



THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

A SYNTHETIC VIEW

Among many other errors, Modernism maintained that Catholic dogma *does not always preserve the same meaning*. The content of dogmas is subject, not to the immutability of data objectively revealed by God, but rather to the contingency of human psychological and religious factors. Dogmas are as contingent and changeable as the subjective conditions of the human beings who believe in them. Since these conditions evolve and suffer frequent changes, without there being any substantive and homogeneous continuity throughout the whole process, it follows that dogmas can undergo a change of substantive content, and that dogmatic formulae can in the course of time come to have different, even contrary, meanings.

These Modernistic tenets were condemned by Pius X in the Encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis* of 8 September, 1907.¹ And in the *Oath against Modernism* prescribed by the same Pius X we find the following: "I sincerely receive the doctrine of Faith transmitted *always in the same sense and the same teaching* from the Apostles through the orthodox Fathers down to our own times; hence I reject altogether the heretical figment of the *evolution of dogmas that change from one meaning to another*."²

What the Pope condemned was the *evolution of dogmas from one meaning to another*. However, as was to be expected, the backlash of reaction rendered suspect the term *evolution* itself. Pius X never denied that dogmas evolved; what he denied was that they evolved in such a manner as to lose the revealed meaning they possessed at the beginning; in other words, that dogma is subject to *transformistic* evolution. Nonetheless, people readily identified these two terms *evolution* and *transformism* since both science and theology

¹ ACTA SANCTAE SEDIS, 40 (1907), 593 ff.

² Oath against Modernism, AAS, 2 (1910), 669-672; Denz.-Schön. 3541.

had been employing them as synonyms — science, because it had been looking at evolution through Darwinian concepts; theology, because it had been looking at the same through Modernist notions.³

Understandably, then, theologians entertained serious misgivings about employing the term. It was in this context of the recent condemnation of Modernism, when the very term *evolution* was suspect, that Fr. Marín-Sola began his series of articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* on *The Homogeneity of the Catholic Doctrine*.⁴ Considering the times, the term *homogeneity* was bound to be particularly gratifying to theologians; very much less so the term *evolution*, which the author of the articles considered consistent with the immutability of revealed dogma.

Despite early misgivings, the articles succeeded in making headway. People began to see that dogma could evolve with no danger of *transforming* itself or of *changing its meaning*; that evolution is inherent in every living and growing thing; that it ought to exist in the revealed deposit unless one was prepared to accept that the deposit was itself inert and lifeless; and that, as a matter of fact, both the history of dogmas and traditional theology were unanimous in affirming the existence of dogmatic evolution. All these points were amply substantiated by Fr. Marín in his articles. Eventually he gathered them together and published them as a closely knit whole which is the present masterpiece THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA. Other writers had already employed the controversial term, and new authors had begun to use it again. On this point they concurred with Fr. Marín, but there was a divergence of views with respect to the extension and scope attributed to the evolving vitality of the revealed doctrine.

The articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* definitively established their author in theological circles. Up to then he had had a name only in the small ambit of Manila, Ávila, and Rosaryville. Now his name was made throughout the world. It did not take long to recognize that here was an exceptional persona-

³It is quite possible for some of our readers, who are more pious than knowledgeable, to be bothered by the title we have chosen for our book, *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*. Ever since Darwin employed the term *The Evolution of the Species* to signify the transformation of one species into another, and particularly after the extrapolation of the transformistic theory to Catholic dogma effected by the heresy of modernism, the very name of evolution has been, and continues to be, suspect in the eyes of some overly timorous theologians, as if all evolution were necessarily transformistic and no homogeneous evolution were possible, or as if all evolution, including that which is homogeneous, were incompatible with the divine origin and substantial immutability of Catholic dogma." (MARÍN-SOLA, O.P., *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, Introduction, no. 1).

⁴*La homogeneidad de la doctrina católica* (The Homogeneity of the Catholic Teaching), a series of articles begun by Fr. MARÍN-SOLA, in "La Ciencia Tomista", no. 9 (July-August, 1911) and concluded in no. 77 (September-October, 1922).

lity — exceptional in the clear vision of the problems, the profound grasp of theology, the lucidity of exposition, the unassailability of the logic, and the innovative thrust with which, whilst keeping faith with traditional guidelines, the most pressing problems of theology were approached and solved.

THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA was received in Spain as a veritable masterpiece worthy of the great theologians of Spain's golden age.⁵ There were readers who felt that one had to go back to Melchor Cano's immortal *De Locis Theologicis* in the XVI century in order to find a comparable work.⁶ Someone went even further and declared that only two books on the subject of dogmatic development were truly invaluable — that of St. Vincent de Lérins in the V century and Fr. Marín's.⁷

Foreign critics were no less unsparing in their praise of both the work and its author. Further on we will quote the reviews made by eminent theologians and statements by high ecclesiastical authorities.

Presently we will be sketching the portrait of Fr. Marín as a scholar and calling attention to the timeliness of his teaching. He had the knack of being *opportune*. Truth, indeed, is *eternal* and of all times. Nonetheless, it cannot be gainsaid that some *truths* seem to lose their edge at certain periods of history. Some philosophers and theologians have been accused of *living too much in the past*. There is a grain of truth in the charge, not in the sense that the truths they expound are *passé* — since the fundamental truths of philosophy and dogma are truths for *all times* — but in the sense that they are unable or do not know how to project on contemporary *actual* problems the light of truths and teachings which, being eternal, are also *of today*.

Fr. Marín-Sola had this gift of *timeliness*, the knack of infusing vitality and actuality into theological questions. At times this was the result of the light he focused on existing problems, as in the case of THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA. At other times it was due to the intellectual vigour of a mind capable of restating a problem in such

⁵Cf., for instance, the appraisal made by Don Celedonio León Herranz, professor of Dogma at the seminary of Madrid, in *Revista Eclesiástica*, July-September, 1932, pg.415.

⁶Many of those who have read the book have expressed this judgment, for instance, the book reviewer for *El Correo de Tortosa* (April 5, 1924) and the reviewer for *Boletín Oficial del Arzobispado de Valencia* (March, 1924).

⁷The illustrious professor of theology at the Colegio Máximo of Oña, Fr. Alfonso Ma. Elorriaga, wrote Fr. Marín-Sola in April, 1929, in these terms; "On the subject of the evolution of dogma I know of only two works of incomparable value for the theologian: that of Lirrensans and that of Your Reverence, and in point of scientific and theological merit, I consider the book written by Your Reverence unique and without equal." Thus the professor of Oña, despite the fact that in matters of detail, he held views that differed from those of Fr. Marín, as can be seen in several articles in *Estudios Eclesiásticos*.

terms that its mere restatement was sufficient to give it vital actuality, as happened in the case of the series of articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* on *The Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion*.⁸ Fr. Marín was never out-of-step but always in-step with his time, either because he grappled with and solved the problems posed by the world to theology, or because he was able to get the theologians involved in the questions he himself proposed.

The publication of THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA could not have been more timely. *Evolution* was a term practically monopolized by the Modernists who used and abused it at their pleasure to tear down the dogma of the immutability of the Catholic faith. Fr. Marín saw that the term could be well employed to stress the progressive character of dogma without prejudice to its immutability, and he set himself to the task of wresting from Modernism and placing at the service of truth a term that, then as well as now, was enormously suggestive.⁹

But he was concerned not simply with terms and words but rather with the concepts and the realities expressed by the concepts. The Church was faced with the problem posed by the immutability and the development of dogma. Modernism solved the problem in a heterodox fashion; modern theology in an orthodox but insufficient manner. Fr. Marín confronted the problem squarely in the light of traditional philosophical and theological principles. As he saw them, these principles possessed sufficient power to channel along orthodox tracks the *progressive* and *vitalist* tendencies of the times — real and legitimate tendencies, indeed, but which Modernism had detailed onto completely unorthodox grooves.

In Fr. Marín's view, the authentic theological conclusion is that which is contained in the principles of theology in a *virtually inclusive* way. Inasmuch as the principles of theology are *revealed* principles, any authentically theological conclusion is likewise revealed and, consequently, capable of becoming a dogma. Thus dogma is capable of development and evolution. Now, since the containment is *inclusive*, the contained truth—, i.e., the truth which we gather or *deduce* when we draw the theological *conclusion*, and which is the same truth that the Pope can make into a dogma by his defini-

⁸*El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina*. "La Ciencia Tomista" (July-August, 1925). *Respuesta a algunas objeciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (January-February, 1926). *Nuevas observaciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (May-June, 1926).

⁹"In the case of words, or of ideas, that contain a substratum of truth and can be useful for the defense and exposition of the revealed deposit, the best policy, we believe, is that counseled and practiced by St. Augustine, viz., to wrest such words, or ideas, from the hands of the enemy and, after having purged them from all false understanding, to place them at the service of the integral truth of the Catholic faith." (MARÍN-SOLA, *op. cit.*, no. 1)

tion — is *homogeneous* to the revealed datum or principle from which it is drawn. There is, in consequence, development and evolution but neither transformation nor change.

Such is the conclusion Fr. Marín reaches in this work, which furnishes evidence of the extent of his sensitivity to the preoccupations of his times, and of his concern with setting them into legitimate and orthodox channels. New data support this view: Modernism wielded the *history of dogmas* in support of its transforming explanations. The author of the HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION appeals to the same history and establishes the fact that dogma has developed and grown by way of *virtual containment* and, hence, dogmatic evolution is homogeneous and in no way changes the meaning of the revealed principles.¹⁰

Modernism stressed the *psychological* or *vitalist* character of dogmatic development. This psychological character, together with the history of dogmas, lays the basis for its contention that dogmas change their meaning. Fr. Marín similarly appeals to the psychological or vital character of our knowledge of supernatural truths and to the role it plays in the development of dogmatic truths, and masterfully shows that, at the divine impulse of the theological virtues and of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, this development, if legitimate, leads of necessity to conclusions that are homogeneous to the vital, or divine, or supernatural principle from which it originates.¹¹

He had, we repeat, the gift of timeliness: in the choice of a problem posed by Modernism to theology and the Church; in turning the very weapons (history, psychology, life) being wielded against orthodoxy to the latter's advantage by showing that they are precisely the same arguments which *traditionally led always* to orthodox solutions; and, finally, in wresting from the enemy the highly suggestive term *evolution*, and showing that it was capable of being employed in a legitimate and traditional sense. Fr. Marín thus put to excellent use St. Augustine's advice, which he himself recalls, to the effect that "if they who are called philosophers, particularly the Platonists, have said things that are *true and in harmony with our faith*, not only are these not to be feared, but they should be wrested from them as from unjust possessors and turned to our benefit."¹² Fr. Marín wrested from the Mo-

¹⁰In sections 2 and 3 of chapter 4, the author analyzes *ten dogmas* to the definition of which the Church arrived by an authentic process of *virtual implicit inclusion*.

¹¹Chapter 4 of the present work contains a special study of the *affective* way and of its value for the development of dogma. In the original Spanish edition, section 5 of chapter 4 is entirely devoted to the affective way. In the French edition, the author added a whole new section (section 6) to its study.

¹²*De Doctrina Christiana*, 1. 2, c. 40; PL 54, 65. Fr. Marín recalls this counsel of St. Augustine on the very first page of his work. Indeed, the whole book may be viewed as a sustained effort at putting the Saint's counsel into practice.

dernists a term charged with strong suggestive power, which they were employing unduly and misleadingly; he likewise wrested from them the weapons of history and psychological religious experience with which they attempted to shore up their wrong conclusions, whereas in truth they serve to confirm and buttress the development of Catholic doctrine understood in an orthodox sense.

The work which is now published in an English translation has not lost its actuality despite the lapse of so many years since the first of its three previous editions. Modernism is dead. But the problem of the development of dogma is still vigorously alive today, it is still very much with us today. There are theologians who do not accept the principles of traditional theology and do not even bother to hide their antipathy towards Scholasticism. The solution proffered by these theologians is not the solution given by Modernism; but neither is it a solution that satisfies the demands of the immutability of the rational principles of philosophy and of dogmatic truths on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the demands of the developmental capacity of the same rational principles and dogmatic truths. The so-called *new theology*¹³ poses the problem of *how to adapt dogma to the changing mentality* of men. This is, fundamentally, the point under debate today. Towards its resolution the Holy See has furnished theologians with firm and clear orientations. On several occasions Pius XII alluded to this problem,¹⁴ and has published an encyclical in which, apart from restating substantially the guidelines he had previously given, he concretely identifies and names certain excesses that have been incurred and which need correction.¹⁵

Whatever solution is given to the problem must safeguard the immutability of the truths of faith. "No one must disturb and stir what is immutable. Many things have been aired, yet without sufficient examination, about the *new theology* which, inasmuch as it keeps changing in step with a universe of changing things, is a theology that is perpetually going without ever arriving

¹³ The term *new theology* has acquired a pejorative sense. For this reason, some of its practitioners feel uneasy at the tag *new* appended to the theology to which they subscribe. Nonetheless, it is a fact that they have used and abused of such expressions as these: scholastic theology has *outlived* its usefulness today, the theology of St. Thomas is *outdated*, etc. Now, that which has outlived its usefulness, that which is outdated should be replaced by the new, the actual, the up-to-date which they represent. The Pope has several times alluded to the *new theology* and has cautioned against the dangerous deviations it contains. His words are quoted in the text, and we shall consider them at greater length in the third part of this introduction.

¹⁴ Address to the 20th General Congregation of the Society of Jesus on 17th September, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 381-385.

Address to the General Chapter of the Order of Preachers, on 22nd September, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 385-389.

¹⁵ Encyclical *Humani generis*; AAS, 42 (1950), 561-578.

anywhere. If such a position were to be accepted, what is to become of the immutability of Catholic dogmas? What is to become of the unity and stability of the faith?"¹⁶ The solution must likewise safeguard the capacity of rational philosophy to account for the development of dogma without jeopardy to its immutability. "The very foundations of both perennial philosophy and theology are now called into question, those foundations which are acknowledged and revered by any body of knowledge and discipline worthy of being judged Christian in truth and in name . . . The truths revealed by God are called into question, that is to say, whether the mind is capable of penetrating them and of drawing further truths out of them. Briefly, the question is asked whether what St. Thomas has constructed *beyond and above any particular time by putting together and closely integrating all the elements furnished by the Christian sages of all times* is built upon solid rock, endowed with perpetual vigour and validity, capable even today of safeguarding the Catholic faith efficaciously and of *providing sure assistance and directive criteria to the new developments of theology and philosophy. The Church, indeed, affirms that such is the case.*"¹⁷

The problem today is none other than the problem of harmonizing the immutability of the truths of faith with their progress. Such a harmony is possible by means of the firm and solid notions of the perennial or traditional philosophy. Any solution that jeopardizes the immutability of dogma eventually ends in a transformationist development of the same and is absolutely unacceptable to the Church.

This contemporary problem, so clearly and nakedly stated by His Holiness, is in essence the problem examined and solved by Fr. Marín in this work. The passage just quoted from Pius XII on the immutability of the Catholic doctrine, on the employment of philosophical concepts in its development, and on the requirement that the immutability of dogma suffer no prejudice from its development by means of philosophical concepts; or, in other words, the problem of the *new theology* with its insistence on utilizing the new philosophies in the task of developing the dogmas of faith — all these things come to mind on reading the following passage from the Introduction to the present work, written by Fr. Marín in 1923:

"Any man who undertakes to study without preconceptions the history of the Catholic Church and of her teachings is confronted by two evident facts.

"The first is the fact that Catholic teaching, even in its strictly dogmatic part, has grown or developed, in a rather large scale, from the days of the

¹⁶ Address, 17th September, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 384-385.

¹⁷ Address, 22nd September, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 387.

Apostles to our own times. To become aware of this, one needs only to compare, on any given doctrinal point, the plain biblical statements with the complex definitions of the last ecumenical councils; compare the primitive Creed of the Apostles with the so-called Creed of St. Athanasius or with the profession of faith of Pius IV; compare any document of the early popes with the *Syllabus* of Pius IX or with Pius X's Encyclical *Pascendi*; or compare any catechesis or any number of catecheses of the Fathers of the Church with one of today's catechisms. The evidence of the fact of growth is immediately obvious.

"The second is the obvious fact that in the aforementioned growth various human philosophies and civilizations have played a large role and exercised a great influence, particularly Greek philosophy in the age of the Fathers, and Scholastic philosophy in the Middle and Modern ages. This influence is noticeable in the writings of the Fathers who developed the primitive doctrine, in the conciliar disputes and disquisitions that preceded the definition of each dogma, and even in the dogmatic formulae themselves which clearly exhibit the mark of the various epochs in which the propositions were defined.

"These two facts can be explained in very different ways, but can in no way be denied. Together they pose the following very serious problem: *Is the progress or growth of Catholic doctrine just mentioned homogeneous or heterogeneous? Is it simply a homogeneous evolution of what was already contained implicitly in the revealed datum, or is it an extrinsic or heterogeneous addition, a truly transformistic evolution?*"¹⁸

It is obvious that these two interrogatives, coming right after the verification of the two facts mentioned, reflect the problem of the *new theology*, viz., the problem of adapting the truths of dogma to the mentality or philosophy of contemporary men, and the danger that the adaptation might be prejudicial to the immutability of dogma itself. It is likewise clear that they also pose the problem described by Pius XII in the passage earlier quoted, a problem whose solution is to be effected, as the Pope clearly enjoins, without jeopardy to the immutability of dogmatic truth.

These considerations amply justify the decision taken by the Royal and Pontifical University of Santo Tomás (Manila) to publish this 4th edition — the first in English — of the masterwork of a man who easily stands out among her most illustrious alumni and her most distinguished professors of dogmatic theology — Fr. Francisco Marín-Sola, O.P.

The introduction requested of us will have the following parts:

I. Fr. Marín and his work.

¹⁸MARÍN-SOLA, *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, Introduction, nos. 5-6.

- II. "The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma."
- III. The "New Theology" and "The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma."
- IV. The Second Vatican Council and "The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma."

FR. MARÍN-SOLA: THE MAN AND HIS LIFE-WORK¹⁹

Fr. Francisco Marín-Sola spent his whole lifetime — 59 years — in study, teaching and writing. However, his was not to be a tranquil and serene pursuit of these tasks. Paradoxically, his exceptional personal worth proved to be the greatest hindrance to an untroubled scholarly existence. It explains the numerous demands made on him for the solution of urgent and perplexing difficulties. Thus, in the course of more than thirty years of teaching, we find him being frequently transferred from one place to another. His longest tour of duty saw him teaching in Fribourg, Switzerland, for eight consecutive years.

This biographical sketch of Fr. Marín-Sola will have four sections:

1. Biographical data.
2. The scholar.
3. Literary output.
4. Moral personality.

I. Biographical Data

Fr. Marín-Sola was born in Carcar, a town of the province of Navarre and of the diocese of Pamplona. At the age of 13 he came to Ocaña (Toledo), soliciting admission to the Novitiate of the Dominican Fathers of the Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines. For lack of the requisite canonical age he was unable to take the habit. However, since he had a prece-

¹⁹This biographical information has been culled from the following sources:

(a) *Actas del Capítulo Provincial de la Provincia del Ssmo. Rosario de Filipinas, celebrado en Manila el año 1934* (Proceedings of the Provincial Chapter of the Province of the Most Holy Rosary, held in Manila in 1934).

(b) *Ensayo de biografía de los religiosos de la Provincia del Ssmo. Rosario de Filipinas* (Biographical Essays on the Religious of the Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines). A ms. in six volumes preserved in the provincial archives of the said Province.

Thanks are due to Fr. Jesús Gayo for furnishing us with a copy of every reference to Fr. Marín contained in this ms. We shall in every case indicate the page of the copy furnished us by Fr. Gayo.

(c) Biographical data in manuscript sent us by Fr. Gregorio Arnáiz, a contemporary of Fr. Marín since the novitiate.

cious intelligence, he was admitted meanwhile to the first year of philosophy together with those who had already made their religious profession.

Upon completing 15 years of age, he took the Dominican habit in the same priory of Ocaña on 9 December, 1888, and his simple religious vows on 10 December of the following year. After his religious profession he gave himself entirely to the study of philosophy. Although he had successfully completed the first year of philosophy, prior to taking the habit, he repeated it of his own volition and at his own request. Even at that young age he realized the importance of a solid primitive grounding in the philosophical sciences.

Upon completion of the philosophical courses, he was transferred to the Priory of Santo Tomás in Ávila. Here he took his solemn vows on 10 December, 1892, and began his theological studies. A serious illness forced him to leave Ávila and go to the Priory of Padrón (Galicia). There he regained his health and returned to Ávila to complete his study of theology.

In 1897, being only a deacon, he was assigned to Manila. The Dominican Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines has for its field of activity in the Far East: China, Japan, Tonking, the Philippines. Thither went Fr. Marín-Sola after barely completing his ecclesiastical studies. He was ordained to the priesthood in September, 1897. Unfortunately, no sooner had he set foot in Manila than his health gave way. On the advice of his doctors, he left Manila for the province of Cagayán in the early days of 1898. The Philippine Revolution surprised him in the town of Amulung. He sought refuge in the town of Enrile and there fell into the hands of the revolutionists, and remained their prisoner for sixteen months. On 1 January, 1900, he was set free and returned to Manila.

His teaching career, uninterrupted until his death, began at this point. In 1900 he taught mathematics, algebra, and geometry at the secondary school of San Juan de Letrán (Manila). The following year he brilliantly passed the examinations for the degree of Lector in Sacred Theology at the University of Santo Tomás (Manila). Meanwhile he continued teaching in Letrán, and in 1902 he joined the staff of the daily *Libertad* and began to publish various articles, some of which attracted a great deal of attention, as we shall presently see.

In 1904 he was taken from Letrán and assigned to teach philosophy at the University of Santo Tomás. But his exceptional qualities as a teacher persuaded his superiors that they would be better employed in the formation of the Dominicans who were being trained in Spain for service in the Orient, than in teaching the natives studying in the University in Manila.

Thus, in 1906 Fr. Marín-Sola returned to Spain to teach the Sacred Scriptures and the Loci Theologici at the Dominican Studium Generale in Ávila. Those were the peak days of Modernism, during which Fr. Marín-

Sola was engrossed in the study of the Loci Theologici. It would not be far-fetched to say that it was even then that the monumental work he was to publish several years later began dimly to take shape in his mind. In tracing the genesis of THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION no one should lose sight of these two factors: on the one hand, Modernism on the attack, and on the other hand, Melchor Cano's work which provides the means of defense.

Fr. Marín stayed in Ávila only two years. In 1908 he was back in Manila. His ecclesiastical formation was now complete and had begun to bear fruit, but one requisite formality was still wanting. The Dominican Order had made him a Lector of theology, but Fr. Marín was destined to teach in universities of world renown, hence it was convenient that he should obtain academic degrees in sacred theology. For this purpose he returned to Manila where he obtained both the licentiate and the doctorate in theology. Upon his arrival he was appointed editor of *Libertas*, of which he had previously been a staff-member.

Two years later, in 1910, we find him back in Ávila holding the chair of theology in the same Studium Generale where he had taught Scripture and the Loci Theologici.

The Dominican Province in the Philippines felt the need of a command of English the better to carry out its apostolic labours in the East. In consequence, the Studium Generale at Ávila was transferred to Rosaryville in the United States. Thither, too, went Fr. Marín. However, prior to teaching theology at Rosaryville, he spent two years at the University of Notre Dame learning English and teaching philosophy.

At Rosaryville he taught theology from 1913 to 1918. The archbishop of New Orleans named him adviser to the archbishopric. Soon he came to be known in all North America on account of the solidity and soundness of the reports and other documents forwarded by the archbishopric of New Orleans to the Apostolic Delegation in Washington and to the Holy See itself. Fr. Marín was also appointed secretary of the Commission organized in the ecclesiastical province of New Orleans to examine the draft of the new Code of Canon Law. Of his contributions to the work of the Commission we shall speak later on.

About this same time the University of Notre Dame conferred on Fr. Marín the Doctorate in Civil Law *honoris causa*. The Rector, Fr. Cavanaugh, wrote him to say that the honor was conferred in view of the imperishable memory left by his teaching in the University and of his own great personal worth.

The year 1919 initiated a new period in Fr. Marín's life. He was named to the chair of theology at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland) left vacant by the death of Fr. Norberto del Prado. Of his teaching there and the

universal esteem in which he was held we shall speak presently in the following section. At Fribourg Fr. Marín continued his series of articles on *The Evolution of Dogma*, which he collected, recast, and published in 1923 in the book whose 4th edition (1st in English) the reader holds in his hands. Also at Fribourg Fr. Marín began a new series of papers on *The Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion*, published in *La Ciencia Tomista*. On the same subject he left an unedited manuscript entitled *Concordia tomista entre la moción divina y la libertad creada* (Thomist Conciliation between the Divine Motion and Created Liberty).

Fr. Marín spent eight years, 1919-1927, in Fribourg. Failing health forced his retirement to the priory at Ocaña where he had taken the habit as a lad. Having recovered somewhat, he returned to Manila in 1929 to end his life teaching theology at the same University that had reaped the first fruits of his youth.

He died on 5 June, 1932, at the age of 59. Death overtook him fully engaged in work, immersed in the twin activities that sum up his whole life teaching and writing. Teaching dogma and writing his *Thomist Conciliation between the Divine Motion and Created Liberty*.

2. The Scholar

Fr. Marín-Sola was an outstanding multi-faceted scholar. He was a great thinker, and thus a great investigator. He was never satisfied merely with hearing and reading. Things heard and read are of no use unless and until they are assimilated. Fr. Marín said and wrote nothing that he had not previously comprehended in the exact sense of this term. Which is to say that his knowledge always proceeded from a previous work of reduction to the fundamental principles of theology and philosophy, and of comparison with other truths with which it could have a connexion, or from which it could receive new light or added corroboration. He investigated the truth both in its principles and in its derivations. It is in this sense that we say that since he was a thinker he was also an investigator.

At the same time he was an outstanding expositor and an excellent pedagogue. For him no obstacles seemed to exist between the thought and the word. He perceived the problems with utmost clarity and endeavoured to bring the same clarity to his exposition. This obsession with communicating to others the clarity of his own perception led him to an insistent repetition of concepts with the hope that what might perhaps have been overlooked the first time, would be noticed and grasped the second or third time.

Lastly, he was a great polemicalist. By temperament he was always eager to test his ideas. Since he never made them public until he had exhaustively comprehended them, it pleased him to be contradicted, for generally he had

anticipated the objections of his opponents, and the positions which the latter deemed weak had been well covered and buttressed in advance.

He shunned the *short* view of things, the *short* solution of problems, the *short* reply to difficulties. Being a robust theologian and philosopher, he preferred to investigate the truth by the light of the superior causes rather than by the light of the inferior and immediate causes. In one word, he truly was a wise man, if by wisdom is meant "the knowledge by the supreme reasons".

A. The Thinker and the Investigator

There are two kinds of investigation and thus two sorts of investigators. One kind of investigation aims at uncovering the *datum*; the other, at discovering the *truth*. The investigators of the one and the other kind are searching for the truth which is their object, but the former are looking for the truth in preceding testimonies, whereas the latter are looking for the truth in other preceding truths. The former are engaged in *positive* investigation; the latter in *rational* investigation.

Fr. Marín belongs to the second group. We have already said that he was a thinker. So say those who were his students. So say we who had the privilege of knowing him and talking to him. So can well say those who have read him. He was a *profound* theologian and philosopher who strove to unearth the deepest roots of any problem. His solutions are not based usually on immediate and superficial reasons but on ultimate reasons. This, of course, requires the penetration, the comprehension of the virtuality of the principles of theology and philosophy. In this comprehension of the *fundamental* truths Fr. Marín finds the solution to the problems studied in his writings. His is a labour of *investigation* of the highest caliber.

He was well equipped for it by a synthesizing mind that enabled him to grasp a lot of things in a few ideas. To him philosophy and theology were not disciplines in which truths are *added* to truths, but sciences in which truths are *joined*, *connected*, and mutually *explicated* by being deduced the one from the other.

But all this should not be taken to deny that Fr. Marín was an investigator in the first sense of the term, to mean that he overlooked the *positive* character of theology. His writings evidence a theological erudition that is simply overwhelming. Relative to the subjects studied by Fr. Marín, it can be asserted, without risk of being forced to recant, that no theologian exists with a vaster or more universal erudition. The present work provides ample evidence. In it Fr. Marín shows that he is acquainted with an astonishing number of theologians of every school. Chapter 7 is definitively conclusive on this point.

The reader is apt to be dazzled by this twin phenomenon verifiable in the writings of Fr. Marín-Sola. On the one hand, the mental power both to penetrate and analyze the truth, and to resolve and synthesize it, which places him in the ranks of *investigators-thinkers*; and on the other hand, his astonishing theological erudition, which classifies him among the *positive investigators*. In our opinion, he was foremost and fundamentally a thinker, and amassed his erudition from sheer necessity. On a certain occasion he artlessly confessed that he understood perfectly whatever he happened to study.²⁰ It is a fact that God had given him a capacity to understand, assimilate, and synthesize quite out of the ordinary. The works of St. Thomas constituted his fundamental sources, which he assimilated with his powerful intellect. But then he found that many theologians, especially the moderns, including even Thomists, did not agree with what he had seen in St. Thomas. So he began to investigate in the theological tradition the same problems whose solution he had already discovered in St. Thomas himself.

He would immerse himself in the study of countless theologians, and in the process unearth the fact that the line of Thomist thought had indeed suffered a deviation. And thus we have the amazing phenomenon of an speculative theologian, as Fr. Marín was, lecturing to the specialists on positive theology and the history of theology. It happened in the case of the *revealed virtual*, of the historical development of which he makes a very detailed study in the present work, and in the case of the so-called *ecclesiastical faith*, of which he makes a likewise perfectly finished positive study, in addition to a strictly doctrinal one, in chapter 5. Similarly, on the question of the conciliation between the divine motion and created liberty, Fr. Marín has amassed more than 15,000 notes in the four volumes of the unedited manuscript. It is the most astounding work of scholarly erudition on the subject. Here, too, his positive researches uncovered the deviation undergone by the pure and genuine thought of St. Thomas, even within the Thomist tradition — a deviation that obscured and notably complicated the problem.

Fr. Marín was, we repeat, an authentic investigator of the truth in both of the two modes of investigation: an speculative investigator of the truth of problems in their principles, and a positive investigator of the truth in the data of theological tradition.

The foregoing should make clear the *renovating* character of his theology. Any problem in the hands of Fr. Marín ended up by being a *renovated* problem. He was an authentic revolutionist — in the best sense of the term — in theology. He was not a man who passively accepted a ready-made theology; he actively made theology himself. But in making theology he took for sure guides the teachings of the Church, the teachings of St. Thomas, the

²⁰Declaration by Fr. Gregorio Arnáiz.

teachings of the *classical Thomist* school. He *renovated* or *revolutionized* without *innovating*. Innovations in theological science are dangerous. Theology has to be studied with a profoundly traditional spirit. Fr. Marín's renovation implied the return to the ideas of traditional theology whenever they had suffered a deviation or come to a dead stop, and the updating of the same.

The reader can find for himself instances of what we are saying in the present work, he can also find them in his other writings. We will mention one: the problem of the physical causality of the sacraments in the case of their reviviscence. The reviviscence of the sacraments poses a grave and serious difficulty to their physical causality, to which the answers were neither suitable nor efficacious. Fr. Marín begins with the principles, incontrovertible in Thomism, that the baptismal character is a passive potency in which the other sacraments are received. He develops this principle, up to now insufficiently exploited, to propose a new solution²¹ that does away with all the inconveniences of the solutions currently offered.

Fr. Marín possessed an extraordinary power of assimilation. His was a philosophical and theological temper, but his achievements were not restricted to these two fields. He possessed a finished formation in the humanities and was well acquainted with mathematics which he taught at the college of Letrán. He had an extraordinary facility for languages. Six months in Cagayán were enough for him to grasp thoroughly the morphology and structure of the Ibanag dialect, and, as those who lived with him testify, to dialogue fluently with the Filipino natives.²²

In the preceding section we mentioned his having taught Canon Law, his having been an adviser to the archbishopric of New Orleans and secretary of the Commission set up in the same ecclesiastical province to review the draft of the new Code of Canon Law, and his having been conferred the Doctorate in Civil Law *honoris causa* by the University of Notre Dame. Some additional data will confirm his capacity and competence in the field of law.

Dr. Blenk, archbishop of New Orleans, made frequent use of Fr. Marín's services. Father's reports were read with great interest at the Apostolic Delegation in Washington. Msgr. Bonzano, the Apostolic Delegate at the time and Cardinal later on, wrote the archbishop saying: "Since this Apostolic Delegation was established in Washington we have received no reports as profound, methodical, and logically structured as those that Your Excellency has gra-

²¹*Proponitur nova solutio ad conciliandam causalitatem physicam sacramentorum cum eorum reviviscencia*. (A new solution with a view to reconciling the physical causality of the sacraments with their reviviscence) An article by Fr. Marín published in *Divus Thomas*, Fribourg, January, 1925.

²²Fr. M. VELASCO, *Biographical Essays*, pg. 2 of the copy in our hands.

ciously remitted to this Apostolic Delegation."²³ The archbishop disclosed that the reports were authored by Fr. Marín.

When the Commission set up by Pius X for the codification of Canon Law finished the draft of the new Code, it was sent to all the bishops so that the latter might submit to Rome the opportune observations. For this purpose a Commission was organized in the ecclesiastical province of New Orleans. Fr. Marín was named its secretary. He personally submitted seventy-nine amendments to the Code. Sixty-three of these amendments were subsequently incorporated literally in the definitive text of the Code. Undoubtedly, Fr. Marín's amendments coincided with those proposed by others elsewhere, but the fact remains that they appear today in the Code Canon Law just as he proposed them.

Obviously, then, his intellectual powers were not circumscribed to one sole discipline. His exceptional talents were evident in all fields of intellectual endeavour, although, as a matter of fact, they shone with particular radiance in the fields of philosophy and theology.

B. The Expositor and Teacher

There are very knowledgeable men — profound thinkers, great investigators, individuals of outstanding personal worth — who, for all their vast learning, are wanting in the qualities necessary to communicate what they know to others, or to induce them into taking part in their investigations. Understanding and explaining are two very different abilities. The former requires intellectual capacity; the latter requires furthermore the ability to translate what one knows into speech and writings not only with the clarity with which the truth exists in one's own mind, but also with the clarity needed by the person to whom the communication is addressed.

In Fr. Marín the clarity of exposition is almost unlimited. Once an idea is assimilated, he seems to find no trouble clothing it with the adequate expression that enables his listeners or readers likewise to grasp and penetrate it. The exact word, the suitable examples, the insistent repetitions . . . everything helps to make himself understood by all. Earlier we said that perhaps he sinned by too much insistence, too much repetition — by an excess of clarity, so to speak. The reader of this book will soon enough see for himself that we utter nothing but the truth.

Fr. Marín is blessed not only with the gift of communicating in a most intelligible manner the truths he perceives, but also of relating them with other clearer and more basic truths or matters in such a way that the reader or listener soon appreciates the accuracy of what he is told because he can see it for himself in the light of other truths with which he is well acquainted.

²³Fr. M. VELASCO, *Ms. cit.*, pg. 4.

One other characteristic, closely connected with his qualities as a teacher, deserves mention here. We refer to his ability to generate interest in the topics under discussion. The problems investigated by Fr. Marín were followed with increasing attention, either because of their inherent interest, or because he knew how to make them interesting. Problems or questions that provoke no interest or uneasiness will hardly cause any stir whether in the classroom or in a book. If they catch no attention, they can hardly be expected to gain wide readership; to say nothing of acceptance. Fr. Marín did not overlook any of this. Hence, for his writings he chose pressing or current problems, and if the subject was neither the one nor the other, he managed its presentation in such a way as to quicken the interest of his readers or listeners. In short, if the topic was not sufficiently interesting by itself, he made it so.

The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma provides an instance of the first case. We have already briefly touched on the actuality of the problem, the confusion created by modernism on the matter, the misguided use made by the modernists of the history of dogmas and of the psychological and affective character of religious truths. We have also mentioned that Fr. Marín took possession of the highly suggestive term, *evolution*, and of the two ill-employed weapons, the *history of dogmas* and *religious experience*, to brandish them in the service and for the benefit of orthodoxy as understood and expounded by traditional theology.

Another instance of the same kind is found in the series of articles published in the Manila daily *Libertas*, in the years 1902-1903, under the general title *Catholicism and Protestantism*. The series was made up of 22 articles.²⁴ The timing could not have been more opportune. Barely two years had elapsed since the Philippines had been acquired by the United States from Spain. The Protestants had begun to build chapels and churches in the islands. At this juncture the Catholic faithful stood in need of orientation. Fr. Marín supplied it with his long series of articles written in a journalistic and breezy style but without prejudice to the solidity of their content. We

²⁴The titles of the articles are as follows: *Catolicismo y las sectas protestantes* (Catholicism and the Protestant sects), 3 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: la Iglesia Ilerana* (Catholicism and Protestantism: The Lutheran Church), 4 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: la Iglesia reformada* (Catholicism and Protestantism: The Reformed Church), 1 article; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: Iglesia anglicana episcopal* (Catholicism and Protestantism: The Anglican Episcopal Church), 2 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: el movimiento de Oxford y su desentlace* (Catholicism and Protestantism: The Oxford Movement and its Outcome), 3 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: Puseismo y Ritualismo* (Catholicism and Protestantism: Puseyism and Ritualism), 3 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: estado actual de la Iglesia anglicana* (Catholicism and Protestantism: The actual state of the Anglican Church); 4 articles; *Catolicismo y Protestantismo: el anglicanismo y la Iglesia Romana* (Catholicism and Protestantism: Anglicanism and the Roman Church), 2 articles.

shall perforce return to these articles further on when we sketch his profile as a polemicist since the reaction they evoked among the Protestants well deserves special mention.

However, there are also instances in which the interest cannot be ascribed to the circumstances but rather to Fr. Marín himself. Theology abounds in disputable questions that were once the focus of heated controversy. Today, with the heat turned off, such questions are discussed listlessly both in the classrooms and in books, perhaps because theological history seems to indicate that there appears to be no way of settling these issues in an entirely satisfactory manner. One such issue is that of reconciling the divine motion with created liberty. If there is any inherently crucial problem, this is it, and yet it would be an anachronism to discuss it with any passion and heat. In the course of the controversies on the subject too much energy has been spent for the little light that has been made on this mysterious topic, with the result that no one investigating or writing on the matter can help being somewhat sceptical about the solutions to the problem, his own included. Which is why any heated discussions of the subject seems anachronistic.

And yet Fr. Marín succeeded in firing the enthusiasms of theologians on this very topic. He did it by *renewing* both the statement of the problem and its solution — renewing them in the genuine sense of the term because he pruned them of many accretions which, in his view, were accidental and mainly served only to obscure the issue, and thus restored them to the pristine simplicity they had in the mind and writings of St. Thomas. This procedure created shock waves everywhere, among Thomists and non-Thomists alike. The upshot: a problem that in its day had generated a great amount of heat but seemed to have burned itself out, recovered its old vigour and fire. If the articles published in *La Ciencia Tomista* under the general title *El Sistema tomista sobre la motión divina* (The Thomist System regarding the Divine Motion)²⁵ had achieved nothing else, they would have been thoroughly justified by the sole fact of having re-enchanted interest in a weighty theological problem that was tottering on the verge of extinction, and of having achieved this feat without straying outside the boundaries of either Catholic or Thomist theology.

A second instance is found in his work on the revival of the sacraments and their physical causality. Although lively and interesting in itself, this particular problem appeared fated to a limbo-like existence both in the classrooms and in the pages of theological handbooks. Fr. Marín revived it with a new treatment in an article on the subject published in *Divus Thomas*, in Fribourg.²⁶

²⁵ *Ibid.* July-August, 1925; January-February, 1926; and May-June, 1926.
²⁶ *Ibid.* January, 1925.

The interest aroused by his writings provides us with a clue to the interest provoked by his oral teaching. There are many who still recall his marvelous expositions at Fribourg. The most sublime mysteries of theology and dogma acquired a stimulating and fascinating light in his elucidations. Fr. Marín exercised, so to speak, a bewitching influence on his students compounded of a lucid exposition, a vigorous eloquence, and personal charisma. His colleague and biographer, Fr. Velasco, wrote: "He was a leader of the Catholic student youth at the University of Fribourg. In his person the spirit of Francisco de Vitoria seemed to have returned to life."²⁷ The Fribourg paper *La Liberté* drew this sketch of him: "To a theological knowledge as vast as it was profound, Fr. Marín joined the qualities needed to make teaching attractive as well as effective, namely, clarity and logic in the exposition, originality and assurance in expression, knowledgeability, liveliness and eloquence in speech — all this topped by a broad and markedly open spirit to which nothing human and modern in the manifold manifestations of intellectual life was alien."²⁸

C. The Polemicist

Fr. Marín was not a closed mind. It pleased him to test his ideas. Before sitting down to write a book, he would first publish the material by installments in various scientific journals in the form of monographic articles. In this way he could appreciate the reactions of the theologians to his views and have the opportunity to reply to their observations and difficulties. Thus, when the book finally made its appearance, it came out well argued and defended. This was the procedure followed by Fr. Marín in writing the present work, and his posthumous unedited book *The Thomist Conciliation of Divine Motion and Created Liberty*.

God had endowed him with the outstanding gifts of a polemicist. In the first place, he had a thorough grasp of the truth. We have already pointed out that he never began to set down his thoughts in writing until he was satisfied that he had thoroughly understood the matter and had reduced it to the incontrovertible principles of theology and Thomism and had traced its connexions to other theological and Thomist teachings. He was, thus, well prepared to do battle, since he had foreseen the possible attacks and had all the seemingly weak flanks well covered. This would not have been possible had he been satisfied with a non-comprehensive grasp of the subject matter, or been content with only an understanding of it based on immediate and superficial reasons, overlooking its connexions with the more universal principles and with other related questions.

²⁷ Fr. M. VELASCO, *Ms. cit.*, pg. 6.

²⁸ *La Liberté* (Fribourg), 17 June, 1932.

Apart from this *dominion of his subject matter*, which is indispensable to every good polemicist, Fr. Marín possessed a second characteristic, viz., he quickly perceived the full scope of the objections hurled against him. We mentioned earlier the artless confession that he "understood anything that he studied." This included the objections of his critics. It was then an easy task to contrast his own teaching with the arguments brought against it. Generally, it was a case of difficulties *already solved* in the simple proposition and elucidation of his own views. We have already noted that he set nothing in writing until and unless he had reduced it to the incontrovertible principles of theology and Thomism and seen its connexions with other related truths. The objections usually stemmed from overlooking any of these reductions or connexions.

One other detail. The same preoccupation for comprehension that drove him to master any subject prior to speaking or writing about it and thoroughly to grasp the arguments raised against his views, likewise constrained him not to leave any loose ends whatsoever. Quite literally he analyzed to *shreds* his critics' terms and concepts.

The reader can verify what we have been saying by reading the whole of chapter 6 and the last two sections of chapter 7 of the present book. He will see for himself how Fr. Marín subjects to minute examination each and every one of the objections raised. He takes them apart, and calmly and firmly proceeds to answer each part whether it is relevant or not. The reader will also verify that the relevant part of the objections is refuted by calling attention to some principle or detail of the previous exposition, which the objector had either missed or overlooked.

We have just said that Fr. Marín was a polemicist by temperament. He was a fighter. Controversy delighted him. Far from avoiding it, he looked for it. Perhaps here, too, he sinned by excess just as he could also be faulted, as earlier mentioned, for an obsession with clarity which impelled him to excessive repetitions. We think that his fighting temperament occasioned no little harm. With more tranquility and peace he could have finished works which he left unfinished. His penchant for testing his ideas and for polemics robbed him of precious time and calm to bring to a successful conclusion the scientific projects he had in mind. A true Navarrese, this fighting spirit was part and parcel of his nature and he never managed to get himself rid of it.

Nonetheless, this fighting spirit was never tainted with harshness. Both nature and virtue combined to endow him with exquisite charity and elegance. Vigour was reserved for the doctrine — to defend what he believed true and to refute what he esteemed false. For the persons of his adversaries he reserved the most thoughtful consideration — not one harsh or strong word that might offend their sensibilities. The present work furnishes ample

proof of it. Further corroboration will be found in the section devoted to the sketch of his moral personality.

D. Three exceptional testimonies

The intellectual personality of Fr. Marín should soon be obvious to any of his readers, since it is clearly reflected in his writings, particularly in this book. Its perusal will justify every single statement made by us. However, we wish to make of the record here three testimonials culled from the many written about his person and his work. These three are particularly valuable because they come from the Master General of the Order of Preachers to which Fr. Marín belonged, from the Dominican Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines of which he was a son, and from the University of Fribourg where he held the chair of theology from 1919 to 1927.

The Most Reverend Fr. Theissing, Master General of the Dominicans, made a canonical visit to Fribourg in 1920. Fr. Marín had succeeded Fr. Norberto del Prado and had been teaching dogma for about a year. Fr. Norberto had achieved great renown and his theological production was numerous and classical. Having heard both the students and the faculty of the Faculty of Theology, the Fr. General made the following appraisal of Fr. Marín: "Quoad soliditatem doctrinae aequas P. Norbertum, et quoad modum docendi superas eum." (In solidity of doctrine you are Fr. Norberto's equal, in the manner of teaching you are superior to him).²⁹

The chronicler of the Province of the Most Holy Rosary of the Philippines wrote the following encomium in the official chronicle: "Fr. Francisco Marín was a man of lofty intelligence and heart. His was a profound mind, an intuitive understanding both analytic and synthetic, an objective mental balance that struck admiration in all who sought his counsel and advice. He thoroughly understood anything he studied, and penetrated the problems he investigated down to their very roots and their derivations to other fundamental questions that had any bearing on them. Here lies the explanation of his sure grasp of the fundamental notions that provide the key to the matters he dealt with; his choice of the starting point capable of shedding light on the subject under study; the order, clarity and impeccable logic with which he proceeded in his investigations; the serenity and the argumentative cogency with which he captivated the minds of his students everywhere he taught — in the College of Letrán and the University of Santo Tomás in Manila, as well as in Spain, America, and Switzerland. His speech possessed an astounding power of suggestion that charmed those who listened to his teaching: such memory will live forever in his beloved students.

²⁹Fr. M. VELASCO, *Ms. cit.*, pg. 7.

"Hence the enthusiasm, the fervent love, the intense affection he evoked in their hearts towards his person as a teacher, and his own loyal and inviolable reciprocal affection towards them. Thus the marvelous interaction between a great and expert teacher and students desirous of slaking their thirst in the admirable wisdom of the teacher which flowed purely and copiously in his lucid and enlightening lectures.

"His gifts as an organizer and eloquent speaker made him the acknowledged leader of the student youth at the University of Fribourg. In his person the spirit of Francisco de Vitoria seemed to have returned to this earth—such was the new vitality he managed to infuse in all those who gathered round his professorial chair, the enthusiasm he aroused in them for philosophical and theological research and study, the renewal of the great problems that engrossed the attention of both ancient and modern thinkers and by him restated with refreshing originality and given brilliant solutions which cut the Gordian knot of difficulties to great theological questions."³⁰

We conclude with this laudatory judgment from the University of Fribourg: "Fr. Marín-Sola was the professor of dogmatic theology in our university since the fall of 1918. This important chair had been brilliantly occupied by another Spaniard, his immediate predecessor, the unforgettable Fr. Norberto del Prado. Fr. Marín-Sola discharged his duties with a brilliancy and success that would be very difficult to surmount. His theological knowledge, as vast as it was profound, was enhanced by all the qualities that make for an effective and attractive teaching: clarity and logic in the exposition; originality and assurance of expression; power, fire and eloquence of speech; a markedly broad and open spirit to which nothing that is human and modern in the manifold manifestations of intellectual life was alien.

"His boldly personal mind renewed whatever problems it dealt with. His lectures were always attuned to the profoundly religious inspiration of his priestly soul. His classes constituted the delight of the listeners, who were drawn in ever greater numbers and with mounting enthusiasm to his chair of dogma. Thus, the news of his recall to Spain for imperative reasons understandably caused unanimous and profound regret in everyone.

"He had the temperament of a polemicist . . . and was, besides, a singularly powerful speaker."³¹

The coincidence of all appraisals is remarkably exact. Fr. Marín was an authentic intellectual: thinker, expositor, polemicist, an open and very human mind. A great theologian, a profound writer, he was a shaper of theologians and writers.

³⁰*Ibid.*, pgs. 8-9.

³¹*La Liberté* (Fribourg), 17 June, 1932.

3. Literary Output

Fr. Marín-Sola's literary output is as varied as his professional activities. He gave himself wholly to teaching from 1900 to 1932 when he died. Of those 32 years, twenty two were devoted to teaching theology in Ávila, Manila, Rosaryville and Fribourg: three years in Ávila (1906-1908 and 1911), five in Manila (1908-1910, 1929-1932), six in Rosaryville (1913-1919), eight in Fribourg (1919-1927).

In Manila he was both a teacher and a journalist. In 1902-1906 he taught mathematics at the Colegio de San Juan de Letrán and philosophy at the University of Sto. Tomás and simultaneously was a staff writer of the daily newspaper *Libertas*. In 1908-1910 he was promoted to the editorship of the same paper and made a professor of theology at the aforesaid university.

These twenty two years devoted to the teaching of theology and six years of journalistic activities were greatly productive. We will mention here his more significant journalistic productions and all his theological writings.³²

1. *Catholicism and the Protestant Sects*. — Three articles in *Libertas*, Manila, 1902.
2. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Lutheran Church*. — Four articles, *ibid.*, 1902.
3. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Reformed Church*. — One article; *ibid.*, 1902.
4. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Anglican Episcopal Church*. — Two articles, *ibid.*, 1902.
5. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Oxford Movement and its Outcome*. — Three articles, *ibid.*, 1902.
6. *Catholicism and Protestantism. Puseyism and Ritualism*. — Three articles, *ibid.*, 1902.
7. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Actual State of the Anglican Church*. — Four articles, *ibid.*, 1903.

³²Besides the works listed in the text, Fr. Marín authored many others. They were mostly journalistic pieces written during his four years as a staffer, and two years as the editor of *Libertas*. He himself had gathered in twenty-two folders his articles published in *Libertas*. They comprise editorials, apologetical and polemical writings aimed at the Protestants, Aglipayans, and other sects.

He also wrote *Santo Domingo de Guzmán y las misiones de infieles* (St. Dominic de Guzman and the Missions among the Heathen), in *Misiones Dominicanas*, August, 1921.

Panegrico de Santo Tomás de Aquino Panegyric on St. Thomas Aquinas), delivered before the Faculty of the Central University of Madrid on 15 March, 1908, and published in Ávila that same year.

8. *Catholicism and Protestantism. The Anglican Church and the Roman Church.* — Two articles, *ibid.*, 1903.
9. *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma.* — Original Spanish edition in 4°, one volume, 600 pages. Published by the Biblioteca the Tomistas Españoles, Valencia, 1923.

This work had been previously published as a series of monographic articles in the journals *La Ciencia Tomista* and *Revue Thomiste*.

10. *L'évolution homogène du dogme catholique.* — Two volumes in 4°, 535 and 375 pages respectively. Fribourg, Switzerland, 1924.

This edition is the French translation of the previous work, augmented by the author with new footnotes in almost all the sections, and with an entirely new section, the 6th section of chapter 4.

11. *Proponitur nova solutio ad conciliandam causalitatem physicam sacramentorum cum eorum reviviscencia* (A New Solution to Reconcile the Physical Causality of the Sacraments with their Revival). — In *Divus Thomas*, Jan. 1925, pgs. 49-63. Fribourg.
12. *El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (The Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion). — In *La Ciencia Tomista*, July-Aug. 1925, pgs. 5-55.
13. *Respuesta a algunas objeciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (Replies to some Objections to the Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion). — In *La Ciencia Tomista*, Jan.-Feb. 1926, pgs. 5-74.
14. *Nuevas objeciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (New Objections to the Thomist System concerning the Divine Motion). — *La Ciencia Tomista*, May-June 1926, pgs. 321-397.
15. *Concordia tomista entre la moción divina y la libertad creada* (The Thomist Conciliation of the Divine Motion and Created Liberty). — Unedited typescript in 4 volumes fol. Volume I has 1039 pages of text and XLIX of indexes; vol. 2, 643 and XXI; vol. 3, 612 and LXXXI; vol. 4, 646 and LXXXV.

4. Fr. Marín's Moral Personality

Fr. Marín-Sola's moral personality possessed truly attractive and exemplary features as a religious and as a man. He endeared himself to God and to men.

A. Fr. Marín, the religious

Father's was a profound and solid religious spirit. We have time and again remarked that there was nothing superficial in him. This was also true of his piety. Occupied as he was in the study and consideration of dogmatic truths, he was not content with a merely *speculativa* knowledge of the same. No one has expounded as well as he the affective and perfective value of Catholic dogmas. In this work he devotes two whole sections to explore this theme. His penetration of the dogmas made it easy for him to transform them into sources of spiritual and divine life.

Thence his solid piety — a truly *dogmatic* piety. He experienced no difficulty in translating his theological investigations into genuine dogmatic elevations of the purest mystical strain. Traces of it can be detected once in a while in his writings, and more frequently in his conversations. It can also be appreciated in some manifestations of his way of life. We are ourselves witnesses of some of these elevations done for our benefit when we were still students. We can likewise testify to the exactness with which he carried over into his exterior life the divine contemplation which filled him interiorly.

This profound and simple piety was accompanied by an equally profound and simple humility. We have earlier called attention to his renewing — not to say revolutionary — and polemical temperament on the intellectual level. This might lead one to surmise that, on the moral level, Fr. Marín was a restless and agitated spirit. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Father was an exemplar of humility as well as of simplicity.

That he should eagerly rise to the defense of his positions is understandable. He had spent many a wakeful night and a great deal of hard work to construct his doctrinal syntheses and to lay bare their traditional roots. For all their renewing and revolutionary features his teachings, as already noted earlier, always possessed a solid *doctrinal* and *positive* foundation. Right or wrong — that is beside the point just now — it is undeniable that Fr. Marín's writings evince a solid basis in doctrine and an equally solid grounding in tradition. Equally undeniable is the evidence that Father had read extensively and given much thought to the matter. Hence it is understandable that he should zealously defend what had cost him so dearly.

And yet Fr. Marín stood ready to give up all these many long vigils, all this intense labour of thought, a whole lifetime of investigation and study, all the fruits of dedicated effort — all of it — on the strength of a single passage in which St. Thomas clearly affirmed the contrary. Undeniably, the authority of St. Thomas ranks as one of the greatest. But equally great is the sacrifice implied in giving up the fruits of a lifetime of thinking, rethinking, and researching; in renouncing a scientific synthesis built in the course of long years of work; in setting aside *fifteen thousand* texts garnered from the

theological tradition for a single text of the Angelic Doctor. In *The Thomist Conciliation of Divine Motion and Created Liberty* Fr. Marín has collected fifteen thousand quotations for his position. Nonetheless, he writes: "Any theologian who disagrees with certain relatively new aspects which we expect to present in these articles, has at hand a very simple and easy way to convince us. He can dispense with long and complex counter arguments and instead show us one single text from St. Thomas that clearly says the contrary, and he can be certain of our recantation."³³

Similar instances of humility and modesty abound in his life. As a student, Father once brilliantly argued against a certain professor in a public disputation. The professor found himself completely beset by the young student. Yet Father's classmates testify that he never, in his conversations, made any allusion to what had happened.³⁴ He passed the examinations for the degree of Lector of Sacred Theology with such flying colours that the Rector of the University of Santo Tomás (Manila), who presided over the exercises, proposed that he be conferred without further ado also the licentiate and the doctorate. Fr. Marín declined, not wishing to draw attention with such an unusual procedure. While teaching at Fribourg, he was proposed for the degree of *Magister* of Sacred Theology. Fr. Marín consented only on condition that the same degree be conferred on a colleague whose attainments were far inferior to his own. He thus gave to understand that he was accepting the degree not as a personal title but in order to add lustre to the chair.

³³Fr. Marín's submission to the doctrinal authority of St. Thomas was anything but servile. It was neither a *blind* faith in the Angelic Doctor's authority nor a total abdication of personal thinking. At one time or another, we have heard him say that his faith and mental docility to the teachings of Aquinas were grounded *on his own experience*. He had repeatedly experienced the fact that the Saint's assertions were firmly grounded on the principles of reason and of revelation; and this led him to place more trust in what he read in Aquinas than in his own investigations.

Fr. Marín always evidenced his great faithfulness to the teachings of St. Thomas. In 1925-1926, the articles he published in *La Ciencia Tomista* to the teachings of St. Thomas caused a great commotion among theologians. About the same time he fell seriously ill in Fribourg. During his illness he wrote an oath of submission to the doctrines of the Angelic Doctor and a moving petition that God would please take him from this world if his interpretation should have deviated from the authentic thought of the Master. God was pleased not to take him at that time, and gave him sufficient time to complete the still unedited four volumes *in folio*.

Father's faithfulness is not to be taken to mean that he was content with the mere reading of Aquinas. He was never satisfied until he had thoroughly mastered what he read and researched — a mastery that normally was not long in forthcoming since he was gifted with a clear and profound mind.

³⁴Declaration by his fellow-student, Fr. Gregorio Arnáiz.

The renovating spirit which he brought to the study and exposition of the theological conclusions expounded by him in the classroom and in his writings caused him no small amount of trials and unpleasantness. The reactions provoked by his articles in people of different persuasions can be easily understood. But Father Marín was a sensitive soul, and such reactions affected him a great deal. However, he was never heard to utter a recriminatory word. His intimate letters provide reliable proof of his humility and religious spirit. And the facts always coincided with the feelings expressed in his letters.

B. Fr. Marín, the man

Father, we have said, possessed a fighting temperament. Yet, he was not one to pick up his pen with a mind to provoke an argument, but to do constructive work. In *La Ciencia Tomista* he wrote: "Although our articles, so far as it depends on us, will have no polemical purposes . . ." ³⁵ Still, he foresaw that the events would frustrate his intentions: "Despite our desire to avoid the faintest shadow of controversy, we anticipate no lack of Molinists, and particularly of Thomists, who will disagree with our ideas, who will attack them and force us to reply."³⁶

His replies were always models of good breeding. Not a harsh word escaped his pen or his lips which could prejudice his critics. He was polite, mild and elegant. Section VII in toto of Chapter 7 of this book is devoted to answering the theologian who maintained the contrary view. The solution to the twenty seven objections raised by the latter take all of 48 pages.³⁷ Yet the critic's name is barely mentioned three times, and then always with expressions of regard.³⁸

Father directed the reply to the doctrine. For the person he reserved an exquisite consideration. He strove "to keep objective discussions from degenerating into more or less personal differences of opinion, as is often the case with controversies carried on through journals."³⁹

³⁵*El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina*; *La Ciencia Tomista*, July-August, 1925, pg. 8.

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*La Evolución homogénea del dogma católico*, nos. 491, 519, Valencia, 1923, pgs. 524-571.

³⁸No mention is made either of the names of his critics elsewhere in the same book. For instance, Section 1 of Chapter 4 is entirely motivated by the objection submitted by a theologian whom he quotes without naming. Chapter 6 is entirely given to the solution of difficulties without naming the persons who had raised them.

³⁹*El sistema sobre la moción divina*, *La Ciencia Tomista*, July-August, 1925, pg. 8.

Neither the harsh attacks hurled on certain occasions against his views nor the severe judgments to which they were at times subjected by some critics were sufficient to discourage him from holding on to his resolve never to climb down from the doctrinal and objective level to the subjective and personal. Fr. Marín never lost his composure and serenity; he always remained understanding and refined. A polemicist by temperament, he was, nonetheless, so far removed from the personal dimension of polemics and so intent only on the clarification of doctrine, that he expressed a wish for a return to the era in which controversies were carried on with no mention of the identities of those taking part. "To the remark added by our objector . . . we shall only make the following observations . . . Fourthly, if this contro- versy is to continue, it would be desirable that it should not be like the heated argument directed by Concina, in the decadent XVIII century, against Billuart by name, but that it should be conducted rather in the urbane style in which, in the classic XVI century, Ferrariensis took issue against Cardinal Cajetan on several questions, but without naming him; or even better still, in the truly saintly manner in which, in the Golden Age of Scholasticism, the two greatest disciples of St. Augustine — St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure — maintained divergent interpretations of the common master without ever attacking one another and without jeopardizing in the least their mutual friendship."⁴⁰

Father possessed a large measure of broadmindedness. He was unshakeable in his convictions, yet he never entertained the thought of imposing his views as definitively true. Indeed, he held them to be definitely true, but were they such in themselves? Broadmindedness was one thing he insisted upon in his articles. "From our adversaries, if there be any, we would ask only a little bit of patience and another little bit of broadmindedness. Of patience, so as not to let themselves be carried away by impressions caused by one or two articles and to allow us enough time to unfold our thought com- pletely in succeeding articles . . . Of broadmindedness, so as to refrain from declaring false an assertion solely because it appears to be new or surprising, let alone qualifying it as anti-Thomistic because it is contrary to one, some, or several Thomists, when, as a matter of fact, other truly ranking Thomists support it."⁴¹ "Of the Thomist school the same thing is true that is true of the Catholic doctrine, to wit: *unity* is to be preserved in *necessary* or evident things, but *liberty* is no less to be upheld in *doubtful* things, and, above all,

⁴⁰ *Nuevas observaciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina* (New Observations about the Thomist System concerning the divine motion), *La Ciencia To- mista*, May-June, 1926, pgs. 396-397.

⁴¹ *El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina*, *La Ciencia Tomista*, July-August, 1925, pg. 8.

charity is to be maintained in *all* things. 'In necessariis, *unitas*; in dubiis, *libertas*; in omnibus, *charitas*.'"⁴²

The mild, urbane, human character of his polemics was always in evi- dence both in debatable and non-debatable matters. His views on the evolu- tion of dogma and on the conciliation of the divine motion with created liberty were debatable matters. He argued for his views as one thoroughly convinced of their truth; but he was also aware of the possibility of being in error, since no man is infallible. On the other hand, his points of view on the question of Catholic teaching as contrasted with Protestant teaching were not debatable matters, since these were dogmatic points of view, and thus infalli- ble. Liberty was out of the question, but there was room for charity. This was clearly obvious in the articles published in Manila on the subject of Pro- testantism. Their objective, serene, and dispassionate tenor produced ex- cellent results in the Protestants themselves.

The Episcopalian bishop in Manila wrote Fr. Marín a letter in the following terms: "Your articles on the Anglo-American Church are written in so urbane and correct a spirit that it was a pleasure for me to read them."⁴³ The bishop requested that *Libertas* publish the letter written by himself to the author of the articles on *Catholicism and Protestantism* so that the Catholic readers of that daily would come to know the pleasure with which the Protestants read what Fr. Marín was writing. Father, in turn, replied via the same daily that the mild tenor of his articles was an exigency of both social living and Christian brotherhood. He wrote: "Thank you, in the first place, for the kind words you have for our modest articles on Pro- testantism. The urbane and correct spirit which you so kindly attribute to us, produces in us the feeling of satisfaction that always attends the fulfill- ment of a duty. Indeed, nothing so becomes a Christian than a moderate and fair appraisal of the ideas of those who dissent from the convictions he holds dear, along with a gentlemanly consideration and respect owed to *persons of all kinds*."⁴⁴ However, this *personal* urbanity shown to Protestants is not to be mistaken for weakness in upholding Catholic teaching, or for a certain interest in reaching a doctrinal compromise. "However", Fr. Marín went on to say, "in order to be utterly sincere, we have to make it clear that until the Episcopal Church returns to her ancient mother, the Roman Church, and acknowledges the Pope as the supreme Pastor and Head of the Universal Church, Catholics cannot consider Episcopalian as their correligionists nor

⁴² *Nuevas observaciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina*. *La Ciencia Tomista*, May-June, 1926, pg. 397.

⁴³ Letter of the Rev. IRVING SPENCER, Episcopalian bishop of Manila to Fr. Marín, 1903.

⁴⁴ Fr. Marín's reply to the Episcopalian bishop of Manila.

believe that the means of salvation can be found in your Church, except in the case of a thoroughly invincible good faith."⁴⁵

In addition to the traits of understanding, gentleness and urbanity, Fr. Marín possessed a youthful — at times, even a childlike — spirit. With the showing he was in his element. He was as one of them, albeit simultaneously once a comrade, a teacher and a father. Therein, together with the clarity of his expositions and the interest he aroused in the problems under discussion, lies the key to the success he enjoyed in his dealings with the youth. To them he was an understanding friend, mentor and counsellor.

Earlier we have quoted incontrovertible testimonies from the chroniclers of the Philippine Province where he lived for so many years, and from the University of Fribourg where he taught for eight years — testimonies that speak of "the enthusiasm and fervent love he stirred up in the hearts of the young, and the intense affection he aroused towards his person"⁴⁶ and affirm that "nothing of what is human was alien to him."⁴⁷ Fr. Marín revived the classical age in which religious men exercised a decisive influence on the masses of university students — the age of Blessed John of Saxony who charmed and won the hearts of young students, the age of St. Thomas chatting with his students from the Sorbonne, by the banks of the Seine, showing himself as the best friend of those same youths who had earlier flocked to his classes to listen to him as their best teacher.

Those who have left us a written portrayal of his soul, and Father himself as well, give us to understand that the human virtues we have mentioned were not simply the fruits of his natural dispositions and education but also *manifestations of his supernatural virtues*. The eulogy made of him by the University of Fribourg at the time of his death recalls "the profoundly religious inspiration of his priestly soul."⁴⁸ Father Marín himself, in his reply to the Anglican bishop who had praised the gentle and fair tenor of his articles on Protestantism, wrote: "We, Catholics, are always ready to observe all the consideration demanded by society and Christian fraternity towards those whom we are precluded from sharing the sacred embrace of religious communion in the unity of faith."⁴⁹

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Fr. M. VELASCO, *Biographical Essays*, pg. 9.

⁴⁷ *La Liberté*, Fribourg, 17 June, 1932.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Fr. Marín's letter to the Episcopalian bishop of Manila.

THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA

The work being published in English in this volume is the most significant of Fr. Marín's published output. There is, indeed, another perhaps even more significant (in 4 vols.), which remains unpublished to this day: but it is this one which made his name in theological circles and definitively established him as a theologian of the first rank.

It was first published in 1911, as a series of articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* under the general title, *La Homogeneidad de la doctrina católica* (The Homogeneity of Catholic Teaching). The articles were later revised and given a better arrangement by the author, who also added some other material published in *Revue Thomiste* and wrote almost all the sections of chapters 6 and 7. Out of it all came the present work. Renamed *La evolución homogénea del dogma católico* (The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma), it was published in Valencia, in 1923, as the first title of the *Biblioteca de Tomistas Españoles* (Library of Spanish Thomists) founded by Fr. Luis Urbano.

The second edition, in French (2 vols., 4°), came out in Fribourg (Switzerland), in 1924. It constituted a notable improvement over the first since, apart from the further development of not a few concepts and the addition of more footnotes, it contained an entirely new section on the evolution of dogma through the affective way, the treatment of which is not as extensive in the Spanish as in the French edition.

To proceed in an orderly manner in the presentation of the work being offered to the public in a new edition, we shall touch on the following points:

- I. The circumstances in which *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* first appeared.
- II. Its content.
- III. Its reception by theological opinion.

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA FIRST APPEARED

The condemnation of modernism was still fresh when Fr. Marín began writing on homogeneity and the evolution of Catholic teaching. He was well aware that modernism had confronted a very real problem and given it an altogether heterodox solution. However, the condemnation of any heterodox solution left the problem unsolved, and the door open to the investigation of a real and pressing problem with a view to giving it a solution in conformity with the faith. It was necessary to find an acceptable solution to a problem which the modernists had solved in unacceptable ways. There were

two aspects to the problem: (1) the unfolding or evolution of Catholic dogma; (2) the influence of religious experience in its evolution. These were two aspects that modernism had ill considered; two aspects that Catholic theologians needed to recognize as real, to investigate, and correctly to explain. There were many who took it upon themselves to study the problem. They all safeguarded the dogmatic aspect of the question, but the proffered solutions were not always concordant. With the present work Fr. Marín enlisted himself in the enterprise.

Modernism was an *arational* conception of the Catholic doctrine. Its philosophy is fundamentally agnostic and the agnosticism is projected onto both the truths of religion and the dogmas. In consequence, faith is not an *intellectual assent* but a *blind sentiment*, the seat of which is not in the intellect since it proceeds rather from the heart under the pressure of the subconscious. "To begin with the philosophical part, modernists lay the foundations of religious philosophy in the doctrine known usually by the name of agnosticism."⁵⁰ "[Faith] which is the beginning and basis of any religion must be located in a certain intimate feeling which issues from the need of the divine. Now, this need of the divine . . . in the first place, lies hidden beneath consciousness, or as they say, borrowing a term from modern philosophy, in the subconscious, where also its root lies hidden and ungrasped."⁵¹

The development of religious understanding (if that name can be given to what is but a *feeling* blindly issuing from the subconscious) is not brought about by the vitality inherent in the *objective truth itself* — which remains unapprehended, in the first place — but by imperatives properly belonging to the life of the subject who has the religious experience. Religious teachings, dogmas, evolve and develop at the behest of man's own psychology. We have here not an objective but rather a subjective development; not a rational or doctrinal but rather a blind and vital development, where the term "vital" does not refer to the developed truths or dogmas — which would be pure orthodoxy — but refers solely to the subject who feels them, man.

Thence flows one immediate consequence, namely, doctrinal and dogmatic evolution which is not subject to a homogeneous process. If such evolution proceeded from an *internal* pressure of the unfolding truth itself, from an explication of what is implicit in the truth, from a surfacing of what is virtually contained in it, one could be talking of a homogeneous evolution. The point arrived at in the developmental process would have been contained in the principle or point of departure. But this is not the case. As conceived by the modernists, the development is heterogeneous. The point arrived at, through one or more evolutionary processes, might or might not coincide with

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Encycl. *Pascendi dominici gregis*, AAS, 40 (1907), 596.51 *Ibid.*, pg. 598.

the primitive datum since the development and the evolution are not dictated by the internal fecundity of the truth which, as it unfolds, maintains a real identity with itself, but by the subjective dispositions of the religious person, dispositions that are extremely contingent and changeable. "That dogma not only does, but must needs evolve and *change*, is something that modernists themselves openly avow, and something that clearly follows from their teachings. . . . The primitive formula needs to be accepted and sanctioned by the heart; the effort by means of which the secondary formulae come into existence must also be guided by the heart. If they are to be vital, these formulae must be and must ever remain accommodated to the faith as well as to the believer. If, for any reason whatsoever, this accommodation should cease, those primitive notions lose their worth and must needs be changed."⁵²

Finally, modernists claim that the dogmatic development just described, namely, one that deviates from the meaning of the primitive data, is a fact attested to by the history of dogmas.

