

Outline of Rational Psychology

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TO THE STUDENT

This Outline has been written primarily for the student, and we have tried at all times to keep in mind his needs, interests, and background. It is an outline only--not a complete text--and as such it is, or purports to be, a digest of the principal facts, problems and theories that come within the scope of Rational Psychology as we conceive it and teach it. In many respects it goes beyond the purely formal boundaries of the philosophy of mind; but, as will be made clear later on, this is necessary to an adequate treatment of the subject.

A word of warning to the student is necessary if he is to derive the greatest benefit from this summary presentation. As a digest, the Outline presents the subject-matter of rational psychology in the very briefest form, and the student is cautioned therefore against the tendency to use the Outline to the exclusion of other sources. In an outline much is necessarily left unsaid; and, while the student may expect further development of the various topics in the classroom, it will nevertheless be necessary for him, if he expects to achieve the knowledge and mastery of the subject that will be demanded of him later on, to supplement the presentation in the Outline with continuous reading in collateral texts. Throughout the Outline will be found suggested readings, and the student is urged most strongly to consult these references on every possible occasion. Particular attention is called to the books by Father Maher and Father Gruender included in the suggested readings and the selected bibliography. In them the student will often find the answers to questions prompted by his reading of this Outline.

We wish to direct the student's attention also to the proofs in the Outline. For several of the more important propositions a brief summary proof has been presented approximating to a more or less strict syllogistic form. In other cases the proof is summarized in one or two expository paragraphs. Here the student may well exercise his wits in putting the matter into strict form for himself. In any event, he should thoroughly master

the expository matter preceding the proof so as to be able to explain as well as to state his brief formal summaries. To achieve such mastery, we would like to suggest to the student the method of active learning which involves thinking and talking and writing about the material he is studying, and not just passive reading or listening.

In the writing of this outline we have tried to adhere to a scheme of development in which each new topic flows logically from those which preceded it. Thus Chapter I deals with the Nature of Rational Psychology, a clear understanding of which is important to the entire discussion that follows. In Chapter II is treated the problem of the Nature of Thought, the correct interpretation of which is essential to a solution of all subsequent problems. Chapter III is taken up with the Nature of Volition and Freedom of the Will. The answer to this problem depends upon an adequate analysis of thought, and at the same time has serious implications for the various problems that follow it. Having thus laid the groundwork for a philosophy of mind, we are prepared to take up, in Chapter IV, the questions of the existence, nature, origin and destiny of the human soul. And then, having established the existence and nature of the soul, we are ready to deal with the question: What is the relation between the soul and the body? This constitutes the subject-matter of Chapter V. The last part, Chapter VI, is devoted to a summary of the contents of the Outline and the conclusions reached therein.

A.A.S.

C.I.D., S.J.

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1941

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OUTLINE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

There are few issues in science or philosophy that are more important than those that are raised and discussed in rational psychology. Under the influence of materialism, determinism, evolutionism, and hedonism, the modern world has arrived at a concept of man that is totally at variance with truth, and that is wholly inimical to the best interests of society, of law, of religion, of morality, and--worst of all--of man himself. This is the concept that man is one with the material world; that there is in reality no spiritual principle in man whose existence insures a future life; that man, after all, is the product of biological evolution so that, between him and the brute animal there is only a difference of degree and not one of kind; that the final end of man is not supreme happiness in the possession of God, but mere sensuous pleasure to be enjoyed with little regard to the demands of conscience or morality; in short, that man is an animal to whom the qualifying term "rational" is added only after it has been explained that it means nothing.

Opposed to this viewpoint is the conception of the Scholastics and all truly Christian thinkers that man is a <u>rational</u> creature in the strictest sense of the term. This means in the last analysis that man is possessed of a spiritual soul, and that he is not therefore the end-product of evolutionary development. It means, also, that man possesses the power of self-determination, and that his destiny is not completely defined in terms of pleasure or the gain of the moment, but rather that there is marked out for him a future life whose precise nature he partly determines by his free acts in this life. It means, finally, that man is a moral creature bound by moral law, and not a mere animal whose nature and actions are regulated by purely physical factors.



I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd

The implications of these two mutually opposed viewpoints are of the most serious kind. There is hardly any phase of life that is not affected by the viewpoint we take of the nature of man. Our science of ethics and our system of law proceed on the assumption that man is a free agent who, under normal circumstances, is responsible for his actions, and thus may be held accountable for them. Our democratic system of government is also founded upon the same principle. Any religion that is worthy of the name must assume that man is not wholly material in nature, that in him there is a spiritual soul whose origin and destiny cannot be explained in terms of the laws of physical nature. Society, too, is dependent upon a correct interpretation of the nature of man. To conceive of the end of man in terms of material gain and momentary pleasure is to cut away one of the cornerstones of society, since the unbridled pursuit of pleasure instead of the good is the first step towards the disintegration of any civilization. For these reasons, the materialistic interpretation of human nature must be combated at every turn. And it is to this task that rational psychology devotes itself.

B. THE PROBLEMS OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

In the pursuit of the aim just described, rational psychology concerns itself with four main problems: (1) The proof of man's rationality, and the refutation of those doctrines, such as sensism and evolutionism, that deny this fact. This is formally described as the Problem of the Difference between Intellect and Sense. (2) The vindication of man's freedom, against the influence of deterministic theories. This is the Problem of Free Will. (3) The existence of a spiritual soul, and the refutation of such theories as materialism and positivism. This is the Problem of the Existence and Nature of the Mind and Soul. (4) The vindication of Causality in Psychology against the influence of positivism. This is the Problem of the Relation between Soul and Body.

I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd

C. THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY

1. The Origins of Psychology

In order to understand the nature of rational psychology, that is, its problems, methods and aims, and its relation to other disciplines, it is necessary to review briefly the nature of psychology itself. Psychology, like all other sciences, is closely related to philosophy in that it originally stemmed from philosophy. Like the other sciences, however, it has tended to establish itself as an "independent" discipline; and there has always been much dispute as to whether psychology is, or ever could be, a true science in the strictest sense of the term. To develop a clear viewpoint with respect to this dispute, let us inquire briefly into the nature of philosophy and of science. In doing this, we will clear the ground for an adequate definition of rational psychology as well as of psychology in general.

2. Philosophy and Science

a. The Meaning of "Science"

Before discussing the nature of science and philosophy, we should realize that the use of the word "science" in contrast with "philosophy" is inappropriate, since the word "science" is a general term that embraces both philosophy and so-called science. The term, as ordinarily used, means "natural science," as e.g., physics, biology, chemistry, and thus stands in contrast with "metaphysical science" or philosophy.

b. Philosophy: Its Nature, Data and Method

Philosophy, then, is defined as the science of <u>ultimate</u> causes, that is, it deals largely with realities, or those aspects of reality, that are not directly observable. Its method therefore, since observation is precluded, is that of <u>deductive inference</u>.

c. Natural Science: Its Nature, Data, and Methods

The natural sciences concern themselves with proximate realities, that is, <u>observable</u> facts and phenomena. The method of the sciences,



I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd

therefore, is characteristically inductive inference, since they begin with observed facts and reason to the laws and principles governing them. Their data are gathered by observation, either casual or controlled. In the latter case, we speak of the experimental method.

3. The Nature, Data, and Methods of Psychology

Psychology is the study of human nature, that psycho-organic unity called man. While it lays particular emphasis upon one aspect of human nature, namely "mind," it is also vitally interested in man as a whole, a unity made up of body and soul. Insofar, then, as it concerns itself with proximate realities - mental processess and behavior - and uses the methods of observation and inductive generalization, psychology ranks with the other natural sciences. But, insofar as it deals with the "ultimates" of human nature - the existence, nature, destiny of the human soul, etc., - and uses the deductive method, it must be characterized as a metaphysical science.

4. The Present Status of Philosophical Psychology

a. The Development of Modern Psychology

i. The Influence of Positivism, Experimentalism, Evolutionism

The foundations of the modern science of psychology are to be found in the empiricism and associationism of such men as Locke, Hume, Hartley, the Mills, etc., who, while philosophers at heart, were interested in developing a purely empirical psychology. This tendency, coupled with the researches of men like Weber and Fechner, and the medical psychologists, eventually culminated in the modern, experimental phase of psychology.

This attempt to convert psychology into a purely natural science was motivated by a desire to emulate the other natural sciences. And since these sciences were characterized by a positivistic attitude - the notion that knowledge is limited to observable data - and

I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd

the method of experimentation, it was inevitable that psychology should develop along these lines. It was not long, therefore, before psychological laboratories were being established, and men were speaking confidently of the "new science of psychology."

At about the same time, a parallel phase of thought was developing within science - the concept of evolutionary development. This notion fitted in neatly with the positivistic attitude in psychology, with the result that psychology became increasingly naturalistic in character. What followed, of course, was the total rejection of philosophy. The important questions of the existence, nature and destiny of the human mind were scorned as being unscientific, and as having no place within the framework of a scientific psychology.

ii. New Definitions

Strangely enough, the very tendencies that united to divorce psychology from philosophy brought discord to psychology itself. On the one hand were the evolutionary-minded psychologists who wished to stress the dynamic character of the mind and its utility as a biological mechanism. From this tendency developed the schools of Functionalism, represented by J. R. Angell; Purposivism, identified with William McDougall; and Psychoanalysis, whose founder was Sigmund Freud. On the other hand were the positivists and experimentalists who were more interested in the structural and cognitive features of the mind. Out of their writings grew the schools of Structuralism, whose chief exponents were Wilhelm Wundt, E. B. Titchener, and O. Kulpe; and Configurationism or Gestalt Psychology, represented principally by K. Koffka and W. Kohler. Finally, there is the school of Behaviorism, which may be regarded as the culmination of all of the tendencies we have

I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd

described. For Behaviorism, whose founder is John B. Watson, is at once positivistic, mechanistic, evolutionistic, experimentalistic, and deterministic, and its vagaries are striking testimony of the fate of a psychology that strives to become purely naturalistic in character.

b. The Scholastic Viewpoint on a Philosophical Psychology

Opposed to all of these schools in the matter of the nature of psychology and its relation to philosophy is the scholastic interpretation. According to this view, there is need for a philosophical as well as a scientific psychology, since man is a composite of soul and body, and psychology studies the whole man. This need is supplied by Rational Psychology.

D. THE NATURE OF RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

1. The Subject Matter of Rational Psychology

a. The Soul and Mind in Rational Psychology

Rational Psychology proper is concerned with the existence, nature, origin and destiny of the human soul, and its relation to the body. Knowledge of these truths, however, depends upon a prior knowledge of the activities of the soul, particularly the "higher" or rational mental processes. For this reason, rational psychology has an important secondary aim, namely, an understanding of man's higher mental powers - his intellect and will.

b. Classification of Mental Processes and Faculties

The mental processes of man fall naturally into two categories: those that are distinctly <u>rational</u> in character, and which are peculiar to rational beings, namely, thought and volition; and those which are distinctly <u>sensory</u> in character, and common to man and the lower animals, such as sensation, imagery, sense memory, and sense appetite. It is possible also to distinguish <u>cognitive</u> and <u>appetitive</u> mental

I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd

processes on both the sensory and the rational plane, but for our purposes the more important distinction is that between the sensory and the rational processes.

Corresponding to all of these processes are certain powers or faculties, a faculty being a capacity of the mind to act, or be acted upon, in a certain way. Thus, the faculty of intellect corresponds to, and is the source of, the thought processes; the faculty of will is the immediate principle of the volitional processes; and the various sense faculties correspond in their turn to the processes of sensation, imagery, memory, and so on. All of these faculties and processes are of course closely related and interdependent, even though between some of them, as we shall have occasion to see later, it is necessary to recognize an essential distinction. It is with the rational processes and faculties of the human mind that rational psychology is the more directly concerned.

It may be noted in passing that the distinction between the sensory and the rational processes which forms the basis of this classificatory scheme is asserted for purposes of analysis and description in general psychology. It is in rational psychology that we shall prove the validity of this all-important distinction.

2. The Method of Rational Psychology

Its primary problem being the existence and and nature of the human soul, the distinguishing method of rational psychology is deductive inference. Since, however, it approaches this knowledge through an analysis of mental processes, the method may be defined more concretely as inference from observed fact in the light of fundamental principles of reason.

3. Suggested Readings

Brennan, R.E., General Psychology, Problems 2, 7, 35.

Brennan, R. E., Thomistic Psychology, Chs. 1,2,13.

I. INTRODUCTION, Cont'd

Dwight,T., Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist.
Harmon, F. L., Principles of Psychology,Chapt. 1.
Maher,M., Psychology, pp.1-41,229-230,459-460.

Questions and Exercises

1. What is the primary aim of rational psychology? How does this aim bear on religion and society?
2. Why does rational psychology begin with the study of thought and volition?
3. Describe briefly the background of thought which led to the rejection of philosophical psychology.
4. What is the Scholastic position with respect to a philosophical psychology?
5. Why are the doctrines of materialism and evolutionism opposed to rational psychology?
6. On what bases are mental processes classified into sensory and rational? Explain the difference between a cognitive and an appetitive process.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLECT AND SENSE

A. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

1. The Rejection of Rationality in Man: Sensism and Evolutionism

Running throughout much of modern psychology is the thought that in man there are no characteristics or activities that make it possible to distinguish him in an essential manner from the lower animals. This thought is engendered by the psychological doctrine of sensism, which teaches that all of man's mental processes are essentially sensory in character, and by the biological theory of evolution, according to which man's mind as well as his body is developed from lower forms.

2. The Problem

Thus are we faced immediately in rational psychology with the problem: Can all mental processes of whatever kind be reduced to or explained in terms of sensations, images and feelings as the sensists claim? Or, are thought and volition - those processes we have classified as rational - essentially different from mere sensory experiences? In brief, is Intellect essentially different from Sense? In order to answer these questions it will be necessary first of all to analyze thoroughly the several processes of thought, and secondly, to develop and prove two distinct but closely related propositions:

(I) WE HAVE UNIVERSAL IDEAS.

(II) THESE IDEAS CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED WITH, OR REDUCED TO, SENSORY EXPERIENCES OF ANY KIND.

3. The Nature and Scope of the Intellectual (thought) Processes

a. The Meaning of the Terms "Thought" and "Intellect"

The term <u>thought</u> is used to embrace all those <u>rational</u> processes that are of a <u>cognitive</u> nature. The term <u>intellect</u> is used to designate the <u>faculty</u> or power of rational cognition.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

b. Intellect and Intelligence

These two terms, while very closely related, are not to be confused, and should not be used interchangeably. Both, it is true, refer to the capacity to think; but intellect is a qualitative term which distinguishes man's power of thought from mere sense cognition; whereas intelligence is a quantitative term which refers to the degree of intellectual capacity a person possesses. It is conceivable, therefore, that intelligence can be measured; whereas intellect, being qualitative, cannot in the strict sense of the term be measured.

c. The Scope of the Thought Processes

The thought processes include Attention, Abstraction, Comparison, Conception, the Apprehension of Relations, Judgment and Reasoning. While this list is not exactly complete, it does indicate the more important acts of rational cognition.

