

In the following chapter we shall see how these two different notions of theology have brought forth correspondingly in Suárez and St. Thomas two divergent parallel theories on the organic place occupied by the authority of the Church in relation to our divine faith and to the evolution or explication of the revealed deposit.

### CHAPTER III

#### DOGMATIC EVOLUTION AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH

118. AN OBJECTION. — It is quite possible that an objection should occur to our readers after reading what we had to say on the nature of the true revealed virtuality or true theology.

Someone might say: I will grant that sacred theology's specific constitutive is not the physico-connexive virtual but the metaphysico-inclusive virtual. I will grant, in consequence, that true theology is perfectly homogeneous and continuous with the revealed datum since it always has to do with concepts that are objectively implicit in the starting point. I will grant, in the last place, that true theology always moves within, and never outside of, the revealed field, and that its results or rigorous conclusions are only different facets or aspects or intellectual explications of the fecund dogmas or divine statements revealed by God to His Apostles and by them committed to the Catholic Church for safekeeping and explication. All of this seems clear in St. Thomas's teaching.

But then this upgrading of the notion of virtual revelation or theological conclusion seems to downgrade formal revelation or dogma. The safeguarding of the dignity of sacred theology and of its homogeneity with the revealed datum appears perilously close to confusing it with divine faith. In raising theology from the valley of physics, where Suárez had consigned it, to the lofty regions of ultrametaphysics, where it properly belongs and where St. Thomas has always placed it, there is the danger of falling into the anti-thomist and discredited theory maintained by Vázquez and some other theologians of nominalist affiliation, who do not distinguish specifically — not clearly, at any rate — between human reasoning and divine faith.

119. **TWO KEYS TO THE PROBLEM.** — The whole problem of the homogeneous evolution of dogmas rests authentically on two bases, which also provide the true keys to the solution of all the objections that are raised against it. The first is the objectively inclusive or *implicit* character of any true theological conclusion in respect of the revealed datum. The second is the *divine* authority given by God to His Church, not merely to safeguard, but to *explicate* all that is objectively implicit in the revealed deposit, provided only that such explication or unfolding can be done without any new revelation.

In the preceding chapter we have dwelt at length on the first of these two bases. It is now time to examine the second, that is, to delve deeply into the true nature of the Church's authority relative to the explication or unfolding of the revealed deposit and the precise organic place occupied by the Church's definition between theology and faith.

**TWO EXTREMES TO BE AVOIDED.** — As a matter of fact — and this will be clear as we get on through the present chapter — the problem of authentic dogmatic evolution reduces on the one hand to the problem of what value must be given to human reasoning or to the theological conclusion, and on the other, what value must be given to the authority of the Church, relative to the unfolding of the revealed truth.

The theologian may find himself floundering against two opposite reefs. He might, in the first case, place so much value on human reasoning as to rate it on a par with the divine value of the Church's authority. Or, on the contrary, he might attach so little weight to the authority of the Church as to identify it with the human value of theological reasoning, or to distinguish it from the latter only accidentally.

Vázquez exaggerated the value of theological reasoning; thus he was misled into confusing it with the value of the Church's definition. He maintained that in respect of the act of divine faith evident reasoning performs relative to the theologian a function that is identical or similar to that of the Church's definition relative to all the faithful. Hence, his theory that the theological conclusion is formally a truth of divine faith and deserves an assent of divine faith from any one who arrives at its knowledge through evident reasoning, independently of the Church's definition. (85)

On the other hand, Molina failed to recognize the truly divine value of the Church's definition and thus came to rate it on a par with the human value of the theological reasoning. In his view, the Holy Spirit assists the Church to prevent her from erring but not to enable her to turn into a truth of divine faith what previously was not formally a truth of faith. Hence his theory that, no matter how inclusive and implicit it may be, no true theological conclusion is a truth of divine faith whether before or after the Church's definition. (84)

Molina's theory radically precludes all dogmatic evolution via true theological conclusions. Vázquez's theory formally confuses theological evolution with dogmatic evolution. Both theories disregard the essential, and not merely accidental, difference between the formally human and thus neither divine nor dogmatic — value of theological reasoning and the truly divine and dogmatic value of the Church's authority or definition.

120. **DIVISION.** — In order to show that the divine magisterium established by Jesus Christ in His Church is one of the hinges on which the possibility of true dogmatic evolution rests, but that nonetheless, dogmatic evolution must be essentially distinguished from theological evolution, we shall divide the present chapter into eight sections:

1. The revealed virtuality or theological conclusion prior to the Church's definition.
2. The revealed virtuality after its definition by the Church
3. The organic locus occupied by the Church's authority in our divine faith.
4. Whether the Church turns the mediate or virtual revelation into immediate or formal revelation.
5. The authority of the Church compared with the authority of God and the authority of the Apostles.
6. Two functions of the Church's magisterium relative to the revealed deposit.
7. Whether the Church's definitions complete revelation.
8. Whether the dogmatic evolution that takes place after the Apostles is objective or subjective.

## SECTION I THE REVEALED VIRTUALITY OR THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION PRIOR TO THE CHURCH'S DEFINITION

121. **THE FORMAL CONCLUSION AND THE SPECIFICATIVE CONCLUSION.** — In the matter of the definability or non-definability of theological conclusions as truths of faith, two divisions or distinctions are usually made.

The first distinction is that made by some theologians who, as Vázquez, distinguish between the conclusion qua conclusion and the conclusion qua consequent. The conclusion qua conclusion is the conclusion as *deduced* from the principles. The conclusion qua consequent is the conclusion as *included* in

the principles. The conclusion qua conclusion is usually termed *formal* conclusion. The conclusion qua consequent is ordinarily termed material or *speculative* conclusion. To assent to a conclusion qua conclusion is to assent not only to the truth affirmed by it but further to assent to the fact that the given conclusion is deduced from the given principle. To assent to the conclusion qua consequent is to assent to its truth but without any regard to its deduction. In this case, says Vázquez, the inference or reasoning is not the formal motive but simply the condition to come to the knowledge that the given conclusion is contained in its principles, and as soon as the reasoning has served this purpose of letting us know the fact of such containment, we assent to the conclusion, not because of the reasoning, but because of the conclusion's being contained or included in the revealed principles. They say that in this matter of conclusions there is something analogous to what happens in the act of divine faith. No act of divine faith exists without previous motives of credibility. However, these motives of credibility are never the formal motive of divine faith; they are but a condition *sine qua non* for us to arrive at the certain knowledge of divine revelation. As soon as this divine revelation is known to us we assent to the revealed truth because of the revelation itself and not because of the motives of credibility.

Likewise, as soon as through reasoning the inclusion of a conclusion in the revealed premises becomes known, this inclusion or revelation is the formal motive of belief, and not the reasoning process.

Thus Vázquez, and thus also many other theologians, at least, in cases involving metaphysico-inclusive conclusions. (85)

**122. THE CONCLUSION BEFORE AND AFTER ITS DEFINITION BY THE CHURCH.** — The second division or distinction between theological conclusions, which every theologian — particularly the authentically Thomist theologian — ought to make, consists in distinguishing clearly and radically between the conclusion *in itself*, that is, without the Church's definition, and the same conclusion *after* its definition by the Church. Prior to the Church's definition the conclusion is not known to us except through one, and only one, medium: through reasoning. After it has been defined by the Church, the conclusion is known to us through two essentially different mediums, to wit: through reasoning, and through the definition.

The conclusion in itself, or prior to its definition by the Church, is usually called by Thomists "the conclusion considered *per se*", and also "the conclusion *as such*."

We will devote the following section to the examination of the conclusion after its definition by the Church. In the present section we will be exclusively concerned with the conclusion in itself or prior to its definition. We intend to show that in St. Thomas's doctrine, no true theological con-

clusion, if it be known merely through reasoning, can be a truth of divine faith or ever be deserving of an assent of divine faith for as long as it is not defined by the Church. And we mean to show that this holds true no matter how clear and evident the reasoning may be, no matter how much inclusiveness or implicitude is involved in it. And that it holds true whether the conclusion be considered as a *formal* conclusion or as a *speculative* conclusion, provided that they truly and properly are conclusions, that is to say, truths that differ virtually or conceptually from the revealed datum from which they are deduced.

In order to make this clear, let us set forth St. Thomas's teaching on the nature and specific distinction of cognitive habits. Both theology and faith are essentially cognitive habits; thus it is impossible to determine when faith alone exists, when theology alone exists, and when both theology and faith exist simultaneously, without a good understanding of that which is material and that which is formal in the specific distinction of both the habits and the acts of our intellectual knowledge.

**123. THE FORMAL AND THE MATERIAL IN ANY KNOWLEDGE.** — Let us begin by recalling that in St. Thomas's view: 1. every theological reasoning must begin from a premise of divine faith, a premise believed with divine faith; 2. that the other premise must be inclusive and not merely connexive; 3. that, consequently, the *middle term* is itself a revealed idea; 4. that, in consequence, the theological conclusion, that is to say, the theological truth or the science of theology acquired in virtue of such reasoning possesses *objective* identity and *real* homogeneity with the premise of faith, or the revealed datum.

We have advisedly underscored the terms *objective* and *real* when we mentioned real homogeneity and objective identity. For it must never be forgotten, (as it has been, ever since the physico-connexive virtual was unfortunately introduced as the constitutive of the theological) that there are two kinds of identity and of homogeneity because there are two kinds of objects: 1. the *material*, or *real*, object; 2. the *formal* object.

Faith, theology, as well as every other intellectual or scientific habit is knowledge. Now, in any knowledge two things must be distinguished: *that* which is known and the *medium whereby* it is known: the *res cognita* and the *medium cognitionis*. If I know that *the human soul is immortal*, that is the *thing known*, the *res cognita*. If I know it through *divine authority*, through *scientific reasoning*, through *human authority*, these are the *medium cognitionis* — three essentially different mediums relative to one self-same *res cognita* or known truth.

Well then, St. Thomas views the *thing known* as that which is material, secondary, accidental. The *medium cognitionis*, the medium whereby the

thing is known, is that which is formal, specific, that which constitutes and essentially distinguishes the knowledge and the cognitive habit. St. Thomas repeats this view to the point of satiety every time he treats of the specification and distinction of cognitive powers and habits in general. But he lays it down particularly and explicitly and as the basis from the very beginning of his treatises on the *Sacred Doctrine* and on *Faith*.<sup>1</sup>

Consequently, when one seeks to determine the value of any affirmation, or proposition, or truth that is the object of the human intellect, one completely loses his bearings, in the Thomist view, should one focus his attention exclusively, or even principally, on the *thing known* by our intellect. That upon which attention should be focused primarily and above all is the *medium whereby* our intellect *knows* the thing.

Thus if two men both know that *the human soul is immortal*, but one knows it *exclusively* through divine authority whereas the other knows it *exclusively* through reasoning or a scientific medium, the thing known is materially the same, homogeneous, identical; but the knowledge itself is formally different; in the former it is *divine faith*, in the latter it is *science*.

<sup>1</sup>In the distinction of powers, or even of habits, the object itself, taken *materially*, is *not considered*, but the *reason of the object*. And therefore [things that are *cognitive habit*." (ST. THOMAS, 1-2, q. 54, a. 2, ad 1) "The different mediums are as different active principles according to which the habits of the sciences are as sciences." (*Op. cit.*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 1) "[The holy doctor] designates the difference of the *cognoscibility* the *medium whereby* something is knowable." (CAPREOLO, in 1 Sent., q. 1, p. 34, pg. 19; ed. Paban et Pègues) "For the unity of the power and the habit is to be considered according to the object, taken *not materially*, but in accordance with the *formal reason of the object*." (ST. THOMAS, p. 1, q. 1, a. 3) "The conclusions are known materially; but the formal reason of knowing is the *medium of demonstration whereby* the conclusions are known." (2-2, q. 1, a. 1) "The object of any cognitive habit has two things, viz. that which is *materially known*, and *that whereby it is known*, which is the *formal reason of the object*." (*Ibid.*) "Nothing falls under any power, or habit, or even any act, unless on account of the *formal reason of the object*." (*Ibid.*, a. 3) "Indeed, every *cognitive habit formally* regards the *medium whereby* something is known; and *materially* that which is known through the medium." (*Ibid.*, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3) Etc., etc. Thus, in order to find out whether any theological conclusion, not precisely *qua conclusion* (because in this sense there are very few theologians who have thought of saying that it is *of faith*), but even *specificatively qua truth*, is *of divine faith* for the human intellect, it is not, one must not consider whether it has more or less identity with the major or principle of faith, but whether we *know it* through the same medium through which we know the major. The unequivocal and constant teaching of St. Thomas is that no assent of divine faith is possible for as long as the *medium whereby* we know it is not the medium of divine authority, but of scientific reasoning; and St. Thomas's reason is that when a truth is *known only* as a conclusion, it cannot be given any other assent but the assent *proper to a conclusion*, since *cognitive* habits are not specified by subjective or voluntary viewpoints, but by objective reasons of the intellect, i.e. by the *medium of knowing*.

If one of the two knows it through reasoning *alone*, and the other through human authority *alone*, the thing known is the same; but the knowledge and the habits wherewith the same thing is known differ essentially: in the former it is *science*, in the latter it is *human faith*.

Assume now the case where both employ reasoning or a scientific medium. But one knows through a metaphysical reasoning or medium, whereas the other knows through a physical reasoning or medium. The thing known remains ever the same; but there is a difference in the *medium cognitivus*; hence there exists a difference in the species and in that which is the formal element in the cognitive habit and in the assent. In the former it is metaphysics, in the latter it is physics.

Finally, let us suppose that one and the same individual knows the same truth or proposition through *different mediums* simultaneously, e.g., through divine authority, through scientific reasoning, and through human authority. In that case he would, or could,<sup>2</sup> have different knowledges, different habits, and different assents relative to the same truth at the same time. The habits, knowledges, and assents of divine faith, science and human faith.

All of the foregoing points stress the following principle which is utterly fundamental in St. Thomas' teaching. One medium of knowing can have one, and only one, corresponding species of habit, assent, and certitude; *different mediums of knowing* have correspondingly different species of habits, assents, and certitudes. "In the distinction of habits one must consider not the *object itself materially*, but the *reason of the object*. And thus in so far as different things coincide in one *reason of cognoscibility*, they belong to *one habit*. But cognitive habits are *diversified* in accordance with the *diversity of the mediums*."

124. THE MEDIUM COGNITIONIS OF THEOLOGICAL TRUTH.— In the light of this teaching of St. Thomas, let us proceed to examine the specific or essential value of any theological truth, no matter how inclusive and identical might be the reasoning whereby our intellect deduces it. The value of the propositions or truths of the last three degrees of Catholic

<sup>2</sup>We say "or could have", because there are habits so incompatible of their own formal nature that not even with different *mediums of knowing* is it possible for them to coexist in the same subject with regard to the same thing. Such is the case, according to St. Thomas (2-2, q. 1, aa. 4-5) with the habits of *faith* and *science* (science of intrinsic perfect evidence, which, theology is not), or the habits of *opinion* and *science*. But this is accidental relative to the question we are dealing with, since there is no incompatibility of any kind between faith and theology, because theology does not have that kind of evidence, provided, however, that there be *two mediums of knowing*: the medium of faith and that of theology.

<sup>3</sup>ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*

doctrine depends wholly on their inclusion and on the mode of such inclusion in the first degree which is the revealed datum or deposit. Their value in no way depends on their inclusion in the principles of reason or in the sciences acquired through the natural light. Let us therefore examine the theological proposition or truth, not in relation to the principles of philosophy or of natural reason, for this would be accidental or extrinsic to any truth of faith or to any theological truth. Let us examine it in relation to the revealed deposit.

As an example let us consider this proposition of Christian truth: *the human soul is immortal*. Three different cases are possible: 1. the human intellect finds this truth in the revealed deposit through a *simple understanding* of the literal meaning of the revealed deposit without any deduction or discourse. 2. The human intellect discovers the same truth only through a proper *deduction* from the simple understanding of the revealed deposit. 3. That both the two cases just mentioned take place. In other words, our intellect finds the proposition or truth in one part of the revealed deposit through simple understanding and without any deductive reasoning. However, it can also be found in another part of the revealed deposit through deduction or reasoning in the proper sense of these terms.

Between being found *without reasoning*, being found *through reasoning*, and being found *in both ways together*, no other alternative exists. These three alternatives exhaust all the possibilities. For as we have already remarked, a fourth supposition; to wit, that the truth is not to be found in the revealed deposit, whether with or without reasoning, would place us out of the problem. Any truth not contained in the deposit in any manner whatsoever would *ipso facto* have no relationship with either faith, or dogma, or infallibility, or theology. It would be merely a profane truth, as the holy Doctor says: "For example, in matters pertaining to geometry or in other similar matters, which *in no way* can belong to the faith."<sup>4</sup>

Let us make these three cases completely clear by making the three simple suppositions that follow: *First supposition*: the whole of the revealed deposit reduces to this single proposition: *the human soul is immortal*. *Second supposition*: the whole of the revealed deposit reduces to one single proposition, but this time the proposition is: *the human soul is spiritual*, and not *the human soul is immortal* as in the previous case. *Third supposition*: the whole of the revealed deposit reduces to two propositions or verses; namely: *verse 1, the human soul is immortal; verse 2, the human soul is spiritual*. In each of these three suppositions, what is the value of the proposition or truth under study, i.e., *the human soul is immortal*?

<sup>4</sup>ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.11, a.2.

125. FAITH ALONE, WITHOUT THEOLOGY. — The answer is quite obvious in the first supposition. In this first supposition, the proposition *the human soul is immortal* is found by my intellect in the revealed deposit, in the word or *authority of God*, through simple understanding, without any sort of reasoning, without any other *medium* of knowledge except the immediate meaning of the revealed deposit. I know it directly, immediately, only and merely through divine revelation, through the divine witness, through the divine authority. There is *only one medium of knowing*, and this medium is divine revelation or authority. Consequently, there is *only one habit*, one knowledge, one assent — the knowledge, assent and habit of *divine faith*.

