrestling and boxing matches, football games, fencing and similar athletic contests, in which fair play and a sportsmanlike spirit prevail, are not fighting as here understood. Similarly, the tournaments of the medieval knights were sports or spectacles, rather than fights.

(b) It is a *conflict*, and so differs from punishment inflicted by lawful authority, as when a police officer uses his club to prevent a crime, a parent or teacher chastizes insubordinate children, or a sober man scuffles with an inebriate to take away his flask or with a lunatic to deprive him of a weapon.

(c) It is a conflict *between two or more individuals*, and so

differs from war and sedition, which are conflicts between nations or parts of a multitude.

(d) It is conducted by means of *physical violence*, that is by the infliction of bodily injuries or harm. Thus, fighting differs from quarreling, which is a dispute in words. It makes no difference whether the attack be made by fists, fingernails or teeth, or by weapons or missiles, or whether the bodily harm be direct (*e.g.*, a blackened eye) or indirect (*e.g.*, a hat knocked off the head).

**1429. Kinds of Fighting.**—(a) As to its *origin*, fighting is provoked or unprovoked, according as one who fights is attacking another or defending himself against attack. (b) As to its *manner*, it is an ordinary fight or a duel, according as it takes place without or with previous arrangement and stipulated conditions. (c) As to its *effect*, the civil law distinguishes between assault and battery. Assault is a show of violence against the person of another, as when one lifts one's fist or cane in a threatening manner to put another in fear of bodily harm. Battery is the actual infliction of personal violence, as when one strikes, pushes, scratches, bites, or spits on another.

**1430. The Sinfulness of Fighting.**—(a) Unprovoked fighting is from its nature a mortal sin. It is classed among the works of the flesh that exclude from the kingdom of heaven (Gal., v. 20, 21), and it is essentially opposed to the charity owed to a neighbor. It is frequently only a venial sin, either because the act is not entirely deliberate, as when one fights in sudden anger, or because the violence is of a trifling kind, as when school-children pull one another's hair or throw snowballs.

(b) Fighting under provocation is no sin at all, when one intends only to defend one's rights and does not go beyond what is necessary for lawful defence, as when one struggles with a burglar who is trying to enter one's house, and pushes him through the door. It is a venial sin, when the person who is resisting aggression acts with some slight degree of hate or revengefulness, or inflicts a little more injury than is really necessary. It is a mortal sin, when the person who was attacked

fighters in a spirit of hate and revenge, or deliberately and needlessly seeks to kill or seriously maim the adversary.

**1431. Causes of Fighting.**—The remedy of sinful fighting is the removal of its causes. The sources of fighting are proximate and remote.

(a) The *immediate* cause is anger. The angry man provokes fights (Prov., xv. 18, xxix. 22), for anger, being a desire of revenge, is not content to injure another secretly, but wishes to punish him—that is, to injure him in such a way that he will know he is being punished and will feel grief on that account. Anger also blinds one to the foolishness of one's actions, and so leads one precipitately into quarrels and fights (Prov., xviii. 6).

(b) The *remote* cause of fighting is an inordinate desire of temporal things, such as wealth, power, ease: "Why are there wars and disputes among you? Is it not because of the desires that war among your members?" (James, iv. 1). Those who are overmuch concerned with their own interests, easily take offense at what they consider slights or insults or opposition, their rage bursts forth, and they proceed at once to visit revenge on those at whom they are offended. It was greed and envy that caused the herdsmen of Palestine to fill up the wells dug by Isaac and to fight with his servants for possession (Gen., xxvi. 14 sqq.).

**1432. Hatred and Fighting.**—(a) Hatred is not necessarily a cause of fighting. The hater wishes evil to his neighbor, not as punishment, but absolutely; his passion is calmer, more lasting, and more insatiable than that of the angry man. If it suits him, he will bide his time patiently, pretending friendship, but all the while plotting ruin to the one he hates. (b) Hatred at times does bring on fighting, for, if the hater sees that he can safely attack openly, he will use quarreling and fighting as a means to his purpose.

**1433. Occasions that Frequently Bring On Fighting.**—(a) Boasting about self or depreciation of others in the presence of persons who will take offense occasions fights, for "he that boasteth and puffeth himself up stirreth up quarrels" (Prov., xxviii. 25). Thus, disputes over the respective merits of nations or

political parties often bring on bloody encounters. (b) Drunkenness occasions fights, for it so stupefies the mind that one minimizes one's danger and exaggerates one's own strength, and so is emboldened to attack others (Prov., xxiii. 29, 30).

**1434. Evil Consequences of Fighting.**—(a) Charity is wounded by fighting, wherefrom there often result lasting hates, discords, scandals. (b) Justice is wounded by fighting, as when a person unjustly maims or kills his neighbor, and is himself imprisoned or executed, to the disgrace and deprivation of his dependents.

**1435. Duelling.**—A duel is a prearranged combat between two persons fought with deadly weapons, for the purpose of settling a private quarrel.

(a) Thus, it is a *combat*, and hence the "suicide duel," in which the contenders draw lots with the understanding that the loser must kill himself within a specified time, is not properly a duel.

(b) A duel is *prearranged*, that is, the time, place, and weapons are determined in advance. Hence, if two feudists meet accidentally and proceed at once to shoot, their combat is not strictly a duel. It is not necessary, however, that a formal letter of challenge and a letter of acceptance precede the fight.

(c) It is *between two persons*, that is, a determinate combatant is matched against a determinate opponent. A true duel, however, might be carried on between many couples simultaneously, as in the fight between the twelve soldiers of Abner and the twelve soldiers of Joab (II Kings, ii. 13-17). The presence of seconds or witnesses is not essential to a duel.

(d) A duel is fought *with deadly weapons*, that is, with such arms as are capable of inflicting severe wounds, so that there is serious danger of grave wound or mutilation or death. There is no duel, therefore, if one fights with weapons that cannot do serious harm (such as fists, light sticks, mud), or if by agreement one uses dangerous weapons in a way that precludes injury (e.g., by padding the edge of one's sword, loading one's revolver with blanks, firing into the air, as in sham or mock duels). But academic duels, in which students try to stab each other in the face



with small daggers, are true duels; for, while the fighters are well protected in vital parts and serious or fatal wounds rarely happen, it remains true that this manner of fighting is mortally dangerous. The same remark applies to duels fought on condition that only one or two rounds of shots shall be fired, or that fighting shall cease as soon as blood has been drawn.

(e) A duel is fought for the purpose of *settling a private quarrel*. A hand-to-hand combat during battle between two soldiers of contending armies is not a duel in the proper sense of the word, since there is no private quarrel between them, but only the public quarrel of their countries.

**1436. *The Morality of Duelling.***—(a) Generally, the duel is mortally sinful. Like ordinary fighting, it is against charity, and in addition it includes a will to kill or gravely injure another, to expose one's own life or limb to chance, and to usurp the function of the State. This applies to the challenged as well as to the challenger, for one can decline the combat to which one is dared.

(b) Exceptionally, a duel would not be sinful, if it took on the character of a war, or of self-defense against an unjust aggressor. Thus, in order to shorten a war or to lessen the bloodshed, it might be lawful to make the whole issue depend on a single combat between the commanders or between champions chosen from opposing armies, as in the case of David and Goliath (I Kings, xvii); but in modern times such a practice has been abandoned. Again, if a person had to choose between certain death, if he refused a duel, and possible death, if he consented to a duel, it would seem that he is in the position of one attacked by an unjust aggressor; but it is not easy to picture such a case as happening in normal conditions.

**1437. *The Fallacy of the Arguments for Duelling.***—(a) The amusement of the spectators was the purpose of the gladiatorial duels fought in ancient Rome. But today there is no one who would not grant that the butchering of human beings to make a holiday for the populace is savagery.

(b) The decision of doubtful cases before the courts was the purpose of the judicial duels fought among the Germans and

Lombards in the early Middle Ages. But manifestly such duels are a temptation of God, since they rashly call on Him to disclose, through a duel between the litigants, what the evidence in court did not disclose. The outcome of the duel shows which party is stronger or more skilful, not which is in the right.

(c) Training in bravery and the termination of serious differences is the excuse offered for military and university duels. But to kill, cripple, or brutalize youth does not make the nation stronger, and the substitution of violence for law as a means of settling disputes is an encouragement to crime.

(d) Satisfaction for insults or other injury, or the avoidance of the reputation of being a coward, is the reason given for so-called affairs of honor. But is it not a superstition and a relic of barbarism to think that dishonor is wiped out by a dishonorable fight, or that a person shows himself brave because he lacks the moral bravery to act against the wrong opinions of the multitude?

**1438. *Penalties against Duelling.***—(a) Church law deprives of ecclesiastical burial those who die as the result of a duel, if unrepentant (Canon 1240); it also declares excommunication reserved simply to the Holy See and infamy against duellists and their helpers (Canon 2351). (b) Civil law in English-speaking countries makes duelling a crime. If death results, it is regarded as murder, and the seconds are liable to punishment as accessories.

**1439.** What is the moral duty of restitution on account of injuries caused in a duel? (a) The challenger and his heirs have no right to restitution. (b) The challenged, if he accepted willingly, has no right to restitution, for his free acceptance of the fight implies the cession of such a right. (c) The challenged, if he accepted under grave compulsion, has the right to restitution. If he is wounded, the aggressor should pay the medical expense; if he is killed, the heirs should be compensated.

**1440. *Sedition.***—Sedition is a discord between different factions of the same multitude so grave as to extend to physical conflict, and to the destruction of the unity of the State.

(a) It is a *discord*, that is, a disagreement of wills, and so it

resembles schism, war and fighting. Difference of opinion in the political parties of a country is not sedition, since there is a unity of will and purpose in all of them with reference to the common good and the peace of the State (cfr. 1197, 1348). In fact, under a democratic system of government, the existence of some opposite parties has proved a useful, if not necessary means of stimulating the interest of citizens, and of expediting the business of legislation.

(b) Seditio is *between different factions of the same multitude*, that is, between different sections or groups of the same body politic. Thus, it differs from war (which is between states), and from fighting (which is between individuals).

(c) Seditio *extends to physical conflict*, that is, it tends from its character to break out into violence and to array the opposite factions in fight against one another. If not accompanied by actual hostilities, it is simple sedition. But, if fighting has begun, it is insurrection or rebellion, when the people seek to overthrow the government; it is civil war, if one part of the nation seeks to secede from or overcome the other.

(d) It is *prejudicial to the civil unity and peace of the people*, that is, it tends to the violent dismemberment of the State, or at least to the disturbance of the common good. Thus, sedition is more serious than riots, tumults, gang-warfare, and like particular disturbances, which are not directed against the State itself, or against the harmony of the whole body of the people. Seditio differs also from the peaceful separation of parts of a state, and from the lawful self-defense of the people against a tyrannical government.

1441. From the definition given above, it is plain that sedition is a special distinct species of sin. (a) It differs from spiritual discord, for unlike schism it is opposed, not to the unity of the Church, but to the unity of the State. (b) It differs from other kinds of temporal discord, for unlike war and fighting it is opposed, not to peace between nations or individuals, but to peace between the members of the same civil body. War takes away peace with foreigners, sedition takes away peace with

fellow-citizens; fighting attacks a private person or persons, sedition attacks the public welfare of the country.

1442. Seditio in the strict meaning given it above is always sinful. (a) Thus, it is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is opposed to what is manifestly one of the greatest of temporal goods, namely, the unity of the State. (b) It is opposed to charity, as destroying the bond of peace; it is opposed to justice, as injuring a unity based on law and common utility, to which the nation has a strict right. (c) Seditio is graver in some persons than in others. Thus, the moral causes of sedition (*i.e.*, those that sow discords or promote disaffection) are more responsible than those who are led and who carry out acts of violence. The gravity of the sin in each case depends on the amount of damage that is due to one's influence or acts.

1443. Is one who resists a tyrannical government guilty of the sin of sedition? (a) When resistance is made by legal and pacific means, such as the rejection of a bad government at the polls, there is no sedition. (b) When legal and pacific means are impossible and armed aggression against a tyrant will benefit the common good, a rebel is not guilty of the sin of sedition. In this case, it is rather the bad ruler who causes discords and is seditious against the common good, whereas the people only defend themselves according to the laws. Thus, the rebellion of the Machabees against their Syrian oppressors was not seditious. (c) When legal means are impossible but armed aggression will not benefit the common good, a rebel is guilty of the sin of sedition.

#### Art. 9: THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE

(*Summa Theologica*, II—II, q. 43.)

1444. Having discussed in the preceding paragraphs the sins opposed to the internal acts of charity (love, joy and peace), we come now to treat of scandal and coöperation which are opposed to the external acts of charity—beneficence and brotherly correction.

**1445. Scandal.**—Scandal is derived from a Greek word signifying a snare or trap prepared for an enemy, or a stone or block laid in the road that he may stumble or trip over it. In use, it is applied in a wide or general sense, and in a strict or special sense. (a) In its *wide sense*, it refers to any kind of harm, especially of a spiritual or moral nature, that one brings on others. (b) In its *strict sense*, it refers to a fall into sin which one occasions for others by misconduct.

**1446.** The following are some examples of the word "scandal" as employed in its wide sense: (a) It is used to signify physical or natural injuries of various kinds. Thus, the servants of Pharaoh called the *plagues* brought on Egypt by Moses a scandal (Exod., x. 7), and the Psalmist says of the sinner that he laid a scandal (*calumny*) against his brother (Ps. xlix. 20). Those who spread *defamatory gossip* are called scandal-mongers, and "scandal" often signifies opprobrium or *disgrace*, as when Shakespeare speaks of the wrangling of nobles as a scandal to the crown. (b) The word "scandal" is also used to signify moral injuries distinct from inducement to sin. Thus, the shock and offense given to virtuous persons by blasphemous language spoken in their hearing is described as a scandal, and one who would prevent another from following some more perfect course or practice to which there is no obligation (such as entering religion, saying grace at meals, etc.), is sometimes said to scandalize.

**1447. Definition of Scandal.**—In the *strict sense*, scandal is defined as "any conduct that has at least the appearance of evil and that offers to a neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin."

(a) By *conduct* is understood external behavior or manner of acting in the presence of others. Thus, scandal differs from sin, for sin is committed, not only by external acts done before others, but also by internal thoughts and desires and external acts that are secret.

(b) Scandal is conduct which is *evil at least in appearance*, that is, sinful, or from the circumstances seemingly sinful. Thus, an act is not scandalous, if it is morally indifferent or a less good, and is perceivable as being such.

(c) Scandal tends to *spiritual ruin*, that is, to a fall into sin, great or small. Here scandal strictly understood differs from scandal in the wide senses given in the previous paragraph.

(d) Scandal is an *occasion* of a fall into sin, that is, it sets an example of sin before the attention, and thus suggests to the will that the will imitate the sin. Scandal is not, however, the cause of sin, for a person causes his own sin in yielding consent to the suggestion offered by scandal.

(e) Scandal is to *another*. A person may be said to scandalize himself in the sense that by his looks or acts he puts himself in an occasion of sin (Matt., v. 29, 30), or inasmuch as he maliciously makes the acts of a virtuous neighbor an occasion of sin; but scandal is more properly understood of an occasion of sin prepared for one's neighbor.

**1448. Causes of Scandal.**—There are various divisions of scandal according to the kinds of external acts. (a) There is scandal in words, as profane language or calumnies spoken in a gathering of people. (b) There is scandal in acts, as when one is perceptibly drunk or fights in a city street. Scandal applies also to things, in so far as they are the result of acts or related to acts, such as disedifying books, pictures, dress. Thus, one gives scandal by having sinful objects on display, such as profane mottoes on one's wall, obscene advertisements or announcements on one's billboards. (c) There also may be scandal in omission, as when one is conspicuously absent from Mass on Sundays.

**1449.** The following kinds of sinful acts are not scandalous, for they are unknown to others, and hence cannot suggest sin: (a) internal acts, such as wicked thoughts, desires, emotions; (b) external acts concealed from others, such as inaudible profanity, intoxication not noticeable by others, omission of an obligatory penance about which others have no knowledge.

**1450.** There are, likewise, various divisions of scandal according to the internal purpose of the scandalizer. (a) Scandal is directly intentional, when the purpose of the scandalizer is to lead others to the guilt of sin (*diabolical scandal*). Example: Titus blasphemes religion before Caius in order that the latter

may become irreligious, and thus be more easily persuaded to follow a life of crime. (b) Scandal is indirectly intentional when the purpose of the scandalizer is to perform some action whose nature is such that it will lead others to the guilt of sin, and he is determined to perform that action, although not directly willing the neighbor's guilt that will result. Example: Titus does not like to see his children drunk, but he likes to get drunk himself occasionally, knowing all the while that his example encourages them to drink.

1451. In the following cases there is no intention of scandal: (a) when one does an act that has no appearance of evil, and one neither directly nor indirectly wills that it should be an occasion of sin to anyone. Example: Balbus performs his duties faithfully, although he knows to his regret that his fidelity occasions envy and hatred in Claudius; (b) when one does an act that is evil or apparently evil, but is invincibly ignorant of the scandal it may give. Example: Sempronius and Titus converse together in a foreign tongue which they confidently think Caius does not understand. The conversation is disedifying, and Caius, who does understand, is shocked by what they say.

1452. The act of the scandalizer who intends, directly or indirectly, the spiritual ruin of his neighbor, is called *active scandal*, while the act of the person who takes occasion from the active scandal to incur spiritual ruin, is called *passive scandal*. Active and passive scandal are sometimes together, sometimes apart. (a) Thus, there is both active and passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his neighbor, and the scandalized does fall. (b) There is active but not passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his neighbor, but the latter does not fall into the snare. (c) There is passive but not active scandal, when one makes the good action rightly performed by another an occasion of sin. Thus, some made the life and passion of our Lord a pretext for not accepting Him (Matt., xiii. 57; John, vi. 62; I Cor., i. 23), and are said to have been scandalized at Him.

1453. As to the act that occasions the spiritual ruin of another, it must be wrong either in reality or in appearance. (a)

The scandalous act is wrong in reality, when it is forbidden as a sin—for example, offering sacrifice in the temple of an idol, or diverting to personal use money collected for the poor. (b) The scandalous act is wrong in appearance, when on account of circumstances it seems to be an act forbidden as a sin. Thus, to take part in a banquet held in a pagan temple might seem like participation in sacrificial rites (I Cor., viii. 10); to expend secretly the money collected for the poor might have the appearance of improper use of funds (II Cor., viii. 20, 21). Hence, St. Paul directs: "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves" (I Thess., v. 22).

1454. The acts wrong in reality or in appearance that give scandal are innumerable, since the whole world is seated in wickedness (I John, v. 19). But today there are a number of acts that should be specially mentioned, as they occasion sin oftener or for more persons than other acts. Among these are: (a) occasions of sin against faith, such as atheistical literature, as discussed in the section on faith; (b) occasions of sin against morals, such as obscenity in dress, pictures, plays, writings, and dances. These last-mentioned will be discussed now in separate paragraphs.

1455. *Obscenity*.—Obscenity is a quality of words, acts or objects by which impure thoughts are conveyed, or impure desires or actions suggested. We may consider it either internally (*i.e.*, in the intention of the person who uses the words, acts or objects) or externally (*i.e.*, in the nature of the things themselves which are used).

(a) Thus, *internal obscenity*, or the will to use what will corrupt the minds and morals of others, is of course a mortal sin. If the intention is to deprave another, the guilt of direct scandal is incurred; if the intention is only to satisfy one's own wish to use the sinful words, acts or objects, the guilt is that of indirect scandal. Thus, a woman who dresses fashionably in order to excite impure love is guilty of direct scandal; if she dresses immodestly, not to excite impure love, but to follow a fashion, she is guilty of indirect scandal.

(b) *External obscenity* is the tendency of words, acts or

objects themselves to call up impure images in the mind, or to excite impure desires or actions in those to whom they are presented. The use of such words, acts, etc., is therefore a mortal sin. For, if the thing said or done is wrong in itself (such as obscene language), it is a scandalous sin against purity; if it is wrong on account of those who will be influenced (such as a talk on sex matters to immature or weak persons), it is a sin of scandal. Hence, a good or even religious motive (such as instruction, refutation of error, health, or mysticism) does not excuse the employment of what is clearly obscene, for the end does not justify the means.

1456. It is not always easy to determine in particular cases when a thing is obscene from its very nature, but the following general rules can be given:

(a) Pictures, statues and other images are obscene, when they represent scenes of immoral or sexual acts, or lascivious attitudes or postures; also, when they represent nude or partly nude human figures, ut quando depinguntur verenda adultorum vel pectora aut partes minus honestæ mulierum.

(b) Female dress or adornment is lascivious, when there is a notable display of the person through abbreviated skirts, necks, and sleeves; or a suggestiveness expressed in transparency of material or a closeness of fit that brings out the lines and curves of the figure; or in an extremity of fashion whose striking color or design will make the wearer conspicuous and direct special attention to her physical charms.

(c) Plays on the stage or moving picture screen are obscene by reason of the lesson taught (as when purity is derided or impurity condoned), by reason of the thing represented (as when the main theme is impurity, or when acts of impurity are represented or suggested, or when sexual passion is emphasized), or by reason of the players (as when they are noted for immorality, or when their dress is indecent, or their language objectionable).

(d) Dances are obscene in themselves when the postures, movements, or contact of the dancers is indecent; they are obscene by reason of the dancers, when these are indecently attired. Public dance halls, cabarets, road houses, and night clubs—

where there is no supervision and young girls come unattended to dance until late hours with men unknown to them, and where there is intoxication and boisterousness—are the natural haunts of the obscene dance, but it may be found even in more respectable places.

(e) Books or other writings contain obscenity when they inculcate or recommend impure acts, or advise how these may be committed; when they treat sins of impurity or narrate immoral facts or stories in such a manner as to make vice seem alluring or pardonable to the intended reader; when an erotic composition by language, allusions, details, sympathetic treatment, etc., gives prominence to animal passion.

1457. As is stated elsewhere (see 1461 sqq.), scandal is not given unless the persons affected by one's conduct are susceptible to evil influence. Hence, there is no obscenity when on account of circumstances there is no suggestion of evil in things which under other conditions would be immoral and seductive.

(a) Images of the nude in the studio of an artist, and anatomical charts, figures or illustrations in a book intended for the instruction of medical men, are not classed as obscene, since the persons for whom they are made are supposed to be so much under the influence of the esthetic or scientific principles of their professions that no harm will be taken.

(b) The obscenity of dress is largely dependent on its novelty, for things that are usual cease to excite special attention. This we can see from the fact that styles that are conservative today would have been extreme ten years ago. And so the scanty attire of hot countries, the dress of the bathing beach, and the moderate décolleté tolerated in private gatherings are not obscene in their own proper times and places.

(c) Plays which contain gross or unseemly expressions or passages are not therefore obscene, if in the main they uphold decency and morality; otherwise, we should have to regard as immoral even the classic drama. Newman says of Shakespeare: "Often as he may offend against modesty, he is clear of a worse charge, sensuality, and hardly a passage can be instanced in all

that he has written to seduce the imagination or to excite the passions." It is a simple matter to omit from plays of this kind the word or phrase that is offensive to modern ears or to the innocence of youth.

(d) The fact that some individuals find all dancing a strong stimulus to impure passion does not prove that every dance is obscene. Some types of dance, it is true, might be rightly called "the devil's march"; other dances, named after various animals, may also be suggestive. But there are also standard types of dance in which many experience not temptation, but innocent pastime, and which have also physical, esthetic and social values.

(e) To books and other writings should be applied what was said about plays, namely, that they are not to be classed as obscene on account of isolated passages unsuited for the reading of children or other susceptible persons, or excitable to prurient or impure minds. Even the Bible may seem objectionable to a prude, and the indecent will go through its pages with a fine-tooth comb in the search for indecent matter; but public opinion will rightly class as a lunatic the person who would endeavor to have the Bible rated as obscene.