4. Suggested Readings

Brennan,R.E.,General Psychology,Problems 10,16, 22,23,24,25,29.
Brennan,R.E.,Thomistic Psychology,Ch.7.
Gruender,H.,Experimental Psychology,Chs.14,15,16.
----------,Problems of Psychology,Chs.1,2.
Harmon,F.L.,Principles of Psychology,Chs.5,8,11, 15.
Maher,M.,Psychology,Empirical and Rational,Chs. XII-XVI incl.

B. THE PROCESS OF ATTENTION

1. Attention, Abstraction and the Process of Forming Ideas

Before beginning our analysis of the process of attention, we wish to point out that the several processes of thought, particularly attention,abstraction and conception, are not in any sense discrete psychological acts, even though they are logically separable. As psychological processes, one merges into the other so imperceptibly that it is difficult to discern, introspectively, where one leaves off and the

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

other begins. The unity of the mind is more than a unity of parts; it is a unity of action, and the interrelatedness of the mental processes illustrates this at every turn.

2. The Definition of Attention

Attention is defined simply as the concentration and direction of cognitive energy to some object that is present to the mind. It is essentially a narrowing of consciousness to an object in such a way as to bring the object into clearer awareness.

3. The Kinds of Attention

a. Voluntary Attention: Attention and Will

For a complete account of attention, it is necessary to describe the various forms that attention takes. There are three kinds of attention: Voluntary, Involuntary, and Non-Voluntary (Habitual) Attention. The first of these may be described as that act by which we organize, concentrate and direct mental energy to some object, act, or situation, to the exclusion of other and irrelevant experiences. It is, by definition, under the influence of the will. However, it is not an act of the will - a volition - as such. Rather, it is an instance of the intellect functioning under the direction and control of the will. Attention of this kind must be rational, that is, supra-sensuous in character, since any purely sensory process is determined by the causal stimulus and the organic basis in which it is founded. Voluntary attention however, as revealed both by introspection and casual experience, is self-initiated and self-controlled, and is therefore independent of either an external stimulus or any organic factors. It is thus a type of mental process which can only be described as rational, and which is peculiar to rational beings.

b. Involuntary Attention: Attention and Sensation

The concentration and direction of consciousness that characterizes the attentive



II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

process occurs at times independently of, and even contrary to, our willing it, and this we call involuntary attention. In such cases it is not our will, but rather the intensity of the stimulus that determines the organization and the direction of the attentive process. While ordinarily originating in some external stimulus, this is not always the case, since some internal experience (such as an obsession) may also act as a distracting influence, thus causing us to attend involuntarily. Where attention is determined by, and bound up with sensation, it may be described as sensory in character, and it is this type of attention that seems to be manifested in some of the lower animals. After all, there is nothing in the nature of attention <u>as such</u> which precludes the possibility that a concentration of conscious energy can occur on the sensory as well as the rational level. It is only <u>voluntary</u> attention that is distinctively rational.

c. Non-Voluntary (Habitual) Attention

Besides the two types of attention described, there is also a third type, which is neither controlled by the will nor contrary to it. For this reason it is called non-voluntary attention. Attention, like all human actions, can become habitual or automatic in character, and this is particularly likely to occur in those situations where the factor of interest is at work. In these instances it is not the intensity of sensation, nor an effort of the will that causes the organization of mental energies, but the automatic character of the act itself, engendered by the factor of interest or attractiveness. This is well illustrated in the reading of a book that is intensely interesting. In such a situation the act of attending is easy, effortless, and automatic.[1]

[1]Whether such an act is sensory or rational is difficult to determine. It seems indeed to involve elements of both kinds, its precise nature at any time therefore depending upon those factors that are predominant.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

4. The Attributes of Attention

There are four characteristic attributes manifested by attention: Quality, Intensity, Duration, and Range. The quality of attention is that character which enables us to distinguish types of attention, as we have just done in the preceding paragraphs. Intensity is the attribute which makes it possible to distinguish different acts of attention in quantitative terms, as when we say "I did not pay <u>much</u> attention to what he was saying." Duration refers to the period of time covered by any single act of attention. This is generally assumed to be very limited, since careful introspection reveals that attention is more intermittent than continuous, although this probably varies with the type of attention involved. Duration would seem to be inversely proportional to the effort expended in attending. The fourth attribute of attention - range - refers to the <u>scope</u> of the attentive process, that is, the number of objects which can be brought within the field of clear awareness at any one time. Here, again, it is generally assumed that there are distinct limits to the process, especially since it is the very nature of attention to involve a <u>narrowing</u> of consciousness; and this narrowing precludes attending to very many objects or acts at a time. Rapid oscillation of attention from one thing to another is often mistaken for a widening of the range of attention.

5. The Conditions of Attention

The effectiveness of attention is determined by certain <u>internal</u> and <u>external</u> conditions that are invariable concomitants of all acts of attention. Prominent among the internal conditions are self-control, intelligence, fatigue, and interest. Among the external conditions occur such factors as the quality of the object, the environmental setting, and distractions. Any one or all of these factors, or any combination of them, may operate in any situation, so that



II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

it well behooves the student particularly to take stock of the influence of these factors in his own work.

6. The Effects of Attention

Attention is probably the most important single factor in learning and in the utlization of past experience. Because it brings an object into clearer awareness through concentration, it intensifies and clarifies our experiences in such a way that they become more meaningful and more completely learned. Attention brings out relationships between old and new experiences, and in that way brings into operation the forces of association, so that retention and recall are greatly benefited by careful and efficient attention. This whole process can be described in one word, apperception, which may be defined for our purposes as the integration of new experiences with old through the processes of attention and associative memory, these processes leading to the eduction of relationships. Without such integration, efficient learning is all but impossible.

C. THE PROCESS OF ABSTRACTION

1. The Nature of Abstraction: Abstraction and Attention

Abstraction may be defined as the mental separation of certain qualities or aspects of an object or a group of objects. This separation is accomplished through the special direction of cognitive energy in the act of attention. Thus, when I attend to the color of an object, this particular quality becomes abstracted (i.e., mentally separated) from the other qualities of the object. Abstraction, therefore, is simply a special form of attention. It should be noted that abstraction can occur with respect to accidental qualities like color, size, shape, etc., as well as with respect to those qualities like rationality, triangularity, etc., that are described as essential.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

2. The Kinds of Abstraction

a. Positive and Negative Abstraction

These are two aspects of one and the same process. In the general process of abstraction, certain qualities are mentally separated from the object in which they occur, and are explicitly attended to. This is positive abstraction. At the same time, certain other aspects of the object are necessarily neglected: this is the negative phase of abstraction. Thus, when I attend to (i.e., abstract) the color of an object, its other qualities tend to be less clearly apprehended; they fade, as it were, into the background of consciousness. These qualities are said to be negatively abstracted.

b. Generalizing Abstraction

This form of abstraction occurs when we concentrate our mind on a quality or qualities of an individual which that individual has in common with others. In doing this we generalize the qualities thus retained in consciousness. The conscious process that results represents, therefore, no longer an individual but the <u>common nature</u> of several individuals, and is called the <u>universal idea</u>. More properly, it is called a <u>direct</u> universal idea, since at this stage we are not yet aware of its universality. (See D, 1 below).

c. Isolating Abstraction

This form of abstraction occurs whenever certain qualitites of an object are mentally separated <u>and treated as though they exist independently of the object</u>. The result of this process is the <u>abstract idea</u>. Thus, motion, energy, justice, beauty, virtue, whiteness, number, etc., are all abstract, "personified" qualities which are invariably thought of as being independent objects, whereas actually they always occur as qualities of objects.

3. The Results of Abstraction

The mental separation of qualities which occurs in the process of abstraction results in

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

the formation of ideas or concepts. Abstraction, therefore, is a necessary prerequisite to the conceptual process.

D. THE CONCEPTUAL PROCESS

1. The Formation of the Concept: Direct and Reflex Universals.

The process of abstraction is but one stage in the formation of a concept. In addition to the mental separation of qualities, there is necessary an explicit awareness of these qualities, and this awareness constitutes the mental process called an idea or concept.[1] This simple awareness of common notes is called a "direct universal," which becomes a "reflex universal" when we become explicitly aware, by reflection and comparison, that the qualities we have abstracted can be applied to a class of objects. Thus, in the formation of the concept "man," I abstract and become aware of the qualities "rationality" and "animality" (direct universal), and then, by reflection, become aware that these qualities taken together can be predicated of a whole class of objects (man-in-general), and this is the reflex universal idea.

2. The Nature of the Concept

a. Definition of the Concept

The concept is a mental representation of the nature or essence (i.e., the essential qualities or notes) of an object.[2] It is a consciousness of those qualities which make an object <u>what</u> it is. Thus my idea of man: rational-animal; my idea of triangle: three-sided, three-angled, plane figure; my idea of God: infinite-just-eternal-etc.,-Being; and so on. In each case it will be noted that I have abstracted, become aware of, and

[1] In the discussion that follows, the terms "idea" and "concept" will be used interchangeably.

[2] "Object" is used here in a broad sense. It includes acts and situations and relations as well as concrete things, since it must be quite obvious that our ideas embrace more than the concrete material realities around us.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

generalized those qualities which enter into the very make-up of the thing represented.

b. Kinds of Ideas

i. The Universal Idea

The universal idea may be defined as a mental representation which can be applied univocally and individually to a class of objects. "Univocally" means that the universal idea is applicable in exactly the same way to all members of the class; "individually" means that it can be applied just as well to each member taken singly. Thus my idea of triangle can be applied to triangles taken as a class, as when I say "Triangles are plane figures;" and of each triangle taken singly as when I say "This triangle is right-angled." This is possible because my idea of triangle embraces only those aspects (three-sidedness, three-angleness, planeness) which every triangle possesses and has in common with every other triangle no matter what its size, shape, color, and so on may be.

ii. The Abstract Idea

The abstract idea may be defined as a mental representation of a quality or group of qualities considered as existing apart from the subject in which they inhere. For example, such concepts as necessity, truth, virtue, justice, beauty, freedom, morality, law, redness, motion, etc., represent real things, but they do not represent them in the way in which they exist in the world of reality. Thus the concept "roundness" represents something that really exists, as do beauty and virtue, but what exists in the order of concrete reality are round objects, beautiful things, virtuous persons, etc.

iii. The Singular Idea

The singular idea is a mental representation of a particular object in terms of those qualities which make the object what

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

it is. My idea of a particular man is a singular idea, since it embraces those qualities which make this person the particular individual he is. In forming the singular idea we apply the process of abstraction to one thing instead of to a class.

c. Characteristics of the Idea

All ideas of whatever kind possess the following features. They are rational (that is, supra-sensuous), immaterial, universal, and relatively stable. These characteristics, as we shall see later, are diammetrically opposed to those of sensory experiences.

d. Theories of the Nature of the "Universal."

i. Exaggerated Realism (Plato): The universal idea exists by itself, independently of a thinking mind.

ii. Conceptualism (Stout): The universal exists (in the mind) but there is nothing in external reality corresponding to it. It is a pure mental construct.

iii. Nominalism (Bain, Sensists generally): The universal as such does not exist - what is universal is the <u>name</u> of objects only.

iv. Sensism, or the Image Theory of Thought (the Mills, Hartley, Spencer, Titchener, etc.): There is no such thing as a universal idea, or rational thought. So-called ideas are merely blends of sense experiences, that is, sensations and images.

v. Moderate Realism (Scholastics): The universal idea exists as a mental reality, with a "foundation" in objective reality. This foundation is the <u>perfectly similar natures</u> existing in a class of objects. This theory, therefore, stands opposed to all four of the other theories described.

3. The Existence of Universal Ideas

a. The Problem: Do ideas - rational, universal, and immaterial in character - really exist in the mind, or are ideas as the sensists claim

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

reducible to mere blends of sense experience and nothing more? Or, as the nominalist contends, is there nothing truly universal in the mind other than the names we give to objects? It is the contention of the scholastic psychologist that such truly universal ideas do actually exist in the human mind. And this contention is supported by proofs based upon our understanding of common vocables, and our ability to classify and define objects.

b. Arguments for the Existence of Universal Ideas

1. The Argument from Meaning

All of us use words - nouns, verbs, adjectives, etc., - and ordinarily at least we are aware of what these words mean; that is, we understand them. But to be aware of meaning is to possess ideas, since the idea is the embodiment of meaning. In other words, it is the possession of ideas that makes words meaningful. Put in another way: Words have meaning for us only when we are aware of the nature of the objects which the words signify; and such awareness as we have seen constitutes the idea. Thus, the word <u>circle</u> has meaning for me because I know <u>what a circle is</u>, that is, I am cognizant of its nature. If, on the other hand, I am not aware of what the word signifies, it is meaningless to me as is the case when words of a strange language, or words with which I am unacquainted, are used. Meaning (or understanding) of these words arises when the <u>nature</u> of the object signified by the word is designated. Thus, a word like "myoma" may be unintelligible to a person; but once he is told that it is a "tumor consisting of muscular tissue" (its nature indicated), the word acquires meaning. A little reflection will show that this argument refutes both sensism and nominalism, since it demonstrates that truly universal ideas really exist, and that, while they correspond to, they are not the same thing as the names of objects.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

The foregoing argument can be restated as a formal proof in the following manner:
We understand the common vocables which we use.
But to understand common vocables is to have universal ideas.
Therefore we have universal ideas.

The major is evident from contrasting our experience with a familiar language and our experience in reading or hearing a language we do not know.

Proof of minor:

To understand a common vocable is to experience mentally or represent to ourselves what is common to many objects and applicable to each in the same sense.

But to experience mentally or represent to ourselves what is common to many objects and applicable to each in the same sense is to have a universal idea.

Therefore to understand common vocables is to have universal ideas.

Corollary: Thought and Language. What relation exists between thought and language? Are they the same? If not, is one prior to, or dependent upon the other? To use language intelligibly, of course, there must be meaning or understanding first, so that in this sense thought is prior to language, and language is dependent upon thought. The nominalists, therefore, are wrong in implying that thought and language (words) are the same. It is true however that language, like thought, possesses universality. A word like "man," for example, can be applied to a class of objects univocally and individually. But this universality of the word is a derived or functional universality, - that is, words have universal applicability by reason of the fact that they symbolize ideas. If the ideas did not exist, these words would be particular symbols only, as is often true

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

when children are first learning to speak. This concept of derived universality can be applied also to word-images, as might be expected since they are merely representations of words.[1]

ii. The Argument from Definition.

To define anything (adequately at least) is to indicate its essential qualities, that is, its nature, as when we define a circle to be "a round, plane figure." But, in order to so define an object, I must first of all be aware of the qualities expressed in the definition; and this awareness constitutes the idea.

iii. The Argument from Classification.

In order to assign objects to a class, I must be aware of those qualities which they possess in common, and if my classification is to be adequate or scientific, it must be in terms of essential features. But, again, in order to do this I must first beaware of those essential qualities, and this awareness constitutes the universal idea.

The foregoing arguments can be stated as a formal proof in the following manner:

[1]The whole precarious structure of nominalism rests upon an assumption it is itself forced to deny. Words only are universal, according to the nominalist. But such universality can be explained only by assuming that these words represent or symbolize that which is common to several objects. In other words, for a word to become universal at all, it is necessary that we first of all become aware of those common aspects which it symbolizes. And it is just such an awareness, as we have seen, that constitutes the universal idea. It is this assumption which the nominalist must assert and deny at the same time.