Light had to be shed on all of this. The Church condemned the errors we have mentioned. Yet, there are valid points contained in them. For instance, the fact that dogmas have developed; the fact that, although it comes down from God to us by revelation, dogma is not disconnected from the life of the person who believes in it; the fact that the connexion between dogma and Christian life has a bearing on the dogmatic development of the revealed truth.

These facts had to be harmonized with the two elements which no Catholic theologian can overlook, to wit, the *rational character of truth* denied by agnostic modernism, and the *homogeneous character of doctrinal evolution* likewise rejected by modernist doctrinal transformism.

In other words, there was a need to state in orthodox terms, and to solve by orthodox means and criteria and with orthodox results, a problem stated by the modernists in unacceptable terms, and by them solved by criteria and with results equally unacceptable to Catholicism. Such was the task to which Catholic theologians addressed themselves. It was also the task to which Fr. Marín applied himself, in the conviction that traditional theology possessed within itself sufficient elements satisfactorily to solve the nagging problem which the Church faced.

The Catholic solutions always safeguarded that which can in no way be renounced, they all upheld a faith that is rational and a process that is homogeneous. But there was not in all the same exhaustive fullness in the treatment of either the scope of the rationality of the faith and of the development of the dogmas *vis-à-vis* the affective influences bearing upon it, or of the scope itself of the development of dogmatic truths.

52 *Ibid.*, pg. 602.

The present work reflects those differences among Catholics. Beneath the author's mild and serene style, echoes can still be detected of the lively and spirited exchanges, of which he occasionally complains.

Without meaning to overlook the fact that faith is an intellectual virtue, some writers accounted for the unfolding of the truths of faith on the basis of a predominantly affective process. This should not be surprising given the fact that the two strains, the intellectualist and the mystic, have always existed among Catholic authors. The truth lies in the equilibrium between the intellect and the will. A correspondent wrote Fr. Marín in these terms: "Dogmatic development very, very rarely, or almost never, takes place through pure dialectics. Dialectics usually comes in at a later stage to justify the development made spontaneously or *intuitively* by way of Christian praxis or experience. Thus, St. Thomas's dictum is fulfilled: 'Life comes ahead of doctrine.' If such were not the case, you should find it easy to cite concrete, real instances of dialectical development, and you should not be satisfied with some hypothetical examples."⁵³ These words mirror the position of those who favour the affective and mystic factors in accounting for the development of dogma. Fr. Marín satisfied his correspondent's scruples. In the present work he cites a respectable number of historical instances that evidence the fact of dogmatic development by means of reasoning.

At the opposite end were those who accounted for the fact of dogmatic progress by an intellectual process that was insufficient both theoretically and historically. The reader will have discerned that we are reviewing only the tendencies dealt with by Fr. Marín in the writing of this book, namely, the heterodox or modernist, and, within Catholicism, the predominantly mystic and the insufficiently intellectual. We shall now consider the latter.

Fr. Marín offers an ample account of the traditional meaning of the revealed *implicit*. Everything that is implicit in the principles is homogeneous to the same. What is implicit in the revealed principles is likewise revealed and if it is revealed, it can be defined as a dogma of faith. But what is the scope of true implicitness? Fr. Marín maintains that the traditional view places the *inclusive virtual* within the scope of metaphysical and theological implicitness. Hence, every truly theological conclusion is implicitly revealed and can be defined as a truth of faith. Consequently, the development of Catholic teaching can reach as far as turning all authentically revealed conclusions into dogmas of divine faith by means of the definition of the Church.

Not everybody was — or is — of this opinion. And Fr. Marín experienced no want of objectors. Dogmatic development by way of reasoning stops short of the *virtual inclusive*; it extends only as far as the *formal implicit*.

⁵³ *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, ch. 4, sec. 1, no. 190.

ciz. Nothing is definable as a dogma if it is not formally revealed. Such is not the case with the conclusions. Hence the conclusions can never be defined as dogmas of faith.

Herein lies the core of Fr. Marín's book. He proves that the *virtual*, understood in the traditional sense, entails real identity with the principles: it is contained in them, included in them. Theological conclusions are *virtually* included in the revealed principles; hence they, the conclusions, are revealed. *Virtually* and *implicitly*, true; but, in any case, revealed. If revealed, then definable. Once they are defined by the Church they are to be believed with divine faith.

But Fr. Marín did not arrive at this position solely through the reasoning just indicated. True enough, the concept of genuine metaphysical *virtuality* could not but bring him to it. Yet it is equally true that the history of dogmas furnished him with a battery of first rate arguments. There are not a few dogmas, already defined and believed with divine faith, that reached the stage of definition by a process of authentic reasoning. Fr. Marín amply documents these instances. Those who maintain that only formally implicit conclusions can be defined as dogmas of faith, and exclude from definition all *virtually* implicit conclusions, must explain how it has been possible for the Church to have defined certain dogmas⁵⁴ that do not seem to have been revealed in a formally implicit manner.

"It is a historical fact *beyond doubt*", writes Fr. Marín, that a number of dogmas have unfolded or developed by way of theological conclusions in the proper sense of the term. This historical fact was admitted by traditional theology up to the 17th century, and it should likewise be admitted by all modern theologians. . . . Once the true concept of the revealed *virtual* is recaptured, it becomes easy to understand how an authentic and proper evolution — but one that is homogeneous — can, and does exist in Catholic dogma. Thus, the antinomy that seemingly existed between the teachings of Catholic theology and the facts of history⁵⁵ vanishes, and the objection

⁵⁴ The author examines ten dogmas that came to be defined through a previous process of investigation and study, a process clearly manifested in the very same conciliar or papal texts in which the definition is prepared or explained. These ten instances are found in ch. 4, secs. 2-3.

⁵⁵ This refers to theological teaching subsequent to the deviation that took place in the 17th century. Having reduced the theological conclusion to the connexive *virtual*, and taking into account the non-revealed character of the latter, theology was bound to affirm that theological conclusions cannot be defined as dogmas. On the other hand, history manifestly shows that truths known by way of genuine theological conclusions have been actually defined.

Certain modern theologians likewise affirm that only the *formally implicitly* revealed can be defined dogmatically. But the history of dogmas attests to instances in

raised by modernism concerning the transformation of dogmas collapses entirely."⁵⁶

There were several reasons that led our author to challenge the notion of a dogmatic evolution restricted solely to conclusions of a formally implicit character. He considers such a notion too narrow. In the first place, it does not do away with the modernist contention that dogmas are subject to transformation. If the virtual is not homogeneous, then, since the Church has in fact defined many instances of the virtual, it follows that there are many dogmas that are not homogeneous to the revealed datum. In the second place, the metaphysical or theological virtual, as understood traditionally, is a virtual that is *included* in the principles, and therefore revealed. In the third place, this is the only sufficient explanation of the definitions by which the Church has officially sanctioned the development of certain dogmatic truths.

It is obvious that Fr. Marín had to contend not a little with certain orthodox ideas narrower than his own, and narrower even than ideas which he considered traditional. He fought against these narrow ideas for a fundamentally *dogmatic* reason: not for reasons of school affiliation (since, as he observes, *all the traditional theology is of one mind on this point*), but because of his desire to strike a blow, true and good, against the modernist error that upheld a transformistic evolution in Catholic teaching. The whole of chapter 6 and the last two sections of chapter 7 bear witness to these debates.

II. THE CONTENT OF THE PRESENT WORK

The contents of the book have already been somewhat outlined. We shall, nonetheless, proceed to give a more detailed account of it, a task made easy by the fact that Fr. Marín's writings — and this one in particular — are models of logical vigour and clarity, two qualities which immensely facilitate an over-all view.

There are seven chapters to the book, each one subdivided into several sections. Chapter I is fundamental. It explains the various kinds of doctrinal evolution; the various kinds of distinctions, those obtaining in things, and those obtaining between the principle which is the starting point of the evolu-

which virtually revealed truths have been defined. Thus, theology and history seemed to be at loggerheads.

Fr. Marín's researches on this point do away with these embarrassments and re-establish a perfect coincidence between theology and history.

⁵⁶ *The Homogeneous Evolution* . . . , Introduction no. 11.

tion, and the term at which it arrives; the various kinds of reasoning by means of which doctrinal evolution is carried out; etc.

Doctrinal development or evolution takes place in three ways, according as it arrives either at formulae or expressions different from the primitive ones; or at different concepts; or at different realities. The merely nominal development or evolution of formulae, which maintains the same concept and the same reality in the first as well as in the final formula, is necessarily homogeneous. Homogeneous, likewise, is the development of one formula into another, when the latter contains a different concept which, nonetheless, included in the same reality expressed by the meaning of the primitive formula or principle which is the starting point. But the same is not the case in the process of development at the term of which we find a formula, a concept, and a reality that differ from those of the starting point. This is a case of true transformation, a case of heterogeneous or transformistic evolution.

It is to be truly homogeneous, the conceptual development must needs preserve the *same meaning* through all the changes of formulation. However, the identity of meaning is maintained not only in the case where the change is solely in the words, but also in the case where the concept is *explicitated*, where the concept is *opened up* and thus discloses or makes manifest what was implicit or contained in itself. Development ceases to be homogeneous solely in the case in which the meaning of the derived formula is either different from or contrary to the meaning of the initially given one. The better to understand when the meaning of a formula is, or is not, implicitly contained in the meaning of another formula, it will help to bear well in mind a threefold distinction of meanings or concepts taught by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, namely, (a) explicative concepts; (b) diverse concepts; (c) contrary concepts. Concepts are said to be *explicative* when they issue one from the other upon the one and only condition that our intellect penetrates their *whole* content.⁵⁷

In this case, between the implicit and the explicit there is only a distinction of reason, not a real distinction. Not a merely nominal distinction either. It is not a case of nominal distinction or a distinction solely of words and formulae. Neither is it a case of real distinction or a distinction of objectivity and subject-matter. It is a case of a distinction of reasoned reason or a distinction of concepts *really contained the one in the other*.

In Chapter 2 the question concerning the nature of *true theological implicitness* is stated and solved. Authentic doctrinal development in theology is carried out by way of conceptual implicitness. Theological conclusions are explications of what is contained in the revealed principles.

⁵⁷ *Op. cit.*, ch. 1, sec. 1, no. 20.

The starting point of dogmatic evolution is constituted by the revealed formulae handed down by the Apostles to the primitive Church. In these formulae there is a part of meaning *formally* contained, and a part of meaning *virtually implicit*. No theologian doubts that the formulae themselves, as handed down by the Apostles, are objects of divine revelation: they have been revealed. No theologian doubts either that the part of meaning formally contained has been revealed. But what of the part of meaning *virtually implicit*? Has it also been revealed? This is the point at issue. Its solution calls for the determination of the traditional understanding of the concept of the true theological virtuality.

Virtual is the counterpart of formal. The formal or immediate content is that which is known by itself *without the mediation of any other*. On the other hand, the virtual or mediate is not known by itself, but disclosed by *something new*.

There are two kinds of *virtual* or *mediate* content. There is a virtual or mediate that differs both really and conceptually from the formal; and there is a virtual or mediate that *differs conceptually* from the formal but is, nonetheless, *really and objectively identical to it*. The existence of these two kinds of virtual is traditionally admitted and forms the basis for two kinds of sciences: the metaphysical, and the physical sciences. Every science is a knowledge of the virtual or mediate, a knowledge of conclusions. Conclusions are nothing else but the virtuality of the principles made plain or explicated. The conclusions of the physical sciences contain meanings that differ from the meaning of the principles both conceptually and really. The conclusions of the metaphysical sciences contain meanings that are conceptually different from, and at the same time really identical to the meaning of the principles. The existence of these two kinds of sciences provides the clearest proof for the existence of these two kinds of virtuality.

Fr. Marín calls these two traditionally accepted *virtually* the *virtual inclusive* and the *virtual connexive*. The former, which is *included* in the principles, really contained in them, is the metaphysical virtual. The latter, which is *connected* or joined to the principles but not included in them but rather distinct from them, is the physical virtual.

In a magnificent example of positive-doctrinal research, Fr. Marín discovers the origin of a change of nomenclature which eventually had enormous theoretical repercussions. The innovation is traced to Suárez who exhibits in these matters a spirit that is traditional in part and independent in part. This great Jesuit theologian admitted, contrary to Molina, that theological conclusions become truths of faith after their definition by the Church. "It must be said that the theological conclusion, after it has been defined by the Church, is of faith formally and most properly, not only mediately but imme-

diately. This opinion seems to me certain and gathered from the common consent of theologians. Nor do I find any theologian who contradicts it."⁵⁸

"Eminently traditional where common doctrines are concerned, Suárez is also one of the most eclectic spirits in matters where his predecessors are divided among themselves. Suárez seldom declares himself unconditionally for any of two opposed schools. More often than not, he introduces a distinction or observation of his own, no doubt with the praiseworthy intention of reducing the distance between the two adversaries."⁵⁹ And that is what he did in the present question. There were those who affirmed that the revealed virtual or theological conclusion is of divine faith by itself prior to the Church's definition. Among these, Suárez says, are Melchor Cano, Vázquez and Vega. Others, on the contrary, affirm that the theological virtual or theological conclusion can be defined by the Church as of divine faith, but, prior to such definition, it can be the object of only a theological assent. Such is the view of St. Thomas, Cajetan, Capreolus, etc.

To shorten the distance between these two positions, Suárez introduced two new terms: the *formal confused*, and the *proper virtual*. He designated as formal confused what had up to then been traditionally called *virtual implicit*, that is, the metaphysical or theological virtual. In other words, what had been traditionally considered a theological conclusion was now considered as an object of *formal* revelation, and thus could be said to be of faith prior to the Church's definition. On the other hand, the connexive or physical virtual was called a *proper* virtual. Since the theological conclusion refers to what is properly virtual, it followed that the properly theological conclusion differed really from the revealed principle, and was not of faith prior to its definition by the Church.

After shedding light on this confusion in nomenclature and making clear at once the doctrinal repercussions therefrom, Fr. Marín goes on to explain the nature of the truly theological virtual or truly theological conclusion. It is the virtual inclusive or the conclusion deduced by means of essential reasoning. The theological conclusion is a metaphysical conclusion; hence, objectively implicit in the revealed principles, which are the principles of theology. The mirrors of reason that play a part in theological reasonings are mere instruments with which we bring out what is contained in the revealed premises. They are not principles *from which* the conclusions are deduced, but *with which* the conclusions are deduced. The conclusions are included in the premises of faith.

Theological conclusions can be considered either prior to, or after, their definition by the Church. Prior to the definition, they are not of faith.

⁵⁸ *Op. cit.*, ch. 2, sec. 2, no. 69.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, no. 70.

Although they contain a revealed truth, nonetheless, its revealed character is not perceived through the Church's proposition but through the light of one's own reason. Thus, one of the conditions for the assent of faith is wanting.

The Church can define theological conclusions because they are included in God's revelation, and the Church has the power and the assistance of the Holy Spirit in order to explicate infallibly what is implicit in the Word of God. No new revelation is required for this explication. Once they are defined, theological conclusions must be accepted and held with divine faith because they have now become dogmas of faith. As a matter of fact, the object attained by theological conclusions, or rather the truth expressed by such conclusions, has been revealed by God, since we are talking of the virtual *inclusive*. After the definition, this truth is accepted through the Church's infallible proposition, and not because the theologian or the believer perceives its inclusion by the light of his own reason. All the conditions for a dogmatic truth are, thus, fulfilled, to wit, divine revelation and infallible proposition by the Church assisted by the Holy Spirit. He assists her not only in order to propose what is revealed, but also to explicate or unfold it.

However, before proceeding, with the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, to the dogmatic definition of a theological conclusion, the Church employs various means *hurnantly* to assure herself that it is truly a case of authentically inclusive conclusions. Still, it must be well understood that neither the Church's infallible definition nor, consequently, the evolution of the conclusions into dogmas, is grounded on such assurance or on the correct employment of the two available means. The sole foundation, Fr. Marín insists time and again, is the infallible divine assistance.

The classical ways, through which virtual inclusive revelation is explicated, are two. One is the way of the intellect, or of reasoning, or of study. The other is the way of the will, or of connaturality, or of the experience of the divine.

The way of study or reasoning is the better known and, at the same time, the more certain. Better known, because the intellectual character of faith and theology are obvious. More certain, because reasoning and theoretical investigation are subject to a process ruled by necessary and immutable factors and laws such as those which preside over the life of the intellect. Better known, besides, inasmuch as it is objectively verified with ease precisely because it is ruled by necessary and immutable laws. It is relatively easy to perceive whether an intellectual process is correctly done or not, and hence to see whether or not the conclusion is included in the principles from which it is deduced.

The way of the will or of experience of the divine is another authentic way of doctrinal, theological or dogmatic, evolution. By this means we are

also able to attain truths derived from principles although, in this case, the medium by which we apprehend such derived truths is not an intellectual one, but rather an experimental medium or one of vital contact. As a matter of fact, the faithful possess within themselves a divine principle of life: grace. From it proceed not a few infused habits: the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. All of this confers on the person who possesses it a *divine mode of being*, which is in effect a principle of intuition or of apprehension of things divine. Just as the natural habits, in virtue of their being *in conformity with right reason*, impart a natural knack of estimating the *rational rectitude* of things, so also the divine habits impart the knack of appreciating the *divine character* of what is opposed, or proposed, to them. Any thing that is appreciated, or adumbrated, or felt by the sense of the divine that exists in us, is something divine, supernatural.

The way of the will is neither as firm or as certain as the way of the intellect. Not as firm, because the laws under which the will operates are much more contingent. Not as certain, because the very contingency of the will subjects it to the increased danger of deception. It is easy to mistake as proceeding from divine grace what in truth proceeds from a natural normal or abnormal psychic condition. Deception is much easier in the realm of the affections than in the realm of reason. A mistake in the latter is more easily detectable than a mistake in the realm of vital experience. Hence, doctrinal development by way of the will needs to be confirmed by theological reasoning.

Fr. Marín examines ten cases taken from the history of dogmas. The ten are instances of a dogmatic process effected by way of the intellect or reasoning. But some of them also reflect the influence of Christian piety, divine grace, and the infused virtues.

After an ample exposition and proof of the points just mentioned, Fr. Marín devotes a whole chapter to disprove the existence of the so-called *ecclesiastical faith*. Modern theology asserts that, once they are infallibly defined by the Church, theological conclusions are believed with ecclesiastical faith. This assertion is made in consequence of the view that theological conclusions have not been revealed since they are not *inclusive virtuals*, that is, included in the theological principles. They are only *connexive virtuals*, connected, etc. Since they are not revealed, it is impossible for the Church to define them as revealed. Thus, when the Christian accepts them, his belief is not grounded on divine revelation, but solely on the Church's infallible proposition. Consequently, it is an *ecclesiastical faith*.

Fr. Marín holds that such a faith is non-existent. Having said that theological conclusions are *inclusive*, that the theological virtual is not physical but authentically *metaphysical*, it follows that, in his view, the *ecclesiastical faith is left without a reason for being*. When the Church defines a theological

conclusion, she defines a revealed truth, and the faith, with which revelation defined by the Church is accepted, is a *divine faith*.

Fr. Marín adduces eleven arguments to disprove the existence of ecclesiastical faith and to show that its presumed object is an object of divine faith. He then makes a special study of the so-called *dogmatic facts*, and another of the concrete dogmatic fact which is the canonization of saints.

The work is virtually complete. If the theological conclusion or theological virtual is *inclusus*, then it is revealed. If revealed, then it can become a dogma. To become a dogma, it is enough that it be infallibly proposed by the Church as revealed. If it becomes a dogma, then it must be believed with divine faith, and the ecclesiastical faith has no reason for being. Such is the path travelled by Fr. Marín in this book.

He adds two more chapters. Chapter 6 bears the title, Solution to the Objections against the Evolution of Dogma. And Chapter 7, The Evolution of Dogma and the Traditional View. In this last chapter Fr. Marín demonstrates a prodigious theological erudition. Up to the 17th century, traditional theology endorsed the view that theological conclusions are definable and having been defined, are to be held with divine faith. In the same century and found the beginning of the disorientation in both nomenclature and theory. Some writers begin to understand the theological conclusion in the sense of a truth *connected* with revelation, instead of a truth *included* in revelation. In such a case, the theological conclusion is not a revealed truth and cannot be defined. It is necessary to return to the earlier and traditional concept of the theological virtual, namely, one that is revealed, definable, capable of increasing the number of dogmas through the intervention of the Church with her definition. Hence, dogmatic development or evolution exists.

III. THE RECEPTION ACCORDED TO THE PRESENT WORK BY THEOLOGICAL OPINION

We have mentioned that the present book was first published in the form of articles. Put together in due order and revised, they make up *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*. The articles began to appear in *La Ciencia Tomista*, in 1911. The book came out in 1923. Two years after the latter's publication and fourteen after the initial appearance of the articles, Fr. Marín, writing in 1925, describes the reaction provoked by his writings in these terms: "Upon the appearance of the first articles, there was a fairly considerable commotion among the theologians both in and outside Spain. Some were of the belief that we had extended too far the scope of dogmatic evolution. Others, on the contrary, felt that we severely restricted the infallibility of the Church. Finally, others thought that we had deviated, on certain points, from the traditional teachings of Thomism."

"Fortunately, as the series of articles continued, the qualms felt by our critics subsided, and when the articles came out collected and amplified in the large tome of the Spanish edition and later in the two volumes of the French edition, they earned warm praises from theologians of all nationalities and schools, especially from Thomists of the caliber of Fathers Gardeil, Pègues, and Ramíñez."⁶⁰

The author of *The Homogeneous Evolution* combined deeply rooted convictions with a profoundly liberal spirit. As any faithful Christian, he regarded *necessary* matters, the *principles of faith*, as beyond all dispute. Likewise, he regarded as unquestionable the principles of Thomism, from which he believed he had never deviated. He was a Thomist out of conviction; but he accepted the fact that within Thomism there were many shades of opinion, many applications that lacked the solidity of the principles. In holding this view, he had in mind *Thomists* rather than Thomism. On this premise he demanded for himself the same freedom of thought, within the boundaries of what in the faith and in Thomist orthodoxy is beyond question.⁶¹

The liberty, which he demanded for himself, he was always ready to respect in others. He never had any wish to impose his views on others. He hoped to convince them, of course, but he was ready to face the fact that they might not be convinced. Hence, he was not surprised to find that his teachings were contested, even among Thomists. Indeed, some of his theses encountered very stiff opposition. We shall briefly describe the reception accorded by theologians to *The Homogeneous Evolution*. He has just said that it was warmly received by theologians of all nationalities and schools. That is the plain truth. It should not be surprising, given the fact that the problem presented and solved in this book cannot be properly said to be a *wrangle between the schools*, since theologians have *traditionally* understood the theological virtual in the sense expounded by Fr. Marín. It was, therefore, perfectly feasible for him to garner the sympathy of the representatives of all schools.

"Numerous journals, French as well as foreign, have introduced to the public and expressed a high regard for this important work of Fr. Marín-Sola. Almost unanimously they express the belief that it provides the solution to

⁶⁰*El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina*, in *La Ciencia Tomista*, July-Aug. 1925, pg. 5.

⁶¹With regard to both the Thomist school and Catholic doctrine, unity is to be preserved in matters that are either *necessary* or evident, but liberty is no less to be maintained in matters that are doubtful, and above all, charity must be observed in all things. "In necessariis, unitas; in dubiis, libertas; in omnibus, caritas." (*Nuevas observaciones acerca del sistema tomista sobre la moción divina*, in *La Ciencia Tomista*, May-June 1926, pg. 397)

the distressing problem of the evolution of dogma."⁶² Such is the view expressed in a journal of French Franciscans. We would not dare to speak of *unanimity*, but we would certainly say that the work as a whole — that is, the identification of the theological conclusion with the revealed inclusive virtual; the consequent assertion that the theological conclusion is a revealed proposition; the ulterior step that it can be defined as a dogma of divine faith; that, therefore, dogma does evolve and the ecclesiastical faith is redundant, since the object assigned to it (theological conclusions) is an object of divine faith — all this logical ensemble of thought found widespread acceptance in theological circles. Let us cite some evidences of it culled from all theological schools and from independent authors.

The Dominicans, Fathers Ramírez, Pègues and Gardeil — the first a professor in Fribourg; the second, in Rome; and the third, the restorer and patriarch of Thomism in France — expressed complete and unreserved acceptance of Fr. Marín's doctrine in reviews they made of the book in various journals.

Fr. Ramírez, in *La Ciencia Tomista*: "We believe that Fr. Marín's book expresses the true mind of St. Thomas and of traditional theology. In this sense his work seems to us definitive and we have no hesitation in dubbing it classical. Any one who takes the trouble of reading it serenely and studying it thoroughly will be convinced that Fr. Marín is right."⁶³

The author of the *Litteral Commentary to the Summa Theologica*, Fr. Pègues, in *Revue Thomiste*: "The book is so abundant, so closely knit, so logical that it disallows prescinding from any part without being marred and impaired in its demonstrative value . . . It can be asserted that the author proves his thesis with such an abundance of authorities and theological reasons that the mind is left dazzled, so to speak."⁶⁴

And Fr. Gardeil, in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*: "One has to read all the parts [of the book] so ingeniously fashioned and convincing, in which the history of doctrines alternates unceasingly with doctrinal principles, that the mind, enlightened and satisfied, can hardly put down pages so engrossing . . . I believe that this beautiful synthesis solves all the difficulties raised by the history of the evolution of dogma, or, at the very least, furnishes the key to their solution."⁶⁵

Well known is the commendation of the book made in *Estudios Eclesiásticos* by the Jesuit Fr. Alfonso Ma. de Elorriaga, renowned professor of

⁶² *Estudios Franciscanos*, March-April 1925, pg. 220.

⁶³ *La Ciencia Tomista*, Nov.-Dec. 1923, pg. 396.

⁶⁴ *Revue Thomiste*, Jan.-Feb. 1924, pg. 57 ff.

⁶⁵ *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, Oct. 1924, pg. 582 ff.

theology in Salamanca, and later in the Colegio Máximo at Oña. Fr. Elorriaga published in *Estudios Eclesiásticos* several articles espousing a different view from that of Fr. Marín concerning the Church's divine authority in her doctrinal definitions and the proximate capacity of the inclusive virtual to be believed with divine faith before its definition by the Church. But he agreed with the central issue of Fr. Marín's work, namely, the determination of the authentic inclusive virtual and its definability and, consequently, the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusions. "A theory," he writes, "admirably outlined and developed, and splendidly argued by the Rev. Fr. Marín Sola in his masterpiece *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* . . . Indeed, if there be any theological work that states and solves the problem of evolution — not theological evolution but dogmatic evolution, which is something altogether different; not of the immutability of dogma under its various and progressive formulae, not of the evolution of dogma in our knowledge and subjective appreciation of the mystery, but in its own objective nature by a growth that is not transformatist but homogeneous and *quasi* vital — this is it . . . No more objective, deeper and at once loftier conception of dogmatic progress is possible; nor will it be easy to produce a clearer, more delicate and conscientious study superior to the present one in subtle analysis, theological foundation, and abundance of proofs in support of its Thomistic and traditional theory on evolution . . . In such unhappy circumstances comes and appears before us, to our joy, Fr. Marín Sola's luminous work, *The Homogeneous Evolution*, as a powerful preservative or an efficacious curative, to furnish us with ready means, if we study and exploit it well, to save the homogeneity of dogmatic evolution and reconcile it with history."⁶⁶

Fr. Elorriaga, in a letter to Fr. Marín, enlarged upon his own judgment in *Estudios Eclesiásticos* in these terms: "It is with no little joy that I take advantage of this opportunity [that of reviewing the book in the aforementioned journal] to express something of the extraordinary esteem, unique in its kind, in which I hold your work . . . Believe me, Father, within my modest erudition, I find only two works, on the evolution of dogma of incomparable value to the theologian: that of the Lirimensis and that of your Reverence. As a scientific and theological study, I find your own unique and without peer. Nor am I alone in holding this extraordinary concept of its worth in this same house where I am writing this."⁶⁷

The view that the theological conclusion or the inclusive virtual is dogmatically definable is traditional in the Scotist school. Hence the praise and

⁶⁶ *Estudios Eclesiásticos*, Jan. 1929, pgs. 42-44.

⁶⁷ Letter of Fr. ELORRIAGA to Fr. Marín, written from Oña on 25th April, 1929.

acceptance accorded by the Franciscans to Fr. Marín's work. Here are some tokens of it:

Etudes Franciscaines: "Numerous journals, French as well as foreign, have introduced to the public and expressed a high regard for this important work of Fr. Marín Sola. Almost unanimously they express the belief that it provides the solution to the distressing problem of the evolution of dogma."⁶⁸

Estudios Franciscanos: "This Library [of Spanish Thomists] sets out with a work [Fr. Marín's] which will undoubtedly be enshrined by fame . . . The doctrinal exposition of all the questions treated in it is solidly grounded on, and strengthened by, a truly Thomistic logic. A luminous clarity makes it engrossing reading. All throughout the author evinces a lofty mind and an extraordinarily serene and impartial judgment . . . This lofty mind manifests itself, in our opinion, not only in the exposition of the theories but also in the treatment accorded to the persons, particularly to the great masters of the different schools — a quality of behaviour that is some times wanting in modern philosophers and theologians . . . Fr. Marín's work will always be worthy of the highest praise."⁶⁹

The adherence of the Franciscans to the doctrine of the definability of the inclusive virtual or to the thesis that dogma evolves by way of truly theological conclusions is apparent in the recent Assumptionist movement, in which they take the stand that the Blessed Virgin's Assumption is definable because it is virtually revealed.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ *Etudes Franciscaines*, March-April 1925, pg. 220.

⁶⁹ *Estudios Franciscanos*, Feb. 1924, Pgs. 134-135.

⁷⁰ Many instances of this adherence could be cited. For example, in the proceedings of the Congreso Nazionale Mariano dei Frati Minori d'Italia celebrated in Rome in 1947, the following view is expressed on the definability of Our Lady's Assumption:

"The Franciscan Marian Congress cannot give its unconditional acceptance to the opinion of those who maintain as a fixed principle the position that only truths formally revealed, if but implicitly, can be defined, and affirm that the Bl. Virgin's Assumption is thus contained in revelation . . . However, we add, it is in no way necessary for theologians to prove that this truth is included *formaliter implicite* in revelation, since the merely virtual inclusion of a truth in revelation suffices to enable the Church to proceed to define that it be held as revealed 'et propter auctoritatem Dei revelantis'." (*Atti del Congresso Nazionale Mariano dei Frati Minori d'Italia*, Pgs. 694-695)

At the Marian Congress of Puy-en-Velay, Fr. BONNEFOY expressed himself in these terms: "Our choice was made after a long time . . . Under certain conditions, in logical conclusions can be the object of a dogmatic definition. This is the only doctrine that can claim Tradition for itself. It is the only one capable of giving an account of indisputable dogmatic facts." (*L'Assomption de la Très Sainte Vierge*, Congrès Marial du Puy-en-Velay, Aug. 1949, pg. 333).

Fr. Bonnefoy also published an excellent study defending the same concept of the virtually revealed. Cf. *L'Assomption de la T.S.V. est-elle définissable comme révélation 'formaliter implicite'?*, in *Marianum*, fasc. 2, 1950.

The Augustinian Fr. Juan Manuel López writes the following in *España y América*: "A considerable and complete work, a very solid cornerstone of the Library of Spanish Thomists, finely wrought by an intellect of great power and loftiness grounded on very solid philosophical principles and extremely wide theological erudition . . . It gives us pleasure to declare that everyone (particularly the clergy and professors of theology) should read and ponder attentively this exceptional work."⁷¹

R. Proost, a reviewer in *Revue Bénédictine*: "Fr. Marín-Sola, a professor at the University of Fribourg, is a thoroughbred Thomist, of the same vigorous mettle of Báñez and John of St. Thomas. The subject of his investigations — the evolution of dogma — is an actual, modern question, which he solves with the principles of the Thomist school without any of the expedients devised by modern theologians. We believe that the author has succeeded in making clear the traditional teaching on the essential issue of his thesis, and that the solution he offers is clear and victoriously resists the difficulties that can be raised against it . . . From the viewpoint of method, Fr. Marín is incomparable both in wealth of documentation and argumentation. Finally, let us mention that the book is written with admirable clarity."⁷²

La Ilustración del Clero, journal of the Claretian Fathers: "The acquisition and study of this masterful work will be indispensable to any one dedicated to higher religious studies . . . There is need for this sort of propaedeutic, in which the study of philosophy, a presupposition of both theology and faith, will preserve us from the three great pseudotheological errors of our time, to wit, fideism, rationalism and radical agnosticism."⁷³

The publications of the secular clergy did not lag behind in their encouragements. To cite a few examples:

Don Celedonio León, professor of dogma at the Seminary of Madrid, did not share all the views of Fr. Marín. Nonetheless, he wrote in *Revista Eclesiástica*: "The Rev. Fr. Marín-Sola, whose death in these past days is mourned by Catholic theology, has fought *pro aris et focis* for the definability as of faith of theological conclusions in his admirable work, which can worthily rank together with the masterpieces of the great Spanish theologians of the golden age."⁷⁴

"This book", in the words of the reviewer in the *Boletín Oficial del Arzobispado de Valencia*, "is, on account of its doctrinal content, the best

⁷¹ *España y América*, Feb. 1924, pg. 285 ff.

⁷² *Revue Bénédictine*, Oct. 1924, pg. 355 ff.

⁷³ *La Ilustración del Clero*, Nov. 1925, 83.

⁷⁴ *Revista Eclesiástica*, July-Sept. 1932, pg. 415.

that has been published in Spain, and even in Europe, in recent years."⁷⁵

Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses: "To our knowledge, no one has up to date investigated with such depth and such felicitous independence in the face of positions already taken, the theological and traditional aspect of such a throbbing question as the evolution of dogma. For its solution, no one had as yet marshalled in such a comprehensive manner both the historical and theoretical methods."⁷⁶

Divus Thomas of Fribourg: "Few works can be found that are capable of clearing away all the shadows and difficulties of the subject matter treated in them with a profound penetration and a scientific exactitude that cannot be faulted, and, at the same time, of pointing the way towards the truth with a clear vision and a sure hand. Fr. Marín-Sola's work is a true *opus aureum* and a monument *aere perennius*."⁷⁷

Lastly, Battifol in *La Vie Catholique*: "We were pleasantly surprised to see a Spanish Dominican come up with the complement required by Newman's conception on the matter of the development of dogma. He accomplishes this task with the wealth of information and the doctrinal security which others have already praised . . . It is a doctrine very carefully researched and thoroughly matured, and I find it accepted by personalities not in the least mediocre."⁷⁸

The journals and writers just cited are not the only ones that warmly welcomed Fr. Marín's work. We have transcribed only some of the many favourable comments made upon the publication of the book. Fr. Marín also received a good number of congratulatory messages, some from ecclesiastical authorities, others from eminent theologians. Among the former are those from Cardinal Merry del Val and from the Master General of the Order of Preachers, which appear on the first pages of this edition. They were printed in the French edition, and it was thought opportune to re-print them also in this one. We deem it unnecessary to print the letters of Cardinals Laurenti, Van Rossum, and Boggiani. The quotations already transcribed suffice to show the atmosphere of calm and serenity, of admiration and acceptance, with which the present work was received in the various sectors of the theological world. Theologians saw in it an authentic return to tradition, not in order to remain immovably fixed in it, but in order to wield it as an efficacious weapon against modernism.

⁷⁵ *Boletín Oficial del Arzobispado de Valencia*, March 1924, pgs. 79-80.

⁷⁶ *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, July 1924, pg. 403 ff.

⁷⁷ *Divus Thomas* (Fribourg), Dec. 1923, pg. 413 ff.

⁷⁸ *La Vie Catholique*, 5th June 1925.

At the beginning of this section, Fr. Marín himself attested to the fact that his articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* had, at first, been received with misgivings by many theologians. Those misgivings abated as the series of articles continued, but never vanished altogether. Truth to say, there were not only misgivings, there was honest to goodness opposition both during and after their publication. But it is no argument against the intrinsic worth of the book; it merely shows that its central theme is a debatable one.

However, the opposition proved impotent to prevent Fr. Marín's thesis from winning the acceptance of extensive sections of the theological community and the support of numerous theologians of the first rank, as the doctrine that best explains the historical instances of the definition of certain dogmas without doing violence to, but rather preserving, the traditional notion of the inclusive virtual, and as the most efficacious solution to the serious problems which modernism had solved in a heterodox fashion.

The book itself offers glimpses of the opposition aroused by the views of Fr. Marín. The first two sections of chapter 6 documents the opposition to *dogmatic evolution in general*.⁷⁹ In them he solves twenty one objections aimed at showing that the theological conclusions or the revealed virtual can never become a dogma of divine faith, and that the conclusions that were so defined by the Church were simply instances of improper or formally implicit conclusions.

At other times, the opposition is directed *against a determinate or particular channel of evolution*. The first section of chapter 4 is devoted in its entirety to the defense of reasoning or discourse as a legitimate channel of evolution.⁸⁰ Without prejudice, however, to the affective channel or the experience of the divine, in favour of which, to the exclusion of all others, his opponent seemed to declare himself.

Opposition, too, against certain particular arguments advanced in support of evolution, as evidenced by section 4 of chapter 6.⁸¹

The opposition which surfaced as Fr. Marín was writing his articles persisted after the publication of the book, and persists to this day in certain sectors. It is principally embodied in the opinion that nothing is definable as a dogma of faith if it is not revealed in a *formal* implicit manner. In chapter 7, the author devotes two entire sections to refuting the latest observations levelled against his views on this particular point.⁸² It is our opinion that any-

⁷⁹ *The Homogeneous Evolution* . . . ch. 6, sec. 1-2, nos. 299-321.

⁸⁰ *Op. cit.*, ch. 4, sec. 1, nos. 186-200.

⁸¹ *Op. cit.*, ch. 6, sec. 4, nos. 340-351.

⁸² *Op. cit.*, ch. 7, sects. 6-7, nos. 465-523.

thing that has been, or can be, said against the definability of the *inclusive virtual* has already been disposed of, either *formally* or *virtually*, in Fr. Marín-Sola's masterpiece.

The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma is a monumental piece of work, a classic worthy of our golden age. Its author was himself truly a master theologian. If a book's worth were to be appraised by the number of people who accept the solutions offered therein, Fr. Marín's opus would rank as a first-rate winner. However number is not of prime importance in doctrinal matters.⁸³ What matters most is the solid grounding of the views expressed, the logical and systematic exposition of the doctrine presented: in a nutshell, the depth and the lucidity of thought. On this score, the book is of exceptional value; so, too, was its author.

But Fr. Marín's credit does not end here. It acquires added dimensions if one considers that, with this book, he has brilliantly spotlighted the traditional teaching on a most interesting theological issue: on the one hand, he clarified the anomaly that appeared to exist between certain facts, certain truths defined by the Church, and, on the other hand, the theological position of certain modern authors who limit the Church's defining power exclusively to truths that are formally, albeit in an implicit manner, revealed. Not to mention the fact that he provided the best corrective to modernism's wrong handling of historical facts in support of its heterodox explanation of the evolution of Catholic doctrine.

THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA AND THE NEW THEOLOGY

La Ilustración del Clero, reviewing Fr. Marín-Sola's present work, pointed out that *The Homogeneous Evolution* could well be the efficacious answer "to the three big pseudo theological errors of these times, namely, fideism, rationalism, and radical agnosticism."⁸⁴ Each of these errors comes under various aspects and guises, some of which persist even to this day. Thus,

⁸³ A Thomist theologian disagreed with the solution given by Fr. Marín, within the context of St. Thomas's principles, to the problem of divine motion *vis-à-vis* created liberty, adding that a number of theologians were of the same opinion (the objector 5). Aside from an adequate doctrinal reply, Fr. Marín retorted with the following observation: "We consider it a debasement of both parties to introduce in these objective observations the consideration of persons and the taking into account the number and quality of votes either favourable or contrary, as if the point at issue were a matter of economics or a senatorial contest." (*La Ciencia Tomista*, May-June 1926, pg.397)

⁸⁴ *La Ilustración del Clero*, Nov. 1923, 83.

it should not be strange that Fr. Marín's book should possess relevance even today.

Certain contemporary theological trends would appear to be tainted by such or similar errors, as the Holy See has pointed out. The Pope has spoken of those who "all the more devalue human reason, the more firmly they adhere to the word of God."⁸⁵ He has also mentioned those who "pretend to dilute as much as possible the meaning of the dogmas and to set them free from the way of speaking hallowed by tradition in the Church and from the philosophical concepts employed by Catholic teachers, in order to return to the expressions employed by the Scriptures and the Holy Fathers in the exposition of the Catholic doctrine."⁸⁶ There is a clear tendency to agnosticism in the former, and to fideism in the latter.

Likewise, there exists today, as in the heyday of modernism, the tendency to a misguided interpretation of what might be termed the *vital* aspect of dogmatic truths. It is true that modern theologians defend the objectivity of dogma and the objectivity of theological truth. However, in the process of *subjectivizing* them in the theologian, of turning them into the theologian's spiritual life, they do not appear duly to safeguard the exigencies of a process that is *healthily rational*.

Hence, it is not strange to hear voices extolling the need of *thoroughly reforming the method of theology, nay, even theology itself*. There are theologians who seem bent on formulating a *new theology*. "There are some today who dare go to such lengths as seriously to question whether theology and its method, as found in schools approved by the Church, ought not only to be improved but also completely reformed."⁸⁷ The tendency to an *arational* theology is inconsistent with the concept of theology as a *science*. The tendency to a *vitalist* theology free from due intellectual supervision conflicts with the notion of a theology that is *affective*, yes, but also intelligent. Lastly, the tendency to a theology susceptible to radical reforms flatly contradicts the concept of a theology which is the development of what is *virtually implicit* in the revealed principles. Since they are revealed, the principles are *immutable*; and the *virtuality*, inasmuch as it is *inclusive*, is likewise necessary and *immutable*.

Fr. Marín-Sola's book, then, is as relevant today as when it was first published. The problems it confronted then, are identical to those we confront today. His teachings on the way of discourse and on the way of the affections duly supervised by the reason; on the immutability of revealed truth, whether revealed formally or revealed *virtually*; on the complete and

⁸⁵ *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 563.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pg. 565.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pg. 564.

perfect homogeneity of Catholic doctrine from its initial starting point down to its ultimate point of arrival, which is the remotest possible theological conclusion — all these teachings should provide welcome relief to theologians ceaselessly subjected today to views of a totally different ilk.

Let us delve somewhat deeper into the matter thus summarily sketched, since it is an issue of great interest both in its own right and in respect to the book now being edited in English. We shall treat of the following points:

1. The new theology and the traditional theology.
2. Theology and faith.
3. Theology and philosophical systems.
4. The true solution to the problem.
5. The permanent and the changeable.
6. A bibliography on the *new theology*.

1. New Theology and Traditional Theology

In certain theological circles — concretely, in those that maintain the need for a *new theology* — the term *traditional theology* is employed in a pejorative sense. It is the theology of the past, a theology made up of categories which are either false, or if true, nonetheless inoperative and ineffectual for present day thinkers; a fossilized theology lurking in conventual and seminary cloisters and buried in dusty and moth-eaten parchments; a theology couched in language and in terms unintelligible to contemporary intellectuals. In short: concepts that are either false or inoperative and expressions that cannot be understood; concepts that say nothing to those that grasp them, and formulae that mean nothing to those who hear them.

It is true that the defenders of the new theology do not always speak so harshly of traditional theology; it is also true that at times they speak an even harsher and cruder language. But what matters is not the language; it is the fact that the content attributed by them to traditional theology is outdated. Consequently, it is itself outdated; its expressions outdated; its method

Anyone, who seriously attempts to verify the exactness of these appraisals of traditional theology, will soon find himself confronted by three thoroughly certain facts. One, there are some theologians who are practitioners of a theology of that sort. Two, there are not a few theologians, eminently representative, who by their theological knowledge, by their open-mindedness to all legitimate theological developments, and by their lucid expositions accessible to modern day thinkers, provide a convincing refutation of the charges just mentioned. Foremost among these are the great masters of the past and the present. Three, traditional or scholastic theology is by definition, by its very essence so to speak, eminently progressive.

It is easy to air charges without going to the trouble of previously ascertaining whether there is a solid basis for them. The invectives hurled against scholasticism, at times even against patrology and against the highest representatives of the one and the other, may imply great acquaintance with present day needs, but they also imply a not inconsiderable ignorance of what is so contemptuously dismissed, an ignorance which cannot serve as a serious foundation for the charge that the traditional teaching (which is not sufficiently known) serves no useful purpose today.

Traditional philosophy and theology are not doctrinal fossils. They are a complex of fundamental truths possessing such a large virtual content and such a great power of adaptation, that neither the development of their virtuality nor their adaptation to changed circumstances verge to the detriment of the truths thus developed and adapted. Traditional theology and philosophy are in possession of immutable foundations, but neither is satisfied with the study of these foundations, or with the development, expression and application of such foundations as were required in times past. They consider these fundamental truths to be open to *both the present and the future*. The traditional view and attitude conjugates the past with the present and with the future; it projects on the problems and issues raised by each epoch the light of everlasting principles and truths, unfolding them as required, completing them where necessary, but without ever denying what can never be set aside by the very fact that it is necessary and immutable.

Certain new theologians, thus, proceed to inveigh against traditional theology from a false conception. These theologians confuse *scholastic theology in itself*, the elements of which are open to legitimate development and legitimate application, and are operative and efficacious for every epoch, including the present one, but elements of which anyone who accuses scholastic theology of being ineffectual is apparently ignorant; these theologians, we repeat, confuse scholastic theology *in itself*, or even scholastic theology embodied in its great representatives in every age, with the scholastic theology of *certain theologians* whose sense of the permanent and immutable is extensively developed, but whose sense of the transitory and changeable is very much less so. These critics ought to have their eyes open to much that is good and useful in traditional theology and traditional theologians today instead of advertising only to the fact that it is not being thus utilized by some theologians. In these circumstances the indictment of scholasticism cannot be a fair one.

We shall divide this section into three subsections, namely:

- A. What is the new theology?
- B. What is traditional theology?
- C. The traditional content of *The Homogeneous Evolution* by Fr. Marín-Sola.

A. *What is the new theology?*

The term *new theology* is, in itself, perfectly acceptable. We shall later have occasion to dwell on the great capacity for renewal inherent in theology and to recall that great theologians have been great innovators. William de Tocco, St. Thomas's biographer, tells us that the Saint proposed *new* truths, followed a *new* method in elucidating them, proved his conclusions with *new* arguments, and that those who heard him teaching *new* things and clearing doubts away with *new* reasons, never doubted that he had been divinely given a *new* light with which to explain the *new* insights God had *newly* inspired into his mind.⁸⁸

Nonetheless, the term *new theology* has nowadays acquired a pejorative connotation. A number of writers, who are being classified as *new theologians*, protest against being thus qualified and avow their adhesion to what is immutable in tradition. We want to make it clear that it is not our intention to refer to anyone in particular. We shall be speaking not of *theologians* but of *theology*, and we shall be speaking of theology not insofar as it is new in a healthy sense, but new in a *pejorative* sense. The contemporary theological problem boils down to an inexact concept of the renewal of theological science.

It should be observed that the *new theology* possesses no clearly defined contours. This makes it difficult to reduce it to precise categories. It is quite possible that some forms of the *new theology* will not exhibit the features we ascribe to it, but others certainly will. We believe that, taken as a whole, our observations have been substantiated in the theological tendencies that have surfaced in the last twenty years. Following the classical, theological and Christian example given by Fr. Marín himself (as already pointed out in the second part of this Introduction where we dealt with his personality as a polemicist), and the example of St. Thomas himself, we shall make no mention of any contemporary writer in our criticisms. But at the end of this study we shall annex a bibliography of modern studies on the nature of theology. In them the reader may verify for himself the truth of what we have to say. In the exposition of the modern currents of theological thought we shall make use of Pope Pius XII's *Humani Generis* and of his Allocutions on the 17th and the 22nd September, 1946.

⁸⁸"For, in his lectures he introduced new articles, found new and clear ways of settling questions, and produced new reasons in determining them. No one who listened to him thus teaching new things and defining the doubtful with new reasons, doubted that God had shed a new light on him, who, from the start, at once displayed such a certitude of judgment, as to show no hesitation in teaching and committing to writing the new things that God had deigned to inspire in him." (*Vita Sancti Thomae Aquinatis*: "Fontes vitae Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, notis historicis et criticis illustrati," curis et labore D. PRÜMMER, pg. 81).

The new theology pretends to replace traditional theology on the ground that the latter is a rational, dialectical, intellectualist theology; whereas the knowledge of God should fundamentally be mystical, vital, arational. A distinction is in order between the divine reality and the divine teaching, between God in his mysteries and the propositions in which man embodies this mysterious divinity.

When the Church affirms that revelation was closed with the death of the Apostles,⁸⁹ this must not be understood in the sense that the content of revelation was ended then, but only in the sense that God brought to a close the manifestations or the propositions of the teaching. The revealed propositions, the revealed teaching came to an end with the death of St. John; but revelation, that is, the thing or reality revealed continues to grow in the Church without interruption. In the Church there are ceaselessly new revelations, there is a constant communication of the mysteries of the divine life.

Theology is embedded in the Church in such a way that it grows apace with the growth of the revealed reality in the Church. Theology is not a dialectical, but an experimental knowledge whereby we are given to know not only the formulae revealed by God in the Scripture and in the divine-apostolic Tradition, but also and above all the divine mysteries that manifest themselves day by day in the life of the Church, of which theology itself is a part.

In this conception of theological science three characteristics are clearly discernible. In the first place, its vitalist or mystical character. Theology is, indeed, formally a natural science; nonetheless, its vitalist or mystical character may not be ignored since its foundation or starting point is to be found in the infused virtue of faith which is a virtue of the intellect with roots in the will, and thus with affective elements of great significance in its make-up. The defect, then, does not consist in affirming the vitalist character of theology but in stressing it exclusively by assuming that it is an arational knowledge. In the second place, Theology's starting point is not the revela-

⁸⁹"For the Holy Spirit was promised to Peter's successors, not to enable them, by his revelation, to disclose new doctrine, but to enable them, through his assistance, invariably to safeguard and faithfully to expound the revelation or deposit of faith handed on by the Apostles." (Dogmatic Const., *De Ecclesia Christi*, c.4. Denz.-Schön., 3070).

Among the condemned modernistic propositions we find this one: "Revelation, which is constitutive of the object of faith, was not completed with the Apostles." (Denz.-Schön., 3421).

⁹⁰The term mystical is not to be taken here in the spiritual sense which corresponds to the predominance of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. We take it here in the sense of *affective, vital*, as opposed to the intellectual or rational.

tion that was brought to an end with the death of the Apostles, but the revelation that is constantly made in the Church; that is to say, not the kind of catechized and lived, or rather, the revealed reality that is constantly being communicated in the Church. And, in the third place, the pointlessness of theological reasoning and of authentic theological conclusions arrived at through study and reasoning.

This mystical tendency is not always expounded in the same manner. At times it is made to appear compatible with rational or discursive theology as, for instance, when theological knowledge is described as follows. The starting point is the divine revelation made to the primitive Church. Today, the Church is not the recipient of new revelations that could be the object of divine knowledge and faith. Revelations that are the object of faith have all been made to the primitive Church before the death of the Apostles. Anything that we might subsequently attain in the order of divine knowledge must necessarily be a development of this primitive revelation. However, the primitive revelation was not effected so much by means of statement. The revealed proposition is something secondary. What is primary is the delicious savouring of the revealed reality.

This revealed datum, this obscure and delicious communication of divine reality has been grasped by means of notions, concepts, judgments, occasional. It is there because man is imperfect and cannot intellectually perceive in an immediate fashion what is proposed to him as a delicious and experimental reality. Theology, then, reduces to him as a delicious revealed reality in a manner at variance from the manner of the revealed reality itself. The reality is something divine that is lived; theology, on the other hand, is an ensemble of notions, formulae, etc., that is known. The distance between the reality and the notion, formulae, etc., that is known. The formula, is the very same distance that intervenes between the thing itself and the ought to be and what it actually is.

All our existing theological apparatus is extrinsic to revelation. It is inadequate and disproportioned. And this is especially true of the apparatus constructed with Aristotelian notions, since Aristotle's is a philosophy of essences, of universals, whereas the revealed reality is the reality of things divine that are singular, individual, historical.

In the *Humani generis* the Holy Father recalls the position of certain theologians who maintain the necessity of formulating the dogmas of faith with the categories of modern philosophy because, among other reasons, "the mysteries of faith can never be expressed with concepts that are completely

true, but only with concepts that are approximative and always subject to change."⁹¹

At other times the new theology presents itself as an intellectualist theology, not because it eschews its experimental character - which is impossible since it belongs to its very nature - but because it is a knowledge that must necessarily express itself through concepts. Correctly understood, this is to put oneself on the right path. Unfortunately, it is not understood as it ought to be.

To begin with, it is assumed that there are no absolute truths. Or, if this is not assumed, it is a conclusion that is quickly reached. The Pope solemnly made this point in an allocution, speaking precisely of the *new theology*: "If such a view were true [viz., that theological truth is always subject to change], what would become of the immutability of Catholic dogmas, what would become of the unity and stability of the faith?"⁹² In the *Humani generis* he points out that also in philosophy itself there are immutable principles and truths. These principles and truths have been professed by traditional philosophy and utilized in the unfolding of divine revelation. "Human reason will be capable of aptly and securely discharging this function [that of achieving a profound understanding of the divine mysteries] only when it has been duly cultivated, that is, imbued with that sound philosophy which has been handed on as a patrimony inherited from preceding Christian generations, and thus also enjoys a superior kind of authority because its principles and chief assertions, gradually made clear and defined by men of great talent, have been tested in the balance of divine 'revelation' by the Church's Magisterium."⁹³

Divine things are grasped by man only with approximative concepts which are always subject to change. Now, since these concepts can change not only into different, but even into opposite concepts, it is possible for two contradictory theological propositions to be true, provided that their formulation has taken place in times or circumstances in which the different or opposed concepts were taken as faithful expressions of reality. "The more daring affirm that this [viz., the formulation of Catholic dogmas with categories taken from modern philosophy, whether from *immanentism*, or *idealism*, or *existentialism*, or any other modern philosophical system] not only may but should be done for the following reason, to wit, that the mysteries of faith can, in their opinion, never be expressed by completely true, but only by approximative notions which are always subject to change, by means of which the truth is, indeed, somehow indicated but also necessarily distorted. Hence, they do not think it absurd, but altogether necessary, that theology

⁹¹ *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 566

⁹² Address, Sept. 17, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 385.

⁹³ *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 571-572.

should replace the old notions with new ones in accordance with the different philosophies which in the course of time serve it as its instruments, in order that by these different, or even in a certain sense opposed, but nonetheless in their view equivalent, ways the same divine truths may be humanly expressed."⁹⁴

Such an account of the nature of theology should not surprise anyone who takes into consideration that it is based on the belief that the world is subject to an absolute and constant evolution, in the process of which the same reality is not brought continuously to perfection but changed into some other thing. And if things themselves change, then the concepts man has of them can and must likewise change, then the concepts change finds support in nothing that is permanent and immutable, and this there is nothing to hinder concepts from changing, even into their opposites, without prejudice to their being both true under certain circumstances. Indeed, the Pope mentions evolutionism in the number of modern errors that have influenced and continue to influence modern theology.⁹⁵

Three tendencies in the new theology have been pointed out: that which might be called mystical; another which is a mixture of mysticism and reasoning but which attributes a merely extrinsic value to the cognitive elements (notions, concepts, formulae, etc.) employed by the theologian; and a third which is rational or discursive but changeable for want of consistency between the things and the concepts which represent them.

Theology, as will be explained in a later subsection, is the unfolding of the faith by means of the philosophical or human means available to man. Thus, the aforementioned conceptions of theology arise from certain philosophical conceptions, which we deem necessary to recall to mind. Prescinding now from details which give them very different shapes, such philosophical conceptions reduce to two: the *subjectivistic* and the *evolutionistic*. Subjectivism is the basis of the theological orientations just described. Evolutionism, the basis of a theology that is falsely mystical or vitalist, evolutionistic.

Contemporary philosophies are many and go by a multitude of names. True. But it is no less true that, in a more or less direct manner, they all boil down to the two we have mentioned. The common denominator that unites contemporary philosophies and philosophers, that are otherwise divided by numerous differences, is, in certain cases, *evolutionism* under such names as the relativism of truth, historicism, Marxism (by all these names it has been called); in other cases, it is *subjectivism*, which also shows up under such various guises as vitalism, existentialism, etc.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pg. 566.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pg. 562.

Anyone imbued with the evolutionistic spirit considers truth in function of actuality. The true is the actual; and the more actual, the truer it is. This equation is, indeed, susceptible of a correct interpretation; but when it is launched into a world saddled with evolutionistic ideas, it soon comes to mean an absolute relativism. To affirm that the criterion of truth is the actuality of what is known, is to take positions vis-à-vis the scholastic and traditional concept of truth, which is "that which corresponds to reality". Since what is actual is measured by the category of *being*, it follows that truth is temporal, by no means eternal. Thus the evolutionism and historicism of truth clash head-on with stable and timeless truth. The metaphysics of phenomena rises to confront the metaphysics of essences.

The evolutionistic spirit of many contemporary philosophies has infiltrated theology to the extent of proclaiming a theology subject to constant change and evolution, a theology that never succeeds in grasping truth firmly and permanently: a theology condemned to the torture of *l'antéluce*, doomed to watch truth slipping away through its fingers at the very moment that it seemed to be apprehended, since the inexorable law of an actuality that *passes away*, of a "now" that vanishes, would have changed it into something entirely different from what it was. "Many things have been said, but without sufficient examination, about the 'new theology', which, since it evolves in step with the evolving universe, is forever going but never arriving anywhere."⁹⁶ With these very graphic terms the Pope describes the relativistic aspect of the new theology, which is a necessary consequence of the relativism of truth and of reality itself professed by evolutionistic philosophy.

To the evolutionism that pervades a large part of contemporary philosophy must be added subjectivism, which is no stranger to it. Subjectivism is a specific kind of evolutionism. It considers truth as a function of life. This rather vague expression might become clearer by saying that truth is measured by reference to the actuality it acquires in the subject who possesses it. Truth becomes truer, so to speak, the better it reflects the situation of the subject possessing it. The subjectivistic tendency, thus, shows vitalistic manifestations; its latest sprouts constitute the existentialist philosophy. Anyone who professes subjectivism takes positions opposite objective truth or the philosophy of extrasubjective reality.

The subjectivistic spirit has also infiltrated theology, especially under existentialist guises. Thus, attempts are being made to construct a theology with categories taken from the latter philosophy. "By reducing Catholic doctrine to this condition [viz., to the formulations found in the Holy

⁹⁶ Address, Sept. 17, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 385.

Scriptures and the Church Fathers, purged from every systematic element] they believe that the way is open whereby, in satisfying the needs of modern times, dogmas may be expressed with notions taken from modern philosophy, whether from 'immanentism', or 'idealism', or 'existentialism', or some other system."⁹⁷

The problems confronting man today, not excluding the theological, are to be solved by means of these two philosophical orientations, that is to say, by the principles and concepts of evolutionism and existentialism. The notions and principles that are operative today come from these two philosophies: on the one hand, the notions and principles stemming from the fundamental idea of absolute contingency or of the changeable actuality of things, which take no account of, or perhaps even deny, the permanency of the essential elements; and, on the other hand, the notions and principles stemming from the fundamental idea that man is, in the contingency of his own life or existence, the point of reference of every thing that happens or is known. Since theology is knowledge resulting from the principles of faith in conjunction with philosophical notions, it follows that contemporary theology will consist in the explication of the revealed truths by means of the notions of *truth-time* and *truth-subject*.

Traditional or scholastic theology is, thus, to be set aside either because, in the view of some, it is inoperative since it operates with altogether ineffectual categories; or, in the opinion of the more radical, as false since it employs false categories. Scholasticism operates on a level destitute of actuality, its categories serve no purpose today. The necessary and unchangeable truth of essences is unintelligible to a modern spirit attuned to the appreciation of the contingent and changeable truth of existences. Objective truth proposed from without is likewise unintelligible to anyone used to considering truth-as-subject or truth-as-life.

Scholasticism was never cognizant of the categories held in highest esteem by contemporary minds. The notions of progress, or evolution, or history, and of subjectivity are thoroughly alien to traditional philosophy. Yet, these are precisely the notions that need to be employed today. Hence, it follows that traditional theology is outdated, *passé*; it must be replaced by another that is up-to-date, by the new theology.

The *Humani generis* takes note of the contempt for the traditional notions of scholastic theology. To the charge that it is made up of notions that were useful in the past but of no use today, it replies in the following terms:

"The body of doctrine elaborated with common accord by Catholic teachers in the course of many centuries, in order to obtain some understand-

⁹⁷*Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 566.

ing of the dogmas, is certainly not grounded on such frail foundations. They are grounded on principles and notions derived from a true knowledge of created things. In deriving such knowledge, divinely revealed truth shone like a star, through the Church, upon the human mind. Hence, it is not surprising to find some of these notions not only employed but also sanctioned by the Ecumenical Councils, so that it is unlawful to deviate from them . . . This contempt for the terms and notions which the scholastic theologians were wont to employ naturally leads to the weakening of speculative theology, which, inasmuch as it leans on theological reasoning, is in their opinion: wanting in true certainty."⁹⁸

The achievements attained in the past by scholastic theology with its own notions have not become obsolete. Furthermore, the conquests that can and ought to be achieved today by theology may not ignore those same notions. Which is to say that both the perennial philosophy and the traditional scholastic theology constructed with the aid of that philosophy, contain in themselves elements capable of achieving an authentic and effective doctrinal development appropriate to the present and to the future. "But human reason will be capable of discharging this function [that of obtaining some understanding of the revealed mysteries or of constructing theology] aptly and safely only when it has been duly cultivated, that is, imbued with that sound philosophy which has been handed on as a patrimony from previous Christian generations, and thus enjoys also a superior kind of authority because its principles and principal assertions, gradually made manifest and defined by men of great talent, have been weighed by the Church's Magisterium in the balance of divine revelation. That philosophy, acknowledged and accepted by the Church, defends the true and genuine value of human knowledge, the indisputable principles of metaphysics -- viz., the principles of sufficient reason, causality and finality -- and the attainment of certain and unchangeable truth."⁹⁹

Since traditional philosophy contains firm notions and principles, it remains effective today and, therefore, it cannot be said to be useless and obsolete. It is an open philosophy, capable of progress, relevant and easily adaptable to modern minds without therefore having to eschew anything of what hitherto it had held as incontrovertible and necessary. "The question is this: whether what St. Thomas has constructed beyond and above any particular time, by combining and knitting together the elements contributed by the students of Christian wisdom throughout the ages, is founded on solid rock, endowed with perpetual vigour and validity, remains even today an efficacious defense and bulwark of the deposit of Catholic faith, and can be

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, pgs. 566-567.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, pgs. 571-572.

employed safely to guide the new developments of theology and philosophy."¹⁰⁰

The Holy Father takes up the validity for our modern times of what St. Thomas has constructed and all Christian philosophers have accepted, viz., the immutability of truth, the objective value of human knowledge, the value of the first principles and their efficaciousness to ground and safeguard the future progress of theology and philosophy. The Pope insists on all these points particularly in the encyclical *Humani generis*. "It is wholly to be deplored that the philosophy accepted and recognized by the Church should be held in contempt by some people, and impudently called antiquated in its form and rationalistic in its thinking processes. In their view, our philosophy mistakenly defends the possibility of an absolutely true metaphysics. They, on the contrary, maintain that reality, especially that which is transcendent, cannot be more aptly expressed except by disparate doctrines that are mutually complementary despite being in a sense inconsistent. Hence, the philosophy taught in our schools, with its lucid exposition and solution of problems, its accurate determination of concepts and clear distinctions, can indeed be a useful propaedeutics to scholastic theology, and was altogether adapted to the minds of men in the middle ages. But it does not offer a way of philosophizing responsive to the requirements of our culture today. The perennial philosophy, they add, is nothing but a philosophy of immutable essences, whereas the modern mind must look to the 'existence' of each and every one, and to life in a state of constant flux."¹⁰¹

In describing the orientations of the *new theology*, we have deliberately made use of texts from papal documents. These texts clearly indicate the tendencies of the *new theology*: at times arational, at times rational, albeit denying consistency and permanency to the truth; at times subjectivistic and vitalistic with fairly clear indications of the inadequacy and lack of correspondence between the concepts by which we know and the reality that is known. Since traditional theology employs a sanely rational philosophy, which accepts the objective value of human knowledge, the new theology has taken it upon itself to inveigh against traditional theology, repeating the trite and commonplace charge that scholasticism is a dated and obsolete philosophy and theology; the more radical claim that it is dead.

B. *What is Traditional Theology?*

We wish to make it clear that we do not pretend to present a complete exposition of theology according to any particular author, or even according to any particular school. It is common knowledge that the Schoolmen were divided on such issues as the object, the method, the scope of theological

¹⁰⁰Address, Sept. 22, 1946 AAS, 38 (1946), 387.
¹⁰¹*Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 573.

science. In this work, Fr. Marfin occasionally alludes to some of these differences, as for instance, the question whether theology is a formally supernatural habit, or a habit that is formally natural and only radically supernatural. A large part of this book deals *ex professo* with one of such differences, viz., the scope of theology, or in other words, the reach which true and genuine theological conclusions are capable of attaining. On this point the Schoolmen are far from being in accord.

By traditional theology we understand a theology characterized by features which are precisely the opposite of those already noted in the new theology. The new theology stands in opposition not only to theology as conceived by one or another school, but to theology as conceived by all of them. Traditional theology, then, possesses the characteristics in which they all coincide.

Theology is the understanding of the faith achieved, among other things, by the use of the rational notions made available by philosophy. These notions possess an analogical value which enables them to express divine truths. Such is the teaching of the First Vatican Council.¹⁰² What are the characteristics of human knowledge, and on what conditions is it employed in theology?

1. We are dealing with *true* notions, that is, with notions that correspond to the reality they represent. Words, concepts, ideas are essentially relative, and the term of that relation is the reality represented. Traditional theology begins by accepting, at the very outset, the correspondence between all those elements and the reality represented in them. The Pope, in a passage already quoted, enumerates the conditions of the sound philosophy which the Church employs to glean an understanding of dogmatic truth, and one of them is "the true and genuine value of human knowledge."¹⁰³ This is not accepted by the new theology.

2. These notions correspond to the reality of things when they reflect truths of the natural order; they do not cease to correspond to objective reality when they reflect divine truths. The divine mysteries cannot be contained perfectly and exhaustively in human notions. Very true. Nonetheless, it is no less true that the divine mysteries are contained therein in a certain *proper* sense. This is made possible by the *analogical* value of the philosophical or rational notions. Analogy is by no means a medium of improper or metaphorical knowledge, let alone a medium of uncertain knowledge. By means of analogy, the analogates can be known properly and with certainty.

¹⁰²The council speaks of the understanding of the faith which is "attained by means of the analogy of those things that are naturally known, as well as by means of the connexion of the mysteries among themselves." (Denz.-Schön., 3016)
¹⁰³*Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 572.

Consequently, traditional theology does not accept that, by reason of the fact that human concepts are not perfectly adequate to the divinity, the knowledge of God achieved through rational theology is uncertain and improper. That is the position taken by the new theology; traditional theology rejects it.

3. Rational knowledge can, at times, be necessary and unchangeable. This happens when the object itself is necessary and unchangeable. Knowledge of it is achieved through a process that provides evidence, and the through a process of rigorous scientific deduction. Traditional theology accepts the immutability of essences and the unchangeability of the correct knowledge of such essences. Extrapolating this to the divine order, traditional theology admits the immutability of the truths revealed by God together with the necessity and the unchangeability of the theological conclusions that are necessarily included in the divinely revealed truth. Pius XII recalls that are this characteristic of our theology when he censured the errors of the new theology in these terms: "Let no one disturb, let no one unsettle what is immutable . . . If such a view were to be accepted [viz., the view of a theological science subject to continual change], what would become of the immutability of Catholic dogmas, what would become of the stability of the faith?"¹⁰⁴

However, this is not to say that our knowledge of contingent things cannot undergo radical changes. Our knowledge of contingent things is the things known, since truth is the adequation of the concept to the reality. Now, contingent things undergo change. If they change, the concept we have of them must also change. Otherwise, if the concept remains unchanged but the thing to which the concept refers has changed, then a false correspondence is established between the two; falsehood then emerges.

4. The immutability of knowledge is no hindrance to its progress and its adaptation to the needs and the preoccupations of each age. Dogmatic reality is unchangeable but it is not known exhaustively; it can, then, be unfolded unceasingly. Inasmuch as it is dogmatic or revealed, it is destined to all men and, thus, adaptable to each and every one: to those of the past, those of the present, and those of the future. The philosophical notions, by means of which this reality is known, inasmuch as they are necessary and permanent, are likewise valid for all men and for all times. These elements, then, precisely because of their necessity and permanence, can serve as the subject that gives *substance and content* to all legitimate development and change. Any change that begins by denying that which of its nature is unchangeable is, by the same token, illegitimate and deserving of condemnation. Traditional theology, thus, contains within itself elements open to progress, development, and perfection; it is not a static but a perfective or perfectible theology. However,

¹⁰⁴ Address, Sept. 17, 1946, AAS, 38, (1946), 384-385.

the development takes place along a continuous line: it does not deny today what it affirmed yesterday. Otherwise, the development would not be perfective but destructive.

The Holy Father underscores the capacity of traditional theology to satisfy the requirements of all legitimate progress in these terms: "The question is this: whether what St. Thomas has constructed beyond and above any particular time, by combining and knitting together the elements contributed by the students of Christian wisdom throughout the ages . . . remains even today an efficacious defense and bulwark of the deposit of Catholic faith, and can be employed safely to guide the new developments of theology and philosophy."¹⁰⁵

In the rational order, these are what might be termed the essential elements of traditional theology *vis-à-vis* the new theology, viz.: the objectivity of our knowledge of things, inclusive of the things of God; correspondence, although not one that is comprehensive, between the analogical concepts we have of God and the divine reality; possession of unchangeable and necessary knowledge; capacity for progress in theological science.

But God is not perceived only through notions. He is perceived also through *contact*. There is knowledge obtained through study; there is, besides, knowledge available through experience. This is true in the natural order; it is no less true in the theological and the mystical orders. The dogmas of faith can be grasped also by way of experience, by a vital contact with the divine reality contained in them. But, according to traditional theology, this kind of knowledge is so far from being irrational that, if it is to be safe and firm, theologically firm and safe, it needs the endorsement of rational guarantees, which are not identical in every case.

"Right judgment", says St. Thomas, "can be had in two ways. First, by means of the perfect use of reason; secondly, on account of a kind of conformity with regard to the object on which judgment is to be passed. For instance, one who has acquired the science of morals judges rightly on matters of chastity through rational inquiry; whereas one who has the habit of chastity judges rightly on the same matters on account of a certain conformity as instruments of knowledge, which is obtained by being in touch with the proper object of the habit concerned. A chaste person has a correct judgment on matters of chastity without the study of morals. The artist judges of a work of art, a musical composition, a painting, etc., armed perhaps with only a natural sense or feeling, without having learned the rules of the art in question. Knowledge is an act of the intellect: it is the intellect that

¹⁰⁵ Address, Sept. 22, 1946, AAS, 38 (1946), 387.