Similarly, we should still be in the first supposition (and not in the second), if in the attempt to assess the value of the proposition *the human soul is immortal*, we repaired to the revealed deposit and found not the same proposition stated *explicitly* but these others instead: "the human soul will never perish", or "the human soul will live forever", or any other proposition with the same meaning but with different words; that is, when no true reasoning, but only a *mere explanation of terms*, is needed in order to find or see it in the deposit or *divine word*. This is what is called the *formal implicit*: implicit because some explication is required to find it; *formal* because the explication is a mere exposition of the meaning of the different terms (which is also known as *improper discourse*, or discourse *only in regard to the form* — John of St. Thomas<sup>5</sup>), whereby *one* and the same *idea* is expressed, and does not involve the admixture or mediation of *another idea*, in which *true reasoning consists*. (27, 61)

As we have previously remarked, this formal implicit comprises the nominal definition and the defined, the unconditioned universal and the particular, the correlatives, the contradictories, and all those things that are *simultaneous in nature and knowledge*, since there is no *virtual* distinction between them, but only a nominal distinction or distinction of reasoning reason. (32)

126. FAITH AND THEOLOGY TOGETHER. — In the third supposition, the proposition whose value is being assayed, is found by my mind in two different parts of the divine deposit. But my mind finds it through different modes or through *different mediums* of knowing. In the first verse I find it directly, immediately, through mere divine affirmation, statement, witness, or authority; without any reasoning or any other scientific or deductive medium. In the second verse I do not formally find, i.e. through mere understanding, that *the human soul is immortal*; but instead I find that the *human*

<sup>5</sup>De Fide, a.2, n.8.

*soul is spiritual.* Now, my human intellect possesses *another medium* of knowing, which is nonetheless, a suitable medium for operating on that which is affirmed by divine authority without introducing a break in homogeneity or an admixture of new objectivity. My intellect employs *this medium*, and through it, that is, through the inclusive-analytic-identical-*transcendent* relation that links and identifies *objectively all* spirituality (hence also *revealed spirituality*) with immortality, I infer and know deductively that *the human soul is immortal* through that *medium*, which is a medium *distinct* from mere divine authority.

In this third supposition I have found the proposition I was seeking for in two parts of the deposit or divine word, but I have found it through *two different mediums of knowing*: one is the medium of mere divine revelation, or witness; the other is the medium of human discourse or deduction — a discourse that is thoroughly analytic, and thoroughly inclusive, and thoroughly homogeneous —; but still a discourse and a *true discourse*, the most rigorous, proper and scientific that is possible; so rigorous, true and scientific that it characterizes the superior sciences — the mathematical and metaphysical sciences, which are almost the only ones that strictly deserve the name of *science and demonstration*, taking these terms in all their extension and fullness.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, in this third supposition I have two *mediums of knowing*: one, the medium of mere divine revelation or authority; the other, the medium of human discourse, although a discourse employed on a divine truth. I will, habits, and two assents: a knowledge, habit and assent of *divine faith*; and a knowledge, habit and assent of *theological science or theology*.

127. TRUE AND MERE THEOLOGY. — Up to this point there has been no great difficulty, and it can be said that all theologians, the earlier and the modern, are fundamentally in agreement.

The difficulty, or more properly, the confusion made by theologians posterior to the Suarezian virtual, lies in the second hypothesis, the case in which a proposition or truth is not found in the deposit without the aid of

<sup>6</sup> "Nowhere but in the metaphysical and mathematical sciences are true demonstrations found." (A. de POULPIQUET, O.P., *L'Object intégral de l'Apologétique*, p.40, Blond, Paris 1912) To characterize as *formal confused or improper virtual* the conclusions of real identity or metaphysical connexion is tantamount to denying to the mathematical, metaphysical, and theological sciences and demonstrations the nature of true human science, in the proper sense of the terms, to physics; and, on the other, to confuse the metaphysico-theological conclusions, which are the only ones that constitute the true and rigorous theology, with simple understanding in the natural order, and with divine faith in the supernatural order. A complete confusion between theology and

reasoning, the case in which to find it or to come to know it the human intellect must employ a deductive reasoning of inclusive virtuality, and *only through such reasoning* and as a consequence of it does our human intellect *know* it. The problem can be stated as follows: What is the value of any theological proposition or of any truth pertaining to the last three degrees of the Catholic doctrine, in the case that the human mind does not find it in the revealed deposit *except* through metaphysico-inclusive reasoning or as an inclusive deduction from the deposit? Is such a truth (prior to the Church's definition) formally a truth of divine faith, or a truth of theology, or of both divine faith and theology at once?

Ever since Suárez, with the intention of saving or *attenuating* Molina's extreme and radical theory, made of the physical or merely connexive virtual the essential and specific constitutive of theology, there was nothing else to do but assign the whole of the metaphysical or inclusive-identical virtual to the formal department of faith and affirm that the metaphysical virtual is of itself or formally a truth of faith; hence, that it could be given the assent of faith and that the theologian should give it the assent of faith from the moment that he deduces it demonstratively. (74)

But since it was obvious that where *reasoning or deduction* exist there *science and theology* must also exist, a second doctrine had to be added: namely, that *two species of assent* could be given to such conclusions, even if they were *known through only one medium*, which is the medium of inclusive reasoning: *theological assent* to the proposition considered as *conclusion*, i.e. to the conclusion taken *formally*; and the assent of *divine faith* to the conclusion taken *specifically*. In other words, the doctrine explained earlier in the case of the third hypothesis when the proposition is known through *two mediums*, divine authority and reasoning, was extended and made to apply also to the second hypothesis when the proposition is known *exclusively through reasoning*. Thus, in the end, the positions reached are identical to those of Vázquez and Vega, whose teachings, on the other hand, are contested.

Finally, since the traditional theology of St. Thomas and his school had always considered reasoning, taken in its proper sense, as the antipode of faith (63), the theological confusion was consummated by affirming, as Suárez and Lugo did, and many other theologians after them, that the implicit or identico-real virtual is neither a proper reasoning nor a proper virtual, but immediate or formal, although . . . *confused*. This is the height of confusion that can be arrived at, by turning all the ideas of Aristotle and St. Thomas upside down. (86)

Let us, then examine this second hypothesis, which is the case of the true and mere theological conclusion. It provides the key to the specific distinction between divine faith and theology. On it depends the correct

understanding of what Catholics call dogmatic progress and Modernists characterize as transformistic evolution. The reader will recall that this hypothesis is the following: God has *only* explicitly revealed to us that *the human soul is spiritual*. On this assumption we want to ascertain the value of this other proposition *the human soul is immortal*, a proposition which differs *virtually* from the former.

In this hypothesis, human reason knows the first proposition *the human soul is spiritual* through one medium, through divine revelation, without true deductive reasoning of any sort, through mere inspection or understanding of the revealed deposit, through divine authority. Hence reason assents to it not through *science* but through *authority*, not through *theology* but through *divine faith*. But, in this same hypothesis, how does human reason know the second proposition *the human soul is immortal*? Does reason know it through mere divine revelation, without true reasoning, without true deduction, without true science, without *any other medium* distinct from the medium of mere divine authority? Is it possible for human reason *immediately* to see or know or apply the divine revelation or authority (which is the formal motive of faith) to the proposition *the human soul is immortal* (which is the *thing known* or the material object)? Or does human reason require *another medium*, a human bridge to serve the purpose of joining *mediately* the revelation or formal motive contained in the major, with the *thing known* or material object contained in the conclusion?

The matter is rather obvious: human reason requires *another medium*, it needs to employ a minor of reason. It is true that the medium employed is inclusive, objectively identical, really homogeneous, which is why *the thing known*, the matter of the conclusion (or the *conclusion taken specifically*), habit, knowledge, or assent are matter, reality, *thing known*, and conclusion *really identical* and homogeneous with the revealed deposit, with the major of faith. Thereby, because of their *material* identity with the major of faith, they are matter of faith, a mediate or virtual object of faith. However, the reasoning or deduction (which is the *medium of knowing* or that which is *formal* in any habit, knowledge, or assent) does not cease to be a true, and real, and essential reasoning or deduction, simply because it is a reasoning or deduction of inclusion and identity; it does not thereby cease to be a *scientific medium* and thus a medium that differs essentially from the *medium of authority* or faith; it does not thereby cease to be, *absolutely speaking*, a *fallible* medium, and therefore distinct from the *Primary Truth (Veritas Prima)*, which is the formal medium of faith and an *absolutely infallible* medium. Hence, it does not thereby cease to be a *different medium of knowing* and consequently it belongs, and can only belong to a habit, knowledge and assent of *theological science*. *Theological* because of its inclusion in, or identity with, the *divine* (which is the primary *material* object of

theology); *theologico-supernatural* (and not natural theology) because of its identity with the *revealed divine*, i.e. with the major of faith from which it is inferred through a rigorous identico-real analysis. To repeat: it is *theological* and *objectively supernatural*; however, it is not an object of faith but of *science*, because it is not an immediate knowledge or one obtained through mere authority, but a mediate knowledge or one achieved through true deduction. Since in this second case we do not have *two* different mediums of knowing, as in the third case, but *only one medium* — the intellectual *deduction* from the revealed, *deductio ex revelatis* — the assent and the habit and the certainty can be none other than the assent and the habit and the certainty of *theology*, not of faith. In the teaching of St. Thomas there can be no diversity or multiplicity of habits, nor consequently of assent, without a multiplicity or diversity of *mediums of knowing*. "Nothing is placed under a habit, or even an act, except through the *formal reason* of the object. But the formal reason of the object is the *medium whereby the thing is known*."<sup>7</sup>

128. FURTHER CONFIRMATION OF THE SAME. To anyone who has penetrated the *objective analysis* of faith and of science made by St. Thomas it will be mathematically evident that *no thing known exclusively through deduction* is formally of divine faith, even if the deduction is made from something divine.

For St. Thomas the formal motive of divine faith is God's *testimony*; the formal motive of science is *intrinsic-mediate evidence*, which we will call *seeing*. Something is *believed* because God *said* it. Something is *known* because it is *seen*. To see *deductively* is characteristic of *all* sciences; hence it does not specifically or distinctively constitute any particular science but is *common* to all of them. Any science is *seeing*, but each science is seeing by a *different medium* or by *different principles*.

In the natural order there are *physical, mathematical, metaphysical* principles or mediums. There are supernatural mediums or principles *obscurely revealed* — the principles of faith — and mediums or principles *seen in themselves* — the divine essence. Human reason can avail itself of all these five principles or mediums to see *deductively* or to see *other things*. Thus there is deductive seeing through a physical medium, a mathematical medium, a metaphysical medium, a supernatural medium accepted by faith, a supernatural medium intuited through facial vision. And there is a physical science, a mathematical science, a metaphysical science, a theological science of the wayfarers, and a theological science of the blessed (this last without formal discourse). The first three are the deductive natural seeing through a natural medium; the fourth is a *natural deductive* seeing through a supernatural medium. There is in all of them an *intrinsic-deductive seeing*, which is the

<sup>7</sup>ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, aa. 1 and 3.

generic characteristic of all science, and there is an objective *medium* through which the seeing is done, which is the *specific* characteristic of each science.

Let us now reconstitute the theological reasoning stating not only the material propositions or the "thing known" which shall be left out of parentheses, but also the "formal medium of knowing", which shall be enclosed within parentheses. The major of faith must contain *God says*; the minor of reason must contain *I see*; the conclusion which is *scientifico-theological* must contain the generic characteristics *I see*, and the specific characteristic or medium by which something is seen, to wit, *in what God says or reveals*. Thus:

(*God says* that) the human soul is spiritual.

(*I see* that) what is spiritual is immortal.

(*I see by or in what God says* that) the human soul is immortal.

That which in these propositions is outside parentheses is for St. Thomas that which is *material*, "the thing known"; that which is within parentheses is that which is *formal*, "the medium of knowing". What is outside parentheses is material to such a degree that if we left it intact and merely exchanged the parenthetical elements in the major and the minor, *ipso facto* both the habits and the assents would be similarly exchanged, so that we would now have a major of reason and a minor of faith. Vice versa, what is within the parentheses is *formal* to such a degree that if we left it intact, the habits and the assents would remain unchanged even if we inverted the extra-parenthetical elements in the major and minor. Therefore, the greater or lesser resemblance among these propositions relative to that which is outside parentheses is *material*; their *formal* distinction or identity is due exclusively to the identity or distinction of that which is within parentheses.

Let the reader now focus his attention on the distinct "mediums of knowing" or formal motives enclosed within parentheses in the major and the conclusion which are the two propositions with which we are at present concerned. I know the major because *God says it*. *What God says* is always and absolutely true; in *assenting to what God says* there can never be an error in any respect. There we have the characteristic of the *Veritas Prima* [First Truth], of the *formal* object of faith. On the other hand, in *seeing* deductively by *what God says* there is always, absolutely speaking, the possibility of error, the same possibility of error that exists in seeing deductively through any other medium.

Thus any proposition seen or known deductively by *what God says* (which is altogether different from *because God says it*) is always a subjectively fallible proposition, and consequently neither formally divine nor formally of faith.

Finally, the reader will notice that the "medium of knowing" of the conclusion or theological truth is made up of two elements: one is *generic*, common to all sciences, which is to see *deductively*; the other is *distinctive*, and distinguishes it from all other human sciences, namely, to see deductively BY or IN *what God says*. The distinctive or specific element is *divine, what God says*; the generic is human, the *deductive seeing*.

That is why when we examined the structure of theological reasoning and compared it with that of the other sciences, we said that the "medium of knowing" of theology is *divine, the revealed formal* (114); but now that we examine its dogmatic value and compare it with faith, we say that the "medium of knowing" of theology is *human, the deductive seeing*. Both assertions are true and inseparable. On the first is grounded theology's objective dignity, superior to that of any other human science, and its real or objective-material homogeneity with the divinely revealed. The second provides the basis for the subjective fallibility of both theology and its homogeneity when inferred and known *exclusively through human reason*, and its inferiority to and specific distinction from divine faith.

The inclusive and homogeneous character of the *intellectual* procedure of theology is the reason why its conclusions approach as closely as possible the principles of faith. This is why the early Thomists used to designate the true theological conclusion as *matter* definable of faith, as *mediate object* and *indirect object* of faith. The Holy Doctor had already adverted to the fact that sciences whose procedure is intellectual and inclusive have this peculiarity; namely, that their conclusions (without ceasing to be mere conclusions and thus to belong essentially to a habit distinct from the habit to which the principles belong) are so homogeneous that they can be said to border on the principles themselves. "To proceed intellectually is not attributed to the divine science as if it did not reason proceeding from principles to conclusions: but because its reasoning lies *closest to intellectual consideration and its conclusions lie closest to its principles*."<sup>8</sup>

However, between saying this and saying that they are formally of faith or deserve the assent of faith there lies an abyss that cannot be bridged by anything human and fallible, but only by the divine and infallible authority possessed by the Church in order to explicate and to propose, with the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, that which is implicitly *included* in the deposit, which is, as we shall see, what St. Thomas means by *explicating* the revealed deposit.

How, then, is it possible for this *theological conclusion*, this *inclusive deduction*, this *human intellectual elaboration* of the divine material — which is *theological* because of the divine material, and *science*, not faith, because of

<sup>8</sup> In *Boetium, De Trinitate*, q.6, a.1, ad 1.



the human intellectual elaboration involved — ever to become a truth of faith and deserve to be given by human reason an assent that is divine, formally divine, which previously it did not, and could not, deserve? We shall examine the matter in the following section.

#### SECTION II THE REVEALED VIRTUALITY OR THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION AFTER THE CHURCH'S DEFINITION

129. THE TRANSITION FROM THE THEOLOGICAL TRUTH TO A TRUTH OF DIVINE FAITH. — It is quite possible that some readers might be surprised by the very heading of "Transition from *theological* truth to truth of *divine faith*", i.e. the transition of what for *our* reason, not for the divine or the apostolic intellect, was rigorously, exclusively, and merely *theology* to a truth of divine faith, to a *dogma* of faith. Nonetheless, there is such a transition, and it is admitted by the traditional teaching of Catholic theology. It is, at bottom, the teaching of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus, the teaching of Vázquez and Vega, Suárez and Lugo, of all the classical theologians of the XVI century prior to Molina, and the teaching of 90% of subsequent theologians with respect to the true theology, the metaphysico-inclusive theology.

The surprise felt by some at the mention of a transition from theology to divine faith proceeds from the false notion of what true theology consists in, stemming from the misbegotten concept of the *merely connexive* virtual, which can ill become a *dogma* of faith because it is not a true revealed virtual and consequently neither a rigorous theological virtual.

On the contrary, if theology consists, as it indeed does, in the *implicit* or inclusive virtuality, the respective fields in which theology and divine faith function, although formally or specifically distinct are nonetheless materially or objectively identical. This objective identity or this implicitness of theology's object in the object of faith accounts not only for the *essential* dependence of our theology on divine faith, but also for the possibility of the transition from one to the other through a new element or a *new medium* of human but *divine*. This new element is the authority of the Church, an authority not human but *divine*. However, since this authority is grounded not on revelation, as in the case of the Apostles, but on assistance, the Church is constrained to employ as an instrument the *human labour* of the theological reasoning, in much the same manner as she employs any other instrument that is suitable to explicate or develop that which is truly implicit in the revealed deposit. This should become clear by analyzing the human labour of the Church and comparing it with the similarly human labour of theology.

130. THE HUMAN LABOUR IN THEOLOGICAL REASONING AND IN THE DEFINITION OF THE CHURCH. — This is a point of utmost importance, which often does not get the attention it deserves in spite of the fact that upon it hinges the nature, the course, and the limits of both theological and dogmatic progress. The slightest slip in the examination of the nature of this *human* labour, this *intellectual* elaboration of the divine, will land one in either of two extremes: modernist transformism, or theologianism; the denial of any true dogmatic progress, or making formally dogmatic anything theological; the rupture or objective-real breach of communication between faith and theology, or the absorption of theology by faith.

On the other hand, from its correct interpretation issues St. Thomas's profound and harmonious theory which vitally, really, objectively, and homogeneously joins theology with the faith in such a way that it maintains the formal, specific, and essential distinction between faith and theology, but leaves the door open to true and perfect dogmatic development. In St. Thomas's teaching, dogmatic development is not restricted to mere nominal explication, i.e. to mere formulae; it encompasses also the intellectual development or explication of the implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit, yet its homogeneity or objective-real identity is kept intact while the pitfalls of both modernist transformism and the theory of new revelations are avoided.