Moreover, the nominalist finds himself in the unhappy position of being unable to explain how persons without a verbal language can think; or how one word, such as "bar," can symbolize five or six different things; or how it is that we often know what we wish to say, but cannot find the "right word" for it. Nor can he explain the fact that a strange language cannot be learned by the simple process of acquiring the symbols of that language. As everyone knows, a language can be learned only by acquiring the meanings that accrue to the words of that language. And meanings, as we have seen, depend upon the possession of ideas. On every count, therefore, the nominalist theory proves hopelessly inadequate.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

We all classify objects and define things. But to classify or define, we must have reflex universal ideas.

Therefore we all have reflex universal ideas.

The major is evident. No argument is needed to prove something attested so often by experience.

Proof of minor:

To classify or define, we must know features common to many objects and applicable to each in the same sense, and must know moreover that these features are common to many objects and applicable to each in the same sense;

But to know common features in this way is to have reflex universal ideas.

Therefore, to classify or to define, we must have reflex universal ideas.

It goes without saying that the three abilities described in these arguments - to understand, to define, and to classify - lie at the basis of all knowledge, science and philosophy. The student can picture for himself what the situation would be if we did not possess ideas.[1]

4. Ideas and Sensory Processes

a. The Nature of Sensory Processes

Sensory processes of whatever kind - sensations, percepts, or images - are mental representations of particular things or objects embracing their material, sensible qualities, such as color, odor, sound, taste, shape, size, etc. The instruments of such representations are the various sense faculties. Moreover, each of these processes is psycho-organic, involving always cooperation of the nervous system.

b. Ideas and Sensory Processes Contrasted: Rejection of Sensism

From the above description, it will be seen that sensations and images are sensuous,

[1] In this connection, see Moore, T.V., Cognitive Psychology, pp. 334-349.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

particular, concrete, material and organic in character. And, in the case of images particularly, they are extremely variable, varying from person to person, and even within the same individual over a period of time. In contrast, as we have already seen, ideas are rational, universal, immaterial and stable in character. To put it concretely: when I have an idea of man, I am aware of the nature of man, divorced from all accidental irrelevancies; when, on the other hand, I have a percept or image of a man, I am aware of a particular individual as he appears now, or has appeared, to my senses in the past. The conclusion from all this is obvious: no two experiences, so diammetrically opposite in character, can possibly be identified.

The foregoing argument against the identification of ideas and sensory experiences can be stated as a formal proof in the following way. This proof holds equally well whether the sense elements referred to are sensations from objects present, or images revived from the past, whether they are few or many, whether they are sense impressions of ordinary objects, of words, or of other symbols.

Universal ideas are representations of features common to many objects and applicable to each in exactly the same sense.

But clusters and blends of sense experiences are not representations of features common to many objects and applicable to each in exactly the same sense.

Therefore universal ideas are not clusters or blends of sense experiences.

The major is obvious, being a definition. The minor is proved below.

Clusters and blends of sense experience are representations of some exterior qualities of individual material objects, and nothing else.

But representations of exterior qualities of individual material objects are not common to many objects and applicable to each in exactly the same sense.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

Therefore clusters and blends of sense experience are not common to many and applicable to each in exactly the same sense.

For these reasons the sensist interpretation of thought as being composed of sensations and images is unacceptable. If this theory were accepted it would follow, as Gruender points out, that thought is "kaleidoscopic" in character, that is, undergoing constant change, since images, out of which thought is supposedly composed, are essentially variable in nature. This would make of language a totally inadequate vehicle of thought, since no two persons, ordinarily, would be "thinking" of the same thing. And, finally, a logical sequence of thought would be impossible, since sensory processes, being organic in character, follow the law of "neural habit," that is, their sequence is determined by casual factors, and not by the logical connections existing between the objects of thought. Contrast, for example, the haphazard sequence that occurs in day-dreaming (imaginal process) with the marvellously logical sequence of thought that occurs in the solving of a mathematical problem. Yet, if the sensist theory were correct, no such sequence of thought would be possible.

c. Experimental Studies: The Theory of Imageless Thought.

Corroboration for the rejection of pure sensism has been forthcoming from a number of experimental studies, which have given rise to the theory of "imageless thought." [1] Such

[1]The theory of imageless thought must not be confused with the scholastic contention, developed in the preceding pages, that thought and imagery are essentially different. The former theory merely states that there are conscious contents whose makeup seems to have nothing of imagery in it, without taking a stand on the precise question of whether or not these "pure thoughts" are essentially different from sensory experiences, although much the same thing is implied in the very statement of the theory. The Scholastics for their part maintain that while thought is not imagery, nevertheless there is no thought which does not have some imagery as an invariable concomitant. In this restricted sense, the Scholastic view on thought actually opposes the imageless thought theory.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

prominent investigators as Woodworth, Binet, Spearman, and Buehler found that their subjects often reported mental content that could not be reduced to, or explained in terms of, the conventional sensist categories of sensations and images. The thought content seemed to be imageless, and entirely unlike anything of a sensory nature. "Pure thought," "conscious attitudes," "pure awareness," are some of the terms used to describe this imageless content. These findings, for which the Wurzburg School is well known, are directly contrary to the results obtained at the Cornell laboratory under the direction of Titchener. But it should be noted that Titchener was an avowed sensist, whose credo precluded from the outset the discovery of anything more than sensations, images, and feelings. Influenced by this bias, Titchener in his investigations violated the rules of scientific procedure and thus rendered his findings open to the severest criticism.[1]

d. Relations Between Thought and Sensory Experience.

i. Association between Ideas and Images.

Despite the essential difference between ideas and images, they are nevertheless closely associated, so much so that some writers contend that <u>there is no idea without its corresponding image</u>. For our purposes, three types of images canbe distinguished: Object-images, word-images, and symbolic images. The first two are well known. Symbolic images are those used to symbolize an object, or an idea. For example, when <u>thinking</u> of liberty, I may <u>imagine</u> the statue of liberty.

Between each of these types of images and ideas there occur associations which will of course vary from one person to another. Thus, I may associate an image of a particular triangle (object-image) with the idea of triangle.

[1]See Gruender, H., Problems of Psychology, Ch. I, for an excellent criticism of the scientific vagaries of the experimental sensists.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

This is called a natural association. Again, I may associate a word-image of man with the idea of man - a conventional association. Lastly, I may associate an image of George Washington with the idea of freedom - an arbitrary association. In any event, depending upon my experience, training, and habits of thought, it is very likely that for every idea or thought there will be associated with it one or another of the kinds of images described. It is this very common occurrence that has led some investigators to the unwarranted conclusion that thought and images are identical, since they invariably discovered images when trying to introspect the thought processes.

This close connection between thought and sense experience is a very natural one - in view of man's composite nature - and very important. Thus, because of this relationship, impairment of the sensory processes (due to brain injuries, etc.) may cause "impairment" of the thought processes, as seems to be the case, for example, in aphasia.[1] In any event, our recognition of the essential difference between thought and sensory experience in no way precludes a recognition of their relatedness.

ii. The Origin of Ideas

The relation between thought and sense experience looms large also in the problem of the origin of ideas. The position of the Scholastics is clearly indicated in the aphorism: "There is nothing in the Intellect which was not first in some way in the senses." This is in harmony with the contention of moderate realism that every idea has a foundation in objective reality; and means simply that the idea is generated by the intellect on a basis

[1]Aphasia is a pathological condition characterized by word-blindness or word-deafness.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

of sense experience. All intellectual knowledge is derived, directly or indirectly, from sense. The presence of the percept or image (of some object) in consciousness stimulates the intellect to abstract the essential qualities, and the awareness and generalization of these qualities results in the formation of the idea.

Admittedly, this unadorned account of the origin of ideas would be of little help in accounting for many of our concepts. And this is particularly true of abstract notions. To what sense experiences, for example, would one trace the origin of the ideas of liberty, virtue, justice, and the like? Careful reflection on one's past experiences reveals in fact that these ideas, as well as many universal notions, are not actually derived from sensory data here and now, but are obtained ready-made, as it were, from other sources - books, teachers, parents, dictionaries, and the like. Thus we know what a mountain is, not because we actually experienced those physical objects called mountains, but because we read a description or definition of them somewhere, or were told what mountains are. So, too, with innumerable other ideas we possess. However, this is not to abandon the above viewpoint, or to capitulate to the innatist or conceptualist theories. Far from it. To say that some ideas are not derived from personal sense experience is certainly not to say that they are pure mental fabrications or that they are innate. Indeed, just the opposite is implied; since it is clearly indicated that ideas must be derived from some source other than one's own mind. What the statement does mean, however, is that the accumulation of ideas depends as much (if not more so) upon cultural heritage as upon actual experience; and that, while a particular idea cannot be traced back to personal experiences

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

of the individual who possesses it, nevertheless it is ultimately traceable to sensory experiences, however far back we may have to go in an attempt to discover its origin. Were it not for this cultural heritage, - were we in fact dependent upon our own experiences for the genesis of all of our notions, - we would find it very difficult to carry on the business of the mind.

The above analysis does not take into account either the genetic development of ideas from childhood, where many of the answers to this difficult question lie. Here one would have to deal with the origin and development of language, rudimentary forms of abstraction, the process of comparison, the development of exact meanings, and so on, in order to give anything like an adequate account of how ideas originate in the slowly developing intellect of children. But, that accomplished, much of the obscurity of the problem would disappear.[1]

E. THE PROCESS OF JUDGMENT

1. The Nature of the Judicial Process

A judgment is a mental act by which we perceive and mentally assent to the agreement or disagreement between two ideas. Thus: a circle is round. A careful analysis of this process reveals several distinct steps: Apprehension of the object (circle); Emergence by abstraction or recollection of the notion "round"; Separate mental grasp of the two terms (circle - round); Their comparison; Perception of agreement or disagreement; Awareness that the mental synthesis of ideas corresponds to objective reality; Assent or dissent. From this it can be seen that the judgment involves both analysis and synthesis, active abstraction, awareness of relations, a universal idea for a predicate, and unity of consciousness.

[1] It will be seen quite readily that this account of the origin of ideas involves a rejection of both innatism and conceptualism. To say that ideas are derived from sense experiences is directly contrary to the fundamental tenets of both of these theories.

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

2. The Kinds of Judgment

a. The Necessary Judgment

The necessary judgment is one in which the relationship between the subject and predicate of the judgment is such that its contradictory is inconceivable. The fact expressed in the judgment is necessarily so, and cannot be otherwise. Thus: God is good; two plus two equals four; circles are round, etc. In these cases, given an understanding of the terms, the mental acquiescence in the truth of the proposition is <u>enforced</u>, and no amount of volitional effort would enable us to think the contrary. This mental agreement or acquiescence is called <u>assent</u>, and is always an act of the intellect. It is thus to be distinguished from <u>consent</u> which is an act of the will. Consent is always voluntary, whereas assent may be free, as when the evidence is of such a nature as not to compel it, or it may be necessary, as occurs in necessary judgments.

b. The Contingent Judgment

This type of judgment is one that is based on evidence the contradictory of which may be true. That is, the truth of the judgment is contingent upon other facts. Thus the judgment "Water satisfies thirst" is dependent upon other factors, such as the composition of the water, etc. In these judgments the assent is not enforced, since that which the judgment refers to is not <u>necessarily</u> true.

3. Judgment and Belief

a. The Nature of Belief

Judgment takes several forms, one of which is belief; and belief in its turn is related to other states of mind, such as opinion, doubt, certitude and faith. Belief means either a state of mind that is founded in authority, or one that relates to probable and future events that are not fully evident. Thus, I believe that Napoleon ruled France; I believe that the sun will rise tomorrow; and I believe

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

that I can "break" 100 in agame of golf. On the other hand, a judgment based on experience either past or present, or on reasoning, is described as knowledge. The firm conviction that may follow upon either belief or knowledge is called certitude, which may be as great in the one case as in the other depending upon the source of the judgment. Ordinarily, however, belief engenders moral certitude, whereas knowledge develops either physical or metaphysical certitude.

Closely allied to belief are opinion and doubt. In fact, opinion may be described as a form of belief. In many instances, however, opinion falls somewhat short of full belief, and here conviction awaits more evidence or greater authority. It is then a state of mind in which we are loath to give complete assent to a proposition because the facts do not warrant it. Opinion of this kind does not develop conviction or certitude.

The state of mind called doubt represents a suspension of judgment, and occurs in those circumstances where there are mutually opposing and equally strong lines of evidence or authority. In this case, assent is withheld completely, and conviction is impossible. Doubt should not be confused with dis-belief, since dis-belief with respect to any thing really signifies a belief in the opposite.

There is one other state of mind that is closely related to belief, and that is faith. Faith is that form of belief that is founded in authority. Ordinarily, the term is used to designate a belief that is rooted in very high or unimpeachable authority, as when we speak of religious faith. Thus, divine revelation is said to develop faith, and not mere belief. However, where human authority is of the highest, ordinary belief is also converted into faith. The assent rendered in the case of faith is complete, and the conviction unshakeable, as long

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

as the authority remains unquestioned.

b. The Causes of Belief

While the above analysis of belief has revealed the primary origins of belief, it should not be thought that evidence and authority are the sole causes. Our beliefs play a very important part in our lives, and a knowledge of their causes is necessary to employ them judiciously. Besides the intellectual factors we have mentioned, there are also volitional and emotional factors that often play a part in generating beliefs; and it is from this fact that the terms "emotional" and "wishful" thinking are derived. Actually, it is not always possible to distinguish clearly between emotional and wishful thinking, because the latter is often a derivative of the former, that is, the will to believe is generated by some emotional factor. In any event, what is more important is the realization of the part the emotions may play in determining our thinking, so that we may learn to base our beliefs on adequate authority or sufficient evidence, rather than on feeling.

4. The Functions of the Judicial Process

Judgment is fundamentally an instrument of the mind by which an increase of knowledge is made possible. Just as the formation and acquisition of concepts extends knowledge, so subsequent analysis and synthesis of our experiences results in greater knowledge. In fact, this process is necessary to the development of knowledge since the process of conception is inadequate to a complete representation of reality. Were human knowledge intuitive rather than discursive in character, the judicial process would be unnecessary. Being what it is, however, the human mind needs the judgment process in order to acquire and develop its knowledge.

5. Judgment as a Rational Process.

a. The Sensist Interpretation of Judgment

In the same way that the sensist explains ideas as associated blends of images, so he

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

reduces the judgment process to association of images, but in this case the association is successive rather than simultaneous.

b. The Scholastic Interpretation.

There are several factors in the judgment process that indicate without question its rational nature. First of all, there is the fact that the judgment necessarily involves attention, abstraction, comparison, and conception, all of which have been shown to be rational. Again, the judgment involves the apprehension of relations (of identity or non-identity between the subject and predicate), and this is necessarily rational in character. Any sense faculty is designed only to experience sensuous, material qualities, and therefore no sense power could function in the apprehension of relations, since they are neither sensuous nor material in character. Yet, it is an obvious fact of experience that these relations exist objectively and that we are aware of them. Therefore, their apprehension can only be ascribed to a power of the mind that surpasses all sense powers.

This summary presentation should not lead to the impression that the mental act by which we perceive relationships is relatively unimportant. On the contrary, the eduction of relationships is one of the most characteristic features of the rational mind, and, incidentally, one of the greatest stumbling blocks in the path of an all-out sensist interpretation of thought. The sensist can make some headway in his account of ideas by asserting that they are mere blends of sense experience; but he encounters an impasse where the awareness of relationships is concerned. To speak of a sensation or image of a relationship is patently absurd, with the result that the sensist interpretation of thought has no explanation of how we become aware of these factors. The only alternative is to deny that such awareness exists at all. This,

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

obviously, is no solution of the problem; rather, it is a tacit admission of the inherent weakness of the whole sensist interpretation.