**1458. Persons Who Give Scandal on Account of Obscenity.—**

(a) In case of obscene pictures or statues, scandal is given by the artists, painters, sculptors or others who make the images, and by the responsible persons who place them in museums, galleries, parks or other places to which there is general admission.

(b) As regards female dress, the guilty parties are proximately the wearers, but remotely and principally the designers and society leaders who impose their will in making the fashions dangerous and in causing one extreme mode to follow quickly upon another.

(c) With respect to obscene plays, the scandal is given by playwrights, managers, actors and actresses, and those who patronize or applaud them. The public itself and the civil authorities share in the guilt, when they supinely tolerate the degradation of the stage and the corruption of morals.

(d) In the case of obscene dances, the givers of scandal are

the proprietors of resorts where the dances are held, the musicians and singers (especially when the songs themselves are obscene), and the dancers, spectators and other patrons.

(e) In the case of salacious publications or writings, authors, publishers, printers, vendors, and the reading public share responsibility for the scandal. Government censorship of the press is not desirable, but government suppression of obscenity has always been the policy of countries of English origin. The private citizen, then, is not free of guilt if he takes no interest even when he sees piles of indecent magazines, pictures, etc., being sold openly on the newsstands. Canon Law (Canon 1404) forbids booksellers to sell, lend, or keep books that deal *ex professo* with obscenity, though there is no objection to expurgated editions, as in the case of classical works.

**1459. Results of Scandal.**—The spiritual ruin occasioned by scandal is sin.

(a) Thus, formal or material sin may be the result of scandal. Example: Titus blasphemed before a boy who did not understand the meaning of the word and before a youth who did understand, with the result that both repeated the same blasphemy. Thus, the scandal given by Titus produced material sin in the boy and formal sin in the youth.

(b) Mortal sin or venial sin may be the result of scandal, just as a stone in the road may cause either a fall or a stumble.

(c) Sin of the same species or sin of a different species from that committed by the scandal-giver may be the result of scandal. Thus, a calumny spoken against a neighbor may induce a hearer either to repeat the calumny, or to imitate the act imputed by the calumniator, or to give up religion.

(d) Sin already committed by the person scandalized or sin which is new to him, sin he had in mind to commit or sin he had not contemplated—any one of these results suffice for scandal. Example: It is scandal to recall to drunkenness by bad example a person who had reformed, or by bad example to bring back to another's mind and desire a sin on which he was once resolved.

1460. Scandal resembles solicitation and complicity, since like them it exercises an evil influence on others; but it is not identical with them.

(a) Thus, solicitation influences another to evil by counsel, persuasion, command, or invitation; scandal may influence to evil either in these ways or by mere example. Again, solicitation does not necessarily intend the fall of another into guilt, as does scandal. Thus, one may solicit another to get drunk who had already determined to get drunk, or one may persuade another that drunkenness is no sin, and then solicit him to drunkenness. But, if one who intends the demoralization and corruption of his neighbor solicits him to drunkenness, solicitation is joined with scandal.

(b) Complicity or coöperation influences another to evil by helping him in the commission of sin; scandal influences him to evil by suggesting that he commit sin. Example: Titus, an elderly man, gets drunk or praises drunkards in the presence of Balbus, a youth. Influenced by these acts and words, Balbus tells his acquaintance Claudius that he intends to get drunk, and Claudius supplies him with the intoxicants. Titus is guilty of scandal, Claudius of coöperation.

1461. The persons before whom disedifying words, deeds or omissions are done, are of two classes. (a) Persons apt to be scandalized are those who are not experienced either in vice (especially that to which the disedifying example would lead), or in virtue (especially the opposite virtue); for such persons are readily subject to bad influence. Thus, young persons whose character is yet unformed, the ignorant and well-meaning persons who are weak, are peculiarly disposed to be led astray by example. (b) Persons not apt to be scandalized are those who are habitually so bad or so good that anything disedifying done before them is not calculated to influence their attitude towards evil.

1462. May a person hold himself guiltless of scandal, therefore, because his wrongdoing was committed before those who are not apt to be scandalized?

(a) If he is certain that the witnesses will not be weakened

morally on his account, and if he does not intend their fall, he is free of the guilt of scandal. Thus, if one blasphemes in the presence of a lady renowned for piety, or of a rough crowd of men whose daily talk is interspersed with blasphemies, it is practically sure that no scandal is given.

(b) If a person is not certain that the witnesses will suffer no moral harm through his example, he cannot hold himself as not guilty of scandal. For, no matter how good or how bad the witnesses may appear to him, they may not be as fixed in character as he thinks, and his misconduct may be the starting point for them of a downward course or of a more rapid descent into evil. Generally speaking, there is this uncertainty about the influence of bad example, for the reading of character is no easy matter, and many sins are internal.

1463. There are two cases especially, when even the very good may become bad or the very bad become worse through force of evil example: (a) when the sin committed is from its nature very alluring. Sic auctores censent vix fieri posse quin in materia luxuriæ malum exemplum peccati motus cieat; (b) the second case is when the authority of the one who gives scandal is great. For the fact that he sides with or seems to side with evil, will demoralize the good and encourage the wicked in wrongdoing.

1464. Passive scandal (see 1452), that is, the spiritual fall consequent on the example of another, is of two kinds: (a) scandal *given*, which is a fall into sin occasioned by conduct really disedifying, as when a youth becomes drunk because he has seen his elders intoxicated; (b) scandal *taken*, which is a fall into sin occasioned by conduct irreproachable in itself, but wrongly interpreted, either out of malice (*Pharisaic scandal*), or out of ignorance or frailty (*scandal of little ones*). The Pharisees were scandalized at our Lord's dining with sinners, because they themselves were unmerciful (Matt., ix. 11 sqq.), and the weak brethren at Corinth were scandalized at the eating of certain meats, because their consciences were tender (I Cor., xi. 23 sqq.).

1465. Sinfulness of Scandal.—(a) Scandal in the wide

sense is not necessarily a sin. Thus, St. Peter acted out of love for his Master when he wished to dissuade Him from the Passion, but our Lord, in order to correct more vigorously the wrong ideas of Peter, called them a scandal (Matt., xvi. 23).

(b) Passive scandal is always a sin in the one who falls because of the conduct of another; but it does not always suppose that the conduct which occasioned the fall was a sin, as is clear from the remarks made above on Pharisaic scandal and the scandal of little ones.

(c) Active scandal is always a sin in the one whose conduct occasions the fall of another, since that conduct is either sinful, or has such an appearance of sin that it should have been omitted. But it does not always suppose a sin in the person who witnesses the scandal, for he may proceed without a fall in spite of the obstacle placed in his path.

**1466.** Is scandal a distinct species of sin, or only a circumstance that may happen to any kind of sin?

(a) Passive scandal is not a special kind of sin. For the scandalized person may fall into any and every kind of sin, and the fact that example occasions his fall does not add any special or new opposition to the virtue against which he offends. Thus, he who breaks the fast because he saw others break the fast, is guilty of the same sin of intemperance as those who gave him scandal. But passive scandal may be an aggravating or an extenuating circumstance, aggravating if the scandal was taken, extenuating if the scandal was given.

(b) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional (see 1450) and is offered by conduct evil in itself, is not a special sin. The reason is that in such scandal one does not specially intend the spiritual ruin of a neighbor, but only the satisfaction of one's own desire. Thus, he who breaks the fast before others to satisfy his own appetite, does not directly wish the corruption of those others, and hence his sin is that of intemperance with the added circumstance of bad example.

(c) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional and is offered by conduct not evil but evil-appearing, is reductively the

special sin of scandal. For, since all active scandal is sinful, and in this case there is no other species of sin, the conduct not being really evil in itself, the sin in question must be reduced to scandal. Thus, one who is dispensed from the law of abstinence and who eats meat on a day of abstinence in the presence of others who know he is a Catholic but do not know he is dispensed, does not sin against temperance, but against edification. His sin is that of scandal only reductively, since he does not directly will the fall of others. There is also the circumstance that the law of abstinence may suffer as a result of the scandal.

(d) Active scandal, if it is directly intentional (see 1450), is directly also the special sin of scandal. For this kind of scandal directly intends the spiritual ruin of a neighbor, and so is directly opposed to a special good of another person and to the special charitable act of fraternal correction. Hence, a person who breaks the fast in order to lead his neighbor into a like transgression, is guilty of both intemperance and scandal; he who to make his neighbor sin appears to break the fast, is guilty of scandal, but not of intemperance.

**1467.** Practical Applications of the Preceding Paragraph to Confession.—(a) *Species of Sins.*—In case of passive scandal there is only one species of sin to be confessed, namely, the intemperance occasioned by bad example; in case of active scandal indirectly intended and offered by evil conduct, there is only one species of sin, namely, intemperance, with the circumstance of publicity or bad example; in case of active scandal indirectly intended and offered by evil-seeming conduct, there is only one species of sin, namely, scandal; in case of active scandal directly intended, there is only the species of scandal, if the conduct of the scandalizer is only evil-seeming, but there are several species of sin, if his conduct is really evil, namely, his own intemperance and the scandal he gives.

(b) *Number of Sins.*—As many sins of scandal are committed as there are persons present to be scandalized, for scandal is given to those present as individuals, not as parts of a group (see 219). Hence, one commits more scandals by being drunk



on a public street than by being drunk with a roomful of companions; and by attacking religion before a large assembly than by attacking it before a small circle.

(c) *Circumstances of Intention and Conduct.*—Those who give bad example should confess especially the end and the means employed, for on these depends the important distinction between directly intentional and indirectly intentional scandal and the specific character of the sin committed, as explained in the preceding paragraph.

(d) *Circumstance of Condition of the Persons Involved.*—This should be mentioned in confessing scandal, if it adds a new malice. Thus, the fact that scandal is given by a superior bound by his office to give good example, adds to the violation of charity a violation of justice; the fact that the person whose ruin is intended is consecrated to God, or married, or a relative, adds to the malice of intentional scandal against chastity; the fact that a person is scandalized entirely against his will, makes the sin scandal rather than simple solicitation.

(e) *Circumstance of the Result of Scandal.*—The results of scandal should be confessed when they add a new malice to the sin or induce an obligation of restitution. This subject will be considered in the three following paragraphs.

**1468.** Is the scandalizer guilty of the species of sin to which his conduct is calculated to lead the scandalized? (a) If the scandal is directly intentional, that is, if the scandalizer intends that some special sin or sins shall be committed by the one scandalized, the former is guilty in desire of that which he intends that the latter shall be guilty of in reality (cfr. 96, 102). Hence, if by calumniating clerics or religious or church members one intends that one's listeners shall be induced to repeat these calumnies, or to do what the calumniated persons were said to do, or to abandon religion, one is guilty in desire of the particular sin or sins that one wills.

(b) If the scandal is only indirectly intentional, that is, if the scandalizer foresees but does not expressly will the fall of the scandalized (e.g., if he calumniates others to injure the calum-

niated and not those who hear the calumny), the matter is more difficult, and authorities differ in their opinions. Some moralists think that the scandalizer is guilty of the result he foresees, because he wills it interpretatively by offering the occasion for it. Others think that he is not guilty of the result foreseen, because he does not effect it, either in intention (for he does not desire it) or in reality (for he is not bound, except by charity, to prevent its accomplishment in others); he permits, but does not approve, the sin of his neighbor.

**1469.** A practical application of the previous paragraph to confession may be made as follows: (a) those who are guilty of direct scandal must confess not only their own sin, but also the sin to which their conduct leads their neighbor; (b) those who are guilty of indirect scandal are not obliged, according to the second opinion given above, to confess the species of sin to which their conduct incited the beholder, and hence, if their conduct was only evil-seeming, it suffices for them to confess that they gave scandal.

**1470.** Is the scandalizer responsible for the injuries to third parties resulting from the sins occasioned by his scandal?

(a) According to one opinion, he is bound to make his share of restitution for injustices occasioned by his own bad example, because it is admitted that he who counsels injustice is so bound, and example is more persuasive than words of counsel. Hence, one who steals from his employer before fellow-employees, and so brings on a custom of stealing among them, is bound to restore, not only what he took himself, but also a share of other losses not made good to the employer.

(b) According to the more common opinion, however, the scandalizer in the present case is not held to restitution, except as regards his own ill-gotten goods, even if there is question of scandal directly intended. For, either the scandalizer is not guilty of the injustice committed by the others, as not desiring it; or, at any rate, he is only the occasion, not the cause or coöperator in that injustice.

**1471.** If scandal amounts to incitation or coöperation, the

guilt of the neighbor's sin and responsibility for injury the neighbor causes are incurred by the scandalizer.

(a) Thus, bad example may amount to incitation to sin, as when a person knows that others are directed to imitate him, and yet he gives them bad example. Even though he does not directly intend their fall into sin, he does intend his own conduct, while realizing that there is attached to it the circumstance that it is an invitation to sin; and hence it would seem that the guilt of this sin is also contracted.

(b) Bad example may amount to coöperation in sin, as when a person by his bad example shows others the way to commit sin, which they could not have learned without his example. Hence, if a person opens a safe to steal, knowing that other dishonest persons are observing in order to learn the combination and steal, it seems that to some extent he shares in the guilt and duty of restitution of the thieves who learn from him. There is no doubt that a defamer is bound to make reparation, not only before his immediate listeners, but also before others who have listened to them; for, by defaming before talkative persons, he virtually authorized them to spread his words.

**1472. The Gravity of the Sin of Scandal.**—(a) From its nature all active scandal is a mortal sin. It turns man away from Christ (I Cor., viii. 12); it is spiritual murder, destructive of the souls of others, and so contrary to the mercy and brotherly correction required by charity (Rom., xiv. 15); it brings on oneself the wrath of God (Matt., xviii. 6), and on one's family, friends and profession obloquy and disgrace.

(b) From the indeliberation of the act or from the smallness of the matter, active scandal may be venial, as will be seen in the following paragraph.

**1473. Mortal and Venial Scandal.**—(a) Passive scandal is always a sin, mortal or venial according to the fall occasioned by the conduct witnessed. But mortal sin may be occasioned by venial sin, as when an inferior takes the liberty to blaspheme, because his superior used profane language; and venial sin may be occasioned by mortal sin, as when the blasphemy of an infidel

provokes his neighbor to use profane language against the blasphemer.

(b) Active scandal indirectly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as when the scandalous conduct is only a venial sin, or is no sin but has the appearance of a slight sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when the scandalous conduct is a mortal sin, or when a person so despises the spiritual welfare of his neighbor that he chooses to do an evil-seeming act that will cause the neighbor to fall into serious sin.

(c) Active scandal directly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as when a person intends by conduct venially sinful to lead a neighbor into venial sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when one intends to lead one's neighbor into mortal sin, or commits a mortal sin in order to lead one's neighbor into venial sin.

**1474. Increase and decrease in gravity of scandal depends on the internal dispositions of the scandal-giver and the external influence he has on the person scandalized.** (a) The internal factors on which the quantity of scandal depends are the amount of deliberation and the degree of intention. It is more serious to speak a scandalous word with premeditation than to speak it somewhat thoughtlessly; more scandalous to speak it when the hearer's spiritual ruin is directly intended, than when that ruin is not directly intended. (b) The external factors on which the quantity of scandal depends are the amount of influence the bad example has and the character of the evil to which it leads. It is more serious to corrupt A, who would not otherwise have been corrupted, than to corrupt B, who would have been corrupted even without one's bad example; it is more serious to cause another to commit mortal sin, than to cause him to commit venial sin.

**1475. Persons Scandalized.**—Is it possible to scandalize people who are firmly rooted in virtue?

(a) If the question be understood of scandal in a wide sense, even the perfect may be scandalized. They may be shocked and horrified at the evil example they witness; they may be hindered from performing the external good works they desire to accomplish (I Thess., ii. 18). But these things do not hinder

them internally, or separate them from the love of God (Rom., viii. 38, 39).

(b) If the question be understood of possibility in an absolute sense, even the perfect may suffer real scandal, that is, they may be influenced to sin on account of the example witnessed. Since they are not confirmed in grace in this life, it is not repugnant that they commit sin and lose grace.

(c) If the question be understood of possibility in a relative sense—that is, if we consider what we should expect in view of the character of perfect men, and what does usually happen—the perfect cannot be scandalized, since they are so firmly united to God that the sayings or doings, no matter of whom, cannot cause them to sin (Ps. cxxiv. 1, 2), although they may at times be disturbed thereby (Ps. lxxii. 2).

**1476.** Is it possible that the perfect should give scandal?

(a) If the question be understood of absolute possibility, even the perfect may give scandal, since they are not immune from defect (I John, i. 8). (b) If the question be understood of relative possibility, as explained above, the perfect cannot scandalize, for their sins are mostly internal acts not entirely deliberate, while the external words or acts in which they fall short deviate so slightly from right as to offer no occasion of sinning to another. The perfect man is one who is on his guard, especially that he become not a stumbling-block to others, and it is therefore a rare exception when he causes scandal.

**1477. Duty of Avoiding Scandal.**—At times it is impossible to avoid giving scandal, unless one surrenders some spiritual or temporal good. Hence, on this point there are two questions to be considered: (a) When is one obliged to surrender spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding scandal? (b) When is one obliged to surrender temporal goods for the sake of avoiding scandal?

**1478. The Surrender of Spiritual Goods in order to Avoid Scandal.**—(a) Spiritual goods that are so necessary that one cannot give them up without committing sin may not be surrendered; for, according to the order of charity, one must be more solicitous to keep oneself from sin than to preserve others, and moreover a good end does not justify sinful means. Hence,

it is not lawful to commit mortal or even venial sin to avoid giving scandal to another. Examples: One may not tone down the doctrine of right and wrong in order to keep another from blasphemy. One may not tell a slight lie to keep another from taking undeserved offense.

(b) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin are not to be neglected on account of malicious or Pharisaic scandal, as long as there is a good reason which calls for their use; for the person who takes malicious scandal from these spiritual things is in difficulty through his own fault and can rescue himself, and it is not reasonable that his malice should be permitted to impede the benefit of others. Thus, our Lord declared that no attention was to be given the scandal which the Pharisees took from His doctrine (Matt., xv. 14).

(c) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be neglected on account of Pharisaic scandal, if there is no great reason for their use; for one should not give another an occasion of sinning, even if the other is in bad faith, unless there is necessity. Thus, our Lord declared that the act of teaching truth to others should be omitted, if it would only provoke rejection (Matt., vii. 6). Example: A wife may omit saying grace aloud, if her prayer moves her husband to mimicry or to attempts to make the prayer a mockery.

(d) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be omitted on account of the scandal of little ones, as long as it remains scandal from weakness or ignorance; for charity requires that one assist those who are in spiritual need, and persons who are in danger of scandal through no fault, or through a slight fault of their own, are in spiritual need. Hence, one should conceal or delay the performance of good works that are not necessary, if they would scandalize the weak, or else one should explain to these persons the righteousness of such works. In any case, one should not do these works before those who without malice will be scandalized, but should await such a time as will give them better knowledge, or put them in bad faith. Examples: If a person knows that personal acts of piety which he performs seem to some well-meaning persons superstitious and

will shake their faith, he should omit these acts when such persons are present. If parents are scandalized because a child wishes to leave them in order to become a priest or a religious, the child should delay for a while, if there is hope of a change of view on their part.

1479. As was said in the chapter on law (see 288 sqq.), the higher law has the preference in case of a conflict. Now, natural law itself requires that one avoid the scandal of the weak. Hence the following cases:

(a) Negative precepts of the natural law may not be contravened in order to avoid the scandal of the weak; for such contravention is necessarily sinful. Hence, one may not lie or commit perjury to prevent scandal.

(b) Affirmative precepts of the natural law should be contravened in order to avoid the scandal of the weak, but only when such scandal is a greater evil than the omission of the thing commanded. Thus, one should omit a fraternal correction or a punishment, if the one corrected would be made worse, or the punishment occasion a schism. But one may not neglect to help a person in extreme need because of scandal.

(c) Precepts of the divine law should be contravened on account of scandal of the weak, unless contravention of the law is a greater evil than permission of the scandal. Thus, the preaching of the Gospel is commanded by divine law, and yet it may be omitted to avoid scandal (Matt., vii. 6). Item integritas confessionis de jure divino est, et tamen pœnitens deberet peccatum silere, si intelligeret confessarium cui ex necessitate confiteri deberet grave ex eo scandalum passurum. But it is not lawful to omit Baptism in order to avoid scandal to those who will be provoked to anger or blasphemy.

(d) Precepts of ecclesiastical law should be contravened, when otherwise there will arise a scandal of the weak which is a graver evil than the contravention of the precepts. Thus, a parish-priest should say Mass on Sunday, even though not fasting, if this is necessary in order to avoid great scandal among the people. A wife may omit Mass or a fast, in order to prevent her ignorant husband from using blasphemies

or imprecations, or to avoid notable dissensions in the home. Puella quae scit juvenem infirmum ex suo aspectu scandalizari debet sacro omissio domi manere.

1480. In order that scandal of the weak may be considered a greater evil than contravention of a grave precept, it is necessary that the following conditions be verified:

(a) The evil of the scandal must be certain and grave, for an uncertain or slight scandal is not a greater evil than certain contravention of a grave precept. Thus, if one only has vague fears that scandal may be given, or if one has no determined person in mind and thinks only that someone or other will be harmed, there is no excuse for contravention of the precept.

(b) The evil of contravening the precept must not impose intolerable hardships or lead to greater scandals; for one is not required to attempt the impossible, or to give scandal in order to avoid scandal. Thus, it would be unreasonable to expect that a student should never read the classical poets or philosophers of Greece or Rome, lest scandal be given some person overstrict in this matter; that a wife absent herself from Mass permanently, lest her ignorant husband be provoked to rage; that a young lady be deprived of fresh air and exercise, lest an old relative be edified. If we have to choose between occasioning irreligion in one person by attending Mass and occasioning irreligion in many persons by staying away from Mass, we should rather permit the scandal of the one. Moralists generally hold that scandal of the weak does not justify absence from obligatory Mass oftener than once or twice, and some hold that it does not require absence from Mass at all.

1481. Good works that are of counsel only (such as evangelical poverty), and those that are obligatory only under certain conditions (such as almsdeeds), may be more easily put aside in order to avoid scandal of the weak. It should be noted, however, that for some persons these works are of precept, and hence they are to be judged, as regards those persons, according to the rules given for contravention of precepts. (a) Thus, the counsels are obligatory for those who have vowed them (e.g., religious).

(b) Corporal and spiritual works of mercy are obligatory for prelates and other clerics because of their office.

1482. Spiritual goods, therefore, whether of precept or of counsel, are not to be surrendered entirely on account of any scandal, whether it be Pharisaic scandal or scandal of the weak. But, out of charity for others, these goods should not be made use of (apart from necessity) in a way that would occasion spiritual ruin to anyone. Hence, if there is danger of scandal:

(a) they should be concealed, as when one goes to Mass early in the morning or by another way, so as not to occasion blasphemy in one's neighbor; (b) they should be delayed, as when one puts off a fraternal correction until the other person is in a frame of mind to be corrected with profit; (c) they may be used but should be explained, as when one is called to give Baptism to a person dying in a notorious resort and takes witnesses with him, or tells the bystanders the reason of his visit.

1483. When Should Temporal Goods be Surrendered for the Sake of Avoiding Scandal.—(a) Temporal goods of which one is not the owner, but only the custodian or administrator, may not be surrendered at will on account of scandal; for no one has the right to give away the property of others. Hence, rulers in Church or State may not arbitrarily surrender common property; guardians may not give up the property of their charges.

(b) Temporal goods of which one is owner should be surrendered on account of the scandal of little ones, unless a greater evil results from such surrender; for, as said above (see 1165 sqq.), one should be willing to suffer some detriment in temporal things to avert from one's neighbor detriment in spiritual things. Hence, one should abstain from a certain food, if one's eating of it will cause spiritual ruin to some innocent person (I Cor., viii. 13).