Indeed, in the view of St. Thomas, there exists a true deductive human labour both in theology and in the Church's definition of the virtual inclusive. This deductive human labour is not confined to mere nominal formalities of one and the same idea but extends itself to different ideas or aspects of this true same objectivity. However, in St. Thomas, the *nature and value* of this true human labour in theology and in the Church's definition are *essentially different*, albeit materially identical. Hence the outcome of that human labour in theology (theological conclusion) differs essentially from the outcome of the human labour of the Church (definition of faith). In the former case the outcome is scientific-human; in the latter the outcome is authoritative-divine. The former is formally theological; the latter, formally dogmatic. Let us see why.

131. POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO LABOURS. — The starting point is the same for both the theologian in deducing and the Pontiff or Council in defining; to wit, the bare revealed datum in the case of the first conclusions or definitions; the revealed datum plus the previous definitions by the Church in the case of subsequent definitions. To proceed from this starting point to the theological conclusion or the definition, both the theologian and the Church need a human *deductive medium*: in the theologian's case, the minor premise of the argumentation; in the case of the Church, the reasons or considerations that precede the Council's or the Pontiff's definition.

nition. In the theologian, the human intellectual labour is represented by the theological minor. The intellectual labour of the Church is represented by what for the sake of brevity we might call the *ecclesiastical minor*, made up of the complex of *reasons* (biblical, patristic, theological . . . commonly designated as the proper *loci theologici*) that have preceded the definition for centuries, and which in the papal bulls or dogmatic constitutions are placed as the preambles or justification of the *We declare and define*.

The theologian would never reach his conclusion without the labour of the theological minor. The Church rarely proceeds to the definition without the labour of the ecclesiastical minor.<sup>9</sup>

Neither the theologian nor the Church seeks to add something *objective* to the major or revealed datum by means of either the theological minor or the ecclesiastical minor, but simply to develop or deduce what is *included* in the revealed datum.

Where the reasoning employed is one of identity or of inclusive analysis, the minor is employed and operates not as an objective co-cause that adds some objectivity to the major, but as an intellectual instrument to uncover the objectivity that already existed in the revealed major, but which cannot be detected by the human mind except through a true deductive reasoning. (96) On all of these points there is agreement between the labour of the theologian and that of the Church.

132. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO. — The *essential* difference between the two lies in the fact that the specific nature of the knowledge, certainty, and assent given to the *conclusion* depends *essentially* on the

<sup>9</sup>When we speak of the "ecclesiastical minor" or *deductive* labour that precedes the definition, we have by no means overlooked the obvious fact that, in defining a truth as of faith, the Church employs the direct procedure of tradition or authority rather than deductive reasoning. She finds out what the Church Fathers, Councils, popes, and other authentic organs of tradition have previously taught on the inclusion of such a truth in the revealed deposit. However, since the Church often defines truths that are not contained in the primitive datum except in an implicit-virtual manner, there must have necessarily existed some *deductive* work. It matters little whether this deductive work is done by the Church for the first time upon defining a truth — this happens very rarely, not to say never — or has already been done previously by those same Church Fathers, Councils, and popes, on whose authority the Church rests when she defines. In defining a truth the Church usually rests on tradition, but not merely on the primitive undeveloped tradition, but almost always on tradition already developed by the work of previous centuries. It is this developing or deductive work, whether done at the time of defining or already done previously, that we designate with the term *ecclesiastical minor*.

We will deal with the case, in which a truth is defined without the human work of reasoning but only through the "sense of faith" or common consent of the faithful, later on when we touch on dogmatic evolution through the affective or experimental way.

*theological minor* employed by the theologian in his argumentation. On the contrary, the nature of the knowledge, certainty, or assent to the *definition* does not depend *in the least* on the *ecclesiastical minor*.

In the theological reasoning the conclusion will be for the human mind certain, more or less probable, doubtful, entirely false insofar as the minor employed is absolutely certain, more or less probable, doubtful, false. "The *whole force* of the argument lies in the *middle* term."<sup>10</sup> Let us for a moment suppose that we have assented to the conclusion of a theological reasoning in the belief that it was fully demonstrative; then we find that the minor, which we had thought to be absolutely certain, is not so indeed, but only probable. The conclusion *ipso facto* loses its certainty for us, and becomes only probable. Let us suppose that we find such strong arguments against the minor that make it doubtful: *ipso facto* the conclusion becomes doubtful. Let us suppose the minor to be not only probable or doubtful, but that proof is found that shows it to be absolutely false: *ipso facto* the conclusion is entirely wanting in certainty.

Therefore: for the human mind, in theological reasoning, in the theological conclusion, in theology, howsoever inclusive the procedure, the *species* of the knowledge or certainty, of the *medium of knowing*, of that which is *formal* in any *habit*, depends *essentially* on the *minor* of the reasoning, on the *human labour*.

Hence, it is not formally divine, it is not formally faith. The human element may enter into the divine as a divinely rectified instrument, but never as the formal or as that on which the formal depends. Now, the faith, which is our present concern, is *divine*; its formal object must be specified by absolute, infallible truth, by the *First Truth* itself; thus no thing that does not fall under the absolute, infallible, First Truth; no thing liable to failure from any point of view, belongs, or can ever belong, formally to *divine faith*. "No thing is *placed* under any power, or habit, or even any *act* except through the formal reason of the object . . . Now it has been pointed out that the *formal reason of the object* of faith is the *First Truth*; therefore, no thing can fall under faith except in so far as it stands *under the First Truth*."<sup>11</sup> "Faith relies on *divine Truth* itself as its *medium*."<sup>12</sup> The theological conclusion, known *exclusively* through reasoning, no matter how superior it is to the physical conclusion, the mathematical conclusion, the metaphysical conclusion, has one thing in common with all those conclusions; namely, the lack of the guarantee of infallibility, which is the exclusive character of the

<sup>10</sup>ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q.14, a.2.

<sup>11</sup>ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, a.3.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, a.10.

*divine medium*, or of the human medium but only in so far as it is a mere instrument infallibly guided and rectified by the divine medium.

The foregoing is not meant to deny that theology is capable of true demonstration; indeed theological demonstration is supreme in the order of scientific demonstration and certainty. Neither is it meant to deny that theology's concern is with the divine. What is here denied is that anything known *scientifically*, i.e. through *demonstration* is absolutely infallible. What is affirmed is that every proposition *known solely through reasoning* can be false, all the more so where it is about the divine, a field in which human reason easily falls into error. "For human reason is *greatly deficient in things divine* . . . Often a man is deceived in this: that he thinks a reasoning to be a true demonstration, which is not so indeed."<sup>13</sup> A PROPOSITION THAT IS FALLIBLE (from any point of view) IS NOT A PROPOSITION FORMALLY OF FAITH.

133. THE OPPOSITE, COMPLETELY THE OPPOSITE happens in the human reasoning or labour that precedes the Church's definition. Where, as in theology the nature of the knowledge, of the certainty, and of the assent given to the conclusion, depends essentially on the validity of the theological minor or the human labour; in the definition of faith made by the Pontiff or by the Council the nature of the knowledge, of the certainty, and of the assent to the definition is absolutely independent of the validity of the human labour or ecclesiastical minor which precedes it.

Let us for the moment suppose that the Council or the Pontiff defines as of faith a truth of inclusive and analytic character, that is, a truth contained in the revealed deposit in virtue of its real identity with the formal statements of the deposit. After the definition one, several, many or even all of the preambles or reasonings of the dogmatic definition are found to be not as certain as they were believed to be, but only probable, or doubtful, or false. Is the definition, or the defined truth, thereby false, doubtful, probable, or less certain? NO.

The definition is preceded by those preambles, those reasonings, that human labor, that ecclesiastical minor; but the definition is not based on them, *nor is it a conclusion derived from them*. The definition is formally based on the *divine assistance*, and this divine assistance is given to define, not to reason; it guarantees divinely and infallibly the truth of the definition, not the truth of the reasoning. However, it is true that because it is merely *assistance*, not revelation, it requires reasoning as a previous human *condition*. But with respect to this reasoning the assistance has no other purpose than that of preventing that the reasoning should ever lead to a false definition,

<sup>13</sup> ST. THOMAS, 2-2, qq. 2-3. Also, *In Boetium, De Trinitate*, lect. 1, q. 1, a. 1.

not for the purpose that the reasoning be true. On the other hand, relative to the definition, or the defined truth the divine assistance has for its purpose to guarantee divinely not only that what is defined as a truth of divine faith is *true*, but that it is also a *revealed truth*, that is, a truth implicitly contained or included in the revealed deposit or datum, in the starting point common to both the labour of theology and the labour of the Church.

Thus, in the Church's definition, the reasoning precedes but does not *formally* contribute to it. The definition is not made without the reasoning, but it is not made *in virtue of the reasoning*. The definition is preceded by a minor, but this precedence is merely *material*, having no *formal* part in the definition. The definition is subsequent to and follows the minor, but it has no formal nexus with the latter: *it is not a conclusion of the minor. Materially*, externally, the labour of the Church in the definition of the implicit virtual follows the same procedure (begin with a revealed datum or major, posit an inclusive minor, and draw a conclusion already included in the datum through a virtuality of real identity), and has the same visible appearance of the human theological labour. But *formally* there is in it neither reasoning nor any human labour. The nature and validity of the *knowledge, the certainty, and the assent* to the definition or defined truth is *formally* effected without any *human medium*, but solely by *divine authority*: a divine authority not to reveal anything new, not even to reason on the things already revealed, but infallibly to *hit the mark* and *discern* by divine assistance that which is revealed from that which is not revealed, that which is *included* in the deposit from that which is not included in it; in short, to *uncover* what was already *in* the deposit; however, since it is not formally stated *in itself* but *included in other* formal statements of the deposit, it is therefore said to be in the deposit not formally, but *mediately* or *virtually*, because it is solely by means of reasoning and *in virtue of* reasoning that its knowledge is attainable by the weak human mind; relative to which *mediate, virtual, and scientific* knowledge comprises not only that which is *not included* in the principles, but also that which is truly included in them provided that its inclusion is not accessible through simple understanding but requires *true deduction* and true *science*, both of which are poles apart from faith.

On the other hand, in the case of the definition by the Church, the same thing that was included and which the theologian knew only *mediately* and *virtually* through scientific reasoning, is now known *immediately, formally*, by *divine authority*, which is characteristic of faith.

134. THE "EXPLICATION OF THE FAITH" IN TRADITIONAL TEACHING. — The labour of the Church which we have described is the meaning of the well-known *explication of the faith* in traditional theology. All theologians admit that the Church possesses the *divine assistance* and mission not only to *preserve* religiously the revealed deposit, without new

revelations or any objective addition to it, but also to expound the same revealed deposit faithfully and with *dogmatic* authority. This doctrine has been defined by the Vatican Council: "For the Holy Spirit was promised to Peter's successors not in the sense that by His revelation they should disclose new doctrine, but in the sense that by His assistance they should inviolably safeguard and faithfully expound the revelation or deposit of the faith handed down by the Apostles."<sup>14</sup> Thus dogmatic definitions are not definitions of new things or doctrines, but authentically divine explanations or explications of that which is implicit in the revealed deposit. "And this was the reason why it was necessary to issue several creeds, which differ in nothing except in the fact that in one is more fully explicated what in another is contained implicitly."<sup>15</sup> "For the subsequent creed does not abolish the preceding one, but expounds it."<sup>16</sup> "The creed of the Fathers is a declaration of the Creed of the Apostles."<sup>17</sup> "The explication of the faith against oncoming errors."<sup>18</sup> "The same faith more expounded."<sup>19</sup>

However this explication of the faith is not confined to a mere change of formulae or a mere nominal development as among things that differ only by a distinction of reasoning reason; it comprises also that which is *deduced* through a procedure of inclusion or real identity, that which differs by a virtual distinction, or by a distinction of *reasoned reason*, that is, the intellectual virtuality of the revealed deposit. This is what traditional theology understands by expounding what is implicit in the deposit. "The explication of the articles of faith, happens in two ways. The first regards the substance of the articles themselves, in so far as the articles themselves are distinctly known. The second regards those things that are implicitly contained in the articles themselves; and this happens when a man knows those things that follow from the principles."<sup>20</sup>

The articles are *substantial* for the faith; hence the unfolding of certain articles into other articles was completed in Christ and the Apostles. "This explication, whereby one article is contained in another, or two in one common to both, was completed by Christ; hence it is not licit to either add to or subtract from His doctrine with respect to the *essentials* of the faith."<sup>21</sup>

<sup>14</sup> CONC. VATICANUM, Const. *De Ecclesia Christi*, c.4, (Denz-Schön. 3070)  
<sup>15</sup> ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, a.9.  
<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 4.  
<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 6.  
<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, a.10, ad 1.  
<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 2.  
<sup>20</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.1, sol.3.  
<sup>21</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Ibid.*, a.2, sol.1, ad 5.

On the other hand, the development or explication through the consequences is *somehow accidental*. "But those things which follow from these *credibiles* are accidental as it were."<sup>22</sup> Now that which is accidental to the faith is not of faith until it is defined by the Church's magisterium whether ordinary or solemn. "But those things which relate *accidentally* to the faith are not necessary for salvation except after they have been determined by the preaching and the teaching."<sup>23</sup>

Treating of what things are definable as of faith, Cardinal Cajetan has this to say: "It makes no difference whether something has been *explicitly* revealed in the Holy Scripture and elsewhere [that is, in the Apostolic traditions and Creed] as e.g., the creation of the world, the incarnation of the Word of God and the like; or *implicitly*, as in the case of all those things the contrary of which cannot be maintained together with the truth of the Holy Scriptures and of other truths which we hold with firm faith, except for the fact that it is necessary to show with the aid of *ingenuity, labour, reason, and understanding*, that these things which are said to be *implicitly* contained are *necessarily connected* with those things in which they are said to be contained."<sup>24</sup> Or as Bññez puts it: "The Church has to this day never proposed to the faithful for them to believe, or defined anything not contained in the Sacred Writings or expressed in the apostolic traditions, or *virtually contained* in them in such a manner that they are *therefrom educed by evident consequence*."<sup>25</sup> The same teaching is held by all theologians prior to Molina, and by the majority of those who came after him. The reader will find them quoted in chapter 7 of this book (352-448). We shall adduce later on (239-250) eleven different proofs for this same truth.

Therefore, divine faith is not restricted to the articles of faith, nor even to the explicitly revealed. In St. Thomas's view, of itself it comprises all that is truly implicit, whether it be implicit as an antecedent, or as a concomitant, or as a consequence of the explicitly revealed, provided that it be explicated or defined by the Church. "For the faith, of its own self, sufficiently inclines to all the things that are *concomitant, or consequent, or precedent*] and to the former [the articles or the substantial] which are *determined* in regard to the faith, *for upon the one the other follows*."<sup>27</sup> There is no other difference except that that which is *substantial* or the *articles* were defined or explicated

<sup>22</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Ibid.*, d.24, q.1, a.1, sol.1.

<sup>23</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Ibid.*, sol.2, ad 4.

<sup>24</sup> CAJETAN, op. *De Conceptione B. Virginis*, c.1.

<sup>25</sup> *In 2-2*, q.1, a.7.

<sup>26</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.1, a.2, sol.2.

<sup>27</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5.

by the Apostles themselves, and the Church has always been teaching and preaching them through her ordinary magisterium; which is why they have been from the beginning not only *matter* of faith, but *formally* of faith; whereas what is *accidental* or *consequential*, although it is of itself *matter* of faith, does not become formally of faith until the Church *defines* or *determines* it by her ordinary or solemn magisterium. "Except after they have been *determined* by the preaching and the teaching."<sup>28</sup> These two views are also expressly stated by the Holy Doctor in the following text: "It is to be said that there are some things in the faith [the articles] which every man is obliged to know *explicitly*; thus should any man err in these things, he is reputed to be an *infidel*, and a heretic if he should in addition be *pernicious*. But if there be *some things* [the secondary or accidental] which a man is not obliged to believe *explicitly*, he does not become a heretic if he should err in such matters; as e.g. if a simple man should believe that Jacob was the father of Abraham, which is against the truth of the Holy Scripture professed by the faith; *until such time* as he becomes aware that the faith of the Church holds the *contrary*."<sup>29</sup>

And to preclude anyone — who pays more attention to the particular example here adduced by the Holy Doctor than to the general doctrine that he establishes — from thinking that this does not apply to the theological conclusions or the inclusive virtuality of the deposit, the Holy Doctor goes on to say: "And since there are *certain things* which are *implicitly contained in the faith of the Church* as *conclusions* in the principles, therefore it happens that in *such matters* different opinions are maintained *until such time* as the Church *determines* that one of them is *contrary to the faith of the Church*, because there follows from it something *directly contrary to the faith*."<sup>30</sup>

Consequently, with respect to divine faith these two things are exactly equivalent for St. Thomas: (a) *formal* or *immediate* revelation, *proposed* by the Church; (b) *implicit-virtual* or *implicit-mediate* revelation, *explicated* by the Church.

But, then, it might be objected: Does this not make the Church a formal element of divine faith? Is this not to attribute to the Church the power to change the revealed mediate or virtual into revealed immediate or formal? We shall examine these questions in the following sections.

<sup>28</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.24, q.1, a.1, sol.2, ad 4.

<sup>29</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.1, ad 6.

<sup>30</sup> *Loc.cit.*

### SECTION III OUR DIVINE FAITH AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH

135. THE CHURCH'S ORDINARY, AND SOLEMN MAGISTERIUM. — Having examined, in the light of St. Thomas's teachings, the true relations existing between theology and faith, there remains the consideration of the true relations of both to the authority of the Church, i.e. the organic place occupied by the Church's authority in *our* divine faith, and thus in our theology. We shall begin with some simple preliminary observations, which are indispensable for the correct statement of, and the right solution to, this fundamental question.