¹⁰⁶ *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q. 45, a. 2.

judges; however, it may arrive at eliciting its judgment by different ways. One is the way of experience obtained by the contact of natural habits with their proper object; another is the way of study by evidences garnered through investigation or research.

What is true in the natural order is also true in the divine order. "Knowledge is of two kinds . . . The other is affective or experimental; it is had when one experiences in himself the taste of divine sweetness."¹⁰⁷ There exist in us supernatural habits which confer a *divine mode of being*. These habits provide us with a "sense of God"¹⁰⁸ or a "sense of Christ",¹⁰⁹ as St. Paul would say. Such habits are grace, the infused virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

One of the infused virtues is faith, which is the starting point of theology. Catholic theology is a knowledge of the supernatural which begins with the acceptance of the revealed principles by faith. Without such acceptance there is no theology. The "theology" constructed by a heretic or a pagan is not identical to our theology, even in the case where it is deduced from the same principles as ours. The two differ essentially because of the essential differences between the acceptance given by them and that given by us to the same principles. The acceptance given by the Catholic is the assent of divine faith; the acceptance given by the heretic or the pagan is purely a humanly motivated assent.

Now, despite its being an intellectual virtue, faith nonetheless requires the formal intervention of the will as determining the assent given to the truths believed; which means that faith must also perfect and supernaturalize the will-power with regard to the perception of these truths. The perception which the will can achieve clearly lies along the paths of connaturality. This explains, among other things, the incontrovertible fact that the affection and piety of the Christian people, which obviously pertain to the will, have played and do play a not insignificant role in the development of theological principles. And when we speak of the affection and piety of the Christian faithful, we do not mean only those that are the outcome of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and belong to the mystical life, but those which can exist apart from the operation of the gifts. The piety and affection can exist apart from the operation of the gifts. The piety and affection of the mass of Christians, with respect to the influence they have exercised in the development of Christian dogmas, can hardly be presumed to be mystical.

All of this is to say that Catholic theology is open to progress and development by way of connaturality and affection, apart from the way of investigation and study. By the infused habits we have a sense or feeling of

¹⁰⁷ *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, p. 97, a. 2 ad 2.
¹⁰⁸ *I Cor.*, 11:16.
¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

the divine. Faith gives us an instinct for divine truth, an instinct by means of which we are able in certain circumstances to judge whether a proposition or statement is in conformity, or not, with the revealed truth which is the object of faith.

Now, knowledge obtained through experience of divine things must possess certain determinate characteristics:

In the *first* place, it has to be *objective* knowledge. Traditional theology is eminently objective. It does not manufacture the truth, but acknowledges that truth is proposed to it by God. Hence, as in the speculative order the starting point is the *datum revealed by God*, so in the experiential order the starting point is the *datum infused by God*. In other words, the criterion determining whether a truth is divine or not, is an *objective* criterion. That criterion is not a natural, inborn habit; it is a supernatural, infused habit, something from the outside, coming from God. To take the experience rooted in natural habits as the criterion determining the legitimacy of dogmatic, or even of simply theological, truths would be to subscribe to an extremely dangerous religious immanentism, which has always been shunned by scholastic theology, adhering, as it does, to the solid firmness of objective criteria.

In the *second* place, it has to be knowledge of which the progress is homogeneous. The only legitimate religious experience is that in which the object experienced is divine, as also divine is the habit through which the experience is had. It can happen that what is only too human and is experienced in a human manner, is mistaken for something divine and experienced by means of divine habits. In this terrain, human psychology is liable to many and fatal mistakes. Furthermore, since between the habit and the object there exists a formal or, at the very least, a virtual coincidence; or, in other terms, an essential coincidence between the habit and its specifying object and the virtuality included in that object, it follows therefrom that the subsequent development of any legitimate experiential perception of divine things is homogeneous with its starting point.

In the *third* place, the allusion just made to *legitimate* religious experience brings us to the third characteristic of any knowledge obtained through experience of the divine, viz., the possession of sufficient guarantees that it is in fact divine. Such guarantees are not inherent in the knowledge itself they are to be looked for outside. The way of the affections is of itself irrational, and thus needs to be sufficiently guaranteed. Since it is irrational, it cannot provide itself the guarantees. Such guarantees are to be found outside itself in various different ways, some of which we will presently detail. The want of such guarantees renders the experiential knowledge truly suspect.

At times, the vital or arational knowledge obtained through a sense or an instinct or an intuition (it is designated by all these terms) is endorsed by the effects produced by this knowledge, which is in them made manifest. Here we already have a *rational* guarantee, to wit, the *visible* effects proceeding from that same knowledge. At other times, the intuition or sense of the theological truth asserted is not simply the experience of a lone individual, but the experience of the whole religious community, of the whole body of the faithful. Such a case would be an instance of a *common* sense, and common sense is a criterion of truth. The particular sense of each individual is liable to error; that of each and every one is not likely to be erroneous. The same thing is true in the divine order. Each one's feeling is liable to mistakes; each one may think he is being guided by God's Spirit when, in fact, he is guided by his own spirit, his temperament, etc. But the feeling of each and every one is not mistaken: it cannot be said that what proceeds from the spirit of the whole Christian community is a false inspiration. The spirit that animates the whole Church is the Holy Spirit. Finally, in the absence of the endorsement given by the resultant effects, in the absence of the warrant provided by the fact that the phenomenon is a common occurrence in the Church, it might be the case that what is perceived by the arational process of experience or feeling is, on the other hand, confirmed by investigation and research, by objective reasons that evidence the correctness of what has been attained through the subjective process.

Enough has been said to make it plain that traditional theology holds a conception of theological knowledge obtained by way of experience which is vastly different from that held by the modernistic and the new theologians. Modernistic theology holds that religious experience is active, it creates its own dogmas and the latter, consequently, change in step with the changes of the former. The new theology maintains that the experience of the divine presupposes the divine reality. However, the experience is destitute of sufficient rational guarantees. Such guarantees are rejected at the outset: either because rational structures are non-existent in theological knowledge; or because, if such structures do exist, they are alien to theology and inadequate to express the divine events taking place; or because the structures lack firmness, are subject to constant change, and, therefore, incapable of serving as criteria of certainty.

C. The traditional character of THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA vis-à-vis the conceptions of the New Theology.

Fr. Marín's work is imbued with a thoroughly traditional spirit, in the sense in which this spirit has been previously defined, to wit, not a mere acceptance of the past, but a projection, as well, of the past onto the present and the future; a projection, however, that does not change whatever is necessary and immutable in the starting point, and proclaims a constant

progress in the understanding of the revealed truth in a uniform and homogeneous sense.

The book contains much that is debatable, without, however, straying from the fundamental canons of traditional philosophy and theology already alluded to in the preceding subsection. Hence, it is not surprising to find scholastic theologians who question not a few of the author's assertions by the same right whereby the author, who is himself a scholastic theologian, questions the assertions of those who disagree with him. For instance, Fr. Marín teaches that dogmatic progress is achieved by way of genuine theological conclusions, while others hold that the theological conclusion is not definable as of divine faith and hence can never become a dogma; such conclusions are merely objects of the Church's infallibility, and, consequently, solely objects of ecclesiastical faith. Another debatable issue refers to the author's contention that theological conclusions are truly inclusive or metaphysical, and, hence, virtually revealed, etc.

We shall not touch on these points. In the preceding subsection traditional theology was defined in terms of characteristics which are opposed to the new theology. Thus, we shall here deal only with those features of the work at hand by which it confronts the modern notion of theology.

In the first place, *The Homogeneous Evolution* explains in a marvelous, exceptional, and we might even say, unique manner the *rational* or *discursive* character of theology with all the features already enumerated previously, viz.: the objectivity of knowledge and of what is known, the process and progressive development of the same, homogeneity in that doctrinal process between the starting point and the ending point.

Fr. Marín-Sola proceeds always within the presupposition of a genuine correspondence between our concepts and the things known. This presupposition, indisputable to the scholastic theologian that he was, is expressed by him in extremely lucid and expressive terms.

Divinely revealed formulae and concepts correspond to the objective reality of things. If there is any knowledge that corresponds to reality, it is surely God's knowledge, since the knowledge God has of things is the cause of the things themselves. The starting point of dogmatic evolution, according to Fr. Marín-Sola, is the revealed formula *insofar as it contains a divine meaning*, which is to say, insofar as it corresponds to the idea God has of the thing revealed, and this idea, in turn, necessarily corresponds to what He reveals. It would be more exact to say that the thing revealed corresponds to God's idea of it, since God's knowledge is eminently active. "For the existence of true revelation it is indispensable that God give some explicit meaning to the revealed formula."¹¹⁰ This divine meaning, given by God

¹¹⁰ *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, ch. 2, no. 55.

to the revealed formula — which must necessarily correspond to the reality known by God or to the objective reality of what is revealed,¹¹¹ is the starting point of all theological knowledge and of all doctrinal evolution.

The divine meaning of revelation does not consist in an *indivisible*. God sees many more things in the formula which He reveals than are seen by the person who receives the revelation. God sees, and sees explicitly, everything that is included in the formula. Those who received the primitive revelation — concretely, the Apostles — also saw explicitly in the formula everything that the Church would discover in it in the course of time. However, the primitive Church that received the revealed formulae in the formula everything that not perceive explicitly all the divine content infolded in them. The starting point of theological knowledge is the *divine meaning* of the revealed formulae as perceived by the primitive Church, that is to say, a meaning explicit with respect to something, but implicit with respect to much more. "The starting point of all dogmatic progress lies in the revealed formulae conveyed by the Apostles to the primitive Church. These formulae, as every other human formula, are made up partly of meaning formally expressed, and partly of meaning virtually implicit."¹¹² Both meanings, the formal and the virtual, are *divine* meanings, meanings *given by God*, and, thus, objective meanings or meanings that correspond to reality. They are not meanings fancied by man for himself, subjective, that do not correspond to the object. That they are divine, and therefore objective, is what Fr. Marín establishes at length throughout the second chapter of this book.

This knowledge, which is theology's starting point and which, in Fr. Marín's view, conforms to the objective reality of the object known, is *subject to progress*. Theology does not have for its starting point the divine meaning of the formulae as perceived by the divine mind. In God the meaning is perfect, exhaustively explicit. No progress is, thus, possible. God does not

¹¹¹ "Note . . . that one of the premises is of *faith*. What does it mean to mean to *be of faith*? In the teaching of St. Thomas it means, as it ought to mean in every Christian philosophy and theology, that in the major of faith we have divinely revealed not two mere names, nor two mere subjective concepts linked nominally by the verb *to be*; nor two symbols of an agnostic reality, or of some subjective experience, or of some pragmatic attitude — all of that is kantian-bergsonian philosophy, the foundation and starting point of the various forms of modernism. For St. Thomas, the major of faith means that, in the terms placed as subject and predicate, we have divinely revealed two objective ideas, and that these two ideas are an authentic and faithful expression of the reality expressed by a verb that is real and transcendental to the human and the divine, the verb *to be*." (*The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, ch. 2, no. 113).

¹¹² *Ibid.*, no. 59.

know more today than He knew yesterday, nor will He know tomorrow more than He knows today. Theology's starting point is the divine, real, objective meaning *grasped by the primitive Church* with the light given her by God. Fr. Marín has just said that that meaning is formal in part and virtually implicit in part. That part of it which is formal does not admit of progress, but that part of it which is virtually implicit, does. Therein precisely lies the theological knowledge: theology advances from the principles or formal to the conclusions or the virtual.

The development of our knowledge of the divine meaning of the revealed formulae is homogeneous and, by the same token, *corresponds to the reality of what is revealed*. If it were heterogeneous, transgressive, there would be no correspondence. All traditional theologians are in accord on the issue of the homogeneity of the development. They disagree on the scope of that development, they are divided on the way of explaining its homogeneity, but they are unanimous in affirming both the development and its homogeneity. Some say that it is homogeneous because the dogmatically defined conclusions have been revealed formally albeit implicitly; and if they were formally revealed in the principles, it is obvious that they are homogeneous with those principles. Others explain the homogeneity on the basis that the dogmatically defined conclusions have been revealed in a virtual *implicit* manner; now if they were revealed in the principles, even if only virtually, they are homogeneous since that virtuality is intrinsic. Finally, others maintain they are homogeneous since that virtuality is intrinsic. In this case, the conclusions are not contained virtually inclusively in the principles. In this case, the doctrinal development and evolution of Catholic dogma should necessarily be *heterogeneous*, since *no real identity* exists between the conclusion and the principles. But these theologians skirt the difficulty by appealing to a divine supplemental action which is equivalent to a new revelation whereby the conclusions share in the divine meaning of the principles, not because they are included in the latter, but because God Himself so effects it through a new manifestation.¹¹³

Fr. Marín-Sola explains the homogeneity of dogmatic evolution by the second means. His theoretical exposition is buttressed by documentation showing that it is also the traditional way of explaining such homogeneity. Since doctrinal development is homogeneous, he rejects the explanation of dogmatic evolution by way of *assimilation*. Assimilation implies the transformation of *alien* matter into one's own substance: it is the process whereby living organisms evolve or develop themselves biologically. The intellectual process that takes place in the evolution of dogma, differs from the biological process. Nothing alien to the deposit of revelation, that is to say, nothing that has not been revealed, can ever be defined, can ever become a dogma. Dog-

¹¹³ Fr. Marín devotes all of ch. 2 to this subject.

matic definition necessarily requires that the truth to be so defined should have been said by God, and thus contained in the principles of faith. Doctrinal evolution proceeds in one direction: from within to without; not from without to within.¹¹⁴

Enough has been said to establish the traditional character of Fr. Marín-Sola's book on the objectivity of theological knowledge and on the existence to the reality revealed by God. Consequently, in this book can be found the reasoned and demonstrated condemnation of the fundamental positions maintained by the *new theology* in the dialectical or rational order. The papal documents quoted earlier make it clear that the new theology takes the position that human concepts do not properly correspond to reality and that their meanings can be changed.

But the new theology exhibits now and then affective and mystical aspects. We have already observed that it manifests itself in many ways: this case it is blighted by the lack of correspondence between the concepts and the reality, and by the constant changes in meaning to which the concepts themselves are liable. On the other hand, with regard to the experiential side of theology, we have noted that, in contrast to modernism which owns that religious experience creates the dogmatic truth, the new theology admits the existence of a divine reality revealed by God. This is a point in its favour. However, the explanation given of the manner in which revelation is made and of the time when it was brought to a close is not altogether correct. Certain writers hold that notions and concepts are not needed for the evolution and development of dogma, nor for the progress in the perception of the process. Therein precisely lies one of its most serious defects.

The Homogeneous Evolution devotes two masterly sections to the study of theological and dogmatic development by way of experience or affection.¹¹⁵ In these two sections, Fr. Marín-Sola explains the three features the presence of which is necessary to absolve the way of affection from all suspicion and to give it security and firmness, to wit, objectivity, homogeneity, and rationality. We stress once more that objectivity and homogeneity are positions which no genuine Catholic theology can dismiss.

The starting point for the way of affection is something *from without*, placed by God in us, viz., the infused habits, which in the experiential process play the same role that the revealed premises play in the rational process. The theologian who employs the affective process does not judge the truth by its

¹¹⁴Cf. ch. 4, sect. 4.

¹¹⁵Cf. ch. 4, sects. 5-6.

relationship to a mode of being that is *proper to himself or natural*, but by its relationship to habits that are not his but infused by God in him. Such habits, then, possess the same consistency and objectivity that mark anything coming from without. In like manner, anyone who employs the way of reasoning, does not judge the truth of the conclusion by reference to his own ideas, but by reference to the principles revealed by God. The starting point of either way comes from God; it is something real, objective, viz., the infused habits in the one case, and the revealed data in the other case. In either case, the starting point is something supernatural, divine.

By means of the elements of judgment consisting in the infused habits, a person may judge whether a truth is divine or not; whether or not it is included in the divine principles infused in himself. Whenever coincides with the divine reality existing in ourselves through the infused habits, is divine; whatever does not coincide, may be presumed not to be divine. Here we have a doctrinal advance or development that is authentically homogeneous and achieved by way of connaturality or experience. As Fr. Marín observes, "Catholic doctrine holds that grace, together with the virtues and gifts derived therefrom, is a real participation of the Divinity. More; through sanctifying grace, the Deity itself, in its Unity and Trinity of Persons, dwells in our soul, not merely by similitude or metaphor, but in an *objective and most real*,¹¹⁶ albeit mysterious and ineffable manner. This indwelling of the Divinity itself within the most intimate recesses of our being is initiated by the supernatural faith possessed by every Christian, even if he be a sinner; it is formally consummated by sanctifying grace, together with the virtues and gifts with which every just man is endowed.

"Thus, he who possesses divine faith, and to a much greater degree, he who possesses sanctifying grace with its virtues and gifts, possesses and carries within himself, in the manner of a nature *the very same object*¹¹⁷ from which all the statements of faith proceed, and with which they are all concerned; the object from which, and from which alone, all dogmatic progress ensues and can ensue, since nothing can ever be dogmatic or belong to divine faith if it is not a real expression of the divinity."¹¹⁸

To the objective value of the affective way and the homogeneous development of Catholic teaching possible through it, must be added the corroboration or endorsement by the way of reasoning. The affective process is blind, and hence liable to many mistakes and deceptions; whereas the

¹¹⁶Underscoring supplied. It is necessary to stress the importance of the objectivity of knowledge, particularly when the traditional teaching is compared with the philosophies employed by the *new theology*.

¹¹⁷Underscoring supplied.

¹¹⁸Ch. 4, no. 218.

inasmuch as its *medium of knowing* (*medium cognitiois*) is the *authority of the revealing God*.

The difference between these two kinds of knowledge is essential. They agree neither in the object nor in the medium by which the object is attained. The object of the former belongs to the natural order, its light is the light inherent in human reason. The object of the latter belongs to the supernatural order, it is a mysterious and hidden object unattainable by reason left to itself, requiring for its attainment the supernatural light of revelation and faith.¹²¹

But the possibilities of knowing God are not yet exhausted. We said that the [First] Vatican mentioned three. The text we have been commenting on speaks of only two. But it immediately adds that human reason, enlightened by faith, can obtain a *certain understanding of the revealed mysteries*, employing for this purpose its natural knowledge, in which there is an *analogue of the faithful* which enables it also to represent the divine truths.¹²² This kind of knowledge is the *theological* which lies midway between the other two.

There is, then, a natural knowledge of God, whose object is constituted by the divine truths attainable by human reason, and whose light is solely the light of human reason itself. There is, besides, a supernatural knowledge of God, the object of which is the supernatural mysteries beyond the reach of human reason, but which God has revealed either in the Scriptures or in Tradition, and which we grasp by the light, likewise supernatural, of revelation and faith. There is, finally, a third knowledge, that of *theology*, which is a combination of the natural and the supernatural. Of the supernatural, because its object is constituted by the divine mysteries, and its light by divine revelation and human reason employing philosophical notions and rational processes but always, of course, under the superior direction of faith.

B. *The knowledge of faith*. — In faith, the two formal elements are supernatural: both the object and the light. The object, viz., the divine

¹²¹ "The perpetual consensus of the Catholic Church has held and holds that there are two orders of knowledge which are distinguished not only by their principles but also by their object: by their principles, indeed, since in the one we know by natural reason, in the other by faith; by their object, because, apart from those things which can be reached by natural reason, mysteries hidden in God, which cannot be attained except through divine revelation, are proposed to us for belief." (VATICAN I, *De Fide catholica*, ch. 4; Denz.-Schön., 3015).

¹²² "Now, when through God's gift, reason enlightened by faith sedulously and soberly seeks some understanding of the mysteries, it achieves a very fruitful understanding (of the same) through the analogy of those things that are naturally known, as well as through the connexion of the mysteries among themselves." (*Ibid.*, Denz.-Schön., 3016).

reasoning process is done openly in the full light of day; albeit fallible if done by man alone, it is nonetheless much firmer and exhibits greater guarantees of being right. This is the view taken by traditional theology, and Fr. Marín alludes to it when he says, "Of course, no sooner does such a seemingly novel sentiment (the new truth embodied in a feeling) externally manifest and propagate itself, than it is seized by speculative theology and subjected to strict accounting by comparing it with the sources of revelation, viz., the divine Scriptures and Tradition, and with the authentic criteria represented by the Church Fathers, Councils, and Popes."¹¹⁹ However, the endorsement of theological reasoning is not always needed. If the sentiment is one that is common, it possesses withal a sufficient guarantee of authenticity. If it is "Whether theology succeeds in demonstrating it or not, the *common sentiment of the faithful is of itself alone*, even without theological reasoning, a sufficient criterion."¹²⁰

To conclude, *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* possesses, among the many things that could be listed in its favour, the merit of being a magnificent exponent of the traditional concept of theology in both its theoretical and experiential aspects; and, thus, also the merit of serving as a safe guide in the present state of disorientation brought about by the new theology.

2. Theology and Faith

A. *Kinds of knowledge of God*. — Human knowledge of God is of three kinds. They are mentioned by the [First] Vatican Council. They are distinguished from each other by the object and the light by which the object is known.

In the first place, the Council speaks of a knowledge obtained by means of the natural light of reason. This knowledge ends in the attainment of truths of the natural order about God, which reason can grasp by its own powers with the help of creatures. This is the philosophical knowledge obtained through reasoning which starts from things as effects of God, and terminates in God as the cause of things. It is knowledge that has for its object God as the Primary Being, the First Principle, the First Cause, etc.

There is, besides, another knowledge achieved by means of the supernatural light of revelation communicated to the person who first received it, and which is achieved today by means of the light of faith, which is similarly supernatural since its formal element is none other than divine revelation,

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

mysteries; the light, which is divine revelation. Whatever is divine, if proposed infallibly, is not subject to debate or doubt. Neither is it accepted through a process of reasoning on the part of the believer. It is accepted through a discussion because its divine character is of itself a guarantee without sequently, any divine truth, once it is guaranteed as divine through the Church's infallible definition, is incontrovertible; it thus has the nature of a principle. Faith is the starting point of theology; faith provides the principles of theology. The role of the articles of faith and of the other revealed and defined dogmas in the acquisition of theological knowledge is identical to that of the first principles of any science in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. The latter are held as indisputable by the science that employs them as principles. They may be questioned and subjected to proof by another superior science, in respect of which they will be conclusions, not principles. But they are unquestionable by any science of which they are

principles. However, the firmness of the principles is not the same in all the sciences. The principles of metaphysics and mathematics are absolutely necessary and immutable; this is not the case with the principles of the natural sciences, which are normally subject to exceptions in their application. The greatest possible guarantee, the word of God. Metaphysical principles, although evident, are backed only by human guarantee and evidence; they accept them because they are evident to him. On the other hand, the principles of faith are guaranteed by the word of God which is not subject either to deception or deceit.

Hence, theology proceeds from principles having the utmost consistency, principles utterly indisputable since they are altogether necessary revealing them, has guaranteed their truth.

But this is not the sole function of faith. It is not just a grasp of supernatural truths accepted by means of a likewise supernatural light, and, thus, an assent the firmness of which is superior to any natural evidence. It exercises, besides, an influence on the natural truths that will be employed by man in the theological process that begins with the truths of faith, and on the reasoning process elaborated with the aid of those natural truths. Insofar as it is a *theological virtue*, faith is restricted to assenting with utmost certainty to the revealed truths on the authority of God who has revealed them. But insofar as it is theology's *starting point*, apart from the foregoing certainties to revealed truths grounded on the authority of God, faith also functions to provide guidance in the rational appraisal of natural truths and in the rational use made of them for the purpose of drawing out the virtual content of the principles.

The truths of faith, as principles of theology, guide or shed light on the rational minor premises and on the reasoning process constructed with the latter and the former. This is a function of the highest importance. The Pope occasionally alludes to it in the *Humani generis* and grounds on it the superior value of traditional philosophy. "The body of doctrine elaborated with common accord by Catholic teachers in the course of many centuries is certainly not grounded on such frail foundations. They are grounded on principles and notions derived from a true knowledge of created things. In deriving this knowledge, *divinely revealed truth shone like a star*, through the Church, upon the human mind."¹²³ "That sound philosophy handed down as a patrimony from previous Christian generations, enjoys a superior kind of authority because its principles and principal assertions, gradually made manifest and defined by men of great talent, have been weighed by the Church's Magisterium in the balance of *divine revelation*."¹²⁴

This is not the sole reason for the superior value of traditional philosophy, but it is a reason that no theologian may ignore, as the Holy Father bewails, it is in fact ignored by many modern theologians.

C. *Theological knowledge*. — Theology is the *science of revelation*, or the *understanding of the faith*.¹²⁵ This understanding of revelation or of the faith is a *wisdom*, a fact which endows theology with certain notable characteristics which we shall presently explain. Theology possesses characteristics which are proper to it as *science*, and characteristics which belong to it as an *ultimate science* or *wisdom*.

Theology is *wisdom* or an *ultimate science*. There is no superior science to which theology may entrust the defense of its own principles. Sciences are traditionally divided into subalternant and subalternant. The latter entrust to the former the elaboration of their principles. In other words, the principles of the subalternant sciences are conclusions of the subalternant. For instance, such sciences as have man for their object — medicine, anthropology, etc. — are subalternant to psychology, and psychology is their respective subalternant. The conclusions of psychology are principles of medicine. The physician must proceed from the presupposition that man is a substantial composite of matter and soul.

Now, then, our theology is exclusively a subalternant science. Not because there is no superior science to which it is subalternant, since it is in

¹²³ AAS, 42 (1950), 566.

¹²⁴ *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (190), 571-572.

¹²⁵ This definition is taken from Vatican I. Cf. Denz.-Schön. 3016. Plus XII recalls it in *Humani generis*: "It is common knowledge how great a store the Church sets by human reason . . . to achieve some understanding, one that is very fruitful, of the mysteries." (AAS, 42 (1950), 571).

fact subalternated to God's own divine knowledge and to the knowledge the blessed have in heaven, but because there is no other scientific knowledge *had by man* to which theology is subordinated. There is no human science which establishes as conclusions the principles of theology. Theological *conclusions* deduced from any other piece of knowledge possessed by man on this earth.

Since no superior knowledge exists capable of working on the principles of theology, that function has to be assumed by theology itself. A parallel instance is found in the case of metaphysics. As the supreme science among those naturally acquired, it is likewise exclusively subalternant and in no way subalternate. Thus metaphysics goes to work on its own principles by an authentic reflexion on itself.

To reflect on itself is a proper function of the ultimate science. Such a science is a *wisdom*. Theology, as also metaphysics, is a genuine wisdom. Here lies the key to the correct understanding of the commonly accepted axiom that theology is a *science of authority*.

It is, in effect, a science of *authority*. What is meant by this? That is argument from authority is the *decisive* one? We believe that that is not the case. Theology does not need to prove its conclusions by arguments from authority; nor are such arguments the more efficacious and decisive.

The axiom means something else. Theology is said to be a science of *authority* because the argument from authority is decisive relative to its *starting point*, that is, relative to the acceptance of its *principles*. *Authority* is essential to its work as wisdom. As a wisdom, theology works on its own principles, and these principles are established *exclusively by means of authority*. The principles of theology are principles of faith, and truths of faith are accepted on the authority of God who reveals them, and of the Church who proposes them, and of the Fathers and theologians, insofar as they are exponents of the faith proposed by the Church through her ordinary magisterium.

If the argument from authority were to be taken as *decisive* relative to the *conclusions* of theology, then the conclusions would *cease to be conclusions* and would become principles. If what is taken as a conclusion should be proven to be revealed by God and proposed by the Church, that is to say, if it should be established by a decisive argument of divine authority as explained and proposed by the Church, then whoever has succeeded in establishing the proof and judges it decisive, accepts that conclusion as established and thus transfers it to the category of principles. Which is why we said that the argument from authority is decisive in theology relative to its sapiential function, that is, relative to the establishment of its principles which are

revealed by God and proposed by the Church, or truths grounded on the authority of God and of the Church.

The view we have been expounding on the theological argument from authority as relative specifically to the *principles* of theology is expressed by St. Thomas as follows: "To argue from authority is in the highest degree proper to this teaching [theology] inasmuch as its *principles* are had by revelation."¹²⁶

But, apart from being a wisdom and carrying out the sapiential function of reflecting on its own principles and establishing them with decisive arguments from authority, theology is also a *science* charged with the performance of *scientific* functions, which perform are concerned with the conclusions. And theology is no exception.

Now, how does theology draw the conclusions out of its principles? To draw them out is to *prove their inclusion therein, to make them known*. How is this done? In various manners and different ways. We have already mentioned that there are two ways of knowing: the way of comaturnality or experience, and the way of investigation or research. We have also pointed out that the former is not of itself a *scientific* procedure since the experience had by means of the will is blind and therefore incapable of providing by itself any *certain* knowledge of what is experienced. Hence, the ever present need of having its assertions verified in one way or another by reasoning.

It follows that theology's specifically scientific work consists in the investigation and study of the principles, not for the purpose of establishing them — this is its sapiential function — but for the purpose of *unfolding* them, of drawing out the *conclusions contained in them*, which can be done in several ways, either *positively* or *speculatively*.

The *positive* way consists principally in proving the *conclusions* with arguments from authority. Obviously, such arguments exist, equally clear it is that authority possesses a value of its own because the scholars and theologians who preceded us were talented men who *knew* whereof they were speaking or writing. But are we to rest content on their authority? Would it not be better to examine the reasons that led them to the conclusions they reached? Relative to the theological conclusions, that is to say, relative to providing theology with *scientific* content, arguments from authority do not have the decisive value they have in proving theological principles, that is, relative to providing theology with *sapiential* content.

There is a positive theology which establishes its conclusions by quoting texts from the Fathers of the Church, Doctors, and theologians. True enough.

¹²⁶Summa Theologica. I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2.

But equally true it is that it is neither the only theology nor the most scientific. St. Thomas raises the question whether theology is an argumentative knowledge. His answer is affirmative. "This teaching does not argue for the purpose of proving its principles, viz., the articles of faith, but from them it proceeds to prove something else, as for instance, the Apostle argues from Christ's resurrection to prove the common resurrection."¹²⁷ To prove one truth by another, the conclusions by the principles, builds up a body of scientific or speculative knowledge. Theology does this. More: it is precisely by the discharge of this function that theology is truly scientific, that is, it provides authentic knowledge of the content of the principles. Positive theology does not provide this authentic knowledge of the principles since it does not penetrate them; it does not perceive the connexion of the conclusions with the truths from which they issue; it limits itself merely to asserting that, according to the authors quoted, the conclusion is a true conclusion. St. Thomas writes to the point: "There is an argumentation ordered to remove any doubt whether the case is so; and it is in theological argumentation of this sort that use is made principally of the authorities accepted by those of the contrary persuasion . . . But in the schools there exists another sort of argumentation, one that is magisterial, not for the purpose of removing error, but of instructing the listeners and bringing them to an understanding of the truth, which is what it seeks. In this case it is necessary to insist on the reasons that probe into the roots of the truth, and make one know the truth of what is asserted. Otherwise, if the question is determined by the teacher through the use of mere authorities, the listener will indeed be certified that such is the case but will acquire no knowledge or understanding and will go away empty."¹²⁸ Speculative theology is necessary in order to obtain a truly scientific knowledge of the revealed truths, that is to say, in order to penetrate them and grasp their content, to see the conclusions concluded or included in them.

Speculative theology, then, is theological knowledge or science in the most authentic or genuine sense. Theology that is based decisively on authority is theology that investigates and establishes its own principles; it is not a science but a wisdom. Relative to the conclusions, the theology that establishes them by way of experience cannot be truly called a science since it is incapable of giving certainty by itself. The theology that establishes conclusions by arguments of authority is a science, but imperfectly, since it does not penetrate into the content of its principles. Hence, speculative theology alone is theological knowledge in the most authentic and genuine sense. Unfortunately, it is looked upon with disdain by not a few of the exponents of the new theology, and not unexpectedly characterized by them as rational.

¹²⁷ Loc cit., body of the article.

¹²⁸ *Quodlibet*, 4, a. 18.

istic, logical, dialectical, etc. In truth, it is nothing of the sort, it is simply theology as an authentic science. Anything short of penetration or insight into the revealed principles in order to perceive the conclusions contained therein, falls short of the true measure of theological science.

The [First] Vatican Council defines theology as the understanding of revealed truths obtained by means of the analogy of things naturally known and the connexion that links truths with one another. "Reason, indeed, enlightened by faith . . . acquires some understanding of the mysteries . . . both through the analogy of the things which it naturally knows as well as through the connexion of the mysteries among themselves."¹²⁹ Pius XII alluded to the tendency to play down the role of speculative theology in these terms: "Concerning truths revealed by God, it is asked whether the mind is capable of penetrating them with the aid of notions that are certain and, thus, of deducing further truths from them. . . . The Church affirms that such is the case."¹³⁰

Theology as a scientific discipline, one employing philosophical notions to unfold the virtual content of the principles of faith, performs an extremely complex task. Theology would be impaired by ignoring the circumstances surrounding the formulation of the philosophical principles employed in the unfolding of the dogmas. Scientific or speculative theology requires a philosophical expertise conversant with the following:

(1) An exact information regarding the facts that have motivated the formulation of the teachings employed. Obviously, such facts shed enormous light on the sense of the teachings to the formulation of which they have greatly contributed.

(2) A similarly precise knowledge of the errors against which those teachings have been proposed as an antidote. By the law of contraries, it will be extremely useful, in order to appraise correctly the doctrinal content of certain philosophical propositions, to know what they were meant to correct or make good.

(3) The process whereby an already established and firm teaching was elaborated. Knowing such elaborative process makes it possible for one to appreciate the influence of a preceding stage on the subsequent; the corrections imposed by subsequent stages on those preceding it; the various aspects and shades of meaning that gradually became apparent to those who elaborated the teachings and systems. The interpretation of a teaching or system risks the taint of apriorism if, together with the details relative to the circumstances and errors, no account is taken of the details connected with the process followed in the elaboration of the given doctrine.

¹²⁹ Denz.-Schön., 3016.

¹³⁰ Address, Sept. 22, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 387.

(4) The emplacement of the teaching within the whole doctrinal conception or body of thought of the authors who hold it. In other words, external motives, the occasions that influence the circumstances, the systems, the latter must, obviously, also exhibit an internal unity. The notions employed, the principles formulated, the theses upheld must certainly be interpreted in the light of those external elements, but, above all, in the light of the internal element, viz., its framing or emplacement within the mentality of the authors who have definitively built and formulated the body of teachings. That mentality shows up in the totality of the doctrinal whole.

Historical research is very much the "in" thing in scholarly circles today. It could be termed the extrinsic study of what has been taught or thought. Which is perfectly correct. But if that were all, then it would not be entirely correct. Notions, formulae, categories, principles possess an internal meaning, a meaning determined not solely by the precedents, circumstances, facts attendant to their formulation, but also by the intimate bonds whereby the whole is structured within an organic doctrinal conception. Which is to say that there is an inner meaning or truth which cannot be ignored, and which is the principal object of investigation and research.

The scientific or speculative theologian must perform all these tasks, and perform them well. Only then can he place the results of his research at the service of dogma in order to unfold it, to deduce the genuine conclusions included in the word of God. No less is required to build sterling theology.

D. Theology and "The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma."
— The present book by Fr. Marín-Sola is a splendid example of everything we have just been saying. It expounds the theory on the nature of theology and at the same time puts the theory into practice.

All theological investigation takes the truths of faith for its starting point. Fr. Marín devotes a whole section to establish this point.¹³¹ The principles of theology consist in the revealed truths, not insofar as they contain the divine meaning they have in God's mind, but insofar as they contain the meaning proposed to the primitive Church, a meaning undoubtedly divine, yet always lesser in scope than the scope they have in the divine mind. This is the realm of faith, which is an assent to what God has revealed and is proposed by the Church. Anything that theology may reach by deduction from the principles of faith is likewise revealed since theology is a science that is essentially inclusive or metaphysical in character.¹³² Hence, the formal element of the truth deduced in the conclusion is exclusively reduced to the revealed notions and principles. Fr. Marín is particularly insistent on

¹³¹Cf. ch. 2, sect. 1.

¹³²Cf. ch. 2, sects. 2-7.

this point because it is overlooked more than is convenient. "It has too often been forgotten that the starting point, the true principles, the *formal subject* of theology is . . . the majors of faith or revealed majors."¹³³ But theology is made up not only of revealed principles, but also of rational minor premises.

Concerning these minors of reason Fr. Marín has several things to say. *First*, he says that they are *mere instruments of deduction*, not formal principles from which the conclusion is deduced. "The confusion in this matter proceeds, we think, either from misunderstanding or overlooking the true role of the human sciences or minors of reason in the reasoning of the science of the revealed or sacred theology. Theology, indeed, utilizes all sorts of sciences or minors of reason, whether metaphysical, physical, or moral. . . . The revealed majors are not instruments of the minors, nor do they enter into the constitution of theological reasoning *on a par* with the minors. On the contrary, the minors are *mere intellectual instruments* to unfold or explicate the objective virtuality which the revealed majors contain even if they do not express it."¹³⁴ "The solution proffered to these problems by St. Thomas and his school has always been that *in the theological reasoning the minors of reason are merely instruments of the majors of faith*, or mere helpers of our mind in the unfolding of what already exists in a latent state in the majors of faith. . . ."¹³⁵ Thus, theology employs man's natural knowledge, particularly philosophy. It may and must do scientific work on the so-called minors of reason. But always in subordination to the majors of faith relative to which they serve as instruments to draw out what is contained in them.

In the second place, Fr. Marín teaches that, in spite of their rational character, the minors of reason do *have specific connections with revelation*. Hence, where a given philosophy is employed in theology, and particularly where that philosophy is already sanctioned by the use and the constant approval of the Church, it would take extreme superficiality to think that no special connections exist linking that philosophy and the divine revelation proposed in the major premises, inasmuch as the former cooperates in developing the virtuality of the latter. "The very serious problems related to the evolution of dogma — considered as new by many to the extent of almost accusing the great masters of scholasticism of being ignorant of them¹³⁶ — were examined and solved by these same masters, and above all by St. Thomas and his

¹³³Cf. ch. 2, no. 96.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*

¹³⁵Cf. ch. 4, no. 214.

¹³⁶Fr. Marín began work on this book early in this century. Then he evinced surprise at finding that the problems of doctrinal evolution were being presented as something new, such that the great masters of scholasticism almost stood charged with ignorance of the same. How would he react today at seeing them accused of being totally ignorant of the categories of evolution, historicity, and progress?

school, with a profundity and breadth that stand out in contrast to the superficiality with which they are studied not only in heterodox works, but even in many Catholic handbooks. What we call today the contact of revelation with the different philosophies and civilizations, the schoolmen called the contact of the majors of faith with the minors of reason.¹³⁷ As *instruments* of deduction, the minors of reason cannot be unrelated to the subject on which they work. As instruments to deduce what is revealed, they must needs have a certain aptitude to work on revelation. A natural aptitude is not enough; there is further need of their elevation by the *vis instrumentalis* (instrumental energy). The minors of reason employed by theology receive from the majors of faith, which are the principal cause of the conclusion, the divine *vis instrumentalis*, which is a special contact with revelation. It is common knowledge that the instrument receives the *vis instrumentalis* from the principal cause, which in this case is the *revealed* majors.

In the third place, the contact of the minors of reason or philosophical truths with the majors of faith or revealed truths in the theological enterprise of deducing theological conclusions from the premises of faith is explained by Fr. Marín as follows: the minor premises of reason are inclusive; consequently, the predicate signifies the same reality as the subject; consequently, the predicate of the minor premise is the predicate of the major premise (otherwise, the reasoning would be incorrect). The predicate of the major is a *revealed* term. Now, the term found in both premises but not in every authentic reasoning process, and in the instant case it is itself a *revealed* term since it is found in the major premise. It reappears in the minor premise where it has a philosophical meaning, but one in conformity with the revealed meaning in the major; otherwise, the argument would have four terms — the two of the major and the two of the minor, and none of the latter coinciding with any of the former — and thus wholly inconclusive. Says Fr. Marín: "The predicate of the premise of reason, (if it is inclusive, as it has to be in theology) is the self-same reality or object or thing as the subject: it is the essence itself of the subject . . . The subject of the minor is the very same predicate of the major, the very same predicate of the premise of faith, one of the two formally revealed ideas. The middle term in theology is formally revealed, illumined by the light of revelation: it is a term of faith . . . Anyone who understands the role of the middle term in the reasoning process, and anyone who understands the meaning of objective homogeneity, would need no further explanation."¹³⁸

Enough has been said of the legitimate use of philosophy and its notions in theology, and on the guarantee given to the premises of reason by

¹³⁷Cf. ch. 4, no. 214.

¹³⁸Cf. ch. 2, no. 113.

their assumption as instruments in the development of the revealed truth to justify our repudiation of all the assertions of modern philosophers and theologians tending to minimize and cast aspersions on speculative or rational theology, by them described as rationalistic¹³⁹ or dialectical; and to vindicate our obligation to subscribe to these words of Pius XII: "Only then will human reason be capable of aptly and securely discharging this function [that of penetrating into the understanding of the faith or building a scientific theology] when it has been duly cultivated, that is, imbued with that sound philosophy which has been handed down as a patrimony from preceding Christian generations, and thus enjoys also a superior kind of authority because its principles and principal assertions, gradually made clear and defined by men of great talent, have been weighed by the Church's Magisterium in the balance of divine revelation."¹⁴⁰

It is, thus, not surprising that the Church should herself have employed specifically philosophical notions and terms to express dogmatic truths, since those notions and terms imply a real, though not exhaustive, identity with the revealed reality. It must be understood that the notions and terms employed by the Church in her definitions, have the meaning they have in the philosophy from which they have been borrowed by the Church and utilized to draw out the defined conclusions. "In the aforementioned growth (of Catholic dogma) various human philosophies and civilizations have played a large role and exercised a great influence, particularly Greek philosophy in the age of the Fathers and scholastic philosophy in the Middle and Modern ages. This influence is noticeable in the writings of the Fathers who developed the primitive doctrine, in the conciliar disputes and disquisitions that preceded the definition of each dogma, and even in the dogmatic formulae themselves which clearly exhibit the mark of the various epochs in which the propositions were defined."¹⁴¹

Pius XII admonishes: "No one denies that the terms employed in the schools and in the teaching of the Church's Magisterium itself to express such notions, are capable of further perfection and polish. It is likewise clear that the Church has not always been constant in the use of the same terms. It is also obvious that the Church cannot be bound to any short-lived philosophy. But the body of doctrine elaborated with common accord by Catholic teachers in the course of many centuries is certainly not grounded on such frail foundations. They are grounded on principles and notions derived from a true knowledge of created things. In deriving this knowledge, divinely revealed truth shone like a star, through the Church, upon the human mind. Hence, it is not surprising that some of these notions have not only been

¹³⁹*Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 573.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, Pgs. 571-572.

¹⁴¹*The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, Introd. no. 5.

employed, but also sanctioned by the Ecumenical Councils, so that it is unlawful to deviate from them.

"Hence, to disregard, or reject, or devalue so many and so important things conceived, formulated and furnished through the multisecular endeavours of men of uncommon intelligence and holiness working to achieve an ever more accurate expression of the truths of faith under the illumination and guidance of the Holy Spirit and the Church's vigilant Magisterium, in order to make room for a new philosophy, whose conjectural notions and fluctuating and vague expressions are like flowers of the field in bloom today and withered tomorrow, is not only the height of imprudence but transforms dogma into a reed buffeted by the winds."¹⁴²

3. Theology and Philosophical Systems

The preceding subsection has shown that theology is by definition the *understanding of the faith* or the *knowledge of the revealed truth*; thus it must be *rational* and, to borrow from the [First] Vatican Council, utilize the natural analogical notions of the human mind. Furthermore, these notions have passed on from theology to dogma, since the Church has not infrequently employed them in her dogmatic definitions. This raises a very frequent problem, to wit, how is theology related, not precisely to philosophy in general, but to *the various philosophical systems* that so frequently come and go.

Not all philosophical systems are equally firm. Traditional philosophy not based on frail grounds, it is not an ephemeral philosophy. Nonetheless, there have been attempts to replace it. The *Humani generis* denounces those who pretend to liberate the dogmas from their traditional formulations and to reduce them to the scriptural expressions, thinking thereby to open the way to the possibility of expressing the dogmas of faith with the notions of the modern philosophies of immanentism, or idealism, or existentialism, etc., and so to satisfy the needs of the men of today.¹⁴³

The problem is fraught with grave consequences. It arises from a very real and pressing need — the need to adapt the truths of faith, meant for all men, to modern minds. Nothing can be more appealing, more apostolic, more Christian than the desire to bring home to all human minds the truths of the Gospel. If theology is the understanding of the faith obtained, among other means, with the aid of notions made available by philosophy, then we are faced with an acute and vexing problem. The existence of many philosophies

¹⁴² *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 566-567.
¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, pg. 566.

is an undeniable fact. Equally undeniable is the fact of many, different, incompatible, even opposed philosophical categories. The same category, formula, term takes on different, or even inconsistent senses in this and that philosophy. Are we, then, to admit the existence of several theologies — scholastic, evolutionist, existentialist? Will it not be possible to construct a theology with the Gospel and Hegel or Marx? With the Bible and Kierkegaard? That is precisely the aim of the new theology.

In this subsection we shall consider the authenticity of the problem just stated, its foundations, and the mistaken solutions it has been given. The traditional solution, which the Church considers to be the true solution, will be dealt with in the next subsections.

A. *Theology should be suitable to all men and to all times.* — Nothing could be truer. Truth is the heritage of all men. Perhaps not truth in all its extension, but at least the truth *meant for men*, the truth tailored for the human mind. Such is the case with philosophical and religious truth. Hence all men can lay claim to the possession of such truths, even if not all men actually exercise it.

Philosophical truth knows no exclusivisms, it is the common heritage of all. Given a human intellect, it is vested with the natural right to know the truth that is proportionate to itself, and to know it in the manner that befits its nature, viz., through reasoning. An intellect not ordered to the truth, a reason not ordered to reasoning are as abnormal as eyes not ordered to light and a will not ordered to the good. It might happen that the mind should fail to grasp the truth, or should fall into error; but in no case will it not be ordered to the truth. Truth does not deny itself to any man. If it is not attained, it will be due to a defect in the man, not to a defect in the truth itself, or because the truth is not meant for him. Furthermore, every man, simply by being a man, has the natural right to know the truth *in a human manner*, not intuitively, but rationally or by way of argumentation. But to know the truth by way of argumentation is to philosophize. Therefore, philosophy is every man's heritage.

The case is the same for the truth of faith or the revealed truth. Every man has a natural and inalienable right to it. Lest we be misunderstood, let it be clear that by natural right we do not mean a right based on a man's being a man, but a right based on a positive and gratuitous divine determination. The supernatural order, to which man has been called, is in its entirety a divine-positive and wholly gratuitous order. But God has established it for all men, and, in virtue of this universal call, no man is excluded. Each and every man, because God has so willed it, has the right to the divine truths, grace, and salvation.

When we assert the existence in every man of a right to know the revealed truths, we do not mean a right grounded on the intrinsic demands of his cognitive power, since the object proportionate to the human mind is not the supernatural truth, which is unattainable, without the gratuitous elevation of human nature. However, if this gratuitous elevation is presupposed, then every man has a natural right, that is, a right corresponding to his elevated nature, to know the truth revealed by God. As a matter of fact, God has destined every man to a supernatural end, and consequently, "enlightens every man who comes into the world."¹⁴⁴ St. Thomas begins his *Summa Theologica* by expounding this elementary truth.¹⁴⁵

The truths of faith are meant for all men. This is not to say that all men actually exercise their right to know such truths. Unfortunately, not all do and, as a matter of fact, the truths of faith remain unknown to a great many. But it must be understood that it is not on account of a defect in the truths themselves, or because they are not meant for some people; but on account of a defect in men themselves who do not avail themselves of available God-given light.

The right of every man to the revealed truth is not limited to knowing it by faith. With faith alone a man can be saved, and no man needs to be a theologian in order to be saved. True. But, granted that theology is not a requisite for salvation, it is still true that theological knowledge is meant for all. For man has the right to know things in his own manner, the human manner, through reasoning or argumentation. Knowledge of the faith by way of reasoning is theological knowledge. Hence, all men may claim the right to a theological knowledge of the truth revealed by God. Hence, theology is meant for all men.

By this we mean to say that theology must be suitable or adaptable to all. Theology is meant not only for a particular era, but for all eras; not only for a particular mentality or culture, but for all the various mentalities and cultures. It should, of course, be obvious that we do not require an equal measure of theological achievement in each and everyone. The same science can be had on various levels, and the problem of adapting the subject matter to the different mental capacities of the learners is a matter of pedagogical skill.

Each epoch in history is beset with its own problems. The problems confronting the 20th century are not identical to those of the 13th century. The things that appealed to men in the past are not the same as those which preoccupy men today. The light of revelation and faith must be shed on the

¹⁴⁴ John 1:9.

¹⁴⁵ *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 1, a. 1.

problems of today as on the problems of yesterday. In other words, we need a theology for the living problems and issues of the present.

Similarly, each era, each century has its own mentality; and theology begs to be adapted also to the mentality of the day. This is done not only by stating and solving the problems of the present in the light of divine revelation, but also by expounding the eternal or permanent problems in a manner accessible to the ways of contemporary men.

Finally, each epoch may also have its own mental categories, or philosophical system. Will it also be necessary to adapt the teachings of the faith to the new systems and categories in order to make the faith truly efficacious and suitable to modern men?

If theology is the knowledge of the faith obtained chiefly with the aid of philosophy, it would seem to follow that there will be as many theologies as there are philosophies. Otherwise, theology, which is intended for all men, will, as a matter of fact, not be suitable for a certain number of peoples or of generations. The inadmissibility of this conclusion seems to require the acceptance of various different theologies. Such is the conclusion reached, without quibbles, by many today. To quote Pius XII in the *Humani generis*: "“(Certain modern writers) believe that the way is open whereby, in order to satisfy the needs of these days, dogmas may be expressed with notions taken from modern philosophy, whether from immanentism, or idealism, or existentialism, or some such other system.”¹⁴⁶ If dogma, which is to say faith itself, is to be adapted to these philosophies, then, the case will apply with even greater force to theology.

B. *Contemporary problems and contemporary theology.* — Our problems today are, undeniably, not the problems of the 13th century. The methods of approach and of problem-solving employed today differ from the methods of yesterday; the criteria for solving present difficulties are not the criteria which prevailed in the past.

A modern spirit is used to living his own life, to breathing a reflexive and subjectivist atmosphere, to relating to problems from the point of view of the self. Consider, for instance, an existentialist. Must he be compelled to accept a theology burdened with Aristotelianism? A theology which considers the truths of faith with the category of *truth-object*, that is, a truth in correspondence with objective reality, the measure of which is to be found outside ourselves? Such a theology is of no use to him. The theology that will be of any use to him will be a theology of the *truth-subject*, the truth *in him*, the truth which is *lived* — not the truth which is *dictated*.

Likewise, a modern spirit has no use for a theology built with Aristotelian categories expressive of *immutable essences*. Truth beyond time is

¹⁴⁶ *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 566.

inoperative for a mind used to looking at things through the categories of time, evolution, or history.

Pius XII recalls that, in the modern view, "the perennial philosophy is nothing but a philosophy of immutable essences, whereas the modern mind must look to the existence of each and everything and to life in a state of constant flux. While showing contempt for this philosophy, they simultaneously praise other philosophies, ancient or modern, and seem to insinuate that there is no philosophy or opinion which cannot be made compatible with Catholic dogma by making some corrections or additions as needed. The utter falsity of these pretensions no Catholic may call into doubt, particularly where such errors are involved as are known under the names of immanentism, or idealism, or materialism, whether historical or dialectical, or even existentialism, whether of the sort that professes atheism or of the sort that, to say the least, impugns the value of metaphysical reasoning."¹⁴⁷

Let us repeat once more that theology is meant for all men and for all times. It follows that all men of all times can claim the right to achieve an understanding of the faith, a theological knowledge of the revealed truth. Consequently, we come up with the following dilemma: either theology is made to swim up river, to develop the problems of faith with outdated, ineffectual, useless criteria, thus effectively excluding from our apostolate and our sphere of attraction the men of today who have to live with the legitimate problems of subjectivism and evolution, as well as the men of tomorrow who will also have to live with the problems posed by the future; or we opt for achieving an understanding of the faith through modern categories and coping by their means with the problems of today. On this count, theology remains a reasoned faith; not, however, with the reason of the past but with the reason of the present. Such is the alternative for which many of the followers of the new theology have opted.

C. *Consequences of the solution given by the "New Theology."* — Opting for a theology constructed with the categories and principles of contemporary cultures is tantamount to admitting many non-coincident, divergent, and even inconsistent theologies. The immutability of the truth, and the homogeneity, of Catholic doctrinal development are thereby eliminated. Such are the fruits of the labour of the new theologians.

To justify the building of a theology with modern categories, reference is often made to what St. Thomas did in his time with Aristotle. The Angelic Doctor took the Stagirite and placed his philosophy at the service of revealed truth. Something of the sort must be done today with existentialism and evolutionism. No one denies St. Thomas the right to take possession of the Aristotelian philosophy of objective truth and immutable essences and to

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pgs. 573-574.

construct with it his theology. Modern theologians claim for themselves the same right to construct a new theology with the philosophy of subjective truth and of mutable truth. To achieve an understanding of the faith in the context of the apostolic needs of the 13th century what was done then had to be done. That endeavour is pointless today. To maintain those positions might even be prejudicial. The old positions should be abandoned and new ones occupied.

This line of reasoning is appealing and not without appearances of truth. But it leads to disastrous consequences. The fact is that it is shot through and through with equivocations. It is not a question of whether the truth should be adapted to the men of different times. That it should is so obvious as to be indisputable. The question is whether the truth is to be so adapted *at the cost of destroying the truth itself*, of changing its being, of forsaking its immutability. Divine truth is unchangeable; it can evolve, adapt itself, but always *preserving its identity*. The progress, evolution, adaptation must be *homogeneous*: only thus will the truth remain unimpaired.

Neither is it a question whether modern theologians may adapt contemporary philosophies to the service of the faith, as St. Thomas adapted Aristotle's philosophy in the 13th century. Rather, the question is whether the traditional philosophy contains *definitive conquests* that may not be disregarded, let alone denied, in the process of making the modern adaptations. Consequently, the question is whether the modern adaptation must take into account or must rather ignore such principles of modern philosophies as are inconsistent with those definitive conquests. Thus, the crux of the matter is not concerned with a certain behaviour that ought to be emulated — as it clearly ought to be — but with certain definitive achievements that ought to be respected. The task of adaptation to the modern mentality must be accomplished on the basis of not denying whatever theology judges to have been definitively achieved. "The question is whether what St. Thomas has constructed *beyond and above any particular time*, by combining and knitting together the elements contributed by the students of Christian wisdom throughout the ages, is founded on solid rock, endowed with perpetual vigour and validity, *remains even today an efficacious defense and bulwark of the deposit of Catholic faith, and can safely be employed to guide the new developments of theology and philosophy*. The Church affirms that such is the case."¹⁴⁸

The question, then, is whether St. Thomas's adaptation of Aristotle is valid also today, that is, whether what he — and all of traditional theology with one accord — taught concerning the objectivity of human knowledge, the immutability of truth, etc., retains its value today and can lend itself to

¹⁴⁸ Address, Sept. 22, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 387.

mitting that theology is naturally subject to change for a number of reasons. However, the change must obey certain fixed and firm canons: it is not totally contingent but it is subject to laws that are, in part, necessary. Hence, philosophers and theologians must have a mind that is *voluntarily open* to progress and at the same time firmly anchored in the foundations that provide homogeneity to the evolving subject, which must preserve its identity through all the stages of its evolution.

Theology is naturally subject to change for various reasons. We shall mention two, which we deem essential: the subject in which theological knowledge resides, and the very nature itself of theology.

The subject in possession of theology is *man*, biologically as well as intellectually, man is subject to constant evolution and progress. Not endowed with the fullness of life from the beginning, he starts out as a germ meant to evolve, grow, progress. But it should never be forgotten that the identity of his human nature and personality is maintained all throughout his development, growth, and progress. No essential changes take place; the changes that occur are homogeneous.

It is not only biologically but also intellectually that man is subject to growth and progress. No man begins knowing everything he knows at the end. His is not an intuitive, but a reasoning intellect. His ideas are not innate but acquired. Man advances in knowledge either because he acquires more items of knowledge, or because he develops the knowledge he already has. Reasoning is by another name called discourse, which, etymologically signifies a *running*, a progressing. A running forward, a running which perfects, an advance.

Endowed with a nature meant to develop itself both biologically and intellectually, it would be acting contrary to nature to cut a man off from the things that give meaning and content to his powers of development. Man changes. In order to change, he gets in touch with things changeable, existential, contingent.

The progressive character of theology, we said, is based not only on man's nature but also on the proper nature of theology itself. Theology is a *science*; as such it is discursive. It progresses or advances from the principles to the conclusions. Science is defined as "knowing one thing by another," that is, a passing from the knowing of one thing to the knowing of another thing, the latter finding its explanation in the former. Theology, then, as a science, is essentially progressive.

That advance is realized by the process of unfolding or explicating the virtuality of the principles that constitute the starting point. Now, that virtuality varies according to the difference in the sciences. In the natural sciences it is a simply *connexive* virtuality; in the metaphysical sciences, an *inclusive* virtuality. Inclusive means that the conclusions are included in the

the new developments and adaptations. That is the real point at issue, and not whether today, on the claim of doing just what he did, one can begin by demolishing what he built.

The endorsement of the enterprise of accommodating the faith to the mentality of modern times at the expense of scholasticism — either by belittling its usefulness or by denying its authority — has eventually led its detractors to hyperbolize some of its real shortcomings and to charge it, besides, with a litany of imagined defects, charges that can be made only by someone profoundly ignorant of this philosophy. For some quarters, scholasticism is a decrepit philosophy and theology, *passé*, ineffectual, ankylotic; for others, it is dead. Scholasticism is completely unaware of the three totally indispensable categories that are operative today, viz., subjectivity, evolution, solidarity, without which nothing is intelligible to a modern spirit. Consequently, modern writers, who favour a change of theology, affirm that the revealed truth must no longer be investigated with the help of scholastic thinking, but rather with the aid of Marxist or Kierkegaardian thought. The Gospel together with Marx or Hegel will give us the exact idea of faith integrated with the categories of temporalness, evolution and solidarity; the Gospel and Kierkegaard, the idea of faith integrated with the categories of subjectivity, contingency, and existence.

4. The True Solution to the Problem

No good purpose would be served by ignoring the theological problem just mentioned. It exists and it is fraught with serious consequences. The truths of faith and the truths of philosophy are meant for all men; consequently, theology is also meant for all men. Philosophy, theology's consent, changes; the mentality of the human beings in quest for a knowledge of God, changes. Will theology, then, become ankylotic, useless for want of change? Will it change to the extent of turning into something else? Or will it change and, without, preserve its identity? Will it evolve heterogeneously or homogeneously?

There is a wide range of possible solutions. The true and traditional solution has already been outlined in the preceding pages. We will now proceed to fill it out in some detail. The reader will have guessed that Fr. Marin's book is here fully brought into play. Its very title contains a guarantee: *evolution*, progress exists; the real identity of the evolving reality is not impaired but preserved because the evolution is *homogeneous*.

A. *Starting presuppositions*. — A problem is not solved either because it is not correctly stated or because the presuppositions that give it body are ignored. The solution to the instant problem requires that we begin by ad-

¹⁴⁹ *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 173.

principles and refer to the same object or reality represented in the principles. This explains why the conclusions of the metaphysical sciences are homogeneous with the principles. Now, theology is a metaphysical science, if, as a science it is progressive, as metaphysical, its progress has to be homogeneous.

Consequently, to deny that theology progresses or advances, to think of it as ankylotic or petrified knowledge, to think that the clock that marked its development has come to a dead stop at some past century, to believe that theology need not be up-to-date implies denying that it is a science and, as such, capable of constant growth; implies denying its accommodation to man who is a subject of growth and development today as much as yesterday. All of this is to say that theology adapts itself to the minds of modern men as it adapted itself to the minds of the ancients; that it grows and advances in the present as it grew and advanced in the past.

But such growth must be without prejudice to *maintaining its identity*. The growth must be homogeneous. Today's advance must not begin by razing to the ground the achievements of the past; rather it must be grounded on them. And this brings us to the second presupposition to the true solution to the present theological problem. Theological growth and evolution are not *absolute*; not everything changes in theology. Some parts or elements are unchangeable and necessary, must remain always, and with their permanence provide the criterion for all genuine growth and progress to the extent of rejecting anything inconsistent with those necessary and unchangeable elements.

The problems of men change. Our problems today are not those of yesterday. The mentality of men changes. Philosophies change. Yet change as much as they will, no problem will affect men if it is not a *human* problem. Man's nature remains identical at all times, and if a problem is to affect him, it has to be a human problem, it has to relate to his humanity. Let circumstances change ever so much, let things be ever so contingent and changeable, they will never pose a problem for man unless they take on a human character.

Man's knowledge, too, possesses fixed and immutable elements, viz., the first principles and the primary notions. Principles and notions in which the essences of things are reflected. Essences are immutable, eternal; essences do not change. If knowledge is to be true, it has to be in conformity with them, and therefore remain identical, changeless. No evolution can exist without a *permanent* subject to provide a point of reference and give meaning to each stage of the process. No contingency can exist without a necessary foundation to support the contingent reality.

Evolution and progress come about from the interplay of the two elements just described: elements that are perfective, and elements that are

already perfect. Anyone who maintains that everything is contingent and subject to evolution places himself outside the pale of traditional thought, and so does anyone who affirms that everything in man and in science is perfect and accomplished leaving no room for advance and progress.

The theologian ought to keep all this in mind. Firmly rooted in the authentic achievements of the past, he must remain open to the achievements yet to be attained. It will not do merely to have his feet firmly planted in the eternal principles of the traditional philosophy and dogma; his eyes, too, must also be cast forward probing the range that can be effectively reached by those principles. The theologian and the philosopher should be able correctly to combine the unchangeable order of essences with the changeable order of existences, and to reflect on each and every stage of existence the eternal values of essence. They must be able to coordinate the necessary and the contingent so as to reflect on each change of contingent things that which is necessary and which never changes.

Thus, will contemporary problems and notions acquire substance and content, and be rescued from being left alone by themselves adrift and at the mercy of changing events. On the other hand, if they are given a sense of permanence, if on them should be reflected the value of what is stable and eternal, then authentic progress, one that is homogeneous, shall have been achieved. Pius XII bears repeating here: "The question is whether what St. Thomas has constructed beyond and above any particular time, by combining and knitting together the elements contributed by the students of Christian wisdom throughout the ages, is founded on solid rock, endowed with *perpetual vigour and validity*, remains even today an efficacious defence and-bulwark of the deposit of Catholic faith, and can *safely be employed to guide the new developments of theology and philosophy*."¹⁵⁰ What St. Thomas and the common tradition of Christian thinkers have taught, is it valid today? Can it lend itself as a basis to further advances? The pope answers categorically: "The Church affirms that such is the case".

They stray far from the truth who think that traditional philosophy and theology are closed systems. This is not true either in principle or in practice. It is not true in principle because they are perfectly aware of the distinction between the essential and the existential, between the necessary and the contingent, and teach that the latter must be grounded on the former, the existential on the essential, the contingent on the necessary. It is not the case that everything is changeless, but that the changeless is to give meaning and content to the changing. Both elements combine to bring about progress and evolution. There is progress in the unfolding of the essential which is not grasped by us at one stroke. There is also progress in

¹⁵⁰ Address, Sept. 22, 1946. AAS, 38 (1946), 387.

knowledge when the human mind appreciates by stages what is necessary and immutable in its total reality.

It is not true in practice, either. As a matter of fact, the works of the great masters contain a great number of elements *unexploited* by modern theologians. Ignorance? Perhaps; but it has certainly not prevented them from censuring scholasticism as wanting in elements that can be exploited very usefully for the solution of the problems which they seek to solve with elements borrowed from other unrelated, or even contrary, philosophies, and thus burdened with either a dangerous or an erroneous content. Many instances could be cited. In a following subsection we will deal with two, *evolution* and *subjectivity*, the two most popular and fashionable categories today.

Elsewhere we recalled William de Tocco's observation calling attention to the *open mind* with which St. Thomas renewed the issues he dealt with.

B. The solution to the Problem. — It has been outlined in the preceding pages. But it will be worthwhile to develop it somewhat more.

To achieve genuine theological progress, to update theology and render it efficacious in our own times, there is no need to throw out any of the conquests already achieved. It might be necessary to sally forth to new positions. But before doing so, a careful study of traditional philosophy and theology ought to be undertaken to find out if they contain the elements that are needed today.

A careful study of scholasticism will undoubtedly bear out the truth of the statement just made. Scholasticism is richer than what we might think. We must know it. If we know it already, we must adapt it and bring it to bear on the needs of the day. Consider concretely the specific instances with which the new theologians seem preoccupied, viz., evolution and subjectivity. These two terms exercise the greatest appeal today. As we shall presently see in some detail, these two categories were not unknown to traditional philosophy and theology. Of course, one can hardly expect to find them identified by their modern names. But that is immaterial. What matters is that the concepts be utilized, as they were in fact utilized, under those or other equivalent terms.¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹In these matters, two equally defective extremes are to be avoided. One is represented by those who affirm that everything is to be found in scholasticism, without taking the trouble of verifying that it is, indeed, *up-to-date*. The other is represented by those who say that it is wanting in the things that are needed today, similarly without taking the trouble of studying it.

That the latter should be charged by those who are under no obligation to know it is no cause for surprise. But that the same charges should be made by those who ought

It might occasionally happen that the needed elements are not formally contained in the traditional teaching. But we all know that much more is contained in philosophy and theology than what is formally expressed or taught. Philosophical and theological principles possess an immense virtuality capable of being stretched, applied, explicated in new ways or explored up to the present, either because of unpropitious circumstances or because neither theologians nor philosophers were sufficiently interested in the undertaking. Can we say that the virtuality of the traditional teaching has been completely exhausted? By no means.

On the other hand, doctrinal situations could arise in which nothing contained, whether formally or virtually, in the traditional doctrine can be put to good use. We must, then, appeal to entirely new notions and to principles as yet unformulated. However, since traditional thinking contains much that is already *definitive*, no new notion, no new formulation can be accepted which is inconsistent with anything that is definitively established. Nothing new can be legitimate if it is inconsistent with immutable truth; it must be thrown out once the inconsistency is proven.¹⁵² unless we are ready to admit change in what is unchangeable and to plunge headlong into a transformistic doctrinal evolution.

Pius XII admonishes: "When new or free questions are brought up for discussion, let the minds be always enlightened by the principles of Catholic teaching; let vigilant care be expended in appraising novelties in theological matters; let there be a segregation of what is certain and firm from whatever is brought into philosophy and theology by an unstable and not always praiseworthy fashion."¹⁵³ What in the Catholic teaching is immutable, be it dogmatic or philosophic, must be respected, and no novelties admitted that place it in jeopardy. The pope insists: "What is immutable let no one disturb, let no one unsettle."¹⁵⁴

to know it, is, indeed, surprising. Before making such accusations, Catholic theologians should thoroughly examine whether the indictment is solidly grounded. Instances exist where people who have not been formed in the traditional philosophy and theology, have, on making their acquaintance, been struck with admiration at the wealth contained therein, and have been instrumental in making known to those of the household what they ought to have known in order to refrain from making such charges.

¹⁵²"Whatever the human mind, through a sincere search, manages to discover of the truth, cannot be opposed to truth already achieved. For God, the supreme truth, created the human intellect and governs it, not so that it may daily oppose new things to those that have already been rightly achieved, but so that, after removing such errors as might have slipped in, it may build up the truth with the same order and structure wherewith nature itself, from which the truth is drawn, is constituted." (*Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 572).

¹⁵³Address, Sept. 17, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 385.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, pgs. 384-385.

In our opinion, the so-called modern minds, modern philosophers and modern theologians who pontificate on the necessity of keeping an *open mind*, are themselves prime examples of *narrow-mindedness*. The notions and the framework employed by them in their thinking are severely restricted in terms of space and time: good, perhaps, for the here-and-now. Their philosophy, for instance, is the philosophy of today; and they criticize scholasticism for being *another philosophy*, the philosophy of yesterday. With such a circumscribed idea of philosophic knowledge, they find it difficult to rise to the level of thinking with general notions and frameworks and thus to appreciate *philosophy* which, as such, is not just for today but for always. They find it difficult to understand a perennial philosophy which is the philosophy for every day, and a perennial dogma which, likewise, is the dogma for every day.

People who are under no obligation to know the traditional philosophy and theology understandably dismiss them as *passé*. Often enough, on closer approach, these same people perk up at the discovery of unsuspected vistas in the traditional teaching, and find themselves in the odd situation of attempting to open up frontiers already well explored by the schoolmen. But that people who ought to be conversant with that teaching should be so unacquainted with it as to join the chorus of maligners who accuse it of stagnation and irrelevance — that, indeed, is amazing. They would do much better to employ their energies in getting to the bottom of what, in a more correct and orthodox sense, scholasticism formally teaches in terms more or less equivalent to those of modern philosophy, in unfolding the virtuality of the old notions and principles in those instances where a formal and explicit teaching is not had, or in incorporating into these permanent notions and principles the legitimate advances and situations of modern times.

This is to say that our philosophy and our theology have not reached the finish line nor have they exhausted their possibilities. But we will not draw nearer to the former nor will we exploit the latter by declaring them irrelevant, but by working at their development. It would be childish to maintain that the schoolmen, however extraordinary their genius, have said the last word. Ours is not simply to repeat what our teachers have said. A mere repetition of St. Thomas is not good enough. Our job is to amplify further what they have achieved. New discoveries are made about things, new aspects of the truths about things are uncovered: it is our task to broaden our principles and apply them to these new manifestations. If the virtuality of the principles does not extend thus far, ours is to find an explanation of the new facts and situations that is not inconsistent with our definitive positions. In one word, we have a twofold commitment: to develop our own heritage, and to integrate into it whatever things cannot be reached by what we already possess.