(c) Temporal goods are not to be surrendered on account of Pharisaic scandal; for this would be injurious to the common good, since it would encourage the wicked to despoil the conscientious, and it would also be injurious to the wicked themselves, since they would continue in sin by keeping what was not

their own. Hence, one may demand money owed, even if the debtor is greedy and will use profane language.

1484. The surrender of temporal goods spoken of in the previous paragraph may be understood in a number of senses.

(a) It can be understood either of the act of giving another what is held by us and is our own property, or of the act of permitting another to keep that which is held by him but which belongs to us. Charity may call for either kind of surrender as a means to the avoidance of scandal. Example: Rather than have a bitter quarrel or lose a friendship over a few cents of change, it is better to let the other man keep what he owes you, or give him what you do not owe, if he is also in good faith.

(b) The surrender of temporal goods can also be understood either of the internal willingness to sacrifice temporal things for things spiritual, when necessity requires, or of the actual external sacrifice. Charity demands the internal willingness, but it does not always demand the actual sacrifice; for sometimes such a sacrifice would be harmful to the common welfare and the welfare of individuals. Thus, the saying of our Lord that we should not contend with a neighbor who wishes to take our coat, but should rather let him take our cloak as well (Matt., v. 40), and the saying of St. Paul that the Corinthians should prefer to suffer injury and fraud rather than have lawsuits against fellow-Christians (I Cor., vi. 7), are to be understood of a willingness to sacrifice temporal things in order to avoid scandal, when a greater good makes this necessary. But those texts do not mean that it is obligatory or advisable to make an actual sacrifice at other times.

(c) The surrender of temporal goods may be understood either of a giving over to others without protest or remonstrance, or of a yielding to them only after one has tried to prevent scandal without incurring temporal loss. Charity does not require, even when there is danger of scandal of the weak, that one should surrender one's goods without any effort to save them. Thus, if an ignorant Catholic is shocked because his priest asks for money to support the Church, the latter will do him a service by explaining the right the Church has to be supported and the duty of the members to contribute.

1485. *Temporal goods* may be understood here either of things of great value (e.g., necessities of life) or of things of minor value (e.g., luxuries). (a) Thus, if scandal will place a neighbor in extreme spiritual need, even things of great value should be surrendered, if this is necessary to avoid scandal. (b) If scandal will not place him in extreme need, one is not obliged to surrender any except things of minor value (see 1165 sqq.). Thus, St. Paul does not ask that his converts give up all food in order to avoid scandalizing the weak, but only such food as they can get along without (Rom., xiv. 15; I Cor., viii. 13).

1486. Should church goods ever be surrendered in order to avoid scandal of the weak? (a) On the one hand, goods of the Church have a special sacredness, because they have been given and set apart for spiritual purposes and the common good of the Church. Hence, he would be an unfaithful steward who would devote them to merely temporal ends, such as the enrichment or exaltation of himself or of his friends, or who would alienate them without due authority. (b) On the other hand, the temporal goods of the Church are to serve spiritual ends, and the spiritual must not be subordinated to the temporal. Hence, one of the chief causes of scandal in the Church is the appearance of avarice in churchmen (even as regards goods that are not personal, but common), especially if they seem to put money before the salvation of the people. There are times, therefore, when to avoid scandal a prelate or priest ought to forego something really due the Church.

1487. Cases of Scandal and Renouncement of Church Goods.—(a) If there is question of Pharisaic scandal alone, one should not renounce the goods of which one is the custodian, but should resist spoliation as far as one is able. Thus, St. Thomas of Canterbury would not agree to the invasion of church rights by Henry II. So also a pastor should not neglect the collection of dues needed for the maintenance of the church, because some malcontents will take offense at this; neither should he yield to the extortionate demands of some hired person who will be scandalized because more is not paid.

(b) If there is question of the scandal of the weak, conces-

sions should be made, lest spiritual things be made to suffer for the temporal. Thus, St. Paul would not accept any support for himself from persons newly converted to Christianity, lest this prove a hindrance to the preaching of the Gospel (I Cor., ix. 12). For the sake of the ignorant or the weak, therefore, the Church does not insist on dues and other payments, until these persons have had the opportunity of learning their duty. The faithful, indeed, are bound to contribute to the pastors who serve them, but the precept is an affirmative one, and obliges therefore not at all times, but when the conditions of time, place, person, etc., make this possible. It would be a real scandal of the weak, if a person were driven from church because he did not realize his duty of contributing, or if a poor person were taxed beyond his means, or if an affluent cleric were always asking for money and never giving to the needy, or if a priest were to talk collections instead of doctrine, or devoted most of his time to money-making enterprises. Anything that commercializes religion is also a scandal both to Catholics and non-Catholics.

1488. *Duty of Repairing Scandal.*—The paragraphs immediately preceding have spoken of the duty of avoiding scandal. There is also a duty of repairing scandal that has been given. (a) Thus, there is a duty of charity to repair the scandal one has given; for, if all are required to practise fraternal correction, those especially are bound to this who are responsible for the sins of others. (b) There is sometimes a duty of legal justice, as when superiors, who are bound from their office to give good example, give scandal to their subjects. (c) There is sometimes a duty of commutative justice, as when the scandalizer has employed unjust means (such as force, fear or traps) in order to lead another into scandal.

1489. *Ways of Repairing Scandal.*—(a) Scandal is repaired publicly or privately. Reparation is *public*, when it is made before the community, and *private*, when it is made before individuals. (b) Scandal is repaired explicitly or implicitly. *Explicit* reparation is made by retraction of one's words, by condemnation of one's acts, by the destruction of one's scandalous writings, by efforts to bring back to virtue those whom one

has misled, etc. *Implicit* reparation is made by reformation of one's conduct, the abandonment of that which gave scandal, the practice of good example, prayer for the person scandalized, etc.

**1490. Particular Kinds of Scandal to be Repaired.**—(a) Scandal is public or private. *Public* scandal is given before the community at large, as when one openly apostatizes so that it is the talk of the whole neighborhood or town, or writes a signed article favoring atheism, or makes a disedifying speech before a gathering of people. Scandal is *private*, when it is given before a few persons, and when it does not tend to become generally known, as when husband and wife quarrel before their domestic circle.

(b) Scandal is ordinary or extraordinary. *Ordinary* scandal is given by bad example alone; *extraordinary* scandal adds to bad example injury or injustice, or the debt of punishment for a crime. Thus, one who becomes slightly intoxicated at a party gives ordinary scandal; while one who by trickery schemes to get another into a situation in which he will be effectually scandalized, or who strikes an inoffensive priest, or who spreads disedifying printed matter, is guilty of extraordinary scandal.

**1491.** It rests with the prudent judgment of the confessor or ecclesiastical authority to decide in particular instances the way in which scandals are to be repaired. But in general the following rules may be given:

(a) Public scandal should be repaired publicly, even though it has not actually seduced those who are aware of it; for otherwise the evil influence remains. Thus, a drunkard should take the pledge of total abstinence, or else give an example of sobriety; an apostate should renounce his errors as openly as he defended them.

(b) Private scandal may be repaired privately, that is, before the few persons who were scandalized. Thus, the husband and wife who quarrelled before their children make reparation when they tell the children not to quarrel, and when they strengthen this advice by good example.

(c) Ordinary scandal may be repaired implicitly, that is, by turning over a new leaf. Thus, one who has been away from

Mass and the Sacraments for a long time makes reparation when he appears at church, goes to confession, and receives Communion; one who has been keeping bad company makes reparation when he separates from his former associates.

(d) Extraordinary scandal is repaired explicitly, that is, by making the restitution or satisfaction which justice demands, or by performing the penalty required by the law. Thus, if through treachery a person has seduced another from virtue, he must either himself or through others endeavor to recall the scandalized person to his former virtue; if a person has been guilty of laying violent hands on a cleric, he must perform the penance prescribed; if a person has distributed scandalous literature, he must try to stop its circulation, or to distribute contrary literature.

**1492.** When satisfaction requires public apology or retraction, this can be made in various ways. (a) Thus, one may withdraw through the press false statements publicly made; (b) one may apologize before a number of witnesses authorized to make this known; (c) one may retract before the pastor or confessor, with the understanding that the priest will later declare that all due satisfaction has been made.

**1493. Denial of Sacraments in Cases of Scandal.**—Is it lawful to administer the Sacraments to one who has not made satisfaction for public scandal?

(a) If the obligation of reparation is not grave, it is lawful to administer the Sacraments, since the person who gave the scandal is not subject to grave sin and unworthy of the Sacraments, and his admission to them will not be a new scandal.

(b) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is lawful to admit the party in question to the Sacrament of Penance; for every person rightly disposed has a right to absolution, and the fact that a person who gave scandal goes to confession is edifying. But absolution should be given on condition that reparation for the scandal is seriously promised.

(c) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is not lawful as a rule to admit to the other Sacraments, until the reparation

has been actually performed. Thus, if it is notorious in a parish that a certain individual has been living in a serious occasion of sin or has been circulating impious doctrines, the occasion of sin should be removed or the doctrines should be retracted, before the individual is admitted to Communion, etc.; otherwise, a new scandal would be given the faithful from the apparent approval given the scandalizer by the minister of the Sacrament received.

1494. In certain cases, however, the Sacraments other than Penance may also be given before reparation for grave scandal has been made, namely, when the circumstances are such that the administration of the Sacraments will offer no scandal. (a) Thus, a dying person who is penitent but unable to perform some satisfaction for scandal given is granted the Sacraments. (b) A person who is well disposed, but who has not yet made satisfaction for scandal, may sometimes be given Communion privately. (c) A person who is not well disposed, and who will not make satisfaction for scandal, is sometimes permitted to contract marriage before the priest, namely, when there is a grave reason for marriage and scandal is precluded.

1495. *Seduction*.—Having discussed scandal, which leads others into sin by bad example, we shall now consider, first, solicitation or seduction, which leads others into sin by moral inducement, and, secondly, coöperation, which assists another to sin (see 1460).

1496. Seduction is some external act (words, writing, signs or gesture) by which one directly and explicitly seeks to win the consent of another to sin. There are various modes of solicitation.

(a) There is command to sin, which is an authoritative direction to commit sin imposed by a superior on his subject. Command is given expressly, as when a father tells his son to steal; or implicitly, as when he tells his son that it will please him if the son steals.

(b) There is counsel to sin, which is direct persuasion to do evil made through argument that sin is lawful, or through in-

struction on the ways of committing sin, or through advice, request, promises, threats, etc., as when one writes in praise of suicide to a person who is very discouraged, and recommends it.

(c) There is enticement which is an indirect persuasion to sin made through flattery, insinuation, calumny, narratives, etc. Thus, Absalom worked on the people of Israel and beguiled them into rebellion against his father (II Kings, xv. 1-6). Those who ridicule temperance and so lead others to drink excessively, entice to drunkenness. A host who offers little except fine meats on a Friday entices to the violation of abstinence.

1497. *The Malice of Solicitation*.—(a) The gravity of this sin according to its nature is mortal, but it may be venial on account of imperfect deliberation or smallness of matter (see 1473). Thus, it is a mortal sin to command one's son to commit grand larceny or perjury, a venial sin to command him to commit petty theft or tell a harmless lie. (b) The circumstances of the sin that aggravate or extenuate are the greater or less degree of deliberation and malice, the greater or less evil of the sin to which one induces one's neighbors, etc. (see 1473, 1474). (c) The species of the sin of solicitation is twofold: there is the sin of scandal, opposed to charity, inasmuch as a neighbor is led to sin, and there is also the sin which one persuades a neighbor to commit (see 1468 sqq.).

1498. *Applications to Confession and Satisfaction*.—(a) Since the seducer willed the species of sin to which he induced his neighbor, it does not suffice that he tell in confession that he induced another to sin; he must also tell the species of sin (e.g., theft), to which he induced or attempted to induce another. (b) Since the seducer is guilty of injustice against the person seduced, if he employed fraud, traps, violence, etc., it does not suffice in such cases merely to confess that he seduced; he must also tell that he used unjust means to seduce. (c) Since the seducer is guilty of spiritual damage, he is bound to make reparation for scandal given (see 1488 sqq.). (d) Since the seducer is responsible for temporal damages that are due to his influence (e.g., when he commands A to steal from or calumniate B), he



is held to restitution for any such damages (see Vol. II on Justice).

1499. In confessing a sin whose nature implies an accomplice (*e.g.*, obscene conversation), is it necessary to mention the circumstance that one seduced the other party? (a) If the seduction includes a special malice against charity or against justice, it should be mentioned. Thus, if the party seduced had been innocent and was scandalized, or was trapped into sin, the fact of seduction should be mentioned. (b) If the seduction includes no special malice against charity or justice, it seems there is no obligation to mention it. Thus, if the party solicited had been living a life of sin and consented to the solicitation without any detriment to ideals or any unwillingness, no scandal is given and no injustice committed by the solicitation, as far as that party is concerned, and there seems to be no reason why the circumstance of seduction must be confessed.

1500. Seduction is incitement to sin, and so differs from mere permission of sin in another. It is never lawful to incite to sin, but it is lawful for a sufficient reason to permit sin in others, as was said above in reference to Pharisaic scandal (see 1477, 1482, 1483). But, in applying this principle to concrete cases, it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between incitement and mere permission. We shall discuss now the following cases in which this difficulty occurs: (a) when one requests another to do something which one knows will be a sin for him; (b) when one advises another to commit a less rather than a greater evil; (c) when the opportunity for another to commit sin is not removed, or is prepared.

1501. Is it lawful to ask another to do something, when one knows that he will not consent without sinning?

(a) If the thing requested is sinful in itself, the request is also sinful. Hence, it is not lawful to ask a thief to sell the goods he has stolen, nor is it lawful to request absolution from a priest who lacks jurisdiction.

(b) If the thing requested is lawful in itself, but there is no sufficient reason for the request in view of the fact that the other

will sin by granting it, the request is sinful. Hence, it is not lawful to ask baptism from a person who is in the state of sin, when one can easily obtain it from another person who is in the state of grace.

(c) If the thing requested is lawful, and there is a sufficient reason for the request, one does not sin by making the request. Hence, it is lawful for the sake of the common welfare to require that witnesses take an oath, even though one knows that one of them will commit perjury.

1502. Is it lawful to advise another to commit a less evil in preference to a greater evil?

(a) If the other has not made up his mind to commit either evil, it is not lawful to advise that he do either. Thus, to counsel another to steal, and to make his victims the rich rather than the poor, is a species of seduction.

(b) If the person has made up his mind to commit the greater evil and the lesser evil is virtually contained in the greater, it is lawful to advise that he omit the former for the latter. For in thus acting one prevents the greater evil and does not cause the lesser evil, since it is virtually contained in the greater evil which the other person had already decided on. Thus, if Titus is bent on stealing \$100, Balbus is not guilty of seduction, if he persuades Titus to take only \$10. We are supposing, of course, that Titus is so determined to steal that it is out of the question to deter him from taking at least a small amount.

(c) If the person in question has decided on the greater sin and the lesser is not virtually contained in the greater, it is not lawful to recommend that he commit the smaller instead of the greater sin. For, if one does this, one does not save the other from the internal guilt of the greater sin intended, while one does add the malice of the lesser sin which was not intended. Thus, if Titus plans to kill Caius, it is not lawful to advise that he rob him instead, or that he kill Claudius instead, for robbery is a specifically distinct sin from murder, and Claudius is a different person from Caius. But, if Titus planned to kill Caius in order to rob him, it would not be unlawful to point

out that the robbery could be carried out without murder and to advise accordingly.

1503. Not all theologians accept the last solution just given.

(a) Some reject it, and hold that, even when the lesser evil is not virtually contained in the greater, it is lawful to advise the lesser. They argue that what one does thereby is not to commit the lesser evil, to induce it or approve it, but only to permit it in order to lessen the harm that will be done, and they confirm their argument from Scripture (Gen., xix. 8). According to this opinion, then, which has some good authorities in its favor, it would be lawful to advise robbery in order to dissuade another from the greater evil of murder. (b) Others modify the solution given in the previous paragraph, and hold that it is lawful to propose the lesser evil or mention it, provided one does not attempt to induce the other person to carry it into effect.

1504. Is it lawful so to prearrange circumstances that an occasion of sin will seem to offer itself to another?

(a) If the end and the means used are good, this is lawful; for there is no scandal or seduction, but sin or the danger of sin is permitted for a proportionately grave reason. Examples: Sempronius knows that someone is robbing his desk, and it is important that he discover the thief. He leaves the desk open and watches from concealment to see whether a suspected person who is coming to the room will steal. Claudius is quite certain that Titus is stealing his chickens, but he needs evidence in order to have Titus convicted and deterred from future stealing. So, he leaves doors open and hides himself with witnesses that Titus may be caught in the act.

(b) If the end or means is bad, it is not lawful to prepare an opportunity for sin, because in either case one intends something sinful. Examples: Sempronius knows that his wife Titia has been unfaithful and he threatens to leave her. She, wishing to have a countercharge to make or to secure evidence to discredit his word, hires various dissolute females to lay traps for him and his friends. Claudius out of revenge wishes that Caius be sent to jail, and he therefore employs agents to provoke Caius

into something criminal in word or deed that will justify incarceration. Balbus knows that Mercurius is a dangerous character, and he frames a scheme by which Mercurius will be invited to participate in an act of banditry and be captured. Titia and Claudius sin, because their purpose is wrong; Balbus sins because he uses wrong means. All three are guilty of seduction, at least in intention.

1505. Seduction was described above (see 1496) as an inducement to sin through such manifest means as command, counsel, or enticement. But there is also a more subtle form of seduction, which does not appeal directly to the intellect or will, but makes a physical approach by acting upon the body, senses, or imagination. This is a more cunning, but none the less guilty form of seduction, examples of which are the following:

(a) Seduction through bodily states is exemplified in those who minister secretly to others drinks or drugs or foods that will produce emotional disturbances or mental confusion and make them more susceptible to temptation.

(b) Seduction through the senses is exemplified in those who surround others with pictures, companions, music, examples, etc., that continually speak of the desirability of vice or the undesirability of virtue.

(c) Seduction through the imagination is seen in hypnotism or suggestion when used to produce a vivid and strong impression of something dangerous to be thought on. A spirit of bigoted uniformity which demands that all dress, think and act alike even in matters where there should be liberty, may also be very seductive; for, rather than commit the unpardonable sin of seeming queer, a person may take to drunkenness or whatever vice is popular in his crowd or group.

1506. **Coöperation in Sin.**—Coöperation or participation in sin, strictly understood, is help afforded another, whom one has not seduced, to carry out his purpose of sinning.

(a) Hence, coöperation differs from scandal and solicitation, for these lead into sin one who had not decided on sin, while coöperation supposes that the other party had already made up

his mind to sin. The scandalizer leads into sin, but does not help in its commission; the coöperator does not lead into sin, but he helps in its commission.

(b) Coöperation, however, may include scandal and solicitation as regards future sins or as regards third parties. Example: Balbus, who had decided on his own initiative to steal, finds to his surprise that his conduct receives aid and comfort from Titus, a person of some authority. This coöperation will act as an example or incitement to Balbus to repeat the offense, and will likewise be an occasion of sin to others.

1507. Coöperation is also different from complicity as follows:

(a) The coöperator acts as assistant or subordinate agent to the one who commits sin, providing him with moral or physical help, or supplying him with the means requisite for the act of sin. Thus, he whose services are commandeered by robbers and who carries away the stolen goods, or who puts a revolver into the hand of one bent on murder or obscene books into the hands of one bent on the corruption of youth, is a coöperator. (b) The accomplice acts as an equiprincipal or coördinate agent with another in the commission of the same sin, performing his own proper part or share of the joint act of sin. Thus, he who enlists as a member of a robber band and acts as their chauffeur or lookout at the time of "hold-ups," or who fights a duel, or who carries on an obscene dialogue, or listens willingly to obscene talk, is an accomplice. The accomplice is always guilty, but the coöperator may be guiltless.

1508. **Kinds of Coöperation.**—Divisions of Coöperation according to Different Kinds of Acts.—(a) From the viewpoint of the internal act, coöperation is either *formal* or *material*, according as one does or does not intend the sin whose external commission one is aiding. Examples: Caius offers a burglar information as to ways of climbing into a second-story window. Claudius, being covered by a revolver, makes no resistance or outcry while bandits are rifling his employer's office. Caius is an abettor of crime and a formal coöperator on account of his

guilty intent; Claudius aids the commission of burglary, but he is only a material coöperator, since he does not intend what the criminals intend.

(b) From the viewpoint of the external act, coöperation is *positive* or *negative*, according as one does something to help the principal agent, or does nothing to impede him. In the examples given above, Caius was a positive, Claudius a negative coöperator. Positive coöperation is given *in a moral manner*, as when one votes for an unjust law or sentence, or cheers a sinful remark; or *in a physical manner*, as when one helps bandits to bind and gag their victims, or leaves doors and windows unfastened for the convenience of thieves.

1509. Divisions of Coöperation according to its Degree of Influence.—(a) From the viewpoint of its activity, coöperation is either *occasional* or *effective*. By occasional coöperation is understood that which leads another into sin, or allows him to be drawn into sin, but does not assist him to commit sin (*e.g.*, scandalous example, failure to give a fraternal correction or admonition). By effective coöperation is understood assistance given another enabling him to carry out, or to carry out more easily, an act of sin on which he had resolved. As is clear from the explanation given above (see 1506), there is question here only of effective coöperation.

(b) From the viewpoint of its nearness to the act of the principal agent, coöperation is either *immediate* or *mediate*, according as one shares in the sinful act of the principal agent, or in some act that preceded or followed it. Thus, he who helps a thief to carry away stolen goods is an immediate coöperator, while he who supplied the thief with necessary keys before the theft, and he who offered refuge to the thief or concealment for the stolen goods after the theft, are mediate coöperators.

(c) From the viewpoint of the dependence on it of what is done, coöperation is either *indispensable* or *not indispensable*, according as the principal agent cannot act without it, or can. Example: Balbus supplies intoxicants to Titus and Sempronius, who are intemperate. Titus cannot secure intoxicants except

from Balbus; Sempronius can secure them elsewhere. Balbus' coöperation is indispensable for Titus, but not for Sempronius.

1510. Coöperation is also divided from the viewpoint of responsibility or of the consequences incurred through it, into *unjust* coöperation and merely *unlawful* coöperation.

(a) Unjust coöperation is participation in the guilt of an injury done to a third party which involves the duty of restitution or strict reparation. Thus, those who act as "fences" or receivers of stolen goods, coöperate in injustice and are bound to restitution to the rightful owners.

(b) Unlawful coöperation is participation in a sin that contains no injustice to a third party, and that entails only the obligations of repentance and satisfaction, and, if the case requires it, of amends for scandal, proofs of sincerity, avoidance of dangers and submission to penalty. Thus, those who coöperate by marrying illegally, or by providing obscene literature to persons who demand it and insist on having it, are guilty of sin and also fall under various punishments prescribed in law. Coöperation, in so far as it is unjust, will be treated specially under the head of Justice (see Vol. II); here we are concerned with coöperation in general, and as it is a sin against charity.

1511. Formal coöperation is either *explicit* or *implicit*. (a) It is explicit, when the end intended by the coöperator (*finis operantis*) is the sin of the principal agent. Examples: Balbus gives incense money to an idolater, because he approves of idolatry and wishes to see idolatrous rites performed. Caius joins an anarchistic society because he agrees with its aims and wishes to help in their fulfillment.

(b) Formal coöperation is implicit, when the coöperator does not directly intend to associate himself with the sin of the principal agent, but the end of the external act (*finis operis*), which for the sake of some advantage or interest the coöperator does intend, includes from its nature or from circumstances the guilt of the sin of the principal agent. Examples: Balbus detests idolatry, but in order to show courtesy he helps a pagan to burn incense before an idol, or he assists in the repairing of a pagan shrine, though his act is looked on as a sign of worship.

Caius joins a freethinking society, not because he likes its principles, but because he wishes to obtain through membership certain social or financial advantages which he cannot obtain in any other way.