The Church's doctrinal authority or magisterium has for its proper and specific purpose the *conservation* and *exposition* of the revealed deposit. To *determine* or to fix infallibly the true meaning of the divine deposit is called a *definition* of faith by the Church.<sup>31</sup>

However, this magisterium or these definitions of faith can be exercised by the Church, as indeed they are, in two ways: the first is through

<sup>31</sup> "For the Holy Spirit was not promised to Peter's successors in the sense that by His *revelation* they should disclose *new doctrine*, but in the sense that by His *assistance* they should inviolably *safeguard* and faithfully *expound* the revelation or deposit of faith handed down by the Apostles." (CONC. VATICANUM, *De Ecclesia Christi*, c.4) "Further, all those things are to be believed with a divine and Catholic faith, that are contained in the word of God, written or handed down, and are proposed by the Church, *whether through a solemn judgment or through the ordinary and universal magisterium*, to be believed as divinely revealed." (CONC. VATICANUM, *De Fide Catholica*, c.3) Instead of the phrase *definition* or *to define of faith*, St. Thomas almost always employs the terms *to determine* or *determination of faith*. "Hence to put forth a Symbol belongs to the authority of him to whose authority it belongs *conclusively to determine the things that are of faith*, so that they are to be held by all with firm faith." (ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, a.10) "Thus, some teachers seem to have disagreed . . . even in certain things belonging to the faith, which were not yet *determined* by the Church. But after they have been *determined* by the authority of the universal Church, if any man should resist such an ordinance he would be judged a heretic." (*Loc.cit.*, q.11, a.1) "But those things that accidentally belong to the faith are not necessary for salvation except after they have been *determined* by the preaching and teaching." (*In 3 Sent.*, d.24, a.1, a.1) "Until he should be instructed by him to whom it belongs *to determine* the things that are doubtful in the faith." (*De Veritate*, q.14, a.11, ad 2) We have already mentioned that, with respect to their essential concepts, the *articles of faith* (134) were defined by Jesus Christ and the Apostles themselves, i.e. they are *taught* in the apostolic preaching in a *definite* manner ("in *determinate* articles" [ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, sol.2, ad 5]) But many other truths of faith and morals were not *explicitly* or *defined* by the Apostles, but are found in the apostolic preaching in an implicit or virtual-inclusive manner. These *indeterminate* truths are those which theology *determines* (i.e. *defines* (conclusions) with a scientific or human value, and the Church *determines* or *defines* with a divine or *dogmatic* value.

the *solemn* magisterium, whether by the Ecumenical Council, or by the Pope alone when he speaks *ex cathedra*; the second is through the ordinary magisterium, viz. through the *ordinary* teaching or preaching of the *universal* Church.

These two ways of exercising the magisterium on the content and the meaning of the revealed deposit are of equal dogmatic value, and both are true definitions of faith. Between them there exists only an accidental difference, to wit, that the magisterium exercised by the Ecumenical Council or by the Pope speaking *ex cathedra* is done with a greater solemnity and show of formulae and is easily discernible by all; on the other hand, the ordinary magisterium is exercised through the universal teaching of the Church without any special display or set formulae, and at times it is not so easy to determine its scope and signification.

These two different ways of exercising the doctrinal magisterium or of defining the revealed truth should always be kept in mind, for when one speaks of definitions of faith, it often happens that the mind tends to focus solely on the definitions by the solemn magisterium, without paying sufficient attention to the fact that there are also definitions by the ordinary magisterium.

Hence, a truth contained in the *revealed deposit*, whose meaning has not yet been infallibly fixed by either the solemn or the ordinary magisterium of the Church, is a *revealed* truth, but not a *defined* truth. A truth contained in the *revealed deposit*, whose meaning has been infallibly fixed or determined either by the ordinary or by the solemn magisterium of the Church is not only a revealed, but also a *defined* truth.

Consequently, to ask whether divine faith can be given to a truth of the revealed deposit prior to its definition by the Church is to ask whether divine faith can be given to it prior to, or without, having its meaning infallibly determined or taught either by the *solemn* or by the *ordinary* magisterium of the Church.

136. WHAT CHURCH IS MEANT. — The tendency of our minds to focus solely or preferentially on the *solemn* definitions, when dealing with the subject of definitions of faith, also has as a consequence the fact that at times we do not give the term *the Church* all the extension that it has. Unconsciously we consider the Church, not from her very foundation, that is, from the time of the Apostles, but the Church of the later centuries, when the Ecumenical Councils and the solemn definitions took place. But, as we have said, the definitions of faith or the Church's doctrinal authority over the revealed deposit are exercised through the *ordinary* magisterium equally or even more than through the solemn; and the ordinary magisterium did not begin with the time of the first ecumenical councils, but with the very first moment of

her inception, i.e. of the primitive Church, with the very first moment of the *apostolic teaching* or *preaching*.

Consequently, a truth of the revealed deposit, whose meaning has been infallibly fixed or *determined* either by apostolic preaching or by the primitive Church or by the Church of later centuries is not only a revealed, but also a defined truth. A truth of the deposit, whose meaning has not been infallibly determined either by the apostolic preaching or by the Church of later centuries is a revealed, but not a defined, truth. Therefore, to ask whether divine faith can be given to a truth contained in the deposit without the Church's definition, is to ask whether divine faith can be given to a truth whose meaning has not been infallibly fixed or *determined* either in the apostolic teaching or in the teaching (whether through ordinary or solemn magisterium) of the Church of later times.

137. IMMEDIATE AND MEDIATE REVELATION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON. — In previous sections we have been speaking frequently of immediate and mediate revelation; however the distinction was made *from the viewpoint of the object*. In this section we must speak once more of immediate and mediate revelation, but this time from a different viewpoint, i.e. *from the viewpoint of the person*. It is necessary to grasp well this twofold division of revelation into immediate and mediate, made from two different viewpoints, if one wishes to avoid getting mixed up in the reading of the treatises written by theologians *On Faith and the Church*.

Two things are found in faith: the object revealed, and the *person* to whom it is revealed.

The object can be revealed either *in itself*, or *in another* truth in which it is latently infolded. In the first case the revelation is *immediate* or *formal*; in the second, *mediate* or *virtual*. If God revealed the proposition *the human soul is spiritual*, its *spirituality* is revealed *in itself* or *immediately*; but its *immortality* would be revealed *not in itself*, but *mediately* in its spirituality in which it is *included* intrinsically and essentially. This is the distinction of revelation into immediate and mediate *from the viewpoint of the object*.

But in revelation there is not only the object revealed, but also the *person* to whom the revelation is made. This person can receive the divine revelation in two ways: first, directly from God without any interposition of other *men*; secondly, not directly from God, but through other *men* to whom the revelation was made by God, or perhaps through other *men* who by successive generations have been receiving it from those to whom the revelation was first and directly made by God. In the first case the revelation is *immediate* because there is no man in between God who reveals and the man to whom He reveals. The contrary happens in the second case, and thus the revelation is *mediate*. The angels, our first father, the patriarchs and prophets,

the apostles and evangelists, those who had the ineffable privilege of listening to the incarnate Word on earth, and even any soul to whom God has deigned to disclose His secrets *by Himself* without the intervention of any *man*, had *immediate* revelation. All others — we — who have not had direct revelation from God, have *mediate* revelation.

Obviously this distinction of revelation into immediate and mediate is made from the viewpoint of the *person*, not from the viewpoint of the *object*. What matters in this case is not whether the object has been revealed *in itself* or *in another*; what matters is whether the *person* has received the revelation *immediately* from God, or *through other men*. Every time we employ in this section the terms *immediate* and *mediate*, without a contrary qualification, we will be employing them to mean immediate or mediate revelation from the viewpoint of the *person*.

138. A VERY IMPORTANT COROLLARY. — *Our* faith, i.e. the divine deposit is a faith of *mediate* revelation (with the sole exception of the case of a private or special revelation). This *mediate* character must never be overlooked because it is the key or the formal reason for the necessity or existence of the Church's magisterium, and for the nature and scope of its relations with our faith.

"To some people the credibles are revealed *immediately* by God, as they were revealed to the Apostles and Prophets; but to others they are possessed by God sending the preachers of the faith."<sup>32</sup> "Since the things that proceed from God are done in a certain order, it behooved that a certain order be observed in the manifestation of the things that belong to the faith, viz. that some men should receive them *immediately* from God, and others from these, and thus in successive order up to the last."<sup>33</sup> "There is a twofold faith, i.e. in accordance with a twofold hearing and a twofold speaking: for faith comes from hearing as it had in Rom. 10, 17. There is an external whereby He speaks to us through preachers, and another internal whereby He speaks to us through internal inspiration. From both hearings faith arises in the hearts of the faithful. From the internal hearing [faith arises] in those who *first* receive the faith, as in the case of the Apostles and Prophets. But from the second [sic] hearing the faith arises in the hearts of *the other faithful* who received the knowledge of the faith *through other men*."<sup>34</sup> "We possess the knowledge of faith, not through a revelation made

<sup>32</sup>ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q. 6, a. 1.

<sup>33</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Contra Gentes*, lib. 3, ch. 154.

<sup>34</sup>*De Veritate*, q. 10, a. 3.

to us, but because we adhere to the revelations made *to others*."<sup>35</sup> "For *our* faith is built upon the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets, who wrote the canonical books."<sup>36</sup>

The fact that certain theologians have not paid sufficient attention to this *mediate* character of the revelation on which *our* faith is grounded — this character is precisely the root of the necessity of the Church's magisterium, and thus also of its nature and scope — is the reason why they have not understood St. Thomas's great theory on the relationship of the Church with our faith, and have instead resorted to the question whether *private* revelations are of divine faith or not, as the criterion to determine such relationship. The question of private revelations, by the very fact that they are *immediate*, is altogether irrelevant to the problem of the relationship of the Church to the faith given *by us* to the revealed deposit, which is a faith given *to mediate* revelation. The nature of the faith that must be given by us to the *revealed deposit* — since it is this *deposit* that is the *formal reason* of the Church's doctrinal authority — is the star by which any true theologian should set his course in the study of the relations of the Church to *our* faith; not the nature of the faith to be given by us to private revelations, which of themselves are alien to the Church's authority.

Hence it is truly amazing to see a theologian of Suárez's caliber stating and orienting the question in the following terms: "*Whether* private divine revelation belongs to the formal object of faith and *consequently* (1) whether the *authority of the Church* belongs to this formal object, and how is faith resolved into it."<sup>37</sup> That *consequently* explains everything. With it Suárez debars himself from understanding St. Thomas's theory on the relations of the Church's authority to our faith, which pertains to *mediate* revelation. Suárez, as well as Lugo and Ripalda, seems not to have paid sufficient attention to the radical distinction between faith and *our* faith, and to the *mediate* character of the latter, which is the key to the Angelic Doctor's treatise *On Faith*, as we shall endeavor to make clear in this section.

139. THE REVEALED OBJECT, ITS PROPOSITION AND EXPLANATION. — In *faith* two essentially different elements must be distinguished: first, the revealed *object*; second, the *proposition* and *explication* of that same object.

In the case of *immediate* revelation, both elements are *divine*. It is God who reveals the object; it is likewise God who proposes and explains it.

<sup>35</sup>*Loc. cit.*

<sup>36</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 8.

<sup>37</sup>SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d. 3, title of section 10.

In the case of *mediate* revelation, the second element, i.e. the *proposition* and *explication* of the revealed truth, is made by *men*, who, however holy and learned we suppose them to be, are of *themselves* always fallible, unless they should possess the *divine assistance* for the purpose of proposing and explicating all that *God has revealed*, and only that which God has revealed, without the addition or commingling of anything *human*.<sup>38</sup>

That which is essential or formal in the assent of divine faith is the revealed object; the proposition and explication are *conditions* without which faith would not exist.

140. FIRST COROLLARY. — Although in faith — be it grounded on immediate or on mediate revelation — there are two elements, viz. the revealed object, and its proposition or explication, the former, i.e. the revealed object is that which is really believed and to which assent is given; however this assent could not be given without a previous proposition or explication. Thus, the revealed object is that which is *essential* or *formal* in the assent of divine faith. The proposition or the explication are *conditions* without which there would be no faith.

141. SECOND COROLLARY. — Faith grounded on immediate revelation, and faith grounded on mediate revelation, are both truly *divine*. Therefore, if the latter should demand some requirement which is not demanded by *revelation* but because it is *mediate* revelation, not because it is *divine* faith but because it is *our* divine faith.

142. THIRD COROLLARY. — Our divine faith is based on mediate revelation, and mediate revelation necessarily requires *human* proposition and explication. Consequently it cannot be argued: if the faith is *divine*

<sup>38.</sup> "Two things come together in the faith. First, the habit of the intellect where by it is disposed to obey the will that tends to the divine truth . . . Secondly it is required for the faith that the credibles be *proposed* to the believer, and this is done by man." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologiae*, p.1, q.111, a.1, ad 1). "Two things are required for faith. One of which is that the credibles be *proposed* to man . . . The other thing required for the faith is the assent of the believer to the things that are *proposed*." (2-2, q.6, a.1) Now, any *proposition* made by men is *fallible* unless it is done with divine assistance. "Just as created being is of itself empty and defectible unless it be conformed by uncreated being, so all truth is *defectible* unless it be *rectified* by *divine Truth*." (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q.14, a.8) It goes without saying that every time we speak of a *proposition* of faith made by the *Church*, we mean that which is made by pope or by the ecumenical councils (solemn magisterium), or by the *universal* teaching of the pastors (ordinary magisterium). Consequently, the proposition made by particular organs, e.g. a missionary, a particular bishop, etc., has no other value than that conferred on it by its conformity with the proposition made by the authentic organs, which are the rule of our faith.

there can be nothing *human* in it. Nor can it be argued: if there is anything *human* there can be no *divine* faith (but only a faith that is human or ecclesiastical . . .) But it can — and ought to be — said: there can be no divine faith if the human explication that enters into it is of such nature that it is capable of altering or modifying the divine *object*, the revealed *meaning*. This is so on account of the fact that the object is that which is essential to the faith, and the object of faith is exclusively divine. *nothing other than the First Truth* (nihil aliud quam Veritas Prima).

143. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. — Having done with these preliminary observations — which perhaps were unnecessary for many of our readers —, we will now deal with an important and delicate question: we will study the *organic place occupied by the Church's infallible authority in OUR FAITH*. Once and for all let it be understood that by the term *our faith* we mean the divine faith given by those, who neither have had nor have immediate revelation from God, to the truths by Him revealed to the Apostles and by these committed to the Church in the sacred deposit of the divine Scriptures and Tradition.

The questions which arise for the theologian are the following: Is the Church's authority an indispensable element for every act of our *divine* faith in the revealed deposit? Can there be any act of divine faith in any truth of the deposit *before* it is defined by the Church? Is the act of our faith described thus: *I believe because God has revealed it*; or is it necessarily described in these terms: *I believe because God has revealed it and because Holy Mother Church thus teaches it*? In short, excepting the case of a special divine revelation or intervention, is the Church the *only* medium that joins our divine faith with the revealed deposit, or are there *other mediums* through which the human mind can get in touch with the revealed deposit with a contact of *divine* faith?

144. THE THEORY OF VÁZQUEZ AND SUÁREZ. — Vázquez, an illustrious theologian in so many respects, was the first who clearly and openly answered in the negative to all these questions or aspects of one and the same problem. Vázquez held that the Church's authority is not an indispensable requirement for every act of our divine faith, except for the ignorant, for those who do not know theology or do not possess enough scientific acumen to see or deduce evidently the profound implications latent in the revealed deposit. But the Church's authority is not indispensable for the learned, for the theologian, for any man who because of his theological, exegetical, historical, critical knowledge of the Bible and Tradition, is capable of deducing evidently by himself the meaning of the revealed deposit.

The *theological demonstration* or the *individual reason* is, in such cases, to the theologian, what the authority of the Church is to the common faithful. Nor, says Vázquez, is there anything to the objection that that which is



known through science or through reasoning can deserve no other but a scientific or theological assent. For the theologian, who through evident reasoning deduces something from that which is revealed, has at his disposal two assents: one, a theological assent based on reasoning; the other, an assent of divine faith based on the divine revelation which is the starting point from which he has deduced his conclusion. These two acts are possible; both are available to the theologian; and neither requires the authority of the Church. Such is displayed as it were in the nude, Vázquez's famous theory, the theory into which anyone who makes theological conclusions formally of faith without the Church's definition, must inevitably land. (85)

In his eagerness to explain or to attenuate a theory of Molina, Suárez landed into this theory of Vázquez by admitting that the inclusive virtuality of that which is revealed (which he denominates *format-confused*) is formally of faith, and accepting as possible for the theologian the two famous assents, one of them being an assent of divine faith, without any intervention of the Church's authority. Lugo and Ripalda followed Suárez on this subject; and since the majority of the textbooks of theology today is more or less influenced by these great theologians, it is not infrequent to find in them, as current theological tender, the following assertions: the Church's authority or definition is not indispensable for the act of our faith, since our faith is the same as that of the angels, patriarchs, and prophets, and these had no need of the proposition or explication of the Church in order to make an act of faith. Thus, the act of our faith does not necessarily require the I believe . . . because the Church so teaches it. Nonetheless, the Church's authority is ordinarily or for greater convenience (ad melius esse) needed especially for the simple faithful who do not know how to rise to the pure motive of divine authority without the Church. But the theologian, who by his individual reason (theological demonstration) uncovers with evidence a truth, or virtuality, or meaning latent in the deposit, ought or may give it an assent of divine faith (in addition to, and distinct from, the theological assent) independently of any definition by the Church. Such is the purpose of the theory of the two assents.

145. — TEXTS FROM VÁZQUEZ, SUÁREZ, RIPALDA, AND FRANZELIN. — "The theological demonstration stands in respect of the demonstrators in respect of the Council, when it declares something as of faith, the Council proposes what it defines to all to be believed by them, so that everybody is obliged to believe; whereas the theological reason proposes it only to those to whom the consequence from the articles of faith is evident."<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup>VÁZQUEZ, *In Summam D. Thomae*, p. 1, a. 2, d. 5, c. 3, n. 8.