Elsewhere we mentioned the fact that modern theologians often cite St. Thomas's work on Aristotle to justify their own work with Hegel or Kierkegaard. But to state the problem in this way is to state it wrong. The point is not whether or not St. Thomas used Aristotle; the point is whether, in utilizing Aristotle, St. Thomas achieved a *definitive philosophy*. Obviously, not all of it is definitive, but some parts of it are. Modern philosophers may not be used in any way that is inconsistent with the definitive parts of traditional philosophy incorporated into speculative theology. It will be instructive to recall once more the words of Pius XII relative to the perpetual validity and the fruitfulness for the future of the common teaching of St. Thomas and all the schoolmen: "The question is whether what St. Thomas has constructed beyond and above any particular time, by combining and knitting together the elements contributed by students of Christian wisdom throughout the ages, is founded on solid rock, endowed with perpetual vigour and validity, remains even today an efficacious defense and bulwark of the deposit of Catholic faith, and can safely be employed to guide the new developments of theology and philosophy. The Church affirms that such is the case."¹⁵⁵ In the *Humani generis*, the pope concretely identifies the fundamental truths to be accepted as rationally firm and valid in the exposition and development of dogma: "That philosophy, recognized and accepted by the Church, defends the true and genuine value of human knowledge, the indisputable principles of metaphysics — viz., the principles of sufficient reason, causality and finality — and the attainment of certain and unchangeable truth."¹⁵⁶

There is no need to insist at length on the great value of Fr. Marín-Sola's book relative to these matters. Its main theme is precisely the *virtuality of the revealed principles*, a virtuality the evolution of which *in no way changes* the primitive meaning but only unfolds it, maintaining always the real identity of the subject and the truth, as well as the presupposition that the evolving teaching corresponds to an objective and divine reality."¹⁵⁷

In other words, *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* is a splendid exposition of the just quoted text from Pius XII on "the true and genuine value of human knowledge and the attainment of certain and unchangeable truth," combined with a legitimate doctrinal advance. The work bears two titles: *The Evolution of Dogma* and *The Homogeneity of Catholic Doctrine*. The latter gives us to understand that all throughout the author maintains the substantial and real immutability of Catholic doctrine;

¹⁵⁵ Address, Sept. 22, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 387.

¹⁵⁶ *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 572.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. ch. 2, no. 113.

the former stresses the fact that we are dealing with a *living* and *progressive* doctrinal homogeneity achieved through the unfolding of an authentic metaphysical or inclusive virtuality.

Furthermore, the whole evolutive process corresponds to an extra-subjective and immutable reality, into the possession of which the human mind comes by degrees. Thus, Fr. Marín explains in this work the theology of these three things: the objectivity of the object known by the theology; the immutability of that object and of the truth that manifests it; the homogeneous progress of the knowledge of that truth and of that object.

S. The Permanent and the Changeable

This section will be devoted to a further explanation of the solution we have given to the problem concerning the relationship between theology and the changing philosophical systems.

At the outset, we wish to make it clear that we shall be dealing only with the elements in philosophical systems that have *something to do* with the *revealed truth*. That is the only issue relevant to the present discussion. Those principles, notions, concepts that have to do with subjects unrelated to dogma might also possess a certain stability and be our present purposes. "Many things are, indeed, expounded in that philosophy [the traditional] which neither directly nor indirectly bear on matters of faith and morals, and which, therefore, the Church leaves to the free debate of the experts."¹⁵⁸

"But no such liberty prevails with respect to many other things, especially those which concern the principles and principal assertions we have mentioned."¹⁵⁹ To wit: "the true and genuine value of human knowledge, the incontrovertible metaphysical principles of sufficient reason, causality and finality, and the attainment of certain and unchangeable truth."¹⁶⁰ On the basis of such principles the existence of an absolutely true metaphysics can and must be asserted. Hence, Pius XII censures the new theologians in these terms: "It is wholly to be deplored that the philosophy which is accepted and recognized by the Church should be held in contempt by some people, and impudently called antiquated in its form and rationalistic in its thinking processes. In their view, our philosophy mistakenly defends the possibility of an absolutely true metaphysics."¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ *Humani generis*, 42 (1950), 572.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ *Enc. and loc cit.*, pg. 573.

We will, therefore, touch only on something which in both philosophy and theology possesses an immutable character; concretely, on the value of knowledge and the correspondence that must prevail between concepts and the known realities.

A. *Knowledge and the elements that make it up.* — Knowledge is something relative; its point of reference is the object known. The possible relationships between knowledge and the things known can be reduced to two: a relationship of cause to effect, or a relationship of effect to cause. Either things depend on the knowledge one has of them, as in the case of God, whose knowledge is productive of the things known by Him; or knowledge depends on the things known, as in the case of our knowledge which takes place inasmuch as we receive some active influence from the objects we know.

Our knowledge is not the cause of what is known by us, nor is the reality of the object known by us dependent on the knowledge we have of it. On the contrary, our knowledge is produced, among other causes, by the very object that is known. The object plays a very important role in our knowing; it is sometimes likened to formal causes since, by means of its vicarious species, the object *informs* the knowing intellect; at other times it is compared to the father, insofar as the latter is the *active* principle of generation. St. Thomas writes to the point: "Our intellect is true insofar as it conforms to its *principle*, that is, to the things from which it draws knowledge."¹⁶² "Now, that which is in the intellect . . . is in our ordinary language called the intellect's conception . . . But what the intellect grasps is formed in the intellect by the *intelligible object as agent* and by the intellect as patient."¹⁶³

We come to know things when the latter make their influence felt in our intellects through their own representations. Truth or falsehood consists in the intellectual representation of the objects. If it conforms to what things are in reality, then the knowledge is true; if it does not, it is false. Truth is subordinate to reality, since it consists in reflecting reality as it is. Thus, the criterion of truth is in things, not in us. Here we have a philosophical statement that constitutes a definitive and highly interesting achievement. Consequently, whenever notions and formulae do not correspond to what things are, these notions and formulae are not true.

The factors that enter into the constitution of our knowledge of things are many and varied. To name a few:

1. The relationship between the representation of the object and the object itself. For knowledge to take place, the object known and the know-

¹⁶² *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 16, a. 5 ad 2.

¹⁶³ *Compendium Theologiae*, c. 38.

ing subject must be in touch. But there is no immediate contact between the two. The contact is effected by means of a representation or vicarious species of the object. No true knowledge is possible if that representation or species does not correspond to the reality represented. This *objective* relationship of the vicarious species or *verbum mentis* is *constitutive* of the truth. Truth exists when the species we form corresponds to the object known; there is no truth when it does not correspond. Such is the meaning of the classical definition, "Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus" (Truth is the adequation of thing and intellect).

2. The relationship between the representation of the object and the subject that knows it (the object). We have just said that the role of the species is to establish contact between the object known and the knowing subject. Therefore, it must be related to the two terms joined by it, and, hence, proportionate to both. As we have just said, the proportion of the species to the object is *constitutive of the truth*; truth prevails only when the idea corresponds to the reality.

The adequation of the species to the subject — what may be called the *subjective* relationship of the species — is not constitutive, but *significative* of the truth. Its function is to manifest the truth, to make it intelligible to us.

3. The factor that puts the object known by us in contact with the outside. The truth known by us can be related to other men, or we can relate it to others. This requires communication, and the ordinary means of communication is language. In other words, it is possible to externalize the concepts we have in our minds, whether we do it for the benefit of others, or for our own benefit alone. That externalization is accomplished by means of *words* by the *verbum oris*.

This third factor is not constitutive of the truth either, but only *significative*. By its means we express externally to ourselves or to others the truth existing in our minds, viz., the concept we possess and which is correctly related to the object.

B. *The immutable element in knowledge.* — Are all these three factors immutable? In other words, for truth to remain unchanged, is it necessary that each and every one of the three elements indicated should remain unchanged? By no means. Only the first factor is constitutive of the truth. Therefore, it alone must remain unchanged, as long as the reality to which it corresponds remains unchanged. The other two factors are only *translations*, and there can be as many of these as may be required. The purpose of any translation is to make something intelligible to somebody; if one individual needs a translation different from that which is needed by another, there is no reason why a new one should not be made. Always on condition, obviously, that the truth is not adulterated in the translation,

that is, that the correspondence between the representation and the object represented remains unimpaired. With this safeguard, there can be any number of translations as good pedagogy may dictate.

From the fact that truth is constituted by the objective relationship, or by the correspondence between the *verbum mentis* and the object, it follows that the objective meaning of that *verbum* will remain always and eternally the same in the case of necessary and eternal objects, such as the essences of things, divine realities, or the content of revelation.

The objective representation can and must change in the case of contingent objects. What is contingent is subject to change. If the thing changes but its representation does not, truth vanishes. Truth consists in the adequation between the *verbum mentis* and the object; if the latter changes and the former remains unchanged, the adequation ceases. In such a case, the objective change in the concept is not an exception to the general rule of the immutability of concepts; rather it is a concrete application of the rule. The general rule states that the concept must not change so as to remain in correspondence to the thing. In the present case, the concept must change precisely in order to maintain its correspondence to the thing which has changed. Thus, the statement stands that the concept must always conform to the object it represents. This assertion is immutable.

However, the fact that the objective concepts of the necessary things mentioned earlier are unchangeable, is not to be taken to mean that such concepts are absolutely static and admit of no progress at all. There is such a thing as homogeneous progress. A simple reality can encompass within its simplicity a virtual multiplicity, as in the case of God. Inasmuch as it is a property of an essentially simple reality, that multiplicity cannot impair its simplicity. In like manner, a doctrinal principle or statement can contain a number of inclusive conclusions, as in the case of principles with metaphysical virtuality. In such cases evolution is possible, an authentic doctrinal evolution with no impairment of the immutability of the truth. It is an evolution of the same objective reality progressively manifesting its multiple virtual content by means of different concepts. Each of these concepts corresponds to the same objective reality, yes, but insofar as it discloses itself in its varied and multiple virtual aspects. Of such an homogeneous evolution we have spoken several times. It not only crops up repeatedly throughout the whole of *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*: it is the central theme of the book.

The conceptual development which we have characterized as homogeneous does not destroy the conformity that must exist between the concept and the reality, since the latter, although unchangeable because it is simple and eternal, is nonetheless virtually multiple. Each concept corre-

spends to one of these virtualities and these can be nothing less than homogeneous since they all belong to one and the same simple reality.

A case for an *objective* or transformistic evolution of the revealed truth might, perhaps, be built on the basis of the *analogy of truth*. Truth is analogous; knowledge of divine things is obtained by means of analogy; analogous forms exist in the analogates in *essentially* different ways.

Undoubtedly, modern theologians, in pursuit of a theology with the help of philosophies inconsistent with the traditional philosophy, appeal to the teaching on analogy or to the fact that analogous forms are predicated of the analogates in essentially different senses, to justify the possibility of *essentially different*, or even incompatible, theologies. Appeal is made to a true teaching for the solution of a false problem, with which that teaching has nothing to do. The fact of analogy is true, but the essential multiplicity of theology is false.

Truth is analogous and can have essentially different manifestations; as for instance, manifestations of one sort in creatures and manifestations of another sort in the Creator; or truth may disclose itself in one way in the case of substance, and in another way in the case of accidents. But all of that is immaterial to the point at issue. The point is whether a definitively attained truth, expressed in an objective concept if philosophic, or in a revealed formula if dogmatic, must *always retain the same meaning*; and whether other formulae or concepts, the implications of which are inconsistent with the former, can be admitted. The point is not whether one truth can be consistent with another different truth. Nobody doubts that; the point is not worth raising, let alone debating. The point is whether a truth already possessed, either one that is definitively achieved or one that is revealed, is subject to changes in tempo with our changing mental categories or philosophical systems. In the *Humani generis* the pope alluded to certain modern theologians in these terms: "They do not think it absurd, but altogether necessary, that theology should replace the old notions with new ones in accordance with the different philosophies which in the course of time serve it as instruments, in order that in these different, or even in a certain sense opposed, but nonetheless equivalent ways, so they say, the same divine truth may be humanly expressed."¹⁶⁴ Previously, he had said: "What is immutable let no one disturb, let no one unsettle. Many things are said, but without sufficient examination, about the *new theology* which, since it evolves in step with the evolving universe, is forever going and never arriving anywhere. If such a view were to be accepted, what would become of the immutability of Catholic dogmas? What would become of the unity and stability of the faith?"¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 566.
¹⁶⁵ Address, Sept. 17, 1946, AAS, 38 (1946), 385.

In a nutshell: the truth concerning necessary things can grow, but it cannot change unless following a change in the object itself; a clear impossibility since we are dealing with necessary objects. Neither can theological truth change unless a change takes place in the revelation in which it is contained, which, again, is impossible.

C. *What can be subject to change in knowledge.* — Two things should be clear by now: (1) what it is that is *not subject to change* in our knowledge of necessary truths, as is the case with revealed truths; (2) what is unchangeable can *grow*. We shall now consider *what can change*.

We have pointed out previously that the *verbum mentis* or mental representation of the object known is the subject of two relations: one is the relation to the object, a relation that is *constitutive* of the truth; the other is a relation to the subject, which is not constitutive but only *significative* or expressive of the truth. The former does not change; any change would imply an inconsistency in the truth itself. The latter can change.

Now, there are two kinds of expression. One is the internal expression effected by means of the *subjective* aspects of the concept, idea, notion, or category. The other is the external expression which comes about by means of words or the *verbum oris*. There is no objection to admitting the changeability of both these expressions even with reference to one and the same truth and to one and the same reality. Such a change in expressions does not necessarily entail a change in either the truth or the reality. It can even be advisable so as to make it easier to grasp the truth or to understand the reality. Only one condition is indispensable, viz., that there be no betrayal of that which is expressed. With this proviso, expressions may take a hundred forms.

Men of the same civilization and culture differ indefinitely in their mental capacity. No harm, then, is done but rather much good by expressing dogmatic and theological truth suitably to each one's capacity, provided that it is done conformably to the reality and the truth. Thus, we find scientific, catechetical and intermediary expositions of the Catholic faith. On the other hand, men of identical mental capacity may differ in terms of culture and mentality. Since the truths about God are meant for all, dogmatic and theological truth may be expressed in ways suitable to these various mentalities, always on condition that the various expressions remain faithful to the reality and the truth.

All this is elementary and undeniable by anyone with two bits of common sense. The pope himself advises that such adaptations be made either *internally* with the aid of notions whereby the truth is rendered more intelligible to the one receiving it, or *externally* by means of more accessible terms or words. "Even in the essential questions it is possible to

clothe philosophy with richer and more becoming garments, to reinforce it with more efficacious expressions, to set it free from certain less suitable academic aids, cautiously to enrich it with certain elements of progressive human thought."¹⁶⁶ "It should be obvious to all that the words used in the schools, and even by the Church's Magisterium to express those notions are capable of further refinement and polish."¹⁶⁷ "In addressing, whether by speech or writing, the men of their own times they ought to employ the kind of language that will make the message intelligible and well received. It follows that in the manner of presenting and stating the problems, in the way of developing the arguments, and also in the choice of a literary genre a wise accommodation should be made to the genius and bent of the times."¹⁶⁸ "Where the need occurs, there should be no objection, as shown by experience and practice, to translating into clear modern language and explaining by means of circumlocutions, for the benefit of laymen, certain so-called technical formulae, for the sake of the obscure to the uninitiated."¹⁶⁹

Nonetheless, this task must be carried out with prudence. Two things are always to be kept in mind. First, the conformity of the notions and of the expressive and significant terms to the objective reality must never be broken. If it were, the truth would not be made intelligible, the truth would not be expressed but destroyed.

Secondly, there are, so to speak, certain hallowed formulae, in the philosophic as well as theological and dogmatic orders. To change them would be presumptuous, even if it could be done with no impairment of the truth. Dogmatic formulae, including those expressed with philosophical notions and terms, must be respected. They could be replaced by other equivalent formulations, but insofar as they are hallowed by use and tradition, they are to be respected.

In the *Humani generis*, Pius XII spoke of the possibility of changes in the expression of the truth. Nonetheless, he pointed out that "the body of doctrine elaborated with common accord by Catholic teachers in the course of centuries, in order to obtain some understanding of the dogmas, is certainly not grounded on such frail foundations. . . . Hence, it is not surprising to find some of these notions not only employed but also sanctioned by the Ecumenical Councils, so that it is not lawful to deviate from them. Hence, to disregard, or reject, or devalue so many and so important teachings conceived, formulated and furnished by the multi-

¹⁶⁶ *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 572.

¹⁶⁷ *Enc. and Loc. cit.*, pg. 566.

¹⁶⁸ Address, Sept. 17, 1946; AAS, 38 (1946), 384.

¹⁶⁹ Address, Sept. 22, 196; AAS, 38 (1946), 388.

secular endeavour of men of uncommon intelligence and holiness, working to achieve an ever more accurate expression of the truths of faith, under the illumination and guidance of the Holy Spirit and of the Church's vigilant Magisterium, in order to make room for a new philosophy, whose conjectural notions and fluctuating and vague expressions are, like flowers of the field, in bloom today and withered tomorrow, is not only the height of imprudence, but transforms dogma into a reed buffeted by the winds."¹⁷⁰

Consequently, the scientific or philosophical or theological expression of the truth should not be subject to change; its common or ordinary expression, yes. "Truth does not change with time. Not all philosophical statements of truth change either; particularly those having to do with principles self-evident to the human mind, or having to do with such judgments as are based on the wisdom of the ages, or such as are in agreement with or guaranteed by divine revelation."¹⁷¹

D. "Evolution" and "Subjectivity" traditional categories. — We have frequently alluded to the claim made by some modern theologians to the effect that scholasticism is unaware of these two categories so immensely appealing to the modern mentality. Others borrow them from the contemporary philosophies of evolutionism, existentialism, immanentism, etc. In these philosophies the two categories are given totally unacceptable meanings. When later on they are brought into theology, the latter is transformed into a falsely evolutionist and falsely vitalist science.¹⁷²

As a matter of fact, scholasticism was cognizant of these two categories under other equivalent terms, gave them a sound meaning and made correct use of them in theology. The result was a healthily progressive and a healthily vital theology.

Some words possess a high power of suggestion both for the masses and for the elite. Philosophers and theologians are not immune to the suggestive power of such small things as words. Evolution, history, vitality are very fortunate terms, in the sense of being able to express with greater vigour a truth already known, in fact, an elementary truth, a truth of which scholasticism was already in peaceful possession, although expressed by it in words of weaker suggestive power. In such cases, the censure of one who is in possession of the doctrine as if he were ignorant of it, simply because he does not express it in contemporary terms, is uncalled-for. What ought to and needs to be done is to retrieve those terms and clothe with their suggestive power the truth already possessed. There is, besides, the added

¹⁷⁰ *Humani generis*, AAS, 42 (1950), 566-567.

¹⁷¹ *Enc. and loc. cit.*, pg. 572.

¹⁷² Cf. *Humani generis* passim.

bonus of giving an acceptable meaning to immensely appealing words that, as utilized by philosophies staking exclusive claim to them, are totally unacceptable.

Vitalism, evolution, as expressive of a philosophy at odds with the objectivity of truth and with the existence of something permanent which provides content to what evolves, are inadmissible. They have to be rehabilitated, and their rehabilitation is all the more urgent because there are traditional teachings capable of measuring up to their great suggestive power, but which up to now have been expressed in equivalent but clearly less powerful words. Fr. Marin-Sola rehabilitated one such word, evolution, and wrote it into the title of his book.

Traditional thought possesses the genuine content of the categories indicated by the terms *evolution*, *progress*, *historicity*, etc. By teaching that things are *perfectible* and that everything in this universe, with the sole exception of God, is composed of *potency and act*, traditional thought, by the same token, fully accepts an *evolving, progressive, historicist* view of things.

Indeed, St. Thomas left us splendid articles on the perfectibility of things and on the perfectibility of our teaching and of our knowledge of things, as well as, to speak concretely of the supernatural order, on the growth of grace,¹⁷³ and of charity,¹⁷⁴ and of the dogmas: 175 in other words, on the growth of the divine life and teaching.

On the contribution of time to the advancement of knowledge, the Angelic Doctor has written very meaningful texts: "It appears to be natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in the speculative sciences we find that the first philosophers left behind something imperfect, which was then improved upon by those who came afterwards."¹⁷⁶ "Time seems to be, as it were, the discoverer and a good cooperater of those factors that help to circumscribe or set something off; not because time per se effects something to that purpose, but on account of the things that are done in time."¹⁷⁷ Scholasticism, it is said, is ignorant of history, or takes little account of it. That might have been true; it might still be true. Melchor Cano rightly complained of the fact that the schoolmen hardly ever mustered any arguments *from history*.¹⁷⁸ But it is one thing to be ignorant of the historical facts, and quite another

¹⁷³ *Summa Theologica*, 1-2, q. 114, a. 8.

¹⁷⁴ *Op. cit.*, 2-2, q. 24, aa. 4-10.

¹⁷⁵ *Op. cit.*, 2-2, q. 1, a. 7.

¹⁷⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1-2, q. 97, a. 1.

¹⁷⁷ *In I Ethic.*, lect. 2, no. 133, ed. Piotta.

¹⁷⁸ *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. 12, ch. 3.

thing to be ignorant of the category of *historicity* or of the bearing that time has on the development of human thought, which is one of the charges levelled against scholasticism by some modern theologians.

The truth of the matter is that in scholastic thinking evolution and growth are not always heterogeneous; rather, evolution and growth in knowledge are not to be achieved by means of absolute changes in the concepts, if previously no changes equally absolute have occurred in the realities themselves. Otherwise, either the first or the second concept would not correctly represent the reality, and there would be, not growth, but the ruin of knowledge. Furthermore, in the case of necessary objects, our knowledge of them can grow only homogeneously, as already explained earlier.

Scholasticism, then, was well acquainted with the content of *evolution* as a mental category. It could, as in fact it did, apply that category to its own teaching as a whole, to the extent that a work, as fundamental as the present one, can rightly be entitled *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*.

Scholasticism is also accused of ignorance of the categories of *subjectivity*, *immanence*, and *vitality* as applicable to the truth. There is no substance to these charges. Scholasticism is perfectly aware of these categories. What happens is that they are expressed in other terms and are not given an absolutely subjective sense. In other words, scholasticism recognizes the subjectivity and vitality of the truth, but always dependent on the *objective reality to which they correspond*.

It would be dangerous to construct a philosophy and a theology based primarily and principally on the category *subject*, and relegating the category *object* to secondary importance. Traditional philosophy and theology link truth to life; they are conscious of the vitalism of truth. But the primacy of the *objectivity* of truth is always maintained because they understand that truth consists precisely in the conformity of the concept to the reality. Scholasticism begins by recognizing the value that is the object of our knowledge. To know is to grasp the real — the object — wherever it happens to be: within us or without. Knowledge depends on things. As long as this is accepted and safeguarded, there is no harm in introducing objective reality into the subject to vitalize it. The supernatural order consists exactly in the introduction of the object — grace — into the subject — man. On the other hand, the *formes peccati* consists in the ruin of the harmony that ought to prevail among the various parts and powers of which the subject man, is made up, a ruin resulting from sin. There is no need to appeal to a Kierkegaardian *angst* to explain original sin and the actual imbalance found in man. One needs only to peruse

the pertinent Questions written by St. Thomas in the Summa Theologica, to appreciate sufficiently enough the tragedy into which mankind was plunged as a consequence of the First Fall — the subjective disharmony and sense of angst explained by an objective cause, and not by a merely existential or contingent criterion.

There is room in scholasticism for both *subjectivism* and *vitalism*. But the schoolmen refuse to accept the dependence of reality on the subject; truth depends on and obeys objective laws, laws that also demand our acquiescence. Once the objectivity of truth is admitted, no harm is done by admitting whatsoever influences it may have on the subject. Truth manifests its vitality in many ways. Here are three of particular interest:

1. Truth is the *cause of intellectual life*. It is not life that causes truth, but truth that causes life. Life is movement, and intellectual life is intellectual movement. Now then, objective truth provides the mind with an authentic knowledge of reality; it is the source of intellectual life. Objective truth, proposed to the mind as its object, is the food on which the mind feeds, a source of life for it.

2. Truth is the *indirect cause of the moral and of the affective life*. Truth is the intellect's object and food. Thus, truth immediately vitalizes the intellect. But the intellect influences the other powers and manifestations of life, as their guide and norm-giver. It follows that, through the intellect, truth extends its influence to a man's spiritual life in its moral and affective dimensions.

3. Truth can be a *direct cause of the moral and affective life*. Such is the case where truth is attained by way of conaturality or experience. In the natural order truth is so attained by means of the natural habits; in the supernatural order, by means of the infused virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit. In these instances the contact between the habits and the object known is immediate, without any mediation by the intellect.

It is, thus, imperative to recognize the existence of a *live theology*: a theology containing the divine truth, which is the life of the intellect that knows it, the norm for man's other powers, and food for the infused habits. In the present work, Fr. Marín-Sola devotes two whole sections — the 5th and the 6th of chapter 4 — to a magnificent exposition of the vitalism of the science of God. But he points out that such vitalism is not to be understood in the sense that life creates the truth, but in the sense that truth creates life. For it is beyond dispute that theological truth is not created by us, it is dictated by God.

6. Bibliography on the "New Theology"

In the preceding pages we have done our best to make clear the orientations adopted by what is commonly referred to as the *new theology*, despite the disclaimers to the name by its practitioners. As a matter of fact, the name matters but little; what really matters is its content. Whether or not it deserves to be called *new*, it is certain that the orientations described above are to be found in some modern writings, and even more in unwritten manifestations.

We have refrained deliberately from mentioning any book or writer by name. For there hardly is anything as disagreeable as fingering for censure persons who might be perfectly honourable and capable of proffering an unexceptionable explanation for their writings. Therefore, we have not considered either persons or writings, but *what has been written*, that is, what has been written in the *Humani generis* and in the allocutions of Pope Pius XII in 1946. These documents from the Holy See contain express and formal references to certain theological orientations. The latter alone have been the object of our preceding observations: the orientations, not the persons of their authors.

These tendencies have not come about through spontaneous generation. Their headwaters are to be found much farther up. To make their origins clear a complete bibliography would be needed. Fortunately, such a bibliography exists. In Spain, two have been published not too long ago: one by Dr. Avelino Esteban, 180 another by Fr. Bartolome Xiberta, O.C.¹⁸¹

We will limit ourselves to listing here the works that deal specifically with the subject we have discussing in this *Introduction*, works that have been published in more recent years, thus completing with some new entries the two bibliographies already mentioned.¹⁸²

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¹⁸⁰ *Revista Española de Teología*, 9 (1946), 531-546.

¹⁸¹ *Introducción in Sacram Theologiam*, (Madrid, 1950), pgs. 35-58.

¹⁸² This bibliography was written in November, 1950, some three months after the publication of the Encyclical *Humani generis*. Today, the bibliography on the subject has grown considerably on account of the commentaries to the said encyclical that have been published in most of the theological journals in Spain, Italy, France, Switzerland, Germany, the United States, and Argentina.

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VATICAN II AND THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA

There are words, formulae, statements that seem to have the power instantly to catch the public fancy and to command widespread acceptance. They are widely and frequently bandied about — for good, for evil; meaningfully, meaninglessly; to some purpose or to no purpose at all. They become commonplace equally at the service of the thoughtful and of the empty-headed; fashionable utterances used left and right for almost everything — which, plainly, is a form of abuse. They persist until they are elbowed out by other terms and formulae fated to undergo the same vicissitudes.

The modern history of theology exhibits a phenomenon of that sort. Such is the case with the terms *evolution*, *relativism*, *aggiornamento*. To define the correct sense of evolution as applied to theology, Fr. Marín's work first appeared in the early years of this century. In the fifties, it was re-edited for the second time in Spanish to provide a counterbalance to relativism. The present English edition will serve to explain, in the light of the most often quoted conciliar guidelines or watchwords and of the work that is being presented anew to the public, the sense that *aggiornamento* ought to have in theology, if theology is to be what it is meant to be.

Evolution is a valid term applicable to many things and on many levels. Matter evolves; so does life biologically, culturally, intellectually, and emotionally. Evolution also occurs in the religious life, in the revealed doctrine, in Catholic dogma. At the turn of the century, modernism proclaimed that dogmatic evolution was the outcome of the subjective situations of the religious person. That entailed the denial of the divine origin of revelation and of the stability of revealed teachings, which were left at the mercy of the variously succeeding situations in the course of men's lives. Fr. Marín set out to meet the challenge of modernism with his monumental work, *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*. Its appearance was due to the circumstances of the times, to the modernistic error then in vogue. But the plain truth is that it goes over and beyond the circumstances in which it was written. It is a classic, as classic as the *Communitorium* of St. Vincent de Lérins, as St. Thomas's treatise *De Fide*, as Melchor Cano's *De Locis Theologicis*.

Precisely because of its classic and fundamental character, the work has been of great help at another turn of theology about the middle of this century. Between the 40's and the 50's, another term began to catch the public mind: the *relativism* of truth became very much the fashion of the day. Grabbed by the so-called *New Theology* and applied by it to the revealed truths, it jeopardized the permanent value of the same. This prompted the second Spanish edition, prefaced by an introduction showing the value of Fr. Marín's teaching to counteract the new and dangerous theological orientation.

In this postconciliar era, the new magic word is *aggiornamento*: the updating of the Church, of her institutions, her practices, her doctrine. The updating of doctrine is liable to a great many risks, as well as to many fruitful achievements. In this part of our Introduction, we shall consider this contemporary problem: we will echo the Council's guidelines, strive to show how they could be properly employed, and how Fr. Marin-Sola deals with them in this book.

Vatican II intended to update the Church and her institutions, including the most sacred, as for instance, the liturgy,¹⁸³ pastoral care,¹⁸⁴ and in the Conciliar documents, to wit:

1. The return to the sources.
2. The search for formulae more intelligible to modern men.
3. The focus on the pastoral dimensions of the doctrine.
4. The attention to the signs of the times.

These policies have met with widespread approval. They have even been turned into slogans that synthesize the spirit of Vatican II. Their correct use will undoubtedly pave the way to great attainments; whereas incorrectly handled, they will lead to dangerous situations, not to say real errors. Only five years after Vatican II, Pope Paul VI was driven to complain of a series of deviations festering under the mantle of an ill-understood, and an even more incorrectly practiced, updating. "A great number of the faithful feel themselves unsettled in their faith by the accumulation of ambiguities, uncertainties, doubts in matters that are essential, as for instance, the dogmas concerning the Most Holy Trinity, Christ our Lord, the eucharistic mystery and the real presence, the Church as an institution of salvation, the priestly ministry in the midst of the People of God, the value of prayer and of the sacraments, the moral exigencies regarding the indissolubility of marriage and the respect for human life."¹⁸⁶

In these postconciliar years, the Magisterium has frequently intervened to head off certain deviations and, in some cases, real errors in the faith. We might mention particularly: two encyclicals by Pope Paul VI, viz., the *Mysterium Fidei* (Sept. 3, 1965) on the Holy Eucharist, and *Humanae Vitae* (July 25, 1978) on human birth; the *Credo of the People of God* (June 30, 1968); and three forceful declarations from the Congregation on the Doctrine of Faith, viz., "On some errors about the mysteries of the Incarnation and the

¹⁸³Cf. *Sacrosanctum Concilium*, no. 47.

¹⁸⁴Cf. *Optatum totius*, no. 22.

¹⁸⁵*Ibid.*, no. 17.

¹⁸⁶Cf. *Quinque iam annis*, AAS, 63 (1971), 99.

Most Blessed Trinity" (Feb. 21, 1972), "On some errors about the Church" (June 24, 1973), and "On procured abortion." (Nov. 18, 1974).

If we are to avoid incurring errors in the faith, it is imperative that these policies or guidelines be given the true interpretation and substance that the Council and the two aforementioned popes meant them to have. This is what we shall attempt in the following pages, pointing out at the same time the recognition and interpretation given to them fifty years earlier by Fr. Marin in the present work.

1. The Return to the Sources

The understanding of what is meant by the return to the sources is given in detail by the Council itself in passages we shall presently quote from the dogmatic Constitutions *Verbum Dei* and *Lumen Gentium*. Then we shall see what *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* has to say on the subject.

A. Sources are of two kinds. The first comprises the constitutive or original sources, that is, Tradition and Scripture; the second, the explanatory sources, viz., the Magisterium whether solemn or ordinary.

With regard to the first kind of sources, the Council teaches that "Christ the Lord . . . commanded the apostles to preach the Gospel . . . This Gospel was to be the source of all saving truth and moral discipline. This was faithfully done: it was done by the apostles who handed on, by the spoken word of their preaching, by the example they gave, by the institutions they established, what they themselves had received — whether from the lips of Christ, from his way of life and his works, or whether they had learned it at the prompting of the Holy Spirit; it was done by those apostles and other men associated with the apostles who, under the inspiration of the same Holy Spirit, committed the message of salvation to writing. In order that the full and living Gospel might always be preserved in the Church the apostles left and living Gospel might always be preserved in the Church the apostles left bishops as their successors. They gave them 'their own position of teaching authority.' This sacred *Tradition*, then, and the *Sacred Scripture* of both Testaments, are like a mirror, in which the Church, during the pilgrim journey here on earth, contemplates God, from whom she receives everything, until such time as she is brought to see Him face to face as He really is."¹⁸⁷

This source, viz., the divine-apostolic tradition and the writings left us by the apostles and some of their contemporaries (the evangelists) was committed to the primitive Church. It constitutes the deposit of the revealed doctrine. However, there is another kind of source, an *explanatory* one. The revealed doctrine is extremely rich in content and needs to be explained and developed. Explanation and development — these are the proper tasks of the

¹⁸⁷*Verbum Dei*, no. 7.

Magisterium, whether ordinary or solemn. "The Tradition that comes from the apostles makes progress in the Church, with the help of the Holy Spirit. There is a growth in *insight* into the realities and words that are passed on . . . This comes about in various ways. It comes through the contemplation and study of believers who ponder these things in their hearts. It comes from the intimate sense of spiritual realities which they experience. And it comes from the preaching of those who have received, along with their right of succession in the episcopate, the sure charism of truth."¹⁸⁸ This growth of doctrine achieved by an ever greater understanding of it as proclaimed by the bishops in common or by the Roman Pontiff, can attain the guarantee of infallibility thanks to the assistance of the Holy Spirit.¹⁸⁹

The Constitution *Verbum Dei* itself indicates two ways of achieving the growth of truth through a greater understanding of it. One is the way of study or research; the other, the way of *vital experience of the revealed mysteries* and truths. Mention of these two ways can be found in the text just quoted.

To sum up: in order to know the revealed truth, a return to three sources is necessary: two are constitutive sources, Scripture and divine apostolic Tradition; the third is explanatory, the definitive Magisterium of the Church. "It is clear, therefore, that, in the supremely wise arrangement of God, sacred Tradition, sacred Scripture and the Magisterium of the Church are so connected and associated that one of them cannot stand without the others. Working together, each in its own way under the action of the one Holy Spirit, they all contribute effectively to the salvation of souls."¹⁹⁰

The growth in the understanding of the revealed truth is at times sanctioned by a dogmatic definition. The definition is not achieved without the assistance of the Holy Spirit which makes it infallible. In such a case, the defined truth is to be regarded as a revealed truth. It has the guarantee of the Holy Spirit. His assistance amounts to an assurance that the defined teaching is included in the revelation made to the apostles. "But the task of giving an authentic interpretation of the Word of God, whether in its written form or in the form of Tradition, has been entrusted to the living teaching office of the Church alone . . . At the divine command and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it listens to this (the Word of God) devotedly, guards it with dedication and expounds it faithfully. All that it proposes for belief as being divinely revealed is drawn from this single deposit of faith."¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*, no. 8.

¹⁸⁹Cf. *Lumen Gentium*, no. 25.

¹⁹⁰*Verbum Dei*, no. 10.

¹⁹¹*Ibid.*, no. 10.

Clearly, then, returning to the sources means a return to the Scriptures and Tradition when it is a question of investigating the meaning of the constitutive sources, and a return to the meaning of the definitions when it is a question of investigating the meaning of the magisterial sources.

B. The *Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma* reads like a commentary to the Council's teaching on the sources, written almost half-a-century before Vatican II and its Constitutions. A perusal of the book will bear out this assertion. Here we shall quote only some highly significant passages.

On the return to the constitutive sources: "The primitive Church received from the Apostles the whole deposit of Sacred Scripture and Divine Tradition, with no further expectancy or possibility of new revelation. . . . The apostolic formulae, notwithstanding their divine and revealed origin, are couched in purely human language, and human formulae never succeed in expressing all the virtuality and meaning implicitly contained in them; much less when it is a case of expressing by their means sublime and fecund divine realities. Such formulae are like seeds bursting with life . . . that await only a favourable environment to unfold into branches, flowers and fruits the same virtuality and vitality already contained truly in them. Consequently, the true starting point of dogmatic progress is the apostolic formulae as they issued from the lips or the pen of the Apostles."¹⁹²

On the return to the magisterial sources: "The primitive Church was in possession of two things: (1) a determinate number of revealed articles; (2) a determinate degree of divine explication of those same articles. Future Christian generations have been, are, and will be, till the end of time, in possession of something new, that is, of a third element acquired by them on account of the Church's dogmatic authority. They, or we, are in possession, not of two, but of three things: (1) the very same revealed articles; (2) the very same explication of these articles given by the Apostles. All these the Church has conserved, and will conserve, unchanged and unchangeable. It is to these two things that the first function corresponds, which is to conserve the deposit. But we have, besides, a third thing, viz., a new explication, which neither is in any way inconsistent with the previously given, nor comes from without, but is drawn out or deduced from within, and increases or unfolds the explication given by the Apostles without changing it . . .

"Of this dogmatic progress or development, human reason, in all its various endeavours: theological, exegetical, critical, historical, etc., etc., is only the human and fallible instrument; likewise, the Church, in her ordinary or solemn magisterium, is nothing more than an instrument, but a divinely

¹⁹²*The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, ch. 2, no. 58.

assisted and infallible instrument; and the Holy Spirit, Who perpetually assists and guides the Church in her twin progressive functions of conserving and explicating the revealed truth, is the author or principal cause."¹⁹³

The Constitution *Verbum Dei* mentions two ways of achieving the growth or greater understanding of the revealed truths: the study of the revealed mysteries, and the vital experience of them. Fr. Marín-Sola's work is devoted almost entirely to explaining the way of study, but two sections of the work — section 5 and 6 of chapter 4 — are devoted to explaining the affective way, or the way of connaturality or of vital contact with the divine mysteries.

2. The Search for Formulae More Intelligible to Modern Men

The late Pope John XXIII enunciated this guideline in his opening address to the Council. Textually reproduced subsequently in some Conciliar documents,¹⁹⁴ it has been frequently invoked with the most varied results, ranging from an authentic clarification of the truth to the adulteration of the same.

A. In that inaugural address Pope John XXIII said: "From the renewed, serene, and tranquil adherence to all the teaching of the Church in its entirety, transmitted with the precision of terms and concepts that constitutes the peculiar glory of the Tridentine and First Vatican Councils, the Christian, Catholic and Apostolic spirit expects of everyone a step forward . . . by the study of the same (teaching), putting it in conformity with the methods of investigation and the literary expression required by the methods prevailing today. One thing is the deposit itself of the faith, to wit, the truths of our venerated doctrine, and another thing is the manner in which it is expressed."¹⁹⁵

This appeal by Pope John XXIII to new literary forms which should, however, express the same teaching in its entirety, has been invoked — and is still occasionally invoked — as a warrant either to set aside, as archaic and no longer useful, formulae that are precise both in expression and in content, or to put into circulation other formulae that deform the authentic content of dogmatic truth, or even to accept as good tender expressions that altogether change the revealed or defined truth. The pope's language, however, is clear and authorizes nothing but new literary expressions of the same content. An attempt has been made to present those words of John XXIII as corrective of

¹⁹³ *Op. cit.*, ch. 3, no. 172.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. *Unitatis redintegratio*, no. 11.

¹⁹⁵ AAS, 54 (1962), 792.

others of Pius XII in *Humani generis*. There is nothing of the sort. Paul VI was undoubtedly Pope John's best interpreter, and Pope Paul repeats, in his encyclical *Mysterium Fidei* on the Holy Eucharist, teachings identical to those of Pius XII.

Thus, the opening address to the Council must be situated between the teachings of John's predecessor and the teachings of his successor. In the *Humani generis*, Pius XII wrote as follows: "(The dogmatic formulae commonly employed in the Church) are grounded on principles and notions derived from a true knowledge of created things. In deriving such knowledge, divinely revealed truth shone like a star, through the Church, upon the human mind . . . Hence to disregard or reject or make of no value so many and so important teachings conceived, formulated, and furnished by the multiseccular endeavours of men of uncommon intelligence and holiness, engaged in achieving an ever more accurate expression of the truths of faith under the illumination and guidance of the Holy Spirit and the Church's watchful Magisterium, in order to make room for the conjectural notions and the fluctuating and vague expressions of a new philosophy which, like flowers of the field, are in bloom today and withered tomorrow, is not only the height of imprudence, but transforms dogma into a reed buffeted by the winds."¹⁹⁶

For his part, Paul VI, alluding to the new formulae put forward to explain Our Lord's presence in the Holy Eucharist, reasserted the same teaching in his encyclical *Mysterium fidei*, in these terms: "The norm of language established by the Church in the course of prolonged endeavours through the centuries . . . must be scrupulously observed, and no one should presume to change it at his own discretion or under pretext of new knowledge. Could any one ever tolerate that the dogmatic formulae employed by the ecumenical councils to express the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Incarnation should be judged inadequate for the men of our times and injudiciously replaced by new ones? Similarly, no private person is to be allowed to attempt at his discretion against the formulae by means of which the Tridentine has proposed the belief in the Eucharistic Mystery. These formulae, as well as all the others used by the Church in proposing for belief the dogmas of faith express concepts that are not bound either to a certain form of culture, or to a certain stage of scientific progress, or to this or that theological school, but rather disclose what the human mind perceives of reality as contained in universal and necessary experience. They further express these concepts in adequate and determinate terms taken either from ordinary or from cultured speech. Hence, such formulae are suitable to men of all times and places."¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ AAS, 42 (1950), 566-567.

¹⁹⁷ AAS, 57 (1965), 758.

B. Section 2 of chapter 1 is devoted in its entirety to examining the change of the formulae that express the revealed truth. The formulae that serve as the starting point for the changes that are to take place are, in the first place, the revealed formulae handed on to the primitive Church and, therefore, contained in the Scriptures and in the divine-apostolic Tradition; and, in the second place, the formulae that have been defined by the Magisterium. Now, what are the changes that can be made in them? Three alternatives are possible. Two are valid, one is not. Fr. Marín-Sola examines all three.

The revealed formulae handed on to the primitive Church and the formulae already defined can be changed for others that express with different words the *same real content* and the *same degree of explicitation*. In this case there is only a nominal distinction between the first formula and the second. This is the sort of change to which Pope John XXIII alluded since he was only concerned with the *literary expression*. This kind of change is very useful especially for purposes of catechetical instruction. It is also very helpful in the case of superficial theological studies in which no deep penetration of the teaching is sought nor an explicitation of the content of revelation.

Revealed and dogmatically defined formulae can also be changed for others which under different terms express the *same reality together with a greater degree of explicitation* of that same reality. In this case, the change of formula entails an advance in the *comprehension* of the revealed or defined datum. There is a change in the words, but no change of reality, only a greater penetration of it. This is the sort of change defended and advocated by Fr. Marín-Sola throughout the present work, the change entailed in the growth or homogeneous evolution of dogma. This sort of change is helpful in the case of profound theological investigations.

But no revealed formula and no dogmatic formula can be changed for new literary expressions that entail a *change of the reality* contained in either the revealed or the dogmatic formula. The deposit of revelation was closed with the death of the last apostle. Since then no other doctrinal growth is possible except that which is intensive or homogeneous. To assert that a truth is revealed by God, when in fact it is *neither expressed in nor drawn out of* the initial formulae, is to play a game of equivocation and to lead the faithful into error.¹⁹⁸

3. The Focus on the Pastoral Dimension of the Teaching

In his opening address to the Council, the Holy Father stressed the pastoral dimension of the revealed teaching. Fr. Marín-Sola's book can also be helpful in this regard.

¹⁹⁸Cf. *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, ch. 1, nos. 31-34.

A. Alluding to the task to be undertaken by the Council, the Pope expressed himself in the following terms: "One thing is the deposit of faith, that is, the truths contained in our venerated teaching, and another thing is the manner in which it is expressed. And this must be taken into consideration, with patience if necessary, everything being measured according to the norms and exigencies of a Magisterium which is predominantly pastoral in character."¹⁹⁹ Thus, two Constitutions were devoted to the Council's central theme, viz., the Church herself: one *dogmatic* or *doctrinal* (*Lumen Gentium*), the other *pastoral* (*Gaudium et Spes*). The General Secretariat recalled this same pastoral character in two responses: one to General Assembly 123 of November 16, 1964, the other to General Assembly 171 of November 15, 1965. The Council Fathers had inquired about the theological qualification to be given to the two doctrinal Constitutions. The General Secretariat replied: "Taking into account the conciliar praxis and the *pastoral purpose* of the present Council . . ."

The term *pastoral* can mean several things. Very often it is taken to mean the technical organization of the work of evangelization. Thus, the pastoral council in diocesan curias, common pastoral undertaking, etc. It is also taken to mean the *pasture* or healthy nourishment which the teaching is supposed to provide. In this sense, stress is laid on the vitalizing function of the doctrine. As a matter of fact, every true teaching is pastoral, that is, it nourishes and vitalizes that noble part of man which is his mind, since the mind feeds precisely on truth. And all theological truth is *pastoral, pasture* or food not only for the mind but likewise for the will. It supernaturally vitalizes the *whole man*.

Theological truth is able to do that because its foundation and starting point is faith, a virtue residing in the *practical* intellect, that is to say, in the intellect that is not moved by the light which it perceives in the truth, but by an impulsion from the will leading it to assent to what it does not see. Faith is a virtue that implies both the rectification of the intellect and the rectification of the will. "That to which the intellect gives its assent (viz., the truth) does not move the intellect to assent on account of the light it (the truth) possesses. The intellect is rather moved by the will's inclination. Hence, it follows that the good, which is the will's object, intervenes as a first mover in the act of faith."²⁰⁰ Theological truth is nothing but the development of the truth of faith; hence, a development of the object of a virtue that vitalizes the whole man. A theology, then, that remains in the stage of speculation and fails supernaturally to vitalize the theologian is a theology that stops short in

¹⁹⁹AAS, 54 (1962), 792.
²⁰⁰QQ, *Disputatae De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 2 ad 13.

the course of its normal functioning — an unfinished theology. And this happens when it fails to become a divine pasture for the theologian or for the believer: when it is not pastoral.

B. Quoting a passage from the Constitution *Verbum Dei*, we pointed out that the channels whereby an understanding of the revealed mysteries is attained are two, viz., study and living contact with the divine reality. Study is the channel whereby the truth is possessed as truth. Vital supernatural contact is the channel whereby the truth is attained as divine. The latter, obviously, is the channel that is best characterized as pastoral. To its study Fr. Marín-Sola devotes two entire sections in his book, sections 5 and 6 of chapter 4. They constitute the best commentary to number 12 of the Constitution *Lumen Gentium*, antedating it by almost fifty years. The reader will be well-advised to read in their entirety those two sections from which we excerpt the following significant passages:

"It is said that he who possesses a virtuous habit or natural disposition, possesses a *new sense*. Thus we commonly speak of a sense of art, a sense of modesty, a sense of humour, a sense or feeling of anything in any order whatsoever. Just as with our external senses we perceive the external objects through immediate contact, without any comparison or reasoning, through simple and genuine intuition, so he who possesses, e.g., the habit of chastity, spontaneously and intuitively perceives the purity or impurity of an action or of a doctrine related to such matters more speedily and keenly, and at times with even greater certainty than can be achieved with all the skills of reasoning by the theoretical moralist, if he is not chaste himself. Much of the same happens in art, education, religion, in all orders of life

"What happens in the natural order, happens even more truly in the supernatural order. . . . As a matter of fact, Catholic teaching holds that grace, together with the virtues and gifts derived therefrom, is a real participation of the Divinity. More: through sanctifying grace the Deity itself, in its Unity and Trinity of Persons, dwells in our souls, not merely by similitude or metaphor, but in an objective and most real, albeit mysterious and ineffable, manner. This indwelling of the Divinity itself within the innermost recesses of our being is virtually initiated with the *supernatural faith* possessed by every Christian, even if he be a sinner. It is formally consummated with sanctifying grace, together with the virtues and gifts, with which every just man is endowed.

"Now then, by history and experience we know that, on the natural level, the aesthetic sense, for example, or the moral sense have contributed to the appreciation and development of the arts or of ethics as much as, or perhaps more than, theoretical rules. Let us imagine what would be the case if, instead of being simply the patrimony of a few geniuses or of a few noble souls, artistic feeling or moral virtue were universally diffused, and the world were

made up exclusively of brilliant artists, or of souls endowed with a high and exquisite moral sense.

"Now, what in the natural order is mere supposition, is a reality in the supernatural order. By the habit of faith, all Christians carry within themselves an inchoate, but nonetheless real, participation of the Divinity; an inestimable number of them possess sanctifying grace, and together with grace, charity, the virtues and the supernatural gifts, and through grace and charity, the Divinity itself and the divine life. Some — many more than we think — possess that life and those gifts in that heroic degree known as sanctity, in which the *life of God* becomes almost normal in them."²⁰¹

The virtue of faith is the beginning of supernatural life, the initial nourishment of the divine life in man. It is also the starting point of theological knowledge. If in the exercise of his theological undertaking the theologian fails to elaborate this nourishment, or, in other words, fails to do pastoral theology, remaining content with doing only speculative theology, then he will be producing only a cold and aseptic theology. He will leave it unfinished, broken off in the middle of its normal course.

4. The Attention to the Signs of the Times

This is the most frequently quoted slogan in the postconciliar era. The assertion is often made that revelation must be taken together with the signs of the times.

A. "At all times the Church carries the responsibility of reading the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel, if it is to carry out its task."²⁰² "An ever watchful attention to the signs of the times must be stimulated within the Church."²⁰³ The Commission that drafted the *Gaudium et Spes* defined the *signs of the times* to mean "those phenomena that, by their widespread prevalence and their frequency, characterize an epoch and express the needs and aspirations of mankind today." Consequently, the term describes a complex of phenomena, cultural and historical in character. In the classical scale of the *loci theologici* they correspond to those enumerated in the last places. Traditionally, the *loci theologici* are listed in the following order: Holy Scripture, Tradition, the Magisterium, the Fathers of the Church, etc., and last, philosophy and history.

The appeal to the signs of the times is not always done correctly. At times they are placed on a par with divine revelation; at other times, divine revelation itself is subordinated to them, revelation being interpreted in the

²⁰¹ *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, ch. 4, nos. 217-218.

²⁰² *Gaudium et Spes*, no. 4.

²⁰³ AAS, 56 (1964), 609 ff.

light of the signs of the times and not conversely. Now, the Council expressly declares that it is precisely the signs of the times that are to be illumined by the Gospel. "At all times the Church carries the responsibility of reading the signs of the times and of interpreting them in the light of the Gospel, if it is to carry out its task."²⁰⁴ "And, indeed, as *reason*, *enlightened by faith*, sedulously and soberly searches . . ."²⁰⁵ Historical as well as cultural phenomena are to be illumined by, and therefore subject to the judgment of, the Gospel and faith. St. Thomas made it clear that theology, as knowledge and understanding of revelation, utilizes all kinds of arguments, historical and cultural phenomena, as a means of penetrating into the content of revealed truth, but it utilizes them as subordinates, as servants, not as agents superior even to revelation itself.²⁰⁶

B. Everything pertaining to the signs of the times or to the contribution made by man — whether as facts, events, or ideas — Fr. Marin-Sola lumps together under the term, obviously borrowed from Aristotelian terminology, *minors of reason*. On the other hand, everything contributed by God, he calls *majors of faith*. "Theology, indeed, utilizes all sorts of sciences or minors of reason, whether metaphysical, or physical, or moral. But it is often overlooked that the starting point, the true principles, the formal subject of theology is not the human sciences or minors of reason, but the majors of faith or revealed majors. Theological reasoning, thus, does not have as its purpose to draw out or to deduce the virtuality contained in the minors of reason with the aid of the revealed majors; on the contrary, its purpose is to employ the minors of reason in order to draw out, or to deduce, or to explicate intellectually the virtuality contained in the principles or majors of faith."²⁰⁷

Some years ago, touching this very issue, we wrote the following: "Of the two elements that join hands in effecting theological knowledge, viz., the divine element consisting of the word of God and the human element consisting of the mental and cultural categories, only the former possesses substantive value. What is substantive in theology is the revealed element — it alone contains in itself the entire content of theology."

"In themselves and by themselves, the human factors are not objects of revelation. Theology employs them as instruments by means of which the theologian unfolds what is contained in the word of God. Notions and mental frameworks, the events that happen each day, the personal situations, the signs of the times in which the person lives — all these things would be

²⁰⁴ *Gaudium et Spes*, no. 4.

²⁰⁵ VATICAN I, Denz.-Schön. 3016.

²⁰⁶ *Summa Theologica*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2.

²⁰⁷ *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, ch. 2, no. 96.

described in logic as the *minor propositions* or *premises of reason*. They prove helpful for working on what is similarly known as the *major propositions* or *premises of faith*. With those instruments or minor premises contributed by man three things can be done: (1) *explore* the source which is the revealed datum; (2) *explicitate* the content of the source; and (3) *apply* the God-given content by projecting it on the various turns taken by life and history. The minors of reason contributed by men are not sources of theological content. They are instruments or means for the exploration, explicitation, and application of the content of the sources.

"As instruments they are ruled by the canons regulating the activity of the instrumental causes. The instrument possesses, indeed, a proper power and efficaciousness. But that power is not activated except by the reception of the influence of the superior agent that utilizes it and which, in the very act of utilizing the instrument, makes the latter a participant in the former's own superior power. It is a commonplace that the major agent, or artificer, elevates and dignifies the minor agent, or instrument."

"As a science, theology consists in the logical play that combines the superior agent, or truth of faith, with the inferior agent, or the human contribution in the form of ideas, mental frameworks, events, phenomena prevalent in the times in which the person lives. In this logical play, in which theology consists, all that is ours or human is bathed in the light emanating from the superior agent, which is the revealed datum."

"It is the exact opposite of what happens when the so-called transcendental anthropology is employed as a method in theology. In such a method the human elements, the situations in which men find themselves, the phenomena characteristic of the historical period in which we play leading roles, these are taken as the supreme criteria by which the truths of faith are measured and evaluated."²⁰⁸

FR. EMILIO SAURAS, O.P.
Valencia, Spain

BRIEF PUBLICATION HISTORY

The present book first appeared as a series of articles from 1811 to 1922 in *La Ciencia Tomista*, a philosophico-theological journal edited by the Dominican Fathers in Spain.

The original Spanish edition in book form appeared in 1923, as the first title of the *Library of Spanish Thomists* established in Valencia in honour of St. Thomas Aquinas on the 6th Centenary of his canonization.

A French translation of the work was immediately undertaken. This French edition was published in 1924 in Fribourg, Switzerland, where Fr. Marín was currently holding the chair in theology. The French edition incorporated new material both in the text and in the footnotes, especially in nos. 11, 44, 48, 80, 82, 106, 107, 165, 204, 209, 214, 220, 231, 247, 294, 312, 315, 317, 320, 331, 335, 336, 361, 365, 393, 417, 441, 443, 469, 506, 515 and 516. The whole of section 6 in chapter 4 is entirely new: in it Fr. Marín expands his explanations on the homogeneity of doctrinal evolution via the affective or experiential way.

The 3rd edition in Spanish appeared in 1952 incorporating in a Spanish translation all the new material contained in the French edition.

The English translation offered to the public in this 4th edition under the auspices of the University of Santo Tomás in Manila, Philippines, is based on the foregoing 3rd edition in Spanish. This English edition reproduces the General Introduction written by Fr. Emilio Sauras, O.P., for the 3rd edition. Fr. Sauras has added new material to show that Fr. Marín's book retains its relevance in the post-Vatican II era.

In editing this English translation of Fr. Marín's classic work, the University wishes thereby to do honour to one of its most illustrious alumni and faculty members in the first decade of this century and to reassert the genuine and authentic nature of sacred theology and its subordination to the living Magisterium of the Church in the face of the confusion and distortions prevailing today when not a few Catholic theologians are wont to question the teaching authority of Peter's successor, when almost anything that contains a mention of God or of religion is labelled theology, and almost anybody who talks about God is called a theologian, no matter how bizarre the views he happens to hold.

A.T.P.

LETTER FROM HIS EMINENCE CARDINAL
MERRY DEL VAL

Rome, 21st December, 1923

The Rev. Fr. F. Marín-Sola, O.P.

Very Reverend Father,

I have received the volume of your important work on *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*, which you have kindly sent me. Thank you very much for this token of your thoughtfulness.

Please accept my heartfelt congratulations for such a successful conclusion of your profound researches on the teaching of the illustrious and holy Doctor.

Let it all be for the glory of God and the growth of the true culture in the thick of the calamitous errors of our times, the disastrous consequences of which become more manifest day by day.

Keep me in your prayers and accept my best regards.

R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL

INTRODUCTION

1. THE TITLE OF OUR BOOK. — It is quite possible that some of our readers, who are more pious than knowledgeable, will be bothered by the title we have chosen for our book, THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF CATHOLIC DOGMA. Ever since Darwin employed the term *The Evolution of the Species* to signify the transformation of one species into another, and particularly after the extrapolation of the transformistic theory of Catholic dogma effected by the heresy of Modernism, the very name of evolution has been, and continues to be, suspect in the eyes of some overly timorous theologians, as if all evolution were necessarily transformistic and no homogeneous evolution were possible, or as if all evolution, including that which is homogeneous, were incompatible with the divine origin and substantial immutability of Catholic dogma.

We are aware that the term *evolution*, when applied to the dogmas of the faith, can in our days easily lead to a false understanding and to abuse. This notwithstanding, we believe that that is not reason enough to refrain from employing it, unless we mean to ban from the theological lexicon the more beautiful and more expressive terms of modern language, thus allowing them to be monopolized and abused by our adversaries for the purposes of error. In the case of words, or of ideas, that contain a substratum of truth and can be useful for the defense and exposition of the revealed deposit, the best policy, we believe, is that counseled and practiced by St. Augustine, namely, to wrest such words, or ideas, from the hands of the enemy and, after having purged them from all false understanding, to place them at the service of the integral truth of the Catholic faith.¹ And today there is every reason for so doing since the term *evolution* is now employed without scruples by eminent Catholic theologians whose knowledgeability and orthodoxy are recognized by all. Among many others that could be cited, let us briefly quote some passages from contemporary theologians belonging to different schools:

Cardinal Billot: "This law of *evolution*, which rules all living organisms, we see *verified also in the Church of Christ*, which while sedulously guarding the *dogmas* entrusted to her, detracts nothing [from them] . . . In treating faithfully and wisely the old doctrine, she pursues with all diligence this one endeavour: to determine and perfect that which previously was formless and

¹ "If they who are called philosophers, particularly the Platonists, have said things that are true and in conformity with our faith, not only are these not to be feared, but they should be wrested from them as from unjust possessors and turned to our advantage." (St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, bk. 2, c. 40; Migne, PL 34, 63).

LETTER FROM THE MOST REV. MASTER GENERAL
OF THE ORDER OF PREACHERS

Rome, 29th October, 1923

The Very Reverent Father Magister
Francisco Marin-Sola, O.P.

It is with satisfaction that I have received the copy, which you have dedicated to me, of your work which bears the title *The Homogeneous Evolution of Catholic Dogma*.

It gave me pleasure to observe that it is the fruit of persevering research in quoting the most appropriate texts on the subject and of attentive reflection and profound investigation of the foundations suitable for the solution of the problem. In this manner, you show yourself a peer of our great theologians of yore, who were not content to rest on what had already been explored, but proceeded to investigate with great sagacity and fruitfulness other truths not yet sufficiently explained.

You have likewise employed your lofty talent and your argumentation, unimpeachable in virtue of its logic, to resolve a question the transcendence of which is acknowledged by all, but which to this day remained controverted.

Let me, then congratulate you for your noble and well finished work. May the Lord bless it with copious light in the field of Sacred Theology.

In token of the particular esteem in which I hold you, Reverend Father, I call up on yourself, the blessing of our Father St. Dominic.

FR. LOUIS THEISSLING, O.P.
Master General

Another Dominican, Fr. de Groot: "An *evolution* of Christian teaching must be admitted. The character itself of the Church demands continuity and *evolution*, stability and movement. The causes that promote such an *evolution* are either direct or indirect; but they all are subject to one principal cause which is Christ, who promised the Holy Spirit to His Church . . . Now, we say that the *evolution* of a certain teaching comes to an end when the Church defines it . . . This is the *evolution and the life of the truth*; this is the sacred union of tradition and progress."⁸

One other renowned theologian, the Belgian Dominican Fr. Tuyauerts, Master of Sacred Theology and present Prior of the General Study at Louvain: "After about a century, probably nothing else has attracted more the attention of men of science than evolution. The Protestants pride themselves in being the pioneers in the study of the history of dogmas. However that may be, it is certain that many centuries before the advent of Protestantism, Catholic writers and teachers had drawn attention to, and studied the fact of the *evolution of dogmas*. Witness St. Vincent de Lérins who treats of it extensively enough in his celebrated *Commonitorium*. Witness the Angelic Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas, who expounds the Catholic concept of it and establishes succinctly its foundations and laws. Hence, one keeps strictly within the bounds of Catholic theology in studying this phenomenon of the *evolution of dogmas*."⁹

The extrapolation of the term *evolution* to dogma is so far from deserving censure that there are Catholic theologians who qualify as *anti-catholic* the opinion that denies all dogmatic evolution. "Hence Mausbach notes *very well* that it is an *acatholic* position to maintain that no true progress or evolution is to be admitted in the Christian religion."¹⁰

We could go on quoting many other contemporary theologians, but we think that nine, of the stature of those we have just quoted, should suffice to dispel all scruples that might be entertained by even the most timorous reader concerning the title, THE HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION OF DOGMA, given to our book.

2. A POSSIBLE SUBTITLE. — To the title, THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA, we could have appended the subtitle, *The Homogeneity of the Entire Body of Catholic Doctrine*, to signify that the aim we pursue is twofold. In the first place, we intend to demonstrate the possibility of true evolution — taken always in the sense of homogeneous evolution — in respect of dogma in the strict and rigorous sense of the term. In the second place, we

⁸ *Summa Apologetica*, q. 19, a.3, nn. 3-4; ed. 3.a, Ratisbonae 1906, p. 778.

⁹ *L'Evolution du Dogme*, introd., p. 5; Louvain 1919.

¹⁰ REGINALDUS-MARIA SCHULTES, O.P., *Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum*, p. 163, footnote 7; Parisiis 1922.

inchoate, to consolidate and firm up that which is already expressly stated and explained, to safeguard that which is already firmly established and defined.²

The Benedictine Fr. Janssens: "Be careful not to dismiss all *evolution* of Catholic doctrine. However, one must distinguish between *evolution* ab *intrinseco*, which is aptly signified by the parable of the mustard seed, and *evolution* ab *extrinseco* or ad *extrinseco*, which is better called *transformation*. With due moderation the former *must be admitted*, whereas the latter must be absolutely rejected."³

The Servite Fr. Lepicier: "*It is quite obvious* that some kind of progress or some kind of *evolution* in *Catholic dogma* ought not to be totally rejected."⁴

The Franciscan Fr. Casanova: "The very notion of progress requires that there be something immutable, and something that advances, grows and increases. These two characteristics exist marvelously in the faith, the objective element of which remains constant while its explication or *evolution* takes place in many ways."⁵

Fr. Van Noort: "In the first place, it is certain that the increase, of which we have spoken, does not involve a change in the doctrine itself, but an organic unfolding or *evolution* of the same preaching, of the same faith. Just as the adult is not a different man from the child, in spite of the fact that his bodily members have grown considerably in size and strength, in like manner the preaching of the Church remains always the same in reality, even if with the passing of time it has *evolved* and become more developed."⁶

The Dominican Fr. Berthier: "Hence it is clear that for us the unfolding of the doctrine handed down is in no way a *permutation* but an *evolution* or progress of the same truth, not with regard to its substance but with regard to its explication."⁷

² *De Ecclesia Christi*, th. 17, §. 2, 3rd. ed. (Rome 1909 p. 398. Emphases added in this and all subsequent quotations throughout the book.

³ *Tractatus de Deo Creatore*, prolog., p. 18, footnote 2; Friburgi Brigoviae, 1905.

Ab intrinseco — from within, i.e. evolution powered by intrinsic energy.

Ad extrinsecum — to the without, i.e. evolution powered by outside energy.

or outside of the evolving thing. (*Transl.*)

⁴ *De Stabilitate et Progressu Dogmatum*, Introd. p. 7; Rome, 1970.

⁵ GABRIEL A. CASANOVA, O.F.M., *Theologia Fundamentalis*, n. 446.

⁶ VAN NOORT, *De Fontibus Revelationis*, n. 234.

⁷ *De Locis Theologicis*, n. 80.

intend to make it clear that this evolution is so ample that it covers all the degrees or levels of Catholic teaching, to such an extent that there is no truth, provided that it rigorously pertains to the Catholic doctrine, that cannot become a true dogma of faith maintaining the most perfect and substantial homogeneity with the divinely revealed deposit.

3. FOUR DEGREES OF CATHOLIC DOCTRINE. — The whole extent of Catholic doctrine can be distributed among four degrees: (a) the *revealed datum*; (b) *dogmas*; (c) *infallible truths*; (d) *theological conclusions*.

The *first degree* comprises all and only the truths or propositions expressly revealed or inspired by God to the Apostles and by them handed down to the Church. However, these truths or propositions are to be taken in the pristine form in which they issued from the pen or the lips of the Apostles or sacred writers; and, hence, prior to any work or speculation expended upon them by the Church or by human reason. It, therefore, embraces two kinds of propositions: first, all the propositions of the Holy Scripture, as they issued from the pen of the inspired writers; second, all the propositions of the Divine Tradition, as they came out of the lips of the Apostles. This first degree is commonly called the *revealed datum* or the *explicitly revealed*. It is the point of departure of the other three degrees, as well as of all progress whether dogmatic or theological.

The *second degree*, known as *dogmas* of faith, comprises all the propositions that have been defined by the Church as revealed, or as propositions of divine faith, or whose contradictories have been condemned with the censure of heresy.

The *third degree* includes all the propositions defined by the Church in an *infallible* manner, but are not defined expressly as revealed. It also includes all those propositions whose contradictories have been infallibly condemned but with a censure inferior to that of heresy.

Finally, to the *fourth degree* belong all the propositions that bear a necessary connexion with any of the other three degrees, and which commonly go by the name of theological conclusions, and which comprise so-called dogmatic facts.

4. IMPORTANCE OF THE FOURTH DEGREE. — These four degrees effectively comprise the whole body of Catholic doctrine. They are, of course, not of equal value. Nonetheless, all the four must be kept in mind by anyone who attempts the study of the homogeneity of the Catholic doctrine or the study of dogmatic evolution.

If anyone is surprised at the inclusion of the fourth degree, the theological conclusions, among the true degrees of Catholic doctrine, let him reflect on the following three facts. First, that a great part of the doctrine taught by the Church to the Christian faithful through the catechism or

through the channel of ordinary preaching belongs to this fourth degree. Second, that all the truths of the fourth degree can move up into the third, since there is no true theological conclusion that cannot be infallibly defined by the Church. Third and foremost, that in the opinion of theologians of the highest caliber — an opinion that seems corroborated by clear facts of the history of dogmas — a great part of the truths of the second degree have come from the fourth degree, that is, from theological conclusions.

Hence, without giving close attention to the nature of theological conclusions it is impossible to effect a good study of the nature of the infallible truths; likewise, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to investigate and understand the nature and the evolution of dogmatic truths.

5. TWO HISTORICAL FACTS. — Anyone who undertakes to study without preconceptions, the history of the Catholic Church and of its teaching is confronted by two evident facts.

The first is the fact that Catholic teaching, even in its strictly dogmatic part, has grown or developed, in a rather large scale, from the days of the Apostles to our own times. To become aware of this one need only compare, on any given doctrinal point, the plain biblical statements with the complex definitions of the last ecumenical councils; compare the primitive Creed of the Apostles with the so-called Creed of St. Athanasius or with the profession of faith of Pius IV; compare any document of the early popes with the *Syllabus* of Pius IX or with Pius X's Encyclical *Pascendi*; or compare any catechism or any number of catechisms of the Fathers of the Church with one of today's catechisms. The evidence of the fact of growth is immediately obvious.

The second is the obvious fact that in the aforementioned growth various human philosophies and civilizations have played a large role and exercised a great influence, particularly Greek philosophy in the age of the Fathers and Scholastic philosophy in the Middle and the Modern ages. This influence is noticeable in the writings of the Fathers who developed the primitive doctrine, in the conciliar disputes and disquisitions that preceded the definition of each dogma, and even in the dogmatic formulae themselves which clearly exhibit the mark of the various epochs in which the propositions were defined.¹¹

6. A PROBLEM. — These two facts can be explained in very different ways, but can in no way be denied. Together they pose the following most

¹¹ Thus the definitions of the early Councils *smell of the Greek spirit*, both as to the thing defined and as to the mode of formulation; the teaching of St. Augustine reveals or shows the Latin mentality; the canons of Trent are full of *scholastic formulae*; similarly the Vatican Council evidences the *mentality of modern theology*. (SCHULTES, *op. cit.* p. 278)

serious problem: Is the progress or growth of Catholic doctrine just mentioned homogeneous or heterogeneous? Is it simply a homogeneous evolution of what was already contained implicitly in the revealed datum, or is it an extrinsic or heterogeneous addition, a truly transformistic evolution? Are the last three degrees, which we call dogmas, infallible truths and theological conclusions, or, if we restrict ourselves to the second degree, are the dogmas of faith truths equally revealed and divine as those of the first degree, or are they human teachings added to the divine deposit?

7. THE MODERNIST SOLUTION. — Modernism solves the problem with the assertion that the present teachings of the Catholic Church are not a homogeneous evolution of the apostolic doctrine or primitive datum but an authentic transformism. It maintains that upon coming in contact with, and under the influence of, various philosophies and successive civilizations, the primitive doctrine has been mixed with, and substantially transformed by countless human and caducous elements, the result of which is an alloy and debasement of the primitive datum. That which we call dogmas, infallible truths and theological conclusions, is, in the view of modernism, not a mere evolution of the apostolic teachings, but a true transformation, or better still, a corruption thereof.¹²

8. THE SOLUTION OF SOME CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS. — Some XVII century Catholic theologians, and a great many among modern theologians find no solution to this problem other than to draw a dividing line between the second, and the third and fourth degrees of Catholic doctrine. In the view of these theologians, the second degree, that is, the dogmas, is a homogeneous continuation of the revealed or apostolic doctrine. On the other hand, the third and fourth degrees are not a homogeneous evolution but an authentic transformation, a real mixture of revealed data and human knowledge. Hence, these theologians maintain that the primitive datum and the dogmas are revealed truths, authentically divine truths deserving of an assent of divine faith, whereas the so-called infallible truths and theological conclusions are human truths, which, even if the Church should define them, are undeserving and incapable of any assent other than that of human, or, at the utmost, of ecclesiastical faith.

9. A VERY SERIOUS DIFFICULTY. — This theory not only denies the substantial homogeneity of the Catholic doctrine in its third and fourth

¹²It is common knowledge that modernistic errors concerning the Catholic doctrine can be classified into two groups: (a) errors concerning the way in which the first degree of the Catholic doctrine, i.e. the revealed datum, was constituted; (b) errors concerning the manner in which the other three degrees unfolded from that first degree. In this book we take always for granted the Catholic teaching concerning the origin and constitution of the revealed datum; hence we will not concern ourselves with the first group of modernistic errors.

degrees, but is also liable to a very serious difficulty in the matter of defending the homogeneity of the second degree, that is, of the dogmas of faith themselves.