F. THE PROCESS OF INFERENCE

1. The Nature of the Inferential Process.

Inference or reasoning is that mental operation by which a new judgment is derived from some other judgment or judgments already known. Thus: All wood floats in water; therefore, this object, which is wood, floats in water. Reasoning comprises, of course, an exercise of judgment and, therefore, analysis and synthesis; and, in addition, it involves "identification": the explicit perception of an element that is only implicit in the previously known relations.

2. Types of Inference.

a. Immediate: when the new judgment is quite obviously contained in the one known.

b. Mediate: when by more or less explicit comparison of two judgments we derive a third.

c. Deduction and Induction

Deduction is a mental progression from a more general to a more particular truth; Induction a progression from facts to general laws and principles. Both involve establishment of a relation between two notions by the mediation of a third.

d. Implicit Reasoning: the Enthymeme.

3. The Functions of the Inferential Process.

The functions of the process of reasoning are substantially the same as those of judgment, namely, an increase of knowledge. Just as judgment is needed to go beyond the process of conception, so reasoning is needed to develop knowledge to a point beyond the simple judgment. It is reasoning that opens up the horizons of metaphysical reality, and without it, both science and philosophy would become stagnant.

4. Reasoning as a Rational Process.

Whatever we have said with respect to the rationality of the judgment process applies with

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

even greater force in the case of reasoning. All the rational processes of attention, abstraction, comparison, conception, judgment and the awareness of relations are involved in the process of reasoning, and therefore what applies to them applies to reasoning as well.

G. THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLECT AND SENSE

1. The Nature of the Intellect

Intellect, we have said, is the faculty of thought, that is, of the rational cognitive processes. But these processes, as we have seen, exhibit characteristics that are diammetrically opposed to those involved in sense cognition; and therefore intellect, which is the source or principle of these processes, must also possess such characteristics. Thus intellect is said to be:

a. Rational, that is Supra-sensuous, which means that it produces effects which transcend the powers of the senses, as in the formation of ideas, perceiving relations, etc.

b. Non-organic, which means that it does not operate through a material organ, as the senses do. It must be non-organic, since its effects transcend what any material organ could produce, as in its knowledge of abstract ideas.

c. Spiritual, which means that it can and does operate independently of the body or any part of the body. This must be so since its knowledge embraces the immaterial, the abstract and the universal. Were the intellect completely dependent upon a material substrate (such as the brain), its knowledge would necessarily be limited to the material, the concrete and the particular. Thus, the intellect is said to be <u>intrinsically independent</u> of matter. Yet, as we have seen, there is some dependence, as in the association between thought and imagery, and in the origin of ideas. This relationship is expressed by saying that the intellect is <u>extrinsically</u> dependent upon matter (i.e., the



II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

nervous system). This intrinsic independence, linked with extrinsic dependence, may be briefly expressed by saying: We do not think <u>with</u> the brain, but we are unable to think without it.

2. Intellect and Sense Contrasted

As contrasted with thought, sense experience is limited to the material, the concrete and the particular, and we say therefore that the various sense powers (for which the term "sense" stands) are sensuous, organic and material in character. These characteristics stand in direct opposition to those of the intellect and our only conclusion can be that intellect and sense are essentially different.

H. SUGGESTED READINGS

Adler, M., What Man Has Made of Man
Gruender, H., Psychology Without a Soul
Muckerman, J., Humanizing the Brute
Wasmann, E., Instinct & Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom

Questions and Exercises

1. Why is the sensist interpretation of thought incapable of explaining the apprehension of relations?
2. In what way are sensism and nominalism related?
3. Describe three arguments against nominalism.
4. What is the difference between "intellect" and "intelligence"?
5. What processes does the term "thought" embrace?
6. Why do the scholastics reject innatism?
7. Describe briefly the implications of the sensist interpretation of thought.
8. Describe in your own words one argument for the existence of ideas.
9. In what way is abstraction related to attention and the conceptual process?
10. Why is voluntary attention described as a rational process?
11. Which of the three theories of nominalism, sensism, and conceptualism comes closest to the scholastic viewpoint?

II. THE NATURE OF THOUGHT, Cont'd

12. What part does emotion play in the origin of belief?
13. What is the difference between assent and consent?
14. What is the basis for the assertion that thoughts and sensory processes are essentially different?
15. Describe two important relationships between thought and sense experience.



III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL

A. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

1. The Rejection of Volition and Freedom in Man: Materialism, Sensism, and Determinism.

The problem of the nature of volition and freedom of the will is closely bound up with the preceding problem of the nature of thought and the essential difference between sensory and intellectual cognition. The denial of the one involves, implicitly at least, a denial of the other. For this reason, the present problem has its origins in much the same tendencies in modern thought that concerned us in the preceding chapter. Modern Sensism, for example, not only denies the existence of the rational cognitive processes, but of volition as well; and in doing so, destroys the very bases of psychological freedom. Materialism, in its turn, denying as it does the existence of any reality apart from matter, denies also the reality of all rational processes, and of a rational principle in man. From these two, and from other tendencies as well, flows the doctrine of determinism, - the theory that all of man's actions are causally determined by some internal or external factor or factors, and are beyond the control of man himself.

2. The Problem

Thus, again, are we faced with two problems: Do volitions exist as mental facts, or are they, as the sensists and others claim, reducible to sensations, images, feelings of strain, etc? What of free volitions? Is there any such thing as free will, or is every act of man rigidly determined by the laws of nature, or by such factors as experience, character, emotions, and motives? In order to answer these questions we shall undertake first of all an analysis of our mental processes, in which we will establish the existence of such acts as desire, choice, etc.; and secondly, we shall determine the nature of freedom and establish the truth of the following proposition:

(I) SOME ACTS OF THE WILL ARE FREE, AND THEREFORE DETERMINISM IS A FALSE INTERPRETATION



III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

3. The Nature and Scope of the Volitional Processes

a. The Meaning of the Terms Will and Volition

The term will is used to signify the faculty of rational appetency; and the term volition is used to designate all appetitive processes on the rational level.

b. The Scope of the Volitional Processes

The volitional processes include such mental tendencies as rational desire, choice or decision, resolution, intention, purpose, and the "higher" emotions.

4. Suggested Readings

Brennan, R.E., General Psychology, Problems 26, 27, 37
Brennan, R.E., Thomistic Psychology, Ch. 8
Gruender, H., Experimental Psychology, Ch. XVII
----------, Free Will
----------, Problems of Psychology, Chs. III,IV
Harmon, F.L., Principles of Psychology Ch. 19
Maher, M., Psychology, Chs. XVIII, XIX
Moore, T.V.,Dynamic Psychology, Pt.IV,Chs.I,II; and Pt.V.
Sheen, F.J., Freedom Under God, Chs.II,III,X,XIII

B. THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF VOLITIONS

1. Rational Appetency and Cognition

In addition to the rational cognitive processes of conception, judgment, inference, etc., discussed in the previous section, careful introspection as well as common-sense observation reveal the presence in the mind of other rational activities that are appetitive rather than cognitive in nature; that is, they incline the mind to or away from some object.[1] In contrast with the sensory appetitive processes which are organic in nature and which are stimulated by the apprehension of a material object as such, these rational tendencies are aroused only when an object is

[1]This appeal to experience is all that is needed to refute the sensist claim that appetitive processes do not exist, since introspection is the last court of appeal in determining the existence of mental processes of any kind. The introspective reports of the sensists on this point must be viewed in the light of their fundamental assumption that only sensations, images and feelings exist, this assumption leading to prejudiced findings.

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

intellectually apprehended as a good. The faculty of inclining towards such objects is called Will, and the acts themselves are designated the rational appetitive processes, or more simply, will-acts or volitions. Such volitions are always and necessarily preceded by a cognitive process: hence the phrase "intellectually apprehended." Stated concretely: I perceive an object (cognitive process), I judge it to be good (also cognitive), and then I desire it (volitional process). In addition, therefore, to the bare cognitive process, there must be an evaluative process (perception of the thing as good), since the will is stimulated or moved only by its formal object, namely, the good. Thus, if I do not apprehend an object as good, I do not experience the volitional tendency called desire. In such cases, I remain indifferent; or, if the object is apprehended as evil, I experience an opposite volitional tendency, a turning away from it, or aversion.

2. Volitions and Voluntary Acts

a. The Nature of Voluntary Acts

Volitions are called internal or elicited acts of the will to distinguish them from voluntary acts, which are called external or commanded acts of the will. Thus, even subjective acts like voluntary attention are external to the will. Accordingly, such acts as desires and resolutions are called volitions, whereas walking or talking (at least ordinarily) are voluntary actions. These actions are characterized by the fact that they are, for the most part, objective and observable in character. They are initiated by the will (and therefore are truly voluntary), but executed by the total animated organism. This distinction should always be borne in mind, because the problem of freedom is not entirely the same for both types of willed actions.

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

b. The Kinds of Voluntary Actions

i. Actually Voluntary Actions

An action is said to be actually voluntary when we expressly will its execution. Thus, the thought occurs to me to write a letter, and I set about writing it. The writing of the letter is described as actually voluntary since the action is executed in accordance with an act of the will here and now present.

ii. Virtually Voluntary Actions

Actions are described as virtually voluntary when they are executed in accordance with a previously formed volition, such as an intention or purpose. In such cases I do not here and now will the action, but rather I have willed or formed the intention or purpose which eventually results in and governs the action. The act is voluntary by virtue of the intention governing it.

iii. Habitually Voluntary Actions

Many actions that at first are actually voluntary gradually become mechanized and eventually crystallize as stereotyped habits. Such actions are called habitually voluntary actions: "habitually" because they are performed in the manner of a habit, - they are facile, mechanical, stereotyped ways of acting; "voluntary" because originally they were initiated by the will. As full-fledged habits, however, they are characterized by a lack of volitional control and by a comparative absence of consciousness and attention. These factors are important to a full understanding of the problem of freedom, as we shall have occasion to see in a later section, especially in view of the fact that a large part of our everyday actions are of this kind.

C. VOLITION AND DESIRE

1. The Nature of Desire

a. Definition

Desire is the simplest of the appetitive processes. It can be described as a mental

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

tendency or want aroused by the apprehension of an absent good. Desire involves therefore, as necessary conditions, the representation of some object not actually enjoyed, and the appreciation of this object as good. The resulting want or craving constitutes the essence of desire.

b. Desire as Sensuous and as Rational

It must be recognized of course that desire of a kind exists also on the purely sensuous plane, as when we desire an object or experience that here and now appeals only to the organic side of our nature. Such inclinations are sometimes referred to as sensory impulses or appetites, but in so far as they definitely involve cognition of some good, the term <u>desire</u> is not inappropriate. In this case, however, the object is not <u>intellectually</u> apprehended as a good; since, if it were, the desire would be an act of the will. Instead, an object that excites, or is known to excite sense pleasure, stimulates the sense appetite, and the resulting inclination is called sense desire.

c. Desire as Necessary and as Free

When an object is intellectually perceived merely as good, the will necessarily tends towards it, since <u>the good as such</u> constitutes the formal object of the will. In such instances, therefore, the first impulsive movement of the will is necessary - I cannot help desiring what I conceive as a good. In this sense, then, the will is said to be the source or principle of necessary as well as of free acts. However, once I realize that the desire is present, I can <u>consent</u> to it, or not. If I do, the desire becomes a free act, since it is also within my power to reject it. Thus the desire, originating as a necessary, spontaneous act of the will, is converted into a free act by my consent.

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

D. THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF MOTIVATION

1. The Nature of Motivation

a. Definition

By the term motive we mean simply that which moves the will. This is merely a verbal definition. Defined specifically and more adequately, it is some aspect of good intellectually perceived in an object.[1] It is not the object in itself, but the object as apprehended, that constitutes the motive. In simple terms therefore, it is my reason for acting in a particular way. The motive then arouses desire, and the desire in turn may or may not be translated into action, depending usually on our decision in the face of conflicting motivies.[2]

b. Motive and the Will

Since desire is necessarily aroused when an object is apprehended as good, it can be said that the motive determines the will to act in the first instance. But it does not determine the will finally, since over and above the bare spontaneous desire is the power of consent, and in this stage the motive can be accepted or rejected.

c. Kinds of Motives

The foregoing description of motivation shows that there are intellectual factors influencing our desires, choices and actions. It is only to these that, in strict propriety, we apply the term motive. A looser usage, however, leads many writers to use the same word motive for any factor that in any way causes or results in action, thus confusing motives with needs, impulses, stimuli, etc. In recent years, too, the term unconscious motivation has come into vogue, and is used to designate the

[1] It should be kept in mind in this connection that the term "good" is used in several ways. It may mean something that is useful (bonum utile), or something pleasurable (bonum delectabile), or something that is rationally satisfying (bonum honestum), or finally, complete happiness (summum bonum). The tendency towards an object may be for any one of these reasons.

[2] Cf. Maher, M., Psychology, p. 385, footnote.

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

influence on actions of experiences, wishes, desires, etc., - quasi-instinctive urges as it were - of which a person is totally unaware. Such factors may at times influence our actions. In so far as they do, the will plays a lesser part in such actions, or may even be entirely in abeyance since, strictly speaking, the will is directly influenced only by intellectual presentation of good. And thus the use of the term motivation for these other influences is hardly appropriate. For our purposes, therefore, the term motive will retain its original meaning.[1]

E. THE PROCESS OF DELIBERATION

1. The Nature of Deliberation

Deliberation occurs whenever two or more opposed motives (and thus desires) are experienced simultaneously. It may be defined simply as the mental weighing or balancing of opposed motives. More strictly, it is a process of reflecting upon values, prior to deciding, by means of which I determine which motive I will accept, which I will reject. It is an experience which every normal person easily recognizes, since contrary desires occur in all of us at one time or other. It goes without saying, of course, that in many instances where opposed motives occur, protracted deliberation is not necessary: one of the alternatives might be, and often is adopted in one way or another: impulsively, or from force of habit, or after very brief reflection. But where motives are of nearly equal strength, more extended deliberation is likely to ensue.

2. Deliberation and Spontaneous Action

In this connection we must bear in mind that the greater number of our everyday actions are

[1]The doctrine of unconscious motivation has its origin in the work and writings of the Viennese psychiatrist, Sigmund Freud, the founder and foremost exponent of Psychoanalysis. It was Freud's contention that most of our everyday actions are determined by unconscious "motives." As a result of this position, Freud stands out as one of the most ardent exponents of present-day determinism.

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

habitually, or at the most virtually, voluntary actions - the outcome of usual, ordinary ways of acting and thinking. Such unreflective action is called "spontaneous"; and many of our acts are the result of this spontaneous tendency of the will. Even in many actions of which we are explicitly conscious, the consent given is only virtual or implicit, - we do not formally will their execution. Such actions are not free in the strict sense; since, as we shall see later, the conditions necessary for freedom are not fulfilled in these instances. If such actions, however, have a moral aspect, they involve responsibility, since they are voluntary-in-cause; that is, they were originally initiated by the will, and we are therefore indirectly responsible for them.