"Nonetheless, however, the Church as ruled by the Holy Spirit is proposed to us as the proximate and sufficient rule of belief, because all the faithful cannot by themselves weigh the doctrine of faith, or bring about in every instance the resolution of their faith into the divine authority expressly perpended, which is much too excellent and spiritual. On the other hand, the Church is a rule available to the senses, which they can more easily hear."<sup>40</sup> Lastly, it should be noted that we can in two ways avail ourselves of discourse in order to assent to the inferred proposition: first, as the formal reason of assenting and as the proper and per se cause of the assent itself to the inferred conclusion; secondly, as proposing and explicating [behold here, to use Vázquez's words, theological reasoning taking the place of the Council] what is contained, and in what manner, in the divine revelation, so that afterwards we cling solely to the latter as the formal reason and per se cause. These two ways are possible as is per se clear, and they depend on the will of man. And hence Vázquez correctly distinguished them, and others have not contradicted."<sup>41</sup>

"Although the Church's proposition is not necessary, nonetheless it is sufficient and much more apt for the assent of faith relative to the faithful who know the Church's infallible authority."<sup>42</sup> "Some of the truths defined by the Church are contained by evident consequence in the things held by faith . . . These truths, then, . . . even before they are defined by the Church, can be believed with divine faith by many of the faithful, i.e. by the more learned theologians independently of the Church's authority, because they clearly see through theological reasonings that they are contained in other things held by faith."<sup>43</sup>

But Ripalda, at least, was frank and logical as usual in drawing out the consequences of such a doctrine. "You will object in the first place: if the proposition by the Church is not per se required in order to believe, it will be possible for a heretic, who denies one article, to hold the others by faith because, apart from the Church's authority, he can still have other motives which render them sufficiently believable. In the second place, a man who is ignorant of the Church's authority, or that something is proposed by the Church, can lose the faith without heresy, by dissenting from some article that is not sufficiently proposed to him out of the others. I admit both consequences."<sup>44</sup>

<sup>40</sup>SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d. 3, s. 10, n. 10.

<sup>41</sup>SUÁREZ, *loc. cit.*, d. 3, s. 11, n. 5.

<sup>42</sup>RIPALDA, *De Fide*, d. 6, s. 4, n. 3.

<sup>43</sup>RIPALDA, *loc. cit.*, n. 32.

<sup>44</sup>*Loc. cit.*, n. 35.

"It sometimes can happen that although a truth, of whose *theological demonstration* there is some question, has not yet been sufficiently proposed in *Catholic faith*, nonetheless to those who are capable of perceiving the *force of the arguments*, it is clearly certain from a diligent examination whether of the Scriptures or of Tradition, that it is contained in the revealed word of God. This being the case, the *arguments* that demonstrate that the said truth is contained in revelation is for them a *sufficient application and proposition of revelation* for the eliciting of an assent of *divine faith*."<sup>45</sup> "That which is enunciated in the conclusion is already contained as implicitly affirmed in the premises, whether conjointly in both, or in only one of them so that the other is assumed merely in order to make clear that the conclusion is included in the first one. Hence, when it is certain that both premises are revealed truths, or that one revealed premise already contains implicitly that which is enunciated in the conclusion, and this comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise is clearly manifested by the other premise even if it be not a revealed one, there is no doubt that the truth enunciated in such a conclusion is a revealed truth. . . . This being so, the truth of the *consequent* revealed by God, and to such proposition there corresponds the *assent of faith* on the authority of God who reveals; or it can formally be considered as a truth understood on account of the truth of the premises and of the legitimate consequence and deduction, and then to such a proposition there corresponds the *theological assent*."<sup>46</sup>

It is pointless to quote more authors since this doctrine is currently accepted in contemporary theological manuals, and its influence can be felt even in many Thomist manuals.

In the theory of Vázquez-Suárez, currently admitted today, it is obvious that the *explication* of the revealed deposit made by fallible human reason is of divine faith and deserves from the learned an assent of divine faith. Thus, with respect to the *proposition* and *explication* of the revealed deposit, *reason* is to the *learned* as the *Church* is to the *ignorant* or to the *common faithful*. The authority of the Church with regard to the *conservation* and *exposition* of the deposit, of which the Vatican Council speaks, is necessary for us; but in this theory the term *us* does not mean *all of us* who receive revelation *mediately* (a *mediation* that can be bridged only by the Church's infallible definition or by a new revelation or extraordinary intervention of God); *us* signifies only those who are not sufficiently capable as theologians or exegetes to bridge by means of *their own reason* that mediation or distance, to *propose and explicate to themselves* the meaning of the revealed deposit.

<sup>45</sup>FRANZELIN, *De Deo Uno*, Prolegomenon.

<sup>46</sup>FRANZELIN, *loc.cit.*

146. THE TRUE THOMIST THEORY. — All the foregoing which since Suárez is common enough in modern theological manuals is, in our view, a deviation from the true theory of St. Thomas, and falls short of understanding the sublime and necessary place occupied by the Church's authority in our faith.

St. Thomas and all his faithful commentators hold that the Church's authority or definition is indispensable for every act of *our* divine faith in any truth of the revealed deposit. The act of *our* divine faith is not solely "I believe because God has revealed it", but necessarily is "I believe because God has revealed it and because Holy Mother Church thus teaches it". The first *because* is essential to our divine faith, not on account of its being ours, but on account of its being *divine*. The second *because* is *necessary* (and it can be replaced only by a special divine revelation or intervention), not on account of its being a divine faith, but on account of its being *ours*.

In short: *science* (theology, philosophy, exegesis, criticism, history . . .) possesses many mediums wherewith to obtain a *scientific, human, acquired* knowledge of the truth of the deposit, and to elicit in regard of it acts of *science* or of *human* faith independently of any intervention by the Church. However, *our divine* faith possesses one, and only one, medium, viz. the authority of the Church. In other words, mankind has no other available medium, except the authority of the Church, wherewith to get in touch with the revealed truth by an assent of *divine faith*.

To many these assertions will perhaps seem new, and even bold. Let us, then, first of all, expound the literal doctrine of the Holy Doctor by repairing to the consummate and immortal treatise *On Faith* in the *Summa Theologica*.

147. THE FORMAL OBJECT OF FAITH. — The Angelic Doctor begins his first question and his first article with the formal *object* of faith. St. Thomas never beats around the bush; from the very first article he situates himself in the central, fundamental, formal, *essential* point of the question: in the *object*. And since the essence of any thing is immutable and must be found whole and invariable wherever the thing is to be found, the object of divine faith is, in the first article, defined *in itself, formally*, without any relation to angels or men. It is defined with the laconic and lapidary phrase NIHIL ALIUD QUAM VERITAS PRIMA (none other than the First Truth).

According to St. Thomas in the formal object, in that which is essential to the faith, there can be nothing *created*, nor the least mixture of any *creature*; neither angels, nor men, nor patriarchs, nor prophets, nor Church. All these things lie outside the *formal object* of faith, outside the object of divine faith *in itself*, outside the object of divine faith *qua divine*. God, and God alone, is its *author*, its *object*, its *end*, and its *rule*. Conceited thus from this formal viewpoint, divine faith in no way includes the "I believe . . . be-

cause the Church, or the Bible, or Tradition so teaches it". It includes solely and exclusively the "I believe because God has revealed it." *Nihil aliud quam Veritas Prima.*<sup>47</sup>

148. THE FORMAL OBJECTS IN THEMSELVES, AND THE FORMAL OBJECTS IN US OR OURS. — However, the *formal objects* themselves, although admitting no *variations* nor changes in themselves, may admit *conditions*, which are not essential to the *object in itself*, but indeed absolutely necessary for the object in us.

Thus, e.g., the formal object of the intellect *in itself*, that is, of the intellect *qua* intellect, is *being*. The formal object of our intellect is likewise *being*, but with a condition or addition which are essential *for us*. To wit it is being *abstracted from sensible things*. Without such abstraction our intellect could never get in touch with its formal object, with *being*.

The formal object of *science in itself*, or *qua* science, is the certain knowledge of a truth *through the medium* of another truth, or the certain knowledge of a truth in *another* truth. The formal object of our science is the self-same thing but with a condition that is essential for us: it is to know one truth by another, but *through reasoning or succession*. Without the latter our science is not possible.

The *specific* or *formal* principles of theology in itself are the supernatural divine truths. The principles of our theology are those same truths, but as *believed* with divine faith, i.e., as obscurely seen. Without this condition of being *believed* or obscurely seen, our theology could never attain to its object, viz. the divine-supernatural truths.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>47</sup> "Thus, in the case of faith, if we should consider the *formal reason* of the object, it is *nothing else but the First Truth*. For the faith, of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything *unless on account of the fact that it is revealed by God*. Hence faith rests upon the *divine Truth itself* as its *medium*." (ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q. 1, a. 1) "Hence to assent to the testimony of either a man or an angel would not lead infallibly to the truth, except insofar as the *testimony of God speaking* is considered in them." (*De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 8) "When a man, led either by natural reason or by the testimony of the Law and the Prophets or by the preaching of natural reason or by the testimony of the Law and the Prophets or by the preaching of the Apostles or others, believes, then he can say that he believes because of none of these things, not because of natural reason nor because of the testimony of the Law nor because of the preaching of the Apostles, but *because of the First Truth itself alone*." (*In Ioannem*, c. 4) "The First Truth is that which is formal in the object of faith, and that from which flows the *whole reason* of the object." (*In 3 Sent.*, d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1)

<sup>48</sup> As every Thomist theologian knows, these distinctions between knowledge *in itself* and our knowledge, between theology *in itself* and our theology, between faith *in itself* and our divine faith, are at once fundamental and elementary for any one who wishes to penetrate the teaching of St. Thomas and not to fall into error in these questions. This is the reason why the great commentator of the *Summa Theologica* recalls them to mind from the first question, from the second article, in which St. Thomas begins to treat of the *object* of theology, and thus of its essence and its essential

Now then: we have seen that the formal object of divine faith *in itself* is *none other than the First Truth*. But what is the formal object of our divine faith, of the divine faith by us given, not on account of a revelation which we have ourselves received immediately from God, but on account of a revelation immediately received from the Apostles? Does the formal object of the faith receive an indispensable condition or addition when it is considered not in itself, but *in us*; when it is the formal object, not of divine faith in itself, but of our divine faith?

149. THE FORMAL OBJECT OF OUR FAITH. — Let us turn to Question 5, where St. Thomas treats of faith with respect to the various subjects in which it can be found: *De habitibus fidei*, on the various subjects who have the faith.

Let us skip over the first and second articles, where St. Thomas treats of faith with respect to the *angels* and the *devils*, and stop at article 3, where he treats of faith with respect to *us*, of our faith. The Holy Doctor poses the question whether in the heretic who denies one single article of faith, divine faith can still remain with respect to the other articles. To answer this question the Holy Doctor needs to determine *all* the elements that *necessarily* enter into the formal object of our faith. If, notwithstanding the denial of one article of faith, *all* the elements indispensable to our faith remain intact, then the faith remains. On the contrary, if the man who denies one single article of faith thereby destroys some element that is *indispensable* to our faith, then the faith is likewise destroyed. Which, then, are the *indispensable* elements of the formal object of our divine faith? The Holy Doctor writes:

"The formal object of divine faith is the *First Truth* IN SO FAR AS IT IS MANIFESTED in the *Holy Scriptures* and THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH, which proceeds from the *First Truth*."<sup>49</sup> The formal object of faith with respect to us is no longer the *First Truth*, period; but the *First Truth* is so far as it is manifested in . . . the teaching of the Church." Not solely the First Truth; not even the First Truth contained in the Scriptures and Tradition; but the First Truth contained in the Scriptures and Tradition *but as understood and interpreted by the Church*.

What follows hence for St. Thomas? That since a habit is lost whenever anything is lost of the *formal object*, which is that which confers the *essence* or *species*, any man who attempts to adhere to the First Truth contained in the Scriptures and Tradition through a medium other than the *Church's authority*, no longer possesses *divine faith*, but some *other* faith

distinction from faith. "But you, *tyro*, when you argue, take care *not to be mistaken* by taking as identical theology *in itself* and our theology: for there is a great difference between these two." (CAJETAN, *In I Partem*, q. 1, a. 2)

<sup>49</sup> 2-2, q. 5, a. 3.

of his own: a created, *human* faith; a scientific or acquired faith. "The species of any habit depends on the formal reason of the object; if this be removed, the species of the habit cannot remain. Hence no man has the habit of faith, who does not rely on the *teaching of the Church* which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in the Holy Scriptures, as on an infallible and divine rule; but he holds the things which are of faith in a manner *other* than faith."<sup>50</sup>

Does this mean that man possesses no *other* mediums, except the Church, to come to know the meaning of the revealed deposit and give it the assent of divine faith? The Holy Doctor says that man has many scientific, human mediums that lead to acts of human science or of acquired faith in the revealed deposit; however, man cannot arrive at the assent of *divine faith* except through one, and only one, medium: the authority of the Church. Without this medium the act of our divine faith is totally impossible. "In the *different conclusions of one science there are different mediums through which they are proven, any one of which can be known without the other . . . But faith holds all the articles of faith by means of one medium, to wit, the teaching of the Church's sound understanding; and thus any man who falls short of this medium, is totally wanting in faith.*"<sup>51</sup>

150. CARDINAL CAJETAN. — St. Thomas's thinking will be obvious to anyone who reads the two afordited questions carefully and without preconceived notions.<sup>52</sup> However, it will not be amiss to adduce the interpretations of his most authoritative commentators, beginning with the foremost among them. Anyone who wishes to obtain a true idea of the fore- and economy of divine faith, and of the primary role played by the Church's infallible authority, i.e., of the Holy Spirit who assists her, in *our* faith, will

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 2.

<sup>52</sup> The distinguished PORRECTA, whose commentaries often are placed alongside those of Cajetan, says that the teaching of this article of St. Thomas is worthy of being inscribed with letters of gold for the instruction of Catholics and heretics. "Let these things be said for Catholics and against heretics as *memorable golden perpetual truths.*" (*In loc.cit.* of St. Thomas) Cardinal Toledo rates it as *most beautiful*. "St. Thomas's reason is *most beautiful*. The reason of faith is not the First Truth absolutely, but restricted with this condition, that it be manifested by the Church. Now, if this necessary condition of the object be set aside, the whole habit is removed." (TOLEDO, *Comment. in loc.cit.*) On the other hand, Suárez, preoccupied with the nature of private revelations, thinks that art. 3 of question 5 is inconsistent with art. 1 of question 1, and adduces the doctrine of each of these two articles as favouring two opposed theories on the formal object of faith, without adverting to the fact that one of the articles deals with the formal object of faith *in itself*, and the other deals with the formal object of our faith. (SUÁREZ, *loc.cit.*, nn.1-2)

do well to read Cajetan's whole commentary to the two quoted articles of St. Thomas. We will have to content ourselves here with some excerpts.

Commenting on the first article of the first question on faith, where St. Thomas defines the formal object of faith *in itself* with the phrase *None other than the First Truth*, Cajetan writes:

"In the 3rd place doubt occurs how is it that the First Truth alone is posited as the *formal* object of faith by saying that it is *none other than the First Truth*. And on this point doubt occurs both simply (simpliciter) and *ad hominem*. Simply, indeed, on account of the fact that the faith adheres to the sense and teaching of the Church as to its infallible rule; otherwise heretics who adhere *solely* to the First Truth, and do not abide by the sense of the Church, would be numbered among the faithful. And Augustine says: *I would not believe the Gospel, if the authority of the Church did not admonish me to do so*. Now, it is clear that the sense and authority of the Church are something *other* than the First Truth since they are something *created*: therefore the object of faith is not the First Truth alone.

"To the 3rd doubt I say that *to the extent* that it is possible for faith to depend on a *created* cause, *to that extent* it is possible for it to have a *created* rule. Now, then, since *two* things are jointly required for the faith, as will be shown below, viz. the assent to, and the proposition and explication of, the credenda: on the part of the assent, faith depends on God alone, as its cause, object, end, and rule. But on the part of the *proposition* of the credenda it can depend on the angels and men, *through whose mediation* God proposes this or that for belief. For with respect to *this, faith proceeds from the hearing of the word of God*, as is said in Rom. 10. And to preclude the possibility of error in the proposition and *explication* of the credenda, the Holy Spirit has provided for an *infallible created rule*, to wit, the *sense and teaching of the Church*; so that the Church's authority is the infallible rule for *proposing and explicating* the things that are to be held by faith. Since there are *two* infallible rules jointly required for the faith, viz. divine revelation and the Church's authority, there is such a great difference between them that divine revelation is the *formal reason of the object* of faith; on the other hand, the Church's authority *ministers to the object* of faith; for the act of faith is joined to the material object or things believed through this medium *that God has said it or revealed it*. And the habit itself of faith inclines the mind to assent to the things proposed *because God has so revealed*. But we believe that *this or that* has been revealed, or revealed *in this or that sense*, because the Church so teaches. And again, divine revelation is an infallible rule that *per se* befits faith; but the sense of the Church befits faith *accidentally* (per accidens), i.e. *with respect to us*, to whom these things are proposed. For the angels, to whom God by *Himself* revealed and explained the mystery of the Trinity, had no need of this rule. And likewise

the first Fathers, to whom these mysteries were revealed, had no need of this rule for the same reason, viz. that God by Himself revealed them and gave the understanding of them through an illumination of the mind, as will be clear later on in the treatise *On Prophecy*."