1512. Mediate coöperation is also subdivided into *proximate* and *remote*. (a) It is proximate or remote by reason of nearness, according as the act of sin will follow closely or otherwise on the act of coöperation. Thus, he who gives a ladder to a burglar coöperates in a remote preparation; he who holds the ladder while the burglar goes up coöperates in a proximate preparation.

(b) Mediate coöperation is proximate or remote as to definiteness, according as the preparation points clearly or only vaguely to the commission of sin. Proximate coöperation is an action which, from its nature or circumstances, is regarded as morally connected with the evil action of the principal agent, while remote coöperation is an action that has no such moral connection with the sin that is committed. Thus, he who sells a revolver to a gunman who is preparing for a murder coöperates proximately, while he who sells the materials for this weapon coöperates only remotely. Again, if one sells to a burglar a "jimmy," a dark lantern, a mask, a revolver, and explosives, the coöperation is definite, since the circumstances indicate that robbery is contemplated. But if one sells a burglar a pair of soft-sounding shoes, the coöperation is indefinite, for the burglar may wish them in order to give no disturbance in his own home, and not in order to attract no attention in the homes of others.

1513. The Sinfulness of Coöperation.—The Sinfulness of Formal Coöperation.—(a) Formal coöperation is always sinful, for it includes the approval of the sin of another and the willing participation in the guilt of that sin.

(b) Formal coöperation is from its nature opposed to charity; for charity disapproves of the sins of others and strives to prevent them, while formal coöperation, on the contrary, approves and assists the sins of others.

(c) Formal coöperation is also opposed to the virtue violated by the sin of the principal agent, in so far as the will of the

coöperator delights in or approves of the circumstance of help given to the sin of the other (see 1468). Thus, if one opens the door to a caller whom one suspects to be a burglar and at the same time mentally sympathizes with the act of burglary, one is guilty in will of the act one approves.

(d) Formal coöperation as to its external act is opposed to the virtue violated by the coöperator, when the external act has a malice of its own. Thus, if one swears falsely in order to conceal the presence of a burglar hidden in the house, one is guilty of perjury; if one disobeys the laws of the Church by marrying clandestinely, one is guilty of disobedience; if one scandalizes third parties by coöperating with sin, one is guilty of scandal; if one shares in fraud, one is guilty of injustice, etc. Hence, in confession it does not suffice to say that one has coöperated in sin, but one must also tell the sin committed and the necessary circumstances.

1514. The Sinfulness of Material Coöperation.—(a) Material coöperation, in itself, is sinful; for charity commands that one strive to prevent the sin of another, and much more therefore does it forbid one to help in the sin of another. (b) Material coöperation, in case of great necessity, is not sinful; for charity does not oblige under serious inconvenience to self, and it does not forbid one to coöperate by an indifferent act to prevent a neighbor from committing a greater evil than the evil he has in mind. He who coöperates materially through necessity does not cause sin, but uses his own right, which the bad will of the other abuses and makes an occasion of sin (see 1447 d).

1515. Lawfulness of Material Coöperation.—The conditions necessary in order that material coöperation be lawful are the same as for any other act that has a double result (see 104); for from the coöperation follow two results, one that is bad (*viz.*, the sin of the other person) and one that is good (*viz.*, the avoidance of loss or the retention of good). Two of the conditions required in the principle of double result need not be considered, however, since their presence is manifestly assured by the very fact that the coöperation is merely material. (a) Thus, the condition that the good effect must not be secured through the

evil effect is verified; for, if one intends the sin of the other party as a means to the good end, coöperation is formal. Hence, if Balbus helps Claudius to get sinfully drunk, so that Claudius may go to confession the sooner, the coöperation of Balbus in the drunkenness of Claudius is formal. (b) The condition that the evil effect is not intended is also verified; for the very definition of material coöperation excludes the intention of the sin committed by the other party.

1516. Hence, we may confine our attention to the two remaining conditions stated in the principle of double effect, and conclude that material coöperation is lawful when and if the act of the coöperator is itself good or indifferent, and he has a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the sin of the other party.

1517. The first condition of material coöperation is that the act of the coöperator must be good or at least indifferent; for, if it is evil, the coöperation becomes implicitly formal. But, since it is often difficult to determine in particular instances whether coöperation is intrinsically evil or merely indifferent, one must examine the nature and circumstances of the act.

(a) Thus, according to its nature, an act of coöperation is intrinsically evil, if it has no uses except such as are evil; it is indifferent, if, according to the intention of those who use it, it is now good, now evil. Hence, it is intrinsically wrong to assist in the manufacture or distribution of obscene books or pictures, or of drugs or instruments used exclusively for immoral purposes, since the only use to which such things can be put is sinful. It is also intrinsically wrong to take part even remotely in pagan superstitions, or to give any immediate assistance to an act which from its nature is opposed to the Sixth Commandment. But it is not intrinsically wrong to assist in the manufacture of firearms or poisons, which have many good uses, or to act as bodyguard to a person who fears harm from others.

(b) According to its circumstances, an act of coöperation is evil, if by reason of adjuncts it is wrong, as when it signifies approval of evil, gives scandal to others, endangers the faith or virtue of the coöperator, or violates a law of the Church. Thus, it is not from the nature of the act wrong to invite a pedestrian

to ride in one's car; but it is wrong from the circumstances when the pedestrian asks to be taken to a spot where he intends to commit robbery. It is not wrong intrinsically to work at building a temple; but it is wrong from the circumstances, when this act is regarded by the public as a sign of adherence to a false religion, or when the act causes scandal (see 983). The laws of the Church on mixed marriage or neutral schools afford other examples of coöperation lawful in one set of circumstances, but unlawful in another on account of significance, scandal, danger, etc.

1518. But the circumstance that the coöperator knows for certain that the principal agent will use the coöperation for sinful purposes, or will take scandal to the extent of being strengthened in his evil designs by reason of the assistance given, does not necessarily make coöperation evil.

(a) Thus, the coöperator may know from the declaration of the principal agent just what is to be done, and yet have no will whatever to concur in the evil. Hence, if a person is forced at the point of a revolver to help in robbing his own guests, he knows very well what is being done, but he certainly does not approve of it.

(b) The coöperator may know that scandal will be occasioned by the coöperation, either to the principal agent or to others, but he may have sufficient reasons for permitting it (see 1478, 1482). Thus, if the employee of an undertaking establishment has orders to assist at the funeral of an anarchist, and will lose his means of livelihood if he does not comply, he is not obliged to suffer this great detriment to avoid Pharisaic scandal or even scandal of the weak. But he should, if possible, declare his want of sympathy with anarchy, if he knows of some anarchist present who regards his coöperation as a mark of sympathy for the principles of the deceased.

1519. The second condition for lawful material coöperation is that the coöperator should have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the evil connected with his coöperation. The standards for judging whether a reason is sufficiently weighty,

are the rules given above on permission of an evil effect (see 105).

(a) Hence, the graver the sin that will be committed, the graver the reason required for coöperation. Thus, a greater reason is required for coöperation in assault than for coöperation in theft.

(b) The nearer the coöperation is to the act of sin, the greater the reason required for coöperation. Thus, he who sells paper to the publisher of obscene books coöperates remotely; he who sets the type or reads the proofs of such books coöperates proximately. A greater reason is necessary for the latter than for the former coöperation.

(c) The greater the dependence of the evil act on one's coöperation, the greater the reason required for coöperation. Thus, a more serious reason is needed to justify giving intoxicants to a person who abuses liquors, if he is unable to procure them elsewhere, than if he can easily get them from others. But the fact that, if you deny intoxicants or other coöperation, another person will grant what you deny, is not of itself a sufficient reason for coöperation.

(d) The more certain the evil act, the greater the reason required for coöperation. Example: Titus gets drunk frequently, Balbus at intervals. Hence, a greater reason is needed for providing liquor to Titus than to Balbus.

(e) The more obligation one is under to avoid the act of coöperation or to prevent the act of sin, the greater the reason must be for coöperation. Hence, a much greater reason is necessary for lawful coöperation by those who are bound *ex officio*, from piety or justice, to prevent a sin (such as parents, spiritual directors, and policemen) than on the part of those who are not so bound.

1520. Reasons for coöperation correspond in gravity with the importance of the goods or evils involved (see 1163 sqq.).

(a) Hence, a grave reason for coöperation exists when, if one refuses it, a great good will be lost or a great evil incurred. A day's wages or income is generally a great good; a severe or long-continued pain, great anger of an employer or other supe-

rior, things that bring on notable annoyance, shame, repugnance, etc., are examples of great evils.

(b) A very grave reason for coöperation is the gain or retention of a very great good or the avoidance of a very great evil. A notable percentage of the goods of one's station in life should be considered as a very great good. A severe and long-continued illness, unemployment on the part of the breadwinner of a needy family, serious detriment to one's honor, reputation or peace of mind, etc., are examples of very great evils.

(c) Graver reasons for coöperation are those that surpass the very grave without being supreme, such as the loss of one's station in life, incurable disease, loss of an eye or other principal member, severe or perpetual imprisonment.

(d) Most grave reasons for coöperation are the public safety of Church or State, loss of all one's property, death, extreme disgrace, and the like.

1521. When the sin committed by the principal agent is grave, but contains no injustice to a third party, the reasons for coöperation need not be so serious as when the sin is grave and unjust.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable coöperation is justified in order to avoid grave loss to self; for example, one may ask absolution from an unworthy minister, in order to recover the state of grace more quickly.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable coöperation, or mediate and indispensable coöperation, is lawful when it is necessary in order to avoid a moderate loss. Examples: One may receive Communion from an unworthy minister in order to make the Easter duty more conveniently. One may supply intoxicants to a drunkard in order to avoid a brawl, if there is no time to call in the strong arm of the law to subdue the drunkard.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable coöperation is justified even by avoidance of a slight loss. Example: A butcher may sell meat on Friday to a cook who will serve it to some persons bound by abstinence, if the cook can easily get the meat from others and the profit will go elsewhere, unless the butcher sells her the meat.

1522. When the sin committed by the principal agent is a grave injustice to a private party, the reasons for coöperation need not be so serious as when the sin is against the public good.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable coöperation is permissible, if without it one cannot avoid a loss to self that is both certain and of a higher kind, or at least a greater one of the same kind than that which will be suffered by the injured party; for this latter would be unreasonable, if he expected one to suffer a greater loss in order to spare him. Example: Mercurius, a servant, is threatened with instant death if he does not open a safe of his employer, take from it certain papers, and deliver them to a burglar.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable coöperation, or mediate and indispensable coöperation, is allowed if necessary for the avoidance of an equal loss to self. Examples: The burglar mentioned above can blow open the safe if Mercurius refuses to open it, but, if he is put to this trouble, he will steal from Mercurius valuables comparable to the papers in the safe. Claudius, a servant, opens a backdoor, the only way through which a burglar can enter secretly, because he is taken by surprise, and refusal on his part will inevitably cost him the loss of papers equally as valuable as those the burglar wishes to secure. Sempronius wishes to rob a house, but he cannot get there without the assistance of Caius, a chauffeur. Caius understands the purpose of Sempronius, but, if he refuses to take him to the house, Sempronius will give out information that will do almost as much harm to Caius as the robbery would do to the owner of the house.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable coöperation is justified by the avoidance of a loss to self less than the loss of the injured party, but in proportion to it. Example: Balbus is usually honest, but today he is going out to "fleece" a number of unsuspecting victims, and he gives orders to his servant Titus to get his coat and hat and open the door, and to his chauffeur Caius to drive him to the gambling place. Titus and Caius have an inkling of Balbus' plans, but no proofs. If they disobey his orders, other servants will do what Balbus asks, the swindling

will not be stopped, but Titus will be demoted, and Caius thrown out of the position necessary for his livelihood.

1523. When the sin committed by the principal agent is against some good of a public character, though not against the common safety, still greater reasons are necessary for coöperation than those given above. (a) Thus, immediate and indispensable coöperation is allowed to avoid a greater public evil, or an equal public evil joined with grave loss to self; for it is lawful to permit a lesser in order to escape a greater evil. Thus, the law may tolerate certain evils for the sake of public tranquillity, if the attempt to surpress them would lead to serious disturbances. One may delay to denounce a practice that is doing harm to a family, if an immediate complaint would cause an equal harm to the family and bring on the maker of the complaint a serious evil.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable coöperation, or mediate and indispensable coöperation, is permitted when it is necessary to avoid an equal public evil, or a very serious personal evil proportionate according to prudent judgment to the public harm done. Thus, an actor who has a harmless part in a somewhat evil play may act it for a time, if the company can easily obtain substitutes but he cannot easily obtain other employment and needs his wages. Similarly, the owner of the only theatre in town may rent it to that company in order to be able to refuse it to another company that is worse.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable coöperation may be allowed when there is need of avoiding a grave loss to self which cannot be prevented except by coöperation. Thus, the ushers in the theatre who have no present way of supporting dependents except by the wages they are earning, may help patrons to seats, even when the play that is being shown is not morally objectionable.

1524. When the sin committed by another is directed against the necessary public welfare (*i.e.*, against the common safety of Church or State), one may not coöperate, but should resist. In this case: (a) coöperation is unlawful, for there is no greater public good to justify it, and much less can it be justified by private

good; (b) resistance should be made, if possible; for the individual should be willing to suffer loss, spoliation, and death itself to conserve the safety of the Church or of the State.

1525. In giving reasons sufficient for coöperation with sins injurious to the sinner alone or to some third party, we considered only the harm or loss to oneself that would result from a refusal to coöperate. But the good of others may also suffice for coöperation.

(a) Thus, the good of the sinner may justify one in coöperating, as when one assists in order to prevent the commission of a greater evil. It would not be wrong to give whisky to one who wished to make himself drunk, if otherwise he would take poisoned alcohol.

(b) The good of a third party may justify coöperation, as when one assists in perpetrating a minor injury against him in order to stop a major injury. It would not be wrong to bind and gag a man who was being robbed, if otherwise a burglar would murder him.

(c) The common good will often be a justifying reason. Thus, in political affairs it is at times necessary in indifferent matters to compromise with opponents, whose general policies one does not approve, in order to secure the election of good citizens or the passing of good laws, when these ends are very important for the general welfare. It is lawful to administer a Sacrament to one who is unworthy in order to avoid a public evil, such as disturbance or scandal among the people.

1526. **Lawfulness of Immediate Coöperation.**—(a) If one cannot coöperate immediately without performing an act that is intrinsically evil (see 1517), immediate coöperation is, of course, unlawful. Thus, if one helped a trembling assassin to administer poison or to stab or shoot to death the victim, one would be an accomplice in murder; if one assisted a decrepit pagan to burn incense before an idol, one would be an accomplice in false worship. (b) If one can coöperate immediately without performing an act intrinsically evil, immediate coöperation is held lawful by some authorities, but there are others who say that all immediate coöperation is sinful.



1527. Arguments for the Opposing Opinions on Immediate Coöperation.—(a) Those who deny the lawfulness of all immediate coöperation argue that immediate coöperation does not differ from complicity, and hence that it is always intrinsically wrong. If theft is the taking away of goods without the knowledge and consent of the owner, what shall we call the act of a servant who assists a thief by carrying out the family silver to a waiting automobile? The fact that the servant does this to save himself from wounds or death cannot change the moral character of the act, else we shall have to say that the end may justify the means. And what is said of theft, can be said likewise of other species of sin.

(b) Those who affirm the lawfulness of immediate coöperation in certain cases argue that circumstances may take away evil from an act of assistance given to a sinner, so that the act becomes indifferent or good. Thus, theft is the taking away of what belongs to another against the *reasonable* will of the owner. Now, the owner would be unreasonable if he were unwilling that one should coöperate in removing his goods, if one had to do so in order to protect one's life, at least if one had not engaged to defend his goods; for one is bound to protect one's life in preference to the goods of another. If a starving man may take a loaf of bread without the owner's consent, why may not one save one's life by assisting a desperate criminal to carry off money? Moreover, it is commonly admitted that a person in great need may lawfully ask a Sacrament from a minister who is unworthy and who will sin by conferring it; that is, one may coöperate immediately with the unworthy administration of a Sacrament and yet be free of guilt on account of the circumstances.

1528. Special Cases of Coöperation.—The cases of coöperation, like those involving scandal, are innumerable, but there are certain cases which occur today more frequently than others, namely, those of coöperation with evil publications, dances, and theatres, and those of the coöperation of merchants, innkeepers, renters, servants, and workingmen. Coöperation in sins against faith and sins against justice are treated in their proper places,

but it will be useful here to speak of these other special kinds of coöperation, since they offer many difficulties and a consideration of them now will illustrate the general principles on coöperation just given. However, the following points should be noted:

(a) The application of the definitions and rules about coöperation to particular cases is one of the most difficult tasks of Moral Theology, and hence there will be found great diversity of opinion among theologians on particular points. Space forbids a discussion here of the opposing opinions, and we shall have to content ourselves, in some of the illustrations that follow, with solutions that are likely, but whose opposites are also likely.

(b) The cases that follow are treated according to the principles of coöperation. But frequently in actual life there will be other factors to be considered, such as the occasion of sin to oneself or scandal to others. It should be remembered, then, that when a particular kind of material coöperation is here said to be lawful, this must be understood as abstractly speaking; for in an individual instance there may be circumstances of danger or disedification which would make it unlawful—a thing that often happens.

1529. Formal Coöperation with Evil Reading Matter.—(a) Cases of formal coöperation on account of *explicit* intention to do harm are those of the managers, editors, ordinary collaborators and authors of periodicals, newspapers, books, etc., which are opposed *ex professo* to faith and good morals; for these persons are the brains which direct and select what is to be written and published, and the matter they are creating or putting on paper is evil, and has no direct purpose except evil.

(b) Cases of formal coöperation on account of *implicit* intention to do harm are those of the responsible heads of printing or publishing firms and their printers, who agree to publish such or publishing firms and their printers, who agree to publish such objectionable written matter; of booksellers, owners of newsstands, etc., who agree to sell it; for, as we suppose, these persons understand that the matter in question is intrinsically harmful and gravely forbidden.

1530. Coöperation with evil newspapers and other reading

matter is material and lawful, if the matter itself is *not entirely evil*, that is, if it has good uses as well as bad, and one has a reason for coöperation that is just and proportionate to the kind of coöperation. The following are examples of coöperation that may be merely material and lawful:

(a) Moral coöperation is given by writers of good matter who assist as collaborators; by those who offer small notices or advertisements; by readers who use a book, periodical, newspaper, etc., for the good matter it contains and skip the rest. For all these persons contribute in a greater or less degree, according to their influence, reputation, and ability, to the prestige and success of the journal, magazine or volume, with which their names are connected or which they patronize. Reasons sufficient to excuse in these cases, given by some authors, are the following: for a permanent contributor, a very grave reason, such as the need of support for his family which he cannot earn in any other way; for an occasional contributor, a rather grave reason, such as the opportunity of refuting error or of setting forth true principles (see Canon 1386, § 2); for the habitual reader, a reason somewhat grave, such as the advantage of reports useful for his business which cannot be found elsewhere; for the occasional reader, a slight reason, such as entertainment to be derived from reading a good story; for the small advertiser, a slight reason, such as profit in business. Those who by laudatory descriptions in advertisements or book reviews urge others to buy and read evil books are guilty of seduction, rather than coöperation (see 1495).

(b) Financial coöperation is given by those who endow or subsidize a publication, by shareholders, by large advertisers, by subscribers, etc. Reasons considered sufficient in these cases are as follows: for the original providers of capital, only a most grave reason; for the buyers of much stock or advertising space, only a very grave reason; for subscribers, a grave reason such as would suffice for habitual reading.

(c) Material assistance is given by those who produce or distribute a publication and by those who furnish necessary material. Among the *producers*, the proximate coöperators are, first,

the managers of the printing company, and, secondly, the printers, the "readers" and the correctors; the remote coöperators are the typesetters, arrangers of ink and paper, binders, and machine operators. For proximate coöperation it is held that a most grave reason suffices, as when a printer cannot otherwise support himself and his family; for remote coöperation a grave reason is needed. Among the *distributers*, there are degrees of proximity in coöperation as follows: first, those who put the reading matter into the hands of others (*e.g.*, by keeping it on the tables in their waiting rooms or offices); next, those who keep it for purchasers who may ask for it; finally, those who are employed as keepers of newsstands, newsboys, etc. We cannot think of any reason sufficient to excuse the first kind of coöperation, since there is no lack of good reading matter which doctors, lawyers, barbers, etc., can provide for those who are waiting in their rooms; for the second kind of coöperation, a very grave reason suffices, such as loss of trade by a poor bookseller, if he would not supply his patrons with popular books or periodicals of a less elevated kind; for the third kind of coöperation, a grave reason suffices.

Among the *suppliers* are those who sell to the printer his ink, type, machinery, etc. These coöperate only remotely, and it is held that profit is a sufficient reason for their coöperation. This we admit, if the coöperation is not indispensable, but we do not think that profit alone would uniformly justify voluntary coöperation upon which depended the publication of pernicious matter.

1531. Formal Coöperation with Evil Dances or Plays.—(a) Cases of formal coöperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are those of the originators of sinful dances and the writers of indecent plays. (b) Cases of formal coöperation on account of implicit intention to do harm are those of the managements that produce bad shows, organize bad dances, or make the arrangements or issue the invitations for these affairs.

1532. Material Coöperation with Evil Dances or Plays.—Material coöperation is lawful, if the coöperation is not itself intrinsically wrong, and if there is a sufficient reason for permitting it.

(a) Cases of immediate material coöperation are those of players and dancers who have harmless parts in the performance. A very grave reason, such as avoidance of penury, is considered as sufficient excuse here, at least for a time.

(b) Cases of proximate material coöperation are those of musicians or singers, who do not perform lascivious music; of spectators, who show no approval of the evil that is done; of those who buy tickets but do not attend. A more serious reason is required in the musician at the dance than in the musician at the play, for the former directs the dance, while the latter only accompanies the play. Likewise, a more serious reason is required when one attends often, or when one's patronage is essential to the success of the occasion, than when one attends only rarely, or when the play or dance does not depend on one's presence or patronage.

(c) Cases of remote material coöperation are those of the owners who rent their theatres or dance-halls or cabarets, of ushers, guards, box-office employees, stage hands, etc. It is held that profit is a sufficient reason to justify the owners in renting their places, if the theatrical company or dance management can readily find other places in case they are sent away. The ushers, guards, and the like are excused, if they cannot easily find other employment; but this does not justify gazing on immodest spectacles or laughing at or applauding obscene jokes.

1533. Formal Coöperation by the Manufacture or Sale of Objects Whose Sole Purpose is Gravely or Venially Sinful.—(a) Cases of *explicit* coöperation are those of the inventor of contraceptives or of instruments that frustrate generation, of the designers of blasphemous representations or of tablets in honor of false deities, the authors of somewhat profane or irreverent cards, and the like. (b) Cases of *implicit* coöperation are those of persons who, for profit only, make or sell objects such as those just mentioned, while knowing that the purpose to which they naturally tend is the commission of sin.

1534. Material coöperation by the manufacture or sale of objects that are used for gravely or venially sinful purposes, is lawful under the conditions given in 1515. Hence, in the first

place, the coöperation itself must not be intrinsically sinful, that is, the object made or sold must have good as well as evil uses. There are two classes of objects of this kind: (a) there are some objects which may have good uses, but which in fact are nearly always made to serve bad ends (*e.g.*, idols, insignia of forbidden societies, pictures of the nude, ultra-fashionable dress, certain drugs or poisons, blackjacks, and pistol silencers); (b) there are other objects which are indifferent in themselves, although often employed for sinful uses (*e.g.*, dice, playing cards and chips, rouge, lipsticks, necklaces and other feminine adornments, imitation jewelry, adulterated articles, and the like).

1535. The rules about proportionate cause for coöperation by the manufacture or sale of things that are employed in committing sin are those given above in 1519.