Indeed, these theologians deny the homogeneity of the third and fourth degrees because human reasoning, in the proper sense of the term, has taken part in their development; in other words, because of the second historical fact earlier mentioned, which is the influence of human reason in the elaboration of the primitive datum.

Now, then, history seems to bear clear witness to the fact that this influence of human reason on the unfolding of the revealed datum is to be found not only in the third and fourth degrees, but in the second degree as well. A cursory study of the history of dogmas seems to evidence the fact that certain dogmas have issued from the primitive datum through a proper reasoning process employing a revealed major and a minor of reason, that is to say, in exactly the same manner as the truths of the third and fourth degrees.

Consequently, if to use human reason and human knowledge in the third and fourth degrees destroys their homogeneity and effects an authentic transformism, as these theologians seem to think, then it would appear that modernism is quite correct in denying also the homogeneity of the second degree and admitting transformism in the whole body of Catholic doctrine.

10. FATHER GARDEIL. — Catholic theology owes this wise and renowned Dominican two of the best monographs on theological methodology.

In the first, entitled *La Crédibilité et l'Apologetique*,¹³ he brought light to the chaos that enveloped the very concept of Apologetics by providing the exact demarcation of the proper object of this science, theology's auxiliary. In its fundamental lines this work can be regarded as definitive. It has been the point of departure of everything that has since been well written on the nature of Apologetics.

In the second work, *Le Donné révélé et la Théologie*,¹⁴ the author set himself a no less important and fruitful, although more complicated and exacting goal, namely, to evince the fact that the revealed datum has developed untainted by transformism, in perfect objective continuity through all the other degrees.

¹³*La Crédibilité et l'Apologetique*, Paris 1908.

¹⁴*Le Donné Révélé et la Théologie*, Paris 1910.

¹⁵Fr. Gardel explains his overall plan in the following words: "To bring to a successful conclusion the program that I have outlined, two capital issues have to be elucidated. It is well known that theology has for its immediate starting point the truth

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Fr. Gardell's lucid mind immediately perceived that the whole problem hinged on two factors: on an historical fact and on a philosophico-theological principle.

Fr. Gardell accepted the historical fact with neither reservations nor distinctions. That fact is the real and profound influence exerted by human reasoning in the development of Catholic doctrine, not only in its third and fourth degrees, but also in its second degree. It was obvious to Fr. Gardell — and in our view, it should also be obvious to anyone who reads history without preconceived notions — that many dogmas have not been attained, nor could have been attained, by human reason except by way of a rigorous and proper theological conclusion deduced from a major of faith and a minor of reason.

With the acceptance of this historical fact, the problem of the homogeneity or transformism of Catholic dogma became wholly dependent on the following principle: whether the concurrence of minor premises on the with major premises of faith in a reasoning process destroys dogmatic homogeneity or not. If, in the unfolding of the revealed datum, all and any intervention of human reasoning, understood properly, ends in transformism, then all endeavour to defend the objective homogeneity of the Catholic doctrine must be given up as hopeless. That homogeneity is obviously eliminated from the third and fourth, as well as from the second, degree unless one denies what seems an evident historical fact.

In any problem as serious as this, which concerns the evolution of dogma, innovations are exceedingly dangerous, and the most prudent course is to hew close to the line traditionally followed by Catholic theologians. Hence, Fr. Gardell determined to obtain a good knowledge of the traditional thought on the matter. To this effect he read, as he tells us himself, all the best that had been written by theologians on the subject. His reading led him to the following conviction: "It seems clear that modern theologians

of faith, that is, the Catholic dogma. It is by means of dogma that theology is in contact with the Deposit of Revelation or revealed datum properly understood. Hence, it is in the form of dogma that the revealed datum especially influences the conclusions of theology. Now, in the twofold stretch of way that goes from the immediately revealed datum to the dogma, and from dogma to the theological conclusions, are we sure and certain that the proper value of the point of departure, that is, the authority of divine revelation, maintains all its vigour, all its purity? Are we certain that this double development is accomplished with perfect continuity and homogeneity? The question is debated these days with respect to either the first or the other stretch of the way. Resuming and systematizing all the old objections, Modernism — as the encyclical *Pascendi* unminutely makes clear — has subjected to attack each and every one of the stages that mark the advance of the revealed truth, from the moment of its birth within the human spirit under the action of the charism of revelation, to the theological conclusions . . . This book has been planned with due regard to these difficulties and with the intention of confronting them." (Introduction, p. 13)

generally deny the possibility of homogeneity between a revealed principle and a conclusion deduced from it when that deduction has been made by a process of reasoning in the proper sense of the term.¹⁶

Although there are rather transparent indications that Fr. Gardell was not pleased by this modern opinion, he did not dare to fight it head-on. So, to be able to continue defending homogeneity he resorted to an ingenious device, by bringing into the problem a new extrinsic factor, which he called the *social charism of the Christian sense*. With the approval of the conclusions by this common sense of the Church, such conclusions could achieve the value of homogeneity and continuity with the revealed datum, which they did not have of themselves.

As Fr. Gardell himself admitted later on, such a factor, despite its usefulness in certain instances, does not solve the problem of homogeneity. This sense might well serve to discern homogeneity where homogeneity already exists. But no matter how powerful and efficacious we suppose this sense to be, it will never be able to create homogeneity, or supply it, where no homogeneity exists.

11. OUR ARTICLES IN *LA CIENCIA TOMISTA*. — This book of Fr. Gardell inspired us to begin writing in 1911 a series of articles in *La Ciencia Tomista* on *The Homogeneity of the Catholic Doctrine*.¹⁷ Since then, during

16. I have read all the best that has been written by theologians on this subject. It seems that they are chiefly concerned with safeguarding the dogmatic value of one part of the theological conclusions, and relegate the rest to sheer theological discourse, which, as it provides nothing but an inference, never attains to an object of faith capable of being embodied in dogma. However, one discovers that the rest is partly made up of truths virtually revealed that have in fact been defined by the Church. Whoever reads the Canons of the Council of Trent — so detailed and explicit — will, in my opinion, find there the clear proof. What, then, is left? [Fr. Gardell then describes the conclusions of the Council of Trent as *part in the whole*, etc., and goes on to say:] And this is about all. Undoubtedly these acquisitions are of very great value; but one is frightened by all the theological conclusions that lie outside these boundaries, but whose doctrine has, nonetheless, been defined. . . . *This is my difficulty.*" (Op. cit. Pg. 71)

17. Fr. Marín-Sola is publishing in *La Ciencia Tomista* a series of articles on the homogeneity of the Catholic doctrine. . . . The series was motivated by a passage from my book, *Le Donné Révélé*, in which I manifested how little pleased I was by the solutions currently given to explain the homogeneity of revelation with certain truths defined by the Church, which seem to fit in the category of theological conclusions properly understood. Fr. Marín agrees with this, but he means to explain the obvious fact of the definition of the theological conclusions in a manner different from that given by me. If we are to believe him, all modern theology is on this point the victim of a mistake made by Suárez, and shared by Lugo. The last great Thomists, the Salmanticenses and John of St. Thomas, are not completely untainted by it. It is, therefore, necessary to return to the mind of St. Thomas, who maintained that the revealed datum and a genuine theological conclusion are homogeneous because they signify *one single and identical reality* under its twofold aspect: the *revelatum* and the *revelabile* . . .

the past twelve years we have continued the series, studying the problem under a great variety of aspects and pointing out its relationships and harmony with the main questions of sacred theology. We believe we have succeeded in clarifying, among many others, the four following points:

1. It is a historical fact beyond doubt that a number of dogmas have unfolded or evolved by way of theological conclusions in the proper sense of the term. This historical fact was admitted by traditional theology up to the XVII century, and should likewise be admitted by all modern theologians.
2. It is a philosophically and theologically certain principle that reasoning in the proper and strict sense of the term, can intervene in the development or evolution of the revealed datum without impairing its perfect homogeneity.
3. The historical fact and the philosophico-theological principle just mentioned were admitted by *all* the theologians prior to the XVII century. The contrary persuasion, found today in some theologians, proceeds from a confusion introduced by Suárez regarding the nature of the true virtuality of the revealed deposit, a confusion continued by Lugo and undetected by the Salmanticenses and Billuart.
4. Once the true concept of the revealed virtual is re-established, it becomes easy to understand how an authentic and proper evolution — but one that is homogeneous — can, and does, exist in Catholic dogma. Thus, the antinomy which seemingly existed between the teachings of Catholic theology and the facts of history vanishes, and the objection raised by modernism concerning the transformism of dogmas collapses entirely.

These four points, and many others, such as the role of the Church in the evolution of dogma, the various paths of dogmatic evolution, the nature of the so-called ecclesiastical faith, etc., etc., constituted the substance of twenty-eight articles published throughout these twelve years, during which we have ceaselessly probed further and further into this problem of the evolution of dogma, a problem at once infinitely complex, in the view of Fr.

Upon reading this thesis of Fr. Marin-Sola, I perceived at once that he was within the authentic Thomist line. After having spent thirty years in the study of St. Thomas and of his commentator Cajetan, it is hardly possible not to acquire a certain *habitus* about these things. The genuine intrinsic and a priori foundation of the homogeneity of truly theological conclusions, according to St. Thomas, is to be found there and not elsewhere. *What I have called the Church's social sense guided by the Holy Spirit can very well be, in some cases, the criterion, and, consequently, the extrinsic proof. For no sense has been given the power to discern homogeneity where it does not exist.* Therefore, it is necessary to posit an intrinsic foundation for the homogeneity of the theological conclusions. And this foundation, according to St. Thomas, is their capacity to be deduced through formal reasoning by way of inclusion and identity. (GARDEIL, in *Revue de Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, Oct. 1912, pp. 825-27).

Grandmaison, as well as of supreme importance and "burning" actuality, in the words of Fr. Gardeil.¹⁸ Those articles, recast and organized along the lines of a better knit and more concise plan, form the book, which we now offer to the public.¹⁹

12. DIVISION OF THIS BOOK. — To accomplish the aim of including in a few chapters the many questions related to the evolution of dogma, we found it convenient to divide this book into only seven chapters:

1. The nature of evolution in general, and the various species and degrees of doctrinal evolution.
2. Dogmatic evolution and the virtuality of the revealed datum.
3. The evolution of dogma and the authority of the Church.
4. The different paths of dogmatic evolution.
5. The extension of dogmatic evolution to the whole object of the so-called ecclesiastical faith.
6. Solution to the objections against the evolution of dogma.
7. The evolution of dogma and the traditional teaching.

We hope that these seven chapters — each subdivided into as many sections as the subject matter may require — will suffice to study the problem of dogmatic evolution, if not as extensively as it justly deserves, at least with sufficient clarity to point out the authentic foundations that will permit saving both the fact of evolution attested by history and the homogeneity of that same evolution, which our faith compels us to assert and which history also attests.

13. TWO METHODS. — There are two methods or approaches to the demonstration of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma. The first is

18. "C'était poser le problème du développement dogmatique... cette question infiniment complexe." (GRANDMAISON, *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique*, 1908, p. 521) "Ces questions si importantes et combien brillantes." (GARDEIL, *Revue des Sc. Phil. et Théolog.*, 1913, p. 704)

19. In the process of recasting for this book the articles already published in *La Ciencia Tomista*, we have tried to eliminate the numerous repetitions inherent in a periodic publication. However, we do not flatter ourselves that we have succeeded in eliminating them all, and therefore beg the reader's indulgence. On the other hand, where it is a matter of uprooting widespread theories, which one thinks mistaken, it is impossible to keep from repeating time and time again certain fundamental concepts, the forgetfulness or the confusion of which has, in our opinion, given rise to error. Likewise, it is quite possible that mistakes might have occurred in quoting the chapter, question, or page of the many texts and passages we cite. But the reader can rest assured that the quoted text is authentic and exact, since not a single text is quoted that we have not verified personally in the sources.

the *theologico-speculative* method wherein both the possibility of such an evolution is shown and the manner it is carried out is indicated, without prejudice to the divine origin and the substantial immutability of dogma. The second is the *historical* method, which demonstrates that such evolution has existed in fact, and points out in which dogmas, and under what circumstances it has taken place.

14. OUR GUIDE IN THE PRESENT ENDEAVOUR. — It is commonly held today that the great fact of the evolution of dogma, which so engages the attention of modern theologians, was neither noticed nor investigated by the great masters of Scholasticism. The most that is nowadays granted is that they paid some attention to the dogmatic evolution of the Old Testament, but none whatsoever to that of the New Testament after the death of the Apostles.

Any study restricted exclusively to either method would necessarily be very incomplete. On the other hand, a study that included both methods and did them equal justice, would be perfect. However, the historical method applied to each particular dogma would both mean such an inordinate extension and require such an amount of historical, critical, and psychological information as to place it almost beyond the capabilities of an individual theologian.

Hence we have opted for a middle way. We have devoted the main part to the *theologico-speculative* approach, since we address ourselves first and foremost to theologians. But we have also added two historical studies: in the first we cite ten concrete instances of dogmatic evolution by way of reasoning; in the second we investigate the traditional view on the matter through the centuries. We believe that by so doing, our demonstration of the homogeneous evolution of dogma *oversteps the confines of theory and becomes sensible and tangible; as embodied in facts it takes on a concrete and practical shape.*²⁰

²⁰The first of these two historical studies, published in *La Ciencia Tomista*, merited the following words from Fr. Gardel: "The articles on *Reasoning and Dogmatic Progress* are particularly priceless for the understanding of the author's doctrine because they justify it by means of not less than ten historical instances of theological conclusions defined by the Church. . . . Thus the central concept of this work ceases to be theory and becomes sensible and tangible, in becoming incarnate in facts, it takes on concrete and practical form." (*Revue des Sc. Phil. et Theolog.*, Oct. 1920, p. 662). We are now publishing for the first time the second historical study which takes up almost entirely chapter 7 of this book. We hope that this study will be of special delight to theologians because we trust that it makes clear with numerous citations that the doctrine of the evolution of dogma, held by many to be of modern vintage, is actually the companion and current teaching of traditional theology. We also believe that a third historical study, that of ch. 5, sect. 1, pp. 226-237, about the origin of the modernly accepted ecclesiastical faith, will be read with greater interest by the historians of dogma than by theologians.

This is a great error. In the course of this book it will be made clear that all Scholastic theologians worthy of note dealt with this fact and endeavoured to explain it. In particular, we shall see that St. Thomas not only acknowledged the fact of dogmatic evolution in the New Testament and distinguished it perfectly from that of the Old Testament, but also traced its course and defined its laws with unerring judgment, thus preserving intact both the fact of evolution and the principle of its homogeneity through all the degrees of Catholic teaching.

The Supreme Pontiffs have repeatedly asserted that the principles enunciated by the Angelic Doctor possess sufficient virtuality to provide a solution to all the great problems related to dogma that have arisen after him. We hope to make it clear that to solve this modern question of the evolution of dogma nothing more is required than faithfully to apply the great and fruitful principles laid down by the Angelic Doctor concerning faith, theology, human reason, and the Church. Our whole work makes no claims other than that of being a constant and faithful exposition of the teaching of the Holy Doctor as it was understood by all his classic commentators prior to the XVII century, that is to say, prior to the time when the confusion of terminology on the matter was introduced in the Schools together with the ensuing confusion about the authentic nature and extension of the *implicit virtuality* of the revealed datum.

15. PROTESTATION. — In any theological question, but especially in a question as momentous and critical as this which concerns the evolution of dogma, we submit ourselves unconditionally to the judgment of the Catholic Church, infallible arbiter in all matters related to the deposit of revelation.

Fribourg University (Switzerland), 1923

18. HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION AND TRANSFORMISTIC EVOLUTION IN MATERIAL BEINGS — In any material being there are two things: its matter and its specific nature.

Hence the growth or evolution of a material being can happen in two ways: 1) Growth in matter, with no change in specific nature; 2) growth in matter together with a change of specific nature.

In the first case the growth is called homogeneous evolution; in the second, it is called transformistic evolution, because the change of specific nature involves not only a change in the matter but also a change of substantial form.

We have clear examples of material homogeneous evolution in the seedling that grows into a luxuriant tree, or in the child that develops into a mature man. There is here an increase or development of matter, but the specific nature remains the same.

Equally clear examples of transformistic evolution are the monkey which, in Darwin's theory, became a man; the mud which God converted into the body of our first father Adam; the tree into which is grafted a branch of another species; the living organism that dies. In each of these instances the change is not limited to the matter, but includes as well the specific nature or substantial form.

Thus, the preservation or the non-preservation of the same specific nature is that which distinguishes homogeneous evolution from transformistic evolution in material beings.

19. APPLICATION TO DOCTRINES. — In material beings there are two elements: matter, and specific nature. Likewise in doctrines there are two things: 1) the words or formulae, and 2) their meaning or signification. Words or formulae are to doctrines as matter is to material things, whereas meaning is to doctrines as the specific nature or substantial form to material things. Hence the aphorism that in doctrines, words or formulae are the material, and the meaning, the formal element.

Consequently, growth or evolution in doctrines can also happen in two ways: 1) growth or evolution of formulae, the meaning of which remains the same; 2) growth or evolution of formulae, the meaning of which does not remain the same.

In the first case the evolution is homogeneous; in the second, transformistic.

Hence, the preservation or the non-preservation of the same meaning is that which distinguishes homogeneous evolution from transformistic evolution in doctrines.

Whence the traditional formula describing the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma enunciated by St. Vincent de Lérins, and consecrated by

CHAPTER I

ON EVOLUTION IN GENERAL, AND THE DIFFERENT SPECIES AND DEGREES OF DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION

16. DIVISION. — A good understanding of the homogeneous evolution of the revealed deposit, which is a doctrinal deposit, presupposes the study of evolution in general — what it consists in — and of the different species and degrees of doctrinal evolution.

Hence, we divide this chapter into five sections:

- I. Evolution in general.
- II. The three degrees of doctrinal evolution.
- III. Evolution in the various kinds of sciences.
- IV. Evolution by reasoning from the essence to the properties.
- V. Evolution by reasoning from the cause to the effect.

SECTION I

ON HOMOGENEOUS AND TRANSFORMISTIC EVOLUTION IN GENERAL

17. EVOLUTION IN GENERAL. — The term *evolution*, and its synonyms, such as, *development*, *unfolding*, *progress*, in general mean nothing but the *growth* or *increase* of anything whatsoever. Thus, the problem discussed today under the modern terms of the progress, or the development, or the evolution of dogma or of the faith, was debated by the earlier Schoolmen in terms of the increase or the growth of the faith: "Whether the articles of faith have *grown* in the course of time." "Whether with the running of time the faith has *increased*."¹

¹ ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologiae*, 2-2, q. 1, a. 7; *In 3 Sent.*, d. 25, a. 2, a. 2.

the Council of the Vatican [I]: "*Crescat igitur . . . sed in eodem sensu*." Growth, yes; but in the same sense or meaning.

20. WHEN DOES THE MEANING REMAIN THE SAME? — The meaning of a doctrine remains the same throughout different formulations when the meaning of the subsequent formulae does not originate from without, but is already *implicitly contained* in the earlier formulae. Otherwise, the meaning does not remain the same. This occurs in those cases where the meaning of the subsequent formulae is not implicitly contained in, but is either *contrary* to, or at least, *different* from, the meaning of the earlier formulae.

To understand better when the meaning of a formula is, or is not, implicitly contained in the meaning of another formula, it will help to bear well in mind a threefold distinction of meanings or of concepts taught by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, viz.: a) explicative concepts; b) diverse concepts; c) contrary concepts.

Concepts are said to be *explicative* when they issue one from the other upon the one and only condition that our mind penetrates their *whole* content.

Diverse concepts are those that do not, and cannot, issue one from the other, no matter how deeply our mind penetrates into their content; however, they do not oppose or destroy one another.

Contrary concepts, not only do not issue one from the other, but also mutually destroy each other because they are incompatible among themselves.

Examples of *explicative* concepts — known also to the earlier writers by the Latin term *consonant* (*consonantia*) — are those of absolute immutability and eternity, or those of spirituality and immortality. One needs only to penetrate well the concept of absolute immutability to find the concept of eternity. Similarly, one needs only to penetrate well the concept of spirituality to find the concept of immortality. They are simply partial aspects of one total concept.²

²For the same reason, although some of our readers might not find them equally clear, we could have given the following as examples of *explicative* concepts: *perfect substantiality with the Father*; or *Trinity of Divine Persons and human will*; or *true Son of God and subsistent relations*; or *Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and Holy Spirit proceeding from the Son*; or *the Church, an indefectible foundation and infallible rule of faith and morals*; or *worthy Mother of God and immune from all stain of sin*, etc., etc. In all these instances, as we hope to make clear in the course of this book, the concepts are mutually implicit or explicative, since upon merely penetrating the whole content of one of the concepts the other comes to light.

Examples of *diverse* concepts are those of science and virtue, or quantity and quality, or colour and taste. The concept of virtue will not emerge from that of science, no matter how deeply one penetrates the latter; neither will the concept of quality emerge from the concept of quantity, nor the concept of taste from the concept of colour. Yet, although these concepts do not issue one from the other, which is why they are not explicative, still they are not opposed to each other, which is why they are not contrary but simply diverse.

Examples of *contrary* concepts are those of spiritual and material, or necessary and contingent, or white and black. These concepts not only do not issue one from the other, as diverse concepts do not, but, furthermore, they exclude one another from the same subject or from the same doctrinal formula.

It has taken us a few paragraphs to expound all this either because of its importance or because of our own lack of conciseness. St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure condensed the whole matter in just a few words. The problem discussed today, whether it is possible to have new dogmas, was debated by the Schoolmen in terms of whether it is possible to *add* (*appondere*) something to the revealed deposit. The objection and the answer follow:

"To the contrary: it is said in the Apocalypse, last chapter, 18: if anyone shall add to them, God will add unto him the plagues.

I answer: addition is twofold: either by adding that which is *contrary* or *diverse*, and this is erroneous; or by adding that which is implicitly contained by way of exposition, and this is praiseworthy."³

"There is an *addition* in which that which is added is *contrary*: there is another in which that which is added is *diverse*; and there is another in which that which is added is *consonant*. The first addition is one of error; the second, one of presumption; the third, one of faithful instruction, because it explicates what is implicit."⁴

21. EXPLICATIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE EVOLUTION. — Consequently, whenever the concepts of the succeeding formulae are neither contrary nor even diverse, but mutually implicit (*consona*) there is an evolution in the same sense or meaning, and therefore homogeneous. Otherwise, the evolution is transformationistic.

Homogeneous doctrinal evolution — that which is characterized by the fact that the formulae are implicitly contained in one another — was denoted by earlier theologians with the name of *explicative* evolution (*quoad explic*

³ST. THOMAS, *In I Sent.*, divisio textus Prologi cum eius expositione.

⁴ST. BONAVENTURE, *In I Sent.*, expositio in Prologum.

cationem); heterogeneous or transformistic evolution — that in which the formulae are not implicitly contained in one another — was by them called *substantive evolution (quoad substantiam)*.

Hence, in matters of doctrine, the distinction between homogeneous or explicative evolution on the one hand, and transformistic or substantive evolution on the other, hinges on whether the meaning of the subsequent formulae is, or is not, implicitly contained in the meaning of the primitive formulae that make up the starting point.

SECTION II

THREE DEGREES OF DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION

22. EVOLUTION AND DISTINCTION. — As we have just seen, evolution or progress in general is simply the growth or increment of something that was already in existence. There can be no increment without the acquisition of something new. Nothing is new unless it is, in some measure, *distinct* from what was already existing. It follows that the degrees of evolution or progress are patterned after the degrees of distinction between the new that is acquired and the old that pre-existed.

23. THREE DEGREES OR KINDS OF DISTINCTION. — Any distinction either exists in the *object* itself prior to any operation of the subject, or does not exist in the object but is made by the subject. In the first case there is an objective or real distinction; in the second, a subjective distinction or a distinction of reason.

Likewise, the subject can make the distinction either with a basis in the object, or without it. In the former case the distinction is called a distinction of reasoned reason; in the latter, a distinction of reasoning reason.

Hence the three degrees of distinction that everybody knows: a) *real* or *objective* distinction; b) distinction of *reasoned reason [rationis ratiocinatae]*, which is also called *virtual* or *conceptual* distinction; c) distinction of *reasoning reason [rationis ratiocinantis]*, also known as *logical* or *nominal* distinction.

The first of these is a distinction of *real objectivity*; the second is merely a distinction of *partial concepts* or *aspects* within one and the same objectivity; the third is purely a distinction of *names* or of *formulae*, not only within one and the same objectivity, but also within one and the same concept or aspect of that objectivity.

The first distinction is purely *objective* and utterly independent of the subject. The second is *subjective*, but based or grounded on the object. The

third is also *subjective*, but so purely *subjective* that it is a mere product of the subject bereft of any basis in the object.⁵

The third distinction is *improperly called* distinction since it is merely nominal and discloses nothing new about the object. The second and the first are *properly called* distinctions since both provide us with some new knowledge. The second offers us new aspects or partial concepts of the same object, whereas the first gives us a new objectivity or reality.

An example of nominal distinction is that which exists between the concepts *man* and *rational animal*. An example of virtual distinction is that

⁵ Thus distinction is nothing but *lack of identity*: for those things are said to be distinct which are not the same.

"It is divided into *real* distinction and distinction of *reason*. Real distinction is the lack of identity obtaining on the part of the thing independently of the intellect. The distinction of reason is the lack of identity, but only as conceived, between things that in reality are not distinct but one and the same.

"The distinction of *reason* is also twofold. One is a distinction of *reasoning reason*, the other a distinction of *reasoned reason*. The former is that which is without a foundation in the thing, as when you distinguish between *Tullius* and *Cicero* . . . The latter has a foundation in the thing, as when you distinguish between justice and mercy in God . . .

"Two grounds can be given for this distinction [i.e. for the distinction of *reasoned reason*]. The first is the eminence of the thing . . . The second is the imperfection of our intellect which, not being capable of attaining to all these perfections simultaneously at once, conceives them by *distinct acts*, as if they were distinct, whence results a *distinction in the intellect*. The distinction, in so far as it is considered in the intellect, is called a distinction of *reasoned reason* with a foundation in the thing; in so far as it is considered in the thing, it is called *virtual*." (BILLIART, *de Deo*, d. 2, a. 3)

"There is a distinction that arises from the things, and there is a distinction made by the intention of the mind. If one distinguishes things which in themselves are many, it is a *real* distinction; if one distinguishes through consideration things which in themselves are not distinct, it is called a distinction of *reason* . . . The distinction of *reason* is twofold. One is a distinction of reason with a foundation in the thing . . . The other is a purely mental distinction. From the foregoing it can be understood that the distinction of *reasoned reason*, that is with, a foundation in the thing, is accomplished through *inadequate concepts* of the same thing; whereas the distinction of reasoning reason, that is, that which is purely mental, is accomplished through a certain *reverting* to the same adequate concept of the same thing . . . The distinction of reasoned reason is also called *metaphysical* . . . Not infrequently it is also termed *virtual*, inasmuch as it is not actual on the part of the thing . . ." (PESCH, *Philosophia Lacensis, Logica*, lib. 1, n. 98)

Therefore, fundamentally there are two, not three, kinds of distinction: one, a distinction of the *object*, which is the real or objective distinction; the other, a distinction of the *subject*, which is the distinction of reason or subjective. The distinction called virtual, conceptual, or of reasoned reason, is not a third member divided on a par with the other two, but a member or subdivision of the distinction of reason or subjective distinction. Virtual distinction, consequently, is *formally subjective*, although with a foundation or basis in the object.

which exists between the concepts *immateriality* and *intelligibility*. An example of objective-real distinction is that which exists between the concepts *soul* and *body*, or *accident* and *actual inherence in a subject*.

In the case of *nominal* distinction the concepts or the propositions are *identical* not only really but also logically or formally. In the case of *real* distinction the concepts or the propositions differ not only logically or formally but also really. In the case of *virtual* distinction the concepts or the propositions are logically or formally *distinct*, but really or objectively *identical*.

We beg the reader's indulgence for taking up so much time in elucidating such elementary matters for on their correct understanding hinges to a great degree the grasp of the problem of the nature, whether homogeneous or transformistic, of all doctrinal evolution.

24. THREE KINDS OF CONCLUSIONS AND REASONINGS. — There being three kinds of distinction, it follows that there will also be three kinds of conclusions, to wit: a) nominal conclusions; b) conceptual conclusions; c) objective-real conclusions, depending on whether between the conclusion and the principle from which it is deduced, there respectively exists a nominal, or a conceptual or a real distinction.

Consequently, there will also be three kinds of reasonings, viz.: a) nominal reasonings; b) conceptual reasonings; c) real reasonings, depending on whether the conclusions deduced are respectively nominal, conceptual or real.

25. THREE KINDS OF VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE. — Since virtual or mediate is the same thing as conclusion, there will be three kinds of virtual or mediate corresponding exactly to the three kinds of conclusions, viz.: a) nominal virtual or mediate; b) conceptual virtual or mediate; c) objective-real virtual or mediate.

26. THREE KINDS OF PROGRESS OR EVOLUTION. — Correlative to these three kinds of distinction, of reasonings, of conclusions, or of virtuality, there are also three kinds of progress or evolution, to wit:

1. *Nominal* progress or evolution, such as exists in passing from one proposition to another nominally distinct, e.g. the passage from *N* is a *rational animal*. This is a progress restricted to *mere formulae*, involving no passage to any new concept or aspect.

2. *Conceptual* progress or evolution, such as exists in passing from one proposition to another conceptually distinct, e.g. the passage from *N* is *spiritual* to *N* is *immortal*. This is more than a progress of mere formulae for it involves a passing on to virtually distinct concepts or aspects, which, however, are really and objectively identical to one another.

3. *Objective-real* progress or evolution, such as exists in passing from one proposition to another that is really distinct, e.g. from *N* is an *accident* to *N* *actually inheres in a subject*. This is a progress not simply of mere formulae nor simply of concepts, but also of objective reality; it is a progress in respect of the substance or real objectivity.

The first is a *merely subjective* progress, just as the nominal distinction on which it is based is merely subjective. The second is also *subjective* but based on the object, as is the conceptual distinction. The third is *purely objective*, as is also the real distinction. (23)

27. PROPER AND IMPROPER DISCOURSE. — Of the three kinds of reasonings mentioned above (24), the first, in which a merely nominal distinction is interposed between the conclusion and the premise, is said to be, and is, an *improper* reasoning. On the other hand, the second, in which there is a conceptual distinction, and the third, in which there is a real distinction, are said to be, and truly are, *proper* reasonings.

The reasoning based on nominal distinction is said to be an improper discourse because there is only *one concept* or idea, notwithstanding the variety of *names* or of formulae between the principle and the conclusion. Which is to say that in this kind of reasoning there are many *oral* acts, but only one *intellectual* act. Hence there is in it no true discourse, for discourse requires various intellectual acts.

On the other hand, the reasoning based on conceptual distinction, and the reasoning based on real distinction are discourse in the proper sense of the term because in these reasonings there is a multiplicity of realities, or at least, a multiplicity of concepts. Now, the human intellect, unlike that of the angels, is incapable of grasping with one single act diverse realities, or even diverse concepts. Hence, whenever either a conceptual or a real distinction intervenes between the conclusion and the principle, the discourse is proper.⁶

⁶ *Discourse*, as any other movement, presupposes a *point of departure*, which in this case is the propositions of the primitive datum. This discourse can be employed to pursue four ends: a) to find the formal meaning of the terms or words which make up the primitive datum: this is hermeneutics and exegesis; b) to explain, that is, to render more comprehensible, through analogies or comparisons, the meaning of the primitive propositions, since these are supernatural or suprasensible propositions: this is the *sapiential* function proper of the supreme sciences relative to their own proper principles; c) to defend it against those who deny it: this is *apologetics*, another sapiential function; d) to *deduce new propositions*, distinct from those comprised in the point of departure: this, and this alone, constitutes *science* as science. It is this fourth case that is relevant when the question of doctrinal progress or evolution is raised. The new propositions can be: a) nominally distinct from the propositions of the point of departure; b) conceptually or virtually distinct; c) really or objectively distinct. In the first case the discourse is improper; in the other two cases the discourse is proper. Thus, whenever mention is made of proper or improper discourses, we do not mean a discourse that is merely exegetical, or apologetical, or sapiential, we mean a discourse that is *scientific* or *deductive of new propositions*.

28. OBSERVATION. — It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish carefully not only the improper from the proper discourse but also, and with even greater care, the two species of proper discourse. To confuse the proper conceptual discourse with the real proper discourse is to confuse the subject with the object, and subjective evolution with objective evolution. Conceptual distinction, as we have already mentioned, notwithstanding its being grounded on the object, is nevertheless formally subjective, whereas real distinction is completely objective. On the other hand, conceptual distinction and nominal or logical distinction are both subjective, the only difference between them being that one has a basis in the object and the other has not.

Hence, when it is a question of determining whether this or that doctrinal evolution is objective or subjective, it is a more serious mistake to confuse the two species of proper discourse, in which one is objective and the other subjective, than to confuse the proper conceptual discourse with the improper discourse, both of which are subjective. And yet, while all modern authors speak of the distinction between proper and improper discourse, there is hardly any one who treats of the distinction between the two proper discourses.

29. PROPER AND IMPROPER VIRTUALITY. — There being one improper reasoning and two proper reasonings, there are correlatively one improper virtuality, the nominal, and two proper virtualities, the conceptual and the real. We have just adverted to the need to distinguish carefully between the two species of proper reasoning. The same admonition holds equally for the need to distinguish sedulously between the two species of proper virtuality. The reasons are exactly the same for both cases.

30. THE SCALE OF DOCTRINAL PROGRESS. — The foregoing makes it easy to construct a true scale wherewith to measure and classify the different possible degrees of progress or evolution in the intellectual or doctrinal order. This scale comprises a point of departure and three perfectly delineated degrees in a sequence of progressive differentiation.

31. THE POINT OF DEPARTURE is made up of those truths held by our minds prior to its movement (*discurrere*) or reasoning. The mind holds these truths without the intervention of any reasoning whatsoever, either proper or improper, that is, it holds them either by simple intuition in the natural order, or by simple revelation in the supernatural order. In the natural order the starting point is made up of the first intuitive or *per se* evident principles; in the supernatural order it is made up of the revealed propositions in the form in which they issued from the mouth or from the pen of the Apostles and inspired writers.

The starting point for any subsequent progress is called either *immediate-explicit*, or *formal-explicit*, or simply *explicit*, period. It is given these names because no reasoning of any sort, no unfolding of any kind by human reason has touched it as yet. It is but the object of simple understanding or of simple revelation.

32. THE FIRST DEGREE of the scale is made up of all the new formulae derived from the point of departure, which differ from the primitive propositions with a merely *nominal distinction*. Such formulae are called: a) *immediate-implicit* or *formal-implicit*; b) *improper-virtual* or *improper-mediate*.

It is said to be, and truly is, improperly virtual or *mediate* — and, therefore, properly immediate or formal — because, as yet, there is no virtual, but only nominal distinction. It is said to be implicit, and not explicit, because there has already occurred some explication of the propositions constituting the point of departure.⁷

This first degree includes all the things contained in the point of departure in any of the four following ways: a) as the definition in the defined; b) as an essential part in the whole; c) as a particular in the undetermined universal; d) as one correlative in the other correlative. It is obvious that, in any of these cases, in order to pass from one extreme to the other, nothing more is required than a simple explanation of the terms, that is to say, an improper reasoning, since each of the extremes is included in the definition of the other.

33. THE SECOND DEGREE of the scale includes all the new formulae derived from the primitive formulae of the point of departure, which differ from the latter not merely with a nominal but with a conceptual distinction. They are known by the names of: a) *implicit virtual* or *implicit mediate*; b) *identico-real virtual*.

It is properly called virtual or mediate since we now have, not merely a nominal distinction, which is improperly termed distinction, but also a conceptual distinction, which is a distinction in the proper sense of the term. It is called implicit or inclusive since, notwithstanding the passage from one concept to another, they both remain *within* the one and the same objectivity of the point of departure. It is described as *identico-real* because there exists no real distinction between this degree and the point of departure; there is only a

⁷If in the point of departure there should be something truly implicit, but with such a profound implicititude that the native power of our intellect is unequal to the task of explicating or bringing it to light, such a thing would be implicit *quoad se* but not *quoad nos*. An example would be the implicititude with which the Trinity of Persons is contained in the unity of the divine nature. Such implicititude requires divine revelation for its explication.

conceptual distinction, that is to say, different aspects within the same objective reality of the point of departure.

34. **THE THIRD DEGREE OF THE SCALE** comprises all the formulae derived from the primitive ones which differ from these not merely with a nominal or a conceptual distinction, but also with a *real distinction*. This degree is signified by the following names: a) *non-implicit virtual or non-implicit mediate*; b) *purely virtual*, or *purely mediate*, or *purely connexive (virtuale tantum, mediate tantum, connexive tantum)*.

It is virtual or mediate because of the proper distinction that is present. It is non-implicit or non-inclusive since, being really or objectively distinct from the point of departure, it is no longer within but outside of it; and thereby the conclusion denotes an objective reality added to the point of departure. It is merely virtual, merely mediate, or purely connexive because between the point of departure and the conclusion there exists no implicitude or inclusion, but only mere connexion.

35. **OBSERVATION.** — The reader will notice that the three degrees of this scale are perfectly characterized by the three degrees of distinction: nominal, conceptual, real. They have, besides, the added advantage of not being liable to confusion since they are of common knowledge and are universally accepted in the same sense by everybody.

Every philosopher or theologian is at liberty to designate these *three degrees of progress* by the *names* of his choice, provided that he does not confuse the content or the *meaning* of one degree with that of another. To confuse the first degree with the second necessarily involves confusing simple understanding with reasoning in the natural order, and consequently, faith with theology in the supernatural or revealed order. To confuse the second with the third degree is to confuse subjective progress with objective progress, since conceptual distinction is subjective and real distinction is objective distinction, and, as a consequence, to confuse homogeneous or explicative evolution with transformistic evolution.

SECTION III

DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION IN THE METAPHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES AND IN THE PHYSICAL AND MORAL SCIENCES

36. **TWO GREAT GROUPS OF SCIENCES.** — Bearing in mind this scale with its clear and perfectly defined degrees, it is easy to determine to which of those degrees the progress or evolution in each of the sciences belongs.

Of the three kinds of reasoning that make up the three degrees of the scale, the first does not produce any science strictly speaking. Nominal

reasoning is an improper reasoning, hence it remains within the scope of simple understanding or intuition, not within that of reason or science.

But the other two degrees, being made up of a proper reasoning and a proper virtuality and a proper and rigorous conclusion, comprise two groups of sciences, to wit: a) the metaphysical and the mathematical sciences; b) the physical and the moral sciences.¹

These two groups of sciences differ essentially in three things: a) in certitude; b) in procedure; c) in homogeneity.

37. **DIFFERENCE IN CERTITUDE.** — The certitude of the metaphysical and mathematical sciences is absolute, unconditional and objectively infallible — a certitude that not even God Himself can cause to fail. The failure of any one single case of a truly metaphysical conclusion involves the ruin of the foundation of human reason, for it would mean the failure of the very *essence* of things, which is the formal object of our reason and of every intellect. Furthermore, it would mean the failure of God Himself, for the essences of things are not grounded on the free will of God but on the divine essence itself.

Hence, in any case where a metaphysical or a mathematical conclusion seems to fail, it is either because it is not a true metaphysical or mathematical conclusion, or because the reasoning is not done well. To say that a conclusion is truly metaphysical or mathematical and validly deduced, but at the same time false, is to utter a contradiction.

Very different, indeed essentially different, is the certitude of the physical sciences or of physical conclusions. In these the certitude is not absolute but conditional or relative; it is not grounded on the essence of things but on the regularity of the laws by which the universe is ruled; it does not depend on the essence, but on the free will of God. Hence, every physical conclusion presupposes, as understood, the condition *provided that the laws of nature do not fail*. Since those laws can fail, and actually fail, as often as it pleases God, every physical conclusion implies the understood condition *provided that God has not intervened miraculously*.

Thus, whereas metaphysical conclusions are absolutely necessary on all levels, in all places, at all times, in the supernatural as well as in the natural order; physical conclusions are not necessary except in the natural order, but they can, and often do, fail in the supernatural order.

Metaphysical conclusions — e.g., every contingent being is a created being, or every spiritual being is immortal, or that which is absolutely immutable is eternal — are equally necessary in the revealed order and in the

¹ The term *physical science* here means any natural science based on observation and/or experiment. The term *moral science* refers to the behavioural sciences. — *Transl.*

natural order, and there is no conceivable case in which they could be false. But the physical conclusion that every man is a human person is false in Jesus Christ. The physical conclusion that the woman who is a mother is not a virgin is false in the Virgin Mary. The physical conclusion that every accident has actual inherence in its subject is false in the Eucharist. The physical conclusion that all fire actually burns is false in the case of the furnace of Babylon. This failure which, in the case of physical conclusions occurs every time it pleases God, can also occur in the conclusions of the so-called moral sciences every time it pleases the free-will of man.

38. DIFFERENCE IN PROCEDURE. — This difference in certitude arises precisely from the difference in procedure, that is to say, from the difference of the *minors* employed by the two groups of sciences in their reasonings.

In the metaphysical and mathematical sciences the minors are in every case essential or conceptual minors, the predicate of which is implicit in the essence of being as being (general metaphysics), or of the essence of this being (particular metaphysics); in other words, they are in every case of the essence. Likewise, mathematical minors are always either of the essence of quantity in general (pure mathematics), or of the essence of this species of quantity (applied mathematics), but in every case of the essence. Thus, to be constituted of act and potency, or to require a cause, is of the essence of contingent being; to be immortal is of the essence of spiritual being; and of the essence of the circumference is that its radii be equal.

On the other hand, in the physical and moral sciences the minors are not essential but accidental; the predicate of the minor is in no case essentially implicit in the subject, but in every case it lies outside of the subject's essence. To be a human person is not of the essence of man; not to be a virgin is not of the essence of motherhood; to have actual inherence is not of the essence of any accident; factual burning is not of the essence of fire; to love or not to love her offspring is not of the essence of a mother.

39. DIFFERENCE IN HOMOGENEITY. — This difference in procedure gives rise to the third difference in respect of the homogeneity of the conclusions or of the evolution. In the metaphysical sciences the progress is homogeneous, that is, a progress of analytic evolution. In the physical and moral sciences the progress is heterogeneous, that is, a progress by extrinsic addition.

The metaphysical or mathematical minor is always of the essence or *de intellectu* [of the understanding or notion] of the major.ⁱⁱ This being the case,

ii. *Minor* and *major* refer directly, not to the terms of the syllogism, but to the minor and major premises respectively. This should be clear from n. 38 where the author speaks of metaphysical and mathematical minors whose *predicate* is implicit in the essence of the *subject*. — *Transl.*

the conclusions do not go beyond the objectivity of the point of departure, but are simply different aspects that were already implicit or included in it. The whole science of metaphysics, in all its conclusions — provided that they are true and rigorous conclusions — is nothing more than an analytic and homogeneous development of the point of departure of metaphysics, namely, the intuitive apprehension of the notion of being as such. With this intuition alone to start with, and by means only of minors already implicit in the starting point, the metaphysician develops his science in all its entirety. If he had from the beginning enough intellectual power to penetrate well all that is implicit in the point of departure, he would have no need of any such minors. In the very point of departure he would intuitively see, as the angels do, all those conclusions which, because of our reason's feebleness, we, as a matter of fact, see successively with the aid of several minors, through reasoning. The role of the minors therefore is, not to *add* something that was not already implicit in the starting point, but merely to help our feeble reason to see part by part, or by successive aspects the very same thing that was already there, implicit from the very start. The imperfect photographic apparatus of our mind requires several exposures of the object from different angles because it is incapable of taking in in one single photograph, that is, in one single act of vision, all the wealth and fecundity of facets or aspects of the point of departure.

The opposite occurs in the poor physical and moral sciences, the fabric and texture of which is not essential but accidental, not analytic but synthetic. No physical minor is really implicit in the objectivity or essence of the majors; physical minors are without, not within the point of departure. A herence in a subject is not truly implicit in the essence of man; actual burning is not implicit in the essence of fire; nor is it implicit in the essence of a stone that it should factually fall or not. Since no thing can be seen in another if it be not truly implicit in the latter, not even God Himself is capable of seeing with absolute certitude in the mere essence of a thing any physical or moral conclusion, any of its actual properties, any of its contingent effects.

Incidentally, this is why St. Thomas and his school require in God an act of the will, a free decree added to his intellect in order to see the contingent futures, that is to say, everything that is not of the essence of things. Through knowledge of simple understanding, independently of any decree of his will, God sees with absolute certitude everything that is essential, that is, all metaphysical and mathematical conclusions. If He had no other knowledge but that of simple understanding, not one single physical or moral conclusion could ever be known by God with absolute certitude.

40. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE. — Thus, the progress or evolution through metaphysical or mathematical minors belongs to the second degree of the scale, that is, to the *implicit virtual*.

It does not belong to the first degree of the formal-implicit or the immediate-implicit, because the first degree admits no reasoning other than the nominal or improper, whereas the metaphysical and mathematical sciences, in those cases where their conclusions differ conceptually from the principles, require for our reason a rigorous conceptual reasoning. Hence, relative to us they are not only truly and properly sciences but even the most exact and the most rigorous of sciences. Neither does it belong to the third degree of the virtual non-implicit or virtual purely connective, because although the reasoning involved is proper and rigorous, it is analytic or inclusive, not synthetic or purely connective.

On the other hand, the progress or evolution through physical minors belongs to the third degree of the scale, that of the virtual non-implicit. It belongs neither to the first nor to the second degree. Not to the first since the reasoning is not merely nominal. Not to the second because the reasoning is not one of analysis or of inclusion within the concepts or aspects of the same thing, but one of pure connexion or of transition from one thing to another that is really distinct from the former.

All of this had already been condensed by St. Thomas in a few words. To the objection that in all true science there must be a proper reasoning or passage *de uno in aliud* [from one to another], he answers: "In all sciences the mode of reason is preserved in so far as there should be a transition *from one to another according to reason*, but not that there should be a transition *from one thing to another thing*, this being proper of natural science."⁸

41. COROLLARY. — Consequently, the phrase *minors of reason*, that appears frequently in the discussion of the progress of dogma, is ambiguous. The term *reason* can stand for two things: a) the power or faculty called reason, whose proper act is reasoning; b) the *reasons*,ⁱⁱⁱ or minor premises that such a power employs when it reasons in the different sciences.

The power of reason is only one, and therefore the same in all the various sciences; however, its *reasons* or minors can be many and essentially diverse. There are minors of *metaphysical reason* and minors of *physical reason*. The former are minors already implicit in the majors that are the starting point of the reasoning, and they are nothing but instruments that our reason needs in order to explicate and develop, not to add or modify, the objectivity of the major. The latter are not implicit in the major, hence they do not merely explicate, but add to the objectivity of the starting point.

⁸In Boet. *de Trinitate*, q.6, a.1, ad primam questionem, ad 3.

iii. In the first of these two senses the author takes the term *reason subjectively*; usage that signifies the power of intellectual cognition as well as its characteristic act. The characteristic act is reasoning or discourse. The power itself is denoted by various other names as, e.g. *understanding*, *intellect*, *mind*.

SECTION IV

THE EVOLUTION BY REASONING OR PASSING FROM THE ESSENCE TO ITS PROPERTIES

42. TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF THE CONCLUSION. — The Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy defines the scientific conclusion in the proper sense, and therefore also the proper and rigorous theological conclusion, with the classical formula: *The deduction of the property from the essence or of the effect from the cause*.

The true or false notion of the nature of the evolution effected through scientific or theological conclusions depends on the true or false understanding of this definition.

In this section we will consider the nature of the transition from the essence to its properties, and in the next we will study the nature of the transition from the cause to its effects.

The objective sense of the term is not in current usage, although traces of it are to be found in such expressions as "There are good reasons for this theory", where *good reasons* means *objectively valid reasons*. However, in the tradition of the Schools, the corresponding Latin term *ratio* was, and is, indifferently employed either subjectively or objectively.

If subjectively *reason* denotes the power of understanding or conceiving intellectually, then objectively the term denotes either (a) that which is *understood*, or (b) that which is *conceived* by mind.

That which is understood is the *outside thing* or *object*. But nothing indeterminate can, as such, be understood. Wherefore, taken objectively, reason denotes in the first place that which is *determinate* in the object or outside thing, that is, its *essence*, *nature*, *kind*, or *species*. It also denotes that whereby the object is placed in a determinate kind or species, viz. its *form*, particularly its *substantial form*. (The modern surrogates for essence and form are constitution and structure respectively).

But that which is understood is not understood except through *that which the mind conceives* about the object. Hence, in the second place, reason objectively denotes the *concept*, *idea*, *notion*, or *definition* of a thing, as well as the *judgments* or *propositions* formed by the mind to express what it knows or conceives about the thing's nature or form.

When the Schoolmen say that to be rational is *of the reason* (*de ratione*) of man, the term is taken objectively, and means that to be rational is of the *essence* or *nature*, of the *understanding* or *concept* or *notion* or *definition* of man. Likewise, the whole proposition itself if *of the reason* of man, i.e. it is an *essential* proposition, or one that describes the *nature* of man, or one that *explicates the notion* of man.

It may be objected that concepts cannot be one of the objective denotations of *reason*, since concepts are subjective. The answer is that in the *psychological* order concepts are indeed subjective, inasmuch as they are accidental qualities inhering in the mind. But in the order of *knowing*, the concept is the *vicar* of, the *stand-in* for, the object. Thus, in the order of *intentionality* concepts are not subjective but *objective*. — *Transl.*

43. THREE SENSES OF THE TERM ESSENCE. — The essence of any thing can be taken in three very different senses, viz.: a) the mere essence, or the essence in the abstract; b) the *integral* essence, or the essence in its *con-natural* state; c) the completely *perfect* essence.

The mere essence, or the essence taken in the abstract implies the *essential* predicates alone, and nothing else. The integral or connatural essence, in addition to the essential predicates, comprises furthermore the connatural predicates or the integral parts which the essence should have in accordance with the laws of nature. Finally, the completely perfect essence includes also all the accidental perfections of which the given essence is capable.

Thus, any thing that possesses the essential predicates of *animal* and *rational*, or those of *rational soul* and *body*, possesses the mere or true essence of man, and it makes no difference that he should lack this or that member or power, e.g. that he be lame, or armless, or deaf, or blind. Whoever possesses not only the essential predicates but also all the integral parts, possesses the integral or connatural essence, even if he should lack the accidental or acquirable perfections, e.g. if he be wanting in science or virtue. Whoever possesses all the perfections without exception, that is, the essential as well as the connatural and the acquirable, possesses the completely perfect essence.

We beg the reader never to lose sight of these three states of the essence if he wishes not to lose his bearings in the problem of the evolution of dogma. The three senses of the term essence are not only distinct but also perfectly ordered in rank or degree. The third sense *includes* the second, and the second *includes* the first. Hence the first is *implicit* in the second, and the second is *implicit* in the third. But the third is not implicit in the second nor is the second implicit in the first.

Consequently, when God reveals to us that "N is a man", He could have revealed it in three different senses, that is: a) man *essentially* or *truly*; b) man *integrally* or *connaturally*; c) man completely *perfect*. Since explicit divine revelation is the starting point of all conclusions or of all progress, the conclusions that can be deduced by way of implicitude, or in the same sense will be very different depending on which of the three senses is taken as the starting point; and consequently, too, the conclusions will vary as regards their homogeneity or heterogeneity with the starting point or revealed datum.

What we have just observed relative to the term *man* must also be said of any other predicate contained in divine revelation.

44. TWO SENSES OF THE TERM PROPERTY. — There are two kinds of properties that differ completely one from the other: a) *essential* pro-

erties, which are also called *metaphysical*, *aptitudinal*, or *radical*; b) *accidental* properties, also known as *physical*, *actual* or *formal*.

The former are really identical with the essence; hence the essence can never be without them, not even by God's power. The latter are really distinct from the essence, and the essence of a given thing can, absolutely speaking, be without them.

It should be easy to distinguish between these two kinds of properties. For instance, one thing is the aptitudinal inherence of the accident in its subject, which exists even in the eucharistic accidents, and quite another the actual inherence. One thing is the radical capacity for seeing, which exists even in the blind but not in a stone, and quite another the actual capacity which is wanting both in the blind and in the stone. One thing is the radical risibility, which is found even in the man whose facial muscles are all paralyzed, and quite another the actual risibility. One thing is radical peccability which is found in all mere creatures, and quite another actual peccability which did not exist in the Virgin Mary. One thing is the radical capacity to die, which existed even in the state of innocence and exists in Elias and Enoch, and quite another actual death. One thing is the exigency of burning, which existed in the very fire of the furnace of Babylon, and quite another the actual burning.

Examples like these could be multiplied to infinity. It is precisely the distinction between the radical or metaphysical properties and the actual or physical properties that grounds the possibility of miracles, or of the supernatural order *quoad efficientiam* [in the order of efficient causality]. God cannot suspend the metaphysical properties, for they are essential; but He can suspend the physical properties, because they are accidental.⁹

⁹"It must be noted that there are two kinds of properties: one physical and real, the other logical and attributive. The physical and real property is a *real accident* consequent to the essence, as utmost heat is consequent to fire . . . The logical or attributive property is a notion that is *distinct from the essence by reason alone*, and consequent to the essence only through the manner of understanding; thus infinity is said to be a property of the divine essence, mortality a property of a living body, not to have contraries a property of substance, etc.; not that they are some thing distinct from the things of our intellect distinguishes from the essence and attributes to the latter as its appendages." (GOUJIN, *Logica Major*, p.1, d.1, q.2, a.7) "*Radical* risibility belongs to man *essentially*; but the *formal* (or physical), accidentally." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus theologicus, de virtutibus*, d.17, a.3, n.14). "There appears no manifest contradiction that the proper passions, which are really distinct from the subject, be separated from the subject . . . And thus those propositions that affirm the proper passions can be falsified by God, e.g. that quantity, which is the proper passion of body, be separated from the subject . . . as to the *actual conjunction* and *exigency*." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus philosophicus*, p.3, q.2, a.2). "Although *aptitudinal* inherence is of the essence of the accident, *actual* inherence is its *proper passion* as something that

45. SIX TYPES OF REASONING OR PASSING FROM THE ESSENCE TO THE PROPERTY. — Since the term *essence* can be taken in three different senses, and the term *property* can be taken in two, there are six ($3 \times 2 = 6$) possible combinations: three by combining the three senses of *essence* with the first sense of *property*, and another three by combining the same three senses of *essence* with the second sense of *property*.

Thus, if as an example of *essence* we take the *essence of man* (man essentially or truly — man connaturally or integrally — perfect man), and as an example of *property* we take *risibility* (radical risibility — actual risibility), there are six types of reasoning from *essence* to *property*, as follows:

Type 1: reasoning from pure *essence* to radical *property*; e.g.: N is man (*truly* man); therefore he is radically risible.

Type 2: reasoning from connatural or integral *essence* to radical *property*; e.g. N is man (*man integrally*); therefore he is radically risible.

Type 3: reasoning from completely perfect *essence* to radical *property*; e.g. N is man (*perfect* man); therefore he is radically risible.

Type 4: reasoning from pure *essence* to actual *property*; e.g. N is man (*truly* man); therefore he is actually risible.

Type 5: reasoning from integral *essence* to actual *property*; e.g. N is man (*man integrally*); therefore he is actually risible.

Type 6: reasoning from perfect *essence* to actual *property*; e.g. N is man (*perfect* man); therefore he is actually risible.

It is obvious that there can be no other types of reasoning from *essence* to *property* aside from the six enumerated, and that any other type reduces to one of these.

46. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE. — Each of these six types of reasoning is a true passage from the *essence* to the *property*; therefore every one of them is a proper reasoning. Consequently none of them belongs to the first degree of the scale.

Every one of them, with the exception of the fourth, are reasonings by way of inclusion or implicitude; therefore they belong to the second degree, that is, to the virtual implicit. This is evident in the case of the first three, since they deal with essential properties, which is to say, *included* in the *essence* itself. It should be equally evident in the fifth and sixth cases. Although actual properties or accidental perfections are not included in the concept of mere *essence*, they are included in the concept of the integrity or

naturally and necessarily accompanies it if it be left to its nature, and yet by the power of God accidents are made to be without a subject in the Sacrament of the Altar." (FER- RARIENSIS, *In 4 Contra Genes*, c.65)

perfection of the *essence*. "For a thing to be perfect, it is necessary that it possess both the form [essence] as well as those things that preexist to, and those that follow [properties], it."¹⁰

On the other hand, the fourth type is clearly a reasoning of real disjunction or of accidental connexion, and thus belongs to the third degree of the scale. This is the reasoning proper of the physical sciences.

In reality, all these six types of reasoning reduce to two: a) reasoning of real distinction or of pure connexion with no implicitude — the fourth type; — b) reasoning of real identity or of true implicitude — the other five types.

47. THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. — That which in other things is called *properties*, and which the ancients also denominated *passions*, is in God known by the name of *attributes*. Now, the distinction between the divine *essence* and its attributes, or between the attributes themselves, is not real but only conceptual. Consequently, the fourth type of reasoning can find no place in the whole treatise on God. Thus all progress from the divine *essence* to its attributes, or from one attribute to another, belongs to the second degree, that is, to the virtual implicit.

48. ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL RELATIONS. — What has been said about the transition or progress from the *essence* to its properties is likewise applicable to the transition or progress from the *essence* to the *relations* that the *essence*, or the starting point, bears to other things, since in the instant case properties are equivalent to relations. "Whatever can be predicated of another is also called *passion*, whether it be negations or *relations* to other things. And many such can be proven of God both from naturally known principles and from the principles of faith."¹¹

Consequently, the passage from the starting point to any of its essential or aptitudinal relations belongs to the second degree of the scale, or the virtual implicit. The passage to its accidental or actual relations belongs to the third degree, or the merely connexive virtual.

CONFIRMATION. — From the many texts that could be cited to corroborate what we have been explaining, we will quote the three that follow:

"Therefore, when that which constitutes the *reason* of a nature, whereby the nature is itself understood, has an *order to*, and *dependence on*, another, it is manifest that that nature cannot be understood without it. And this holds not only in the case when one is conjoined to the other with that conjunction wherewith the part is conjoined to the whole . . . or the form is united to matter . . . but also in the case where the one is in reality

¹⁰ ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.5, a.5.

¹¹ ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate*, q.2, a.2, ad 3.

separated from the other, as the father *cannot be understood* without the understanding of the son, notwithstanding the fact that *these relations* are found in things that are distinct."¹²

"That *inclusion* is said to be identical and *essential*, when certain things are so related that one *includes* the other *essentially*, and vice versa, as is *manifest* in God, in Whom the divine essence *essentially includes* each and every attribute and conversely each attribute *includes* the divine essence itself; or when two things *essentially* coincide in a third one, as, e.g. the *persons* and *modes* in *being itself*."¹³

"On the other hand, there are *relations*, not accidental but *essential*, which are *implicit* in a given essence or in one of its faculties. *The concept* which *expresses this essence* expresses *at the same time the relations* which it contains. Thus, *being* denotes that which bears relation to existence and this relation is *included* in the very *nature* of that which exists . . . What we say of being in general and of its properties can likewise be said of *all* the absolute analogical *perfections* which the common sense of men attributes to God, e.g. intelligence, wisdom, providence, free-will, love, mercy, justice."¹⁴

49. COROLLARY. — Hence, the definition usually given of the theological conclusion, as the deduction of a property from the essence, and the classical example of the same, *Christ is man, therefore He is risible*, are both ambiguous and capable of two radically different senses.

If by *man* is understood the mere human essence and by *risible* is understood actual risibility, then the conclusion is of the fourth type. It is not an implicit, but a purely connexive conclusion, one that belongs to the third degree of the scale.

But if by *risible* is understood radical risibility (types 1, 2, and 3), or, if taken to mean actual risibility, by *man* is understood either the integral or the perfect man (types 5 and 6), then the conclusion is implicit in its principle and thus belongs to the second degree of the scale.

Consequently, to grasp the true mind of a theologian, it is not enough to ascertain whether he uses, or not, the given definition and example. It is necessary to verify in which of those two senses he employs them.

¹² ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3.
¹³ MAGISTER AQUARIUS, O.P., *Formalitates iuxta doctrinam Angelici Doctoris*, Neapoli 1605, c. 1, p. 7.

¹⁴ GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O.P., *Dieu, son existence et sa nature*, Paris 1915, pp. 542-545, n. 56.

SECTION V

EVOLUTION BY REASONING OR PASSING FROM THE CAUSE TO ITS EFFECTS

50. TWO KINDS OF CAUSES. — There are two essentially different kinds of causes, viz.: a) causes that are really identical with, and differ only conceptually from, their effects; b) causes that are really distinct from their effects.

Instances of the first kind are absolute immutability relative to eternity, or immateriality relative to cognoscibility, or spirituality relative to immortality. Absolute immutability is said to be, and is, the cause of eternity because the latter *results* from the former, and the former is the *raison d'être* of the latter. Nonetheless, the two are not distinct realities but only two aspects of the same reality. The same can be said of the other two, and of many more, examples.

Instances of the second kind of causes are fire relative to the effect of burning, or a stone's gravity relative to its falling, or the debit which is the cause of original sin relative to the fact of contracting it. Between the fire and the burning, or between gravity and the stone's fall, or between the debit of original sin and the sin itself, there is not only virtual causality or *raison d'être* but also real distinction.

Causes of the first kind are called *metaphysical*, or *virtual*, or causes *in cognoscendo* [in the order of knowing]; causes of the second kind, *physical* or *real*, or causes *in essendo* [in the order of being].

A cause of the first kind really contains in itself not only the power to produce the effect, but also the effect itself. Thus in absolute immutability is contained not merely the power to produce eternity, but eternity itself. If we distinguish between immutability and eternity, or between immateriality and cognoscibility, or between spirituality and immortality, the distinction is not real or objective, it is a distinction that is *ours* or subjective, that is, a distinction between aspects or concepts but with a basis in the object itself.

A cause of the second kind really contains the power to produce the effect, but not the effect itself. Fire contains the power of burning but not the act of burning itself, which is a thing that really differs from and, absolutely speaking, is separable from the fire. It is a distinction that is not subjective or ours, but objective or of the object in itself.

51. APPLICATION OF THE SCALE. — The progress or reasoning from the virtual or metaphysical cause to its effects obviously pertains to the second degree of the scale, or to the virtual implicit. Not to the first because the intervening distinction is not merely nominal but conceptual. Not to the

third because between the metaphysical cause and its effects there is no real or objective, but only a subjective distinction, that is, a distinction of aspects.

On the other hand, the progress or passage from the physical or real cause to its effects obviously pertains to the third degree of the scale for the exactly opposite reason. It is a purely connexive virtual, with no inclusion or objective implicitude.

52. COROLLARY. — What has been said of the definition *deduction of the property from the essence* (49), must likewise be said of the definition cause, in the definition, be taken to mean the metaphysical, or virtual, or cause *in cognoscendo*, then the conclusion was already objectively implicit in the starting point. If by cause be understood the physical, or real, or cause *in essendo*, then the conclusion is not implicit, but purely connexive. The reason is that the physical cause contains the power to produce the effect, but not the effect itself; whereas the metaphysical cause contains the effect itself, not merely the power to produce it.

53. CORROBORATIVE TEXTS. — Although we think that the foregoing is sufficiently clear, we shall quote supporting authorities, principally in order to penetrate well the distinction between the physical and the metaphysical cause.

The Ferrariensis: iv "To make this evident, observe that there are two ways of considering the a priori demonstration [or by cause]: the first considers that whose middle is *truly and really the cause*; the second considers that whose middle is *not truly and really the cause*, but only a *middle according to reason* . . . I say, then, first: that of God [theological science] there can be no demonstration at all of the first sort, since there is in God *no thing truly caused* . . . I say secondly: that, indeed, neither of being nor of the *supreme universal genera* [metaphysical sciences] is there any demonstration of this sort for the same reason . . . I say thirdly: that hence it does not follow that neither *metaphysics* nor *mathematics* are sciences, for although no thing can be demonstrated either of being or of the supreme universal genera by the first sort of demonstration, nevertheless some thing can be demonstrated of them by the second sort or demonstration."¹⁵

iv. SYLVESTER OF FERRARA, O.P., is commonly known in theological literature as the *Ferrariensis*, just as Aristotle is known as the *Stagyrite*, and Thomas de Vio, O.P. is better known as *Cardinal Cajetan*, or simply *Cajetan*. — *Transl.*
¹⁵In *Summam Contra Gentes*, lib. 1, c.25, n.13; in the ed. Leon. of the works of St. Thomas, t.13, pp. 80-81.

John of St. Thomas: "The answer is that it is not necessary that [a demonstration] should always proceed from a cause which is *formally* and *physically* a cause, but it is enough that it be a cause *virtually* and *metaphysically*, so that one is the *reason of the other*, even without causing it, as for instance immutability is the reason of eternity and perfection the reason of goodness."¹⁶

Cardinal Cajetan: "Hence, speaking *formally*, not uncommonly is immutability said to be the cause of eternity, and immateriality the cause of immortality, and so in other cases."¹⁷

¹⁶*Curraus Philosophicus, Logica*, p.2, q.25, a.1, ed. Vivès, t.1, p.683.

¹⁷*In Post. Analyt.*, c.2, Lugduni 1572, p.283.

SECTION I

THE TRUE STARTING POINT OF ALL DOGMATIC
OR THEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION

CHAPTER II

55. REVEALED FORMULAE AND REVEALED MEANING. — Two elements must be clearly distinguished in divine revelation: a) the revealed formulae, whether verbal or imaginary; b) the revealed meaning of the formulae. These two things are respectively denominated by St. Thomas as: a) the reception of a thing; b) the judgment on the things received.

Now, the divine revelation formally consists in the revealed meaning and not merely in the formulae. If God had restricted Himself to revealing to us new formulae without disclosing their meaning, that would not be a case of true revelation but a case of mere vision. Such a vision would be as useless for divine faith as the God-sent dreams of Pharaoh or the God-sent vision of the *Mane, Thecel, Phares* seen by Belshazzar, if God Himself had not subsequently disclosed their divine meaning through Joseph and Daniel.

For true revelation to exist, and not simply vision, it is not necessary that the prophet or the inspired author should grasp *all* the meaning that God intends to convey by means of the formulae, and is truly contained in them. Neither is it necessary that the prophet or the apostle, when promulgating either orally or in writing the revelation received, should explicitly express *all* the meaning that with the aid of divine light he sees in the divine formulae. Much less is it necessary that they who hear the prophet or apostle should from the beginning understand *all* the meaning really contained in the statements of the prophet or apostle.

However, for the existence of true revelation and true divine faith it is indispensable that God should have given *some* explicit meaning to the revealed formulae; likewise, it is indispensable that the prophet or apostle should have understood, at least *something* of that divine meaning; and, finally, it is indispensable that those who hear the prophet or apostle — that is, the primitive Church in the present case — should have understood from the beginning *some* meaning, that is, *some explicit* meaning, in the apostolic formulae. Whoever receives formulae from God without perceiving *some* meaning would not be a true prophet but a visionary or a dreamer, nor would those who subsequently receive such formulae from the prophet or apostle be capable of eliciting any act of divine faith. Thus, not the formulae, but the divine meaning is the formal element of both revelation and faith. To receive divine formulae without receiving *some* divine explicit meaning cannot be properly called divine revelation; progress of formulae without progress in meaning cannot be properly called dogmatic progress.

THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA AND THE IMPLICIT VIRTUALITY
OF THE REVEALED DATUM

54. DIVISION. — Having considered the nature of intellectual evolution in general and the various degrees of virtuality that can contribute to it, we proceed now to the study of the different virtualities of the deposit revealed by God to the Apostles and by them conveyed to the Church, and the examination of the virtualities that are, or are not, capable of true dogmatic evolution.

To this effect we shall examine seven things.

- I. The starting point of dogmatic, as well as theological, evolution.
- II. The origin of the modern confusion concerning the true revealed virtuality.
- III. Classification of the various Catholic theories on this subject.
- IV. The physico-connexive virtuality is neither a true revealed, nor a true theological, virtuality.
- V. The true theological virtuality is the implicit or metaphysico-inclusive virtuality.
- VI. The metaphysico-inclusive virtuality is truly homogeneous with the revealed datum and objectively revealed.
- VII. Two opposed concepts of the nature of sacred theology or revealed virtuality.

St. Thomas has this to say: "Prophecy [or divine revelation] is a supernatural cognition. Now, two things are required for cognition, viz. reception [formulae] and judgment [meaning] of the things received. At times, therefore, the cognition is supernatural only in respect of the reception; at other times in respect of the judgment alone; and at other times in respect of both. But if it be supernatural only in respect of the reception [revelation of formulae unaccompanied by a revelation of meaning], a man will not therefor be called a Prophet, as Pharaoh, who supernaturally received a sign of forthcoming fertility and barrenness under the symbols of the cows and ears of corn, is not to be called a Prophet. But if he should have the supernatural judgment [meaning], or both the judgment and the reception [meaning and formulae], he is therefor called a prophet."¹

"For unless there be intellectual light to understand the sensible representations formed in the imagination, he to whom these representations are shown is not called a prophet, but rather a dreamer. At times he is called a prophet, but *improperly* and very far fetchedly."²

"It must be observed that there is a difference between *vision* and *revelation*: for revelation includes vision, but not conversely. For at times some things are seen, and then there is *vision alone*: as were the visions of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar. But when together with the vision the *meaning* and the *understanding* of the things that are seen are also given, *then revelation exists*. Hence, in the cases of Pharaoh and Nebuchadnezzar, the vision of the wheat stalks and of the statue was merely vision: but in the cases of Joseph and Daniel, who were given the *meaning* of the things seen, it was revelation."³

"For faith cannot issue into act unless by *believing* something *determinedly* and *expressly*."⁴

"For man would not assent by giving faith to certain propositions unless he *understood them somehow*."⁵

Thus Card. Billot has very well written: "The reception of revealed truth does not consist in the material possession of the dead letter but in the attainment of the *meaning* and of the *understanding* of the statements."⁶

¹ *De Veritate*, q.12, a.7.

² *In 1 ad Corinth.*, c. 14, lect. 1.

³ *In 2 ad Corinth.*, c. 12, lect. 1.

⁴ *In 3 Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, sol. 1, ad 3.

⁵ 2-2, q. 8, a. 2, ad 2.

⁶ *De Ecclesia Christi*, q. 10, th. 16, ed. 3. a (Romae), p. 356.

Consequently, the *starting point* of dogmatic progress has to be an *explicitly revealed meaning*. Without some explicit meaning there can be nothing implicit or virtual, nor can there consequently be any progress or evolution.