The foregoing is Cardinal Cajetan's commentary on art. 1 of question 1, where St. Thomas, speaking of the formal object of faith in itself, defines it as none other than the First Truth. Later, in his commentary on art. 3 of question 5, where St. Thomas, defining the formal object of our faith, seems to correct the none other than the First Truth when in truth he does nothing but introduce an addition or condition that belongs, not to the formal object of faith in itself, but to the formal object of our faith, Cajetan says the following:

"In the third article of the same fifth question two big doubts arise. The first, how is it to be understood that the Church's teaching is an infallible rule to the extent that he who recedes from it, recedes from the formal reason of the object of faith. But since this has been explained in q. 1, art. 1, there is no need of repeating, but of adding [to what has been said.] Indeed, the Church is the rule in proposing and explicating the things of faith, thus modifying, at least with respect to us, the divine revealing Truth, thus whosoever recedes from the condition that modifies the formal reason, viz. the divine revealing Truth, recedes from the formal reason of the object of faith. Thus he who recedes from the rule of the Church, recedes from the formal reason of the object of faith not only because he recedes from the revealed article as we said earlier, but also because he recedes from the condition or mode of the formal reason of the object of faith with respect to us. And this corresponds to the plain meaning of the text. For it puts the reason of faith: the First Truth, indeed, as the very reason itself of believing; whereby the First Truth proposes and explicates itself and other things pertaining to faith. Now, although this sort of condition, considered simply (simpliciter) with respect to the faith, be not of the integrity of the formal object of faith (as is obvious in the faith of the first man if he had remained eternally alone and in the faith of the angels in their own way), it is nonetheless of the integrity of the formal object of our faith."<sup>53</sup>

151. BÁÑEZ. — "Third conclusion: The testimony of the Church, insofar as she is ruled by the Holy Spirit and insofar as it is one of the articles of faith to believe the Holy Catholic Church, is that into which our faith is at length resolved with respect to the distinction and explication of the

<sup>53</sup>CAJETAN, *In 2-2*, q. 1, a. 1, and q. 5, a. 3.

things to be believed. To understand this, note that the conclusion is to be understood of our faith, who have not received revelation, together with the distinction of the things to be believed, immediately from God."<sup>54</sup> "For we readily profess that the testimony of the Church determines the potentiality of the light of faith with respect to the proposition and distinction of the things that belong to the faith."<sup>55</sup> "In the second place, I answer that with respect to the acquired sciences there are many material mediums that vary in keeping with the variety of the quiddity and essence of things in order to infer different conclusions. However, with respect to the faith there are not many mediums — neither formal nor material — whereby we assent to the things revealed by God; but all of these are immediately believed on account of divine revelation manifested through the ministry of the Church."<sup>56</sup>

152. JOHN OF ST. THOMAS. — "The heretic does not receive the divine testimony as it proceeds from God, but as it appears to him; hence he does not adhere to the divine witness but is led to the attested thing by his own judgment whereby he persuades himself that such a thing has been said by God, not through that medium whereby God speaks, i.e. through the Church; hence he believes fallibly because his belief is dependent on his own judgment, and this judgment is fallible. Thus, if he should deem it good, he will change his judgment and cease to believe; therefore the heretic does not regard the divine witness insofar as it comes from God and in the manner in which it comes from God, but insofar as it is subject to his own fallible judgment; and consequently any such faith as the heretic has is not infused by God but acquired by himself, as any other human faith."<sup>57</sup>

We ask the reader to ponder well the preceding paragraph, replacing the term *heretic* with the term *theologian*, if he wants to grasp well the kind of faith that ought to be given to the inclusive virtual (Suárez's *formal confused*), or to any other theological conclusion, prior to the Church's definition. But, to continue quoting John of St. Thomas:

"Should you urge: therefore faith does not have as its formal reason the witness of God but the Church's proposition; the consequence is proven by the fact that this man is not a heretic because he denies the witness of God, but because he does not accept the Church's proposition. . . . The answer is that the heretic denies the true witness of God and destroys it by his denial of the Church's proposition, to which the true witness of God is linked, not as to its formal reason but as to the condition that applies the

<sup>54</sup>BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q. 1, a. 1, dubit. 4.

<sup>55</sup>*Loc. cit.*, ad 4, argumentum.

<sup>56</sup>*Loc. cit.*, q. 5, a. 3, ad 1, argumentum.

<sup>57</sup>JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Fide*, d. 1, a. 1, n. 27.

divine witness and is its *organ*. Nor is it necessary to be in direct opposition to a form in order to destroy it; it is enough to destroy the  *requisite conditions without which* such a thing will not subsist; just as he who should remove the obscurity of faith would destroy the faith, although obscurity is only a condition; and he who destroys the dispositions that are required for the soul to exist in the body, kills the man."<sup>58</sup>

"Faith does not regard the proposition of things as made in particular by this or the other inferior minister, who *can* deceive or be deceived, and does not have the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit; but faith directly regards the Catholic Church's proposition, as it comes from the Pope, who *cannot* err. And thus the faith is not placed in jeopardy if what this minister proposes is false; for faith does not assent absolutely to the thing proposed, nor does it assent to it as proposed by this minister, but assents to it as *proposed by the Church*, and this is virtually included in every act of faith. Now if any man is led to accept that thing absolutely, and *without presupposing the condition that it is truly defined by the Catholic Church, such a man does not believe through infused faith but through an acquired faith.*"<sup>59</sup>

"The material object of faith, i.e. the thing that is to be believed and attained through such a revelation, requires *two* conditions herein explained by St. Thomas, in order to be a matter of faith. The *first* condition is that such a thing should not be evident. . . . The *other* condition required in order to be a *matter* of faith, which is our present concern, is that *it be proposed by the Catholic Church*, and by her Head in whom is found the infallible rule of faith or of those things that regard the faith; with this we have to do now. For its understanding, *note* that this condition and visible rule are required for faith nor for just any reason whatsoever, but they are required *with respect to us because God does not speak immediately to us* nor does He immediately by Himself *propose* the revealed things, but *through men* . . . But we should undoubtedly have no need of any visible proposing rule, but would be immediately certified by the Spirit of God Himself concerning the matter proposed for belief, just as the Apostles and Prophets were taught [by God Himself]; they did not receive from the Church, but rather conveyed to the Church the things of faith."<sup>60</sup>

153. GONET AND CONTENTSON. — Let us also consider the commentary of two other Thomists, Gonet and Contentson. "No one of the faithful can assent to God who reveals His mysteries, unless the divine revelation be

<sup>58</sup> *Loc. cit.*, nn. 28-29.

<sup>59</sup> *Loc. cit.*, d. 2, a. 4, solution of the arguments, n. 3.

<sup>60</sup> *Loc. cit.*, d. 7, *De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis, Proemium*.

*proposed and made known to him through the Church.*"<sup>61</sup> "The *formal reason* of faith is divine revelation *insofar as it is made known by the absolutely infallible teaching of the Church*, to the extent that, *with respect to us*, this teaching and the persuasion of its infallibility are the *absolutely necessary condition* for divine revelation to move our intellect to assent to the truth revealed by God."<sup>62</sup> "Wherefore, the divine authority is the *formal* reason of faith, but the *Church's authority* is the *condition without which* we would never believe; just as the proposed goodness is the motive that entices and allures the will towards itself, but the *proposition* of the goodness made by the *intellect* is the condition without which the manifested goodness would never capture the will."<sup>63</sup> "The second condition of the object of faith is as follows: the formal, or the virtual revelation *declared by the Church*. The object of faith must be not only virtually, but formally revealed, or *at least expressly declared by the Church* . . . and then the statement *begins* to pertain to the object of our faith, not precisely because it is virtually revealed, but because, being virtually revealed, it is formally declared and educed from an article of faith by the Church."<sup>64</sup>

154. THE SALMANTICENSES. — The Salmanticensis themselves who, as we have earlier said, adopted Suárez's terminology in the matter of the revealed *virtual*, and even admitted the doctrine of the *two assents*, albeit restricting it only to the conclusions deduced from two premises of faith (80-85), have nonetheless remained faithful and profound expounders of St. Thomas's teachings on the matter of the relationship of the authority of the Church to our faith.

"In this regard note that the formal motive of belief through theological faith is not the witness of God taken precisely, but *as applied* to the article which we hold through such a faith . . . Whence, if the assent of faith is to be certain and firm so that it may be elicited by theological faith, it is necessary that the testimony of God be applied *certainly and infallibly*; otherwise the aforesaid assent would waver on this account. Now, the certainty and infallibility of this *application* can happen in *two ways*: *first*, by the fact that man is evidently aware of the fact of divine revelation, that is, of the fact that *God speaks to him*, as in the case of the prophets and of those who received the knowledge of the mysteries of faith *immediately from God*. Secondly, by the fact that the aforesaid revelation is asserted and applied *by an infallible rule* established by God for this very purpose, which is the Church. Wherefore, the *formal motive* of theological faith

<sup>61</sup> GONET, *De Fide*, d. 1, n. 53.

<sup>62</sup> GONET, *loc. cit.*, d. 8, n. 30.

<sup>63</sup> CONTENTSON, *Theologia mentis et cordis, De Fide*, l. 8, d. 2, c. 1.

<sup>64</sup> CONTENTSON, *loc. cit.*

with respect to us is the testimony of God proposed and applied by the Church; so that the aforesaid testimony is the formal reason of belief, where- as the proposition or application made by the Church is the necessary condition for the infallible application of the aforesaid testimony . . . Theological faith, being an intellectual virtue, has an infallible order to the truth and it is impossible for it to elicit a false assent. However, in the heretic it cannot involve this order on account of the fact that, if faith is to have infallible order to the truth, it is not enough that the motive of assent be infallible in itself; but it is further required that it be infallibly applied to the object of assent. It matters little that the motive be infallible in itself if it has either no connexion or only a contingent connexion with the object. On this account an opinable or contingent conclusion is frequently inferred from a necessary principle because it has no necessary connexion with the object. Now, in the heretic, the testimony of God, although it is infallible in itself, cannot be infallibly applied to the object of assent: for the application is neither made through evidence which the heretic has of the fact of divine revelation nor through the infallible rule of the Church . . . Therefore it remains that he does not apply the testimony of God through a certain and infallible application, either through evidence [of the fact of revelation] or through the proposition of the Church, but that he applies it because he judges it to be so. <sup>65</sup>

As we have previously remarked, a mere substitution of the term heretic in these quotations by the term theologian will make clear the kind of assent that can be given to theological conclusions deduced through fallible human reasoning prior to the Church's definition.

155. CARDINAL GOTTI. — In order not to weary the reader with quotations from other commentators, we will end with the following words of Cardinal Gotti on the question of the two assents, the theological assent and the assent of faith. "There is no room for two assents with respect to the conclusion: one with respect to the conclusion in itself, another with respect to the conclusion as inferred; for whether the conclusion be considered in itself or as inferred, it always belongs to the same habit, viz. the habit of science. <sup>66</sup> And, touching upon the necessity of the Church's definition for every act of our divine faith, he concludes thus: "The student of theology can easily determine these and other similar things by keeping always in mind that nothing can belong immediately to the faith, that has not been proposed by the universal Church as revealed in the word of God. <sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup>SALMANTICES. *De Fide*, d. 8, dub. 3, nn. 2-33.

<sup>66</sup>*Theologia Scholastica Dogmatica*, vol. 1, tr. 1, q. 1, dub. 3, n. 14.

<sup>67</sup>*Ibid.*, dub. 4, n. 20.

156. RÉSUMÉ. — In short: according to St. Thomas nothing purely human can enter into the act of divine faith; all the elements of the latter must be divine, and if there be anything human, it must necessarily enter insofar as it is guided by God or as a mere instrument of the divine. Now then, since there are two elements in faith, the object and its proposition or explication, both these elements must be divine. In the case of immediate revelation, both elements are of themselves divine: both the revealed truth and its proposition and explication come immediately from God; hence those who have received any immediate revelation, have no need of the Church. However, in the case of mediate revelation, although the revealed truth comes from God, its proposition and explication come from men, from a human element. Hence, to make room for divine faith, it is necessary that the proposition and explication be made, not by fallible human reason (theology, exegesis, history, etc.), but by God Himself, i.e., by human reason assisted by God, which is to say, by the definition of the Church, who alone possesses divine assistance, not in order to reveal anything new, but in order to expound and explicate faithfully the revealed truth.

Thus, according to St. Thomas, the Church becomes a true rule and a true why of every act of our divine faith. Rule and why, not of our faith insofar as it is divine, or of divine faith in itself, but of divine faith insofar as it is ours. Rule and why that condition and modify the very First Truth itself or revealed deposit, not in itself, but with respect to us. Rule and why, not of the formal object of faith, but of its proposition and explication. Finally, a rule and why that are as necessary for every act of our divine faith as the proposition of the object by the intellect is necessary for the act of the will. When there is no proposition by the intellect and there is only a proposition of the lower level of the senses, there can be no true act of the will, but only an act of passion or of the sensory appetite. The proposing or proximate rule must belong to the same order as the regulated.

Hence, he who elicits an act contrary to the rule of the Church's definition, elicits an act contrary to divine faith, an act of heresy. He who elicits an act aside from that rule, elicits an act aside from divine faith, an act of science or of human faith.

Thus, every explication of the implicitness or inclusive virtuality of the revealed deposit made contrary to the Church's definition, is a heretical explication. Where it is made aside from the Church's definition, it is a merely scientific or human explication. Where it is made by the Church's definition, it is a divine explication, a dogma of faith.

Consequently, theological conclusions inferred through inclusive or explicative minors of reason do not belong to our faith, nor can they (without a special divine revelation) be worthy of a true act of divine faith, prior to the Church's definition made through either the solemn or the ordinary

magisterium. (In our view, this is true also of conclusions inferred from two revealed premises; however, this is secondary for our purposes). Prior to the definition, such conclusions possess, indeed, the *formal motive* of our theology, which is the inclusive deduction from the revealed datum; but they lack one of the indispensable *conditions* of the *formal motive* of our faith: the definition by the Church.

#### SECTION IV

### WHETHER THE CHURCH TURNS THE MEDIATE OR VIRTUAL REVELATION INTO IMMEDIATE OR FORMAL REVELATION

157. — Having shown in section II that the revealed mediate or virtual, if it is implicit, becomes a truth of divine faith through the Church's definition, we concluded with these words: "But, then, does this not make the Church a formal element of divine faith? Is it not to attribute to the Church the power to convert the revealed mediate or virtual into a revealed immediate or formal?"

We have answered the first of these two questions in the preceding section. In it we think we have succeeded in showing that, according to St. Thomas, the Church's authority is not the formal motive of faith, as Durandus and Miguel de Medina opined; nor even a part of the formal motive, as alleged by Lugo. However, it is not necessary merely for *greater convenience* (ad melius esse), or for the common faithful, as we are given to understand by Vázquez and Suárez; but for both the learned and the ignorant it is such a necessary and indispensable **CONDITION** of the *formal motive* of our faith, that without it there is no room for any act of true divine faith in the revealed deposit, outside the case of a private revelation or of an extraordinary or miraculous intervention of God.

The significance of this doctrine is obvious. All theologians are agreed in that there exists an essential and very fundamental difference between divine faith and human faith. On the other hand, they are all also agreed in that the difference between divine faith and Catholic faith is merely secondary and accidental. Hence, to posit the authority of the Church as an indispensable element only of *Catholic* faith but not of divine faith, as is frequently done today in the wake of Vázquez and Suárez, is to make the authority of the Church necessary, but necessary only for something merely secondary and accidental; it is to make of it, not an organic and universally necessary element, but an element of convenience and perfection. On the contrary, to posit the authority of the Church as an indispensable condition, not only of Catholic faith, but also of our divine faith; not only for the simple and igno-

rant, but for every man, as St. Thomas does, is to make of it an element that is organic, necessary, humanly irreplaceable.

God can today, as He can at any time, explicate by Himself the revealed deposit to any man, either through a private revelation, or by confirming with a miracle the explication of the divine revelation made by one sent by Him. But, with the exception of an extraordinary case of divine intervention, no act of *divine* faith in the meaning of the *revealed deposit* is possible without the authority or definition of the Church exercised either through the solemn or the ordinary magisterium. Theology, exegesis, history, human reason, in short, are instruments, nothing more than human instruments or implements in explicating the *divine* meaning of the revealed deposit. When they are employed not only *against* the authority of the Church but even *aside from* her authority or definition, they can only produce a *human* assent whether of acquired faith or of theological science. Only the Church's *divine* authority when she proposes and explicates the meaning of the deposit can lead to an act of true divine faith. The truth *already taught* by the Church can reach the infidel or the heretic in good faith; but, in St. Thomas's view, no man infidel or heretic, simple Christian or learned Christian — can ever elicit acts of divine faith with respect to doctrines not yet taught or defined by the Church. No man, aside from an extraordinary privilege from God, can be in possession of a *divine* faith more explicated than the faith possessed by the Church. The Church, not human reason, is the *rule*, not only for the conservation, but also for the explication of the revealed deposit. Any explication of the revealed deposit or principles effected solely by human reason is a *human* explication, is merely and solely a *theological* assent.

Hence, the sacred bridge between the human and the divine, theology and faith, is not the theologian's reason nor the minor premise of his scientific reasoning but the authority of the Church. Without it there will be theological, but never dogmatic, development or progress. With it there is, not only theological, but also dogmatic progress in both the individuals and the whole Church. And yet this does not make the Church the formal motive of faith; but it does make her the *intrinsic* and indispensable condition of the formal motive of *our* faith, by the very fact that she is the condition of the divine *proposition* and *explication* of the revealed deposit.

158. THE TRANSITION FROM THE MEDIATE OR VIRTUAL TO THE IMMEDIATE OR FORMAL. — There remains the problem of dealing with the second question: whether to grant the Church the authority to define as of *divine* faith (and not only as of ecclesiastical faith) the theologico-inclusive conclusions, conclusions which, as we have maintained, are mediately or virtually revealed with respect to us, is not the same as granting the Church the authority to convert the revealed mediate or virtual, without which there can be no true and proper theological conclusion, into a revealed



immediate or formal, without which divine faith cannot exist. It is common knowledge, and we have said it time and again, that, according to traditional theology, that which is revealed immediately or formally or *in itself* is the specific constituent of faith; whereas that which is revealed mediately or virtually or *in another* is the specific constituent of theology.

The solution of this problem calls for a careful examination of what St. Thomas and traditional theology mean by *immediate* and *mediate*.