(a) Hence, the greater the sin that will be committed or the more harmful the consequences that will ensue from the use of an object, the greater the reason required for making, repairing or selling it. In some instances only a *most grave* reason will excuse, such as peril of instant death for refusal. Thus, one may not sell poison or drugs to a person who contemplates suicide, murder, or abortion. One may not sell narcotics to a person who asks for them in good faith and who cannot obtain them elsewhere, but who will become a drug-fiend if they are given him. One may not sell morphine, heroin, etc., to a person who is already a drug-addict and who will abuse the drugs, unless there is a *very grave* reason for not refusing, such as danger that refusal will lead him to set fire to the building. If one has all the playing cards in some remote hamlet, one should not sell them without *grave* reason to a customer who will spend a great part of the time at games to the neglect of serious duties, nor without a *very grave* reason to a customer who is a card sharper and who will swindle many innocent victims, or to a gambler who will waste the money due to his wife and family.

(b) The more closely related an object is with sinful uses, the graver must be the excuse for having part in its manufacture or sale. Thus, an ordinary reason (*e.g.*, profit) might suffice for selling a lamb to a pagan or attractive ornaments of dress

to a woman, where only a very grave or most grave reason would suffice for selling incense to a pagan or ornaments that are frequently used as amulets or charms. Generally speaking, it is seriously wrong and gravely sinful to make or sell articles whose ordinary use is gravely sinful.

(c) The more a customer depends on a determinate manufacturer or merchant to obtain such an object, the more serious must be the reason for making or selling it. Thus, a grave reason, such as a notable loss, is sufficient reason for selling a special fancy apparel to a notorious "vampire" (*i.e.*, a woman who carries on scandalous flirtations in order to get presents), if the adornments can be obtained from other dressmakers or modistes or stores; but a much graver reason would be required, if the apparel could not be purchased except at one place. In the former case, refusal to sell would not prevent the activities of this woman; in the latter case, it would at least hinder her to some extent.

(d) The more certain it is that an object will be employed sinfully, the greater must be the reason for making, repairing or selling it. Examples: Sempronius, a curio dealer, is asked by three men for a statue of Joss along with joss-sticks and papers. The first customer says he intends to use these articles for religious rites; the second will not tell what his purpose is; the third wishes to present the articles to a museum. Sempronius may not sell to the first customer except for a most grave reason, such as fear of death if he refuses; he may not sell to the second customer without a very great reason, such as a very considerable loss to himself; he may sell to the third customer for an ordinary reason, such as the profit he makes from the sale. Titus, who sells firearms, knows that some of his customers, though he has no particular individuals in mind, will use these weapons unlawfully in poaching or shooting out of season. Since evil is not to be presumed of any particular individual, Titus has the right to sell to all for the usual reason of business profit.

1536. Is a merchant bound to inquire the use which a customer will make of an article that is often employed for sin?

(a) If the positive law requires that the merchant inform

himself, he is bound to make inquiries necessary for obtaining the information. Thus, if the civil law forbids the sale of weapons without a permit or of poisons without a prescription, the merchant has to ask for the customer's authorization to buy.

(b) If the positive law has no such regulation, we should distinguish between articles that are frequently used for sin and articles that are generally used for sin. When an article of the former class is requested, there is no obligation to make inquiries, for such an obligation would be unduly burdensome; but, if an article of the latter class is desired, one should make inquiries, unless one is morally certain that the intention of the customer is good, or there is a very grave reason for seeking no information. Thus, one may sell a deck of cards to a stranger without asking for proofs that he is not a confidence man in disguise; but one may not sell deadly poison to an entire stranger merely on the strength of his word that he needs it for medical or other lawful purposes.

1537. Sinful Coöperation in Providers of Food and Drink.—

(a) There is *explicit* formal coöperation with sins of gluttony, drunkenness, violation of fast or abstinence, whenever one gladly supplies the means for these sins to those who are about to commit them. Thus, if a host supplies a guest who is overdrinking with all the intoxicants the latter desires, and secretly wishes that the guest may make himself drunk, there is explicit coöperation. There is *implicit* formal coöperation when he who supplies the food or drink does not directly intend evil, but when the act of giving the food or drink is from the circumstances of the case an evil act, as when a person is given a meal which will not agree with him and will make him sick or aggravate a malady, or when a person who wishes to violate a fast ostentatiously to show contempt is furnished with the eatables he asks for.

(b) There is unlawful material coöperation when one does not approve of the sin that will be committed, but nevertheless without sufficient reason supplies the food or drink. Thus, there is sinful coöperation when a restaurant owner gives meat on Friday to one not dispensed, for no other reason than the profit he himself will make.

1538. Material coöperation in providing food or drink to those who ask it, but have no right to take it, is lawful when one has the right to provide the food or drink, and there is a sufficient reason for coöperation. The sufficiency of the reason depends on circumstances, as explained in 1519.

(a) Hence, a greater reason is required when the sin that the other person will commit will be greater. Thus, a grave reason, such as indignation of a customer, might suffice for coöperation with a venial violation of temperance or abstinence; but a graver reason, such as a serious quarrel, is required if the violation will be mortally sinful. A graver reason is also necessary when the consequences will be more harmful (*e.g.*, the fights of the drunkard, or the serious illness of one who has neglected his diet) than when they are less harmful (*e.g.*, the foolish talk of the drunkard, or the stupefaction of the glutton).

(b) A greater reason is required when the coöperation is closer. Thus, in supplying meat the butcher coöperates only remotely, while the cook who prepares it and the waiter who serves it coöperate proximately.

(c) A greater reason is necessary when one's coöperation is essential to the commission of the sin. Thus, in a large town where there are many restaurants, the fact that a customer would quarrel if denied meat on a day of abstinence would excuse coöperation, whereas in a small village which has only one eating place, it seems there should be a more serious reason, such as blasphemies or boycott or strike against one's business which the refusal of meat might evoke.

(d) A greater reason is called for when the sin of the other person is more certain to follow. Thus, a restaurant-keeper who is patronized by strangers of all kinds, temperate and intemperate, Catholic and non-Catholic, may serve wine at meals, where this is allowed, and provide meat on days of abstinence for all comers; for the diners are not known to him, and it would not be possible for him to inform himself whether they are sober in their habits or exempted from the law of abstinence. But in a boarding house the landlady should not consent to have strong beverages on the table, when she knows that some of those pres-

ent will thereby become intoxicated; neither should she agree to provide meat on Fridays for a Catholic who is not excused from abstinence, unless there is a serious reason, such as the loss of this boarder which she cannot afford on account of her poverty. Moreover, since dispensation is given from the laws of fast and abstinence but not from the law of temperance, there is less certainty about the intent to sin when one asks for meat on Friday than when one asks for a great quantity of liquor to be brought to one's table. Drunkenness is also more certain when a person who asks for drink is already somewhat under its influence.

1539. The sins with which one coöperates by supplying food or drink to others who have no right to it are more or less serious according as they violate the natural law or only positive human law.

(a) Thus, violation of fast and abstinence is opposed to the natural law when it is intended as a manifestation of hatred of religion. One may not coöperate with a violation of fast and abstinence which is manifestly of this character.

(b) Violation of temperance is also opposed to natural law, and doubly so when it leads to such evils as quarrels, fights, murders, blasphemies, etc. It is not lawful to coöperate with intemperance, unless this is necessary in order to prevent the commission of a greater sin by the other person, or a serious loss to oneself. Thus, it is not unlawful to supply whisky to a burglar who wishes to get drunk, if this is the only way one can prevent the robbery of a third party or serious injury to oneself.

(c) Violation of a fast or abstinence in itself is opposed only to positive law; and, since fasting is more difficult than abstinence, one is more easily excused from the observance of the former than from that of the latter. Hence, if there is a doubt whether a customer has a right to receive the food or drink he asks for, a restaurant-keeper can decide more readily in the customer's favor if there is question of fast or abstinence than if there is question of intemperance, and more readily still if there is question of fast than if there is question of abstinence. Generally speaking, a restaurant-keeper may supply meat on Friday

to all who ask it, provided he has other substantial food indicated on his bill of fare and shows himself willing to serve that as well as meat.

**1540. Renting of Houses or Rooms and Coöperation in Sin.—**

(a) He who rents to persons who wish to carry on disorderly, immoral, idolatrous, unlawful, or other sinful occupations or practices, is guilty of formal or unlawful material coöperation, if he approves of the conduct of the renters or has no sufficient reason for renting to them. The same is true if in a similar way one permits persons bent on evil (*e.g.*, pickpockets) to lounge in one's offices, hotels, etc.

(b) He who gives the use of his house, room, hall, field, etc., to persons who will employ them for evil, is only a material and not a guilty coöperator, if there is no prohibition of his act, and he has a sufficient reason for it.

**1541. Examples of reasons sufficient for coöperation in renting are as follows:**

(a) *A very grave reason.*—In civitatibus in quibus majoris mali vitandi causa permissum est, licet locare domum meretricibus, dummodo non sequatur grave nocumentum vicinis honestis vel major ansa peccandi ob domus situm, et adsit ratio proportionate gravis, utputa quod alii locatorii non adsint, dominus notabile damnum patiatur si domus non occupetur, et meretrices facile alium locatarium obtinere possint. Hodie vero quum constet meretrices plerasque invite vitam turpem exercere (white slavery) et morbis pessimis morteque præmatura affligi, meretricium vero nocumentum multigenum bono publico (the social evil) inferre, omnis vir probus abhorrebit a pretio locario ab administratoribus lupanarium oblato.

(b) *A more grave reason.*—Meetings whose purpose is contrary to the common good (*e.g.*, anti-religious gatherings), even though permitted by civil law, should not be given the use of one's premises except in a rare case of the greatest necessity.

**1542. Unlawful Coöperation of Servants, Employees, and Workingmen.**—(a) Coöperation is formal if these intend the sin of their employer with which they coöperate, or if the act of coöperation is itself intrinsically evil. Thus, a bookkeeper does

no wrong in merely keeping a record of receipts and expenses; but, if he notices many instances of great frauds and injustices done by his firm and keeps at his post in order that dishonesty may be covered up and continued, he becomes a formal coöperator. But a bookkeeper who falsifies or destroys records in order that his business may be able to issue an incorrect statement of its financial condition is involved in its guilt, even though his motive is pity or loyalty. Other examples of formal coöperation are those of a secretary who takes down dictation which contains blasphemous or obscene expressions, and of a taxi-driver who tells his passengers how to get to gambling dens, or who helps a criminal to get away by driving him through dark streets.

(b) Coöperation is material and unlawful, when the intention and the act itself are not evil, but when there is no sufficient reason for the coöperation. Thus, the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI in 1679 as scandalous and pernicious: "Famulus qui submissis humeris scienter adjuvat herum suum ascendere per fenestras ad stuprandam virginem, et multoties eidem subservit deferendo scalam, aperiendo januam, aut quid simile coöperando, non peccat mortaliter, si id faciat metu notabilis detrimenti, puta ne a domino male tractetur, ne torvis oculis aspiciatur, ne domo expellatur" (*Denzinger*, n. 1201). Though the acts of coöperation of the servant here mentioned are not intrinsically evil, the coöperation is proximate and positive and habitual, and the wrong done so serious that only a most grave reason, such as fear of death, could justify the help given by the servant to his master.

**1543. Lawful Coöperation of Servants, Workingmen, or Employees.**—(a) If coöperation is remote and is not indispensable to the sin to be committed, the mere fact that one is employed by the principal cause will excuse; for the employee is not supposed to question the employer about the reasons of orders given, and he is not responsible for the intentions of the employer, but for the performance of what is assigned to himself. Hence, the following kinds of coöperation are held permissible for no other reason than that of service: carrying liquor or food

to an employer who wishes to make himself drunk or to break the fast, buying and carrying to him papers which he should not read, giving him his hat and coat or getting his car ready as he starts out to attack an enemy, opening the door to a slanderer whom the mistress of the house wishes to employ. Also, a public taxi-driver may take his patrons to clubs or road-houses where they will become intoxicated, if he is in no way responsible for their intention and shows no approval of it, and they can go just as well without him.

(b) If coöperation is proximate, the mere fact that one is employed is not sufficient as an excuse for coöperation; there must be some other reason that is sufficiently weighty in view of the gravity of the sin and the other circumstances. Thus, to drive one's employer to the place where he is to receive stolen valuables is justifiable, if one is under threat of great bodily harm if one refuses. Item ob incommodum gravius evitandum permittitur famulo deferre litteras heri amatorias ad amasiam cum qua illicitum commercium habet, tempus et locum conveniendi amasiæ nuntiare, excubias agere dum simul adsint. But a servant who is called on habitually to coöperate in these ways should secure another position, if possible.

1544. The principles given as to servants should be applied likewise to other persons who are subordinates, with due allowance made for the difference of circumstances.

(a) Thus, children, wives, pupils, etc., may be less excusable in coöperation than servants, since the former may be in a better position to remonstrate against what is ordered. Hence, if the master of the house who sometimes goes on a spree orders a servant to bring him his demijohn, disobedience might be more difficult than if the same order was given the wife.

(b) Children, wives, pupils, etc., may be more excusable, since unlike the servants they may be unable to go elsewhere. Those who agree to work at places known as vicious resorts, or who let their employer understand that they will not see or hear many things, or who habitually perform services proximately related to sin (what is called "dirty work"), are guilty of formal coöperation, at least when they can secure good employment

elsewhere. Children, on the contrary, may be so dependent on a tyrannical father that they cannot refuse coöperation without serious consequences to themselves.

1545. **Duties of Confessors.**—Instruction should be given to penitents who are guilty of sinful coöperation. (a) The confessor should instruct ignorant penitents on the sinfulness of their coöperation, when there is a duty of justice to do this, as when the penitents ask to be instructed; or when there is a duty of charity, as when the sinfulness of the coöperation in question is known to many persons, or the penitents by reason of coöperation are giving great scandal or are in serious danger. (b) The confessor should not instruct ignorant penitents on the sinfulness of their coöperation—at least, not for a time—if they are in good faith and if graver evils would result from the instruction than from silence.

1546. **Obligations to be Imposed on Penitents on Account of Sinful Coöperation.**—(a) Some cases of coöperation cause the culprit to fall under ecclesiastical penalties, for example, those who act as seconds or spectators at duels (Canon 2351). (b) Some cases entail a duty of reparation for scandal given, as when one has aided the diffusion of irreligious or obscene literature or whisperings among the people. (c) Some kinds of coöperation include dangerous occasions of sin which one is bound to avoid, as when one works for a man who produces adulterated wares or gets money under false pretenses.

Art. 10: THE COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY

(*Summa Theologica*, II—II, q. 44.)

1547. There is no commandment concerning charity in the Decalogue, but charity is implicitly contained in all the commandments of other virtues; for charity is the end of every commandment (I Tim., i. 5). Thus, the commandments of the first table of the Law tend to the love of God; the commandments of

the second table to the love of neighbor. On account of its supreme importance, however, charity was made the object of special commandments in both the Old and the New Testament.

(a) In the Old Testament, at the second giving of the tables of the Law, it is declared: "Now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in his ways, and love him, and serve the Lord thy God, with all thy heart and with all thy soul?" (Deut., x. 12).

(b) In the New Testament, our Lord, being asked which is the great commandment in the law, replied: "Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God, with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind. This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets" (Matt., xxii. 37-40).

1548. Charity must come "from a pure heart, and a good conscience and faith unfeigned" (I Tim., i. 5), and these words may be used to indicate how all other commandments have charity for their purpose.

(a) "A pure heart" is had by the observance of the negative commandments of the natural law, which forbid evil, or of the commandments about the virtues regulative of the passions; and it is a disposition preparatory for the love of God, since an impure heart will be taken up with evil or with earthly things, and so turned away from the goodness of God.

(b) "A good conscience" is had by the observance of the affirmative commandments of the natural law, or of the commandments regulative of actions; and it too tends to charity as its goal, for a bad conscience fills one with dread and horror of the justice of God.

(c) "Faith unfeigned" is had by the observance of the supernatural law, or of the commandments about worship of the true God; and it leads up to charity, for a feigned faith, or false worship, separates one from the truth of God.

1549. Though charity is but one virtue (see 1115), it has two acts: one about love of God, which is the end, and another about love of neighbor, which is a means to that end

(a) If all understood that the end includes the means and the means supposes the end, there would be no necessity for two distinct commandments; for there is no love of God without love of neighbor (I John, iv. 20), and he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law (Rom., xiii. 8).

(b) But since many would not perceive that one of the commandments of charity contains the other, it was necessary to propose these commandments separately: "We have this command from God that he who loves God love also his brother" (I John, iv. 21).

1550. Charity extends to other objects than God and the neighbor, namely, to self and one's own body (see 1133 sqq.); it also has other acts than that of love, such as the acts of joy, peace, beneficence (see 1193 sqq.), and the suppression of unpeace, charitable hatred, sloth, envy (see 1295 sqq.), etc. Nevertheless, charitable hatred, sloth, envy (see 1295 sqq.), etc. Nevertheless, on the two commandments of love of God and love of neighbor depend the whole law and the prophets (Matt., xxii. 40), and other commandments about charity are not necessary.

(a) Thus, the objects of love are either the end or the means to the end, and, as the two commandments of charity refer to both of these, they omit nothing that is to be loved. It was not necessary to make express command of love of self, for nature inclines to that sufficiently, and the duty of keeping love of self within bounds is provided for in the commandments that God be loved above all and the neighbor as oneself.

(b) The acts of charity distinct from love result from love, and the acts opposed to charity are virtually forbidden in the commandments of their opposites. Hence, there was no need of explicit precepts about the secondary acts of charity or of explicit prohibitions of the sins against charity. But for the sake of those who might not perceive that the minor functions of charity are commanded and acts of uncharitableness forbidden in the two great commandments, special and explicit laws were given which enjoin peace, joy, etc., and forbid hatred, envy, etc.

1551. The precepts of the secondary acts of charity are: (a) joy: "Rejoice in the Lord always" (Phillip., iv. 4); (b) peace:



"Follow peace with all men" (Heb., xii. 14); and (c) beneficence: "While we have time, let us do good to all" (Gal., vi. 10).

1552. The prohibitions of uncharitableness are as follows: (a) against hatred: "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart" (Lev., xix. 17); (b) against sloth: "Bow down thy shoulder and hear her (wisdom), and be not grieved with her bands" (Ecclus., vi. 26); (c) against envy: "Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another" (Gal., v. 26); (d) against discord: "Speak the same things and let there be no schisms among you" (I Cor., i. 10); and (e) against scandal: "Put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother's way" (Rom., xiv. 13).

1553. **The Commandment of Love of God.**—In the commandment of love of God two things are expressed: (a) the matter of the commandment is God, the object of love; (b) the manner of the commandment is that God be loved as the Last End, to whose love all other love is to be subordinated.

1554. There is a twofold manner or mode of performing a virtuous act:

(a) The *intrinsic* mode is that which comes from the nature of the virtue commanded. Thus, in the Fourth Commandment is included not only the substance of an act (*viz.*, that honor be shown), but also the mode of the act (*i.e.*, that such honor and so much honor be shown as is owed to a parent by his child). The intrinsic mode is always included in a commandment along with the substance of the act prescribed (cfr. 480 sqq.).

(b) The *extrinsic* mode is that which belongs to some virtue different from the one commanded. This mode is not included in a commandment. Thus, if honor be shown to parents out of love of God, the mode of love of God is extrinsic to the commandment, for the commandment is concerned with the virtue of filial piety, and the mode of the act pertains to charity, which is a virtue distinct from filial piety.

1555. The intrinsic mode of performing an act of virtue is also twofold:

(a) The *essential* mode is that without which an act is not

virtuous. Thus, he who gives to his indigent parents according to his means and their needs fulfills the essential mode of the Fourth Commandment, for, if he gave them less than he could afford and they needed, his act would not come up to the requirements of the commandment.

(b) The *ideal* mode of the performance of virtue is that which adds to the virtue greater goodness and value, and which is intended by a lawgiver as the end, but not as the object of his command. Thus, he who gives to his indigent parents not only sufficiently, but also with a great willingness and cheerfulness, fulfills the Fourth Commandment with greater perfection than another who supports his parents with less alacrity.

1556. The mode of the love of God prescribed in the first and great commandment is that God be loved with the whole heart, etc. But "to love with the whole heart, etc.," can be understood in various senses.

(a) Thus, it may be understood to mean a love that is subjectively or intensively great, as when one loves God with much fervor and affection. This mode of love is ideal, since the measure of loving God is to love Him without measure, but it is not essential. The end of the commandment is that we love God ever more and more, and perform what is required with ever greater promptitude and gladness; but the commandment does not fix any certain degree of intensity, although it would be inordinate to choose to love God less intensely than we love creatures (see 1160).

(b) "To love with the whole heart" may be understood to mean a love that is objectively or appreciatively great, as when one esteems and loves God as the Supreme Good. This mode of love is essential, and hence without it the commandment is not observed. However much one loves God, if one does not love Him as the Supreme Good, one does not love Him aright, and does not practise the virtue of charity that is commanded.

1557. Love of God from the whole heart, objectively or appreciatively understood, is either actual or habitual.

(a) *Actually*, one loves God with one's whole heart when there is never any interruption or distraction to one's love, and

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one is continually engaged in an act of loving God above all else. This is the ideal mode of fulfilling the commandment of love, and it is also the end to which the commandment is intended to lead. But it is only in heaven, where God will be all in all (I Cor., xv. 28), that this ideal fulfillment will take place.

(b) *Habitually*, one loves God with one's whole heart when one is in the state of grace, preferring the love of God to every contrary love, although it is only at intervals that one is able to make acts of love. This is the essential mode of fulfilling the command of love here on earth. The whole heart must be given to God to the exclusion of love for any mortal sin, for mortal sin separates from God.

1558. The mode of loving God is expressed in various places in Scripture (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., xxii. 37; Mark, xii. 30; Luke, x. 27), and there are slightly different interpretations given to the words by which it is conveyed. Thus, some exegetes see in the expressions "heart," "soul," "mind," "strength," synonymous significations of the one thought that God should be loved over all, and they think that different words are used only in order to give greater clearness and energy to the thought. But the following seems also a reliable explanation: (a) God must be loved with one's whole heart, that is, the will must not intend any Last End other than God; (b) God must be loved with one's whole mind, soul and strength, that is, the powers moved by the will—intellect, appetites and executive faculties—must be subject to God, must be regulated according to His will, and must carry out His commandments.

1559. Love of God with one's whole heart excludes, then, opposite loves, but it does not exclude other loves that are not opposite or other dispositions that are less perfect. (a) Thus, love of God with one's whole heart does not exclude love of self or of neighbor. (b) Love of God with one's whole heart does not exclude the use of acts in reference to God that do not reach the height of disinterested love, such as acts of hope, gratitude, or fear (see 1033, 1054, 1093).

1560. There are various degrees of perfection in the fulfillment of the commandment of love of God.

(a) The *most perfect* fulfillment is found in heaven, where there is no turning from the love of God by grave sin, no impediment to its exercise by venial sin, and no interruption of its act by other occupations.

(b) The *more perfect* fulfillment of this commandment found on earth is modelled on the love of God exercised by the Saints in heaven, and the nearer one approaches to the model, the better does one fulfill the commandment. Thus, he who avoids not only what is against charity (*i.e.*, mortal sin), but also, as far as possible, what is aside from charity (*i.e.*, venial sin), loves God more perfectly than one who is careless about venial sin; and he who shuns, not only things unlawful that are harmful to charity, but also things lawful that interrupt the exercise of charity, loves God more, other things being equal, than another who avoids the unlawful, but whose mind is greatly occupied with lawful temporal matters.

(c) The *ordinarily perfect* fulfillment of the commandment is found in all those who, both in their internal and in their external acts, avoid all that is contrary to the love of God, although they fall into venial sin and are mostly occupied with temporal affairs.

Thus is charity the bond of perfection (Col., iii. 14), the tie that binds man to his highest good; those who keep the commandments for its sake are followers after perfection, those who embrace counsels for its sake are in the state of perfection.