56. THE MEANING OF THE FORMULAE IN THE DIVINE MIND. — We have just seen that the divine meaning of the revealed formulae is the essential thing in both revelation and faith. But this meaning can be considered at three different stages before it reaches us: a) in the mind of God, who conceived it and revealed it to the Apostles; b) in the mind of the Apostles, who received it from God and conveyed it to the primitive Church; c) in the mind of the primitive Church, that received it from the Apostles and conveyed it to us.

In God's mind the meaning of the formulae was not partly explicit and partly implicit, not partly immediate and partly mediate, not partly formal and partly virtual, not partly revealed and partly revealable. On the contrary, in God's mind the meaning was, and is, utterly explicit and contains formally, immediately, and actually, all the implicitude and virtuality of which the formulae are capable. Consequently, if the question whether or not progress in the meaning of dogma is possible has for its starting point or for its point of comparison the meaning of such a dogma in God's mind in order to compare it with the meaning that it has in us, it is clear that there has been no progress but, instead, a diminution or retrogression. No matter how much we unfold the meaning of the dogmatic formulae, we shall never achieve but a vastly smaller amount of the meaning that they contain and that is seen by God in them. Hence, when theologians assert that a dogma progresses in meaning, it is obvious that no progress exists if the divine mind is taken as a term of comparison. Therefore, to discern whether there has, or has not, been an increase of meaning, that is, dogmatic evolution, the starting point is not the meaning that exists in the mind of God. Relative to this starting point there can be no increase.

57. THE MEANING OF THE FORMULAE IN THE MIND OF THE APOSTLES. — What has just been said of God's mind must be likewise said of the minds of the Apostles. Not precisely because revelation was made to them immediately by God — since both the Prophets and the Hagiographers also received their revelations immediately from God, — but because revelation was made to them as to the heads or chiefs of the Church of the New Testament, in whom the *plenitude* of divine revelation on earth was consummated and brought to a close.

Where mere prophets or inspired authors are concerned it is not absolutely necessary that they should explicitly know all the implicit meaning contained in the formulae revealed or inspired by God to them. According to St. Thomas, not even true prophets know all that the Holy Spirit intends to

signify by the visions, words or events revealed to them; and there is no inconsistency in saying that today we understand the prophecies and revelations of the Old Testament much more explicitly and fully than the Prophets themselves on account of the fuller divine or dogmatic explication of those prophecies and revelations given us by Jesus Christ, the Apostles, and His Church.⁷

But the Apostles were much more than mere prophets or mere hagiographers. As supreme teachers of the full and definitive revelation, and as foundations of the Church until the end of time, traditional theology acknowledges in the Apostles the special *privilege* of having received through infused light an *explicit* understanding of divine revelation greater than that which all the theologians, or even the Church as a whole, possess or will possess up to the end of time.

Hence, all the dogmas already defined by the Church and all those that will be defined in the future existed in the minds of the Apostles, not mediately or virtually or implicitly, but immediately, formally, explicitly. Their mode of knowing the revealed deposit was not like ours. We know by means of partial and *human* concepts, that implicitly and virtually contain much

⁷But it must be considered that, since the mind of the prophet is a deficient instrument, as has been said, even the true prophets do not know everything that the Holy Spirit intends in what they see, or say, or even do." (ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q. 173, a.4). There is nothing incompatible with this doctrine of St. Thomas in Leo XIII's encyclical *Providentissimus* where the Pope defines inspiration in the following terms: "By supernatural power (God) so aroused and moved them to write, was in such a manner present to them while they were writing, that they correctly conceived in their minds and willed faithfully to write, and aptly expressed with infallible truth all the things that He had commanded, and those alone; otherwise He would not be Himself the author of the S. Scriptures." (Denz.-Schön 3293).

VACANT suggests that this text of Leo XIII teaches that the Prophets knew, as the Apostles knew, all the divine meaning intended by the Holy Spirit. "According to various theologians, it would not be necessary for the inspired prophets to comprehend the full scope of some of the prophecies that they were writing; they would not at all have been capable of grasping their full meaning; it would be left only to future centuries really to understand their meaning. *This view is not shared by the encyclical 'Providentissimus'*. It says that all inspired writers conceive exactly all the statements that God causes them to formulate. *Ut ea omnia . . . recte mente conciperent'*: (*Constitutions du Concile du Vatican*, v.1, n.461, p.469). But it is obvious that to understand the meaning (recte mente concipere) of something is very different from understanding all its meaning. Leo XIII simply says that the inspired authors understood the meaning of all the things inspired by God - St. Thomas had already said as much -; but the Pontiff does not say that they understood all their meaning. However, the question is unimportant relative to the subject matter we are dealing with now for we are here concerned with the Apostles, and with respect to what amount of meaning was understood with the All the theologians concur with St. Thomas in asserting that they knew as many dogmas as the Church may define.

more meaning than they express, and require effort and time successively to unfold or explicate what is contained in them. They knew by means of *divine* or infused light, which is a simple supernatural understanding that in one stroke actualizes and illumines all the implicitude and virtuality.

Thus, if we take as a term of comparison the meaning of the revealed deposit as it was in the mind of the Apostles in order to compare it with the meaning that we know, then something similar to what we said of the mind of God must be said; namely, that there has been no progress but rather diminution or retrogression. We know, and will know, of the meaning of the revealed deposit much less and less explicitly than what the Apostles knew. When we talk of dogmatic progress, it must not be understood to mean progress beyond what the Apostles knew. Therefore, the mind of the Apostles cannot be the starting point or primitive datum required in order to detect the presence or the absence of dogmatic progress.⁸

⁸"It is not to be expected that a future state will come in which the grace of the Holy Spirit will be had more perfectly than it has been had up to now, especially by the Apostles, who received the first fruits of the Holy Spirit; that is, to say, *first in time* as well as *more abundantly than the rest*." (ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.106, a.4). "Sometimes, in order to manifest his power, [God] infuses in man those habits that can be acquired by natural energies; e.g. to the Apostles He gave the *knowledge of the Scriptures* and of all languages, which can be acquired by men through study or custom, although *not as perfectly*." (2-2, q.1, a.1, and 4) "It is an error in the faith to assert that, after the time of the Apostles, the *Doctors of the Church*, or even the *Church herself*, believe many more things *pertaining to the faith*, or believe more explicitly, than did the Apostles and the Sacred Writers of the evangelical doctrine." (BÁÑEZ, 2-2, q.1, a.7) This is to be understood, as St. Thomas himself admonishes, of the knowledge of all doctrine of faith or of morals, not of the knowledge of *contingent facts* or future events, e.g. what Councils or Popes were going to be in the Church. "The Holy Spirit taught the Apostles all the truth concerning those things that are necessary for salvation; that is to say, things to be believed and to be done; but He did not teach them the truth about all future events." (2-2, q.106, a.4) "Finally, on account of that which is said of the substance of the mysteries between two orders of propositions, which come to be explicitly believed in the course of time: for certain propositions belong, as it were to the substance of the mysteries; e.g. in the case of the mystery of the Incarnation, that Christ had two wills; and in that of the Eucharist, that the substance of the bread does not remain after the consecration, and others similar to these. Of these and other such propositions it is to be believed that they were known by the Apostles not only implicitly but explicitly for theirs was a perfect knowledge of the Scriptures and of all the mysteries that belonged to the teaching of faith. But there are other contingent propositions, which had not happened yet during the time of the Apostles; e.g. that this man is the Pope, that this Council is a true Council, and others of the same kind. Propositions such as these the Apostles had no need of knowing explicitly, but only in general, for it was not necessary that they should know all future events." (SUÁREZ, *De fide*, d.2, s.6, n.18)

These *contingent* things, that were unknown to the Apostles, are today called *dogmatic facts*. Since they are not contained in the revealed deposit except conditional

58. THE MEANING OF THE FORMULAE IN THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. — Something altogether different must be said of the revealed formulae as they existed in the primitive Church. The Apostles conveyed to the Church, in written or oral formulae, all the things that God had revealed to them to be communicated. However, the Apostles did not give the Church all the explication or explicit meaning of those revealed formulae which they knew, and which was really and truly implicit in them. That explication was given by the permanent dogmatic magisterium, which is nothing else but a perpetual continuation of the divine apostolic magisterium for the purpose of deepening or unfolding more and more the revealed deposit's implicitude as required by the heresies, disputes, or needs of each epoch.

Thus, the primitive Church received from the Apostles the whole deposit of Sacred Scripture and Divine Tradition, with no further expectation or possibility of any new revelation. But the primitive Church did not receive from the Apostles the infused light given them by God wherewith to receive pass in one single stroke all the divine meaning that is truly included in, although not formally expressed by, the revealed formulae. For this reason, the apostolic formulae, notwithstanding their divine and revealed origin, are couched in purely human language, and human formulae never succeed in expressing all the virtuality and meaning implicitly contained in them; much less when it is a question of expressing by these means sublime and fecund divine realities. Such formulae are like seeds bursting with life, or better still, like trees abounding in sap that await only a favourable environment to unfold into branches, flowers and fruits the same virtuality and vitality already contained truly in them.

Consequently, the true starting point of dogmatic progress is the apostolic formulae as they issued from the lips or the pen of the Apostles. Hence, where it is a question of determining whether dogmatic progress or evolution has existed, or whether the progress was only a transition from the formal-implicit to the formal-explicit or also a transition from the virtual-implicit to the formal, it is misleading to focus attention on those dogmas as they existed either in the mind of God or in the mind of the Apostles. In both these instances there is no sense in talking of formal and virtual, mediate and immediate, implicit and explicit. In either case everything was not only formal and immediate, but also explicit, and the question of progress or evolution makes no sense.

What must engage our attention is the state of those dogmas in the mind of the primitive Church; not in the mind of God or the Apostles. In

ly, as we shall see subsequently (256), they are not seen in the deposit until such time as the condition is verified; that is, until the event really takes place; e.g. the election of such a Pope, the celebration of such a Council, the writing of such a book of Jansen.

other words, whether all our actual dogmas were already contained formally, or only virtually, in the written or oral *formulae* emanating from the Apostles; giving these formulae not precisely the meaning which the super-naturally illumined mind of the Apostles explicitly understood in them, but the meaning that the formulae of themselves express, as they were understood by the primitive Church.

59. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA. — We have just seen that the starting point of all dogmatic progress lies in the revealed formulae conveyed by the Apostles to the primitive Church. These formulae, as every other human formula, are made up partly of meaning formally expressed, and partly of meaning virtually implicit.

Now, all Catholic theologians agree in that not only the formulae are revealed, but that their immediate or formal content is also revealed, and therefore definable as of divine faith. But is their mediate or virtual content also revealed, and therefore also definable as of divine faith? If it is not, then no true dogmatic evolution is possible, since without virtuality there is no evolution, and without truly revealed virtuality there is no dogmatic evolution. If it is, then dogmatic evolution is possible: evolution because it is an unfolding of virtuality, dogmatic because it is an unfolding of revealed virtuality.

Clearly, then, the whole problem of dogmatic evolution hinges on the existence or non-existence of true *revealed virtuality*. The solution of the latter problem requires, first of all, that the theologians be unanimously agreed on what is meant by revealed virtuality. But does such unanimity exist among theologians? To this question we now turn our attention.

SECTION II HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE MODERN CONFUSION CONCERNING THE TRUE REVEALED VIRTUALITY

60. UNITY IN FORMULAE AND DIVERSITY IN MEANING. — We have earlier mentioned (3) that Catholic doctrine encompasses four degrees: a) revealed datum; b) dogmas of faith; c) infallible truths; d) theological conclusions.

When the problem of determining the nature of each of those four degrees arises, all theologians agree on the four following formulae or criteria: a) in the Catholic doctrine there are formally or immediately revealed truths, and virtually or mediately revealed truths; b) formally or immediately revealed truths make up the proper or *per se* object of *divine faith*; c) virtually or mediately revealed truths make up the proper or *per se* object of *theology*;

d) the *infallibility* of the Church has for its primary object the formally or immediately revealed truths, and for its secondary object the virtually or immediately revealed truths.

To avoid useless repetitions of synonymous terms, we will note once and for all that in this matter formal is the same as immediate, and virtual the same as mediate.⁹

There is complete unanimity among all theologians, ancient and modern, on those four formulae or criteria which denote the nature of the objects of *divine faith*, theology, and the *Church's infallibility*. However, the unanimity in the *formulae* is of little value where there exists a divergence in the *meaning*.

The reader will have, in effect, noticed that in these formulae divine faith, and infallibility, are defined in function of two objects; i.e., the formally revealed and the virtually revealed. Therefore, accordingly as either distinction or identity exists between the immediately or formally revealed and the virtually or mediately revealed, there will also exist a parallel distinction or identity between divine faith, theology and infallibility among themselves. The slightest change in either the nature or the extension of these objects will necessarily entail the same change in their corresponding habits. With the same formula it is possible for each author to say or understand different things simply by having a different idea of what is meant by *immediate* or *formal* and by *mediate* or *virtual*.

⁹It seems almost pointless to remark that whenever, in theology or in ecclesiastical documents, mention is made of *divine revelation*, whether immediate or mediate, the term is always taken to mean the *supernatural* revelation, not the natural knowledge that we obtain through the inspection or study of created things. The latter is sometimes improperly called *revelation*, or *mediate* revelation, but one that is completely natural. Of these two revelations, natural and supernatural, St. Albert the Great speaks in the following text.

"There are two modes of revelation: the first mode is that effected by the general light placed in us [natural]; and this is the mode of revelation to philosophers, . . . The second light is for contemplating the things above this world [the supernatural], and it is over and above us. By this light this science [sacred theology] is revealed. The first shines in the self-evident things [first principles of natural reason]; the second in the *articles of faith*". (ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Summa Theolog.*, p.1., tract. 1, q.4. ad 3). St. Thomas treats of the comparison between supernatural revelation, which is usually called immediate, and natural revelation, often termed improper or mediate, in the following passages: "For it [theology] accepts its principles *not from other sciences*; but *immediately from God* through revelation." (P.1., q.1., a.5 ad 2) "By knowledge; but *immediately from creatures*, but *immediately inspired by divine light*." (*In I Sent.*, prol., q.1. a.1) This term, *immediately* contradistinguished from the natural order or revelation, which is also described as *mediate*, has absolutely nothing to do with the meaning of the terms *immediate* and *mediate* within the *supernatural* revelation, which is our only concern at present.

Thus, if one wishes to know an author's opinion on the nature or extension of divine faith, theology, or infallibility; nothing is gained by investigating whether the author employs those formulae; what should be verified is the meaning he gives to the terms formally or immediately revealed, and virtually or mediately revealed, which form the basis of the four formulae. Everything depends on this.

In this section we propose to make the following clear. First, that since Suárez up to the present, the majority of the theologians employ the terms immediately or formally revealed, and mediately or virtually revealed, in a sense totally at variance with the sense in which they were, and are, understood by traditional theology, and particularly by St. Thomas. Secondly, that by holding a different notion of these two objects, they consequently hold a different concept of the nature and extension of both divine faith and theology. Thirdly, that by modifying the meaning of these two terms, they have also modified the genuine meaning of the formulae, thus giving rise to the curious phenomenon whereby with the same formulae some authors mean radically different things, while with other different formulae others mean one and the same thing. Finally, that, from the variation introduced by Suárez in the meanings of formal or immediate, and virtual or mediate, proceeds the persuasion held by many that no true dogmatic evolution is possible by way of virtuality or theological conclusion, as well as the maddening difficulty experienced by certain theologians and apologists in reconciling the teachings of modern theology with the evident facts of the history of dogmas.

To make all this as clear as possible we will briefly examine four points: a) St. Thomas's teaching on what is meant by virtually or mediately revealed, properly speaking; b) Suárez's innovation; c) the consequences of this innovation; d) the root of the modern confusion on this matter.

1. THE VIRTUALLY REVEALED ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

61. THE VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE AND THE FORMAL OR IMMEDIATE IN OUR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE. — To understand well what St. Thomas means by immediate or formal, and by mediate or virtual, it is necessary to grasp well the distinction between simple understanding and reason, or between intuition and discourse.

Our power of intellectual cognition, notwithstanding its being one single faculty, differs from that of God and of the angels in that it comprises two functions or ways of knowing. Following Aristotle's lead, St. Thomas gives them two different names: a) *simple understanding*, or, in Latin, *intellectus*; b) reasoning or *discourse*, in Latin, *ratio*.

By the first of those two functions of our single intellectual faculty, we know by one single and simple act of intuition, immediately, without discourse in the proper sense. By the second, we know by means of successive acts, mediately, discursively.

The dividing line between simple understanding and reason, between intuition and science, between the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual lies in whether discourse, properly speaking, is necessary or not.

Whenever a thing can be known by us without true discourse there is simple understanding, intuition, immediate or formal. Whenever it cannot be known except through a proper discourse, there is for us not simple understanding but science, not immediate or formal but mediate or virtual.

Hence, when our mind sees the truth or the falsehood of a proposition upon merely hearing it or upon a simple exposition of the terms, without employing any new idea, the knowledge is immediate or formal, it is a knowledge of simple understanding. In this case there is no passing or transition (discursus) from one concept to another concept, but an instantaneous perception of the relation between predicate and subject; at most there is a passage from the word to the idea, but not from one idea to another idea. Thus, to assent to the proposition *the whole is greater than its part* it is enough to hear it said, or at most, to define or explain the simple meaning of the words *whole* and *part*, without the intervention of any other concept.

Whence, the following corollary of the greatest importance in the Thomist doctrine; namely, two things are required and suffice to make a proposition immediate or formal for us: a) that we require no reasoning in order to perceive either its truth or its falsehood; b) that if some reasoning be required, it be an improper reasoning, that is to say, a reasoning ordered merely to find the formal meaning of the terms.

The second function of our intellectual cognition, called *reasoning* or *science* differs essentially from the first. Often it is not enough to know or verify the formal meaning of the two terms, i.e. the predicate and the subject, but we further require the intervention of a new term or concept, the intervention of a third concept, virtually distinct from the first two. By means of this new concept with which we compare the concepts of the predicate and of the subject — and only by means of it — can we discover the truth or the falsehood of the proposition, in *virtue* of the principle underlying all reasoning which states that things which are identical to a *third* are identical among themselves.

In St. Thomas's way of speaking, this second mode of knowing is called *mediate* or *virtual*, because the truth of falsehood of the proposition is not known *in itself*, but by *means*, or in *virtue*, of another concept. The mental act whereby this mode of knowing is effected is called *reasoning* or *science*;

the truths known in this manner are called *virtual* or *mediate*; and this mode of discourse is termed *proper discourse*, it being immaterial whether the new term be only *conceptually* and not *really* distinct as in the mathematical sciences, or *really* distinct as in the physical sciences.

62. COROLLARIES. — Whence these two other corollaries, no less basic in the teaching of St. Thomas: a) for a conclusion or truth to be virtual or mediate relative to us it suffices that it cannot be known by us without a proper reasoning; b) for a reasoning to be proper it is not necessary that the new formulae or deduced conclusion be really distinct; it suffices that it be virtually or conceptually distinct.

We beg the reader's indulgence for explaining at some length so obvious a thing, which has already been indicated elsewhere (24-27); but this is a most fundamental point for anyone who wishes to understand St. Thomas's doctrine on the nature of divine faith and theology and the distinction of the one from the other, and, further, to perceive well the possibility of dogmatic evolution without an increase of real objectivity.¹⁰

10. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the human intellects obtain perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of *movement* and *discursive* intellectual operation, as they advance from one known to another. But if in the knowledge of a known principle they were immediately to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions, there would not be in them in any discourse at all. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they originally know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them. Therefore they are called *intellectual* beings: because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped naturally by the mind are said to be understood (*intelligi*); hence *intellect* is defined as the habit of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by some kind of *discourse* are called *rational*; and this comes of the *feebleness* of their intellectual light." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 58, a. 3) "For the act of *understanding* signifies the *simple acceptance* of something; whence *principles*, which are known of themselves without any comparison, are said to be *understood*. But to *reason*, properly speaking, is to come from one to the knowledge of another. . . ." (Ibid., q. 83, a. 4. These two habits [understanding and science] are distinguished inasmuch as understanding regards the truth known of itself, while science regards the truth known through another." (Ibid., 1-2, q. 75, a. 2) "Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which is either known of itself, as in the case of the first principles, which are held by *understanding*; or known through something else, as in the case of conclusions, which are held by science." (Ibid., 2-2, q. 1., a. 4) "Whoever *understands* is determined to one without any process of comparison. . . ; but one who *knows* (science) gives assent through the very process of comparing the principles to the conclusions. . . ." (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 1) Understanding designates *simple and absolute knowledge . . . Reason*, on the other hand, denotes a *discourse* whereby the human soul comes from one to know another." (Ibid., q. 15, a. 1) "Immediate propositions, that is, which are not demonstrated by some middle, but are clear of themselves. They are called immediate inasmuch as they have no middle demonstrating them. . . ." (ST. THOMAS, *In Post. Analyt.*, lib. 1, lect. 3) Mediate, that is, one that has a middle by which the predicate is demonstrated of its subject." (Ibid., lect. 4) "Immediately, when the truth of the

63. THE VIRTUAL OR MEDIATE AND THE FORMAL OR IMMEDIATE IN OUR SUPERNATURAL KNOWLEDGE. — As simple understanding is to reason in the natural order, so is divine faith to theology in the supernatural or revealed order. The reason for this is that revelation is in the supernatural order what intrinsic evidence is in the natural order.

The starting point in the natural order is the first principles of reason known immediately by pure intuitive evidence, without any proper reasoning. Likewise, in the supernatural order the starting point is the first principles of faith, that is the propositions comprised in the primitive or revealed datum, known immediately by simple revelation, without any discourse. (31)

Everything that our mind perceives in the first principles of reason, either without any reasoning at all, or with an improper discourse, that is, any discourse designed to verify the meaning of the terms, is immediate or formal, not mediate or virtual. Similarly, everything that our mind perceives in the revealed datum, either without any discourse or with an improper discourse, is immediately or formally, not mediate or virtually, revealed.

Anything in the natural order, that cannot be known by our mind without proper reasoning or without the intervention of a new concept, is for us, science or reason, not simple understanding or intuition. Likewise, anything in the revealed datum or revealed premise that cannot be known by us without proper reasoning or without the intervention of a new concept, is for us, theology or theological science, not simple understanding or divine faith.

It is therefore clear that the whole teaching of St. Thomas on the distinction between faith and theology or between the immediately or formally revealed and the mediate or virtually revealed, in the supernatural order, is perfectly grounded on the distinction between simple understanding and reason, or between the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual, in the natural order.¹¹

propositions is infallibly clear at once from the intelligible objects themselves. This is the state of one who understands principles which are known as soon as the terms are known . . . Mediate, however, when the intellect, once it knows the definitions of the state of one who has science, as in the case of demonstrative conclusions. This is the q.14, a.1) "in all sciences the mode of reason is preserved in so far as there should be a transition from one thing to another according to reason, but not that there should be a transition from one thing to another thing, the latter being proper of natural science." (In Boetium de Trinitate, q.6, a.1, ad primam questionem, ad 3).

¹¹ "In the doctrine of faith the articles of faith are as the self-evident principles in q. 1 a. 7) "The superadded light is to the things that are supernaturally known to us as the natural light is to the things that we know primordially." (Ibid., q. 8, a. 1, ad 2) "Just as the habit of first principles is not acquired through other sciences [that is to say, through reasoning] but comes from nature, whereas the habit of conclusions deduced from the

The parallel cannot be more complete. Intrinsic evidence is the formal motive of both intellectus and ratio, in the natural order; revelation is the formal motive of both faith and theology, in the supernatural order. Natural evidence is divided into evidence in itself and evidence in another; the former is immediate or formal evidence, the latter mediate or virtual evidence; the former is the formal motive of simple understanding or intuition, the latter the formal motive of science or reason. Similarly, supernatural revelation is divided into revelation in itself and revelation in another; the former is immediate or formal revelation, the latter mediate or virtual revelation; the former is the formal motive of faith, the latter the formal motive of theological science.

St. Thomas does not have two philosophies or two nomenclatures, one for the natural, and another for the supernatural, order. The philosophy and the nomenclature employed by him in the natural order to denote simple understanding and reason as well as the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual evidence, which are the two cognitive habits together with their corresponding specific objects in the natural order, the same are also employed, and employed in the same sense, to denote divine faith and sacred theology as well as the immediate or formal and the mediate or virtual revelation, which are the two cognitive habits and their corresponding specific objects in the supernatural order.

64. COROLLARIES. — Hence two parallel corollaries, equally fundamental in the doctrine of St. Thomas — and never to be forgotten by anyone who does not wish to get disoriented in these matters, — to wit: a) any truth that cannot be deduced by us from the revealed datum or premise except by means of proper reasoning is for us virtual or mediate, not formal or immediate.

first principles is acquired, so, too, in this doctrine the habit of faith, which is like the habit of principles, is not acquired [through science or reasoning,] whereas the habit of those things that are deduced from them [the principles of faith] is acquired." (In I Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2) "And just as God, by the very fact that He knows Himself, knows other things in His own manner, namely, through simple intuition, not through discourse; so also, from the things we grasp by faith through adherence to the First Truth, we come to know other things in our own manner, that is, through discourse going from principles to conclusions. Hence, in this science the original things themselves which we hold by faith are as principles to us, and the rest as conclusions." (In Boetium de Trinitate, prooem., q. 2, a. 2) "The knowledge of faith belongs most of all to understanding; for we do not receive it through the investigation of reason, but we assent to it by the simple acceptance of the intellect." (Ibid., q. 2, a. 2, ad tertiam questionem, ad 3). "For [sacred doctrine] does not receive its principles from other sciences, but receives them immediately from God through revelation." (Summa Theol., p. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2) "Faith clings to divine Truth itself as its medium of knowing." (Ibid., 2-2, q. 1, a. 1)

¹The term revelation is here to be understood in an objective sense, i.e. for the revealed deposit. — Trans.

diante revelation; b) any reasoning in which the new formula or deduced conclusion expresses a *concept* although not a reality, *distinct* from that of a revealed datum or premise from which it is inferred, *is for us a case of proper reasoning, and therefore of virtual or mediate revelation.* (27)

All the foregoing is merely the ABC of the teaching of St. Thomas, as every Thomist knows. Should anyone desire a more ample exposition on the distinction between the immediately and the mediate revealed, he will find it in Section IV of Chapter III, nn. 157-169, where we shall examine the relationship between the authority of the Church and mediate or virtual revelation.

II. — SUÁREZ'S INNOVATION CONCERNING THE VIRTUALLY REVEALED

65. Section 11 of Disputation III of Suárez's treatise *On Faith*, is epoch-making in the history of theology. That section bears the title "*Whether virtual or mediate revelation suffices for the formal object of faith.*" To this title of great significance for the problem of the evolution of dogma Suárez added the subtitle "*Where [study is made] of the formal distinction between the objects of faith and theology.*"¹²

66. IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION. — The subtitle clearly indicates that Suárez is well aware of the importance of the subject he intends to study, and of the fact that the formal distinction or identification of divine faith and theology hinges completely on the nature of the revealed virtual or mediate.

Suárez begins by observing, and with good reason, that the question proposed in the title is almost the equivalent of the following: "Whether a proposition inferred by discourse from two principles of faith, or from a premise of faith and another natural premise, is to be held by faith."¹³ This heading, to all appearances so inconsequential, that many manuals dismiss in a few lines as if it were an antiquated disquisition, conceals all of the modern problem concerning the homogeneity or the transformation of Catholic dogma.

That question, translated into modern terms, reads exactly as follows: When in the course of time divine revelation (premise of faith) comes into contact, or inters into combination, with what today we call human cultures or philosophies (premise of reason), is the result (conclusion) of such contact the corruption or transformation of the primitive Gospel, or simply its homogeneous development? Is the result — called by the ancients conclusion — of

¹² *Opera omnia*, ed. Vivès, t.12, p.95.

¹³ *Loc.cit.*, n.1.

¹⁴ *Loc.cit.*, n.11

identical value as the Gospel — to be *of faith* means exactly that — or is it of merely human value — which is what is meant by saying that it is not of faith but merely a theological conclusion?

These observations, which thoroughbred theologians will find commonplace, are made because there is no dearth of superficial theologians who seem not to have penetrated beyond the rind of Scholastic terminology, and who, on the matter of the evolution of dogmas, blissfully assert that the old masters said little or nothing on the subject. There is hardly any modern problem related to dogma that has not been studied, and thoroughly at that, by the old Schoolmen. The theologian desirous of fundamental principles for the solution of such problems would be wise to go back to them. But to return to Suárez.

67. SUBDIVISION INTO TWO QUESTIONS. — Suárez, following the lead of the Thomist tradition, subdivided the proposed question into two others: first, whether the conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason is of faith *before* the Church's definition; second, whether it is of faith *after* the definition. He deals with the first question from No. 2 to No. 11; with the second, in Nos. 11 and 12.

68. UNANIMITY RELATIVE TO THE SECOND QUESTION. — Touching the question whether the theological conclusion is of divine faith *after* the Church's definition, Suárez observes that the affirmative answer is unanimous among the theologians, so much so that of all the great theologians who preceded him, only one has affirmed the contrary, and that one is Molina.

69. SUÁREZ'S TRADITIONAL SPIRIT. — In contrast to his predecessor Molina, or his contemporary Vázquez, or his successor Ripalda, Suárez is an eminently traditional spirit, and when an opinion is common among the theologians, he very rarely ventures the contrary. Thus, in spite of the affection, not to say respect, he always shows for Molina, Suárez can hardly contain in the present instance his amazement (*it is amazing*, he says in No. 3) that Molina had dared, against all tradition, to deny that the theological conclusion is of faith even *after* its definition by the Church. And against Molina he establishes, not as probable, but as certain, the following thesis: "it is to be said, in the third place, that the theological conclusion *after* it has been defined by the Church, is *of faith formally and most properly*, not only mediately but immediately. This opinion seems to me *certain* and gathered from the *common consent of theologians*. Nor do I find any theologian who contradicts it."¹⁴

Up to this point Suárez trends on firm ground, as does anybody who follows a view common to all the great masters of theology. That this view was not only common, but completely unanimous prior to Molina, seemed so obvious to Suárez, that he did not even bother to quote from them. We shall do so in the last chapter of this book (352-398) listing them by centuries.

70. SUÁREZ'S ECLECTIC SPIRIT. — Eminently traditional where common doctrines are concerned, Suárez is also one of the most eclectic spirits in matters where his predecessors are divided among themselves. Suárez rarely declares himself unconditionally for any of two opposed schools. More often than not, he introduces a distinction or observation of his own, undoubtedly moved by the praiseworthy intention of reducing the distance between the adversaries. However laudable this purpose, it is not always philosophically sound and can often prove dangerous; for when it is a question of harmonizing heterogeneous, or even contradictory, systems, there is the risk of making a mess of everything instead of putting things in order. This is the risk run by all eclectic or concordist spirits, a risk into which Suárez fell, as we shall presently see, in his treatment of the first question, viz., whether the theological conclusion is of faith *prior* to its definition by the Church.

71. TWO CONTRARY OPINIONS ON THE FIRST QUESTION. — On this subject Suárez found theological opinion divided.

A first opinion holds that the revealed virtual or theological conclusion is of divine faith of itself, prior to its definition by the Church; it can thus be given the assent of divine faith by any one who deduces it through evident reasoning. Such is, according to Suárez, the view of Cano, Vázquez, and Vega. We hope to show elsewhere (449) that Cano is not of this opinion, as Suárez himself recognizes subsequently.¹⁵ Lastly, Suárez very well observes that all those who fail to distinguish specifically the habits of divine faith and theology must consistently follow this view of Vázquez and Vega.

A second opinion, described by Suárez as radically opposed (*extreme contraria*), holds the negative view, that is, that prior to its definition by the Church, the revealed virtual or theological conclusion is not of divine faith but a mere theological conclusion, to which no assent can be given other than theological assent. This is, says Suárez, "what is commonly held by . . . Capreolus, Cajetan, the Thomists, and quite clearly St. Thomas."¹⁶

¹⁵N.7.

¹⁶Loc.cit., n.3.

72. SUÁREZ'S ATTITUDE. — Had Suárez been a loyal Thomist, after the manner of Capreolus or Cajetan, Báñez or Medina, John of St. Thomas or Gonet, Gotti or Billuart, it would be easy to tell *a priori* the view he would follow. Having confessed that the two above-mentioned opinions were irreconcilable (*extreme contraria*), and that St. Thomas clearly held the second (*ac plane D. Thomas*), a thoroughbred Thomist would have unhesitatingly committed himself to the second opinion.

But Suárez, rather than a Thomist, was, as we have indicated, one of those eclectic minds who have never taken an oath upon the word of the master, not even if that master happens to be St. Thomas.

Thus instead of aligning himself openly and completely with one of these two contrary opinions, Suárez opts to agree partly with one and partly with the other, that is, to concur in part with Vázquez and Vega, and in part with St. Thomas. To this effect he introduces into the problem a new factor of his own invention, to which he gives the name *revealed formal-confused*. To our mind, this formal confused is the real cause of all the confusion in post-Suarezian theology concerning the definability as of divine faith of the true and proper theological conclusion, or equivalently, concerning the evolution of dogma by way of a proper and rigorous implicit virtuality. The notions of the revealed formal and the revealed virtual are correlative; the slightest modification in the understanding of the one overflows into the understanding of the other, and modifies in parallel fashion the notions of divine faith, theology and dogmatic progress, which are correlative to the notions of revealed formal and revealed virtual.

73. THE FORMAL CONFUSED AND THE PROPER VIRTUAL, ACCORDING TO SUÁREZ. — There is a distinction, in philosophy, between two kinds of properties, and consequently, there are two kinds of virtuality and of conclusions. Properties of the first kind express nothing more than a concept distinct from the essence or principle from which they flow; properties of the second kind express, not only a different concept, but also a distinct reality or objectivity. The former are really identical with the starting point, and thus, inseparable from it, even by divine power; the latter are really distinct from the starting point, and therefore separable from it, absolutely speaking. The former are called metaphysical, or essential, or radical properties; they constitute the implicit virtuality of the metaphysical and mathematical sciences. The latter are called physical or accidental, or formal properties; they constitute the virtuality, not implicit, but purely connexive, of the physical sciences. (44)

Well then, Suárez considers the first kind of properties or virtuality not *virtual* in the proper sense, but truly *formal* although formal *confused*. On the other hand, he considers *properly virtual* only the second kind of properties, or virtuality, or conclusions.

Hence, by the new name of *formal confused* Suárez understands two kinds of conclusions: a) conclusions inferred through improper reasoning or mere exposition of terms, such as occurs in conclusions in which the defined is inferred from the definition, the parts from the whole, the particular from the universal, or one correlative from the other. Modern theologians call these *formal implicit*. b) Conclusions that are *conceptually distinct* from the revealed premise and, thus, *really identical* with it and absolutely *inseparable* from it. These are today known by the names *virtual implicit*, or virtual identical, or virtual connexive-essential. (32-33)

On the other hand, by the name of proper virtual, or theological conclusions in the proper sense, Suárez understands only those conclusions that express something *really distinct*, and absolutely speaking *separable* from the virtual, merely mediate, merely connexive (*virtuale tantum*, *mediate tantum*, *connexive tantum*); but we will always call them virtual non implicit or virtual physico-connexive.¹⁷ This, for Suárez, is the true and proper revealed virtuality, the true and proper theological conclusion, theology in the proper and rigorous sense.¹⁸

Any one who is not well versed on these matters and reads Suárez for the first time, might not find it obvious that by *formal confused* Suárez understands all that we have just attributed to him. But we are certain that all true disciples of Suárez, as well as any one who attentively reads the whole of Section 11 of Disputation III of the treatise on Faith, which is the subject of the present discussion, will agree that that is the genuine mind of Suárez. In support we will quote a witness above suspicion, Ripalda: "The third opinion lies *midway* [that is, midway between the views held by Vázquez and Vega and the view held by St. Thomas.] to wit, that the object of such a conclusion is credible by faith when it is *really identified with the revealed object, but not if it be really distinct and separable from it*: and therefore the *metaphysical property* of a nature is credible by faith in virtue of the revelation of the nature itself, but not so its *physical property*. Consequently the *radical* and remote risibility of Christ belongs to the faith by which we believe that Christ is man; but not the *formal* and proximate risibility which we suppose *separable and distinct* from the nature, notwithstanding the fact that the *conclusion of both properties* is deduced from the revelation of human nature

¹⁷We could have said more briefly, and perhaps even more clearly, that of the three degrees comprised in the scale of progress (30), Suárez has grouped together the first and second degrees under the name of formal confused, and reserved the name of virtual properly speaking for the third degree.

¹⁸*Loc. cit.*, n. 5.

and simultaneously from the evident *knowledge* whereby human nature is radically and proximately risible. Thus Suárez and Lugo.^{19,19}

Thus similarly Lugo,²⁰ Haunoldo,²¹ Card. Mazella,²² or any other Suarezian author.

74. SUÁREZ'S SOLUTION. — Having made the distinctions of formal confused and proper virtual, Suárez is thereafter perfectly logical and traditional, and brings to the solution of the problem none other but the Thomist principles, according to which all that is formally revealed belongs to faith while all that is virtually revealed pertains *per se* to theology.

Thus, to the question whether revealed virtuality, that is, the theological conclusion is of divine faith *per se*, or without the Church's definition, Suárez replies quite logically with the two conclusions that follow:

1. If it be a question of that virtuality or those conclusions called *formal* confused, then such conclusions are of faith *per se* or prior to their definition by the Church and can be given an assent of divine faith by the theologian provided only that he comes to know them through evident reasoning. "In this", says Suárez, "I concur with the first opinion", that is, with Vázquez and Vega.

2. If it be a question of those conclusions described as properly virtual or merely virtual, they are not *per se* of divine faith, nor can they be given an assent of divine faith, but only a theological assent. "In this", says Suárez, "I follow Capreolo, Cajetan, and St. Thomas." Suárez deserves to be quoted literally and in Latin:

Dico ergo primo: Revelatio *formalis*, etiamsi *confusa* sit, sufficit ad obiectum formale fidei et consequenter ad assentiendum de fide particularibus contentis sub tali revelatione, si sufficienter ad illa applicetur, et homo utatur discursu convenienti modo ad assentiendum. *In hac assertione conuenio cum prima sententia* . . . Dico secundo: Revelatio *tantum virtualis* seu mediata non sufficit ad obiectum formale fidei, et consequenter assensus in illa fundatus, cum iuvamine alicuius principii naturaliter evidentis, non sufficit ad proprium assensum fidei, sed tantum ad theologiam. Hanc sententiam

¹⁹RIPALDA, *De Fide*, d. 8, s. 3, n. 37; ed. Vivés, t. 7, p. 143.

²⁰LUGO, *De Fide*, d. 1, s. 13, nn. 259, 265, 286.

²¹HAUNOLDO, *De fide*, l. 3, n. 145.

²²*De Virtutibus Infusis*, n. 414.

praeter auctores citatos . . . tenet non obscure Caietanus . . . etiam idem sentit D. Thomas . . . ubi etiam Capreolus."²³

75. TRADITION AND INNOVATION. — In the position taken by Suárez we have to distinguish carefully the part which he has preserved of the Thomist tradition, and the part in which he has introduced an innovation.

Suárez hews to tradition in four things: a) in retaining the division of the revealed into immediate or formal, and mediate or virtual; b) in affirming that the former is the *per se* object of divine faith, and the latter the *per se* object of theology; c) in denying, against Vázquez and Vega, that the revealed virtual is of faith *per se*, that is, without need of being defined by the Church; d) in maintaining, against Molina, that it is of faith after the definition.

On the other hand, Suárez is an innovator in two things: a) in considering as properly virtual only the virtual non-implicit or physico-connexive, which is really distinct, and absolutely separable, from the formal; b) in considering as formal, albeit qualifying it as *confused*, the implicit or essential virtual, in other words, all conclusions really identical with the revealed premise, but conceptually distinct from it.

Thus, Suárez's theory nominally retains the division between the formally revealed and the virtually revealed. But under the new label of *confused*, Suárez has furtively transferred all implicit virtuality, that is, the whole of theology rigorously speaking, to the department of the revealed formal or of divine faith; for, it is obvious — and we hope to make it clear in the following sections — that no rigorous theological conclusion is possible, and likewise no rigorous metaphysical or mathematical conclusions, except through implicit or essential virtuality.

76. THE SERIOUSNESS OF SUÁREZ'S INNOVATION. — To understand the immense transcendence of Suárez's innovation it is enough to consider three things.

1. In order to deduce or explicate implicit virtuality, our weak human reason requires in every case a proper reasoning, a reasoning that is often

²³ "Therefore I say, first: Formal revelation, even if be *confused*, suffices for the formal object of faith and consequently for giving the assent of faith to the particulars contained under such revelation if the latter is sufficiently applied to the particular and the man employs discourse in a manner convenient to generate assent. In saying this I concur with the first opinion . . . I say, secondly: Merely virtual or mediate revelation does not suffice for the formal object of faith, and consequently the assent based on it with the further aid of a naturally evident principle, does not qualify as a proper assent of faith, but only as theology. This opinion, besides the authors cited, . . . is not obscurely held by Cajetan, . . . St. Thomas also is of the same view. . . . Likewise Capreolus." (*Loc.cit.*, n.6-7)

complicated and profound, as may be seen in mathematics and metaphysics. Now, then, to characterize such a virtual as formal or immediate and as pertaining *per se* to divine faith, is to overturn completely the doctrine of St. Thomas, who excludes from the domain of divine faith, which is a simple understanding, all that our reason is incapable of knowing except by a proper reasoning.

2. Implicit virtuality includes all the conclusions that are really identical and objectively homogeneous with the revealed premise or deposit of faith. Consequently, the exclusion of this virtuality from theological science properly speaking, and its inclusion in the domain of faith, leaves theology without any homogeneity or objective continuity with the revealed deposit; it opens a *hiatus* or objective abyss between dogmatic matter and properly theological matter.

3. Implicit virtuality, inasmuch as it is grounded on real identity, is immune from failure for as long as the principle of contradiction stands; it is therefore, the only virtuality capable of investing the discourse or its conclusion with an absolute certainty that not even God can invalidate. Hence, to remove such a virtual from theology means bereaving theology of absolute certainty, leaving it inferior in certainty to metaphysics and mathematics, and with only the certainty of the absolutely fallible and contingent physical sciences. (37)

III. CONSEQUENCES OF SUÁREZ'S INNOVATION

77. Suárez's innovation opens an interesting historico-theological episode of incalculable consequences for the problem of dogmatic evolution, which no one, as far as we know, seems to have noticed. Three theologians of the first order: Suárez, Lugo, and the Salmanticenses, take part in it.

Prior to Suárez, no renowned theologian, with the exception of Molina, had denied the definability of faith of what traditional theology called the revealed virtual. In other words, no one had denied that the third and fourth degrees of Catholic doctrine were capable of a definition of faith. Since by that term they meant inclusive virtuality, its definability was no problem because it is in itself or objectively identical with the formally revealed. Thus, when the Church defines it as a truth of faith, she teaches us nothing but what was from the beginning objectively implicit in the revealed deposit.

On the contrary, since the innovation introduced by Suárez, the term virtual came to denote a virtual really distinct from the revealed premise and thus not implicit objectively in the revealed datum, which is the same as saying that it is not revealed. Consequently, the problem of the objective homogeneity and definability of the last two degrees of Catholic doctrine met

Nevertheless, Suárez clearly saw that there was no other way to harmonize the two propositions, the first of which was his own personal notion of the revealed virtuality, and the second an undeniable fact of the history of dogma. What will he do? Deny evident facts of history that conflict with certain theories, or modify the theories as may be needed to adjust them to the reality of history?

Suárez is not a man to waver. Toning down his speech as much as possible, for he senses that his position is extremely delicate and serious, he nonetheless resolutely asserts that the Church's definition is a new divine witness, a new revelation. God — says Suárez — speaks to us anew in each definition of the Church; His witness through the Apostles or the Prophets, truth is identical in value as His witness through the Apostles or the Prophets, and therefore equivalent to a true revelation. Hence, that which was not a revealed truth prior to the definition, becomes such in virtue of the definition and, consequently, is a truth of faith. Here are his own words:

"The reason therefore is that *God through the Church witnesses* what the Church defines. But the Church defines such a truth [i.e. the objectively distinct virtual] in itself and formally; therefore *by the same token* it is sufficiently placed under the formal object of faith. For the divine witness is *the same* and equally certain whether God gives it by *Himself*, or by the *Church* or by any other minister . . . Consequently, this is a sign that the Church possesses a proximate and immediate infallibility from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is *equivalent to a revelation*, or consummates it, if I may say so."²⁴

Although Suárez's thought is altogether clear from the context, it will not be superfluous to quote two other illustrious theologians, both of Suárezian pedigree. "Therefore, if it is to be subsequently believed as a truth of faith, it is necessary that it be revealed anew by God, and this is done by the Church's definition, as *Suárez opined*."²⁵ "Suárez teaches that the theological conclusion belongs to the faith because he holds that in this instance the definition of the Church is a *new revelation*."²⁶

After the Vatican Council this opinion of Suárez can no longer be maintained. Cardinal Mazella justifiably describes it as intolerable, without naming its author — "*Can no longer be tolerated*."²⁷ To this predicament was a

²⁴ *Loc.cit.*, n.11.

²⁵ LUGO, *loc.cit.*, n.274.

²⁶ MENDIVE, S.J., *Institutiones Theologicae, De Fide*, th.4; Vallisolei 1895.

²⁷ *Loc.cit.*, n.411, p.207, footnote.

with an insurmountable difficulty. In his attempt to solve it, Suárez resorts to an unheard of and dangerous theory: the theory of new revelations. Lugo tries to correct Suárez's error without correcting its root, and himself falls into another theory, not as dangerous, but equally indefensible: the theory of indefinite or transforming assistance. Finally, the Salmanticenses realize that Suárez and Lugo had left behind a knot that defied unraveling. They themselves are unable to untie it because they are not aware where the tangle lay. And so they cut it clean with the daring stroke of their famous *Nego majorem*, denying, as Molina did, against all the theological tradition, that the Church had ever defined the revealed virtual, or can ever define it, as a truth of faith.

As this episode has had serious consequences for all subsequent theology, and we do not know that it has been noticed by anybody up to now, we shall describe it, explaining briefly: a) Suárez's theory of new revelations; b) Lugo's transforming assistance; c) the famous *Nego majorem* of the Salmanticenses.

A. First Consequence: Suárez's Theory of New Revelations

78. The laws of logic are all the more inexorable, the more talented the mind that employs them. Once a false step is made, especially in the definition or understanding of primary notions, the end result can be nothing but an absurdity. St. Thomas had already observed that a small error at the beginning becomes large in the end. This misfortune befell Suárez's great talent because he misunderstood the concept of the revealed virtual, one that is most fundamental since the other concepts of faith, theology, and dogmatic progress depend on it.

With the new definition given by himself of the revealed virtual in the proper sense of the term, Suárez at once found himself between the devil and the blue sea; he found himself with these two propositions: a) the revealed virtual in the proper sense comprises only truths that are really distinct from the revealed truths, that is to say, truths that are not revealed; b) the Church has defined as of divine faith truths that are virtually revealed, or theological conclusions in the proper sense.

The antinomy between these two propositions is too glaring to escape a man as talented as Suárez. If the proper virtual is objectively distinct from the revealed formal, then it is impossible for it to be implicitly revealed. Now, no thing that is not truly revealed, at least implicitly, can ever be defined as a truth of faith, unless we take the Church's definition for a new revelation whereby that which, prior to the definition, was not revealed is converted into something revealed. To admit new revelations is an unheard of thing in Catholic theology, and Suárez was so far from ignoring this, that he repeats it time and again in various parts of his works.

theologian of Suárez's calibre brought by a false understanding of the proper revealed virtuality.²⁸

B. Second Consequence: Lugo's Theory of Indefinite Assistance

79. Cardinal Lugo's treatise *On Faith* is no less extensive nor less profound than that of Suárez. The subject of revealed virtuality, which is the basis of dogmatic evolution, is treated by Lugo in Disputation I, Section 13, under the title: "From the foregoing is inferred the distinction between the habit of faith and the habit of theology." The section is divided into three

²⁸This theory, viz., that the Church's definition is equivalent to a new revelation, may be the key to another strange theory of Suárez, which is that *private* revelations pertain to *Catholic* faith, if and when they are approved by the Church. "With regard to this part it must be observed that *private* revelation may be *referred* either to the one who receives it or to others. . . . Now, from the aforementioned Lateran Council it can be gathered that, if others are to be under obligation to believe, the approval of the Church is required as a general rule. And then *the belief begins to be Catholic belief.*" (SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d.3, s.10, n.7)

St. Thomas teaches that no private revelation can ever become a truth of Catholic faith. "Our faith relies on the revelation made to the *Apostles* and *Prophets*, who wrote the canonical Scriptures, and *not on any revelation made to other teachers.*" (*Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.8, ad 2) If at times the Church approves such private revelations, this approval requires from us nothing more than a pious or *human* faith. "It must be noted that this approval is little else but a *permission* that [*private* revelations] may, after mature examination, be made public for the instruction and utility of the faithful. Indeed, although the *assent of Catholic* faith is *neither due, nor can be given*, to revelations thus approved, nonetheless the assent of *human* faith is due them according to the rules of prudence, that is, those in keeping with which such revelations are judged to be *probable* and *piously credible.*" (BENEDICT XIV, *De Servorum Dei Beatificatione*, lib.2, c.32, n.11)

A number of early theologians, Thomists included, at times refer to the definitions of the Church by the name of revelation. But they expressly say that these definitions do not extend beyond unfolding that which was already truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit. Therefore by revelation they understand what today we call, as it should be called, in order to preclude confusions, mere divine assistance. Aptopos of this meaning in the early theologians Valencia writes to the point: "Whether the new assertion or clearer proposition of the Church should be called a *new revelation* because it is infallible in virtue of the assistance of the Holy Spirit, the same Who assisted the canonical Writers; or should not be so denominated because it contains no new truth that was not known to the Apostles; this is a *question of names.*" (GREGORIUS DE VALENTIA, *De Fide*, d.1, q.1, punct.6, t.3, p.128)

Thus Suárez is not deserving of censure precisely because he employed the term *new revelation* but because he employed it with regard to things that he himself acknowledges were not implicitly contained in the revealed deposit. In this sense Card. Mazella is right in saying that *it can no longer be tolerated* (lam tolerari non potest).

paragraphs, the first of which carries the title "Of the conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and another evident natural premise."²⁹

In the wake of Suárez and all the Thomist tradition, Lugo begins by subdividing the issue into two questions: a) the theological conclusion *prior* to the Church's definition,³⁰ b) the theological conclusion *after* its definition.³¹ Relative to the first question, Lugo recites the two completely opposed opinions we already know: the opinion of Vázquez and Vega for the affirmative, namely, that it is of faith *per se* without the definition; and the opinion of St. Thomas and his school for the negative, namely, that *per se* or without definition it is not of faith but purely theological.³²

Before pronouncing himself for either one, Lugo explains the notions of revealed formal and virtual in exactly the same manner as Suárez. He considers *formally* revealed, although *confusedly*, any conclusion that is really identical with, although conceptually distinct from, the revealed deposit. The *virtually* revealed, *properly* speaking, includes nothing else but the conclusions that are really distinct and absolutely separable by divine power.³³ Having made these distinctions, Lugo, with Suárez and the whole Thomist school, maintains that the virtual is not *per se* of faith, that is, prior to the definition,³⁴ and answers several objections against this thesis.³⁵

However, there remains the second question, which is the more significant, to wit, whether the virtually revealed pertains to the faith *after* its definition. Lugo cites Molina for the negative and recalls the theory of new revelations employed by Suárez for the affirmative. The learned cardinal discredits both as contrary to all theological tradition. Against Molina, he establishes that the revealed virtual is truly a truth of faith after it has been defined, and this is — he says — both the common opinion of the theologians and the constant practice of the Church. "Which is confirmed, not only by the arguments adduced by Suárez, but also by the practice and custom of *everyone.*" Against Suárez, he establishes that the Church neither has nor

²⁹IOANNES DE LUGO, *Disputationes scholasticæ, De Fide*, t.1, p.89; ed. Vivès, Parisiis 1867.

³⁰Loc. cit., nn.258-68.

³¹Nn. 269-277.

³²Loc. cit., n.258.

³³Loc. cit., n.259-260

³⁴Loc. cit., n.261.

³⁵Loc. cit., nn.262-268.

needs new revelations to define the revealed virtuality, and that this is likewise the common view of the theologians. "For this seems to be the common opinion of the theologians."³⁶

Up to this point it has been easy sailing for Lugo. But at this juncture, he came across, as he had to, the Gordian knot that Suárez had run afoul of. Lugo had just admitted together with Suárez and all the theological tradition against Molina, the definability of the virtual as a truth of faith. Lugo has understood the revealed virtual in the same sense as Suárez, that is, the virtual that differs objectively from the formally revealed, and which, thus, is not revealed. He has finally, rejected, with all the rest of the theologians, Suárez's theory of new revelations, which appeared to be the only way out of the difficulty. How, then, will Lugo solve it? How can a non-revealed virtual be defined as a truth of faith, that is, as revealed, if the theory of new revelations is set aside?

If it were the case of the virtual implicit, which therefore is revealed, such as that which both Suárez and Lugo had labeled formal confused, its definability would pose no problem.³⁷ Neither would there be any — Lugo adds — if it were the case of a conclusion inferred from two premises of faith.³⁸ But that is not the case. The case is precisely the case of the virtual in the proper sense, a virtual which is obviously not revealed. That such a virtual is not revealed Lugo had already established with these beautiful and convincing words, on which the Salmanticenses later on based themselves: "Let revelation and the revealed object be explicated as much as they will bear, the object of the conclusion will never be found to have been said by God."³⁹ Now, if such a virtual is *not truly said* by God, which is the same as not revealed, how can the Church define it as a truth of divine faith, that is, as a revealed truth, without a new revelation?

At this point Lugo gives clear proof of his flexible ingenuity. Here is his curious solution. It is true, he says, that the virtual in case is not truly revealed. But it is not less true that we have it revealed that the Holy Spirit assists the Church in *all*, and consequently in *each*, of her definitions. Hence, when such a virtual is defined by the Church, we have two revealed propositions, to wit: a) The Holy Spirit assists the Church in *all* her definitions; b) The Holy Spirit assists the Church in *this* definition of this virtual. Therefore, after its definition, such a virtual is no longer deduced from a premise of faith and a

³⁶ *Loc. cit.*, nn.269-271.

³⁷ *Loc. cit.*, n.272

³⁸ *Loc. cit.*, n.273

³⁹ *Loc. cit.*, n.261

premise of reason as happened prior to its definition; now it is deduced from two premises of faith, and consequently is of faith. Here is what Lugo literally says:

"God could have attested *not to the things themselves* but *only to His assistance*, that is, that He would not allow the Church to be deceived by proposing anything false, and from this revealed assistance of God we infer that this object proposed by the Church is true: *not because God has determinedly revealed this object*, but *because its truth follows from the revealed assistance of God*. Thus, now it follows, not from *one* revealed proposition and another that is not revealed, but from *two revealed* propositions, which are these: 'What the Church proposes and defines with the assistance of the Holy Spirit to preserve her from erring, cannot be false', and again, 'The Holy Spirit assists the Church when she defines that Christ is risible'. Of these two propositions, the first is of faith . . . the second is also of faith because . . . [the first proposition] is universal and comprises all the particular cases, and thus also this one . . . Now, the proposition which follows from two revealed premises is also of faith; for [the proof of] this see the following."⁴⁰

Suárez had said: The non-revealed virtual is a truth of faith after its definition because the Church's definition is a new revelation. Lugo says: The non-revealed virtual is a truth of faith after its definition because the Holy Spirit's assistance for its definition is a revealed truth.

Obviously Lugo assumes that which he has to prove, that is, that the Church can define *such* a virtual. As we shall see later on, the Church cannot define *such* a virtual either as a truth of faith or even as an infallible truth. With Lugo's theory we could equally prove that the Church can define infallibly the number of stars in the sky or the number of drops of water in the sea. With regard to this theory, but again without mentioning its author, Card. Mazella has written with good reason: "The Church could therefore define *whatever should please her*, prescinding from the other objects contained in the revelation conveyed by the Apostles and attending only to the promise of assistance to preserve her from error."⁴¹

In these two theories of Suárez and Lugo there would be no problem at all about the homogeneity of the evolution of dogma. However enormous the changes in doctrine, however profound the *hizus* or discontinuity between the primitive datum and the subsequent developments, there always is an easy way out by resorting, with Suárez, to new revelations, or, with Lugo, to an unlimited and transforming assistance. This has been the end result, even for

⁴⁰ *Loc. cit.*, n.275

⁴¹ MAZELLA, *loc. cit.*, n.411, p.208, footnote.

difficulty is all the more serious since the fact is clearly evidenced by the history of dogmas and is admitted without exception by all theologians prior to Molina.

The Salmanticenses are aware of it, as likewise were Suárez and Lugo. They propose the difficulty to themselves as an objection, whose *major* premise is as follows: "The Church often defines as truths to be accepted by faith, many truths which are *not formally revealed* in the Sacred Writings; but which are legitimately *deduced* from what is made known therein and other added natural principles."⁴⁵

In answer to the major, which forms the basis of the objection, the Salmanticenses recall and reject the Suarezian theory of new revelations as contrary to truth and all theological tradition.⁴⁶ Then they review and likewise discard Lugo's theory of indefinite and transforming assistance as inconsistent and of no value at all.⁴⁷

Having discarded these two solutions, the Salmanticenses perceive that it is pointless to essay a new one. The revealed virtual, understood in the sense in which the Salmanticenses take it in the wake of Suárez and Lugo is a virtual that is neither explicitly nor implicitly revealed. What is not revealed can never be defined as a truth of faith. Now, then, since it must be presumed *a priori* that the Church has never done what she cannot do, the Salmanticenses cut the Gordian knot, with one bold stroke and with a solemn *We deny the major* they raze history to the ground by denying that the Church has ever defined anything virtually revealed, or any theological conclusion properly understood. Here are their words:

"Therefore, setting aside these and other solutions, we reply to the argument by *denying the major*. For the Church *never* defines as a dogma of faith that which prior to her definition is not presupposed as *formally* revealed

⁴⁵N.143.

⁴⁶."This solution [Suárez's] is *not in consonance with the truth* . . . for even if everyone concedes that the things defined by the Church as dogmas properly belong to the faith, nonetheless no one says that this is so because God, through the Church's definition, *reveals to us something anew*; on the contrary, *this manner of speaking is rejected by all*" (SALMANTICENSES, *loc. cit.*, n.144).

⁴⁷."But this solution [Lugo's] is *of no value at all* . . . Nor does it make any difference what Lugo says, to wit, that the Church's definition effects that the proposition defined by her be contained in the universal divine revelation: *for this is absolutely impossible*, since there exists no potentiality in respect of the past." (SALMANTICENSES, *loc. cit.*, n.145)

such eminent theologians as Suárez and Lugo, of a false definition or conception of the revealed virtuality properly understood.

C. Third Consequence: The Celebrated "Nego Majorem" of the Salmanticenses

80. After Suárez and Lugo came the celebrated theologians of Salamanca and with them ended in lamentable tragedy the problem of whether the proper virtual, understood in the sense of Suárez and Lugo, was definable as a truth of faith.

The Salmanticenses deal with the question of the revealed virtual in *Dubium IV* of Disputation I of their noteworthy treatise *On Faith*, Nos 124-133.⁴²

In common with all the theologians, the Salmanticenses define the revealed virtual properly understood as that which is *deduced from the revealed deposit as an effect from its cause*. However, in the wake of Suárez and Lugo, by cause they have in mind the natural or physical cause, which is always *really distinct* from the effect. Consequently by revealed virtual they understand only that which is really distinct from the revealed deposit, and therefore not revealed. This makes it easy to lay down and prove with an abundance of reasons the following conclusion: "Thirdly, it must be said that the *virtual revelation* of a certain truth *in its cause*, whether adequate or inadequate, as e.g., *that Christ is risible* is revealed in the proposition *He was made man*, does not suffice for the reason *sub qua*⁴³ of the habit of faith, and consequently the aforesaid truth is *not of faith*, but a *theological conclusion*."⁴⁴ The proofs of the thesis follow up to No. 134; but before concluding their exposition they note that in the aforesaid thesis they have been speaking of the *natural* cause or cause *in being*. "We answer by denying the major with respect to the natural cause, that is of the *being* and the appearing, of which we have been speaking in our *third conclusion*."⁴⁴

Having understood the revealed causality or virtuality in the sense of Suárez and Lugo, the Salmanticenses inevitably had to run afoul of the same difficulty the other two had previously encountered, that is to say, the *fact* that the Church had defined virtually revealed truths as truths of faith. The

⁴²Ed. Vivès, Paris 1879, t.11, pp. 58-71.

⁴³The reason *sub qua* (ratio sub qua) is the precise formality under which, a thing is considered. — *Transl.*

⁴⁴N. 124

⁴⁴N.132

ed in the Sacred Scriptures, at least *confusedly* [we have here the Suarezian *formal confused*: an effective index to the mind of the Salmanticensis] and implicitly. . . . But that which is included in a revealed proposition *only* as an effect in the cause [the Suarezian and Lagonian pure virtual or physico-con-nexive virtual] since it is not said, or attested to, by the Holy Spirit, *cannot be defined by the Church as a dogma of faith*.⁴⁸

No theologian prior to Molina, whether of the Thomist or of any other school, had ever dared to hurl that *Nego majorem* of the Salmanticensis, which constitutes a total denial of everything evidenced by the history of dogmas and unanimously admitted by theologians up to the end of the XVI century. And yet, one must confess that the Salmanticensis were more logical than either Suárez or Lugo. For once revealed virtuality is taken in the sense of non-implicit virtuality, which is how Suárez and Lugo understand it, such a virtual's definability of faith is impossible, and the Salmanticensis are justified in denying it. But if the Salmanticensis evinced a much greater sense of logic than did Suárez and Lugo, the latter two evinced a much greater sense of history than the former.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Nra. 146 and 147.

⁴⁹We should be sorry to learn that what we have said should cause any of our readers to think that we hold a low opinion of the authority of the Salmanticensis. On the contrary, we hold these egregious Thomists of the order of Carmel in such esteem that we do not hesitate in making our own, in principle, the words of the Spanish Dominican Jerónimo Vives: "As often as you should read the aforesaid *Course of the Carmelites*, think of something so excellent in the school of St. Thomas, that any opinion *should be considered truly Thomist* by the sole fact that it enjoys their support." (HIERONYMUS VIVES, O.P., *De Primatu Divinae Libertatis*, l. 1, n. 32, p. 9, Valentia 1645).

Nevertheless, in principle, there is no human principle — however universal we suppose it to be — that admits of no exception in particular instances. Homer himself is caught napping once in a while. The authority of Card. Cajetan, Prince of the Commemoration, is incomparably greater than that of the Salmanticensis. And yet, apropos of the learned Fr. Norberto del Prado, had no qualms about saying this of him: "But Cajetan, as the good Homer who occasionally dozes, was certainly dozing in the interpretation of the corollary placed by St. Thomas at the end of the article." (*D. Thomas et Bulla dogmatica 'Ineffabilis Deus'*, Friburgi Helvetiorum 1919, p. 196)

Finally, notwithstanding the authority of John of St. Thomas, which is not inferior to that of the Salmanticensis, a blue-blooded Thomist as Fr. Santiago Ramirez, O.P., wrote, only last year, these pointed and witty words, which every Thomist would do well to keep in mind: "One should ascertain whether in John of St. Thomas, everything is St. Thomas's or there also is something of John's." (*La Ciencia Tomista*, March 1922, p. 183)

IV. RESUMÉ: TWO HISTORICAL DATES AND THE ROOT OF THE CONFUSION

81. In the history of theology, as in the history of any other science, there are events that can be said to be epoch-making because they are the departure points of a new orientation, good or bad, on which subsequent developments hinge. Now, then, in the problem of the revealed virtuality's definability of faith, which is none other than the problem of dogmatic evolution, there are two historical epochs prefaced by two names each vying in renown with the other: Suárez and the Salmanticensis.

Up to Suárez, all the great theologians, with the sole exception of Molina, had defended or taken for granted as beyond discussion the virtual's definability of faith. Traditional theology considered obvious the following equation:

Revealed virtual = definable as of faith

The only question in which we find theological opinion divided was the question whether the revealed virtual is of faith *before* or *after* its definition. Vázquez and Vega, and all theologians more or less affiliated with Nominalism who did not distinguish between the habits of faith and theology, maintained that it was of faith before the definition. The Thomists and all who distinguished between theology and faith maintained that it was of faith after the definition. But all were unanimous in maintaining the *definability* of the revealed virtual because by revealed virtual they understood a virtual that was implicitly, but nonetheless really and objectively, revealed.

Comes Suárez. With the new notion given by him of the revealed virtual, which Lugo later made his own, Suárez completely changes the first member of the equation, since by revealed virtual he understands a virtual that is not implicit, and hence *not revealed*, although it continues being labeled as revealed.

When in any equation one of its members is changed, the other cannot remain unchanged. However, since the second member is supported by all theological tradition and by evident facts of the history of dogmas, Suárez and Lugo, moved by an excellent traditional spirit, spare no efforts to maintain it intact, even at the cost of resorting to such strange theories as those of

The criticism leveled at a theologian — however great he may be — on a particular point, detracts nothing from his authority. To convince other schools of the impartiality of the criticism we direct at some of their theologians — be they as eminent as Scotus, Suárez and Lugo — no better proof can be given than not to refrain from criticizing or not to disguise such criticisms with euphemisms where our own men are concerned, whoever they may be, John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticensis, or Billuart.

new revelations and transforming assistance. With the advent of Suárez and Lugo, the traditional equation is transformed into the following:

Virtual (not) revealed = definable as of faith

The term *not* placed within parenthesis, signifies that both Suárez and Lugo persist in calling it revealed, although the notion they give of it evidences that it is not revealed.

Come the Salmanticenses, and the traditional equation takes a new slightest slip, notice at once the inconsistency of Suárez's and Lugo's equation. But the manifest falsity of the theories of new revelations and transforming assistance that Suárez and Lugo had introduced on the side of the second member to prop it up, divert all the attention of the Salmanticenses to the second member, thus causing them to ignore the fact that the root of the evil is not in the second, but in the first member. And therefore, with a solemn *Nego majorem* they correct the defect of the second member, paying but meager attention to the first member. The equation, then, is reformulated as follows:

Virtual (not) revealed = *not* definable as of faith

Obviously the transformation of the traditional equation is now complete. Both members have been changed from affirmative to negative. The first *not* was furtively introduced by Suárez, with the new notion of the virtual given by him. The second *not* was the result of the relentless logic of the Salmanticenses.

Modern writers on faith or theology, depend almost to a man on one of these three great theologians; their citations make it immediately clear. The only difference lies in the fact that those who are not rigorous Thomists prefer to quote Suárez and Lugo; and those that are, preferably quote the Salmanticenses. These three theologians agree in defining the revealed virtual as a virtual that is not implicit, and thus not revealed. And that is the notion of the virtual that one finds in the majority of modern authors. Since to defend its definability, it would be necessary to resort to the inadmissible theories of Suárez and Lugo, almost all modern authors concur with the Salmanticenses in denying the definability of such a virtual.

With respect to the other theological conclusions, that is, the conceptual or identico-real conclusions, almost to a man they follow Suárez and Lugo and give them the name of formal confused, or formal implicit, or virtual identico-real. Furthermore, they not only affirm that these conclusions are definable as truths of faith, but also that they are truth, of faith *per se* or independently of definition.

This has been the cause of a confusion among some apologists, who are desirous of defending the homogeneous evolution of dogma or the homogeneity of the 3rd and 4th degrees of Catholic doctrine. They perceive that the 3rd and 4th degrees obviously are cases of revealed virtuality. They also perceive that modern theologians seem to deny almost to a man the *virtual's* definability. Hence they conclude that it is impossible to maintain the evolution of dogma without running counter to the high prevailing theological opinion. All this is due to not adverting to the fact that since the time of Suárez, the formulae containing the terms formal and virtual conceal a confusion that apparently denies what, at bottom, is affirmed.⁵⁰

To resume: it is clear that the modern confusion on this matter lies in two things: a) Many reserve the traditional term of revealed virtual to denote exclusively a non-implicit virtual, which in truth is neither a revealed virtual nor a theological virtual, but a *physical* virtual, that cannot be the object

⁵⁰There are, however, even after Suárez, some theologians who have faithfully preserved the divisions, and exact definitions, of the revealed, into revealed immediate or formal explicit, revealed immediate or formal implicit, revealed mediate or virtual implicit, and revealed mediate or virtual physico-distinct or purely connexive, as e.g. CLAVE, and MAZELLA (*De Virtutibus infusis*, d.2; *De Fidei Divinae Objecto*, a.9, nn.473-474; Romae 1879). However, we think that the examples he gives are not always correct, and for this reason we omit them. Hence in a truth revealed *formally and explicitly*, the meaning of which is clearly and distinctively expressed by the terms themselves, other truths can be *implicitly* contained *whether* formally or virtually. Those things are said to be contained *formally implicitly* in the explicitly revealed, which *really as well as formally are identified* with the latter. *Really*, because they are identified on the part of the object, as wisdom is identified with the other attributes and with the essence of God; *formally*, inasmuch as they have the same *formal concept*; or as others would have it, differ *only* with a distinction of *reasoning reason* and not with a distinction of *reasoned reason*. Now, in the *first* place, that is said to be *virtually* contained in an explicitly revealed truth, which, notwithstanding being *really identical* with it, nonetheless differs *formally* from it [this is the virtual *inclusive*]; . . . or, in the *second* place, which is *not really identical* with the explicitly revealed but is *only connected* with it [this is the virtual *physico-connexive*]; thus all the *physical* properties (in the hypothesis that they *really differ* from the essence) are virtually contained in the essence; the necessary effect is really contained in the *formal implicit* and the *virtual implicit* or *inclusive* is very well distinguished, in our opinion, in the following passage from RIPALDA: "There are some predicates implicitly revealed that differ *only through reasoning reason, solely by an explanation of terms*, but not through reasoned reason or through an expressed perfection or objective formality; as for instance man and rational animal or a composite constituted by soul and body. [Thus far we have the *formal-inclusive*; now comes the *virtual-inclusive*] There are other *really identified* predicates that differ *through reasoned reason* and by *more than a mere explanation of terms*, because they express *different formalities* and perfections of the object with respect to different operations and connotations . . . as, for instance, to be wise and to be immense is said of God. Of this distinction we have spoken in Dialectics and Metaphysics." (RIPALDA, *De fide divina*, d.8, s.3, n.43)

either of true theological certainty or of the Church's infallibility, as we shall see in Sections 4 and 5 of this same chapter; b) under the label of formal confused they have concealed, and continue to conceal the whole domain of the true and rigorous revealed and theological virtual.

Hence two odd phenomena may be observed in modern theological authors: a) when they deny the definability of the *virtual* or theological conclusion, they deny only the definability of the Suarezian virtual, that is, the non-inclusive virtual; b) when they assert the definability of faith of the formal confused or formal identico-real, they affirm the definability of faith of the true virtual and the homogeneous evolution of dogma by way of true implicit or conceptual virtuality.