159. IMMEDIATE AND MEDIATE PROPOSITIONS IN GENERAL. — Immediate, according to St. Thomas and Aristotle, simply means *without a middle*. Thus any proposition in which no *middle* exists between the predicate and the subject, is an immediate proposition. Whence the Holy Doctor infers the following general principle, which he frequently repeats: "Every *inclusive* proposition, that is, every proposition the predicate of which is included in the subject, or the predicate of which is of the subject's essence, is *in itself* immediate." Or, in other words: "Every *identical* proposition is *in itself* immediate."<sup>68</sup>

160. THE REAL OR OBJECTIVE ORDER AND THE IDEAL OR INTELLECTUAL ORDER. — In God there exists a perfect identity and adaequation between the real and the ideal, the objective and the intellectual, the divine mind the medium through which it is known. In the judgments of the divine mind the predicate is perfectly identical and one with the subject; or to be more exact: in God there is no composition of predicate and subject, no

<sup>68</sup> "Immediate propositions, viz. those which are not demonstrated by some middle [term], but are clear of themselves. Those, indeed, are said to be *immediate*, inasmuch as they lack a demonstrating middle." (ST. THOMAS, *In Poster. Analytic.*, lib.1, lect.3) "Mediate, i.e. one that has a middle whereby the predicate is demonstrated of the subject." (*Loc.cit.*, lect.4) "Every proposition whose predicate is in the reason of the subject is *immediate* and *self-evident*. IN SO FAR AS IT ITSELF IS CONCERNED." (*Ibid.*) "This is a mediate proposition, every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles. The middle whereby the predicate is syllogized of the subject is a figure having an external triangle equal to the two internal that are opposed to it." (*Loc.cit.*, lect.28) "Hence understanding corresponds to the *immediate* proposition; but *science* to the *conclusion*, which is a *mediate* proposition." (*Loc.cit.*, lect.34)

Let the reader take note in this example taken from mathematics that propositions and reasonings of *intellectual* or *metaphysical* virtuality are, and are termed, *mediate* with respect to our intellect, even without a *real* distinction. The Holy Doctor and his commentators deal with the question of immediate and mediate propositions or those which are *self-evident* (per se notae) and *not self-evident* (non per se notae), together with their divisions, in the *Summa Theologiae* (p.1, q.2, a.1), in the *Contra Gentes Sententiarum* (lib.1, d.3, q.1, a.2), and in the *In Posteriores Analyticas* (*loc.cit.*). In our opinion, the best commentaries are those of CAJETAN to the last-mentioned book. Cardinal Zigliara takes from him his principal notes for the Leonine edition of the works of St. Thomas (tom.1, pp.58 ff.)

knowledge by way of composition and division, no complex knowledge by way of *enunciatives*. In God there is only a simple, infinitely comprehensive intuition that comprises in only one *Word* all the subjects and predicates, all the principles and conclusions, all the reality and ideality of being. In the infinite ocean of light which is God's mind, nothing is mediate, virtual, potential, *known through another*: everything is immediate, formal, actual, *known by itself*. Neither movement, nor progress, nor becoming are to be found there. In God to exist, and hence to understand and to act, are identical to His essence. God is the oneness and utmost and absolute adaequation of the real and the ideal, of the objective and the intellectual.

*In us* it is not so. The reality that is known is one thing, and quite another the idea or concept through which we know reality. That which is known and that which is believed, in the order of science and in the order of faith, is the reality and not only the idea. But that reality and that objectivity, already involved or included in the *datum* or starting point of our knowledge, do not reach us except through *partial* and *successive* ideas or predicates, that express something of the subject's reality, but are never adequate to it. The human idea, expressed in propositions, in terms of subjects and predicates, in cognition by way of *enunciatives*, in successive acts of judgment and reasoning, contains and expresses something of the objective reality of the subject, but does not exhaust it. This is a sign of the feebleness of our intellect, but it is also the indispensable basis of our *progress* in all orders of intellectual life. Because we are not pure act, as God is, we do not know all the reality and ideality of being, but only a small part of it. Because we are not purely *intellectual*, as the angels, but *rational*, that same small part of being and ideality known by us, is known through an *abstractive*, not intuitive, idea; through judgments and reasonings that imply *succession* and progress, not through a simple vision or understanding that comprises from the beginning all that is included in the natural or the revealed object, or all that we can know of it in the course of time. Our knowledge is *abstractive*, *imperfect*, *successive*, *discursive*.

161. TEXTS OF THE ANGELIC DOCTOR. — Although the foregoing is obvious, let us quote some texts of St. Thomas.

"In God the *understanding intellect*, and the thing understood, and the very act of *understanding itself*, are absolutely one and the same."<sup>69</sup> "Hence, since God sees everything *in Himself* as in the cause, His knowledge is not *discursive*."<sup>70</sup> "Just as God knows material things immaterially and composite things simply, so too He knows the enunciatives *not in the manner of*

<sup>69</sup> ST. THOMAS, p.1, q.14, a.4.  
<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, a.7.

*enunciatives*, but He knows each of them through *simple understanding*: as would be the case if by the very understanding of what man is, we should also understand all the things that can be predicated of man. Such indeed is not the case with *our* intellect, because it *passes* from one to another on account of the fact that the *intelligible species* [the *concept* or *idea*] represents one [object of knowing] in such a manner that it does not represent another. Thus by understanding what man is, we do not by the same token understand other things that exist in him, but we understand divisively and according to a certain *succession*. And this is why those things that we understand separately and divisively need to be brought back by us into unity by way of *composition and division*<sup>71</sup>, by forming an *enunciation*.<sup>71</sup>

In the angels their essence is distinct from their actual existence, and thus also from their actual operation. Their real being is not identical to their ideal being; hence in them that which is known differs from the idea through which they know it. However, although their essence is not pure act, it is nonetheless unmixed with *material* potentiality or matter, which is that which is opposed to cognition. Hence their act of understanding, or their idea, is neither potential nor successive, but actual and a case of simple understanding. In them there is no *discourse*, as in man, but *simple understanding*. They do not know all that is knowable, as God does; but they know from the beginning and in only one act everything that is by them knowable in their idea or proper object. Their mode of understanding is similar to God's, not to man's.

"Thus the lower intellects, *viz.*, those of *men*, [not only those of the ignorant but also those of the wise, nor only those of the simple faithful but also those of the greatest theologians] obtain perfection in the knowledge of truth [whether natural or supernatural, *i.e.* of faith] through a certain *movement and discourse* of the intellectual operation, as they proceed from one known to another. But if in the very knowledge of a *known principle* [the natural or the revealed datum] they were to perceive at once as evident all its *consequent conclusions* there would be in them no *discourse* at all. Such is the case with the angels [and with those who received the revelation *immediately* and fully from God, as the Apostles] because in the things they naturally know they immediately behold all that can be known, and thus they are called intellectual beings, because even with ourselves the things which are immediately apprehended naturally are said to be understood (*intelligi*): hence intellect is said to be the habit of first principles. But human souls [in the case of both the theologian and of the simple faithful] are called *rational*; and this comes from the *fecbleness of the intellectual light* in them.

<sup>71</sup>By way of composition and division", technical term for the act of judgement  
Transl.

<sup>71</sup>*Ibid.*, a.14.

For if they had the fullness of intellectual light, as the angels [or as the Apostles] they would immediately in the first perception of the principles [*i.e.*, of the *articles of faith*, in the supernatural order] comprehend *all their virtuality*, by intuiting whatever can be syllogized from them.<sup>72</sup>

Let us continue quoting further from the Holy Doctor on the difference between *our* discursive knowledge on the one hand and the knowledge of the angels or the infused knowledge on the other hand, since therein lies the basis of the difference between *our* faith and faith *in itself*: "The fact that *our intellect* understands through *discourse*, and through *composition* and *division*, comes from the same root."<sup>73</sup> "It is necessary for the human intellect to understand by composing and dividing. Since the human intellect issues from *potency* into act [from the *virtual* to the formal], it has a certain similarity with *generable* things [vital or organic progress], which do *not immediately* possess their perfection, but acquire it successively. *Likewise*, the human intellect does not obtain the perfect knowledge of a thing *immediately* in the *first apprehension* [the natural, or the revealed *datum*]; but first it apprehends *something* [the revealed formal explicit], for no man would assent by faith to things that are proposed unless he *understood them somewhat*." (2-2, q.8, a.2 ad 2) "Faith cannot issue into act unless by *believing something determinately and expressly*" (*In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.1 de ipso); e.g. the quiddity [the *articles*] of the thing itself, which is the first and proper object of the *intellect*, and then it understands the properties [the intellectual and the real *virtuality*] and the accidents and the relations *surrounding* the thing's essence. And in accordance with this it is necessary for it to *compose and divide* one object of apprehension with another and to proceed *from one composition and division to another*, which is *to reason*. But the angelic intellect, and the divine [and that of the Apostles in virtue of *infused light*] possess perfectly all the knowledge of the thing at once. Hence by knowing the quiddity of the thing [the primitive *datum*], it *simultaneously* knows of the thing whatever we can know *through composition and division and reasoning*.<sup>74</sup>

This mode of knowing "by way of composition and division, by way of the complex, by way of the enunciative", which conditions *our* knowing and distinguishes it from knowing *in itself*, that is, from the knowing proper of pure or simple intellects, also conditions *our* faith and distinguishes it (not with the respect to the *object*, but with respect to the mode of its *proposition or explication*) from faith *in itself*, to wit, the faith of the angels, the pro-

<sup>72</sup>*Ibid.*, q.58, a.3.

<sup>73</sup>*Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.58, a.4.

<sup>74</sup>*Ibid.*, q.85, a.5.

phets and the apostles and of all those who have received divine revelation immediately from God. For this reason, just as the Holy Doctor placed at the beginning of the treatise *On God* the question: "Whether that God exists is known of itself (per se notum)", since on it hinges the nature of our knowledge of God; so also at the very beginning of his treatise *On Faith* he places this other correlative question: "Whether the object of faith be something complex IN THE MANNER OF AN ENUNCIABLE. I answer that it must be said that the known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. But the proper mode of the human intellect is to know the truth by composing and dividing, as has been said in the first part. And thus the human intellect knows the things that are simple in themselves according to a certain complexity . . . Therefore, the object of faith can be considered in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed itself, and so considered the object of faith is something *incomplex*: that is, the thing itself which is believed. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and considered thus the object of faith is something *complex in the manner of an enunciabile*. But the act of the believer terminates, not in the *enunciabile*, but in the *thing*. For we do not form *enunciabiles*, except to gain through them knowledge of the things, as in science, so in faith . . .

162. FIRST COROLLARY. — Therefore, in any proposition one thing is the *objective reality* of the subject and the predicate, and another thing is the *partial concepts* that we form of that reality. It is possible for us to form *multiple concepts of one and the same reality*, and to employ some of these concepts to deduce the others. All of these concepts are really included in the subject, but none of them adequates or exhausts the subject.

SECOND COROLLARY. — Since the immediate proposition is that which is understood *without a middle*, and since there are two kinds of middle, to wit, a *real* or objective middle, and an intellectual or *conceptual* middle, there will accordingly be different kinds of immediate or *conceptual* propositions, depending on whether the middle required to understand them differs really or conceptually from the predicate and the subject. In other words: there will be different kinds of propositions depending on whether between the predicate and the subject there exists a *real* distinction or identity, or only a *conceptual* distinction or identity, also known by the name of *virtual* distinction or distinction of *reasoned reason*.

Hence, only three combinations are possible: 1. propositions of both *real* and *conceptual identity*; 2. propositions of both *conceptual* and *real distinction*; 3. propositions of *real identity* but of *conceptual distinction*. In other words: propositions that are really and conceptually *immediate*,

75 2-2, *De Fide*, q. 1, a. 2.

propositions that are really and conceptually *mediate*, propositions that are really *immediate* but conceptually *mediate*. Or, as St. Thomas calls them: propositions that are immediate *in themselves* and *to us* (*quoad se et quoad nos*), propositions that are *not* immediate *either in themselves or to us* (*neq quoad se, nec quoad nos*), propositions that are immediate *in themselves*, but mediate *to us*. Let us examine them briefly.

163. PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE IMMEDIATE IN THEMSELVES AND TO US. — Every proposition in which not only is the reality of the predicate included in the reality of the subject, but also the *idea* we have of the predicate is identified with the *idea* we have of the subject, is a proposition that is immediate, not only really, but also intellectually; immediate, not only in itself, but also with respect to us. Thus, the propositions the *whole is greater than any of its parts*, *man is a rational animal*, *all the points of a circumference are equidistant from its center*, *the son is engendered by his father*, are immediate propositions, not only really, but also intellectually. Not only is the reality of the predicate identical to the reality of the subject, but the *idea* of the predicate is the same as the *idea* of the subject, although expressed with different words. The *idea of generation* is included, not only in the reality, but also in the *idea* or *definition* of the son; the *idea* of part is included in the *definition* of the whole; the *idea* of equidistance of all the points is included in the *idea* or *definition* of the circumference; the *idea* of rational animal is included in the *idea* or *definition* of man. In these propositions the predicates are not ideas that differ from the ideas of the subjects: they are the same *idea* or *concept* of the subject, only expressed with different terms. In this kind of propositions the distinction between predicate and subject is neither real nor intellectual or virtual, but only a nominal distinction or a distinction of *reasoned reason*. They are propositions that belong to *simple understanding*, not to *science* or *reason*. To know or demonstrate them no true reasoning is required, but only an explanation of terms; if at times the form of reasoning is employed, it is an *improper* reasoning, that possesses only the form of reasoning, and is *merely* explanatory. There is no room for any proper or true reasoning without, at least, a *virtual* distinction between the subject and the predicate, or between the *middle* and the extremes. (27) In these propositions the predicate is known through the *self-same concept* of the subject; the propositions are known *without any middle*.

164. PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE MEDIATE IN THEMSELVES AND TO US. — There are propositions in which there exists not only an intellectual or virtual, but also a real or objective distinction between the predicate and the subject; in which not only the *concepts*, but also the *realities* expressed by the concepts of the predicate and the subject differ. Hence, to know or to demonstrate them our intellect needs a medium that differs, not only intellectually, but also really. The propositions *every body is actually impenetrable* or *all that is heavy actually falls towards the center*, are propo-

sitions that are *mediate*, not only intellectually, but also really; *mediate*, not only *with respect to us*, but also *in themselves*. The middle on account of which impenetrability belongs to a body is not the *essence* or definition of a body, but its *extension*, which differs really from actual impenetrability, and can even exist without it. The middle on account of which the fall towards the center belongs to anything that is heavy is not its *essence*, but the attraction or *gravity*, which differs really from the fall towards the center, and can even exist without it. In such propositions, although the *essence* of the subject be known evidently or through revelation, the actual existence of the predicate can by this sole means be never known with absolute or theological certainty. In the case of such propositions, the predicate is not revealed by the revelation of the subject, nor is the conclusion revealed by the revelation of the principle. The maxim that with the destruction of the predicate the subject is destroyed, or that with the destruction of the predicate the principle is destroyed ("This is the relation of the conclusion to the principle, that with the destruction of the conclusion the principle is destroyed," ST. THOMAS, *In Post. Analyt.*, lect. 38) is not applicable to this kind of propositions, that are mediate both to us and in themselves, as it is applicable to the propositions of the first and third groups. In the propositions of this second group, it is absolutely speaking possible for the predicate or the conclusion to fail, without necessarily involving the failure of the subject or the principle. These propositions or conclusions are those which make up the inferior and contingent physical sciences, which are not grounded on objective or essential identity, but on mere physical connexion without objective implicitness. (37, 98).

165. PROPOSITIONS THAT ARE IMMEDIATE REALLY OR IN THEMSELVES, BUT MEDIATE CONCEPTUALLY OR TO US. — This third group is the most important: it comprises the famous propositions *immediately known in themselves* (*per se notae quoad se*), but *not immediately known to us* (*non per se notae quoad nos*), of which St. Thomas often makes mention, and which constitute the true and rigorous conclusions of the sciences of absolute certainty (mathematics, metaphysics, and theology). These propositions represent the bridge of objective continuity joining *understanding* and *reason* (intellectus — ratio) in the natural order, and *faith* and *theology* in the supernatural or revealed order. In these positions lies the key to dogmatic progress.

In effect, there are propositions in which the objective reality of the predicate is included in that of the subject; thus they are immediate objectively or in themselves. However, the *concept* which we form of the predicate is not immediately included in the concept formed by us of the predicate; thus they are mediate conceptually or with respect to us. Of themselves such

propositions belong to *understanding* or *intuition*; but *for us* they belong to *science* or *reason*.<sup>76</sup>

For instance, the propositions *God exists* or *the rational soul is spiritual* are in themselves identical or inclusive propositions; and hence, they are immediate *really* or in themselves, since there is no *real* distinction, no *real middle* between the predicate and the subject. But these same propositions are *mediate* intellectually, mediate with respect *to us*; that is to every *human intellect*; they are, as the ancients called them, "per se notae quoad se"; but "non per se notae quoad nos". Between the predicate and the subject there is no real distinction, but there is a *virtual* distinction or a distinction of *concepts*. The predicate is *really* included in the subject, but *formally* with respect *to us* it is not. The idea we have of the subject and the predicate is not enough to make us see the predicate included in the subject; we need to lay hold of *another idea*, of a *middle*. And the result is not a knowledge of simple understanding or intuition (which never comprises anything more than the two ideas of subject and predicate), but a knowledge of *science* or *demonstration*, which is the resultant of *three ideas* or concepts, the ideas of the *subject*, and the *predicate*, together with that of the *middle* term, which are known in logic as the major, minor, and middle terms. Where the middle term is a *reality* distinct from the reality of the extremes, we have the poor, inferior, contingent *physical* sciences. Where the middle term is really identical, but virtually or conceptually distinct, we have the superior, necessary, sublime mathematico-metaphysico-theological sciences. Thus, to know God's eternity, it is necessary to recur to the *middle* of His absolute immutability; to know the human soul's immortality, it is necessary to recur to the middle of its immateriality or independence in operation and in being. For the human mind these are cases of *mediate* knowledge, cases of *scientific* knowledge, not of simple understanding or of mere nominal explanation. The great schoolmen always called them *virtual* or *by cause*; but since they are *really* identical or proper of the superior sciences of intellectual or conceptual analysis, the *middle*, or *cause*, or *minor* proposition employed can never be physico-connexive, but must needs be metaphysico-inclusive.

<sup>76</sup>Is every proposition that is evident of itself (*per se nota*) also evident to us? Concerning this question we must explain the first opinion, that of Scotus and Aureolus, who hold that every proposition that is evident of itself (or immediate) is also evident to us. . . . For the rest, the other opinion, which is far more true, is that of ST. THOMAS, CAJETAN, FERRARIENSIS, CAPREOLUS, and almost all philosophers, who maintain that not every proposition that is evident of itself is also evident to us. . . . Hence it must be gathered that every and any proposition is by its nature self-evident (or immediate), the knowledge of which depends solely on the knowledge of the terms, meaning by these not the words, as ineptly held by Gregory, but the *things* signified; for Aristotle did not undertake to dispute about words but about the *things* signified by them." (DIDACUS MASIUS, O.P., *Commentaria in primum librum Aristotelis de demonstratione*, c.3. qq.2-4, pgs.280-285)

166. FIRST COROLLARY. — The fundamental distinction between the immediate or mediate *in itself* or in the *real* order, and the immediate or mediate *to us* or in the *intellectual* order, must never be forgotten. Between the intellectually immediate and the intellectually mediate no real distinction exists, but there exists a *virtual* distinction or a distinction of concepts. Between the *really* or objectively immediate and the *really* or objectively mediate, there is not only a distinction of aspects or concepts, but also a real distinction or a distinction of objectivity. To convert the really mediate into really immediate, it would be necessary to add a *new reality*, to increase the primitive objectivity. To turn the intellectually mediate into intellectually immediate, it is not necessary to modify in any way the reality or objectivity of the primitive datum, it is only necessary to change the *mode* or *medium* of knowing, i.e. to know through a *medium* of simple understanding the *same thing* that was previously known solely through the medium of science or discourse.