1561. **The Commandment of Love of Self.**—Love of self is understood in many senses. (a) According to its *moral* character, love of self is either sinful or virtuous, and virtuous self-love is either natural or supernatural (as was explained in 1136). (b) According to its *physical* character, love of self is either innate or elicited. *Innate* love of self is the tendency of nature to desire what pertains to the perfection of self, such as existence and its preservation (see 1108). *Elicited* love of self is the choice on the part of the reason and will of an ultimate happiness for self and of the means thereto.

1562. Charity obliges each one capable of precept to an elicited supernatural love of self. The obligation is grave for the

following reasons: (a) the love of God includes love of self, for we cannot love God truly unless we also love those things that are His, especially His rational creatures made to His image and destined for His society; (b) the love of neighbor supposes love of self, for the commandment of love (Matt., xxii. 39) offers love of self as the model for love of others.

1563. The goods which the law of charity to self requires one to desire and seek after, are all those things that are necessary for the attainment of one's happiness and due perfection.

(a) Thus, as to supernatural goods, one is bound to obtain for oneself things necessary for salvation. One is obliged, then, to acquire a sufficient knowledge of the faith; to enter into a state of life for which one is suited (*e.g.*, matrimony or religion); to avoid sin and the occasions of sin; not to delay conversion for a notable length of time; to put oneself in the state of grace, especially at the hour of death. But one is not obliged to perform these duties with the motive of charity in mind, nor to elect for self works of supererogation or counsels of perfection.

(b) As to intellectual goods, one is bound to seek what is necessary for a proper fulfillment of the duties of one's station in life. Thus, one owes it in charity to oneself to seek the education and training that are presupposed in one's profession or occupation, and to bestow the necessary study and attention. See above, on the intellectual virtues (144 sqq.) and on the sin of ignorance (904 sqq.).

(c) As to corporal goods, one is obliged to use the ordinary means for preserving life and health (on the desire of death, see 1063). Hence, in matters of food, drink, clothing, and recreation, each one is in duty bound to follow the laws of hygiene.

(d) As to the external goods of person (*i.e.*, honor and reputation), there is a strict duty of guarding them or of recovering them, as far as possible.

(e) As to external goods of fortune (*i.e.*, wealth and possessions), one must aim to acquire as much as is necessary for one's subsistence and the fulfillment of duties to others. Hence the duty of labor for those who do not possess the necessary means. But charity to self does not demand that one aspire to

reach the top of the ladder in the financial world or to accumulate a very large surplus. One may indeed lawfully seek to become a millionaire, or to become so wealthy as to be able to retire with leisure, if one goes about this lawfully; but there is no obligation to strive after more than is reasonably necessary.

1564. Man owes it to himself to put to good use the talents God has bestowed upon him for his self-improvement and self-development. It is a sin, therefore, greater or less according to circumstances, to neglect the care of the mind or of the mental culture one should possess.

(a) Thus, reason is the faculty that elevates man above the irrational world, and knowledge is the perfection and excellence of that faculty. What life or health is to the body, reason or knowledge is to the mind; and so, just as it is a sin against the body to neglect life or health, it is also a sin against the mind to neglect reason or knowledge. Persons predisposed to insanity who expose themselves to alienation of mind by the use of drugs or strong spirits or by practices or occupations that expose them to shocks (such as gambling), and others who value ignorance, scepticism, and error as if these infirmities were goods, sin against the mind, at least materially.

(b) Reason and knowledge are also necessary in numberless ways to man's bodily, social, cultural, and religious life. Without the elements of a general education in reading, writing and arithmetic, one is very seriously handicapped in making a bare living; and without the education of the high school, college or university, one is frequently under a disadvantage in seeking to better oneself or improve one's position. Besides these utilities for practical affairs, education has advantages of a loftier kind: it makes its possessor a more capable citizen, a more pleasant companion and friend, a more influential exponent of good causes, and a greater credit to the religion he practises; it gives enjoyment to leisure, comfort to rest, and dignity to success; the labor of acquiring it is a discipline of the will; the taste for higher things it imparts is a natural protection against much that is evil; the mental power and knowledge that are its gifts enable one to expose error and fallacy and to uphold the truth

and the right. It is of precept, therefore, that one acquire the moral and mental training which one's salvation and calling in life make necessary; it is of counsel—and the counsel is one that should be much urged in our times—that one who has the opportunity of attaining to a higher proficiency, to the advantage of self and society, should avail himself of that opportunity.

1565. Examples of Sins Committed by Neglect of Necessary Education.—(a) *Directly*, one sins against the duty of cultivation of the mind when through laziness or malice one slights the means of acquiring necessary knowledge—as when pupils absent themselves from school, or give no attention to the teacher or no preparation to their lessons; or when collegians sacrifice study to athletics and amusements.

(b) Indirectly one sins against the duty of knowledge, when one is responsible for habits that impede or prevent necessary concentration of mind, as when one goes about so much socially that the mind is always in a whirl, or reads so much light literature that everything serious becomes a bore, or overeats so much that the brain becomes sluggish, or pays no attention to the wise rule that a sound mind needs a sound body.

1566. The proper care of the body and of health is not merely a thing next to godliness; it is a moral duty, and so a part of godliness. God Himself on Sinai gave to the Chosen People of old a sanitary code, and the faithful observance by orthodox Jews of those regulations has had much to do with the superior health and longevity of their race. Moral Theology, therefore, is not digressing from its proper subject-matter, if it gives some attention to rules of health. The duties owed to physical well-being can be reduced to the following: (a) to secure for the body the things needed for the maintenance and replenishment of its substance and vigor, such as food, air, sleep and exercise; (b) to ward off or remove those things that are injurious to or destructive of health, such as excessive heat or cold, waste matter, poisons, and disease; (c) to assist these physical means by psychical or spiritual ones, such as cheerfulness and the will to keep well and fit.

1567. Food and drink are naturally a prime requisite for life,

since they furnish the material from which the body is built and renewed. They should be used, however, in such a way as to serve their purpose.

(a) Thus, the quantity and quality have to be regulated according to the needs of the individual and circumstances, and so will vary with climate, age, health, and occupation. The distinction of clean and unclean foods does not exist in the New Law (Rom., xiv. 14; Matt., xv. 17-20), but it is clear that the same kinds or amounts of food and drink do not agree with all constitutions; that overeating, undereating, and want of variety in diet are not conducive to good health. Physicians recommend that something raw be eaten every day and something indigestible at every meal, and that a person watch his weight, keeping a little overweight up to middle life and a little underweight after that age.

(b) The manner of eating is of first-rate importance, since the digestion is harmed if one eats without appetite or with mental preoccupation on deep subjects, or bolts the food, or makes excessive use of relishes or condiments.

1568. Fresh air, on which the production of pure blood and the continuance of vitality depend, is another necessity of life. Hence, we may well heed the following rules which hygienists lay down on this point: (a) let in fresh air and sunshine to the places where you live and work, and exclude dust and smoke; (b) wear light, loose and porous clothing, so that the skin may have air; (c) get out of doors in the open air part of the time every day, even though the weather is uninviting, for sunshine or natural light is also a requisite of good health; (d) breathe through the nose, and not through the mouth. Breathing should be deep, slow and regular, and one should take deep-breathing exercises several times a day; (e) sleep in a well-ventilated room, or out-of-doors if possible.

1569. Rest and relaxation are needful for body and mind alike, that the burdens of life may not bear too heavily, and nature may be allowed to exercise her ministries of renewal and restoration. But here, as in other things, the guiding rule must be moderation.

(a) Through *excess*, some harm their health by indulging in too much repose. A strong, healthy individual who remains in bed from midnight till noon, or who gives most of the afternoon to a prolonged nap, is storing up more energy than he or she needs, and will feel the worse for it. Similarly, persons whose life is one round of vacations or diversions pay for their aimless existence in various kinds of mental or nervous disorders, to say nothing of the moral dangers to which they are exposed (Eccles., xxxiii. 29).

(b) Through *defect*, on the other hand, some injure their health by depriving themselves of the sleep or rest they ought to take. The time that should be given to repose differs with the individual. The young, brain-workers and the feeble are in greater need than others; but there is no one who can *dispense* with his proper share of rest. It is sinful, therefore, to reduce needed sleep by late retiring or early rising, or to work unremittingly to such an extent that the bodily powers and resistance become unequal to the demands made on them and unfitted for duties. According to physicians, seven hours out of every twenty-four should be spent in bed, and the hours before midnight are much more precious for rest than the early morning hours. Some holidays and vacations are a necessity in these days of rapid and strenuous life.

1570. Physical exercise is a factor of good health, for it stirs up the circulation of the blood, assists digestion, and rids the body of surplus weight. Moreover, it has great value for the mind (to which it gives diversion and refreshment) and for the soul (since it promotes temperance and chastity). If taken in the form of sports, physical exercise is a training in coöperation with others, in loyalty, discipline, and fairness. But health is impaired by excess as well as by defect in exercise.

(a) Examples of over-exercise are athletes who carry on endurance tests to the point of exhaustion, devotees of violent forms of contests or matches that overtax the heart, etc.

(b) Examples of under-exercise are able-bodied persons who prefer to lounge about the house all day rather than bestir themselves; also those who work indoors all day and who from choice

ride rather than walk, no matter how short the distance they have to go, etc. Persons of sedentary life who can do so, should exercise every day, preferably out-of-doors, playing at some game like golf, taking a brisk walk of about five miles, or doing some manual labor, such as gardening or sawing wood. Regular gymnastics or setting-up exercises, and the habit of sitting, standing, and walking erect at all times are prescribed by experts on health as very important.

1571. Under the head of preventive or curative measures that ought to be attended to for the sake of bodily well-being are the following:

(a) In time of health sickness has to be guarded against. Suitable clothing and shelter must be used as protection against injurious effects of heat or cold; cleanliness must be cultivated by such means as daily baths, frequent ablutions, washing of teeth, tongue and gums; infections must be avoided; drugs or stimulants hurtful to one's health must not be indulged in, and attention must be given to daily, regular and natural elimination and to the exclusion of poisons from the system. According to authorities, one should drink at least six glasses of water a day, but warm water is often preferable to cold or hot.

(b) In time of sickness efforts must be made at restoration of health, if this is possible. It is of obligation to use the ordinary means to recover physical fitness, that is, to take remedies and medicines that are suitable, not on the advice of acquaintances or advertisements, but on the recommendation of a competent physician in whose knowledge and skill one has perfect confidence (Eccles., xxxviii. 1 sq.). But there is no obligation to have recourse to extraordinary means of recovery, such as a trip to a more balmy climate when one's purse cannot afford it. Similarly, a very painful and uncertain operation or mutilation is not obligatory, unless one has dependents, and the danger to life from the operation is slight. In time of sickness, as well as in health, we should not omit to implore the divine aid.

1572. The state of mind has very much to do with good or bad health. It is well known, for instance, that a happy, cheerful attitude helps digestion and sleep; whereas worry, fear,

anger or other emotional stress will bring on dyspepsia, insomnia, disease, and perhaps insanity. We should not overlook, therefore, the importance of the mental factor in our efforts to maintain good health.

(a) Natural means of cultivating an even temper and a buoyant disposition are: some kind of labor or occupation, avoidance of hurry and worry in one's affairs, cultivation of some interesting hobby or avocation that will vary the monotony of business or work, use of congenial recreations, whether of a more refined (*e.g.*, conversation with friends, literature, music, art, the drama, travel to historic or beautiful scenes, etc.) or of a more material kind (*e.g.*, reading tales of mystery or adventure, raising pet animals, witnessing baseball games, races, etc., playing billiards, cards, etc., smoking, attending banquets, picnics, etc.). A sense of humor and laughter in moderation are good for the health and not opposed to spirituality.

(b) Religious practices are all-important for cheerfulness of spirit. Christian Science, indeed, is in error when it holds that faith thinks or wills sorrow and disease and death out of existence, for evil is a reality; but virtue and a good conscience rid one of many enemies to peace, and there exist in the Church many supernatural and miraculous means that benefit body, mind and spirit.

1573. Persons who give exaggerated attention to their health cannot justify themselves by the commandment of charity to self; for this commandment has to be interpreted according to the order of charity as explained above (see 1164 sqq.). The bodily good has to be cared for, but with due subordination to higher goods (Matt., vi. 25; Rom., xiv. 16).

(a) Thus, spiritual goods are more important than those of the body, and it is lawful to practise mortifications by fastings, vigils, hair-shirts, and the like, which, though afflictive to the flesh, are refreshing to the spirit, provided all be done according to holy prudence.

(b) Intellectual goods are better than those of the body, and it is not sinful to devote oneself to studies, researches and other mental occupations in preference to manual labor or athletic

exercises which would improve one's physique, but not one's mind. It is even lawful for the sake of mental improvement to suffer some slight detriment to health.

(c) Public good is greater than private good, and hence it is not only lawful but laudable to expose health, or even life, for the advancement of science or the welfare of the community. Many men and women in daily life do this as part of the day's work.

1574. Does charity to self oblige one to desire honors, such as dignities, titles, positions or rank, precedence, testimonials, eulogies, medals, decorations, monuments, and the like?

(a) Charity to self demands that one strive to acquire the excellence that is expected of one, and so to be deserving of honor. For we must let our light shine before men (Matt., v. 16; Rom., xii. 17; II Cor., vii. 21).

(b) Charity to self does not require that one actually secure honors. For one cannot force another to declare one's praises, since he may be prejudiced or ignorant, and it is not seemly to sing one's own greatness or merit (II Cor., x. 18), except in self-defense (II Cor., xii. 11).

(c) Charity to self would require one to seek after an honor, if the honor were necessary and the manner of seeking it honorable. Thus, it is a duty to self to seek to obtain a diploma or certificate of good character or proficiency, if this document is needed to exercise the profession for which one has trained.

(d) Charity to self would forbid one to seek after an honor, if the honor would prove harmful, or if it could not be obtained in a respectable way. Thus, if an honor rightfully belonged to another, or if it were bestowed in recognition of evil done, or if it would impose obligations for which one knows oneself to be unsuited, or if it could not be attained except by dishonesty, charity to self would urge one to fly from the honor.

(e) Charity to self in other cases would permit one either to seek an honor (as when a dignity will be useful and will be employed for good, and is not sought out of vainglory or hypocrisy) or to forego it (as when it is not necessary and one is moved to shun it, not out of contempt, but out of some virtuous motive),

1575. Does charity to self require one to desire a good name?

(a) Charity to self does require that one desire to be worthy of a good name, for one owes it to oneself as well as to others to be blameless (Phil., ii. 14-16) and to provide good things in the sight of men (Rom., xii. 17).

(b) Charity to self does require that one desire to have a good name. Spiritually, a good name is an advantage, for many a one is encouraged to continue in virtue by the good opinion which others have of him, while many another is discouraged from attempting or continuing a good life because he has a bad reputation. Temporally also, a good name is useful or necessary, for, if others do not trust us or respect us, we shall find it difficult to secure employment or position, or to exercise our office fruitfully. Hence, Scripture admonishes: "Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great" (Eccclus., xli. 15).

(c) Charity to self does not require that one actually have a good name, since reputation may be lost through the work of detractors or through one's own unintentional imprudence, or through circumstances over which one has no control.

(d) Charity to self ordinarily requires that one seek to acquire a good name, if it has not yet been earned, also to preserve it, when gained, to recover it, when lost; for, as a rule, there is no greater good for which the good of reputation should be sacrificed. The means to be employed, however, should not be evil, as when one uses hypocritical pretense in order to pass as a man of piety, or has recourse to lying or duelling, to undermining or attacking another in order to recover one's reputation. A good name is built up by fidelity to the duties of one's calling and the avoidance of what may be offensive or scandalous to others; it is preserved or rebuilt by good deeds, especially those one is known or supposed to have lacked, and in case of need by words of self-defense, vindicating one's conduct, or refuting aspersions or false charges.

(e) Charity does not require one to seek after a good name, when this should or may be sacrificed for the sake of some higher good. St. Paul faithfully practised what he preached, that no

dishonor might be reflected on the Gospel; and yet his enemies looked on him as a seducer and a nobody, as a melancholy and avaricious man. But the Apostle answered his traducers that neither honor nor dishonor, neither evil report nor good report, would move him from the exercise of his ministry (II Cor., vi. 4 sqq.).

1576. Sacrifice of reputation is not lawful, however, unless there is a proportionately grave reason and the means are good.

(a) The end must be good and relatively important, not only if compared with the good of personal reputation, but also if compared with the public good and the rights of third parties. Examples: It would not be right to allow oneself to be defamed in order to cover up the tracks of a rascal who deserved punishment, or to distract attention from an evil that is being done; for the purpose would then be the defeat of justice or the success of some sinful plan. In such cases the end would not be good. Neither would it be right to allow the sacrifice of a good name for the notoriety and money profits to be gained in stage or book royalties. The practice of many young men of accepting or book royalties. The practice of many young men of accepting imputed faults, of which they are not guilty, in order to be popular, or interesting, or attractive, is also sinful. Money cannot buy back a lost reputation, and popularity with the thoughtless is no compensation for disgrace before the judicious and loss of self-respect. In these cases the end is not important, if compared with the advantage of a good name. And even when an end is good and more important than one's fame, there will frequently be rights of others involved that forbid a sacrifice of reputation, as when a passive attitude in the face of calumny would give scandal or cast discredit on one's profession, office, work, religion, family, or friends.

(b) The means must be good. Examples: Even if the ambition to be "a good fellow" is praiseworthy, drunkenness and profanity are not suitable ways of winning esteem, and the same applies to pretending wickedness or accusing oneself of imaginary escapades and vices to please a circle which admires wildness in youth. The means used in these cases (drunkenness, profanity, lying) are evil in themselves. Again, the wish to cul-

tivate humility does not justify one in giving scandal by consorting with evildoers as intimates, or by conducting oneself in such a way as to lower the esteem or respect that is entertained for one's position. The means used in those cases are at least *evil-seeming* and disedifying.

1577. Is self-detraction, that is, the revelation of some real fault or defect, lawful?

(a) If there is question of faults or defects that are of a public nature and generally known, a disclosure made in a good spirit and in a proper manner, and from which beneficial and not harmful results can be foreseen, is lawful, and sometimes obligatory. Example: Balbus has calumniated his neighbors, and he now admits the fact, not to boast about or excuse it, but to make satisfaction; he does not repeat the details of his defamatory remarks, but merely states that he wishes to retract what he had no right to say; he has every reason to think that his present course will undo the harm caused by the defamation. Balbus does right in thus acknowledging his mistake.

(b) If there is question of faults or defects not generally known, the reasons for mentioning them should be more serious, unless the sins are of a trifling nature. Examples: Caius once served a term in jail for dishonesty, but he is now a decent citizen. His family would be scandalized and would feel disgraced, if they knew this. But Caius thinks it would be a suitable reparation to tell them of his former guilt. Caius is wrong. To speak of his past experience would only add the sin of scandal to the old one, and there are other ways in which he can do penance in further expiation of dishonesty. Claudius wishes to marry Sempronia, but the latter insists that there must be no secrets between husband and wife, and that he must give her complete and accurate answers on certain questions about his past career—for example, whether he has ever been drunk, whether he has ever wished to be drunk, whether he has ever had questionable relations with other women, etc. Claudius should not deceive Sempronia, nor leave her in ignorance of any serious objection to the marriage, even if she forgot to mention it in her questions; but he owes it to himself not to put himself in her

power by giving her information which she would probably use against him then or later. Titus has stolen a considerable sum, and, for the sake of getting advice and direction on how to make restitution, he consults a prudent friend who will regard his communication as confidential, just as if he were a confessor. Titus does not act against his own reputation by telling his case to this friend.

1578. Confession of Sins against Charity Owed to Self.—(a) It is not necessary to declare in confession that one has acted against the charity due to self, if there is question only of sins in which transgression of that charity was not directly intended; for to say that one has sinned against God by blasphemy, or against self by intemperance, or against the neighbor by injustice, is equivalent to saying that one has hurt one's own soul by sin. (b) It is necessary to declare a want of charity to self, if one has expressly intended such a sin. Thus, if a person who has been admonished to have care for his own soul is so enraged thereat that he vows to deliver his soul over to evil, and thereupon proceeds to commit various kinds of sin, he does not declare his true state of conscience by merely mentioning these latter sins. A case of this kind, however, is not usual (see 1307).

1579. The Commandment of Love of Neighbor.—Charity to fellow-creatures, especially to members of the chosen nation, was commanded in the Old Law. (a) Thus, internal love was made obligatory. The Lord forbade hatred, revenge, remembrance of injuries (Lev., xix. 17), and commanded love of fellow-citizens (*ibid.*) and kindness to foreigners dwelling in the land (Lev., xix. 33). (b) External love was also obligatory. Alms and help were to be given the needy (Deut., xxii. 1, 2, xv. 11), loans were to be made without interest (Deut., xxiii. 19), kindness was to be shown to widows, orphans, the blind, the crippled (Exod., xxii. 22, 23; Lev., xix. 14), part of each harvest was to be left for the poor, and in the third, seventh and fiftieth years special assistance was to be rendered the needy (Lev., xix. 9, xxv. 2-12; Deut., xiv. 28, 29).

1580. In the New Testament, which is the law of love, the precept of charity to neighbors is given with greater clearness



and perfection. (a) Thus, internal love must be universal and modelled on the love which Christ had for humanity. Enemies are to be loved as well as friends, the bad as well as the good (Matt., v. 43-45), Gentiles as well as Jews, since there is one Lord of all (Rom., x. 12). The new commandment, whose observance will mark the faithful follower, is an imitation of the charity of Christ (John, xiii. 34, 35). (b) External charity must be practised, even at the cost of self-sacrifice (I John, iii. 16), for it will be regarded by Christ as done to Himself (Matt., xxv. 40), and will be the subject of interrogation and eulogy at the judgment (Matt., xxv. 34-46).

1581. In giving the commandment of love towards fellow-creatures, our Lord indicated both the reason for the love and the mode in which the love should be exercised: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Matt., xxii. 39).

(a) The reason for this love is that a fellow-creature is our neighbor, or, as it is elsewhere expressed, our brother (I John, iv. 20, 21), our friend (Lev., xix. 18). He, like ourselves, is made to the image of God and is destined for the same beatitude.

(b) The mode of this love is that it should be similar, though not equal, to the love one has for oneself. Hence, the end of loving our neighbor should be God, that it may be a holy love; the rule to be followed in loving him should be that we agree with his wishes in good, but not in evil, that the love may be just; the manner of loving him should be that one wishes him well, not that one only seeks pleasure or advantage from him, and so the love will be sincere. For, as love of self must be holy, just and sincere, the same qualities are required in love of the neighbor.

1582. The following conditions must, therefore, be met in the love of neighbor which charity commands:

(a) Love must not be of a covetous or selfish or superficial kind, but must be sincerely benevolent and beneficent (see 1109). Those who wish to retain the companionship or association of a neighbor because this redounds to their own gain, on account of his wealth, influence, etc., while harming the neighbor, love themselves rather than the neighbor. Nor is love of neighbor

genuine if it exists only in the emotions, or if it is manifested only in expressions of good will; for true love includes benevolence and will be translated into beneficence when the occasion presents itself (James, ii. 14 sqq.; I John, i. 22). Persons who are most ready to shed tears at the distress of others, or who are most profuse in compliments or good wishes, are frequently most unwilling to assist others, especially if some sacrifice is necessary.

(b) The love of the neighbor must not be a sinful benevolence or beneficence, but must desire for him and confer on him what are real, and not merely apparent goods, such as we ought to desire for ourselves (Matt., vii. 12). Those who secure for others lower and unnecessary goods at the sacrifice of those that are higher and necessary, putting wealth, pleasure, or position above virtue and a good conscience, have not the love of charity, for "what does it profit a man to gain the whole world, and lose his soul?" (Matt., viii. 36).