F. DECISION OR CHOICE

1. The Nature of Choice

The process of deliberation is ordinarily followed by our acceptance of one motive to the exclusion and rejection of opposing motives, and this act of acceptance is called decision or choice. We may describe this, or even express it at the time by a (free) practical judgment: "This is what I want."; and as a result I identify myself with (that is, accept) the preferred motive. Such common phrases as "I decided," "I yielded," "I made up my mind," "I made a choice," etc., exemplify clearly the act of choice as it occurs in our daily lives. Both processes of deliberation and choice exemplify free or self-determined volition in the strictest sense.

2. Kinds of Decision

a. The Reasonable Decision: One made on grounds of reason

b. The Impetuous Decision: One made to escape indecision

c. The Acquiescent Decision: One in which we follow the line of least resistance; where we follow the spontaneous tendency of the will, yielding to motives, and influenced strongly by character, past experience, etc.

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

d. The Anti-impulsive Decision: A decision that is contrary to our instincts, natural inclinations, etc. It involves a distinct feeling of effort. In this type of decision, our power of self-determination is perhaps most clearly evidenced.

G. FREE WILL, OR PSYCHOLOGICAL FREEDOM

1. Determinism: Its Nature and Types

Many scientists, philosophers and psychologists regard man as a being whose actions are as rigidly regulated and determined by the inexorable laws of nature as are those of the lower animals and of inanimate things. This follows, of course, from their denial of rationality in man, and the doctrine itself is called <u>determinism</u>. Determinism is founded on the assumption that man's actions are controlled by external or internal factors and it involves therefore the denial of free choice, along with any form of self-control. Two types of determinism are distinguishable: 1) <u>Physical Determinism</u>, according to which man's actions are regarded as functioning in accordance with the same laws that govern the physical universe; that is, man is a mere machine, his mental processes having nothing to do with his actions; and 2) <u>Psychological Determinism</u>, according to which man's actions can be entirely explained in terms of his genetic or personal history, his character, or his motives; that is, his conscious states determine his actions, leaving no room for freedom.

2. Indeterminism: the Doctrine of Free Will

Opposed to the above doctrine is the contention of the scholastics called <u>Moderate Indeterminism</u>, according to which some of man's actions are free; that is, they cannot be explained as an invariable sequence of external cause and effect, nor solely as the result of character, heredity, motives, etc. This doctrine contends therefore that, under certain conditions, human beings have free choice and the power of



III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

self-determination. It is opposed to any form of determinism.

3. The Meaning and Kinds of Freedom: "Free Will" explained

To avoid confusion, it should be kept in mind that the term "freedom" has several meanings, and that indeterminism is concerned in establishing the reality of only one kind of freedom. Thus there is:

a. Physical Freedom (Freedom from coercion or external restraint)

This is freedom of spontaneous action and is common to man and the lower animals. Thus, I am physically free to walk across the room, and a horse is physically free to roam within the confines of its pasture. This means merely that the individual is neither coerced nor constrained by physical factors.

b. Moral Freedom (Freedom from Obligation; Freedom of Independence)

In a certain sense man does not possess moral freedom, since the obligation imposed by the moral law binds with absolute necessity. Thus, a man is not <u>morally</u> free with respect to the dictum that one must avoid doing wrong. Man's ability to act contrary to this dictum is a result of his freedom of choice. This paradoxical situation can be summed up in the phrase: He <u>can</u> (disobey the moral law), but he <u>may</u> not. This statement, however, involves a transition from the psychological order (he can) to the moral order (he may not). It asserts psychological freedom and denies moral freedom.

Moral freedom, in a wider sense however, does exist in those situations where no moral obligation is operative. Moral freedom of this kind pertains simply to actions not commanded or forbidden.

c. Psychological Freedom ("Free Will"; Freedom from Internal Necessity; Free Choice; Freedom of Active Indifference)

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

1. Nature and Definition of Psychological Freedom

Psychological Freedom means immunity from that internal necessity which regulates the actions of all purely animal or material beings. It is the freedom of rational beings to choose between alternatives, to determine within limits their own course of action, to regulate their own destiny. It is expressed in the term <u>free will</u>, and it should be kept in mind that this appetitive faculty alone is free. Strictly speaking, no other powers in man are free, except with the freedom they derive from the will. Furthermore, not every act of will is free: will-acts are free only when certain requisite conditions are fulfilled; thus the distinction between deliberate acts (<u>actus humani</u>) and indeliberate acts (<u>actus hominis</u>).

Psychological Freedom therefore may be described as <u>that capacity whereby man, when all requisite conditions are fulfilled, is free to act or not to act, to act this way rather than that</u>. The phrase "to act or not to act" signifies what is called <u>freedom of exercise</u>, and this means the self-determination to move towards a good or not to move towards it. The phrase "to act this way rather than that" signifies <u>freedom of specification</u>, and this means the power to choose one good to the exclusion or rejection of others. Freedom of the will may be said to reside formally in freedom of exercise. Thus, when two unequal goods are presented to me the act of preference is certainly not free - I necessarily <u>prefer</u> the better - but there is nothing which necessitates me to <u>choose</u> one or the other, that is, to move towards or adopt either one, however strong my preference may be. I exercise my freedom, then, <u>not in preferring</u>, but <u>in choosing</u>, thus determining <u>myself</u> by

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

consenting to one of the alternatives, or by rejecting both.

ii. The Basis of Free Will: The Source of Active Indifference

Psychological freedom arises from the fact that the will, through the instrumentation of the intellect, can embrace both the absolute and the universal good. It is a rational appetite which, strictly speaking, embraces nothing of necessity except the absolute and the universal good. Therefore, as long as any object is apprehended as a limited good, the will can reject it, no matter how attractive it may be. And it goes without saying that no object in this life is ever apprehended as the absolute good. The clear apprehension of this good would remove freedom. It is for this reason that, with respect to contingent goods, the will is described as actively indifferent, since no one of these goods can completely satisfy the will.

In the psychological sense, then, freedom of will flows from man's powers of abstraction and generalization - the ability to form the concept of the good and to apprehend values. Given this power, man can perceive both good and non-good in an object (what is generally called the process of evaluation), and it thus becomes possible for him to form an <u>indifferent</u> judgment. The judgment in this case is described as <u>objectively indifferent</u>, that is, it is one in which an object is appraised on the one hand as desirable, and on the other as <u>not necessary</u>, since the perceived object, <u>while good</u>, is <u>not good in every respect</u>. Were the object apprehended <u>as necessary</u>, the will would not be free with respect to this object. From the foregoing it will be seen quite readily that while freedom resides formally in the will, it has its roots in man's intellectual power.

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

iii. The Conditions of Free Choice

It is important to remember that the doctrine of Moderate Indeterminism asserts that man is free only when certain conditions are fulfilled. The first of these is the active functioning of consciousness and attention. Acts, therefore, performed unconsciously or in a state of abstraction cannot be said to be free. Moreover, both consciousness and attention admit of degrees, and thus there are degrees of freedom, which means that when either consciousness or attention is at a low level, we are that much less free. The student himself can apply this principle to such states as coma, intoxication, habitual acts, drugged states, delirium, hypnosis, sleep and the like. It is instructive to recall in this connection that our legal system fully recognizes this factor in judging responsibility.

The second condition requisite for free choice is the power and the employment of intellectual deliberation. Every free volition must be preceded by an objectively indifferent judgment. To the extent that deliberation is made difficult or impossible, to that extent are we less free or actually determined in our actions. This situation arises in the case of individuals with reduced intelligence, as in dementia and feeblemindedness, in many of the states of clouded consciousness described above, and also in cases where one motive is so attractive that it sometimes overpowers the will, as seems to be true with such motives as life itself. In this connection it should be remembered that if a person is responsible for his inability to deliberate, the act, while not free here and now, is nevertheless imputable to the person as an act voluntary in cause.

The third condition for freedom of choice is the presence of at least two motives,

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

since obviously it would be impossible to make a choice if only one motive were present. "If there be but one motive within the range of intellectual vision, the volition in such circumstances is not free, but necessary." (Maher: p.396). In this life, however, such a situation seldom endures for more than an instant, since for every motive there is an alternative, if it be nothing more than the alternative of not acting at all. From the foregoing it can be seen that Moderate Indeterminism subscribes neither to causeless volition, nor to motiveless volition. The will is the cause, and it acts only when influenced by motives, and chooses only when there are at least two alternatives.

iv. Factors Influencing Psychological Freedom

1. Character, Habits, Emotions

Experience teaches that the way we act is more often than not seriously influenced by our character, our habits, and particularly our emotions. And certainly our power of self-determination or freedom is lessened or even eradicated to the extent that these factors influence or determine the course of our actions. What actually occurs of course is that these factors at times abolish the conditions requisite for free will. This is clearly illustrated in emotionally controlled actions, where the power of deliberation may be practically suspended. To admit the influence of these factors, however, is quite different from the assertion that they determine our every action. It is possible of course that degraded persons are controlled entirely by such factors; but is this true in the case of normal, healthy individuals? Has not every such person had the experience of acting contrary to his character, his habits, and his emotions?

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

2. The Influence of Motives

We have already seen that motives by their very nature influence the will, and that when conditions requisite for freedom are absent, they actually determine the will to act. Now the question arises: Does the stronger motive always prevail? This question is important, since it is often contended that action is invariably determined by the stronger motive. Our solution of this problem will depend on our interpretation of the above question. First of all, it is certainly true that in many instances we freely elect the more appealing of two alternatives, and thus it may be that in this case the stronger motive actually prevails. Again, it may occur that I freely deliberate before electing a course of action, and by this process strengthen what was originally a weaker motive. Here, again, - provided I actually choose the strengthened motive - it may be said that the stronger motive finally prevails.

Finally, there is the circumstance in which an objectively weaker motive is made stronger by my choosing it; and here, too, it may be argued that the "stronger" motive actually prevails. It is "stronger" by reason of my making it my own. In no one of these cases, however, is the motive a determining factor because of its greater strength. Rather, the "stronger" motive prevails because I have freely elected it, or because either by deliberation or by my choice I have made it the more appealing of two alternatives.[1]

[1]The fact that the will is basically independent of the strength of the motive is clearly illustrated in those instances where a motive is strengthened by deliberation. Here, even after a motive has been made intensely appealing by careful evaluation, it is still within my power either to accept it or to reject it. Were the motive

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

4. Proofs of Psychological Freedom

a. The Psychological Proof: Freedom of the Will as a Datum of Experience

The most certain and convincing arguments for freedom of the will come from experience itself, - arguments that possess the virtue of being verifiable by anyone who cares to do so. There is first of all the fact of voluntary attention which, by experience and definition, is the free direction of cognitive energy to some object present to the mind. A conspicuous instance of this is the voluntary direction of thought, such as occurs in the solving of a problem. Another instance is the experience of deliberation, and this perhaps, more so than any other example, clearly denotes freedom of the will, since if the motive were a determining factor in every sense, the process of deliberation would be a psychological absurdity.

Allied to these experiences is another - the ability to adhere to a resolution or decision, no matter what the strength of contrary impulses and tendencies. It seems a bit absurd here to speak of being necessitated by impulse to act in one way, when myaction here and now is exactly contrary to those impulses which, of and by themselves, possess a greater determining power. Should I, in a given situation, yield to those influences, the consequence would likely be an experience of remorse and repentence; and these, too, connote freedom. It is not likely that I would experience remorse or repentence for something which I could not help doing. If such were the case

a determining factor, it is certain that in these instances particularly the will would be forced in its choice. To the contrary, however, experience teaches that the final choice depends upon my free, self-determined election; and in this sense I am independent of the strength of the motive whatever the source of that strength may be.

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

I might feel regret or sorrow, but never remorse. Such experiences are the most inexplicable psychological oddities unless the will is free.

In the act of choice itself, the fact of freedom can be verified from experience. Faced with making a choice, I perceive clearly that I am being influenced by conflicting motives, that they are of equal or varying strength, and that the issue is decided by my free election of one of the alternatives or the rejection of both of them. This freedom of action becomes especially clear in important questions, such as choosing a vocation, deciding on a dangerous operation, etc.

Finally, there is the fact that our attitude with respect to future conduct and events becomes psychologically inexplicable unless freedom of will exists. It would be both presumptious and foolhardy, for example, to make promises, or to predict what one is going to do, or to ask for advice with respect to certain of our actions, if it were not within our power to so regulate and control our actions that these promises and predictions could be realized, or advice acted upon. In brief, our actions attest the fact of freedom at every turn because we know from experience that we are free.

The foregoing proof of freedom of the will can be stated formally in the following manner:

If I have actual experience of self-determination, the will is free;

But I do have actual experience of self-determination;

Therefore, the will is free.

The major is evident.

The minor is evidenced in various situations in which every normal individual finds himself at one time or another:

(1) Before choice, when we attend to motives, deliberate, hesitate, consult others, etc. about various modes of action;

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

(2) During the act of choice, when we make important decisions, adhere to resolutions under strong temptation, or decide on trivial matters (as shown also in laboratory studies);

(3) After choice, when we experience remorse, self-approval, etc.

These experiences, had repeatedly by everyone, lie at the basis of the universal conviction of freedom held by all who are unprejudiced by deterministic theorizing.

b. The Proof from Moral Concepts

This argument can be stated very briefly by saying that certain moral concepts such as responsibility, obligation, justice, merit, reward and punishment, are practically meaningless if the will is not free. It is difficult to understand, for example, how a person can be held responsible for an act if he was not free not to do it. Yet, responsibility is the keynote of justice in a human society. Allied to this is the notion of obligation. If I am obliged (i.e., morally necessitated) to obey the law, it certainly must be within my power to do so. The very notion of justice itself demands freedom of action, since it is founded on the assumption that individuals are really responsible for their actions under certain conditions. It would be a strange situation, indeed, if everyone were to plead in our courts of law that they were determined in their actions, and therefore should not be punished!

The same holds true with respect to the other concepts mentioned: merit, reward, and punishment. Do we bestow merit or reward for actions over which a person had no control? Or do we punish men for actions when it was not within their power to act otherwise? It can be seen from these arguments that freedom of the will not only makes these various notions intelligible; it makes society itself

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

intelligible. The student can picture for himself the moral and social havoc that would ensue if the determinist interpretation were accepted as a guiding principle.

The proof from moral concepts may be stated formally as follows:

All moral concepts derive from one fundamental precept: man must do good and avoid evil;

But this precept would be unreasonable if man is not free;

Therefore, man is free.

The major is a statement of fact.

The minor becomes evident upon a little reflection; for, without freedom, to be obliged to do what I cannot do and to avoid what I cannot avoid, is manifestly unreasonable.

The foregoing proofs, added to the preceding analysis of the processes of volition and the influence of various factors on these processes, render the doctrine of determinism in either of its forms wholly unacceptable. The cardinal error of determinism, as with so many other theories, consists in starting from false premises and preconceived notions, and forgetting or ignoring the overwhelming evidence of reason and experience. The determinist argues that because there is determinism in the physical order and in the order of brute life, there must be a corresponding determinism in the human order. This, however, is not the case. Such a conclusion would follow only if an unbroken continuity between the various orders of existence could be established. And this, we have seen, is itself impossible. Man is a rational animal, and therefore the explanations and theories that fit the purely organic and inanimate worlds do not necessarily apply in the case of man. Therefore, to arrive at a true concept of man, and a satisfactory solution of the problem of

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

human action, it is necessary to start from reasoned principles and experience, - not from preconceived theories and hypotheses. If experience taught that man is not free, no amount of argument or theorizing would suffice to keep alive the universal conviction of freedom that has always existed in the minds of men. By the same token, however, no amount of theorizing will ever suffice to eradicate this conviction of freedom as long as experience and reason testify that man is free.