82. CONFIRMATION. — In support of this we will quote two modern theologians among the many who could be cited for this purpose. In the first place, we quote the learned Card. Mazella. "If the question be raised about a truth implicitly contained in another which is explicitly revealed, in such a manner, however, that the former is identical with the latter *only really* and *not formally*, then Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses and others hold that the former is not revealed; the contrary of which is held by De Lugo, Suárez, etc. And *this seems to be the opinion which should be subscribed to . . .* But if the question be raised regarding an object which is said to be contained in another explicitly revealed in so far as the former is *only connected* with, or follows, the latter (this they call *properly virtual* comprehension), then the same Suárez, De Lugo, etc. deny that the former is *per se* said by God and credible by faith . . . However, I would here make a distinction, one which seems also consonant to the mind of these masters, to wit: the implicit object either follows the explicitly revealed truth in such a manner that *under no hypothesis is the former separable from the latter*, and this is clear without a new revelation: in this case I would say that the former *is revealed*, since otherwise the truth of the explicitly revealed object could in no way stand fast; or the former *is separable* from the latter, at least by God's absolute power, and in this case the opinion of Suárez, Lugo, etc. reappears. We shall presently say what we think of it. This is, then, our opinion. *Proposition XVII*: That which is *formally* and *implicitly* contained in some explicitly revealed truth is of itself a material object of faith; however, that which is connected in it *only virtually* — in so far as, notwithstanding being necessarily connected with the latter, it nevertheless differs from the latter *really as well as formally*, and is even separable from it by God's power — does not seem to belong per se to the object of faith."⁵¹

⁵¹ *De virtutibus infusis* ed. 6^a, Neapoli 1909, n. 414.

In the second place, we quote another learned theologian, Fr. Sola. "Thesis 76: The truth that is contained formally implicitly is another explicitly revealed truth that pertains of itself to the material object of faith. The same is to be said more probably of truths contained, *materially* and *identically* or *essentially connexively*, but not formally, in another explicitly revealed truth. *Censure*: the first part, namely, that any truth *formally* contained in another explicitly revealed is of itself a material object of faith, that is to say, truly and really revealed, is certain and common against Arriaga . . . The second part is in reality most common and very much more probable, at least where the *real identity* of the one and the other can, without a new revelation, be known by us with certainty. Among the earlier writers, this view is held by Suárez, and Lugo . . . and commonly by the more recent authors against Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses and others . . . Thesis 77: Truths which are contained *only virtually* in others explicitly revealed are not of themselves the material object of faith."⁵²

This teaching of Card. Mazella and Fr. Sola is found in the majority of theologians posterior to Suárez and Lugo, although expressed in different terms. Whoever reads them attentively will notice at once that when they deny the definability of the revealed virtual or theological conclusion, they mean by that term the false virtual of the fourth type; and when they admit the definability of the revealed *formal* or assert that only the formally, or identically, or essentially revealed is definable, by formal, or identical or essential, they mean the true virtual of the other five types. (45-46)

Whatever may be one's opinion on the subject of the revealed virtual's definability, it will be impossible to interpret the true mind of theologians posterior to the XVI century without keeping in mind clearly the distinction between the false virtual, that of type No. 4 — admitted into theology after Suárez — from the other five types of the true revealed virtual.

SECTION III

CLASSIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPAL OPINIONS AMONG CATHOLIC THEOLOGAINS ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

83. THEOLOGAINS PRIOR TO MOLINA. — A brief survey of the various opinions held by Catholic theologians on the subject will be helpful before proceeding to investigate the existence and nature of true revealed virtuality.

⁵² *De gratia Christi et virtutibus infusis*, Vallisoleti 1919, nn. 619-627.

All theologians prior to Molina, with no exception that we know of, maintain that the true revealed virtuality or true theological conclusion is definable as a truth of faith. This is equivalent to maintaining the possibility of true evolution in dogma.

There is no difference among these theologians except the following. The Thomists, who have always specifically distinguished faith from theology, take pains to point out that, notwithstanding its definability as of faith, the theological conclusion, prior to its definition by the Church, is not formally a truth of divine faith but only a theological truth. On the other hand, the Scotists and Nominalists who do not specifically distinguish, or are not quite clear about the specific distinction of faith from theology, are satisfied with saying that every theological conclusion is of divine faith, without specifying whether it is so prior to, or after, the definition.

But all Thomists and Scotists, agree in maintaining that it is definable as a truth of faith and, consequently, is a true dogma of faith if the Church defines it. Hence Suárez, who was fully aware of the tradition of the Schools, wrote without any hesitation: "This view is, in my opinion, certain and gathered from the common conviction of theologians; I find no theologian who contradicts it."⁵³ Lugo, with equal justification and historical sense, adds: "Apart from the arguments adduced by Suárez, it is confirmed by the practice and the usage of all."⁵⁴ On this point no historical doubt is possible.

84. MOLINA'S INNOVATION. — Of all theologians, Molina was the first to assert that no true theological conclusion — even one as inclusive or implicit as the conclusion of the existence of two wills in Christ — is or can be a truth of divine faith, whether before or after the Church's definition. Consequently, even if the Church defines them, such conclusions do not deserve the assent of divine faith but only a theological assent based on reasoning, because it is through reasoning that the Church knows them and defines them. And it makes no difference that the Church should define such conclusions with the dogmatic *anathema*, as the Sixth Ecumenical Council defined the existence of two wills in Christ. There is thus no growth in dogma, which is the same as saying that there is no true dogmatic evolution.⁵⁵

⁵³ *De fide*, d.3, §.11, n.11.

⁵⁴ *De fide*, d.1, n.270.

⁵⁵ "In this sentence the principles are all the things revealed by God immediately and in themselves. These are exclusively the things contained in the Canonical books, together with the tradition not included in the Holy Scriptures, which are conserved in the Church as certainly revealed by God. There were some who have said that the principles of theology should also include the definitions whereby the Church has established certain truths because She sees that they are evidently deduced from those that are revealed, as e.g. that in Christ Our Lord there are two wills, the divine and the

Granados subsequently defended Molina's truly innovative opinion no less ardently than brilliantly. Ripalda followed it in part. Kilber or the so-called Wirceburgenses and some others embraced it *in toto*. The Salmanticenses and Billuart apparently seem to concur with Molina as a consequence of their failure to advert to the confusion introduced by Suárez in the notion of the revealed virtual.

On the other hand, Molina's innovation was energetically assailed not only by all the Thomists prior to the Salmanticenses, including John of St. Thomas, but also by Suárez and Lugo, and by the great majority of theologians of different schools prior to the introduction of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

Molina's innovation, which eliminates all dogmatic evolution, earned the following judgment from the great Navarrete: "This opinion is plagued with many falsehoods, which for the time being we do not wish to qualify with a censure because it is not sufficiently clear what this author thinks. . . . Therefore the aforesaid author [Molina] is very much mistaken when he asserts that the theologian assents to that truth through the habit of theology, in the same manner that the Church deduces it. For even if the Fathers present in those Councils deduced that conclusion by the habit of theology, nonetheless, supposing the definition to have been made, they assented to it through the habit of faith."⁵⁶ The Thomist Nazario plainly qualified it as *Molina's error*.⁵⁷

human, which, although it is not expressed in the Holy Scriptures, is nonetheless evidently gathered from them. They are moved by this reason, namely, that just as the Holy Spirit stood by Paul and the other Sacred Writers to prevent them from straying in any way from the truth in anything that they were writing, so also does He stand by the Church to preclude her from erring in anything that She defines as certain. Therefore, as the conclusions that Paul deduced from other truths. . . . have the nature of immediately revealed principles by the very fact that they are asserted by Paul, so too the conclusions that the Church defines because She sees that they are evidently deduced from revealed truths, will have the nature of immediately revealed principles by the very fact that they are defined by her. This opinion does not please me. Cano has likewise rejected it in 12 of *De locis*, chap. 3. For the concurrence whereby the Holy Spirit stands ready by the Catholic Church and the Supreme Pontiff, who is her head, is not meant for the purpose of turning into a truth of faith anything that she declares anything that belongs either mediate or immediately to the faith. . . . You will therefore ask: through which habit do the faithful assent to those truths defined by the Church, which are deduced from other revealed truths, if they do not immediately assent to them through the habit of faith? I answer: if they know how to infer them from other revealed truths, as the Church infers them, then they assent to them through the *theological habit* in two ways."⁵⁶ (MOLINA, *Commentaria in 1 p. D. Thomae*, q.1, a.2, d.2, t.1, p.7; Venetii 1602)

⁵⁶ *Controversiae in D. Thomae et eius scholae defensionem*, auctore F. BALTAS-SARE NAVARRETE, O.P., Vallisolet 1605, t.1, cont. 7.

⁵⁷ See below, n.407.

This is the innovation which so astonished Suárez that he could not but exclaim: "It is amazing . . ."⁵⁸ Recently, the Jesuit Schiffrini has commented on it in the following terms: "Suárez is amazed at the novelty of this opinion [Molina's] and he exposes it as *contrary to the common conviction of theologians*."⁵⁹

85. THE POSITION OF VÁZQUEZ AND VEGA. — Vázquez and Vega hold, not only that the true theological conclusion is definable as of faith, but also that it is *per se* of divine faith even before the definition; hence, any theologian who deduces it through an evident reasoning can, and ought to, give it the assent of divine faith. In the first part Vázquez and Vega follow the traditional view against Molina; in the second part they hew to the Scotist or Nominalist line against the Thomist.

Vázquez, in effect, teaches that, even prior to its definition by the Church, any theological conclusion can be considered under two aspects: a) formally, that is, precisely as a conclusion; b) materially, that is, in so far as it is contained in the revealed premise or premises. Under the first aspect, it deserves theological assent; under the second, it is worthy of divine faith, which Suárez — and in his wake almost all modern theologians — later applied to the formal-confused or metaphysico-inclusive conclusions — later applied to the formal-confused or metaphysico-inclusive conclusions, and which the Salmanticensis — contrary to all Thomist tradition — applied to the conclusion deduced from two revealed premises.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ *De Fide*, d. 3, s. 11, n. 3.

⁵⁹ *De Virtutibus infusis*, n. 126; Friburgi Briggoviae 1904.

⁶⁰ "In the next place mention must be made of the teaching of Cano and Vega. . . . Some regard this teaching as less true and attempt to refute it with the argument that the conclusion always follows the weaker part However, these doctors do not seem to have understood the foregoing opinion of Cano and Andrés de Vega. The reason adduced only proves that the assent given to the theological conclusion, *insofar as it is inferred* either from premises of faith or from one of faith and another of natural reason, is not the assent of infused faith, but either an assent inferior to that given to the premises, or an assent of another kind. But Cano and Vega contend that, besides this assent that is produced by reasoning and is called *theological*, there exists another assent proximately produced by the light of *faith*, which requires, as a previous condition, the theological assent, notwithstanding that it is less certain than the assent of faith. But this should not be cause for surprise. For as they very appositely observe, and as we shall explain at greater length, the assent of infused faith also demands as a condition an assent of human faith: for in order to believe through infused faith any proposition defined by the Church it is necessary to believe first that it was defined by the Council or the Pontiff, and yet this can be known only through human faith. Likewise, we first believe with human faith the preacher or the man who proposes the articles of faith, and once this faith is supposed, there follows the assent by the light of infused faith. Cano and Vega, therefore, similarly teach that, given the *previous*

Vázquez bases his view, that conclusions known by evident reasoning are of divine faith for the theologian even without the Church's definition, on the fact that the reasoning is to the theologian's private mind as the Council's definition is to the whole Church. "Theological demonstration is proportionally to the demonstrating theologian what the Council is to the whole Church, when it defines something as a truth of faith. The only difference between the two is this: the Council proposes what it defines *to all* for them to believe, so that the obligation to believe is laid on everyone; whereas theological reasoning proposes it *only to those* to whom the inference from the articles of faith is evident."⁶¹

This theory of Vázquez has given rise both to the distinction made today between dogmas of *divine faith* and dogmas of *Catholic faith*, and to the theory that the authority of the Church is absolutely necessary for the faith of the common faithful but not for the faith of learned theologians. This distinction and theory, both of which are false, will be examined later on. (135-156)

Of Vázquez's theory the usually mild-spoken John of St. Thomas says the following: "The purification seemingly intended by the opposite theory between the certainty of the theological conclusion and the Church's definition *can in no way be tolerated* Otherwise, if it were granted that the conclusion theologially inferred possessed relative to the theologian who inferred it as much certainty as the Church's definition, then it would have no need of the definition of faith as the confirmation and as the rule of its certainty; and, consequently, the theologian would be unto himself the sufficient rule of certainty in matters of faith without any recourse to the Church: this would be a *most pernicious error*."⁶²

86. THE THEORY OF SUÁREZ AND LUGO. — The reader is already familiar with the theory of these famous theologians. They distinguish two kinds of revealed virtuals: the metaphysico-inclusive and the physico-con-

dition of an *evident consequence* from the articles of faith, or from a premise of faith and a natural premise, there follows the assent of *infused faith*, for *theological demonstration is proportionally to the demonstrating theologian himself what the Council is to the whole Church, when it defines something as a truth of faith*. The only difference between the two is this: the Council proposes what it defines to all for them to believe, so that the obligation to believe is laid on everyone; whereas theological reasoning proposes it only to those to whom the inference from the articles of faith is evident". (VÁZQUEZ, *Commentaria in I partem D. Thomae*, q. 1, a. 2, d. 5, c. 3, p. 15; Lugduni 1631). We shall quote the text of Vega in no. 388. We shall treat at length of the true mind of MELCHOR CANO elsewhere (449-464).

⁶¹ VÁZQUEZ, *in I partem*, a. 2, d. 5, c. 3, n. 8.

⁶² *Cursus Theol.*, q. 1, d. 2, a. 4.

nexive. In respect of the former they maintain, like Vázquez and Vega, that not only is it definable of faith, but also that it is of divine faith for any theologian who knows it through evident reasoning, even before its definition. Thus they applied to this species of virtual the two assents introduced by Vázquez.

In respect of the latter, they held that it alone was the virtual or theological conclusion in the proper sense of the term. Consequently they applied to it what the Thomist tradition teaches of all true revealed virtuals, namely, that prior to the definition it is not of divine faith but merely a theological conclusion, whereas after the definition it is truly a truth of faith. However, having considered as properly virtual that which is not implicit, and thus a virtual that is not revealed, they had, in consequence, to resort to the theory of new revelations or the theory of indefinite and transforming assistance, as we have seen earlier. (72-79)

87. THREE, NOT TWO, THEORIES. — Therefore, relative to the question whether theological conclusions, or the revealed virtual, are of *faith* or two opinions, to wit: that of Cano, Vázquez and Vega; and that of the rest of the theologians. There are three fundamentally different theories; two diametrically opposed to each other, namely that of Molina, and that of Vázquez, and a third which holds the middle ground between them, which is the Thomist.

The *first*, Molina's, denies that theological conclusions are of divine faith either before or after the definition. This theory, followed only by a handful and censured or rejected by the majority, subsequently gave rise, as we shall see at the proper time (233), to the so-called ecclesiastical faith by applying to dogmatic facts almost the same things that Molina had said of theological conclusions.

The *second*, Vázquez's and Vega's, lies at the opposite pole. It affirms that theological conclusions are of divine faith not only after but also before the definition. We hope to show fully later that Melchor Cano never subscribed to this opinion, although it is commonly affirmed that he did. (449-464) But Suárez and Lugo did follow it with regard to the metaphysico-inclusive conclusions, as likewise do most of modern theological manuals, with hardly any awareness of so doing, when they treat of the formal confused or the virtual identico-real.

The *third*, which lies midway between the first two, is the traditional Thomist theory which distinguishes between before and after the definition. Before the definition, no true theological conclusion, not even that which is deduced from two revealed premises, is of divine faith, nor is it worthy of an act of divine faith; it is merely a theological truth and deserves no more than

theological assent from either the learned theologian, or the common faithful. However, after its dogmatic definition by the Church, any true theological conclusion — as we shall presently see, only the metaphysico-inclusive are true theological conclusions — is as truly a truth of faith as the articles of faith themselves.

These three theories must be understood with respect to the true theological conclusion, which is exclusively the metaphysico-inclusive conclusion, since prior to Suárez it had not occurred to any theologian to consider the physico-connexive conclusion as truly theological. Thus, if we were to extend the name of theological conclusion or revealed virtual to include also the physico-connexive virtual, we would have to admit a *fourth opinion*, held by Suárez and Lugo, which applies to such false virtual or theological conclusion what the third theory teaches regarding the true virtual or theological conclusion. In truth, it is only this fourth opinion which the Salamanticenses assail with irrefutable logic when they deny the definability of any virtual (*virtute tantum*), although they seem to deny the definability of any and all virtuals in consequence of their failure to distinguish between the true virtual and the physico-connexive virtual.

The third, or traditional Thomist theory is expounded by John of St. Thomas in the following terms: "The third opinion maintains that propositions evidently deduced from the principles of faith, if defined by the Church, belong immediately to the faith . . . This opinion is commonly held by the Thomists, as can be seen in Master Navarrete and Master González."⁶³ In the treatise *On Faith*, alluding to this same passage, he writes:

"The foregoing justifies inferring that virtual or mediate revelation, or that which is deduced through discourse, such as is found in *theology*, differs specifically from immediate revelation which is had through the testimony of Him who speaks and attains to what must be believed as a truth of faith. We have examined this at greater length in part I, question I, disputation 2, article 4, where we rejected two extreme opinions. One of these is Vázquez's, who holds that a conclusion deduced from premises of faith is, with respect to him who knows the reasoning, as certain as a proposition defined by the Church. The other is Molina's, who maintains that, even if a proposition, which previously was not a truth of faith, should be defined by the Church, the definition would not turn it into a truth of faith; for the Holy Spirit assists the Church to prevent her from erring, but not to turn into a truth of faith that which previously was not of faith. These two opinions can be found impugned in the aforesaid place."⁶⁴

⁶³ *Cursus theologicus*, q.1, d.2, a.4, n.3.

⁶⁴ *De fide*, d.1, a.2, n.13.

The reader will have noticed that, of these three theories concerning the metaphysico-inclusive conclusion, the third, which is the Thomist, defends its definability as of faith, which is to say, that it defends the evolution of dogma by way of a true theological conclusion. The same defense is made in the second theory, which is that of Vázquez and Vega, Suárez and Lugo. However, these sin by excess in asserting that such conclusions are not only definable as of faith but also formally of faith *per se* or independently of the definition. Only the first theory, that of Molina, Kilber and a few others, denies their definability as of faith, which is the same as denying true dogmatic evolution.

Therefore it can be truly said that the position which maintains that inclusive or conceptual conclusions are definable as of faith, and thus upholds the evolution of dogma by way of implicit virtuality, is common doctrine among theologians, past and contemporary, notwithstanding the fact that many manuals give a contrary impression by not distinguishing between inclusive conclusions and physico-connexive conclusions.

88. **INTRINSIC STUDY OF THE PROBLEM.** — Setting aside the opinions of theologians, since at the end of this book we shall be literally quoting most of them (353-448), let us now proceed to the examination of the problem of the evolution of dogma in itself. Fundamentally, this problem is none other than the problem of the existence and nature of the virtuality of the revealed deposit combined with the problem of the nature and compass of the Church's authority with respect to that virtuality.

We have seen (46) that the six types of virtuality or reasoning reduce to two: the physico-connexive virtuality, which is that of the fourth type of reasoning, and the metaphysico-inclusive, which comprises all the other five. In the following sections we shall investigate whether these two virtualities, or at least one of them, are truly revealed virtualities and capable of dogmatic evolution, and whether dogmatic evolution is possible, or not, without the Church's definition. These are most fundamental questions, for they lie at the heart of, and provide the key to, the existence of dogmatic evolution, and the specific distinction between dogmatic evolution on the one hand, and theological evolution on the other hand.

SECTION IV

THE PHYSICO-CONNEXIVE VIRTUALITY IS NEITHER A REVEALED NOR A THEOLOGICAL VIRTUALITY

89. **THE FOURTH TYPE OF VIRTUAL.** — We have previously seen that, since the time of Suárez up to the present, the properly revealed or properly theological virtual has been and continues to be identified with the

virtual physico-connexive, that is, the fourth of the six types of reasoning or virtuality considered above. (45 and 73).

In the present section we intend to make clear that the physico-connexive reasoning is not a rigorous *theological* conclusion, not conclusive in *theology*, not a *theological* or *revealed* virtual, not *necessarily connected* with the revealed major or revealed deposit from which the attempt is made to deduce it. Now, if it is not a *revealed* or *theological* virtual, if there is no *necessary* nexus between it and the revealed deposit, much less can it be an object of *infallibility*, and least of all can it be definable as a *truth of divine faith*. To many, our assertions will, no doubt, seem to contradict what is said in most theological manuals since Suárez. However, we think that it is not difficult to prove our position conclusively, and to show that in all this there is nothing but a confusion between the pure essence or essence in the abstract on the one hand, and the connatural or the perfect essence on the other.

65. What we call today immediately or formally revealed and mediately or virtually revealed, St. Thomas respectively designated, in the very first pages of the *Summa Theologica*, with the names of *divine revealed* and *divine revealable*. The former is the formal object of divine faith; the latter, the formal object of sacred theology. "Hence, since the *Holy Scripture* considers certain things inasmuch as they are *divinely revealed*, all things whatsoever that are *divinely revealable* share in the one formal reason of the object of this science." (*Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.1, a.3) "St. Thomas places the *immediately revealed* on the part of the Holy Scripture, because the things conveyed by the Scripture are believed as truths of faith; but on the part of *theological science* he places the *revealable*, which are *potentially* or *virtually* revealed." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus*, q.1, d.2, a.1.) For St. Thomas, to be *divinely revealable* or to be *virtually* or *potentially* revealed means to be *knowable* [scilicet] or *cognoscible* by the light itself (objective principles) of divine revelation, for revelation itself (objective revelation) is the *formal medium* of knowing of sacred theology. "And similarly the sacred sciences, remaining one, can consider the things dealt with in the different philosophical sciences under one *formal* reason, that is, in so far as they are *divinely revealable*." (*Ibid.*, a.4). "The formal reason of the object of theology, qua object, is what I call the *revealable* or the *knowable through the light of divine revelation*" (CAPREOLO, *In 1 Sent.*, prolog., q.1) "The medium shining with *divine light* constitutes the *theological knowable* [scilicet]." (CAJETAN, *In Summam Theologicam*, p.1, q.1, a.2). What is meant by *properly knowable* [scilicet] or *cognoscible* as distinct from the *revealable*, and, consequently, what is meant by *theological science* properly speaking as distinct from faith? The Angelic Doctor replies: "Observe that, since sciences is of the conclusions whereas understanding is of the principles, the *conclusions* of demonstrations in which the *passions* [properties] are predicated of their proper subjects are said to be *properly knowable* [scilicet]." (*In Post. Analyt.*, lib. 1, lect.9). This is the source of the classical definition of theology in its true and proper sense, and of the true and proper theological conclusions, namely, *the conclusions contained in, or deduced from, the revealed deposit as properties in the essence*. Our purpose in this and two following sections is to bring out the true Thomist meaning of this *definition* of sacred theology, of the true theological or revealed virtuality.

90. THREE PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. — It should be remembered, in the first place, that the physico-connective reasoning endeavours to infer in the conclusion, not the metaphysical or essential or aptitudinal or radical properties, but the physico-actual properties; and, further, that it is assumed that physico-actual properties differ really from the essence, and that they are absolutely, or by God's power, separable from the essence. (44)

In the second place, it should be kept in mind that, in order to deduce these physico-actual and absolutely separable properties, we take for our starting point the essence in its pure or abstract state, that is, we assume that God has revealed nothing more than that N has such an essence, and has said nothing either explicitly or implicitly about whether the essence is in a connatural or preternatural state, in a state of integrity or defect, in a perfect or imperfect state.

In the third place, the conclusion we want to arrive at is not a conditioned, but a simple or absolute conclusion. In other words, assuming that by revelation we know that N is a man (mere or abstract essence), we are not after a conclusion that says: therefore N is actually risible if he is in a connatural state; we are after a conclusion that states simply: therefore N is actually risible. If we mean to infer a conditioned conclusion, we would be straying outside the boundaries of type 4. To deduce that N is actually risible if he is in a connatural state reduces to: N is in the connatural state; therefore, N is actually risible. This is not a type 4, or physico-connective reasoning, the only one with which we are now concerned; it is a reasoning of type 5, which we readily grant to be, not only theological, but also definable as of divine faith.

We have made these preliminary observations, even at the risk of being considered repetitious, because we judge them to be indispensable, given the delicate nature of the problem. We will now present the proofs on which we base our contention that any reasoning of type 4, or physico-connective, is not conclusive in *theology*, and thus neither is, nor should be called, a true revealed virtual or a true *theological* conclusion, except in the broad sense whereby we call conclusion, not only that which is rigorously demonstrative or conclusive, but also that which is theologically uncertain and probable.

91. FIRST AND FUNDAMENTAL PROOF. — It is axiomatic in logic that a false conclusion can never follow from a true antecedent, or that if a conclusion is false, it can only be either because one of the premises is false or because the reasoning itself is ill constructed. Let us, then, examine one or several reasonings involving a true physico-connective virtual, or, reasoning of type 4, viz., reasonings whereby from revealed knowledge of the mere essence of any thing, we deduce in the conclusion a physico-actual property through a physically necessary minor premise.

By *revelation* we know that the body of Christ in the Eucharist is a true body; that the eucharistic species are true accidents; that the fire in the furnace of Babylon was true fire, etc. By physical science we know with full physical certainty or necessity that every body is locally extended, that is, occupies space; that every accident has actual inherence in its subject; that all fire duly applied actually burns, etc. Let there be, then, the following reasonings of type 4:

1st: The body of Christ in the Eucharist is a true body; but, every body actually occupies space; therefore, the body of Christ in the Eucharist actually occupies space.

2nd: The eucharistic species are true accidents; but every accident actually inheres in its subject; therefore, the eucharistic species actually inhere in their subject.

3rd: The fire of the furnace of Babylon was true fire applied in the proper and due conditions; but, any true fire properly and duly applied actually burns; therefore, the fire of the furnace of Babylon actually burned.

4th: The fire of hell or of purgatory is a true fire; but no bodily thing is capable of torturing or imprisoning a spirit; therefore the fire of hell or of purgatory neither tortures nor imprisons spirits.

5th: Elijah was a true man; but all true men actually die; therefore, Elijah actually died.

6th: Jesus Christ is true man; but every true man is both a human person and conceived of a human male; therefore, Jesus Christ is a human person and was conceived of a human male.

7th: The Blessed Virgin is a descendant of Adam and was conceived of a man; but, in these conditions original sin is actually contracted; therefore, the Blessed Virgin actually contracted original sin.

8th: Jesus Christ and His Blessed Mother truly and really died; but no dead human rises again or comes back to life; therefore neither Jesus Christ nor the Blessed Virgin has risen or come back to life, etc., etc.

Let anyone examine these reasonings attentively. They all are true reasonings involving the physico-connective virtual. In the major premise we know by revelation the *essence*. In the minor premise we state a physically necessary or certain principle. However, the conclusion, is so far from being a *theological conclusion*, so far from having *theological certainty*, so far from having *theological necessity or nexus*, that it is, on the contrary, a *theological error*. Therefore, the virtual physico-connective is not a true theological conclusion, does not have *theological certainty*, does not have theological necessity, does not have a necessary nexus with the *theological* that is with the *divine*, that is, with the *revealed* major or revealed deposit.

We are convinced that whoever reflects upon these reasonings carefully, without preconceived notions, and does not allow himself to be misled by considerations alien to their intrinsic value will soon perceive that there exists a radical difference between *physics iii* and *theology*, and that the physico-connexive reasoning is absolutely bereft of demonstrative value in *theology*.

As a matter of fact, all these reasonings are true physico-connexive reasonings or virtuals and yet, far from being conclusive in *theology*, they end in false conclusions. It is evident that a false conclusion cannot proceed in any case except from these two sources: either one of the premises is false, or the syllogism is incorrectly structured. In the above syllogisms, neither of the premises is false, since the major premises are revealed premises, and the minor premises are physically certain. Therefore it can only be that these syllogisms are incorrectly structured. In other words, a syllogism, the major of which expresses only a mere essence, and the minor is not essential but denotes a purely physical connexion, is an incorrectly structured syllogism in *theology*. But that is precisely the structure of the virtual physico-connexive or type 4. Therefore, it is obvious that such virtuality is *not conclusive* in *theology*, is not a theological conclusion.

92. A DODGE. — Let no one say that these reasonings are not conclusive or that these conclusions are false *because* we happen to know by *revelation* that their contradictories are true.

In the first place, such a reply is quite proper in *simple* or common faithful, but highly unseemly in true philosophers or theologians, as both Báñez and Cajetan observed ⁶⁶ apropos of a similar remark.

ⁱⁱⁱ *Physics* does not have in this book the meaning that it usually has in the academic curriculum as distinct from chemistry, biology, etc. Much less does it mean that specialized part of physics known as theoretical physics which is more mathematical physics, and is concerned with pure theory, as distinct from what might be termed theoretico-experimental physics which is concerned with verifying the mathematically constructed theory in the world of nature.

The author takes the term *physics* in the classical tradition, and means by it what today we designate by the name of *natural experimental, or observational, sciences*. Thus physics would include physics, chemistry, biology, mineralogy, astronomy, etc. — *Transi.*

⁶⁶ Since one truth cannot contradict another truth, and since dogmas revealed by God are *infallible truths*, St. Thomas teaches that no presumed demonstration or conclusion opposed to a dogma is a true demonstration or conclusion, but a fallacy or false argument that can be *solved*. "Since faith is grounded on infallible truth, and it is impossible to demonstrate the contrary of what is true, it is manifest that the proofs adduced against the faith are not demonstrations but *soluble arguments*." (*Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 8) Commenting on the words *soluble arguments*, Báñez says that there are two ways of solving an objection against a dogma: first, by saying that it is not conclusive *because God has revealed the contrary*, without, however, pointing out the internal defect of the objection or argument.

Secondly and fundamentally, these conclusions are not false *because* God has revealed the contrary, but vice versa. God has revealed the contrary *because* they are false. Their intrinsic falsity is not caused by divine revelation, but by their lack of necessary connexion with the principles or premises from which the attempt is made to deduce them. God could, undoubtedly, have revealed to us only the major premises of these reasonings while keeping absolute silence on their conclusions, and yet these conclusions would continue to be as false as they are. God could have revealed the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist without telling us whether it is extended in space or not. He could have revealed the real existence of the eucharistic species, and said nothing of their actual inherence. He could have revealed the death of the Bl. Virgin without disclosing her resurrection. He could have revealed the fact that the three young men were cast into the furnace of Babylon and told us nothing about their being burned or not.

He could have told us nothing about these supernatural facts in which the *connatural* state of the essence is by divine will suspended, as He has told us nothing about many other supernatural events pertaining to His supernatural providence; and yet whether we knew them or not, the facts would not have been one whit less true whether we were cognizant of them or not; and the physico-connexive reasonings and conclusions that deny these facts would not have been one whit less false in the absence of revelation, as we now know them to be through revelation. Revelation does not change the value of reasoning; it only make us know what was already true or false, but the truth or falsity of which we either might not perceive or not perceive as clearly but for the help of revelation.

Therefore no reasoning of type 4, that is, the physico-connexive, leads, or can lead, to *theologically certain* conclusions. No reasoning of such type is conclusive in *theology*.

Secondly, by exposing the weakness of the argument or objection. The first way of solving, says Báñez, belongs to people of little account — proper of the common faithful — and unseemly in a theologian; the second is proper of the theologian. "Solutions of the first kind are *not theological*; this mode of answering belongs to the common run of the faithful. But those of the other kind are *theological*." (*Comment. in loc. cit. D. Thomae*, concl. 3.) Cajetan and the other commentators express themselves likewise. Let, then, anyone examine those eight instances or arguments of physico-connexive virtuality we have given in the text; let him pinpoint the reason why they lead to false conclusions, and he will immediately see that it is because, whereas the major only asserts the mere *essence* of an individual, the conclusion infers its *actual* physico-distinct property. Therein precisely lies the intrinsic *defect* which causes the argument to conclude erroneously, and therein precisely lies the essence of the physico-connexive virtual, or that of type 4. On the other hand, if the major affirmed the mere essence and the conclusion inferred the essential property (types 1, 2, and 3), or if the major affirmed the connatural, or the perfect, essence and the conclusion inferred the actual property (types 5, and 6), the argument would conclude perfectly.

93. WHY ARE SUCH REASONINGS INCONCLUSIVE IN THEOLOGY? — These reasonings are inconclusive both in theology and in metaphysics simply because they are *invalidly structured*; because, under a seemingly faultless form, they are actually *four-footed*. The major premises affirm only the mere *essence* in the abstract, an essence that abstracts from both the natural and the preternatural order, from both the integral and the defective state, from both the perfect and the imperfect state. The major affirms only the *essence* and nothing but the *essence*.

On the other hand, the minor premises state something that is not true of the essence in each and every one of its states, but is true only and exclusively of the essence in its connatural, but not in its supernatural, state. These arguments, thus, contain four terms. The middle term does not have the same sense in the major and in the minor. In the major the middle term is taken in the *essential* or abstract sense; in the minor it is taken, not in the essential, but in the *connatural* sense. The argument has four terms, instead of three. It is not surprising that it should be inconclusive.

WHY ARE THEY CONCLUSIVE IN PHYSICS? — Because in physics, as the *physicist* understands them, they are validly structured. In physics there are no *essential* premises, that is, premises that abstract from the natural and supernatural. In physics all premises, all statements are always understood, in virtue of the formal object itself of the science, in the *connatural* sense. The physicist, as such, is not concerned with the supernatural. When physics, or the physicist, says, N is a man, he understands the term *man*, not essentially or abstractly, but connaturally; he takes the essence in so far as it is subject to, and governed by, the physical laws of nature. The starting point for the physicist is not essence, but *nature*. If the essence be thus understood in the major premise, then the minor is faultless. The minor states that *every* essence (that is, every *connatural* essence, an assumption made by the physicist as such), always and indefectibly has its actual properties. In the assumption of connaturality, which is always presupposed and is the starting point for the physicist, the conclusion is entirely flawless. The conclusion states nothing but that N is actually risible in the *supposition* (starting point for the physicist) that the laws of nature are operative or that the connatural state is verified.

But it should be obvious that *in this hypothesis* we no longer have a physico-connexive argument. We have instead a physico-connatural argument. We are no longer dealing with a type 4, but with a type 5 reasoning. (90) No physico-connexive argument is valid in theology; if it is valid in physics it is

^{iv} *Physicist* here means any natural scientist, i.e., one engaged in the study of nature or the material world through observation or experimentation. — *Transl.*

because in physics it no longer is physico-connexive in view of the restriction of physics to the natural or connatural state and its consequent inability to rise to the supernatural or to the essential levels, which are proper of theology and metaphysics respectively.

94. WHERE IS THE THEOLOGICAL DEFECT OF THE PHYSICO-ABSTRACT REASONING? — To perceive clearly where the defect of such theological arguments lies, nothing else is required but to attend to the middle term *man*, which is the predicate of the major and the subject of the minor. The major exclusively states, or we assume that it exclusively states, that *N is man essentially*, that is, has a true human essence. Taken thus *essentially*, the term *man* does not determine any of the states in which the human essence might find itself; on the contrary, it abstracts from all such states. A man is essentially man in the natural or in the preternatural or in the supernatural state; in the integral or in the defective state, in the supremely perfect natural state; or in the imperfect state, with all the *actual* properties, or without them. A man can be found in any of these states without forfeiting his human essence. This being the case, we assume that the major of the argument affirms merely the essence and abstracts completely from any of its states.

But next we find that the minor states that *every man has actual properties*. What does this term *every man* suppose for? Does it, perhaps suppose for every man whether in the natural or the supernatural state, whether subject to the ordinary laws of nature or subject to the miraculous dispensation of God? No. In this sense, the minor would be very far indeed from being true; it would be one of the greatest errors, it would be the rationalist error, the very denial of the supernatural order.

Therefore, when we assert in the minor that *every man has these or those actual properties, that all accidents actually inhere, that all fire burns, that all who die stay dead, that all bodies occupy space and are impenetrable; that all who are men are human persons, etc.*, we make these assertions of *all* such beings *on condition* that they be in the *connatural* state, or *on condition* that God has not miraculously intervened. Consequently, either we should infer the conclusion conditionally, e.g., *N is actually risible if God has not intervened miraculously* — but in this case we have strayed beyond the boundaries of the physico-connexive reasoning; — or, if we infer it absolutely and unconditionally, we deduce in the conclusion something that was not in the premises.

The theological defect of physico-connexive reasonings can also be seen clearly by taking note of how the physicist concedes them, whereas the theologian distinguishes them. If we propose the following argument to a physicist: The eucharistic species are true accidents; but all true accidents inhere in a subject; therefore the eucharistic species inhere in a subject, the physicist's

comment will be: *I concede the whole argument.* And *qua physicist*, he will have answered well. However, if the same argument is proposed to a theologian, he will at once distinguish, as he should, the minor and the conclusion as follows: All true accidents inhere in a subject, *I distinguish*: they inhere *aptitudinally*, *I concede*; they inhere *actually*, *I subdistinguish*: if the accidents are in a *connatural* state, *I concede*; if they are not in a connatural, but in a supernatural or miraculous state, *I DENY*.

This elementary distinction that every theologian makes, as he must, evidences three things:

1st, That the reasoning whereby aptitudinal, or radical, or essential properties are deduced from the essence of a thing (types 1, 2, and 3) must be *conceded* in theology, that is, such a conclusion is a *theological conclusion*.

2nd, That the reasoning whereby *actual* properties are deduced from the essence of a thing, on *condition* that the essence is either in a *connatural* or perfect state (types 5 and 6), must likewise be *conceded* in theology, in other words, the conclusion is also a *theological conclusion*.

3rd, That the reasoning whereby *actual* properties are *unconditionally* deduced from the *mere* essence of a thing (type 4) must be *denied* in theology, which is to say, that the conclusion is *not truly a theological conclusion*.

These three assertions embody our position, and, we think, the true Thomist teaching on the nature of the authentic, as well as of the false, revealed or theological virtuality.

95. THE SO-CALLED *PHYSICAL NECESSITY* — But someone might ask: is physical necessity not a true necessity? Yes. Physical necessity is true necessity, but *physical* necessity, not metaphysical nor theological; similarly, moral necessity is true necessity, but *moral* necessity, not physical nor metaphysical.

The term *necessity*, as Cardinal Cajetan already pointed out,⁶⁷ is not a *univocal* term; it is *analogical* and thus it is neither applied, nor can it be applied,

⁶⁷For the necessity of propositions, which is the concern of the Posterioristic investigator, is to be taken from the *matter*: and just as it exists *analogically*, not univocally, in different things, so, too, it is to be required *analogically*, not necessary propositions of *different demonstrations*. For it is foolish to require that all not univocally necessary be *univocally necessary*, if the things signified be themselves also the *necessary* must be distinguished into *three orders*. The *simply* (simpliciter) *necessary* is found in things separated from matter [the metaphysical or essential order]; the *regularly necessary* exists in mobile but incorruptible things; while the *necessary in the majority of cases* (it in pluribus) is found in mobile and corruptible things." (CAJETAN, *In Post. Analyt.*, lib. 1, c. 6; Lugduni 1572, p. 340). A different kind of

equally to all orders of being or of science. That which is *morally necessary* that is, necessary in the moral order,^y is not physically necessary, but *contingent* or uncertain in *physics*. That which is physically necessary, that is, necessary in *physics*, is not necessary in *metaphysics* and much less in *theology*, but *contingent* or uncertain in theology and metaphysics. It is therefore possible for an argument to *conclude* in moral science but not in physics; or to *conclude* in physics but not in metaphysics nor in theology. A conclusion can be a true or certain conclusion in moral science and be uncertain or probable (which amounts to not being a true conclusion) in physics. Likewise a conclusion can be a true and certain conclusion in physics and be uncertain or probable in metaphysics and theology, which amounts to not being a rigorous metaphysical or theological conclusion.

Thus, e.g., the principle, *every mother loves her children*, is a necessary and certain principle in morals, but uncertain and contingent in physics, metaphysics, and theology. If we reason thus: *A was the mother of B; therefore A loved B*, the conclusion is a necessary, true, proper, and certain conclusion in *morals*; but it is not a true conclusion either in physics, or in metaphysics, or in theology. The principle, *any fire that is applied in the proper physical conditions actually burns*, is a certain and necessary principle in physics, but contingent or uncertain in metaphysics or in theology. The conclusion, *N is fire that is properly applied to something combustible; therefore it actually burned it*, is a necessary and certain, proper and rigorous con-

nclusion, then, is to be required in accordance with the matter. But the *matter* or the *subject* (subjectum) of the theological syllogism is not the minor of reason, but the *revealed* major. Therefore, if the revealed major asserts only the *essence*, we are in the *metaphysical* order, and the necessity required in the minor is the *simply necessary* (necessarium simpliciter) which exists only in an aptitudinal or essential minor. If the revealed major asserts, not merely the essence, but the *connatural* of the essence, we are in the *physical* order and a minor characterized as *regularly necessary* (necessarium regulariter), that is, a physico-actual minor, suffices. There is, thus, no attempt at denying entry into theology to physical or actual minors. What is denied is that they may be combined with purely *essential* majors in order to infer *particular* conclusions, when any physical law can be suspended by God in any *particular case*. Hence, Cajetan admonishes that in *physical* demonstrations actual properties can be deduced, "but in general, *not in particular*." (*Ibid.*, c. 4, p. 309) Or, as Cardinal Zigliara has very appropriately remarked: "Third corollary: It is *illegitimate* to infer se a singular proposition from a proposition that is true *physically* or *morally*." (*Dialectica*, 22, 4)

^y*Moral* order, *moral* laws, *moral* science do not mean only the order of morality, or the laws governing the morality of human behaviour, or the sciences that study the moral goodness or evil of human acts. Moral, as contradistinguished from metaphysical and physical, is equivalent to the contemporary term *behavioral*. Thus moral order means behavioral order; moral laws, behavioral laws; and moral science, behavioral science. — *Trans.*

clusion in *physics*, but contingent and uncertain (and, thus, not a true conclusion) in metaphysics and theology.

Consequently, if God has revealed that *A* was the mother of *B*, and nothing more, that is, without disclosing that she was a good mother or that she behaved in accordance with the impulses or moral laws of motherly love, the moralist^{vi} will be certain, with moral certainty that is, that *A* loved *B*. But the physicist will not be certain; he will be uncertain because no principle of physics crumbles due to the fact that *A* loved, or did not love, *B*. The metaphysician will be even more uncertain, for none of his principles is ruined because *A* did not love *B*. Since the theologian's starting point, or principle, is the revealed major, and the major premise merely states that *A* was a mother (i.e. essentially, not that she was a good mother), the theologian is as uncertain of the conclusion as the metaphysician because the revealed principle, that *A* was the mother (essentially) of *B*, remains utterly unimpaired and firm whether *A* loves *B* or not.

96. THE MINORS OF REASON^{vii} — The confusion in this matter proceeds, we think, either from misunderstanding or overlooking the true role of the *human sciences* or *minors of reason* in the reasoning of the *science of the revealed* or sacred theology. Theology indeed utilizes all sorts of sciences or minors of reason, whether metaphysical, or physical, or moral. But it is often overlooked that the starting point, the true principles, the formal subject of theology is, not the human sciences or the minors of reason, but the majors of faith or revealed majors. Theological reasoning, thus, does not have as its purpose to draw out or to deduce the virtuality contained in the minors of reason with the aid of the revealed majors; on the contrary, its purpose is to employ the minors of reason in order to draw out, or to deduce, or to *explicitate* intellectually the virtuality contained in the principles or majors of faith. Consequently, the revealed majors are not instruments of the minors, nor do they enter into the constitution of theological reasoning *on a par* with the minors; on the contrary, the minors are mere intellectual instruments to unfold or *explicitate* the objective virtuality which the revealed majors contain even if they do not express it. These minors of reason are of themselves or objectively unnecessary. If they are needed by theology, — or better, by *our* theology; or better still, by the *theologian*, — the need is simply due to the feebleness of our intellect, which is incapable of seeing

^{vi}The term *moralist* includes both the ethician and the behavioral scientist. — *Transl.*

^{vii}In the context of a theological syllogism a *minor of reason* means the *minor own power*. The *major of faith* signifies the *major premise*, which is a *revealed* proposition, i.e. whose truth is formally accepted only through *faith* grounded on divine revelation. — *Transl.*

intuitively, or in one stroke, everything that is *really included* in the revealed majors; and thus requires these instruments or minors of reason to unfold or bring to light by degrees what was already contained in the revealed majors or revealed deposit. This is the only true Thomist concept of sacred theology.⁶⁸

Therefore, in a *theological* reasoning the revealed majors are never to be subordinated or accommodated to the minors of reason; it is the minors of reason that are to be subordinated and accommodated to the revealed majors. Where the revealed principle merely discloses the *essence* of a thing, the minor can only be *essential*. Where the revealed principle, besides the essence, discloses also its *connatural* state, the minor can be physical or *natural*. Where

⁶⁸That this science [sacred theology] utilizes them [the human sciences or minors of reason] is not on account of a defect or insufficiency in *itself*, but on account of *the deficiency of our intellect*. (*Summa Theol.*, p. 1 q. 1, a. 7) "The superior natural light [major of faith] does not of itself need the natural premise [the minor of reason], for it can encompass the latter even without the aid of the natural light through the largesse of the revealing God, if it were more explicated in the intellect itself [this is the purpose of the minor of reason], viz. to explicate the major of faith . . . considering that premise [the minor of reason] in respect of the natural light that exists in it, it is in this regard an *assistance* so that we may *more connaturally* use the premise of faith in keeping with our mode of knowing, by *applying* and *explicitating* it [the premise of faith] to infer the conclusion. . . . Although the natural premise concurs in inferring the conclusion, nevertheless the ultimate resolution does not stop in it, but the resolution proceeds further so that it becomes *dependent on the premise of faith and elevated by it* . . . The natural premise joined to the premise of faith does not remove the latter from the reason of a revealed virtual, as explained previously, and therefore the role of the natural premise is merely to *explicitate* or to lead to *explicitating* the connexion of the object to be inferred [the conclusion] with the revealed object [the major of faith], and thus all of it remains within the boundaries of the *virtually revealed object*." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus, De Sacra Doctrina* q. 1, d. 2, a. 6, nn. 12-13, and a. 9, n. 6)

The *premise of faith alone* contains the *whole truth* and certainty of the *conclusion*, and the other, known by natural light, is assumed *only accidentally* (per accidens) and because of the *imperfection of the subject* . . . in the theological demonstration the *premise of faith alone* is the *per se cause of the conclusion*, and *it alone* the conclusion is reduced by way of resolution; but the natural premise is only a condition *applicatory and explicatory* of the supernatural principle, which is needed because of the defect of *our intellect*." (GONET, *Clypeus theol. Thom.*, *disput. prooemialis*, a. 1, n. 38; a. 4, n. 58).

Today many manuals of theology, including some of Thomist persuasion, take it as a matter of fact that when the minors are *explicatory* of the majors, the *theological conclusions* are not properly conclusions or virtual, but *formal*, albeit *confused* or *equivalent*. In consequence, they also take it that properly *theological conclusions* are only reached through minors that are not *explicatory* but *completory* of the majors of faith. These theologians have completely lost the Thomist notion of theology, and have unwittingly adopted the Suarezian notion. Hence the difficulty they experience later when it comes to accepting the theological conclusion's definability as of faith.

the revealed principle discloses the essence in the *perfect* or *moral* state, the minor can be *moral*.

Thus, and only thus, is the subordination of the minors of reason to the revealed majors and the subordination of reason to faith maintained in that unique and sovereign science, in which both faith and reason must function together, yet not as equals. This is exactly what St. Thomas and every Thomist understands when they speak of the *elevation* of the minors of reason by the majors of faith. This is precisely the reason why theology possesses a certainty greater than the moral, or physical, or metaphysical certainty even when it employs metaphysical, physical, or moral minors.

It is, then, one thing to reveal that A was truly or *essentially* the mother of B; and quite another to reveal that she was not only a mother essentially but also a mother in keeping with all the physical or *connatural* laws of motherhood; and still quite another to reveal that she was a *good* mother, that is, in keeping with all the moral laws and instincts of motherhood. To determine the *meaning* of the revealed datum belongs, as we have said, to the Church; to deduce its *consequences* is the function of theology.

If, in accordance with the meaning or teaching of the Church, it has been revealed merely that A is the *true* mother of B, then theologians can infer that A possesses all the *essential* attributes or properties of motherhood, e.g., the substantiality of nature. But it cannot be inferred with theological necessity that she possesses all the physico-natural requisites or attributes, e.g. marital intercourse, loss of virginity; etc., etc. If the knowledge that a woman is truly or essentially a mother were enough to establish the theological certainty or necessity of her not being a virgin, then we should be able to reveal that Christ's Mother was *not* a virgin, since we know by revelation that She was a mother.

On the other hand, if it were revealed that A was not only the true mother of B, but also that she was a mother in the *connatural* or ordinary way as other women, then we can be theologially certain of any conclusion that is *physically* connected with motherhood, e.g. that she conceived through a man, etc., etc. However we will remain uncertain of the *moral* attributes or conclusions, e.g., whether she loved her child, or not.

Finally, if it were revealed not only that she truly and *connaturally* was a mother, but also that she was a *good* mother, then we will be theologially certain that she loved her child.

There is, thus, room in theology for all kinds of *minors* (and, consequently, for their corresponding reasonings and conclusions) whether metaphysical, physical or moral, provided that they are applied proportionally to the nature or meaning of the revealed major. To posit as a revealed major a proposition the meaning of which is merely *essential*, and then to join to it an

accidental minor is to ignore the homogeneity of any science, and worse still, to ignore the subordination of the minors of reason to the majors of faith; it is to construct an argument that is neither theological nor metaphysical nor physical, but a hybrid amalgam of theology or metaphysics, and physics. If such arguments seem *conclusive* in physics, it is due to the fact that the physicist assumes *a priori*, that is, in virtue of the formal object itself of his science, the essence's *connatural*, and excludes *a priori* the essence's preternatural and supernatural state. But such an assumption cannot be made by either metaphysics or theology without denying themselves.

97. THE ANALOGY OF BEING. — What has been said of the term *necessity* must be equally said of the term *being* or *to be*. It is not a univocal, but an analogical term or concept; hence when it is extrapolated from one science to another, this must be done with due regard to maintaining its analogy of proportionality, that is to say, it must be employed in due proportion to the being or science in question. If the revealed major merely affirms the *essential* being (essentially man, essentially accident, essentially fire, etc.), the minor cannot simply affirm *being* in any manner whatsoever, it must likewise affirm *essential* being; otherwise, the common term *being* in the major and the minor will conceal two different concepts, and there will be four terms to the argument.

If I argue as follows : N is (essentially) a man; therefore N is (essentially) risible, which is the same as saying that N possesses radical or essential risibility, the argument is correctly constructed. The verb *is*, not only is literally identical, but also has the same meaning in both the major and minor premises, to wit, an *essential*, radical or aptitudinal meaning.

But if I say: N is (essentially) a man; but every man is (actually) risible; therefore, N is (actually) risible; in this argument the verb *is* despite its literal sameness in the major and the minor, has two different meanings: an *essential* meaning in the major and an *actual* or accidental meaning in the minor. Under the same term *is*, two different meanings have surreptitiously entered into the argument. Under the appearance of three, the argument has four terms. This is why it does *not conclude* in theology.⁶⁹ If it concludes in physics, it is because the physicist takes the term *is*, and for that matter any

⁶⁹ Thomists have always distinguished, and very carefully, the *essential* character of radical or metaphysical properties, and the *accidental* character of physico-actual or formal properties. "Radical risibility pertains *essentially* to man; the [formal] [the physico-actual risibility] *accidentally*." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theol. De virtutibus*, d. 17, a.3, n.14) With regard to actual risibility, St. Thomas had earlier already adverted, "The property predicated by this term *man* and by this term *risible* is *not identical by essence, nor does it have one esse*." (*De Veritate*, q.1, a.5, ad 21) Hence, when one premise affirms the mere *essence*, and the other asserts the actual property, the reasoning has four terms. "It does not have *one esse*."

On the other hand, if in lieu of the actual, we were to deduce the aptitudinal or radical properties, or also, if we were to deduce the actual properties from a revealed major that posits, not the mere essence or the essence in the abstract, but either the connatural or the perfect essence, it would be immediately obvious that in neither instance can the conclusion be denied without denying the principle. *Radical* risibility cannot be denied without denying or destroying the *essence* of man, on the assumption that the former is identical with the latter. Nor can actual risibility, or any other physico-natural property, be denied without denying or destroying the *connatural*, or the *perfect*, state of the essence. Consequently, the conclusions that infer radical or essential properties from a revealed major that posits the essence, or the conclusions that infer actual properties from a revealed major that posits the connatural, or the perfect, state of an essence, are true theological conclusions or true revealed virtuality; but this must be denied of conclusions that infer actual properties from a revealed major that posits only the essence.

What has been said of the aphorism, *deduction of the property from the essence*, must be applied *exactly* to the aphorism, *deduction of the effect from its cause*.

There is a *metaphysical* cause, also termed virtual, and there is a *physical* or *real* cause. The former is really identical with, although conceptually distinct from, its effect; as e.g. absolute immutability is the metaphysical or virtual cause of eternity, and spirituality the cause of immortality. The latter really differs from its effect, as e.g. the essence of fire differs really from its effect or from the act of burning. (50) This physical and really distinct cause can (as we have just said of the essence) be considered either in the pure or abstract state, in the connatural, or in the perfect state. Hence these three consequences:

1st. The conclusion that infers the *metaphysical* effect from its *metaphysical* or virtual cause is a true, proper, and rigorous theological conclusion; e.g. *N is absolutely immutable; therefore eternal; or N is spiritual; therefore immortal*.

2nd. The conclusions that infer the *physico-actual* effect from its physical cause in the *connatural* or integral or perfect state is likewise a true, proper, and rigorous theological conclusion; e.g. *N is fire in the connatural state that is properly applied; therefore it actually burns; or, the powers in Christ were in a completely perfect state; therefore Christ actually possessed the acts of knowing and loving*.

3rd. The conclusions that presume to infer the *physico-actual* effect from its mere or abstract cause are not rigorously theological conclusions, that is, they have no theological certainty; e.g. *N was fire that was properly applied, therefore it actually burned; or, N was a heavy body, therefore it sank in water; or, N was a composite of contrary or corruptible elements,*

other term or concept, in the connatural or accidental sense, and thus there are only three terms to the argument. The physicist knows nothing of *essential* concepts, or of preternatural, or *supernatural* concepts. These are all ultra-physical; that is, metaphysical, or theological. Consequently, the necessity that characterizes the *deduction* or *consequence* in the physico-connective reasoning is not a *theological necessity*.

98. ANOTHER CONCLUSIVE PROOF. — The Angelic Doctor provides another proof, which in our opinion is completely convincing, for the assertion that the physico-connective reasoning is not a true *theological* conclusion or a true revealed virtual. According to St. Thomas, it is of the essence of any true reasoning that the destruction or denial of the conclusion carries with it the destruction or denial of the principle from which it is deduced. If the denial of the conclusion leaves the principle intact, we have therein an infallible sign that the presumed conclusion is not a true conclusion of the given principle.⁷⁰

Now, then, let us examine *any* physico-connective reasoning, that is, any argument the major of which merely affirms the *essence* of an individual thing while the conclusion affirms its *physico-actual* properties, and it will be palpably clear that the conclusion can be false and denied without having therefore to deny or falsify the major premise or principle. Let us examine the same classical example: *N is true man or essentially man; therefore, he is actually risible. Does one cease to be a man essentially because one ceases to be actually risible? Does an accident cease to be truly and essentially an accident because it ceases to have actual inherence? Does a body cease to be truly and essentially a body because it actually does not occupy a place or because it is penetrated by another body? Does fire cease to be truly and essentially fire because it does not actually burn? Does anything, in general, cease to have the essence it had because it ceases to have the actual properties, on the assumption that these differ really from the essence? Obviously, no. Therefore, the actual properties are not true theological conclusions from the essence. Therefore, the physico-connective reasoning — that in which the revealed major only the essence of an individual is asserted, whereas the conclusion attempts to deduce its *actual* properties — is not a true revealed or *theological* virtual, nor a true *theological* conclusion, but a hybrid mixture of theology and physics, that is neither physics nor theology.*

⁷⁰. This is the relation of the conclusion to the principle, viz. that when the conclusion is destroyed, the principle is destroyed." (ST. THOMAS, *In Poster. Analyt.*, lect. 38). "Demonstrative conclusions have a necessary relation to the principles by which they are demonstrated, so that if the conclusions are not true, it is necessary that the principles be not true." (*De Veritate*, q. 24, aa. 1-18)

therefore it was corrupted. All these effects can fail in the supernatural or theological order. Therefore they are neither rigorous theological conclusions, nor revealed virtuality.

We believe that the foregoing has amply explained the traditional definition of the theological conclusion or revealed virtuality, viz., that which is contained in the revealed deposit as the property in the essence, or as an effect in the cause. To explain and understand well the definition of a thing is to explain and understand well that thing's nature or essence. "For the definition signifies the form and the essence of the thing."⁷¹

99. THE PHYSICO-CONNEXIVE VIRTUALITY AND THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CHURCH. — Can the Church, therefore, infallibly define that *N* is risible, or that he has any other property, in the supposition that it has been revealed that *N* is a true man, that is, that *N* possesses the essence of man?

We believe the answer to this question should be clear from all that has been said. If it be a question of defining the radical risibility, or any other radical or aptitudinal or essential properties, the Church can define them infallibly upon the one and only condition that She knows by revelation that *N* is essentially a man. It is impossible to preserve or save the truth of the revealed major which states that *N* is a man, if it be denied that he is essentially or radically risible. Hence, the conclusion is necessary for the preservation of the revealed deposit and, thus, it is an object of infallibility.

If it be a question of defining the actual risibility, or any other physico-actual properties, the Church can also define them infallibly, provided, however, that the meaning of the revealed major is, not merely that *N* is essentially a man, but that he is a man in the conatural or integral state, or that he is a man with no defect, or a man like the common run of men, or a man in the perfect state. It is impossible to save or preserve the revealed truth that states that *N* is a man in the conatural or integral or perfect state if he be deficient in any conatural property or attribute or perfection. Thus the conclusion is also an object of infallibility.⁷²

⁷¹ST. THOMAS, *In Poster. Analyt.*, lib. 1, lect. 9.

⁷²Reasonings through which the actual properties are deduced from the conatural or integral or perfect essence, are as *inclusive* as those in which the essential or integral or perfect properties are deduced from the mere essence. The revealed major, *N* is man concept of man or human essence, contains two revealed concepts, to wit: the conaturalness of that human essence, and the concept of the integrity or perfection or created being, the term *created* is really included, not in the first, but in the second concept. When, e.g., I argue: *N* is a contingent being; therefore it is a contingent. Likewise, when I say: The Church is a perfect society; therefore, she is independent, the concept *independent* is included, not in the concept of society in the

But if it be a question of defining the actual risibility, or any other actual properties of an individual, on the sole basis of a revealed major that merely states that *N* is essentially or truly a man, and provides no further information on whether he is in a conatural or a preternatural state, in a state of integrity or of deficiency, in a state of perfection or of imperfection, then our view is that the theologian cannot deduce with theological certainty, nor the Church define *infallibly*, that *N* actually has these or those actual properties. The Church can define that *N* conaturally requires them (radical property); She can define that he actually has them *if or on condition* that he be in a conatural state (reasoning of type 5, not of type 4). But to define infallibly that *N* actually and unconditionally possesses actual properties can neither be the object of theological science nor of infallibility for as long as no other data are available except a revealed major in which only the essence is affirmed, and a minor in which a physical law is affirmed.

To be essentially a man, essentially an accident, essentially a body, essentially fire, is perfectly consistent with not being actually risible, not having actual inherence in a subject, not actually occupying a place, not actually burning. Therefore, to save or preserve the revealed majors or the revealed deposit which states that *N* is essentially a man, an accident, a body, fire, it is not indispensable to affirm the truths or conclusions that *N* is actually risible, actually inherent, actually occupying a place, actually burning. Now, then, if these conclusions are not indispensable for the conservation of the revealed deposit, if the truth of the revealed deposit can be preserved without them, then they are not the object of infallibility as *erroneous*, although they might be the object of infallibility as *tenerarious*, *imprudent*, etc. If revelation merely discloses the essence of a thing, then whoever affirms that such an essence is not in a state of conaturality and integrity but in a preternatural or in a defective state; that is to say, whoever affirms that such an essence is deprived of this or that actual property through a *miracle* or by divine intervention, such a one might be imprudent, rash, foolish in affirming a miracle *without reason*. But to be *without reason* or rash is one thing; and

major premise, but in the concept of *perfect*. Consequently, such reasonings, are not only perfectly theological but, as we shall see, also definable of faith, because they are *inclusive*.

But, if instead of saying: *N* is a contingent being; therefore it is a created being; we were to say: *N* is a being; therefore it is a created being; such an argument would not conclude either in metaphysics or in theology, notwithstanding the fact that there is only one possible case in which something is a being and not a created being, viz. God. Similarly, if instead of saying: *N* is man integrally or perfectly; therefore he is actually risible, or therefore he possesses any other actual property; if we were to argue: *N* is man essentially, therefore he is actually risible; such an argument is not conclusive theologically. To be a man without being *actually risible* can happen by exception not only once, but as many times as it should please God.

quite another, to be *contrary to reason*, or better still, *contrary to revelation*, which is the only thing that constitutes an *error* in theology.⁷³

100. THE ACTUAL PROPERTIES IN CHRIST. — Then how is it that the Church has defined infallibility, and even as a truth of faith, the existence of certain *actual* properties in Christ; e.g., that He had a human intellect and a human will? We believe that here lies the origin of the mistake or the inadherence of many a modern writer. The Church has defined these actual properties of the most sacred human nature of Our Savior because by revelation we have, not merely that Christ was man *essentially* or *in the abstract*, but also man in the state of *integrity* and *conatural* and *without defect*, and even more, that as a man He was *perfect* or *utterly perfect* in everything not contrary to the hypostatic union or to the purpose of redemption. Starting from the revealed major that Christ was a *whole and perfect man*, the Church can define as infallible truths, and even as truths of faith, not only the intellect and the will of Christ, but also each and everyone of the properties or attributes that belong to a perfect human nature, e.g. actual risibility, all the external and internal senses, quantity, gravity, and all the other properties of soul and body.

⁷³ By the way, it will not be amiss to point out that the physical or moral necessity of *deduction* or *consequence* which is our concern here, must not be confused with either the physical or moral necessity of *means* to an *end*. When God prescribes an end, He must provide the means necessary thereto, be they necessary with metaphysical, physical, or moral necessity. That He has to provide the necessary means is certain, not merely with a moral and physical certitude, but with a certitude that is metaphysical, theological, absolute, with no exceptions. *God does not command the impossible*. Hence, if He has commanded the Church to preserve and explain the revealed deposit, He cannot but give her *all that is necessary* to preserve and explain the revealed deposit, be it necessary with metaphysical, physical or moral necessity. Everybody is agreed on this. But this necessity of *means* to an *end* must not be confused with the necessity of *consequence* from a *principle*. God, who has established the physical principles, can suspend or cause the failure of their physical properties or consequences; whereas He cannot deny the physical or the moral means to the end He has prescribed.

Therefore, when from the fact that the Church is infallible in any and every thing necessary (with whatever sort of necessity) for the preservation of the revealed deposit, one argues that the Church must also be infallible in the conclusions or consequences that are certain or necessary with physical or moral necessity, there is a confusion between the necessity of means to the ends prescribed by God — a necessity which is absolute and can never fail in any case, — and the necessity of physical or moral consequence, which relative to God is a *contingent* necessity subject to failure as often as it should please Him. To preserve the revealed proposition that *Mary is the true Mother of Christ*, there is no necessity (of whatsoever kind) to maintain the proposition that *she conceived through a man*, notwithstanding that a man is physically necessary in order to be a mother.

But if God had merely revealed that Christ is man essentially, without disclosing further, whether explicitly or implicitly, that His human essence was, or was not, in an integral or defective, conatural or preternatural, perfect or imperfect, state, then it would be impossible to claim either theological certainty or infallibility about any of His actual properties, just as no such claims can be made in the case of many other individuals, of whom we know through the Bible that they were men, but yet of whom neither the Church nor theology know whether, or not, they were whole men or without defect.

In the case of our adorable Saviour it was necessary or proper for us to know not only the essence in the abstract but also His properties and perfections. Hence, God revealed to us not only the essence but also its conatural and perfect state. Of many other men and things revelation has only disclosed to us the *essence*, because we had no need of knowing *divinely* or *theologically* anything else. The starting point for both theology and infallibility is the revealed datum, and it alone. In the order of reasonings or conclusions, that alone is theological or the object of infallibility without which the *revealed truth* cannot be saved or preserved. Now, the *essence* can be perfectly safe even if God should deprive it of any, or of all, its actual properties.

101. THE TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION. — In the *Summa Theologica's* treatise *On the Incarnation* any one can verify how carefully the Angelic Doctor distinguishes the three revealed principles (Christ is true or essentially man — Christ is a whole or perfect man — Christ is an utterly perfect man), and how he employs one or the other accordingly as it is a question of deducing *essential* parts or properties, *conatural* properties, or *accidental* perfections. If it be a question of whether Christ had something *essential* to human nature, e.g. whether He had a *true body*. St. Thomas utilizes the first revealed principle, which concerns the *essence* of man: "Whether the Son of God should have assumed a true body. I answer that it must be said that . . . three reasons can be given for this. The first of which is taken *from the reason* [essence] of *human nature*, to which it belongs to have a true body. Assuming therefore from the foregoing that it behooved the Son of God to assume a human nature, it follows that He assumed a true body."⁷⁴

But when the Angelic Doctor wishes to deduce any of Christ's *conatural* properties, e.g. whether He had the powers of the intellect, or of the will, or of the concupiscible and irascible appetites, he does not resort to the revealed principle that "Christ is truly or essentially man", but to the other which says that "Christ is a whole or perfect man". "Whether in Christ there

⁷⁴ *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 5, a. 1.

are two wills. I answer that it must be said that . . . For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a *perfect* human nature, as has been shown previously. Now, the will belongs to the *perfection* [not to the essence] of human nature, of which it is a natural power, as is the intellect, and this is clear from what has been said in the first part. Therefore it must be said that the Son of God assumed a human will in the human nature."⁷⁵

"Next it is supported by the reason given by St. Thomas in this article. For the power of willing is a *perfection* of human nature, without which the latter would not be *whole* and *perfect*: but the Word assumed a human nature that was *perfect* and *integral*, with all its properties: therefore the Word assumed human nature together with the power of willing, which is proper and connatural to it."⁷⁶

Finally, when the Angelic Doctor wishes to deduce the *accidental* or acquirable perfections of human nature, e.g., science or virtue, he does not resort either to the principle that "Christ is true man", but to the principle that "Christ is a *perfect* or *utterly perfect* man". "Whether Christ had some knowledge other than the divine knowledge. I answer that it must be said that . . . it behooved Christ to possess created knowledge for three reasons. The first is for the sake of the *perfection* of the soul. For the soul, considered in itself, is in potency to know the intelligibles. But what is in potency is *imperfect* unless it be reduced to act. Thus, it behooved that the soul of Christ should be *perfect* by some knowledge."⁷⁷

Next the conclusion is proven by the argument of St. Thomas in this article, which we can reduce to the following form: Christ the Lord had an *integral* and *perfect* human nature: but without the created act of intellectual knowing the said nature would not have its *integral* and *perfect* being; therefore . . ."⁷⁸

The same procedure can be seen even more clearly where the Angelic Doctor asks: "Whether the virtues existed in Christ. I answer that it must be said that . . . the *more perfect* the principle, the more it impresses its effects: wherefore, since the grace of Christ was *utterly perfect* there consequently proceeded from it the virtues to *perfect* each and every power of the soul in respect of all the soul's acts; and therefore Christ possessed all the virtues."⁷⁹

⁷⁵ *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.18, a.1.

⁷⁶ SALMANTICENSES commenting on the Angelic Doctor's just quoted words, *Cursus Theol.*, vol. 16, ed. Vivès, p. 12.

⁷⁷ *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.9, a.1.

⁷⁸ SALMANTICENSES, *loc.cit.*, vol.15, p.5.

⁷⁹ *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.7, a.2.

Thus, in the treatise on the Incarnation, where the properties or perfections of the human nature of Our Saviour are determined through reasoning, the starting point is not restricted to the principle that "Christ is essentially man". The starting point is made up of these three principles: 1st. Christ is *essentially* man; 2nd. Christ is a *whole* man, that is without any physical deficiency in whatever; 3rd. Christ, as man, is *utterly perfect*, that is, has the purposes of redemption; 3rd. Christ, as man, is *utterly perfect*, that is, has all the perfections that are not opposed to the same hypostatic union or to the purpose of redemption. All *essential* properties are deduced from the first principle; all the actual or *connatural* properties are deduced from the second principle; all the accidental or acquirable properties, from the third. Whoever denies any of the essential properties, runs counter to the first principle that affirms that Christ is true man. Whoever denies any of the *actual* properties in the belief that God had suspended them in the human nature of Our adorable Saviour, as He has suspended its human personality, would not run counter to the principle that Christ is essentially man, for the essential being of man can be maintained without this or that actual property; but he would run counter to the revealed principle that Christ is man connaturally or integrally, or without defect, or like the rest of men. Finally, whoever denies any of the accidental perfections, e.g., Christ's knowledge or virtue, would not run counter either to the principle that Christ is man or to the principle that Christ is man *connaturally*, but he would run counter to the principle that Christ is man *utterly perfect* man. The failure to distinguish clearly the three concepts of *mere essence*, *connatural essence*, and *utterly perfect essence*, has caused in many a misunderstanding of the aphorism, *deduction of the property from the essence*, that is the classical definition of the revealed or theological virtual and the specific constitutive and distinctive element that sets theology apart from divine faith.

102. COROLLARIES. — All the foregoing leads to these two evident corollaries:

1st. True and proper *revealed virtuality*, and true and proper and rigorous *theological conclusions* are: a) all the conclusions that from the revealed essence (including the mere essence or essence in the abstract) infer any of its *essential* or metaphysical or aptitudinal or radical properties; that is to say, all the conclusions of types 1, 2, and 3 (45); b) all the conclusions that from the revealed *integral* or *connatural* or *perfect* essence infer any of its *physical* or actual properties, that is, all the conclusions of types 5, and 6 (45). This is the true Thomist understanding of the *revealed virtual* or of the *deduction of the property from the essence* which is the classical definition of the true and proper and rigorous and specific *theological conclusion*.