(c) The love of the neighbor must not be purely natural, but must wish for him and confer on him real goods out of a supernatural motive. This motive is the friendship one has for God, so that the neighbor is loved because God loves him and desires to communicate to him a share in the divine life through grace and glory. The motive of charity is absent, therefore, when one loves only one's friends, when one is kind to others out of pity, or generosity, or admiration for their good qualities, if there is no thought of God in this philanthropy or humanitarianism.

1583. The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with *as to its acts* by all those who are leading a good Christian life. (a) Thus, the internal acts of sincere affection, peace, joy, and mercy are exercised by prayer for the living and the dead, or a devout recitation of the Lord's Prayer. (b) The external acts of spiritual and corporal mercy are performed by those who are giving according to their means and the necessities they meet.

1584. The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with *as to its motive*, even though the supernatural motive is not actually present before the mind, or other and natural motives are also present. (a) Thus, the supernatural

motive directs our love of neighbor, if it is present virtually, as will be explained in 1590. (b) Natural motives of love that are good in themselves (such as ties of relationship or nationality, common intellectual or other interests, the virtue or ability of a neighbor) do not detract from the supernaturalness of love, provided their influence is subordinated to the divine friendship and the desire of beatitude for the neighbor. Even a certain amount of natural repugnance is not inconsistent with charity; on the contrary, charity is seen to be great, if for love of God one does good to implacable enemies, or waits on persons suffering from a loathsome disease.

**1585. Fulfillment of the Commandments of Charity.**—We speak now only of the commandment of love, in which the other commandments of charity are contained (see 1550 b). The love which is commanded must have the following qualities: (a) on the side of *the subject who loves*, it must be internal and made at the proper times—that is, one must love from the heart and affection, as well as in works and manifestations, and must make and renew the act of love as the law requires; (b) on the side of *the object loved*, it must be both universal and well-ordered; one must not only love all to whom charity is due (see 1133 sqq.), but one must also bestow love according to the rank of precedence in which charity is due (see 1158 sqq.).

**1586.** The act of charity can be made in various ways.

(a) It is made *in itself*, when one elicits or expresses love; it is made *in its manifestations*, when one performs an act of virtue distinct from charity. One who sincerely loves God with his whole heart will keep the commandments (John, xiv. 21), and hence acts of temperance, justice, fortitude, etc., may be called acts of love, in the sense that they are indications of love.

(b) The act of charity may be made *internally* or *externally*. Thus, affection for another as a friend in God, and a sincere desire of his good, are internal acts of love; while spiritual or temporal alms bestowed upon him, such as instruction or aid in time of sickness, are external acts of love.

(c) The act of charity may be made *explicitly* or *implicitly*. Charity is called explicit with reference to a person or object

which is loved in itself, and not as included in another; it is called implicit with reference to a person or object loved as included in another, as when means and end involve each other, or a part is contained in the whole. Thus, he who loves God above all things loves God explicitly and his neighbor implicitly; he who loves his neighbor as a future co-sharer in bliss loves his neighbor explicitly and God implicitly (see 1549); he who includes all mankind in a common act of love, gives explicit love to the race collectively, and implicit love to individual members of the race not mentioned (*e.g.*, enemies or strangers).

**1587.** For the fulfillment of the commandment of charity other acts of virtue are not enough. There must also be love. (a) Thus, as to charity towards God, our Lord declares that love of God is the great commandment on which the others depend, and St. Paul makes salvation depend on love: "If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema" (I Cor., xvi. 22). (b) As to charity towards the neighbor, the fulfillment of other commandments in his regard is inferior to the fulfillment of the commandment of fraternal love, and thus the commandments of justice to others are distinct from the commandment of love. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that we are not obliged to love our neighbor by a formal act of love (Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, n. 1160).

**1588.** For the fulfillment of the law of charity, external acts of love are not enough; there must also be internal love or affection.

(a) With regard to charity towards God, there can be no question of external charity through acts of beneficence, as is clear; but one is obliged to signify one's love of God, if silence would cause scandal or convey an expression of hatred of God. Mere lip-service, however, will not do, for God must be loved and served from the heart (Matt., xxii. 37; Eph., vi. 6; II Thess., iii. 5; etc.).

(b) With regard to charity towards the neighbor, external charity is commanded (see 1210 sqq. and 1551). But there must also be internal charity, for we are bidden to love our neighbor as we love ourselves (Matt., xxii. 39), as Christ loved us (John,

xv. 12), from the heart (I Pet., i. 22). If a man distributed his goods to feed the poor, not out of love, but out of vanity or other sinful motives, his act would not be an exercise of charity. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that we may satisfy through external acts alone the precept of loving our neighbor (Densinger, n. 1161).

1589. Must the internal act of love be explicit? (a) Love of God should be explicit, for the commandment of charity is that God be loved as the Last End, and the other commandments are to be observed as means to that End (see 1120, 1547). The Last End is that which is loved for its own sake, and hence distinctly, while the means are loved for the sake of the Last End. (b) Love of the neighbor is required to be explicit as regards all neighbors in general, when this is necessary for the preservation of charity towards God, or the fulfillment of obligations of charity towards man; it should be explicit as regards an individual, when this is necessary for the proper discharge of external works or other duties of charity, as when one will not be able to overcome a temptation to hatred unless one makes an act of charity which expressly includes the person one is tempted to hate. But one who loves his neighbor implicitly through an act of supernatural love of God, and neglects no external duty of charity towards others, is considered to have sufficiently complied with the law in ordinary circumstances.

1590. The Intention of Performing All Good Works out of Love for God.—(a) This intention is *actual*, when one expressly wills God as the Last End of one's actions. The commandment of loving God above all things does not require an actual reference of each good work to His love (see 1120, 85, 86).

(b) This intention is *virtual but explicit*, when previously a person had the actual intention and never retracted it, and now acts under the influence of that explicit and unretracted intention, though he does not advert to the Last End as he now acts. Thus, if an act of love of God above all things is made supernaturally by a Christian or naturally by a non-Christian, and later on by reason of the acts of love these persons give alms to the poor and do not think of God as they give the alms, their

works are not actually, but virtually and explicitly done for His love. The commandment of love of God, as we shall see (1593 sqq.), obliges one at certain times to elicit an act of love of God as the Last End, loved above all things else (in unbelievers it must be an act of natural benevolence, and in believers an act of supernatural charity); and, since such an act includes a consecration of one's works to God, the commandment requires likewise at certain times a virtual and explicit reference of good works to the love of God.

(c) The intention is *virtual and implicit*, when there is no previous act of love of God influencing a present act, but this act itself is good, tending from its character and object to the Last End, and it is precisely its character and object that cause it to be chosen by the agent. Thus, if an infidel, who has made no offering of his works to God, gives an alms out of love of mercy, or honors his parents out of love of piety, or pays his debts out of love of justice, he has explicit love for virtue and implicit love for the Author and End of virtue. The commandment of love of God, being affirmative, does not oblige one at all times to elicit acts of love of God as the Supreme Good, and hence, apart from the occasions when that affirmative commandment calls for exercise, a virtual and implicit intention of acting for the sake of God suffices to excuse from sin.

1591. Applications of the Preceding Paragraph.—(a) A Christian who makes acts of love of God at the necessary times fulfills the commandment of loving God with his whole heart and the precepts of doing all things for the glory of God (I Cor., x. 31), and in charity (I Cor., xvi. 14), and in the name of Christ (Col., iii. 17).

(b) An infidel invincibly ignorant of the supernatural law, who makes acts of natural benevolence with reference to God when he should, does not sin against the precept of charity, and observes the law of natural love.

(c) A person who in no way refers a deliberate act to love of God, natural or supernatural, sins in that act. His sin is venial, if the evil intended is small (e.g., an alms given purely out

of vainglory); it is mortal, if the evil is grave (*e.g.*, an alms given for the purpose of seduction into serious sin).

1592. It should not be inferred from what has been said on the qualities which charity must have, or the influence it must exercise, that the duty of love of God is only for the perfect, or that it is with difficulty accomplished. (a) On the contrary, charity is a universal obligation, for it is the first commandment (Matt., xxiii. 38), and he who does not love is accursed (I Cor., xvi. 22). (b) Neither is the commandment hard (I John, v. 3), for nature itself inclines one to love the Supreme Good, and grace helps one to remove the impediments to a love of friendship that will cling to God above all. The observance of the commandments indicates that one is guided habitually by love, while a devout recitation of the Lord's Prayer is an actual expression of that love; and hence conscientious persons should not worry lest they may have been wanting in God's love.

1593. With reference to the times when the precepts of charity oblige, we should distinguish three kinds of precepts: (a) the negative precepts forbid sins against charity (such as hatred, envy, scandal, etc.), and they oblige at all times; (b) the positive precepts of external beneficence oblige when occasion requires, as was said above (see 1210 sqq.); (c) the positive precepts of internal love oblige at certain special times, as will now be explained.

1594. The precept of love of God obliges directly—that is, by reason of the virtue of charity itself—at the following times: (a) at the beginning of the moral life, that is, of the use of reason; (b) during life; (c) at the close of life, or when one is about to die (Denzinger, nn. 1101, 1289).

1595. The Obligation of an Act of Love of God at the Beginning of the Moral Life.—(a) The *beginning of the moral life* here signifies the moment when a child arrives at a full use of reason, and is able to deliberate on things of grave importance, such as the duty of having a supreme purpose in life and of doing good and avoiding evil. This moment does not coincide necessarily with any fixed period of the child's age (*e.g.*, the seventh year),

but depends on the gradual development of the moral conscience, and may be earlier or later according to intelligence, surroundings, education, etc. (see 932).

(b) The *act of love of God* here signifies the turning to God as one's Last End, but it may be made either formally or virtually, according to the knowledge had. A formal act of love of God is made, when one has explicit knowledge, either through faith or through natural reason, concerning God as the Supreme Good and Last End, and when one loves Him as such. A virtual act of love of God consists in a resolution to direct one's life according to reason, or in a love of the goodness of virtue; for in such an act there is implied a love of the Author and End of moral good. The faithful who cannot remember having made this first act of charity when they came to the use of reason, should not disturb themselves at this, for the commandment was fulfilled by any service they freely offered to God.

(c) The *reason* for requiring an act of love at the beginning of the moral life is, that in that moment one has the choice placed before one of good or evil, and that faith, hope and charity, being fundamental precepts, should precede the other virtues of the law.

1596. Ignorance as Excusing from the Act of Love of God.—

(a) Ignorance of God as the Author of the supernatural order excuses from the precept of supernatural love or charity, if it is invincible ignorance. Thus, a pagan who knows nothing of revelation does not sin by omitting an act of charity towards God.

(b) Ignorance of God as the Author of the order of nature does not excuse from a natural act of benevolence towards God, if the person in ignorance, though an infidel, has sufficient use of reason, for ignorance of God is then inexcusable (Rom., i. 20).

1597. The Obligation of the Act of Love of God throughout Life.—(a) The existence of an obligation to make frequent acts of love of God during life is a consequence of the preponderant part played by charity among the virtues (see 1115 sqq.), for how is one to regulate one's life according to the virtues, if one does not frequently renew that virtue which is the inspiration and direction of all the others? The Old Testament requires

that one have the commandment of love of God frequently in one's thoughts (Deut., vi. 5-7), and in the New Testament it is called the commandment on which all the others depend (Matt., xxii. 37-40). The Church has condemned propositions that made infrequent performance of the act of love—such as once in a lifetime, once in five years—sufficient (Denzinger, nn. 1155-1157).

(b) The details of this obligation—that is, the frequency with which and the times at which the act of love of God must be made under pain of grave sin—is a matter of dispute among authorities. Some think once in three years sufficient; others, guided perhaps by the analogy of the precept of yearly Communion, regard once a year as sufficient; others, with St. Alphonsus, hold for once a month, basing their opinion on the difficulty of overcoming temptations if acts of love of God are omitted for more than a month; others, with Scotus, think the act of love of God should be made once a week, for, since the Sundays are set aside for the worship of God, the Church seems to have thereby determined with regard to the act of divine charity that which the law of God had left undetermined; finally, some teach that an act of love of God must be made daily, arguing that Christ commanded the Lord's Prayer to be said daily, and that its first petitions contain formal acts of love of God.

1598. None of the opposed opinions just given can be considered as demonstrated and theoretically certain. But in actual life this offers no difficulty, and the following are accepted as practical rules that may be acted on:

(a) Those who live habitually in the state of grace may be regarded as having fulfilled sufficiently the commandment of love of God, for "if any man love Me, he will keep My word" (John, xiv. 23).

(b) Those who live habitually in an occasion of sin or in sin itself, no doubt neglect the commandment of love of God; but it is not necessary that they accuse themselves of the omission to their confessor, since it is understood in the mention of the occasion of sin or bad habit. The confessor, however, ought to admonish careless penitents about the obligation of love of God.

of recitation of the Our Father, etc. Mortal sin revokes the direction of one's works towards God, and, though one is not obliged to renew that direction immediately after repentance, a delay beyond four or five months according to some authors would be notable.

1599. Obligation of the Act of Love of God at the Close of Life.—The duty of making an act of love of God when one is at the point of death is admitted by all for the following cases:

(a) the dying person is directly obliged to make an act of love of God when this is the only way in which he can secure justification, as when he is not in the state of grace and cannot receive the Sacraments; (b) the dying person is indirectly obliged to make an act of love of God when otherwise he cannot securely struggle against temptations to despair, doubt, etc.

1600. The duty of making an act of love of God at the time when death is near is considered as doubtful by some authorities when the following points are morally certain: (a) when the dying person has already sufficiently complied with the duty of making an act of love (*e.g.*, when he made such an act just before he fell into danger of death), or is now in the state of grace (*e.g.*, when he has received absolution with attrition just before or after the danger); and *also* (b) when the dying person will not expose himself on account of omission of the act of charity to the violation of any serious commandment.

1601. In practice, the priest who is attending the dying person should act as follows:

(a) He should remind the dying person of the obligation, if it appears certain, and should suggest to him the motives and assist him in pronouncing the form. In many manuals of the Ritual exhortations and aspirations suitable for this purpose are given.

(b) The priest should recommend the act of love of God, even though the obligation does not appear certain, if no harm will result from his doing so. For this will better prepare the dying person for entrance into eternity.

(c) He should not speak of the act of love of God, if the obligation is uncertain and harm would result from his doing

so (*e.g.*, if the dying person is in good faith, and would be much disturbed if told about the act of love to be made).

1602. Thus far we have spoken of the obligation which the precept of love of God imposes directly, or by reason of charity itself. There is also an obligation that is indirect, or by reason of some virtue or commandment distinct from charity.

(a) Thus, by reason of a virtue distinct from charity, one is bound to make an act of love of God, if this act is the only means of avoiding sin against that virtue. Example: Titus suffers severe temptations to injustice, and finds that only the love of God keeps him from injustice. In temptation, therefore, he should make an act of love of God.

(b) By reason of a commandment distinct from that of charity, one is bound to make an act of love of God, if otherwise one cannot fulfill rightly the commandment in question. Thus, if a person has to receive or administer a Sacrament of the living, or solemnly to administer a Sacrament, when he is not in the state of grace and has not the opportunity of receiving absolution, he is obliged to make an act of perfect contrition, which includes an act of love of God.

1603. An implicit love of neighbor is contained in every true act of love of God (see 1549, 1586). But in some cases love of neighbor must be explicit (see 1589).

(a) Thus, one is bound to explicit love directly (or by reason of charity itself), when the law of charity requires this. *Per accidens*, charity requires an internal act of love, when without this act some good commanded by charity (*e.g.*, reconciliation with an enemy, alms to one in distress) will not be done, or some evil forbidden by charity (*e.g.*, hatred, revenge) will not be overcome. *Per se*, it does not seem that charity requires explicit acts of love towards the neighbor, but only those implicit acts contained in the love of God; in practice, however, conscientious persons frequently make explicit acts of fraternal charity, as when they pray for the living and the dead, or say the Our Father with due attention and devotion.

(b) One is bound to explicit love indirectly (or by reason of some other virtue than charity), when apart from such ex-

PLICIT love that other virtue cannot be exercised as commanded. Example: Balbus is often tempted to defraud Caius, and does not resist the temptation successfully, unless he puts himself into a charitable disposition towards Caius.

1604. The Necessity of Charity.—(a) The *habit* of charity is necessary as a means (see 360, 785) for all persons, infants included, so that without it no one can be saved. For it is only with this virtue that one possesses the divine indwelling (I John, iv. 16), and is made a friend of God. Those who have not the wedding garment of charity are cast into the outer darkness (Matt., xxii. 13).

(b) The *act* of charity is also necessary as a means of salvation to all adults, for it is only by actual charity that they turn towards their Last End, and without actual charity they are in death (I John, iii. 14). A person who is justified through attrition joined with a Sacrament receives grace and the habit of charity, and by his voluntary acceptance he consents to the divine friendship and thus makes an act of charity.

(c) The act of charity is obligatory under *grave precept* at the beginning of the moral life, frequently during life, and at the hour of death (see 1594 sqq.).

1605. Is it possible that a sin against the love of God be only venial? (a) The imperfection of the act makes such a sin only venial, as when without full deliberation one wishes to omit an obligatory act of love. (b) The slightness of the matter makes such a sin venial, when it is aside from, but not contrary to, the love of God, as when one makes an act of love of God with culpable lukewarmness. Venial sin is not, strictly speaking, opposed to the commandment of love, since it does not destroy love.

1606. As the order of charity is commanded as a part of the law of charity, one is obliged not only to love those to whom love is commanded, but also to give greater love to those to whom greater love is due.

(a) God must be loved above all creatures, since He is to be loved with the whole heart (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., x. 37).

(b) Self must be loved more than the neighbor, for love of

neighbor is commanded only as like to that of self (Matt., xiii. 39).

(c) One should love one's neighbor more than one's own body, since we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren (I John, iii. 16). The claims of self and of the neighbor to love are in the following order: the spiritual goods of self, the spiritual goods of the neighbor, the bodily goods of self, the bodily goods of the neighbor, the external goods of self, the external goods of the neighbor.

(d) Among neighbors, those who are better or more nearly related to self should be given the preference in love; for we should do good to all, but especially to those who are of the household of the faith (Gal., vi. 10), and those persons are specially blamed who have no care for their own and for those of their own house (I Tim., v. 8). The claims of neighbors on our help (as was explained in 1176 sqq.) rank in the following order: wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters, other relatives, friends, domestics, citizens of the same town, state, and country, and, finally, all others.

1607. The order of charity is commanded, because it is a mode intrinsic to the performance of the act of charity (see 1554); it is a circumstance without which the act of love is not in proportion to the person to whom it is shown. Thus, love given to God is not in proportion to His lovableness, if it is exceeded by the love given to a creature; love given to the members of one's family is not in proportion to their claims, if it is less than the love given to strangers.

(a) Hence, outside cases of a neighbor's need, the law of charity requires that one give him the amount of internal love that corresponds with the external charity due to him. Thus, love for a father should be in proportion to the external honor one is bound to show one's parent; love for a brother in proportion to the external marks of friendship that are due a brother.

He who has no filial love for his parents, or fraternal love for his brethren, does not fulfill the law of charity.

(b) In cases of a neighbor's need, the law of charity requires

that the internal love be in proportion to the external charitable assistance one should give. Thus, if a parent and a stranger are in equal necessity, more help and more love are due the parent; but if a stranger is in need, and a parent is not in need, more help and more corresponding love, as to that particular case, are due the stranger.

1608. It should be noted, however, that there is a twofold love of the neighbor.

(a) Obligatory love is that which is commanded, and which is due another as a debt, such as love for God, for a parent, for all neighbors in general, etc. The amount of love for fellow-creatures that is obligatory is, of course, not infinite, for no creature is infinitely lovable; neither is it mathematically fixed, for, as said above, it may be greater or less according to circumstances; but it is comparative or relative—that is, it should agree with the higher or lower claim to external charity that a neighbor has on one.

(b) Optional love, or love of supererogation, is that which is not commanded, but which may be given lawfully, such as special friendship outside a case of need for an enemy or stranger. As there is no precept regarding this kind of love, neither is there any precept regarding the order of love as between those to whom it is given, and one may invert the order that is obligatory as regards commanded love. Thus, if a brother and a cousin are both well-to-do, and one has property to bequeath to which neither of them has any right, it is not against charity to leave more to the cousin and less to the brother, or some to the cousin and none to the brother. This supposes, however, that in the matter of obligatory love the preference in order of charity has been shown the brother (as explained in 1158–1182).

#### Art. 11: THE GIFT OF WISDOM

(*Summa Theologica*, II—II, qq. 45, 46.)

1609. Wisdom is the Gift of the Holy Ghost which corresponds with and serves the virtue of charity (see 159 sqq.,

808 sqq., 1041 sqq.), and hence it is discussed in this place. The following points concerning Wisdom will be treated: (a) the Nature of the Gift of Wisdom; (b) the Persons who Possess the Gift of Wisdom; (c) the Beatitude of the Peacemakers, which pertains especially to Wisdom; (d) the Sin of Foolishness, which is opposed to Wisdom.

So far is it from being improper to give some space in Moral Theology to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost (as if they pertained only to higher mysticism), that it is even necessary to emphasize them. The Gifts are essential to salvation, and play a most important part in the daily spiritual life, whether in correcting or reinforcing the virtues, or in giving immediate direction from the Holy Spirit. Man, it is true, does not set them into action, but it is man's part to value them, to hold himself in readiness for them, and to hearken to their whispered enlightenment and counsel. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are the very soul of Theology and of the Christian life.

**1610. The Nature of the Gift of Wisdom.**—Wisdom is defined as “a habit for judging things in the light of their First Cause, the Supreme Good, which is infused into the soul along with sanctifying grace.”

(a) Wisdom is a *habit*, and so it differs from passing acts. Thus, a man in the state of sin who avoids idolatry, judges in the light of the highest cause that worship is not to be given to creatures; but he lacks the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, and therefore does not judge in virtue of that special instinct or power which originates from the abiding presence of the Holy Ghost.

(b) Wisdom *judges*, and this sets it apart from habits that belong to the will (*e.g.*, the Gifts of Piety, Fortitude, and Fear), as well as from habits whose chief act is assent (*e.g.*, the virtue of Faith) or penetration (*e.g.*, the Gift of Understanding).

(c) The standard by which Wisdom judges things is the *First Cause of all*, or the Supreme Good, as when our Lord explained that the condition of the man born blind was due to the purpose of God to be glorified through that blindness (John, ix. 3). The wise man is he who goes back to first principles, to the origins

of things, to ultimate purposes; but it is not every wisdom that estimates things according to the Supreme Good, and there is a false wisdom (see 1623) whose canon of excellence is the imperfect good opposed to Supreme Good. The Gift of Wisdom, therefore, is distinct from sinful wisdom, which understands evil (Jer., iv. 22); from particular wisdom, which understands well the theory and practice of some science, art, or profession, and is able therefore to decide correctly and to arrange successfully such matters as fall under a special kind of activity, as in medicine or architecture or strategy (I Cor., iii. 10).

(d) The *things* that make up the object of Wisdom are, in the first place, divine things (*e.g.*, the attributes, plans, government, operations of God); and, in the second place, created things, whether in the speculative order (*e.g.*, mind and matter, good and evil, science, religion, history), or in the practical order (*i.e.*, human actions). Wisdom contemplates the divine order as known from faith or the beatific vision, and then, with the things of God as its rule, it judges the things of earth and directs the conduct of men: “The spiritual man judgeth *all things*” (I Cor., ii. 15). Thus does Wisdom differ from the Gifts of Knowledge and of Counsel; for Knowledge is concerned directly with secondary causes and rises from the creature to the Creator, while Counsel is not a speculative but a practical Gift, and is a response to direction given by the Holy Spirit for the guidance of conduct.

(e) The Gift of Wisdom is an *infused* perfection of the intellect, “a wisdom descending from on high” (James, iii. 15). Hence, while it resembles the virtue of Wisdom, which also judges human and divine things through first causes (see 145), it differs from that virtue, even with reference to the same objects, on account of its different way of approach. Theology and philosophy judge correctly because they employ study and the investigation of reason; but the Gift of Wisdom has a right judgment because it depends, not on analysis or argumentation, but on a supernatural knowledge had through faith (or vision in case of the blessed) and a supernatural experience of God through charity. Wisdom may express itself, indeed, in the



concepts and language of philosophy or theology, but it is not through scientific processes that it knows and judges.