5. Experimental Investigation of Volition

The foregoing explanations of volition and freedom have been confirmed by laboratory studies. Important in this connection is the work of such men as Michotte and Prum, Aveling, Boyd-Barrett, Lindworsky, etc., whose researches have shown clearly that the restricted views of the sensists and determinists cannot be sustained in the light of experimental results.[1]

Questions and Exercises

1. What is the Scholastic doctrine on free will called?
2. How do volitions differ from voluntary acts?
3. What is meant by the term "psychological determinism"?
4. Describe the influence of habits and emotions on human actions.
5. Explain the phrase: "Not all acts of the will are free."
6. What is the difference between a sensuous and a rational desire?
7. Does the will execute the bodily movements in voluntary actions? Explain.
8. How does a spontaneous act differ from a free act?
9. Explain the statement, "An act, even though voluntary, is not necessarily free."
10. What is meant when it is said that freedom is rooted in the intellect?

[1]For a summary presentation of these important investigations and their results, see Gruender, H., Experimental Psychology, Ch. IV.

III. THE NATURE OF VOLITION, Cont'd

11. How do you distinguish moral from psychological freedom?
12. Explain the assertion that we are sometimes responsible for voluntary acts even though they may not be free.
13. Which conditions must be fulfilled before an act is free?
14. What is a motive? Why is unconscious motivation impossible?
15. What is meant by "freedom of exercise"?



IV. THE MIND AND SOUL IN RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

A. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

1. The Rejection of a Rational, Substantial Soul: Sensism, Materialism, Evolutionism and Positivism.

It should be clear to the student by now that the several problems of rational psychology fit into a closely-knit pattern. A denial of any one of its major contentions involves, by implication if not by explicit assertion, a denial of the others. In a sense, therefore, the problem of the existence and nature of the soul, with which we are now concerned, is simply a continuation of the preceding problems, although it is basically more philosophical in character. It should not be a matter of surprise, then, that our arguments in this connection should be directed against much the same tendencies in modern thought that we encountered in discussing the problems of thought and volition. All four of the above-named theories - sensism, materialism, evolutionism and positivism - denying as they do the rationality of man and the reality of the spirit, destroy the foundations for a philosophy of the human soul. Sensism, in its rejection of rational activities leaves us nothing but a sensory consciousness indissolubly linked to the material organism. Materialism, of course, is an outright denial of the existence of a mind or soul of any kind. Evolutionism would trace the origin of whatever mind does exist to lower forms, and ultimately to matter. And positivism scoffs at the concept that anything beyond the purely sensible exists.

2. The Problem

Thus do we face the problem: Do human beings possess a mind or soul that is something apart from the mental processes, and distinct from the material part of man's nature? Or is the mind nothing more than a sum of mental processes, and the soul a figment of primitive superstition? If the soul does exist, what is its nature? What characteristics does it possess? What is its

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL Cont'd

origin and destiny? What, incidentally, is the relation between the concepts of "mind" and of "soul"?

3. The Nature of our Knowledge Concerning Mind and Soul

The student should keep in mind that whatever knowledge we derive regarding the existence and nature of the human soul is the outcome of reason and not of introspection, experiment, or measurement. It is true that our development of this problem takes its start from knowledge gained by introspection and casual observation, but this knowledge by itself, unaided by deductive inference, would not reveal the existence and nature of the soul. The concept of the soul is a metaphysical one, arrived at by inference, and our knowledge of it is necessarily philosophical in character.

4. Suggested Readings

Brennan, R.E., General Psychology, Problems 22, 38.
----------, Thomistic Psychology, Chs. 1, 12.
Gruender, H., Problems of Psychology, Chs. 5, 6, 7.
Maher, M., Psychology, Chs. XXI - XXVI incl.

B. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MIND

1. The Sensist-Structuralist Theory: Mind and Consciousness

According to this view, championed by Titchener and his followers, mind is merely the sum, or structured totality, of those processes ordinarily referred to as "conscious." Mind, we are told, is structured consciousness. This "structuration" of the mind is accomplished through the mechanisms of association working on accumulated experience. It will be seen from this that the structuralist employs the same principle of explanation - association - whether he is dealing with mental processes or with the mind itself.

2. The Functionalist-Evolutionist Theory

This theory takes the stand that mind is the product of a long process of evolution from lower forms, and is regarded as a functioning totality of conscious processes by means of which an individual, human or animal, responds adaptively to

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL Cont'd

its environment. It stresses what the mind does - that is, its function - rather than what it is. Chief among the exponents of this view is Angell, whose viewpoint has gained many adherents among the rank and file of psychologists.

3. The Psychoanalytic View: Mind and Psyche

The psychoanalysts extend the concept of mind to include not only conscious processes, but unconscious ones as well. Since the terms mind and consciousness are so nearly identical, the analysts adopt the term psyche, employing it to mean the totality of conscious and unconscious processes by means of which an individual responds to his environment. The term is often used by these writers as a substitute for both mind and soul, although they do not mean to imply that the psyche is a substantial, immaterial principle. Like the preceding view, the psychoanalytic interpretation is based on evolutionary principles.

4. The Scholastic Position

Scholastics mean by mind, not a mere sum of processes, but the ultimate principle by which we feel, sense, think and will; the root and the source of the conscious processes. This principle is shown to be distinct from the acts which it produces. It is also shown to be a substantial, immaterial principle, which has its origin in a creative act of God, and which is destined for immortality. Our task will be to explain and prove these several assertions, and thereby refute all the non-Scholastic theories.

C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIND AND SOUL

These two notions, while not altogether identical, are very closely allied. It is well to distinguish them carefully. Let us express it this way: The concept of mind has its origin in the attempt to answer the question, What is the ultimate source of our sensations, images, feelings, thoughts, volitions, etc., that is, of our conscious life? The concept of soul, on the other hand, originates in the answer to the question: What is the ultimate source in man of all living

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL Cont'd

activities? What is the principle, not only of his conscious processes, but of those that are purely vegetative as well? Thus, the mind is regarded as the source of those vital activities which are distinctly mental in character, while the soul is thought of as the source of all vital activities, mental and non-mental alike. Careful analysis will reveal, therefore, that soul and mind, while conceptually or logically distinguishable, are not distinct in reality. There are not two vital principles in man - a soul and a mind - but rather the mind is the soul acting at a psychical level. We may conclude, therefore, that the terms mind and soul, when used to signify the ultimate source of mental life, are synonymous. This interpretation will enable us to dispense with the dual terminology in future discussion.

D. THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE SOUL

1. The Existence of the Soul: Materialism and Vitalism

According to materialists, all reality is fundamentally material in character, and all processes, living and non-living, mental and bodily, are explainable in terms of the purely physical and chemical properties of matter. For materialists, therefore, the problem of the existence and nature of the soul does not exist. The modern school of Behaviorism is an outstanding example within psychology of this viewpoint, since it denies the very existence of consciousness and the soul along with it.

Opposed to this theory is the view that all living things - plants, animals, and man - are differentiated from non-living things by the possession and manifestation of properties and activities that cannot be ultimately explained in terms of merely physical and chemical energies. Thus, at the organic or vegetative level, there are the processes of nutrition, growth, and reproduction; at the sentient level are the activities of sensation, imagination, feeling, etc.; and at the supra-sensuous level are the processes

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

of rational thought and volition. It is these distinctly vital activities that lie at the basis of the contention that in all living things there is a special principle that is superior to the chemical and physical properties of inorganic matter. It is this vital principle which is designated by the term "soul," which in plants is vegetative, in animals is sentient, and in man is rational in nature.

On what grounds do we assert the existence of such a distinct vital principle in man? On the best grounds possible, namely, that every effect must have an adequate cause. Non-living matter cannot be an adequate cause of living processes, and therefore, to account for the vital activities we have described above, we assert that besides the material principle in living things there exists also a vital principle which is the source of the distinctly vital activities manifested in all living things including man. This tells us nothing of the ultimate nature of the vital principle - whether it is simple or extended, material or immaterial - but it does tell us that such a principle must of necessity exist.

2. The Unicity of the Human Soul

Some earlier writers, because of the different kinds of living activities in man, inclined to the view that there is more than one such vital principle or soul in man. Scholastics, however, and vitalists generally, are agreed that there is in man but one actuating principle, the rational soul, which is the source of all vital activities whether of a vegetative, sentient or rational nature. In other words, the three types of activities in man do not demand but rather exclude a plurality of souls. This can be seen from the interrelatedness and mutual interdependence of all vital activities in man. For example, disturbances in digestion (vegetative function) can cause emotional disfunction (mental function); worry, in turn, can disrupt bodily efficiency; thought (rational function)

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

is dependent upon sensation (sensory function); image can be compared with idea; will can direct the process of thought; and so on. Obviously, if these several processes originated in distinct principles such interrelatedness would be impossible, and we are thus forced to the conclusion that the rational, sentient, and vegetative processes in man originate in one principle, and that is the rational soul. This is saying no more than that the human soul subsumes the functions which, at lower stages of life, are activated by the vegetative and sentient souls.

3. The Soul as a Substantial Principle

The question of the substantiality of the soul is crucial since it is this characteristic that is denied, implicitly or explicitly, by all those who assert that the mind is nothing more than the sum of conscious processes. Moreover, unless it can be shown that the soul is substantial, it is impossible to prove from philosophy either its continued identity or its immortality.[1]

a. The Concept of Substance: Its Meaning and Validity

Substance is defined as that which exists <u>in se</u>, or that which subsists in itself. It stands in contrast to <u>accident</u>, which is defined as that which of its nature inheres in something else as in a subject of inhesion. Thus, such qualities as color, taste, shape, size, etc., are accidents, and that in which they inhere is called substance. Substance must not be thought of as an inner core or substrate which would be revealed if only the accidents could be removed

[1]The denial of a substantial mind is an inevitable result of the trend towards positivism in psychology. The concept of substance being metaphysical, and therefore beyond the pale of observational science, the positivist in psychology regards "mind" as being constituted of that which is observable, and that of course is the mental processes. Since, therefore, mental processes are by nature accidental, this view leads ineluctibly to a denial of mind as substance. The doctrine of structuralism is perhaps the most systematic expression of this viewpoint, which claims many adherents among all classes of psychologists.

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

from the object. The thing itself is substantial (the tree, horse, man, water, etc.), and the qualities or properties which it exhibits are the accidents, these qualities being logically separable but never all actually separated from the subject in which they inhere. What is known by observation, therefore, are these accidents, and from them we pass on to a knowledge of the substance. Substance, then, is an object of thought, not of immediate sense experience, and is known by means of inference rather than by direct observation.[1]

b. Proof of the Substantiality of the Soul

Whatever exists must in the last analysis either subsist in itself or inhere in another being, that is, it must be substantial or accidental in nature. Now since it is the nature of mental processes to be accidental - to require something in which to inhere - the soul itself must be substantial. Our ideas, judgments, inferences, volitions are not "self-existing" things, nor do they subsist in each other - they necessarily presuppose a subject of which they are the modifications, just as color or shape require something in which to inhere. We implicitly recognize this fact in everyday conversation when we say, for example, "I have an idea" or "The thought preyed on his mind." Herein is implied the distinction between the thinker and the thinking process itself, between the mind as a subject of inhesion, and the thought as something inhering in the mind. Philosophic reasoning bears out this common-sense distinction.

Moreover, mental processes are acts and thus require for their production a principle that is substantial in nature. It is inconceivable that an accident could cause itself or be the

[1]This point requires special emphasis. One must be careful always to distinguish between substance and substantial thing. The latter, of course, may be observable; whereas substance as such is known only by inference.

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

adequate cause of other accidents. Therefore, mental acts, like all other activities, must proceed from a cause that is substantial in nature.

c. The Soul as Incomplete Substance

A complete substance is defined as one which of its nature is not ordained to form part of a natural unit of a higher order; whereas an incomplete substance is one so ordained. Thus, a human being is a complete substance, whereas the soul is an incomplete substance since it is ordained to form with the body a unit of a higher order - the human person. The body, therefore, is also an incomplete substance in this sense. Both body and soul are real substances, not accidents, but each requires the other for completeness: the body without the soul is lifeless, a mere unstable aggregate of non-living substances; the soul without the body cannot function on the vegetative or sensory levels.

4. The Permanent Identity of the Soul

a. The Concept of Identity

Many psychologists, adhereing to the concept of mind as a sum of mental processes, have been led to question or deny the continuing identity or essential sameness of the mind, since it is quite obvious that mental phenomena are constantly undergoing change. This standpoint, therefore, is a natural corollary of the denial of mind as a substance, although it should not be inferred from this that substantiality and identity are essential to each other. Substances do change, and are therefore deprived of their identity in some instances. But in the case of the human soul it is argued that, besides being substantial, it is a being that remains essentially the same throughout the unceasing changes of consciousness.

b. Proof of the Identity of the Soul

That the soul or mind continues the same throughout life is attested by many facts. The simplest act of reflection reveals clearly the

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

distinction between the constantly changing mental processes and the mind or subject that remains the same throughout these changes. Again, the processes of judgment, reasoning and volition are possible only to an agent that persists the same during the progression from subject to predicate, from premise to conclusion, or from one motive to another. Particularly is this true in acts of recollection, whereby the past is telescoped into the present. Such an act is possible only because the experience which is here and now reinstated in consciousness occurred originally as a modification of the self-same, identical agent who now recognizes it as his own. The facts of memory are inexplicable apart from the assumption of a continually abiding mind.

Were the mind, then, merely a succession of conscious processes, such identity would be impossible, so that the question of identity is closely bound up with the problem of substantiality. Moreover, were the body regarded as the substantial principle in which these processes inhere, identity would again be precluded since it is a well-known fact that the material part of man's nature is constantly changing; and from this we may conclude that not only is the mind substantial, but it is a reality that cannot be identified with the organic part of man's nature.

The importance of this characteristic of mind cannot be overestimated. Our ability to remember, to reflect, to plan our future, to hold fast to the hope of a future life - all of these depend upon the continuing identity of the mind. Arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, the conviction of personal identity is rooted deeply in the minds of all men - even those who argue against it.

5. The Simplicity and Indivisibility of the Soul

a. The Nature of Simplicity

To describe a thing as simple is to say that it is not made up either of spatial parts

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

(quantitative simplicity), or constituent principles (entitative simplicity) of any kind; that it is, therefore, unextended. Such an object is of course indivisible, since to be divisible a thing must first have parts into which it can be divided. When reference is made in every-day speech to the "immense complexity" of the human mind, this is not to be taken as a denial of simplicity, but merely as a reference to the diverse ways in which mind expresses itself, and to the interrelatedness of the many mental processes.

b. Proof of the Soul's Simplicity

The fact that the soul is not composite, but is both quantitatively and essentially simple, is derived from the unity of consciousness, and from the nature of the mental processes themselves. First of all, it is an incontestable fact that all processes of mind appear as modes of one being. Now this being must be indivisible, since if it were composite, mental states would appear as discrete bits of consciousness, quite as unrelated, disconnected and unintegrated as are the separate consciousnesses of individuals in a crowd. It is the ability of mind to bring unity into the multiplicity of conscious processes that establishes beyond doubt its essential indivisibility. If a composite substance (as, for example, the brain) were the ultimate subject, and not merely the "tool" of consciousness, such unity would be impossible.