2nd. The conclusions that from the revealed *mere essence* or essence in the abstract of an individual infer its physico-actual properties are neither

true and proper revealed virtuality nor true and proper theological conclusions. This means all the conclusions of type 4, which make up the physico-connective virtuality and are the only ones that belong to the third degree of the scale of progress. (46)

SECTION V THE TRUE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUALITY IS THE METAPHYSICO-INCLUSIVE VIRTUALITY

103. A DIFFICULTY. — If, as we have just seen, the physico-connective virtual is not a true theological virtual, then it is obvious that theological reasoning must be metaphysico-connective,^{viii} it must proceed intrinsically not extrinsically, it must pass from one to another according to reason but which is not other in reality. In one word, theological reasoning must be merely conceptual, that is, restricted to different aspects of the same objective reality of the starting point.

However, this does not seem to be always the case, or else it presents a grave difficulty. For, as a matter of fact, both theology and metaphysics do not argue solely through formal causes, as mathematics and logic, but also through efficient and final causes. Thus e.g., the existence of God and the creation of the world are true metaphysical and theological conclusions, and yet, they do not seem to be deduced through formal but through efficient and final causality. Now, it is common knowledge that, whereas the formal cause is an intrinsic cause, the efficient and final causes are extrinsic causes and really distinct from the effect from which our reason infers them. Therefore a conclusion can be a true theological conclusion and at the same time be really distinct from the revealed deposit and extrinsic to it. There are many who argue thus because of a want of clear understanding of the true metaphysical, and hence of the true theological, process.⁸⁰

viii *Metaphysical connexion* is the same thing as intrinsic inclusion. The author immediately clarifies what he means by saying that theological reasoning must proceed intrinsically, not extrinsically. Cf. also footnote 85. — *Transit*.

⁸⁰ The majority of modern theological treatises is dominated by the teachings of Suárez and Lugo on the revealed or theological virtual, and thus also on the relationship between theology and faith. Suárez's and Lugo's whole system, whose logical consequences were drawn by the Salmanticenses with their celebrated *Mega maiorum*, can be summed up in these four propositions: 1. The revealed virtual is the specific constituent of theology and the specific characteristic that distinguishes it from faith. 2. Now, the properly revealed virtual, and therefore the properly theological conclusion, is solely that which is deduced from the revealed deposit by a merely connective process, that is, a process from one to another in reality. 3. Therefore, that which is deduced by

104. THEOLOGY EMPLOYS ALL SORTS OF ARGUMENTS. — Let us begin by recalling that sacred theology is truly wisdom, nay that it is the highest of human wisdoms; that it is the foremost among sciences; that it extends itself to the subject matter of all sciences; that therefore it can employ all sorts of procedures.

Hence, sacred theology can use all kinds of arguments: it can use probable arguments as well as certain arguments; if the latter, it can argue a priori or by cause, and a posteriori or by effect; if by cause, it can argue by formal, as well by efficient, exemplary, and final causes.⁸¹

But, if both metaphysics and theology employ all sorts of arguments, still these arguments are not all of equal worth nor are they all rigorously metaphysical or theological.

Indeed, even if we eliminate probable arguments as not strictly scientific, and confine ourselves to those that are certain, these are still classifiable into three essentially different species of certitude, to wit: moral, physical, and metaphysical. Thus, only arguments characterized by metaphysical certitude qualify as rigorously metaphysical arguments. Since theology is nothing but metaphysics applied to God, no argument is rigorously theological unless between its premises and its conclusion there exists a metaphysical or absolutely certain link.

such a process is objectively distinct from the revealed deposit, that is, a non-revealed objectivity. 4. Therefore, the true and proper revealed virtual, that is, the true and proper theological conclusion, is not definable of faith (Salmanticenses), except in virtue of a new revelation (Suárez) or in virtue of transforming assistance (Lugo). Of these four propositions, the first or major premise is the teaching of the whole of traditional theology. The third and fourth are perfectly deduced conclusions if one assumes the truth of the second or minor proposition, which is the basis established by Suárez in order to explain Molina. The whole system is thus grounded on the second proposition which asserts that "the properly revealed virtual, and therefore the properly theological conclusion, is solely that which is deduced from the revealed deposit by a merely connective process, that is, a process from one, to another in reality."

In this section we propose to demonstrate that this second proposition is a Thomist heresy, by making it clear that in theology, as well as in metaphysics, it never is a case of mere connexion but always a case of inclusion or objective implicitness, and consequently even the conclusions arrived at through the efficient or the final cause, which seemingly are cases of mere connexion or transition to another in reality, are, when the reasoning is rigorously theological, connective-inclusive, that is a transition "from one to another according to reason".

⁸¹ The sacred doctrine, being itself one, extends itself to things that belong to the various philosophical sciences. (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 4) "Theology can employ the principles of all other sciences, although they are posterior in dignity, since they are somehow ancillary and preliminary to itself." (In *Boetium de Trinitate*, q. 2, n. 3, ad 7) "This doctrine is supremely wisdom among all human wisdoms, and not merely in a particular order, but unqualifiedly (simpliciter)." (*Summa Theol.*, loc. cit., a. 6) "Theology has in itself something from all other sciences inasmuch as it is the foremost of them all." (ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d. 22, q. 1, a. 4, expositio textus)

producing conclusions that are really identical and homogenous with their principles.

Since theology is a true metaphysical science, we propose to show, with all the clarity that we can muster, how every rigorously theological conclusion issues from the revealed deposit *intrinsically* not extrinsically; by way of *implicitness* or inclusion or analysis, not by way of mere connexion or *synthesis* or addition; by way of objective identity within the revealed deposit; by way of perfect homogeneity. And that this is the case irrespective of whether the reasoning proceeds by effect or by cause, irrespective of whether it be by formal, or efficient, or final cause, provided that the reasoning process is truly metaphysical.

106. THE TRUE METAPHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL PROCESS. — For what is *metaphysical certitude*? Metaphysical certitude is said to be, and is, that which is absolute, that is, which obtains *in every case*; that which can never fail; that whose denial implicates the ruin of the principle of contradiction, and hence of the principle of identity; it is, in one word, the certitude grounded on the very *essence* of the thing, and therefore a certitude that belongs to the *understanding itself* (*de intellectu*) of the thing.

What, then, is a *metaphysical proposition*? That which is characterized by metaphysical certitude, that whose certitude is the very certitude of the principle of contradiction and identity, that whose predicate is of the essence of the subject or vice versa. ⁸³

83.—We do not always speak *metaphysically*, sometimes we speak morally, i.e., taking into consideration the customary behaviour of men. Consider these examples: *the circle is round; fire burns; parents love their children*. These propositions are both true and universal; but roundness is inseparable from the circle in such a manner that if it be removed, the nature of the circle perishes. This proposition is said to be *metaphysically* universal. The second proposition is similarly universal and true, *not because of the intrinsic nature* of the subject, but on account of the laws of nature which the author of nature, God, has imposed on the things created by Himself, which therefore He can suspend by His omnipotence; consequently, the proposition does not exclude *exceptions*. These propositions are said to be *physically* universal. Likewise, the third proposition is true and universal but on account of the laws by which human behaviour is *generally* governed. These propositions are said to be *morally* universal, and they admit more exceptions than physically universal propositions. Whence follow some corollaries worthy of note. First corollary: A universal metaphysical proposition is *absolutely false*, better still, it should *not be called metaphysical*, if it admits *any exception*. . . . Third corollary: It is *illegitimate* to infer *per se* a singular proposition from a proposition that is true *physically* or *morally*. (ZIGLIARA, *Dialectica*, 22, 4) "A thing is judged to be *absolutely necessary* from the relationship of the terms: inasmuch as the predicate is placed in the *definition of the subject*, as it is necessary for man to be an animal; or because the subject is of the *reason of the predicate*, as it is necessary that a number be either odd or even." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 19, a. 3.) "Just as in the reasoning intellect the *conclusion* is compared to the *principle*, so in the *composing grad* dividing intellect the *predicate* is compared to the *subject*." (*Ibid.*, q. 56, a. 4) [To *compose and divide* said of the intellect signifies the mental act of judging. — Transl.]

105. SACRED THEOLOGY IS THE METAPHYSICS OF THE REVEALED DEPOSIT. — Theology, according to St. Thomas, has God as its formal object, and nothing can fall under its consideration unless by reference to God.

Since God can be known in two ways, either naturally through creatures or supernaturally through divine revelation, there are correspondingly two species of metaphysics of God or theology. The first is the natural metaphysics of God or natural theology or theodicy. The second is the sacred metaphysics of God or sacred theology. ⁸²

However, the knowledge we have of God in this life, whether in the natural or in the supernatural order, is not a knowledge of God *in Himself* but only a knowledge of God through his *effects*. Hence, in both natural theology and sacred theology the *medium of demonstration* is not God Himself but some effect of God. Natural theology employs as a medium of demonstration the natural effects of God that we call creatures. Sacred theology employs as a medium of demonstration that supernatural effect of God called divine revelation or revealed deposit. Metaphysical principles applied to creatures produce the conclusions of natural theology or theodicy. These same metaphysical principles applied to the revealed deposit produce the conclusions of sacred theology. The principles of metaphysics alone are analogous and transcendent; consequently, they alone are applicable to the divine and to the human, to the supernatural or revealed as well as to the natural. Metaphysical principles alone are grounded on the principle of contradiction, and hence on the principle of identity; therefore, they alone are capable of

82.—Theology, i.e., the third part of speculative knowledge, which is called *divine* or *metaphysical*, or *First Philosophy*. (ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium de Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 4, c. 2) "All of this is the concern of *Theology* or *Divine Science* because God is in it the chief object of consideration; it is also known by another name as *Metaphysics*." (*Ibid.*, q. 5, a. 1) "Thus *Theology* or *Divine Science* is of two kinds. There is one in which things divine are not considered as the subject of the science but as the principle of other subject, and this is the *Theology* which the philosopher pursues, and which by another name is called *Metaphysics*. There is another that considers things divine for their own sake, as the subject of the science, and this is the *Theology* that is called *Holy Scripture*. However, both of them treat of things that are abstracted from matter and motion . . . although *some things* are considered in it [the *Theology* of Holy Scripture] that are in matter and in motion, insofar as they are required for the manifestation of things divine." (*Ibid.*, q. 5, a. 4) "That which is not taken into account except for the manifestation of some other thing does not belong *per se* to a science but only quasi *accidentally*." (*Ibid.*, ad 1) *In all sciences that which is accidental is set aside* and that which is *per se* is taken in." (*Ibid.*, q. 5, a. 3) "Although in respect of God we cannot know *what He is*, in this doctrine we take His *effect*, whether in the order of *nature* or of *grace*, in lieu of the definition in respect of the things considered in this doctrine, just as in some other philosophical sciences something is demonstrated in the cause, through the effect, by taking the effect in lieu of the cause." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1)

What is *metaphysical reasoning*? Since the relationship between the *conclusion* and its *principle in reasoning* is the same as the relationship between the *predicate* and the *subject in the proposition*, metaphysical reasoning is that which is characterized by metaphysical certitude; that whose conclusion cannot fail without implicating the failure of the principle; in one word, that whose conclusion is of the very essence of the principle.

For the sake of clarity, let us first examine some examples of metaphysical reasoning by formal cause and then some examples of metaphysical reasoning by efficient and final causes.

When I say, *the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles*, or *that which is spiritual is immortal*, these are propositions of metaphysical, absolute, essential certitude; propositions of *intrinsic* truth, of absolute *inclusion* and *identity*. In these propositions the predicate is of the essence of the subject. The predicate and the subject are *other and other according to reason*, but they are *not other* but one in reality.

When I argue thus: *It is a triangle, therefore its angles are equal to two right angles*; or *it is spiritual, therefore it is immortal*, these are reasonings or processes of metaphysical, absolute, essential certitude; processes that are inclusive and of perfect identity and homogeneity. Why? Because the conclusion is of the essence of the principle from which it is deduced. The conclusion and the principle are *other and other according to reason* but *not other in reality*.

All this is rooted in the fact that the worth, the fabric and the nature of any argumentation depends on the *middle term* or *minor* proposition.⁸⁴

Hence, in truly mathematical or metaphysical propositions the predicate must be of the reason of the subject; in truly mathematical or metaphysical reasonings the conclusion must be of the reason of the principle. Since the true principles of sacred theology are the principles of faith or the revealed deposit, the truly theological conclusion must be, and is, of the reason of the revealed deposit, of the understanding of the revealed

84. "The whole strength of any argument lies in the middle term." (ST. THOMAS, *de Veritate*, q. 14, a. 2, ad 9). "The whole process of any argumentation is contained in the middle term." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2, a. 1). "The formal reason of science lies in the mediums of demonstration by which the conclusions are known." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q. 1, q. 1) In every rigorously mathematical or metaphysical process the *minor* is always intrinsic, inclusive, essential, really identical, and the necessary process the *minor* is always extrinsic, merely connexive, contingent, really distinct. Therein lies the dividing line between the contingent physical sciences and the necessary mathematical and metaphysical sciences. (38) Therein lies the essence of theology and of true theological conclusions deduced with the aid of minors of reason. Therein, as we shall see, lies one of the keys to the homogeneity of the true theological conclusion and to its definitivity as of faith.

Unfortunately, this is often overlooked in spite of its elementary and fundamental character. One's attention is focused on the *external* fabric of the process, whether it is by *cause* or by *effect*, instead of being focused on the *middle term* or *minor premise*,^{ix} on which everything depends. If the minor premise is a metaphysically certain proposition, then the process and the conclusion possess metaphysical, intrinsic, essential value, the value of identity. Now, what are the minors or middles of those two reasonings? The following: *the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles*, and *that which is spiritual is immortal*, the very same propositions cited as paradigms of a structure that is metaphysical, intrinsic, essential, proceeding from one to another according to reason.

Let us now examine the metaphysical and the theological process by efficient, final, and exemplary causes, which because they are denominated *extrinsic*, have given rise to the difficulty described above. Let us take as models the two examples already mentioned, viz. the conclusions concerning God's existence and the creation of the world.

The process or ways by which St. Thomas and the First Philosophy^x prove the existence of God are based on the *reason of motion*, on the *reason of efficient cause*, on the *reason of contingent being*.

Let us begin by taking note of those words *the reason of*, for they are the key to the whole process, and without them the argumentation would not be metaphysical. Metaphysics employs as physics does, arguments from efficient causes, from effects, from *motion*, from *contingency*. Thus metaphysics apparently assumes the extrinsicity characteristic of physical science. However, metaphysics employs only the *reason* or *essence* of causality, effect, motion, and contingency. Since nothing is more intrinsic than the *essence*, the process, which to all appearances is extrinsic, is in reality as intrinsic as the process of mathematics.

In metaphysics or theology God's existence is proven thus: *changeable, or potential, or manifold, or contingent being exists; therefore God exists*. This seemingly extrinsic and merely connexive reasoning is essentially intrinsic or inclusive; this process which seemingly is a transition from one thing to

^{ix} The middle term is put on a par with the minor premise because of the identity of their functions. In a syllogism there are three terms: the major, the minor, and the middle. There are likewise three propositions: the major premise (which the author often calls the *principle*, since it is the final point of resolution), the minor premise, and the conclusion. The function of the middle term is to link the minor to the major term. The function of the minor premise is to link the conclusion to the major premise or principle, into which it is logically resolved. — *Transl.*

^x A term employed by Aristotle to designate metaphysics. Cf. footnote 82. — *Transl.*

another thing is in reality a transition from one to another according to reason. Undoubtedly God is a thing other than changeable being; nonetheless, the truth and hence the being, of the conclusion are essential for the truth, and hence for the being of the principle. The major or principle does not express, but it nevertheless includes the truth and the being of the conclusion.

When our mind passes from the datum of the major (*changeable* being exists) to the truth and being of the conclusion (God exists), there has not been a transition to something *extrinsic*, but simply an intellectual unfolding of the *twofold* reality essentially included in *one and the same* datum. The datum of the major premise contains two realities: one which expresses changeable being, and another that *essentially implies* necessary being. In order to perceive the second reality it is not necessary for the mind to add another new reality, a new datum, but merely to analyze or open up the reality or truth already existing in the major by means of a minor belonging to the *essence* of the major (the *reason* of motion, the *reason* of contingency, etc.), a minor that is essentially inclusive, that is, *identical to the essence* or *reality* of the major. If our minds were sufficiently powerful and intuitive, that minor would be superfluous, for in the major itself we would see infallibly and quasi *simultaneously* — and nothing is truly seen that is not there — the truth and reality expressed in the conclusion. Thus, the transition is not precisely a transition from the reality of potential being to the reality of God's existence, but a transition from the reality of potential being *plus* the reality of God's existence, *essentially implicit* in the term potential, to the existence, *as explicitated*, is the term of the process. The reality of God's reality was already *essentially implicated* in the starting point of the process. Thus, the process is one of mere *intellectual explicitation*; it is really a process "from one to an other according to reason."

This is *always* the case in every truly mathematical or metaphysical process. This is *never* the case in any physico-connexive process, which, according to St. Thomas is proper of the natural or physical sciences.⁸⁵

⁸⁵The sciences or conclusions of absolute certainty, e.g. metaphysics and theology, precisely because they are metaphysical sciences or conclusions, i.e. sciences or conclusions of real identity, are by the same token connexive, since no thing can be more connected with a thing than itself: "For there is no greater connexion than that of a thing to itself." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Curus Theologicus*, p.1, d.4, a.3, n.12). However, they are never merely connexive but connexive-inclusive. Since to say connexion is the same as to say virtually, inclusive sciences possess true and proper virtuality; however, theirs is not mere or pure virtuality but inclusive or *implicit* virtuality (*virtuale implicitum*). The merely connexive or merely virtual (*virtuale tantum*, connexive tantum) is proper of the physical sciences; *proprrium naturalis scientiae*.

CONFIRMATION. — It is unquestionable that, whereas mathematics and logic admit no demonstration other than by *formal cause*, both metaphysics and theology, as well as the physical sciences, demonstrate by efficient and final causes. "The logician and the mathematician consider things only according to formal principles."⁸⁶ "But the things which the *theologian* considers are separated [substances] existing in reality. Now such can be the principle and the end of motion. Therefore there is nothing to hinder the theologian from demonstrating through efficient and final causes."⁸⁷

However, since the metaphysical and theological sciences differ essentially from the physical sciences, the metaphysical argumentation by efficient and final causes employed in metaphysics and theology must differ essentially from the mode of argumentation employed in physics. "For each science takes a part of being according to a special mode different from the mode according to which being is considered in metaphysics."⁸⁸ The mode according to which metaphysics considers any being — and therefore also the final, efficient, and exemplary causes — is to consider it not from the point of view of *this or that* cause or effect, but from an *essential* or *transcendental* point of view. "For metaphysics also considers each being, not according to proper reasons whereby it is *this or that* being, but in so far as it participates the common reason of being."⁸⁹

Hence the relation of efficient cause and effect whereby we proceed from creatures to the existence of God is not the physico-connexive relation of the natural sciences, but the essential-inclusive relation of the metaphysical sciences. Which is why the relation is *one and the same* in each and every creature. "For all creatures, in so far as they are His creatures, are referred to God by *one* kind of relation."⁹⁰ "This mutability which belongs to every creature is not consistent with any *natural* movement but consistent with their dependence on God, by Whom if they were to be forsaken, they would fall short of that from which they have being. Now this dependence pertains to the consideration of *metaphysics* rather than to that of *natural science*."⁹¹

Therefore, the process whereby the transition is made from the contingency of being to the existence of God or to the necessity of creation is a process by way of *essence*, and thus it is *utterly formal*. The conclusion *God*

⁸⁶ST. THOMAS, *de Potentia*, q.6, aa. 1-12.

⁸⁷ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate*, q.5, aa.5-7.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, q.5, aa.1-6.

⁸⁹*Ibid.* aa.4-6

⁹⁰ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.2.

⁹¹ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate*, q.5, aa. 2-7.

exists, or God is the creator of everything, is essential for the principle *contin- gent or participated being exists*. "Therefore the efficient cause is necessary not merely because the effect is contingent, but because the effect would not exist [principle] if the cause did not exist [conclusion]."92 "Creatures are contained under the divine order and it is their nature that they depend on God."⁹³ This essential relationship between God and any creature may not be expressed in the definition of contingent being, but it is *included* or *implicit* in the very essence of every contingent being. "Although the relation to the cause does not enter the definition of the being that is caused, it is nevertheless consequent to the things pertaining to its reason."⁹⁴

Physico-actual properties, which provide the basis for the physico-connexive process, are intrinsic to the subject but extrinsic to the subject's existence, since, absolutely speaking, the subject can exist without them. But God's existence, or any other thing deduced by a metaphysical process, is *intrinsic, intimate, of the utmost immediacy* not only to the subject but to the existence of the subject or principle from which it is deduced because it is intrinsic, intimate, immediate to being as being, and being as such is what is most intimate and *most formal*. "Since God is being itself by essence it is necessary that created being be His proper effect, as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. But being is what is *most intimate* in anything, what lies deepest in everything because it is what is *formal* in respect of everything found in a thing. Therefore it is necessary that God be, and be *intimately*, in all things."⁹⁵ "All this makes it obvious that God exists *intimately*, within each thing just as the proper being of a being is intimate in it."⁹⁶

Therefore, when by such a process a transition is effected from the *datum* or principle *contingent being exists* to the conclusion *God exists*, there has been no transition to a reality outside the datum or principle but to a reality that was within, although not explicitly, the datum itself. Thus the process is really and essentially *intrinsic*, one that stays within the same reality of the datum. That is what is meant by the phrase "from one to another according to reason" used in reference to *inclusion* and *homogeneity*. We do not mean to say that the reality of God's existence is not distinct from the reality of contingent being, but that the reality of God's existence is

⁹¹ Datum or premise from which the reasoning starts and into which the conclusion as such is resolved. — *Transl.*

⁹² ST THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 44, a. 1, ad 2.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, q. 28, aa. 13.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 44 a. 1, ad 1.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 8, a. 1.

⁹⁶ ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1.

essentially required for, and is essentially included in, the reality or existence of contingent being.

The fact that a metaphysical conclusion or metaphysical science is essentially *intrinsic* is the reason why, according to St. Thomas, *faith and metaphysically certain knowledge* cannot coexist in the same subject in respect of the same truth, even if such a truth be known by the process of cause and effect, as in the case of the truths of the existence of God and of the creation of the world. And it is commonly accepted that, in St. Thomas's view, only knowledge through *intrinsic* evidence is incompatible with faith. Gonet profoundly observes that the impossibility of faith in the existence of God in anyone who knows it by the seemingly extrinsic process of cause and effect is due to the fact that the creature and God are essentially or intrinsically linked, and thus both the process and the evidence are really intrinsic. "The reason for the disparity lies in the fact that, since every effect is in its cause, not formally of course, but virtually, it can be said that any creature is, with regard to everything it has, virtually *intrinsic* to God."⁹⁷ "Although the First Cause, which is God, is not part of the essence of created things, still the being found in created things cannot be understood except as drawn from the divine being." (ST. THOMAS, *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1) If God's existence were not of the understanding (de intellectu) of the creature's existence, the demonstration of the existence of God would be neither metaphysical nor theological.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ GONET, *de Fide*, c. 2, §. 2.

⁹⁸ "If in mathematics, demonstrations are some times made through extrinsic means, nevertheless, in such cases an *entirely intrinsic* proportion or adaptation of one to another is supposed, and thus because of the *included relation* the process is not entirely extrinsic, although the aforementioned relation is not one of either effect or cause, but one of proportion. Now, in the case of things that are demonstrated through supernatural light [supernatural objective revelation — *Transl.*] this light although extrinsic, is nonetheless derived from God in Whom exist immutable and infallible connexions with things, howsoever contingent these may be; hence their manifestation is in the last instance resolved into something *intrinsic at least on the part of the relation that all creatures have to the First Cause.*" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Philosophicus, Logica*, p. 2, q. 25, a. 2, ed. Vivès, vol. 1, p. 688) "Thirdly, I say that there are two kinds of consequences: one that is essential and intrinsic and another that is *accidental and extrinsic*. When the holy Doctor says that from the fact that something is a being, by participation it follows that such a being is caused, he speaks of an *essential* and *intrinsic* consequence, as from the fact that something is a man it follows that it is an animal, since to be caused is of the reason of the being by participation." (PAULUS NAZARIUS, O.P., *Disputationes et Commentaria Scholastica in Summam D. Thomae Aquinatis*, t. 1, q. 44, a. 1, in fine; Coloniae Agrippinae, 1621) "There are relations, not accidental but *essential*, which are implicit in a given essence. The concept which expresses this essence expresses at the same time the relations which it contains." (GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, *Dieu, son existence et sa nature*, Paris 1951, p. 542)

107. TWO WAYS OF ARGUING FROM CAUSE TO EFFECT. — To answer the proposed difficulty directly we say that physics as well as metaphysics or theology argue by cause (efficient, final, or exemplary) and effect, but that they argue through essentially different processes since there are two essentially different ways of considering any cause and any effect. In any being there are two really different things: 1. the *essence*, which includes the *metaphysical properties* and the *essential or transcendental relations or connexions*. 2. The *physical properties* and the *accidental or contingent relations*, both of which *differ really* from the essence. Hence there are two ways of arguing by cause or by effect: 1. Taking as medium the *essence of the cause* (or effect) or, which is the same thing, the *metaphysical properties or essential relations* of the cause (or effect). 2. Taking as middle the *physical properties or the accidental relations* of the cause (or effect). Both are processes by cause and effect. But the first process utilizes only what is essentially *intrinsic*, that is, the *essence* of the so-called extrinsic cause or effect. The second process, on the other hand, utilizes precisely what is *extrinsic*, viz., the physico-contingent properties or relations, of the cause and effect. The first process is metaphysical; it can never be employed by physics. The second is properly physical; through this process the certitude proper of metaphysics or theology, that is, absolute certitude, can never be obtained.

Let us consider some simple instances of both processes, to wit, the physical process by *cause* or by *effect*, and the metaphysical or theological process by *cause* or by *effect*.

Physical process by cause. The physical effect of fire is burning; the physical cause of burning is fire. If I argue: *there is fire* with all the physical requirements for burning, therefore *there is a burning* or the effect of combustion, this is a true argument by *cause*, not metaphysical but physical, not of absolute but of contingent and fallible certitude, which actually failed in the furnace of Babylon and can fail any time that it should please God. Now, what is capable of failing is neither metaphysical nor theological.

Why is it not metaphysical but physical? Why is it not necessary but fallible? Because I have taken as a *medium* or *minor* something that is not *essential* or not *intrinsic* to the essence: burning is not of the essence of fire; it is not of the *reason* or of the *understanding* of fire.

But if we argued instead: *there is fire*, therefore *there is the aptitude to burn* or the *exigency* of burning, the argument would be rigorously metaphysical and impossible of failure. That aptitude or exigency existed in the fire of the furnace in Babylon;⁹⁹ it will always exist by absolute necessity in any fire

⁹⁹“Hence the order to burning remained in the fire of the furnace even if it did not burn the three young men in it.” (ST. THOMAS, *de Potentia*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 2) He asserts the same thing of the eucharistic accidents: “The aptitude for a subject

because it is of the essence of fire, because it is an *essential* relation of the cause to the effect.

Let us now turn to examples of demonstration, both physical and metaphysical, by *effect*.

Physical demonstration. Take any effect you please. The argument, then, will run this way: *the effect N exists; therefore, its immediate or physical or secondary cause exists.* For instance, N has recovered from such a disease; therefore the physical causes or conditions of his recovery have existed. Or, N has obtained nourishment from the Eucharist; therefore, in the Eucharist there is nutritive substance; etc., etc.

These arguments, in which from the existence of the effect we conclude its secondary or physical cause, are physical, not metaphysical: connexive, not inclusive; contingent and fallible, not necessary and infallible. They can fail through divine intervention any time it pleases God, simply because the relation of the secondary cause to its effect or that of the effect to its secondary cause or physical cause is accidental, not essential. God can supply directly by Himself any action and any effect of any efficient secondary causes, which is what He does in any miraculous happening in which the so-called physical process or demonstration fails. Physical demonstration can never be a rigorous demonstration because it does not demonstrate through the essence or the *quod quid est*^{xii} of the cause, or effect.

It must be kept in mind that these demonstrations, and all physical demonstrations, are not fallible and contingent *because* God causes them to fail; but, on the contrary, God can cause them to fail *because* they are fallible and contingent, because they are merely connexive and not inclusive, because they are physical and not metaphysical (92).

On the other hand, when, to prove God's existence, I say: potential or changeable being exists, therefore God exists; when, to prove the creation of any being other than God, I argue: God is being by essence, therefore any other being must proceed from Him; or, any being other than God is potential or composed of essence and existence, therefore it is a caused being; the

^{xii}Literally which what is *Quod quid est* is itself a literal Latin translation of Aristotle's TO TI HN EINAI, a term employed by the Philosopher to denote the essence of a thing. — *Transl.*

always remains in them but not the actual inherence.” (*Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 77, a. 1, ad 2) The action or the effect as well as the physico-actual properties are contingent, and they can be suspended or supplied by God. This is the reason why the physico-connexive process does not, and cannot, serve the purposes of metaphysics and theology. But the process by way of *essence* or of essential relations is a process of absolute and indestructible certainty, it is characteristic of sciences that are superior to physics, and thus of theology.

uncaused being is essentially *one*, therefore all multiple being proceeds from the uncaused being; these arguments, although by cause or by effect, proceed via the *essence* of the cause or of the effect, they are metaphysical, not physical, arguments; absolutely necessary, not fallible, because essences are necessary and immutable and not even God Himself can cause the nature of a thing, or its essential relation, to fail.

Since the relations of creatures to God, as to their *first* efficient and exemplary cause or as to their *ultimate* end, are *essential* relations, the metaphysical reasoning between God and creatures, whether by cause — efficient, exemplary, or final — or by effect, is not an extrinsic but an intrinsic process, not merely connexive but inclusive, not contingent but essential.

And since nothing is more *formal* than the essence, the argument between God and creatures via efficient or exemplary cause, and every argument drawn from the *reason of the cause*, *end*, *exemplar*, *effect*, etc., is always and in reality a formal process.¹⁰⁰ notwithstanding the appearances of extrinsicity.

108. TWO SOURCES OF MISUNDERSTANDING. — The illusion or appearance of extrinsicity in the metaphysical argument drawn from the *efficient cause* or from the *effect* comes from two sources.

1. The causes are classified into material, formal, efficient, final, and exemplary. The first two are called *intrinsic*, and the last three are said to be *extrinsic*. This creates the impression that when one argues by efficient, final, or exemplary cause, the process is extrinsic and not intrinsic. What is here overlooked is the fact that these three causes, as well as the effect, can be employed for purposes of argumentation either in an *intrinsic* sense (the *essence* and the *essential* properties or relations of cause and effect), or in a

100. "Thirdly, I say that there are two kinds of consequences: one that is *essential* and *intrinsic* and another that is *accidental* and *extrinsic*. When the holy Doctor says that from the fact that something is a being by participation it follows that such a being is caused, he speaks of an *essential* and *intrinsic* consequence, as from the fact that something is a man it follows that it is an animal, since to be caused is of the *reason* of the being by participation in as much as caused being bears a transcendental relation. It is the same as if he said: *formally*, by the same token that something is a being by participation it is caused by another, just as by the same token that a thing is a man it is an animal. But the predicamental relation and the proper passion (*physical* properties and relations) follow the subject by an *extrinsic* consequence because they are extrinsic to its *reason*; hence the example of the *risible* (actual or *physical* risibility) is not entirely similar, but only in the manner previously explained." (NAZARIUS, O.P., *op.cit.*, p.1, q.44, a.1, in fine). "This proposition: the world was created by God, is an analytic judgment in spite of its *synthetic appearance* for the *intimate* notion of the world contains the notion of an infinite cause." (FR. DE REGNON, S.J. *Enûtes sur la Sainte Trinité*, vol. p.22)

merely connexive-extrinsic sense (physico-actual properties or relations). Metaphysics and theology employ them in the first sense; physics, in the second.

2. For a process to be intrinsic or inclusive or from one to an *other according to reason*, it is commonly required that it proceed formally. Again it is overlooked that the term formal, said of any thing, means not only its form or *formal cause*, but also whatever is *essential* to it, whatever is *of the reason* of it, anything without which *the thing cannot be understood*, which is precisely one of the definitions of essence.

When I say: A is a part of B, therefore it is smaller than B; when I say: A is the son of B, therefore B is the father of A, when I say: A has primary matter, or primary matter exists, therefore A has substantial form, or substantial form exists; these arguments or processes are not really extrinsic but intrinsic; not merely connexive but inclusive; they do not proceed from one to an *other in reality*, but from one to an *other according to reason*. Not because the whole is identified with its part, or the father with his son, or form with matter; but because the part, the father, the form are essentially included, although not expressed, in the whole, the son, primary matter; because the one is *of the reason* or *of the understanding* of the other.

Likewise, when I say: a *contingent being exists, therefore God exists; or it is a contingent being, therefore it is a created being*; the reasoning process is really intrinsic, inclusive, from one to an *other according to reason*. Not that God, we repeat, is identical to the reality of contingent being, nor that the being of the Creator is identical to the being of the creature; but that the existence of God is essential for the existence of the contingent being, and the existence of the Creator is essential for the existence of the created or potential being. The former is *of the reason* or *of the understanding* of the latter; the former is included in the latter.¹⁰¹ The only difference is this: in the arguments about the whole and its part, the father and the son, the

101. "From the fact that something is attributed to some other thing it is necessary that *everything* that is *of the reason* of the former be attributed to the latter." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.28, a.3) "In the nature of creatures is that they *depend on God*." (*Ibid.*, a.1, ad 3) "Therefore, when that which constitutes the *reason of a nature*, whereby the nature is in itself understood, has an *order to, and dependence on*, another, it then is manifest that that nature *cannot be understood without it*; and this holds not only in the case where one is conjoined to the other with that conjunction whereby the part is conjoined to the whole . . . or as form is united to matter . . . but also in the case where the one is in reality separated from the other, as the father cannot be understood without the understanding of the son, notwithstanding the fact that *these relations are found in things that are distinct*." (ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate*, q.5, a.3) Thus, the process, even where it takes place between things that are distinct and separated, is a process employing "that without which the thing cannot be understood"; hence it is an *essential* process, an *intrinsic* process; and since whatever is essential is also called formal . . . "The essence is also called *form*." (ST.

implicitness is simple and superficial (formal implicit), one that only requires a mere explanation of terms, and thus the reasoning is improper, and the knowledge is *immediate* or one of *simple understanding*. But in the cases of contingent being and God, matter and form, spirituality and immortality, immutability and eternity, the implicitness is profound and recondite to human reason (virtual implicit or inclusive), so that it requires a combination of new concepts, and thus the reasoning is *most properly proper* and the knowledge is *mediate* or scientific. However the new concepts or minors combined by human reason to effect the discovery of those mediate or scientific conclusions are not new realities but the definition itself, or essence, of what is contained in the datum or principle: the definition or essence of the contingent and necessary, of primary matter and form, of cause and effect, of spirituality and immortality, of immutability and eternity. Therefore the process is by way of *essence, formal, by way of inclusion, by way of perfect homogeneity*.

THOMAS, *De Ente et Essentia*, c.1) — the argumentation employs a *formal process* although not always a formal cause. Hence metaphysics can never argue by secondary causes, whether efficient or final, because then its process would be physico-fallible. Metaphysics argues by *formal causes*, or by *first efficient and final causes*. Since when it argues by these *first causes*, its process is as essential and formal and intrinsic as when it argues by *intrinsic causes* alone. "Metaphysical consideration does not proceed except by internal cause." (PESCH, *Philosophia Laceratis*, Lib.4, n.1082).

Finally, the fact that the *minor premises* of all true metaphysical process must be *intrinsic* or of the *essence* of the majors which are their starting point is the reason why St. Thomas says that the conclusions of metaphysics or of theology are *proximate to the principles themselves*. And since the principles of Christian theology are the *truths of faith*, the genuine Thomist school has always considered the conclusions truly and rigorously deduced from them to be not only definable as truths of faith, but even already *proximate to faith*. "Hence it is manifest that metaphysical or theological consideration is *supremely intellectual*. Whence, too, metaphysics provides the principles to all other sciences inasmuch as intellectual consideration is the principle of rational consideration. . . . To proceed intellectually is attributed to the principle of rational consideration. . . . To proceed intellectually is attributed to the principle *reasoning is closest to intellectual consideration and its conclusions closest to the principles*." (ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate*, q.6, a.1) "It should be observed, in our judgment, that the first and highest degree of *erroneous* propositions, according to the common way of speaking among theologians, obtains when someone asserts the contrary of a manifest *theological conclusion*, which is deduced by evident consequence from the faith but is not yet defined by the Church. . . . It must be noted that this degree is so close to heresy that at times it may even be called heresy." (BANEZ, *in 2.2*, q.11, a.2)

The more thoroughly we study St. Thomas and his great commentators, the more amazed we are at the poor idea that has been formed of the true theology, and the wretched virtual or *extrinsic* or non-inclusive process, as a consequence of the essence of properly theological science is said to consist

109. COROLLARIES. — All the foregoing leads to the following five corollaries:

1. Sacred theology, *over and above* the physico-connective process or from one to another *in reality*, which is proper of physics, possesses another intrinsic-inclusive, rigorously metaphysical and theological process. This is a formal process, or from one to another according to reason, which is proper and exclusive of the mathematical and metaphysical sciences, that is, of sciences possessing an abstraction, dignity, and certitude superior to those of physics. This is the solid ground on which objective homogeneity is based. Of course, this does not mean that theology is necessarily limited to this process, or that theology must deduce all its conclusions by such a process; but it underscores the abundance with which theology is endowed.
2. Any rigorously metaphysico-theological conclusion is always deduced through a process of reasoning by *essence* or *essential relations* implicit in the essence itself, irrespective of whether the argument employs the effect or the cause, or whether the cause is material and formal, or efficient, exemplary, or final.
3. Therefore, every metaphysico-theological conclusion is deduced by an intrinsic and inclusive process, by a process of objective identity.
4. Every rigorously metaphysico-theological conclusion is homogeneous with the revealed deposit itself because it is objectively implicit in it.
5. Therefore, the whole of theology properly and rigorously understood, and all theological conclusions in the proper and rigorous sense, far from being *extrinsic* to the revealed deposit, as modernly they are thought to be since Suárez, are, on the contrary, in the view of St. Thomas, intrinsic to the revealed deposit and pertain to the very essence or *understanding* of *revealed being*. Just as natural theology or metaphysics is of the essence or of the *understanding of natural being* (40).

SECTION VI

THE TRUE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUALITY, OR TRUE THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION, IS OBJECTIVELY AND TRULY IMPLICIT IN THE REVEALED DATUM.

110. THE STRUCTURE OF THE TRUE THEOLOGICAL REASONING. — The foregoing makes it sufficiently clear that the true theological conclusion, that is, the metaphysico-inclusive conclusion, is truly implicit in the revealed premise or revealed datum from which our reason does nothing but deduce it. However, since this implicitness or objective containment is the true foundation or requisite for its definability as of faith, and consequently, for

homogeneous dogmatic evolution, we will confirm it by another means, through the examination of the true structure of theological reasoning.

For this purpose, let us take and analyze any example of a true and proper theological reasoning, and hence of a true and proper theological conclusion, and thus of theology in the true and proper sense of the term, provided that such a reasoning satisfies the conditions required by the teaching of St. Thomas.

These conditions are *four*: *first*, that at least one of the premises be a truth of faith. *Second*, that the other premise, if it is a truth of natural reason, be really identical or inclusive, but at the same time virtually distinct: in other words, it must neither be merely nominal nor merely physico-conjunctive. *Third*, that this premise be neither doubtful nor probable, but evidently demonstrated. *Fourth*, that the reasoning be well made, that is to say, that the conclusion be correctly deduced from the premises.

The first condition is required because the true principles of theology are the truths of faith. Consequently, if neither premise is a truth of faith, the reasoning is not theological but philosophical.¹⁰²

The second condition is required because if the minor were purely nominal and did not have even a virtual distinction, the reasoning would be improper (27); on the other hand, if the minor were merely physico-conjunctive and without real inclusion, the reasoning would not have theological nor even metaphysical, but physical, certitude. "In divine matters it is necessary to be engaged *intellectually* . . . From one to an *other* according to reason: Theology is *supremely intellectual*."¹⁰³ Obviously, this second condition implies the condition mentioned by many to the effect that the reasoning

102. For it [this science or theology] accepts its principles not from other sciences but immediately from God through revelation." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2) "The principles of this science are the *articles of faith*." (Ibid., a. 7) "This doctrine does not argue in order to prove its principles which are the *articles of faith*." (Ibid., a. 8) "From the things that we grasp through faith by adhering to the First Truth, we come to know other things in accordance with our own manner of knowing, that is, through reasoning from principles to conclusions. Hence, the original things themselves that we hold by faith are for us as the first principles in this science, while the rest are as the conclusions." (ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate, Proem.*, q. 2, a. 2) "This doctrine has as first principles the *articles of faith*, and from these as principles, without disdaining the *common principles*, this science proceeds." (ST. THOMAS, *In Sent.*, prol., q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3, sol. 2, ad 2) By the way, note the term *common principles* employed by the Saint to denote the kind of *minors* of reason admissible in theological reasoning, and now, even then, he does not admit them except in the absence of two revealed premises, which would constitute a more completely *theological* reasoning.

103. ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate*, q. 2, and 6.

must be proper, not improper, since where virtual, and not merely nominal, distinction is present the reasoning is not improper but proper, and even *supremely proper*.

The third condition is required because it is quite pointless for a thing to be absolutely certain in itself if it were to be doubtful to us for want of evident demonstration. The Trinity of Persons is most certainly included in the divine nature, but relative to our natural reason it is the same as if it were not included since our reason cannot demonstrate its inclusion. For *science* to exist it is not enough that there be inclusion, it is further necessary that it be possible to see or demonstrate that inclusion without a new revelation.¹⁰⁴

The fourth condition is required because it is quite possible to reason incorrectly even with certain and evident premises, so that a conclusion is drawn that is not contained in the premises, or drawn with a greater extension than the premises allow.¹⁰⁵

Of these four conditions, the third and the fourth are common to *all* sciences. The second is proper of supraphysical sciences or sciences of absolute objective certitude, that is, mathematical, metaphysical, and theological sciences. The first is characteristic and exclusive of sacred theology.

Hence every *definition* of the true and rigorous theological conclusion must contain or presuppose these four conditions: the third and fourth as the *remote genus*, the second as the *proximate genus*, the first as the *ultimate difference*. Should any of the four be missing, there would be no rigorous theological conclusion for lack of something *essential*.

111. A MODEL OF INCLUSIVE REASONING. — Let the following be a model in which we *suppose* that all four conditions are present:

God is altogether immutable (major of faith).

What is altogether immutable is eternal (minor of reason).

Therefore God is eternal (theological conclusion).

We repeat that we take for *granted*: 1. That the major premise is a truth of faith. 2. That the minor is merely a truth of reason, that is to say,

104. For the perfect knowledge of the conclusion requires two things, viz. the understood principle and the derivation of the principle to the conclusion by reason. Hence the *perfect knowledge of conclusions* will not exist in any man who either is in error or in doubt concerning the principles, or is *deficient* in the reasoning, or fails to understand the *force of the argumentation*; and consequently neither will he have science insofar as it is an intellectual virtue." (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q. 14, *De Fide*, a. 6)

105. Man is often deceived in that he thinks a process to be demonstrative, which is not so." (ST. THOMAS, *In Boet. de Trinitate*, lect. 1, q. 1, a. 1.)

that revelation has said nothing about either eternity or the relationship linking eternity with immutability; better still: let us suppose that the whole of divine revelation, the whole of the Holy Bible and Tradition reduces to God speaking the four words of the major premise, and not one word more.

3. That the minor is an inclusive and demonstrated proposition. 4. That the reasoning is correctly done.¹⁰⁶

Under these four conditions, which St. Thomas holds to be necessary if a true theological conclusion and true theology are to exist, let us investigate the nature and the worth of the theological conclusion and of theology.

112. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION. — Note, in the first place, that the *subject* of the conclusion is the very same subject of the premise of faith. This must always be the case, whether overtly or covertly. The reason for it is the fact that, since science or the conclusion is nothing else but the actual unfolding in the conclusion of the virtuality contained in the principles, the subject of the conclusion or science has to be necessarily the self-same subject of the principles of the science. Since the true principles of theology are the truths of faith, the theological conclusion must take its *subject* from the premise of faith, and not from the premise of reason.¹⁰⁷

This observation is not absolutely necessary for what we propose to demonstrate. Nonetheless it is useful in order to point out that the theological conclusion always aims at discovering something in the revealed major, not at discovering anything in the minor of reason. The premise of reason must serve to uncover what lies in the premise of faith; not the premise of faith to uncover what lies in the premise of reason. Hence the premise of faith and the premise of reason do not come into theological argumentation on

¹⁰⁶In this model given to examine the structure of theological reasoning, the conclusion *God is eternal* is formally revealed *elsewhere*, and hence a truth of faith. But it should be evident to anyone that that is absolutely accidental to our purpose. Let it be simply assumed that revelation says nothing about the conclusion, or that, as we have suggested in the text, the whole of revelation, Sacred Scripture and divine Tradition contains nothing but the four words of the major proposition. We have chosen this example in preference to others because these two ideas, *immutability* and *eternity*, are those given by Cardinal Cajetan (Super., 1, Post., c.2 *super illam partem calum ex causis*) to prove that true reasoning, and true science, and true deduction of the effect from the cause and of the property from the essence exist when the reader is free to choose any other example more agreeable to his taste from any of the forty three questions of the treatise on God, or from any of the other treatises in the *Summa Theologica*.

¹⁰⁷“The subject of the principles is the same as the subject of the whole science, since all of the science is virtually contained in the principles.” (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, q.1, a.5) “The subject of the science is that which is the subject in the demonstrated conclusions.” (CAPREOLO, *In prol. Sent.*, q. 4)

equal terms: the premise of reason comes in as an auxiliary (ancilla) of faith or as an auxiliary of human reason, inasmuch as the latter is incapable of seeing at one stroke or in one act everything contained in the premise of faith and thus needs an auxiliary (the premise of reason). There are two reasons for this need: one is the native condition and feebleness of our reason in so far as it is a reason and not simply an intellect;¹⁰⁸ the other is the fact that the truths of faith are divine truths and realities of inexhaustible fecundity. When such realities are locked up in human language, it is impossible for the latter to express all the implicitness hidden in the former, which is indeed divine and revealed but compressed, concealed, profound, mediate, beneath the explicit and surface meaning of the human statement of the divine, beneath the formally and immediately revealed.¹⁰⁹

113. THE PREMISE OF FAITH. — Note, in the second place, that one of the premises is a *premise of faith*. What does it mean to be a premise of faith? In the doctrine of St. Thomas, it means — as it should mean in any Christian philosophy or theology — that in the major of faith we have divinely revealed not two mere names (God and immutability); nor two merely subjective concepts nominally linked by the verb *to be*; nor two symbols of an agnostic reality, or of a subjective experience or of a pragmatic attitude — all of this is Kantian-Bersonian philosophy, the basis and the starting point of all the various forms of Modernism. For St. Thomas, the premise of faith of all the various forms of Modernism. For St. Thomas, the premise of faith means that in the two terms standing for the subject and the predicate we have divinely revealed two objective ideas, that these two ideas are an authentic and faithful expression of reality, a reality expressed by a verb at once real and transcendent to the human and the divine, xiii the verb *to be*.

¹⁰⁸The fact itself that this science uses them [the profane sciences, the minors of reason] is not due to its own deficiency or insufficiency, but to the imperfection of our intellect.” (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.5) “But human souls, which acquire knowledge of truth by some kind of discourse, are called *rational*; and this comes of the *feebleness of the intellectual light* in them. For if they had the fullness of intellectual light, as the angels, they would immediately, at the first viewing of the principles, comprehend all their virtuality by intuiting everything that can be syllogized from them.” (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1 q.58, a.3)

¹⁰⁹“Thus the truths of faith are proposed to the intellect, not indeed in themselves, but in certain words which are not sufficient to express them.” (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.24, a.20, q.1, a.3)

xiii “By ‘transcendent to the divine’ the author does not mean that the verb *to be* can go beyond and above the divine, since there is nothing higher than, and beyond, God. He simply means that the verb *to be* is transcendent inasmuch as it is applicable not only to the sphere of the human but also transcends it and is proportionally applicable even to the sphere of the divine. Cf. no. 117 below: “... the transcendent notions of the human mind, that are proportionally and really applicable to that which is within as well as to that which is without, to the human as well as the divine . . .” — (Trans.)

For St. Thomas it means that, through the premise of faith, the theologian is in possession of two objective-real ideas, two ideas whose truth and reality are divine, two ideas of unconditional and absolute consistency, two ideas whose reality and union, being affirmed by God Himself, provide greater certainty to human reason than can be provided by any and all metaphysical evidence, and to the eyes of faith shine with a light that, if not as clear, is a thousand times more intense, firm and certain than the very light of the first principles of reason.

The reader will do well to keep this in mind: at the very first stage and starting point of his reasoning the theologian is in possession of two divine ideas, those of the subject and the predicate, whose objectivity and truth are guaranteed by the authority itself of God and illumined by divine light, to wit, the divine light of faith.

THE MINOR OF REASON. — Note, in the third place, that the minor of reason is one that is, or that we suppose to be, *inclusive*. For St. Thomas this means that the predicate *eternal*, although expressing an intellectual aspect other than that of the subject, *altogether immutable*, is nonetheless *really identical* with it; in other words, these are not two objects or two realities or two distinct things joined by a distinct physical link, these are but *one* and the self-same and identical *objective reality*, *one self-same object*, *one self-same thing* under two intellectual aspects or expressions that differ only intellectually. *In divine matters it is necessary to proceed intellectually . . . by intrinsic causes . . . from one to another according to reason, which is not an other in reality.*

A COROLLARY NOT TO BE FORGOTTEN. — The predicate of the premise of reason is the self-same reality or object or thing as the subject: it is the essence *itself* of the subject.

THE MIDDLE TERM. — Note, in the fourth place (and this, together with the corollary just stated constitutes the essence, the greatness, and sublimity, the divine character, of theology), that the subject of the minor is the very same predicate of the major, the very same predicate of the premise of faith, one of the two ideas that are formally revealed, which means that theology's middle term is a *formally revealed term* illumined by the light of revelation: it is a term of faith!

Whoever understands the rôle of the *middle term*¹¹⁰ in the reasoning

110. "The whole strength of any argument is in the *middle term*." (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q. 14; *De Fide*, a. 2, ad 9). "The whole process of the argumentation is virtually contained in the middle term." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3^o Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 1). "The formal reason of knowing (*ratio sciendi*) is the *middle* of demonstration through which the conclusions are known." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q. 1, a. 1)

process, and the meaning of *objective homogeneity*, would need no further explanation.

THE MINOR TERM (or the predicate of the minor which is the very same predicate of the conclusion, and consequently, is the *conclusion* and the science of theology) is *really identical with the middle term, and the middle term is itself a revealed idea.*

114. **THEOLOGY'S SUBLIME AND DIVINE CHARACTER.** — Whoever reads carefully the immortal introductory question of the *Summa Theologica*, in which St. Thomas examines the essence, object and procedure of theology cannot but experience a profound feeling of respect for the *sacred science* at the sublime phrases employed by that privileged mind — used to weighing the accuracy of his terms as if they were gold — to denote the *middle term*, the *ratio sciendi*, the *ratio sub qua*^{xiv} of the science of theology.

To enable those of our readers, who are not used to the reading of the Holy Doctor and of his foremost commentators, to perceive the whole significance of the texts we shall shortly quote, we will permit the remark that the terms *divine revelation*, and *divine light* or the *light of divine revelation* have two meanings, as will presently be clear. Two verbal nouns are derived from the verb *to reveal*; they have the same term but different meanings: 1. *revelation*, i. e., the act of *revealing*; this is revelation in the *active* sense. 2. *Revelation*, i. e., the *revealed truth*: this is revelation in the *objective* sense. Both the act of revealing and the thing revealed are called *divine revelation* (*divina revelatio*). By the same token, the term *light of divine revelation* also has two meanings: 1. the divine light that accompanies the transient act of revealing (*infusing light*, *lumen infundens*, Cajetan). 2. The permanent light surrounding the revealed object, which is said to shed divine light (*revealing light*, *lumen revelans*, Cajetan) on the believer's mind with much more reason than when we say that a mathematical or metaphysical truth sheds light on this or that.

St. Thomas deals with the *act* of revealing (first meaning of *divine revelation*) and the divine light that transiently accompanies it (first meaning

xiv *Ratio sciendi*, literally the reason of knowing. *Ratio sub qua*, literally the reason under which (something is known or knowable). These terms denote the precise aspect or viewpoint, mode, process, medium, whereby a thing is knowable. They all are correlated in perfect correspondence. Thus, if something is supernatural, under that aspect it is knowable only through faith (mode), which is a simple act of assent (process) relying on the witness's testimony (medium). If a thing is natural, under that aspect it is knowable either immediately or mediately (modes). If immediately, it is known through intuition (process) motivated by the self-evidence of the subject itself (medium). If mediately, it is knowable through discourse (process), which is dependent on the middle term (medium). — (*Transl.*)

of light of divine revelation) in the questions On Prophecy.¹¹¹ On the other hand, in the first question of the *Summa Theologica*, he studies the object of theology. Thus, every time that the holy Doctor and his commentators here speak of *divine revelation* or of the *light of divine revelation*, the terms are taken in the second sense, in the objective sense, in the sense of the *revealed truth itself (revelation)* and the *divine light* of that same revealed truth (light of *divine revelation*).

By the same token that revelation here is the same as the *revealed* or the object revealed, the term *revealed* must not be understood as that which is *revealed by God*, that is to say, that which God has not yet revealed but which He can reveal; for that which in the sense just described is *revealed by God* can ill be the object of science for as long as God does not reveal it. The term then must be understood in the sense of *revealed by the revealed object itself*, that is to say, what is *knowable (unveiling-revelation)* through the *divine light* of the *revealed object itself* and not through any thing other than it; *revealed, that is, knowable through the light of divine revelation* (Capreolo). Since it is in and through the middle term that the conclusions are known and scientific knowledge is obtained, where the middle term does not differ really from the revealed object and its objective light, but is really and essentially the self-same object or revealed truth, we can say, and we do say, with mathematical exactitude and realism, that the middle term, the *ratio sub qua*, the *medium of demonstration* of theology is *divine revelation*, the *divine light*; that the science of theology is acquired *through divine revelation*.

Let the reader now ponder the following texts: "The difference in the *reason of the knowable* induces the diversity of the sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by both the astrologer and the natural philosopher, e.g., that the earth is round. But the astrologer demonstrates it through a mathematical *middle*, that is, abstracted from matter; whereas the natural philosopher does it through a *middle* considered in reference to matter. Hence, there is nothing to hinder the things, which the philosophical science considers in so far as they are knowable through the light of natural reason, from being also considered by another science in so far as they are known through the light of divine revelation."¹¹² "In theology the *ratio sciendi* is the *light of divine revelation*."¹¹³ "The *middle shining with divine light constitutes the theological knowable (scibile)*."¹¹⁴ "The *divine revealing light*

¹¹¹ *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, qq. 171-177.

¹¹² *Summa Theol.*, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

¹¹³ CAPREOLO, *In 1 Sent.*, prol., q. 4.

¹¹⁴ CAJETAN, *In Summam Theol.*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 2.

is the *ratio sub qua* of our theology."¹¹⁵ "All things whatsoever are *divinely revealable* participate in the one *formal reason of the object* of this science."¹¹⁶ "The sacred doctrine, remaining one, extends itself to matters that pertain to different philosophical sciences because of the common *formal reason* which it considers in different things, viz., insofar as they are *knowable through divine light*."¹¹⁷ "And thus in the text the unity of theology is inferred *from the unity of the divine light* as from the *formal reason sub qua*."¹¹⁸

"This science . . . transcends all other sciences, both speculative and practical . . . It is manifest that in every way it excels all others in dignity."¹¹⁹ "Among all human wisdoms, it [sacred doctrine] is wisdom in the fullest sense, not only in a certain order but unqualifiedly (simpliciter)."¹²⁰ "The *knowledge* that is *proper of this science* is that which is obtained through *revelation*, not that which is acquired through natural reason. Hence its proper concern is not to prove the principles of the other sciences, but only to judge them. For whatsoever in the other sciences is found to be inconsistent with the truth of this science, all of such is condemned as false."¹²¹ Etc.

It will be immediately obvious to the reader that all these texts of the holy Doctor and of his chief commentators possess an utterly formal meaning if the *middle* term in the theological reasoning is the *essence itself* (inclusive process) of the *revealed* idea or reality, the *light itself, revealed by God* and in its turn revealing with regard to our minds. But let the middle term be a physico-distinct connexion, which is to say, something that differs really from the revealed reality or idea, something *not* revealed, something contingent and fallible, and the whole of theology and of all those phrases of the holy Doctor vanishes into smoke.

115. CONFIRMATION. — To bring all the above within the grasp of everyone, let us restate it in terms of a simple mathematical formula. Let *A* be the meaning of the major term, which is a revealed term. Let *B* be the meaning of the middle term, which is also a revealed term. Let *C* be the meaning of the minor term, which is the predicate of the conclusion or the theo-

¹¹⁵ CAJETAN, *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 3.

¹¹⁷ ST. THOMAS, *ibid.*, a. 4.

¹¹⁸ CAJETAN, *ibid.*

¹¹⁹ ST. THOMAS, *ibid.*, a. 5.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, a. 6.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

logical predicate. The following formula will then express the value of the inclusive reasoning:

$A = B$ (major of faith)

but $B = C$ (inclusive minor)

therefore $A = C$ (theological conclusion)

The first identity is guaranteed by God. The second identity is granted, since by supposition the minor is inclusive, that is, one where there exists real identity between predicate and subject. Therefore $A = C$, that is to say, the meaning of the revealed datum is the same as the meaning of the theological predicate. There is progress, but progress *in the same sense*: homogeneous progress.

Observe, furthermore, that B , which is the middle term, must have the same meaning in both the major and the minor, for otherwise the argument would have four terms. Now, then, where does our reason see C , which is the theological predicate? It sees it in B , since by supposition the minor is analytic or inclusive. In other words, it sees it in the *formally revealed*, in the very light of objective divine revelation.

This is the true meaning of that text of St. Thomas: "[Theological conclusions] are known through the *light of divine revelation*." And of that other knowable (scibile)^{xv} Well could they speak thus since they were speaking of *inclusive* conclusions.

116. THE THEOLOGY OF THE NON-INCLUSIVE VIRTUAL. — After reading St. Thomas or his chief commentators one can hardly seriously consider the non-inclusive or physico-connective virtuality as constitutive of the properly theological conclusion. On such a virtuality not only is it impossible to build a *wisdom* of the kind that theology is, it is even impossible to build a science that would rise one inch above Aristotle's Physics in either certitude, or abstraction, or dignity.

But let us examine, if only briefly, this physico-connective virtuality. The reader is already acquainted with the fact that the physico-connective virtuality or conclusion, or that of type 4 (45), consists in inferring from the *middle* term of the mere essence its physico-distinct properties, employing as between the nature and its physical or actual properties, the latter being really distinct from the former.

^{xv} These texts are among those quoted in no. 114. — (*Transl.*)

Thus if it is revealed to me that N is *truly man*, and I infer, *therefore he is physically or actually risible*, I have deduced a physico-distinct property, and such is the theological conclusion properly speaking, such is the true science of theology in the current explanations found in theology handbooks is the wake of Suárez's innovation.

Let us consider a model of a merely connective theological conclusion, as we have done in the case of the inclusive theological conclusion.

Oddly, almost comically, no example can be given about God. Where God is concerned no merely connective reasoning is possible. Since there can be no real but only virtual distinction between His essence and His attributes or between His attributes among themselves, in the case of God there can be no merely connective, but only inclusive, reasoning. Hence, to state it crudely, given the notion of theology in the proper and rigorous sense of the term proposed by Suárez, Lugo, and the majority of modern handbooks, there can be no theology nor any theological conclusion, properly speaking, about God. And God is, for St. Thomas, the subject of theology, that is, theology has God for its principal subject-matter and cannot concern itself with any other thing except in reference to God! This alone should suffice to drop all mention of the merely connective virtual.

Since no example can be given about God, let us consider an example about some other thing. Here is the very one given by the authors:

N is truly man (by supposition a major of faith).

Every man is *actually* risible (minor of reason).

Therefore N is *actually* risible (theological conclusion!)

What is the dignity, abstraction, and elevation of theological arguments of this sort? Exactly those of the following:

The eucharistic accidents are truly accidents (a major which we suppose to be of faith).

Every accident *actually* inheres in its subject (minor of reason).

Therefore the eucharistic accidents *actually* inhere in their subject (theological conclusion!)

What does any student of theology have to say of this true theological conclusion . . . of the merely connective type of virtual? Simply, that it is a sophism. But how is it possible that an argument should be, as it is, *conclusive* in physics, whereas it is a sophism in theology? St. Thomas replies: "The definition of an accident is not that it is a being in a subject, but that it belongs to the *quiddity* or *essence* of the accident to have existence (*esse*) in a subject . . . Thus in this sacrament it is not given to the accidents not to exist in a subject *in virtue of their essence* . . . nor is the definition of the accident

removed from them, to wit, the accident's *aptitude* for a subject, which always remains in them, but not the actual inherence", etc.¹²²

Which, for anyone capable of reading, means in plain language: the argument, and any other argument of the sort, fails, that is, is not *theological*, because the reasoning does not proceed via the *essence*, or *quiddity*, or *definition*, or *aptitude*, or metaphysical property, but via *actual inherence*: an inherence or actual property that fails in the instant case, that absolutely speaking is always subject to possible failure, that often fails where the supernatural order is involved. A theology that can possibly fail even in one single instance, a theological conclusion that can possibly be false, as all conclusions based on a merely connexive virtual can be, is not *theology* but *physics* (98).

If in the natural order we take as the *middle term* of demonstration the essence or the *inclusive* properties of *being*, the result will be the sublime *wisdom* of metaphysics. On the other hand, if we take as middle the properties linked by physico-real connexion, the result will be the poor and fallible science of physics.

Likewise, if in the supernatural order we take as the *middle* of demonstration the essence or the *inclusive* properties of *revealed being*, of the true *logos*. But if we take as middle the physico-distinct properties, the result will be the *physico-theological* [sic], of exactly the same consistency, abstraction, and certitude as natural physics.

Whereas in St. Thomas's view of the theological conclusion, that which is *inclusive-identical* to the *revealed*, the essence of the *formal revealed*, is employed as the middle to draw out from its depths the *revealed* implicit virtual, the sacred *revealable* or *theological*; in the theological conclusion of the connexive virtual type the middle employed is a physico-distinct connexion, something objectively distinct from the revealed, something that is not implicitly *revealed*, and its necessary result or conclusion is a *physico-contingent* conclusion, but nothing of *divine* essence, nothing of *theological* essence.

SECTION VII

TWO CONCEPTS OF THEOLOGY OR REVEALED VIRTUALITY

117. — We believe that the foregoing sections have clearly shown that a great confusion exists in modern theology with respect to the understanding and the nature of the immediately or formally revealed and the mediately or virtually revealed which specifically constitute and distinguish faith and theo-

logy respectively; that this confusion dates back to a false notion of the revealed virtual introduced by Suárez in order to mitigate an extreme theory of Molina; that the result of this Suarezian notion, widely accepted in theological handbooks today, has been to confuse the authentic theology and theological conclusion with the faith. Thus Suárez's teaching merges with the Scotist doctrines of Vázquez and Vega, and what emerges as theology and theological conclusion in the proper sense of these terms is a nominal theology devoid of any possible homogeneity with the revealed datum and of any certitude and abstraction greater than those of the physico-contingent order.

Further, we hope to have established that the preceding doctrine is not the doctrine of traditional theology, and, particularly, not the doctrine of St. Thomas; that in St. Thomas's view the inclusive virtual, that is, a virtual whose reality and objectivity are identical to the revealed formal, is the specific constituent and difference of theology and of the theological conclusion; that theology and the theological conclusion constitute a development that differs conceptually but is objectively identical to, and homogeneous with, the immediately revealed truth; that there exists a perfect objective-material identity, a complete real continuity, albeit together with a conceptually distinct virtuality and a different formal motive, between the theological conclusion and the revealed datum or between theology and faith; that authentic theology and the rigorous theological conclusion are not material found *outside* the revealed deposit through a connexion with that which is within the deposit, but material found *in* the revealed principles, *within* the revealed deposit, through an identico-intellectual analysis made by human reason of the divine principles or propositions contained in the deposit, employing therefor not a physical connexion between that which is within and that which is without, but the transcendent notions of the human *intellect* that are proportionally, yet really, applicable to that which is within as well as to that which is without, to the human as well as the divine, the natural as well as the supernatural, the revealed as well as the non-revealed. If this our notion of theology, which we believe is that of St. Thomas, is legitimate, then there are two supremely different, and even opposed, concepts of theology.

What these may be can be gathered from reflecting on the fact that God has not revealed to us all the truth but only a determinate number, a definite range of truths. Thus there has to be a boundary to mark off the range of the revealed from the range of the non-revealed. There must be two ranges: one, the range of *revealed truth*; the other, the range of *non-revealed truth*. The former is the range of divine truth; the latter, the range of human truth.

Recall to mind now that all the truths that make up the whole body of Catholic doctrine are distributed into four groups or departments: 1. The *revealed datum*, or the ensemble of divine statements committed by the

¹²²ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 77, a. 1, ad. 2.

Apostles or the inspired writers to the two sources of revelation viz. Holy Scripture and Tradition; 2. the *dogmas*, that is, the ensemble of dogmatic statements defined by Church as truths of divine faith; 3. the *infallible truths*, to wit, the ensemble of statements defined by the Church as infallible, but not yet as truths of divine faith; 4. the *theological conclusions*, the ensemble of propositions demonstratively deduced by theology from the principles of faith. (3)

All these four departments or ensembles^{xvi} must be either truly revealed or not truly revealed. They must all be either really within the revealed field or outside of the revealed field. Advisedly we have here avoided the term mediate and immediate, formal and virtual, since a bad or a different understanding of these terms leads to confusion. Instead we have employed the term *really*, since there can be no middle between really revealed and not really revealed, between really within the revealed field and really in the non-revealed field.

Now, then, let the reader ask himself: in which of these two fields is each of those four degrees of Catholic truth located? To which of the former must one go in order to find the latter? In the attempt to answer these questions he will clearly realize that there are two concepts of theology, two theories on the nature of theological truth manifestly at variance with one another. Both concepts or theories agree in affirming that the revealed datum and the dogmas are located within the revealed field. Both also agree in maintaining that in order to discover the infallible truth and the theological truth — wherever these may be located — the investigation must start from within the revealed field. But Suárez maintains that the theological truth is located in the non-revealed field, so that one must cross over to the latter to look for the theological truth. St. Thomas maintains that the theological truth is located within the revealed field and thus one must keep himself within it in order to find the theological truth.

In Suárez's view, theology starts from the revealed fields (majors of faith) advances through the procedure of physical connexion (virtually connexive minors), by means of which it crosses over from the revealed field to that which is not revealed, and reaps its harvest (conclusions) in the latter field. In St. Thomas's view, theology utilizes the procedure of the virtual implicit or the bond of metaphysico-inclusive connexion that runs through the interior of the revealed field, and reaps its harvest *within* the revealed field itself.

^{xvi}All these four, . . . , not in the sense that each and every one of the four is either truly revealed or not truly revealed; but in the sense that *any* of these four is either truly revealed or not truly revealed. — (Transl.)

Suárez thinks of the theologian as being properly a technician situated in the revealed field but looking through a telescope at the objects in the other field, the non-revealed field. St. Thomas thinks that the proper work of the theologian is to look through a microscope at, or to apply the scalpel to, the objects themselves within the revealed field in order to find what lies within them.

Suárez conceives the authentic theological minor as a road that begins in the revealed field, goes out of it and runs along the outside; all the things that the wayfarer discovers along the road are human, profane, not divine, not revealed; although it is certain that he would not have discovered them if he had not set forth from the revealed. St. Thomas conceives the theological minor as a path running through the interior and the depths of the revealed; thus, everything one finds is objectively divine and revealed; however, these findings are made by human reason, and there always is the possibility that human reason might take a wrong turn and unwittingly end outside, or that it might, much against its will, blemish or becloud the revealed object.

In short, in Suárez's thinking the authentic theological conclusion expresses objectivity that differs really from the revealed deposit, that is *not implicitly revealed*, that is *matter not definable as a truth of faith*, barring a new revelation. In St. Thomas's thinking, the authentic theological conclusion, the theological truth is really or objectively identical to the revealed deposit, it is implicitly revealed, it is matter definable as a truth of faith without need of any new revelation.

The parallel we have just drawn between the different concepts maintained by Suárez and St. Thomas is rigorously exact. The parallel is drawn with reference to theology in the proper sense of the term, that is, to theology in so far as it is a rigorous science "that does not reason in order to prove its principles which are the articles of faith, but proceeds from these to make some other thing (the conclusion) clear." Therefore the parallel does not refer to theology's other role, the *sapiential* role of defending and explaining its own principles. "For whereas this sacred doctrine has no other superior to itself, it argues against anyone who denies its principles."¹²³

We make this observation to obviate the possible dodge that could be made by anybody who advances the claims that Suárez also admits that theology likewise deals with the revealed field since it is engaged in the explanation of its principles, which are revealed principles. But that is not the point. Principles are not the point at issue. The point at issue is the concept of theology *qua* science of properly called conclusions.

123ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 8.

In the following chapter we shall see how these two different notions of theology have brought forth correspondingly in Suárez and St. Thomas two divergent parallel theories on the organic place occupied by the authority of the Church in relation to our divine faith and to the evolution or explication of the revealed deposit.

CHAPTER III

DOGMATIC EVOLUTION AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH

118. AN OBJECTION. — It is quite possible that an objection should occur to our readers after reading what we had to say on the nature of the true revealed virtuality or true theology.

Someone might say: I will grant that sacred theology's specific constitutive is not the physico-connexive virtual but the metaphysico-inclusive virtual. I will grant, in consequence, that true theology is perfectly homogeneous and continuous with the revealed datum since it always has to do with concepts that are objectively implicit in the starting point. I will grant, in the last place, that true theology always moves within, and never outside of, the revealed field, and that its results or rigorous conclusions are only different facets or aspects or intellectual explications of the fecund dogmas or divine statements revealed by God to His Apostles and by them committed to the Catholic Church for safekeeping and explication. All of this seems clear in St. Thomas's teaching.

But then this upgrading of the notion of virtual revelation or theological conclusion seems to downgrade formal revelation or dogma. The safeguarding of the dignity of sacred theology and of its homogeneity with the revealed datum appears perilously close to confusing it with divine faith. In raising theology from the valley of physics, where Suárez had consigned it, to the lofty regions of ultrametaphysics, where it properly belongs and where St. Thomas has always placed it, there is the danger of falling into the anti-thomist and discredited theory maintained by Vázquez and some other theologians of nominalist affiliation, who do not distinguish specifically — not clearly, at any rate — between human reasoning and divine faith.