(f) The Gift of Wisdom is infused into the soul *along with sanctifying grace*; for, like the other Gifts of the Holy Ghost, it is intended to supplement through the action of the Holy Spirit the control exercised by grace, which is imperfect on account of the limitations of the virtues. The Gift of Wisdom, therefore, is an ordinary and normal fact in the spiritual life, and must not be confused with rare and extraordinary phenomena—with the “word of wisdom” (I Cor., xii. 8), which was granted to the Apostles and at times to other preachers of the faith, nor with the clear contemplation of God bestowed in the state of innocence, nor with the infused knowledge or light of glory enjoyed by Christ and some of the Saints while on earth. Thus, while all who are in the state of grace possess the Gift of Wisdom, comparatively only a few have received the “word of wisdom”—that is, the ability to instruct others in the higher mysteries of faith and to explain to them with ease and in suitable language the meaning of these mysteries and their relation to supreme causes. Both these graces are supernatural, but, while the Gift of Wisdom is needed by each individual for his own sanctification, the word of wisdom is needed only in certain cases for the sanctification of others.

1611. From the foregoing definition it is seen that Wisdom belongs both to the will and to the intellect.

(a) In its *cause*, Wisdom belongs to the will. The cause of right judgment by means of divine things is either the suitability of the intellect, which knows well how to judge, or the suitability of the will, which is inclined towards divine things. Thus, he who is well versed in moral science will give a correct decision about a case of chastity as it falls under the inquiry of reason, and he who is chaste will judge correctly about the same case, even without moral science, but from the sympathy he has for the virtue. The intellectual virtue of Wisdom, then, judges aright because the intellect is sound in its procedures; but the Gift of Wisdom is right in its judgments, because the will has been united to God through charity, so that there has resulted

in one a suitability for judging about the things of God: “Give me one who loves, and he will understand what I say” (Augustine, *Tract. xxvi. in Joan.*).

(b) In its *essence*, Wisdom belongs to the intellect, for it consists in judgment, and this is an act that is exercised, not by the affections, but by the reason. Through love the soul becomes one spirit with God (I Cor., vi. 17), and the will experiences the sweetness of this union (Ps. xxxiii. 9); the intellect then judges concerning the divine which has been the object of its mystical communion. The Gift of Wisdom, built as it is on faith and charity; differs utterly from private interpretation of revelation (which is subversive of faith) and from the Modernistic experience of the divine (which is explained as a natural intuition had by a special religious sense of a reality that is divine and yet only subjective and unknowable).

1612. From the definition and explanation of the Gift of Wisdom it also follows that this Gift is practical as well as speculative.

(a) Primarily, Wisdom is *speculative*, for one must consider divine things in themselves before one applies them to other things; and, moreover, the object of Wisdom is God, who is the first truth in the order of knowledge or speculation. It is by Wisdom, then, as well as by the other intellectual Gifts or extraordinary graces, that the act of supernatural contemplation is exercised; but Wisdom, more perfect than the other Gifts, ascends at once to things that are heavenly, divine and eternal, and thinks of God as transcending in perfection every known or knowable degree of created excellence, and as being most true, most beautiful, most lovable (Eph., iii. 17–19).

(b) Secondly, Wisdom is *practical*, for God whom it contemplates is the supreme rule of action, as well as the first truth. Thus does the higher Gift of Wisdom unite in itself what are found separate in lower virtues—the speculative quality of the virtue of Wisdom and the practical quality of Prudence (see 1620).

1613. The practical uses of the Gift of Wisdom are indicated in Coloss., iii. 16–17, iv. 6: “Let the word of Christ dwell in you

abundantly, in all Wisdom, teaching and admonishing one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles, singing in grace in your hearts to God. All whatsoever you do in word or in work, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ. . . . Walk with Wisdom towards them that are without, redeeming the time. Let your speech be always with grace, seasoned with salt."

(a) The contemplation of divine things is useful for instruction in the truths of faith and the duties of religion ("teaching and admonishing one another"); for the mind becomes in a way divine, like the things on which it dwells, filled with knowledge of God and of Christ and of the means of holiness.

(b) Wisdom helps one to fulfill the duty of praying to God with reverence and interior devotion ("singing in your hearts to God"); for Wisdom makes one perceive and feel the sweetness and attraction of the things of God.

(c) It directs one in both words and works ("do all in the name of Christ"); for the intellect which judges things in the light of eternity and with the fervor of divine charity will not mislead in matters of salvation.

(d) It enables one to profit by opportunities of edification ("redeeming the time"); for the example of a life directed by tender love of God and by kindness and courtesy to all is a recommendation of virtue and religion in the sight of the world.

**1614.** Wisdom is a Gift of the Holy Ghost, and is numbered with the other six communications of the Spirit: "And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of Wisdom, etc." (Is., xi. 2).

(a) *Likeness to the Other Gifts.*—The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are energies diffused in the powers of the soul as instruments of the supernatural governance of the indwelling Spirit, just as the moral virtues are the instruments of the natural governance of reason. The infused virtues (*e.g.*, faith or charity), unlike the acquired virtues (*e.g.*, temperance or fortitude), do not suffice for the government of the soul; for, while these latter are according to nature, the former surpass nature, and are received by it imperfectly. Hence the need of the Gifts, which on earth supplement the infused virtues, strengthening

them against contrary vices, developing secondary acts of the virtues which the virtues only initiate, and in heaven perfecting the blessed in good.

(b) *Unlikeness to the Other Gifts.*—Wisdom, which is enumerated by Isaias in the first place, is also given the highest rank among the Gifts by theologians, on account of its greater elevation, more universal scope, and the directive power it exercises. Fittingly, then, is Wisdom assigned as the Gift that serves Charity, the queen of the virtues: Charity loves God above all things; Wisdom dwells with delight upon the object of this love (Wis., viii. 16), looks upon life with the eyes of love, and in directing its human actions communicates to them something of the savor and sweetness of divine charity.

**1615. The Persons Who Possess Wisdom.**—The Gift of Wisdom, as said above (see 1610), is given with sanctifying grace, and hence only those and all those who are in God's friendship have this supernatural endowment.

(a) Only those in the state of grace have divine Wisdom, for without love of God it is impossible to have that right judgment of things that is consequent on the relish for and connaturality with divine things. Hence, it is said: "Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins" (Wis., i. 4).

(b) All those who are in the state of grace have the Gift of Wisdom, for man is so weak and the supernatural virtues are so far above him that, even when he has received these virtues, he is unable to make proper use of them or to preserve them in time of temptation, unless he has received the supplementary forces that will enable him to obey more easily and promptly the voice and impulse of the Holy Ghost. Thus, Charity destines man to beatitude, but, unless he has Wisdom to value this virtue and privilege, to spurn the false wisdom of the world, to think on the love of God with delight and to make it the norm of his judgments and decisions, he will not progress in Charity, nor retain it, nor arrive at the beatitude to which it destines him.

**1616.** Though all who are in the state of grace possess all the

Gifts of the Holy Ghost, these Gifts are not had in the same way by all their possessors. Thus, the following points should be noted with reference to the Gift of Wisdom:

(a) The Gifts, like the infused virtues, are possessed *habitually* by baptized children and insane persons, and *actually* by adults. Just as infants have the possession but not the use of certain natural gifts (such as reason and responsibility), so likewise supernatural life and powers are granted them through baptismal regeneration, but the exercise of this life and of these powers is prevented by their inability to realize what they possess and to make use of it. The lack of bodily development, which impedes the use of natural reason, also impedes the use of supernatural Wisdom.

(b) The Gift of Wisdom is had *in itself* by all who are in the state of grace; but *in its extension*, which is the "word of Wisdom," it is possessed only by highly gifted souls who have a special mission from God (see above, 1610 sqq.). With sanctifying grace, each one receives the supernatural Gift of judging rightly about heavenly things and of regulating his conduct by them in so far as is necessary for the attainment of salvation; otherwise, we should have to say that grace is inferior to nature, and does not provide what is necessary for its end. But the ability to explain heavenly things so as to draw others to the truth, and to apply heavenly doctrines to the guidance of others so as to lead them to good, is one of the gifts freely given, which the Spirit divides according as He wills (I Cor., xii. 11): "To one by the Spirit is given the word of Wisdom, to another the word of Knowledge, etc." (*ibid.*, 8).

1617. The Gift of Wisdom in itself (*i.e.*, as intended directly for the benefit of the recipient and not for the benefit of others) is also had in varying degrees. (a) Thus, different persons do not possess this Gift in equal measure; for to some is granted the contemplation of loftier mysteries not granted to others, and suprahuman Wisdom plays a greater part in the direction of some lives than in that of others. (b) The same persons do not possess Wisdom in an equal degree at all times. Thus, in Baptism all the Seven Gifts are received, but in Confirmation they

are in some way perfected, either in themselves by a greater refinement or sensibility to the action of the Holy Spirit, or as regards their possession by their subject through a firmer hold of them.

1618. The Exercise of the Gift of Wisdom.—(a) The *external magisterium* (*i.e.*, revelation and the teaching Church) conveys the truths of faith to the mind of the believer. (b) The internal Teacher, the Holy Ghost, illuminates the soul with Wisdom, so that it ponders on the first principles of faith and makes the love of them control its judgments, words, and actions: "You have the unction from the Holy One and know all things" (I John, ii. 20), that is, all that is needed for salvation.

1619. The Beatitude and the Fruits that Correspond to Wisdom.—The Gifts of the Holy Ghost, by supplying for what is imperfect in the habits of virtue (*e.g.*, by protecting faith against dullness of perception, hope against presumption, charity against distaste for divine things), give to these virtues a perfection like to that which they will have in the state of beatitude, and to their exercise a corresponding enjoyment. Hence, to the Gifts, which are most excellent habits, correspond those most perfect or most delightful acts of virtue known as Beatitudes and Fruits (see 159 sqq.).

(a) There appears a special correspondence of the seventh beatitude ("Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of God," Matt., v. 9) with Wisdom, both as regards their merit, and as regards their reward. The work of Wisdom is to reduce all things to unity, to see life and the world as a whole, to look upon creatures as parts of one great divine plan. Similarly, the work of the peacemakers is to put an end to dissension and division and to reconcile the warring powers of the soul, or to introduce harmony between those that are at enmity: "The Wisdom that is from above is peaceable" (James, iii. 17). Again, the reward promised the peacemakers is that they shall be called the sons of God, and of Wisdom it may be said that it makes one the image of the Son of God, who is Eternal Wisdom.

(b) The Fruits of the Holy Ghost that are assigned to Wis-

dom are, with regard to God: *charity*, or a tender love of God ("The charity of God is poured out in our hearts," Rom., v. 5.), *joy*, or delight at union with God ("Rejoice in the Lord always," Phillip., iv. 4), *peace*, or security in the enjoyment of God ("There is much peace to them that love Thy law," Ps. cxviii. 165). The Fruits that have reference to the love of neighbor are: *goodness*, or an internal benevolence characterized by sweetness ("The fruit of the light is in all goodness," Eph., v. 9), and *kindness*, or a beneficence accompanied by cheerfulness ("The Lord loves the cheerful giver," II Cor., ix. 7).

1620. St. James (iii. 17, 18) describes the direction which Wisdom gives to human actions (see 1612, 1613) and the fruit of peace to which it conducts them, as follows: "The Wisdom that is from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable; modest, easy to be persuaded; consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, without judging, without dissimulation. And the fruit of justice is sown in peace to them that make peace."

(a) Thus, first, Wisdom directs one to be free from sin ("chaste"), for the fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom (Ps. cx. 110).

(b) Next, Wisdom directs one to work for peace within one's own soul, by following moderation where one can decide for oneself ("modest"), by seeking advice where one is in doubt ("easy to be persuaded").

(c) Further, Wisdom directs one to be peaceful towards others, to be well disposed towards their good or benefit ("consenting to the good"), compassionate and helpful in their distress ("full of mercy and good fruits"), not partial or hypocritical in criticizing their defects ("without judging, without dissimulation").

(d) Finally, Wisdom, having sown in peace, reaps the peace of righteousness. False wisdom leads to wrangling and disorder, true Wisdom to concord and harmony.

1621. **The Sins Opposed to Wisdom.**—Just as blindness and dullness—that is, the want of all or of sufficient perceptiveness in spiritual things—are opposed to the Gift of Understanding

(see 912), so stupidity and foolishness—that is, the want of all or of sufficient good judgment about spiritual things—are opposed to the Gift of Wisdom.

1622. Foolishness is defined as "a slowness and darkness of mind that is due to some moral defect, and that makes it difficult for one to judge rightly about the Last End of things and the Chief Good."

(a) Foolishness is slow and darksome, and thus the contrary of Wisdom, which is alert and discerning.

(b) It is a defect of judgment, and so differs from the sins of blindness and dullness of heart.

(c) It is an error of judgment about the chief concern of life and the things of greatest value, and thus it is different from the innocent simplicity of many good persons, whose judgment is not sound in affairs of this world.

(d) It is brought on by moral fault, and is therefore not to be identified with invincible ignorance, which is a physical imperfection caused by nature, as in the weak-minded and the insane.

1623. Just as true Wisdom seems foolishness to the world, so does true foolishness seem wisdom to the world (I Cor., iii. 18 sqq.). There is a counterfeit wisdom, which places its last end in some created good, and which is therefore foolishness before God. St. James (iii. 15) describes false wisdom as "earthly, sensual, devilish"; and these words express very well three chief classes of worldly wisdom. (a) Some of the worldly-wise aim above all things at amassing and increasing wealth or other external possessions (earthly wisdom). (b) Others seek chiefly pleasure, health, comfort, or other bodily goods (animal wisdom). (c) Others imitating Lucifer, who is king over all the sons of pride (Job, xli. 25), devote their whole lives solely to the pursuit of inordinate excellence of some kind—that is, of selfish domination or honors or glory, etc. (devilish wisdom).

1624. The foolishness we are now considering is sinful, for it is a voluntary choice of evil, a violation of commandments, and the ruination of man. In Scripture the term "fool" is applied to the wicked, the impious, the objects of divine anger

(Ps. xiii. 1), and hence it was that our Lord declared severe penalty against those who call another a fool (Matt., v. 22).

(a) Foolishness is a voluntary choice of evil, for it consists in a turning away from spiritual things or an entire absorption in the things of this world, with the result that one becomes unfitted to judge aright concerning the values of human existence: "The animal man does not perceive the things of the Spirit of God" (I Cor., ii. 14). But the fact that his taste is perverted, and that he has no relish for the spiritual, is due to his own deliberate rejection of good and the cultivation of evil.

(b) Foolishness is a violation of commandments about the knowledge and employment of truth (see 914 sqq.): "See how you walk, not as unwise, but as wise" (Eph., v. 15, 16).

(c) Foolishness leads to perdition, for, being defective in its judgment, it barter away the future for present satisfaction and sells its birthright for a mess of pottage: "The prosperity of fools destroys them" (Prov., i. 32); "Thou fool this night shall thy soul be required of thee" (Luke, xii. 20).

1625. The causes of the sin of foolishness, as was said above (see 1623), are the wrong and sinful views taken of life, which make men judge all things by the standards of gain or pleasure or power, rather than by the standard of the First Cause, in comparison with whom all these lower goods are but trivial. But, among all the vices that lead mankind astray from Wisdom, the preëminence is held by lust, for its attraction is greater and its hold on the soul more complete. As chastity especially disposes for heavenly contemplation and Wisdom (see 912) by the refinement and elevation and spirituality it gives the mind, so does sensuality especially indispose for these goods by the coarseness and degradation and materialism that follow in its wake.

## APPENDIX I

### SUMMARY OF COMMON LAW ON PROHIBITION OF BOOKS

(Holy Office, 17 Apr., 1943)

Seeing that delays and omissions in denouncing the books frequently occur, and that many of the faithful are in a state of deplorable ignorance regarding the denunciation and prohibition of harmful books, the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office deems it appropriate to call to mind the principal provisions of the sacred canons on this subject; for it is beyond doubt that bad or harmful writings expose purity of faith, integrity of morals, and the very salvation of souls to the greatest dangers.

Certainly the Holy See cannot by itself, with adequate care and in due time, prohibit the numberless writings against faith and morals which, especially in our time, are being published almost daily in various languages all over the world. Hence it is necessary that the Ordinaries of places, whose business it is to preserve sound and orthodox doctrine and to protect good morals (C. 343, §1), should, either personally or through suitable priests, be watchful as to the books which are published or sold in their territory (C. 1397, §4), and forbid to their subjects those which they judge should be condemned (C. 1395, §1). The right and duty to forbid books for just cause belongs also to an Abbot of an independent monastery and to the Superior General of a clerical exempt Institute acting with his Chapter or Council; nay, in case of urgency, it belongs also to the other Major Superiors with their proper Council, it being understood, however, that these must as soon as possible report the matter to the Su-

perior General (C. 1395, §3). Nevertheless, books which require a more expert scrutiny, or in regard to which, for salutary results, the judgment of the supreme authority seems to be required, should be referred by the Ordinaries to the judgment of the Holy See (C. 1397, §5).

It is, of course, the duty of all the faithful, and especially of clerics, to denounce pernicious books to the proper authority; but this duty is especially incumbent on clerics who have some ecclesiastical dignity, such as the Legates of the Holy See and the Ordinaries of places, and on those who are eminent in doctrine, as for example the Rectors and Professors of Catholic Universities.

The denunciation is to be made either to this Congregation of the Holy Office or to the Ordinary of the place, giving by all means the reason why it is thought the book should be forbidden. The persons to whom such a report is made have a strict duty to keep secret the names of those who make it (C. 1397, §1,2,3).

Finally, Ordinaries of places and others who have the care of souls should duly inform the faithful of the following:

a) The prohibition of books has the effect that, unless due permission is obtained, the forbidden book may not be published, nor republished (without making the corrections and obtaining due approbation), nor read, nor retained, nor sold, nor translated into another language, nor in any way communicated to other persons (C. 1398, §1,2);

b) Books condemned by the Holy See are considered as forbidden everywhere and in whatever language they may be translated (C. 1396);

c) The positive ecclesiastical law forbids not only those books which are individually condemned by a special decree of the Holy See and placed on the *Index of Forbidden Books*, or which are proscribed by particular Councils or Ordinaries for their subjects, but also the books which are forbidden *by the common law itself*, that is, in virtue of the rules contained in Canon 1399, which forbids in a general manner nearly all books which are bad and harmful in themselves;

d) The natural law forbids the reading of any book which occasions proximate spiritual danger, since it forbids anyone to place himself in danger of losing the true faith or good morals; accordingly, permission to use forbidden books, from whomsoever it be obtained, in no way exempts from this prohibition of the natural law (C. 1405, §1).

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## APPENDIX II

### The "Ecumenical Movement"

On December 20, 1949 the Holy Office issued an instruction on the "Ecumenical Movement" addressed to all local Ordinaries. In its prefatory remarks the Instruction insisted upon the Church's intense interest to attain to the full and perfect unity of the Church. It noted as an occasion of joy the desire of many separated from the Church to return to the unity of Christ's fold, a good intention, indeed, which, however, in being put into practice has not been regulated by right principles. Accordingly the Holy Office prescribed that local Ordinaries maintain due vigilance over the associations seeking Church Unity, that they designate well-qualified priests to pay close attention to everything which concerns the "Movement," and that they supervise publications on this matter by Catholics or by non-Catholics. In as far as these are published, or read, or sold by Catholics, the manner and method of proceeding in this work is to be regulated by the Ordinaries, who are cautioned to prevent the growth of indifference to Catholic truth and fallacious hopes of unity based upon false or impossible foundations. With regard to mixed assemblies of Catholics and non-Catholics, when there seems to be hope of spreading knowledge of Catholic doctrine, the Ordinary is instructed to designate well-qualified priests, to explain and defend the Church's teaching. Special permission, however, must be obtained from Ecclesiastical Authority if Catholic laymen are to attend. Where no hope of good results exists, the meetings are to be ended or gradually suppressed. The following specific instructions are given for the conduct of "Ecumenical meetings."

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All the aforesaid conferences and meetings, public and non-public, large and small, which are called for the purpose of affording an opportunity for the Catholic and the non-Catholic party, for the sake of discussion, to treat of matters of faith and morals, each presenting on even terms the doctrine of his own faith, are subject to the prescriptions of the Church which were recalled to mind in the *Monitum*, "*Cum compertum*" of this Congregation under date of 5 June, 1948. Hence, mixed congresses are not absolutely forbidden; but they are not to be held without the previous permission of the competent Ecclesiastical Authority. The *Monitum*, however, does not apply to catechetical instructions, even when given to many together, nor to conferences in which Catholic doctrine is explained to non-Catholics who are prospective converts, even though the opportunity is afforded for the non-Catholics to explain also the doctrine of their church so that they may understand clearly and thoroughly in what respect it agrees with the Catholic doctrine and in what it differs therefrom.

Neither does the said *Monitum* apply to those mixed meetings of Catholics and non-Catholics in which the discussion does not turn upon faith and morals, but upon ways and means of defending the fundamental principles of the natural law or of the Christian religion against the enemies of God who are now leagued together, or where the question is how to restore social order, or other topics of that nature. Even in these meetings, as is evident, Catholics may not approve or concede anything which is in conflict with divine revelation or with the doctrine of the Church even on social questions.

As to *local* conferences and conventions which are within the scope of the *Monitum* as above explained, the Ordinaries of places are given, for three years from the publication of this Instruction, the faculty of granting the required previous permission of the Holy See on the following conditions:

1. That *communicatio* in sacris be entirely avoided;
2. That the presentations of the matter be duly inspected and directed;
3. That at the close of each year a report be made to this Su-

preme Sacred Congregation, stating where such meetings were held and what experience was gathered from them.

4. As regards the *colloquies of theologians* above mentioned, the same faculty for the same length of time is granted to the Ordinary of the place where such colloquies are held, or to the Ordinary delegated for this work by the common consent of the other Ordinaries, under the same conditions as above, but with the further requirement that the report to this Sacred Congregation state also what questions were treated, who were present, and who the speakers were for either side.

As for the *interdiocesan conferences and congresses, either national or international*, the previous permission of the Holy See, special for each case, is always required; and, in the petition asking for it, must also be stated what are the questions to be treated and who the speakers are to be. And it is not allowed, before this permission has been obtained, to begin the external preparation of such meetings or to collaborate with non-Catholics who begin such preparation.

5. Although in all these meetings and conferences any communication whatsoever in worship must be avoided, yet the recitation in common of the Lord's Prayer or of some prayer approved by the Catholic Church, is not forbidden for opening or closing the said meetings.

6. Although each Ordinary has the right and duty to conduct, promote, and preside over this work in his own diocese, yet the cooperation of several Bishops will be appropriate or even necessary in establishing offices and works to observe, study, and control this work as a whole. Accordingly it will rest with the Ordinaries themselves to confer together and consider how a proper uniformity of action and coordination can be obtained.

7. Religious Superiors are bound to watch and to see to it that their subjects adhere strictly and faithfully to the prescriptions laid down by the Holy See or by the local Ordinaries in this matter.

In order that so noble a work as the "union" of all Christians in one true faith and Church may daily grow into a more conspicuous part of the entire care of souls, and that the whole

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Catholic people may more earnestly implore this "union" from Almighty God, it will certainly be of assistance that in some appropriate way, for example through Pastoral Letters, the faithful be instructed regarding these questions and projects, the prescriptions of the Church in the matter, and the reasons on which they are based. All, especially priests and religious, should be exhorted and warmly encouraged to be zealous by their prayers and sacrifices to ripen and promote this work, and all should be reminded that nothing more effectively paves the way for the erring to find the truth and to embrace the Church than the faith of Catholics, when it is confirmed by the example of upright living.

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