This fact of simplicity is borne out also by a consideration of mental processes. Ideas, for example, are of their nature simple, indivisible acts, since it is impossible that they should be in any way extended. And therefore, in view of the dictum that an effect must be proportionate to its cause, it must be that the source of these processes is itself simple and indivisible. Again, the acts of judgment, inference and choice are possible only to an

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

indivisible being. Were the mind a composite entity, the two terms of the judgment, inference, or volition would then occur as modifications of discrete parts, and any assent, conclusion or decision would be as impossible as would be the case were the two terms experienced by different minds. To form a judgment, it is necessary that the terms be simultaneously apprehended by one indivisible agent, and the same holds true for inference and choice. This is what is meant by the unity of consciousness, and of its very nature it demands indivisibility in the principle of consciousness.

6. The Spirituality of the Human Soul

a. The Nature of Spirituality

To define a being as spiritual is to signify that in its existence and at least in some of its activities it is independent of matter. As for the human soul, it is contended that in its existence, and in some of its operations, it must be regarded as independent of the body and that it is therefore spiritual in nature.

b. Proof of the Spirituality of the Soul

That the soul is intrinsically independent of matter in some of its operations follows from what was said previously of the nature of thought and of the intellect, since the intellect is simply a power of the soul. There it was pointed out that thought is immaterial in character, and as such it must be produced independently of matter. The power to apprehend abstract and universal ideas, to grasp necessary truths, to apprehend relations, and above all, the power of self-conscious reflection, are all non-organic in character, utterly opposed in nature to the properties of matter. Such obviously immaterial processes could not proceed from a material agent, since an effect can never transcend its cause; and therefore the soul, which is the agent of thought, must itself be immaterial in nature.

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

Volition, too, can be shown to be intrinsically independent of matter. Man can desire and choose immaterial goods, a power no purely material being possesses. Moreover, if the soul were not of its nature independent of matter, free volitions would be impossible, for an agent intrinsically dependent on matter would be subject to the laws governing matter, and all acts of the will would thus be reduced to a mechanical sequence of cause and effect. Free will is possible only to an agent that can transcend the limitations imposed on material things by the laws of nature; so that spirituality of the soul is as much a fact as is freedom of the will.

We see then that the human soul, as the agent of thought and volition, acts independently of matter (the body); and for a being to act independently of matter in any way at all, it must be intrinsically independent of matter in its existence. It is inconceivable that a being immersed in, or identified with, matter could ever act independently of it. Thus, our only conclusion can be that the soul is a spiritual substance.

E. THE ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL

1. The Evolutionist Interpretation of the Origin of "Mind"

To avoid confusion in this discussion of the origin of the human soul, it should be kept in mind that the terms "mind" and "soul" are not used synonymously by non-Scholastic writers generally. For them, as we have seen, the mind is nothing more than a structured totality of conscious processes, and the soul a metaphysical concept or reality which they do not discuss. Because of this distinction the problem of the origin of the mind (as defined by these writers) is quite different from the question of the origin of the soul (conceived as a substantial and immaterial reality). Since, however, these two concepts are closely related, a discussion of

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

non-Scholastic theories of the origin of the mind may well serve as a preface to a discussion of the Scholastic view of the origin of the human soul.

According to the evolutionist viewpoint the human mind is evolved from lower forms of consciousness, just as the body in their view is evolved from simpler organic structures. It does not, for them, differ in nature from the animal mind, but only in degree of complexity and organization. More recently, the obvious difference between animal and human minds is accounted for by the principle of emergent evolution, according to which each higher form of mind is a new "emergent" which, while derived from lower forms, is nevertheless not contained formally in them. Instead, it is thought that the laws of organization governing the general process of evolution produce a new element - an emergent - which cannot be wholly accounted for in terms of the structures and functions that preceded it. While a distinct improvement over the older evolutionary concepts, this interpretation is yet inadequate to account for the origin of human minds, since, as we have shown, the human mind is an immaterial substance. It must be quite obvious that no degree of organization or complexity can work to bring a rational, immaterial substance out of something that is purely organic and material.

2. Panpsychism and Psychic Monism

Allied to the above theories are the concepts of panpsychism and psychic monism. According to the former all reality, whether organic or inorganic, has a psychic quality to it; while the latter notion means that, ultimately, there is nothing but psychic reality. Both of these theories represent attempts to account for the mentalistic element in both animals and man; and both are discredited on the simple grounds that they contradict both experience and reason. The difficulty in all these views flows from an

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

attempt to apply the theory of evolution to facts of the mental order - an application which the facts do not warrant.

3. The Scholastic Position

The Scholastic starts, it will be recalled, by postulating for all living things a vital principle distinct from the physical and chemical properties of matter. What is the source of this principle? In lower forms, it is <u>educed</u> from the matter in which it appears, and in man it is <u>produced</u> by a special creative act. This creative act becomes necessary in the case of man's soul because any form of generationism is precluded by the distinguishing characteristics of the human soul. Its spirituality precludes both material generation by the parents, and evolution or eduction from lower material forms, since an effect cannot be greater than its cause. Its simplicity makes impossible a generation of the soul from the souls of the parents in the manner, for example, that the body is generated from the parental cells, for the simple reason that the parents' souls are themselves simple, and therefore could not generate a new soul. To account, then, for the origin of the human soul, the Scholastics argue that it is brought into existence by a special creative act of God, Who accepts the initial formation of the body (i.e., the fusion of the germ cells) as a condition for the creation of a human soul.

F. THE DESTINY OF THE HUMAN SOUL: THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY

The characteristics of the human soul discussed in the preceding pages enable us to gain some insight into its destiny, although it should be noted that psychology <u>by itself</u> cannot give a final and complete answer to this question. Appeal must be made at times to both



IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

natural theology and revealed religion, since the question of the unending existence of the soul is inseparably bound up with the existence and nature of God, and a clear understanding of the relations of God to man. However, by a careful consideration of the nature and characteristics of the soul, it is possible to adduce several clear-cut arguments for the continued existence of the soul after the death of the body.

1. The Ontological Argument

This argument, deduced from the nature of the soul as a simple, spiritual substance, can be stated very briefly. Whatever ceases to exist perishes either by breaking down into parts (corruption), or by complete and absolute cessation of being (annihilation). Now the soul cannot be corrupted per se or directly, - that is, broken down into parts as is the body after death, - because it is a simple, non-extended being. Nor can it be corrupted per accidens or indirectly, - that is, by destroying the subject in which it inheres, - since it is a substantial entity subsisting in itself and intrinsically independent of the body. Neither can the soul be annihilated either by itself or by any other contingent being, since annihilation (the reduction of a thing to nothing) is possible only by the withdrawal of the conserving (or creative) power which has sustained the thing in existence; and this power of course rests only with the Creator of all things. It is absolutely possible for God to annihilate the soul which He has created, but that He will not do so can be concluded both from philosophic and psychological considerations. The philosopher in Natural Theology shows that the purpose for which the soul was created - the extrinsic glory of God - excludes its annihilation. For, since the end for which the soul was brought into existence remains eternally, the act of conserving the soul in existence ought itself be eternal. Psychological considerations presented in the teleological

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

argument, point to the same conclusion.

2. The Teleological Argument

The teleological argument for the continued existence of the soul after death is derived from the purpose or end of the rational powers of the soul.[1] The argument may be stated in this way: man has the natural capacity and the connatural desire to know truth and to achieve complete happiness. Now it is an obvious fact of experience that these capacities are not and cannot be satisfied in this life; so that, if they are to be satisfied at all, the soul must continue to exercise its powers when this life is ended. It is contrary to reason to suppose that the soul would be endowed with these aspirations if, from the very moment of its creation, it was destined never to achieve them. It is true of course that these ends are partly realized in this life; but it is just this fact that they are only partly realized that enforces the conclusion that there must be a future existence in which they are wholly achieved.

3. The Moral Argument

Perhaps the most convincing argument on this question is that derived from justice and morality. It is epitomized in the assertion that "Immortality makes morality reasonable." Experience teaches us that right action in accordance with principles of justice and morality are not always (if ever) adequately rewarded in this life; nor are injustice and evil adequately punished. Yet, if morality is to be reasonable, it must be that action in accordance with, or contrary to, the dictates of morality will eventually be met with the reward or punishment it has merited. Otherwise, it would be more reasonable, at least in many situations, to be guided by expediency rather than by a strict moral code. Therefore, since the moral law binds with necessity, and since the sanctions imposed in this

[1]Teleology is the philosophical study of evidences of design. Hence it relates to purposes or ends.

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

life are obviously imperfect, it can only be that there is a future life in which action in accordance with moral law will be adequately rewarded, while action contrary to morality will be just as adequately punished. If justice is reasonable, then the scales of justice must be balanced, if not in this life, then in a life after death.

4. The Argument from Universal Conviction

A final argument for the continued existence of the human soul is derived from the practically universal belief in immortality. While it may be argued in this connection that men often believe what they want to believe, it is nevertheless difficult to conceive how a belief could be so widespread and so deeply rooted in the minds of men unless it is grounded in man's very nature. On such an important issue, it is incredible that the Author of nature would lead men to be forever deluded.

G. RECAPITULATION

In the present section we have dealt with the problems of the relation between mind and soul, the existence and nature of the human soul, and its origin and destiny. We have seen, first of all, that the distinction between mind and soul is not an adequate one; that the terms mind and soul, when rightly understood, signify different aspects of one and the same reality. As regards the nature of the soul, we have shown, through a consideration of its activities, that it is a simple, spiritual substance; and that therefore it cannot be evolved or generated in any way, but must be produced by a special creative act. And finally, from a consideration of the nature and powers of the soul, we demonstrated that the soul is immortal, this conclusion being confirmed by the arguments from the reasonableness of morality and from universal belief. In view of these conclusions, such theories as sensism and evolutionism, which attempt to account for the nature and origin of the human mind, must be rejected as wholly inadequate and contrary to fact.

IV. THE MIND AND SOUL, Cont'd

Questions and Exercises

1. Name four theories that are opposed to the Scholastic doctrine of the human soul.
2. Why is a study of the soul necessarily philosophical in character?
3. In what way is the problem of the soul linked to the problems of thought and volition?
4. With what theories of mind are Angell and Titchener identified?
5. How do you distinguish the concepts of mind and soul?
6. Describe briefly the Scholastic viewpoint on the nature of the mind.
7. What is meant by "vitalism"? Why is it opposed to materialism?
8. Which psychological theory is directly opposed to the concept of mind as substance?
9. Describe the relationship between the substantiality and identity of the human soul.
10. Explain why the evolutionary theory is at variance with the concept of a rational, spiritual soul.
11. Why is the teleological argument for the continued existence of the soul so-called?
12. Why is the soul incorruptible?
13. Explain the difference between simplicity and spirituality.
14. On what principle is the moral argument for immortality based?
15. Is the soul the vital principle of the human person?

V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN PERSON

A. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

One of the most obvious facts about human nature is the reciprocal influence of the mind and body. Nerve action "causes" sensation, emotional states react upon the physical constitution, a blow on the head produces unconsciousness, and brain injuries are reflected in a disturbance of the thought processes and even of the total personality. The fact seems to be obvious, but its explanation has proved one of the greatest problems in psychology, both ancient and modern. What, then, is the nature of the relationship between mind and body? Do they inter-act, or is their inter-action only an apparent one? Or is it possible that both "inter-actionism" and "non-interactionism" are faulty interpretations? Whatever view one takes in this matter, one final question presents itself: What is the nature or constitution of the mind-body entity? What, in other words, is meant by the terms, Ego, Self, Person?

B. SUGGESTED READINGS

Brennan, R.E., General Psychology, Problems 4, 38
----------, Thomistic Psychology, Chs. 3, 11
Gruender, H., Problems of Psychology, Chs. V, VI
Harmon, F.L., Principles of Psychology, Chs. 21,22
Maher, M., Psychology, Chs. XXII,XXIII,XXV,XXVI

C. THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

1. Monistic Theories

Many writers have conveniently rid themselves of the mind-body problem by declaring that either mind does not exist or that matter does not. The first of these is called Materialistic Monism, and the latter Spiritualistic or Idealististic Monism. Closely related to these theories are Psychic Monism, according to which all reality is fundamentally mental in character; and the Double-Aspect Hypothesis, in which mental and bodily processes are regarded as two aspects of one and the same reality. In all of these theories the problem is "resolved" simply by denying the existence of one or the other of the factors. These are

V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd

therefore not solutions at all, but mere evasions of the problem.[1]

2. Dualistic Theories

a. Exaggerated Dualism: Psychophysical Parallelism

The theory most in favor at the present time with non-Scholastic psychologists who still cling to some form of dualism is psychophysical parallelism, according to which both mental and physical processes actually exist, but neither one is conceived of as influencing or causing the other. They run as it were parallel courses, every mental process having its counterpart in the physiological order of nervous events; and every nervous process, at least at the higher levels, having a counterpart in the order of mental events. It is conceived as impossible, however, that mental processes should in any way cause or interrupt a chain of events occurring in the nervous system. This notion stems indirectly from the Exaggerated Dualism of writers like Descartes who, while insisting on the ultimate duality in nature of existing reality, could not conceive of an essential relationship between reality that is material in nature, and that which is non-material or spiritual in character.

A development of parallelism is the theory of Epiphenominalism, which regards mental processes as phenomena that accompany nervous excitations, but which exert no influence on bodily reactions or, for that matter, on each other. Even more so than in parallelism, mental processes are here regarded as entirely devoid of causal efficacy - as mere epiphenomena

[1]Within the framework of modern psychology may be discerned representatives of several of these theories. Behaviorism, for example, is both materialistic and monistic, while both Structuralism and Gestalt theory at times closely approach the double-aspect hypothesis. Idealistic monism and panpsychism, however, are championed only occasionally, having lost ground before the onslaughts of the materialists and positivists.

V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd

that have no purpose or function whatever. It goes without saying that both parallelism and epiphenominalism shed little light on the mind-body problem. If anything, the problem is made more difficult by these theories, since they make it impossible to account in any way for the very origin of the mental processes. Like monistic interpretations, they are at best only restatements of the central problem.[1]

b. Methodological Dualism: Interactionism

Interactionism cuts the Gordion knot of the mind-body relation by boldly asserting a system of reciprocal causation between conscious and bodily processes, whatever the ultimate metaphysical structure of the human person may be. It generally assumes a dualism of mind and body as a methodic device for description and proximate explanation - hence the term "methodological dualism" - but it refuses to commit itself to a metaphysical dualism in which mind and body are regarded as essentially different realities. Interactionism veers towards the common-sense view of the relation between mind and body, and is certainly a distinct improvement over the preceding theories; but it is in the last analysis merely a description of what seems to occur, and is in no sense an adequate explanation of the relationships between the mind and the body.[2]

c. Moderate Dualism: The Scholastic Position

i. The Constitution of the Ego

For the Scholastic, the answer to the question of the mind-body relation flows

[1]Parallelism has its ablest exponents in the writers of the structuralist school of thought, while epiphenominalism is defended by some Gestaltists. It must be recognized that only a very thin line separates these views from the monistic theories described above.

[2]In modern psychology Interactionism fits into the framework of Functionalism, Psychoanalysis, and the Hormic Psychology developed by William McDougall. In some of his writings, however, McDougall veers towards panpsychism as the only consistent explanation of the seeming interaction between mind and body.



V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd

from his explanation of the nature and make-up of human personality. According to this view, called Moderate Dualism, human beings are composed of two incomplete substances, the material body and the spiritual soul which are joined together into a "psycho-physical," substantial unit of a higher order called a person or ego. Following the Aristotelian theory of matter and form, the soul is shown to be the informing or determining principle by which the composite is constituted a living human being; and the body the determined principle which, through its union with the soul, becomes a distinctively human body. What results from the union of these two substances, then, is a real unit, in which soul and body are related not in any merely accidental or dynamic way, but are substantially united to form a unitary being - the Self or Person - to which all actions of whatever kind are ascribed. Thus, I rightly say "I think," "I will," "I walk," etc., and not "My mind thinks," or "My body walks." While it is clear that the soul, in producing thoughts and volitions, acts with intrinsic independence, nevertheless it is a substantial part of the whole person, and therefore any actions exercised by it are attributable to the Person or Ego.

The problem of interaction between mind and body, therefore, is an artificial one created by those who assume an exaggerated dualism, wherein the disunion rather than the union of mind and body is emphasized. For Moderate Dualism, with its insistence on the substantial unity of the Person, the "problem" of interaction between two realities is resolved in the concept of a higher unity that is composed of these realities. Instead of interaction between a body and a mind, this theory substitutes the action of a single, composite substance - the human person.

V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd

This concept of the intimate, substantial union of body and soul must not blind us to the fact of the ultimate duality of matter and spirit. To say that they are substantially united does not mean that they are not really distinct. Matter is not spirit, nor is spirit matter, even though they are united to form a composite being. Spirit, then, can and does remain itself; it can and does act, on its own level, in thinking and willing, even while it uses data presented by powers of the material body of which it is the co-principle. It is true, as we have seen, that we are correct in saying "I think," meaning by the pronoun "I" the <u>total</u> Ego; it is also true that the brain makes some indirect contribution to thinking; but there is nothing in these facts to render false the contention that, in thought and volition, the soul is acting with intrinsic independence.

The substantial union of these co-principles in the human person does not mean that their essential natures are transformed, nor that their natural functions are thereby inhibited. The fact that the soul informs the body must not be taken to mean that it thus becomes material in nature. It is a spiritual principle, capable of spiritual activities; but one which is also by its nature ordained to activate the material body with which it is substantially united.

ii. The Relationships between Soul and Body

For all that we have said with respect to assuming too rigid a dualism of mind and body, it is nevertheless possible and profitable, without falling into the errors of exaggerated dualism, to define the relationships between the material and spiritual principles in man. Thus, as regards the purely rational processes of thought and volition, the soul is described as being <u>intrinsically independent</u> of the body, which

V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd

means that the soul in producing these functions acts alone, since a material agent could not cooperate in the formation of immaterial acts. However, even in the rational processes, the soul is not entirely independent of the body, since it depends upon sense faculties and their bodily organs for the material from which thought is derived. This relationship is expressed by saying that, as regards the rational processes, the soul is extrinsically dependent upon the body. Finally, there is a third relationship where the sensory and organic processes are concerned. Since the soul could not in any way exercise these functions without the cooperation of a material principle, this relationship is expressed by saying that, as far as these functions are concerned, the soul is intrinsically dependent upon the body with which it is united. It will be noted that in every function the soul is in some manner dependent upon its material co-principle; while without the soul, the body would not be what it is, nor exercise any of its characteristic activities; so that here again we are reminded of that fundamental unity of the Ego which arises out of the union of the two principles.

D. THE NATURE OF HUMAN PERSONALITY

1. The Psychology of Personality

In recent years much emphasis has been laid upon the study of personality, and attempts have even been made to measure personality objectively. Unfortunately, however, clear thinking along these lines has been made extremely difficult by a severely muddled terminology, wherein such concepts as personality, character, temperment, self and ego have been used with too little regard at times for their exact meanings. In order to round out our discussion of the constitution of the human person, it becomes necessary to define and distinguish these allied notions.



V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd

a. Person, Self, Ego

While these three terms cannot be used interchangeably in every situation, careful analysis will reveal that they signify much the same thing. Each term refers to the total individual composed of body and soul, and the question of their nature is at bottom a philosophical one. These terms, however, particularly "self" and "ego," have been brought over into psychology, with some confusion as a result. This is seen, for example, in the widely discussed concept of the "empirical ego," by which is meant the ego <u>as experienced</u> by itself. Contrasted with this is the "pure ego," a term used to signify an abstraction - the empirical ego as <u>experiencing subject</u>, apart from its experiences. Now it is true that I do have some knowledge of myself, in the sense that I am aware of my own thoughts, desires, attributes, ambitions, etc., which I loosely gather into a concept of my own ego. But these qualities and attributes, as apprehended by me, no more constitute a self or ego, than do my experiences of the color, size and shape of an object constitute a book. Moreover, the ego as experienced is not radically different from the ego that experiences, and the two brought together do not constitute a self or person. The self is a substance, not a psychological abstraction.[1]

b. Personality, Character and Temperament

The term <u>personality</u> symbolizes an abstraction and means literally the "being person" or the "possessing self-hood." Just as we say: He is a man, and therefore possesses humanity; so we can say: he is a person, and therefore possesses personality. Personality, then, is not <u>some thing</u> which exists as such; rather, it is a term used to designate a group of

[1]On this point cf. Gruender, H., Problems of Psychology, Ch. V, especially pp. 116-120.

V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd

qualities, - abstracted, isolated and personified, - which exist as attributes of a real being. It is a conceptual construct, derived by abstraction and then treated as though it exists independently. Thus, the concept of personality as a sum of traits is wholly misleading, since it involves a faulty transition from the logical to the real order, and fails to bring to light the essential unity of the person. The personality appears as multiplex because of the manner in which it is conceived; the person is a unity because of the manner in which it is constituted. Hence, whenever we speak in psychology of personality, we must be careful lest we forget that what really exists are persons.

With these limitations of the term "personality" in mind, we offer the following definition: Personality refers to that dynamic organization within man of those mental, physical and psychophysical systems which, under the influence of intellect and will, determine as individual's unique adjustment to his environment. Obviously, a full understanding of this definition of personality requires much more elaboration than the limits of time allow in this connection. The development of this concept is undertaken in more advanced courses in psychology.

What we have said above of personality applies also to the terms character and temperament. Whereas the term personality designates all of the unique characteristics of an individual, character and temperament refer to special groups of such characteristics. Thus the term character embraces those qualities of the personality that, for the most part, have a moral aspect. It is therefore related to Will, and is defined in existential terms as a disposition to act according to regulative principles. Temperament, on the other hand, is that disposition in a person to respond



V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd

emotionally to a variety of stimuli, and thus embraces those aspects of personality involving emotional resonance or expression. Character, while partly rooted in native constitution, is largely acquired through training and experience; whereas Temperament, while partly acquired, is for the most part derived from innate, constitutional factors. Together, these two aspects of human nature make up a large portion of what many psychologists include under personality.[1]

2. The Philosophy of Personality

We have already indicated that the essential nature of personality is a philosophical question, and for that reason we have drawn a distinction between the psychology and the philosophy of personality. Person is defined in philosophical terms as an individual and incommunicable substance of a rational nature; and hence personality is here regarded as that quality of a being that renders it unique, incommunicable, etc. In the definition, the term individual means that a person is a unique being, that he is sui juris, an end in himself, and thus possesses a dignity that precludes anyone's use of a person as a means. The term incommunicable signifies that persons do not exist as an integral part of another being; nor can they, like many other substances, be united with other things to form a new substance. And, finally, the term rational indicates that not all individual substances are persons, but only those possessing the powers of thought and volition. A person, then, is a unique, thinking, self-determining being whose existence is freighted with dignity and individuality. Thus, personality becomes a quality that distinguishes man from all other forms of created things, and brings him nearer to God, in Whose image and likeness he is created.

[1] On the meaning of character, see Hull, E.R., The Formation of Character.

V. THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP, Cont'd

Questions and Exercises

1. What is the difference between Moderate Dualism and Interactionism?
2. With what mind-body theory is Behaviorism identified?
3. Is the Scholastic concept of the mind-body relationship monistic or dualistic?
4. Explain what is meant by saying that in one respect the soul is intrinsically independent of the body while in another respect it is intrinsically dependent upon the body.
5. Describe what is meant by the terms personality, character, and temperament.
6. In what sense is the soul intrinsically dependent upon the body?

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this brief outline of Rational Psychology we have attempted to solve four main problems: (1) The nature of thought and the difference between thought and sense experience; (2) The nature of volition and freedom of the will; (3) The nature, origin and destiny of the human soul; and (4) the relation between soul and body, and the nature of human personality.

As a background for these problems, we first of all concerned ourselves with the nature of rational psychology. Thus, we had occasion to see that rational psychology is fundamentally a philosophical science, concerned with ultimate reality, and employing the method of deductive inference. It was pointed out, however, that while rational psychology is primarily a study of the human soul, our knowledge of the human soul is derived from a study of its activities, and that therefore it was necessary first of all to analyze carefully the intellectual and volitional processes, and their relation to organic, sensory activities. Thus it became evident that the scope of rational psychology is considerably broader than its essential definition would lead us to expect, and that other problems besides the nature of the soul would have to be dealt with.

Having defined the nature and scope of rational psychology, it became our task to determine the nature of thought and its relation to sense experience. Careful analysis revealed that the term thought embraces attention, abstraction, reflection, comparison, conception, judgment and inference; and that all of these processes possess a common element in that they are supra-sensuous in character. It was shown too, by analysis of our human experience, that universal ideas as such really exist; and that these ideas, as well as other thought processes, are essentially different from sensory activities. From this we concluded that intellect and sense are essentially different; and that intellect is non-organic and immaterial, and that the sense powers are organic and material in nature. Despite this radical difference, however, it was also indicated that between thought and sense experience there are very important

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION, Cont'd

relations: that intellect, while intrinsically independent of the nervous system, is nevertheless extrinsically dependent upon it; that all knowledge has its ultimate origin in sense experience; and that thoughts are invariably associated in one way or another with sensory elements. Thus, while rejecting the sensist and nominalist interpretations of human thought, our own conclusions were in no sense at variance with common-sense observation and experience.

In addition to the thought processes, our analysis revealed that there is another group of mental acts called volitions which, like thought, are rational in character; but, unlike thought, are appetitive rather than cognitive states of mind. The attempts of sensists and others to reduce such acts to sensory, cognitive processes were therefore rejected. In addition to this distinction, we also pointed out the difference between volitions and voluntary acts. Volitions we defined as internal acts of the will, and voluntary acts as external or commanded acts of the will, the first being purely subjective and involving the will alone, the latter being preponderantly objective (observable) and usually involving the entire organism composed of body and soul.

Of the volitional processes we selected desire and choice for more detailed consideration. Desire, we found, is aroused whenever an object is intellectually apprehended as good, such an object constituting a motive. When two or more such motives influence the will at the same time, deliberation may result, especially if they are more or less equally appealing to the will. This process of deliberation eventuates in the act of decision or choice, by which is meant acceptance of one motive or course of action to the rejection of others. Analysis of this experience revealed that, when certain conditions are fulfilled, the act of choice is free and self-determined; and therefore deterministic interpretations of any kind must be rejected.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION, Cont'd

The argument for psychological freedom derived from experience was further bulwarked by a consideration of certain moral concepts such as responsibility, justice, merit, reward, etc. which, we found, would be meaningless if the will were not free. Furthermore, these same general conclusions were found to be supported by experimental research into the nature of volition. For these reasons, then, we concluded that volitions really exist as distinct, rational processes, and that certain of these are free, self-determined actions.

Having defined the nature of the rational processes of thought and volition, it became our task to determine the nature, origin and destiny of the human soul. By way of preface, however, we first analyzed the relation between the concepts of mind and soul, this analysis revealing that the two terms refer ultimately to one and the same reality - the term mind being used to signify the source of those activities that are conscious in nature, the term soul signifying the principle of all vital activities.

As regards the nature of the human soul we found, by a careful analysis of its activities, that it is a simple, spiritual, self-identical substance. This substance we defined as incomplete, because it is destined by its nature to form with the human body a complete substance of a higher order, - the human person or ego. From the simplicity and spirituality of the soul, we deduced further that it could not have been generated or educed in any way, and that therefore it is produced by a special creative act of God. Also from its nature as a simple, spiritual substance, we were enabled to conclude that it will outlive the body, because it cannot be corrupted in any way. Adding to these arguments certain considerations from the aspirations of intellect and will for supreme truth and happiness, and others from the principles of justice, and excluding the possible annihilation of the soul by God because of the reason for which it was created - we concluded further that the human soul is destined not only to outlive the

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION, Cont'd

body, but to live immortally. For these reasons, then, we rejected materialistic, sensistic and evolutionistic interpretations of the nature, origin, and destiny of the human mind as being at variance with truth and reason.

Our final problem consisted of determining the relation between soul and body, and the nature of human personality. Various theories, such as interactionism, parallelism and panpsychism, were analyzed and rejected as being unable to explain either the relationship between the mental and the physical in man, or the make-up of human personality.

In their stead we presented the Scholastic interpretation of the nature and constitution of the human ego, wherein soul and body are regarded as incomplete substances, united together to form one complete substance - the human person. In this view the soul is regarded as the substantial form, that is, the determining principle by which the composite (the united soul and body) is rendered distinctively human. This soul, however, is a spiritual substance, and therefore its relationship with the body is expressed differently depending upon the nature of the processes under consideration. Thus, in the case of the spiritual processes of thought and volition, the soul is described as being intrinsically independent of the material body, though even here there is extrinsic dependence; while, for the sensory and vegetative processes, the soul is shown to be intrinsically dependent upon the body. In every case, however, since soul and body are united to form one composite substance, every act is predicable of the entire composite, so that it may be rightly said that the Ego is the principle of all actions of the composite, whether they be acts of thought, of volition, or acts of the purely sentient or vegetative kind.

This substantial composite of body and soul is called a person - person being defined as an individual substance of a rational nature. The abstractum thereof - personality - is then regarded as that quality of a human being that renders him individual, unique, incommunicable. A person is <u>sui juris</u>, the

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION, Cont'd

master of his own acts, a free, self-determined creature, far above the brute animal to which modern thought would reduce him.

From the considerations adduced in this Outline, then, we can see that Rational Psychology is at once a criticism of, and a bulwark against, the many attempts on the part of sensists, materialists, and evolutionists, to explain human nature in purely material terms, and thus bring man down to the level of the animal. It is an attempt, within psychology, to describe man as he really is, and not as a particular hypothesis or methodology dictates he should be. It constitutes a recognition and an affirmation of the truth that man is first and foremost a rational creature, and as such can strive after moral and religious values as well as those that are purely material; and that he can, within limits, plot the course of his own destiny. In its insistence upon the spiritual in human nature, it recognizes, implicitly at least, man's relation to God, and thus elevates human nature to a plane which could never be achieved in a purely materialistic universe.

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