167. SECOND COROLLARY. — All that has been said of the relation obtaining between the predicate and the subject in the case of *propositions* is to be applied, without the least change, to the relation obtaining between the *conclusions* and the *principles* in the case of reasonings and demonstrations; since, as St. Thomas teaches, and the matter is evident of itself, the relation of the conclusion to the principle in a demonstration is exactly the same as the relation of the predicate to the subject in a proposition.<sup>77</sup> Thus, the conclusions will be either really immediate or mediate, or intellectually immediate or mediate, depending on whether a *real* or a *virtual* distinction exists or not between the conclusion and the principles, and this in turn depends on whether the *middle* term employed differs really or virtually from the extremes. On the other hand, where the middle term differs neither really nor virtually from the extremes, but differs only with a nominal distinction or a distinction of reasoning reason, no proper reasoning exists, but only an improper reasoning, i.e. a reasoning *as to form*, and the conclusion is not a true *conclusion*, but the *principle* stated in other words.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>77</sup> "Just as in the reasoning intellect the conclusion is compared to the principle, so in the composing and dividing intellect the predicate is compared to the subject. Thus it is clear that the fact that our intellect understands by way of discourse, and of composition and division, proceeds from the same root, viz. that in the first apprehension of something that is apprehended, it cannot at once see everything that is contained virtually in it; and this comes from the feebleness of the intellectual light in us." (ST. THOMAS, p.1, q.58, a.4)

<sup>78</sup> "In the reasoning that constitutes a new mode of knowing in the true and full sense, the conclusion is enunciated in the major premise not formally implicitly but only virtually implicitly." (PESCH, *Philosophia Lacensis, Institutiones logicae*, lib.2, c.3, n.326) "Those things are said to be contained formally implicitly in the explicitly revealed, which are identical with it both really and formally . . . That is said to be

Thus conclusions are divided into the same three groups into which we have classified the propositions: 1. *immediate* conclusions, both really and intellectually; 2. *mediate* conclusions, both intellectually and really; 3. *conclusions* that are *immediate* really or in themselves, but *mediate* to us, i.e. to human reason.

The first are conclusions of *improper* reasoning or of nominal explanation; the second are conclusions of *proper* reasoning, but a reasoning of *mere physico-distinct connexion*; the third are also conclusions of *proper* reasoning, but a reasoning of *inclusive* connexion. (24-28)

The first are not properly conclusions, but principles in the *form* of conclusions; the second are true conclusions, and belong to the contingent physical sciences; the third are likewise *true* conclusions, and belong to the true and necessary sciences of the superior order, to the only *rigorously true sciences*, the mathematical, metaphysical, and theological. (36-41)

168. ANSWER TO THE QUESTION. — The answer to the question whether the Church converts or can convert the revealed mediate into a revealed immediate can be easily gathered from what has been said. The answer is either negative or affirmative depending on whether the mediate is *non-inclusive*, as is the mediate or virtual of type 4 introduced by Suárez and Lugo; or *inclusive*, as are the other five types of mediate or virtual, which, according to St. Thomas, constitute the true and rigorous revealed virtuality or theological conclusion.

In the case of the non-inclusive mediate, the predicate of the minor is not included objectively in the essence of the subject; nor, consequently, is the conclusion objectively included or implicit in the revealed major. Thus, it is clear that the Church does not, and cannot, convert such a mediate into immediate. Such a mediate is not objectively revealed since it is not included or implicit in the revealed major. Hence, to convert such a mediate into immediate by defining it as of divine faith, would be the same as to convert the non-revealed into revealed and to increase objectively the deposit of revelation. Not even God can do such a thing except through a new revelation. Hence, Suárez was consistent in appealing to new revelations in order to defend the definability as of faith of such a mediate. Hence, too, the Sal-manticenses and Billuart, and all Thomists, are logical in denying the definability as of faith of any mediate or virtual understood in this sense.

But where the mediate is *inclusive*, as is the case in all rigorous theological conclusions, it is obvious that the Church can, and does, convert such a

contained *virtually* in an explicitly revealed truth, which: either first, although *really* identical with it, is nonetheless *formally distinct* from it; or, secondly, is *not really* identical with the explicitly revealed but is *only connected* with it." (MAZELLA, *De virtutibus infusis*, n.405, 6th ed. Naples 1909)

mediate into immediate. As we have seen, the inclusive mediate is mediate *in itself*, but immediate *in itself*. "Any proposition the predicate of which is included in the reason [the essence] of the subject, is immediate *insofar as it itself is concerned*. . . . As the conclusion is compared to the principle in the reasoning intellect, so is the predicate compared to the subject in the composing and dividing intellect." (ST. THOMAS) (159-167). To convert such a mediate into immediate means nothing else than to convert that which is revealed *immediately in itself* into something revealed *immediately with respect to us*. All theologians have always granted that the Church can do this. This, and nothing else, is what the Church does when she defines as of divine faith the implicit virtual or the inclusive theological conclusion.

Hence, when all Thomists, and even all theologians prior to Molina, affirmed that the Church can define, and has defined, as of divine faith, not only the immediately revealed, but also the mediate revealed; when they affirmed that not all of our dogmas are immediately contained in the revealed deposit, but that some of them were mediate or virtually contained; they spoke a great truth because they had in mind the truly *inclusive* mediate, the truly *implicit* virtual.

All these statements mean nothing more than that not all the dogmas have been revealed *in themselves* to us, but that some of them have been revealed only *in other* truths, from which human reason cannot deduce or know them except through a proper and rigorous reasoning, albeit an *inclusive* reasoning. They mean nothing more than that not all the dogmas were contained in the deposit in terms of the *proper concept* in which they are defined, but in terms of *another concept*, which is really identical although virtually distinct, and from which they are known and inferred. They mean nothing more than that the Church's dogmatic definition provides the human mind, not with new non-revealed matter or reality or object, but with a *new medium* of knowing the matter or object originally revealed. Prior to the dogmatic definition, these virtually or mediate truths or concepts are not known except through a *theological medium*, which is the *deduction from the revealed*; or, in other words, *reasoned revelation*; or, in other words, *revelation explicated by reason*. On the other hand, after the dogmatic definition, those same truths are no longer known by *another medium* different from that of faith, but are known by the self-same medium of faith, viz., *revelation explicated by the Church*. Prior to the definition those truths were mediate or virtually of faith, because although they come from revealed majors or minors of faith, nonetheless they proceed from them through minors or mediums of reason, and reasoning or deduction is the medium, not of faith but of science. After the definition they are known by the medium itself of faith, which is not revelation alone, nor much less *reasoned revelation*, but revelation *explicated by the Church*; the *First Truth manifested by the Church*. (156)

Since before the definition they were known by a *medium other* than that of faith they were *mediate* and were designated as such. Since after the definition they are no longer known by another medium, but known by the self-same *medium* of faith, they are *immediate* and are designated as such. Likewise, since before the definition they already had the same objectivity (*res cognita*, the *thing known*) of the revealed principles, but had only the medium of knowing (*medium cognitionis*) of theology, they were *materially* of faith or matter definable of faith, but *formally* theological. Since after the definition they have not only the same objectivity of the principles of faith, but also the same medium of knowing, they now are not merely matter of faith but also formally or immediately of faith. "Every cognitive habit **FORMALLY regards the MEDIUM through which the object is known; but MATERIALLY it regards THAT WHICH IS KNOWN through the medium.**"<sup>79</sup> "Now the **FORMAL reason of the object in the case of FAITH is the First Truth MANIFESTED BY THE CHURCH, just as the FORMAL reason of SCIENCE is the MEDIUM OF DEMONSTRATION.**"<sup>80</sup>

169. — SCOTIST ORIGIN OF THE EXTREME POSITIONS OF VÁZQUEZ AND MOLINA. — We beg the reader to allow us a small digression in order to show that in the third group of *inclusive* propositions (165) lies the line that divides St. Thomas and Scotus with regard to the nature and specific distinction between *understanding* and *reason* in the natural order, and between faith and theology respectively in the revealed order. St. Thomas says: inclusive propositions are immediate *in themselves* but mediate *to us*; of themselves they belong to simple understanding but relative to us they belong to science or reasoning. Since the *reality* or the thing in itself is that which is *material* in any habit, and the *medium* through which we know the reality is that which is *formal*, those propositions belong *materially* to understanding but formally to reason or science. (123)

Scotus, with whom Vázquez and Molina show themselves to be in sympathy, says: every objective (since our concern is not with the merely logical order) proposition either is immediate in itself and to us, or is not immediate in itself and to us; it either belongs materially and formally to understanding, or belongs materially and formally to reason or science. There is a middle with respect to the objective *reality*, or with respect to the merely logical or formal proposition; but there is no middle with respect to *objective propositions*. All objective propositions are either totally immediate or totally mediate.

<sup>79</sup> ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q. 9, a. 2.

<sup>80</sup> ST. THOMAS, QQ. *Disputatae De Caritate*, a. 13, ad 6.

<sup>81</sup> On the question of what is meant by *immediate* or "per se notum", and by *mediate* or "non per se notum", the sympathy of Vázquez and Molina in favour of Scotus and against St. Thomas is obvious.

Up to this point the difference could seem to turn on a merely technical question, to be merely a disagreement in words between the two great geniuses of Scholasticism on a minor point of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. It would be easy, indeed, to show the relation which that difference bears to the gravest problems of both *ancient* and modern philosophy; but all that would matter little if it did not have a very close bearing on the problems and theories concerning faith, theology, dogmatic progress, and the authority of the Church.

The revealed truth is not communicated to us through merely *logici* or symbolic propositions, nor through divine *realities* experienced immanently. As Modernism pretends; but through *conceptual-objective propositions*, as Catholicism teaches. Hence, the question that had arisen in the Posterior Analytics concerning the nature of the propositions known by natural reason crops up later relative to the objective propositions known by *divine revelation*. Are the propositions or conclusions found in revelation with the character of, or through, *inclusive virtuality immediately or mediately revealed*? Do they belong to *understanding* or to *reason*? To *faith* or to *theology*? Do they represent to the human mind *divine values*, or values that are merely human, or at best, *ecclesiastical*?

<sup>11</sup>Finally, Gregory, Gabriel, Ockham, and Basolis do not admit the division of the proposition into evident *per se* and evident to us. . . . Now if they are speaking of the connexion itself and the concept, the opinion of these men, with which Scotus concurs, has my approval." (VÁZQUEZ, *In I Partem*, q. 2, a. 1, ed. cit., p. 58) "Wherefore, since no proposition is found in things themselves considered in themselves, but only inasmuch as they are apprehended by the intellect, or are signified by these or those words or writings, properly speaking no proposition ought to be called evident in itself which is not also evident to us, as Scotus correctly affirmed. . . . Although, St. Thomas spoke with less propriety." (MOLINA, *In I Partem*, q. 2, a. 1, ed. cit., p. 33) Molina, as also later on Ripalda and Kilber, was unable to free himself from a narrow conceptualism in these matters nor to rise to the true *objective realism* of the Thomist doctrine, which John of St. Thomas expounds as follows: "There is the well-known division of the *per se* evident proposition, made by St. Thomas, into that which is *per se* evident in itself and that which is *per se* evident to us. But this division is not admitted by Scotus nor commonly by his school; and some later [writers] say that St. Thomas spoke *improperly*. . . . Nonetheless, St. Thomas, considering *more profoundly* the *per se* evident proposition, dealt with it not only in accordance with the formal reason of the proposition on the part of the concept or the signifying word, but also on the part of the *basis* which is found in the thing signified itself; for the fact that a proposition is demonstrable by some middle, or lacks a middle whereby it is demonstrated, and thus is *immediate* and *per se* evident, does not arise from the *signification itself of the terms*, but from the *connexion itself of the things signified*." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Philosophicus, Logica*, p. 2, q. 24, a. 4) Please take note, all those modern Thomists who, for purposes of determining what should be taken of either *connexions* or *reality*, but only of the conceptual meaning of the propositions (515).

A true Thomist must say: all propositions or conclusions of revealed-inclusive virtuality are immediate or of faith *in themselves*, but mediate or of theology *with respect to us* for as long as we do not know them except through the human medium of reasoning. If the *divine* authority of the Church did not exist, if there were no medium to *explicate* them, i. e. to develop their inclusive virtuality, other than fallible human reasoning, that virtuality would never acquire divine values, values of faith relative to us.

The Scotist theory must say, and does say: such propositions are either *immediately* revealed both in themselves and to us, or they are not so in themselves and to us. Either they are of *faith* in themselves and for us (Scotus and Vázquez), or they are not of faith either in themselves or for us (Molina). Either they are of faith in themselves and for the theologian, without any need of the Church's definition (Vázquez), or they are not of faith either for the theologian or in themselves, even if the Church should define them (Molina).

*In this matter*, says Vázquez, the theological reason or minor is to the theologian as the authority of the Church is to the faithful. If such propositions are immediate or of faith for the faithful after the Church has defined them, they must likewise be immediate or of faith for the theologian when his reason deduces them evidently.

Molina says: in this matter the authority of the Church is of no more value to the faithful than the authority of the theologian. If they are not immediate or of faith, in spite of being evidently deduced by the theologian, neither will they be so even if the Church defines them.

The Thomists must say, and do say: such propositions and conclusions are immediately revealed *in themselves*, but mediate with respect to *human reason*, whether in the simple faithful or in the theologian. But *in this matter*, i. e. in the *explication* of the implicitly revealed virtuality, in the unfolding of that which is included in the deposit, the authority of the Church is essentially different from, and infinitely superior to, the private authority or reasoning of the theologian. The former is *divine* authority; the latter, *human* authority. The explication of the implicit virtuality of revealed propositions made by the theologian's reason is a *human explication of divine revelation*; hence, a subjectively fallible explication, a *theological explication*. The explication made with the Holy Spirit's divine assistance to the Church is a *divine explication of divine revelation*; thus it belongs immediately to *divine faith*. It is a true development, but a development that is divine, *dogmatic*.

As we have indicated, these three theories proposed by St. Thomas, Vázquez, and Molina are the only ones that have been propounded and the only ones possible, concerning the inclusive virtuality's definability as of faith (87). The latter two have the Scotist origin that we have pointed out,

which is also found in the two different existing theories on the nature and the distinction between the immediate and the mediate. After the XVI century, many authors have become entangled in difficulties on the question whether the Church converts mediate revelation into immediate, because they have not distinguished clearly between these theories. They have overlooked the fact that mediate revelation, if it is *inclusive*, is already immediate *in itself* (quoad se); the Church does nothing more than explicate and propose it, whereby it becomes immediate *to us* (quoad nos).

SCOTIST ORIGIN OF SUAREZ'S *FORMAL CONFUSED*. — The origin of Suárez's *formal confused* or *improper virtual* is also to be found in the teaching of Scotus. In the view of Scotus, the reasoning of real identity is an improper reasoning, or, as he calls it, a *begging of the question*, since in this kind of reasoning there are two terms, not three. Ferraricensis, in defense of St. Thomas's teaching, replies with good reason that, *materially* speaking, there are indeed two terms; however, *formally* speaking, there are three terms, and thus the reasoning is proper. The objection by Scotus, and the reply of Ferraricensis follow:

"Confirmation: if such a proposition were self-evident (per se nota), the demonstration in which a proposition is demonstrated by the definition of the subject, besides being impossible because it attempts to demonstrate what is indemonstrable, would involve a *begging of the question*, because the same would be demonstrated by the same, and the equally obvious by the equally obvious.

"To the confirmation [of Scotus] I say that if everything is considered *formally*, there is no *begging of the question* involved, because the *same thing conceived distinctly formally differs from itself conceived confusedly*. But, considered *materially*, there is indeed a *begging of the question*, and there are only two terms: because the middle and the subject of the conclusion are materially identical."<sup>82</sup> The defect in Scotus, and later on in Vázquez, Suárez, and Lugo, lies in the fact that he deals with these questions *materially*, whereas that which specifically distinguishes the habit of faith from the habit of theology, or simple understanding from reason, is not the material, but the formal. (123)

The known conclusion or the *res cognita* — if we may be allowed the repetition — is *materially* the same after and before the Church's definition; but the medium of knowing or the *medium cognitionis* is *formally* different. Prior to the Church's definition the *medium of knowing* was *revelation explicated by the human reason of the theologian*. After the definition, it is *revelation explicated by the divine authority of the Church*. "But the *formal*

<sup>82</sup>FERRARIENSIS, *In Contra Gentiles*, lib.1, c.11, nn.4-6; Leonine ed., tom.13, pp.26-27.

reason in *faith* is the First Truth manifested by the Church, as the *formal* reason of *science* is the *medium of demonstration*."<sup>83</sup>

## SECTION V

## TWO FUNCTIONS OF THE CHURCH'S DOGMATIC MAGISTERIUM

170. THE CONSERVATION AND THE EXPLICATION OF THE DEPOSIT. — The Church's *dogmatic* magisterium exercises two functions with respect to the revealed deposit. The Vatican Council has very distinctly pointed out these two functions, which had been earlier stated with admirable clarity and beauty by the great expounder of dogmatic progress, Vincent of Lérins.<sup>ii</sup> These two functions are: 1. to *conserve* the revealed deposit; 2. to *explicate* it. "*Inviolably* to KEEP SAFE; and *fidelity* to EXPOUND."<sup>84</sup> "Let her *take care of* and *finish* whatever things are of old unformed and inchoate, and *keep safe* whatever has been formed and defined."<sup>85</sup>

Whence the two fundamental characteristics of Catholic dogma: *immunity* and *progress*. Which does not mean, as is commonly understood, immutability in matters of dogma, and progress in matters of discipline; but immutability with respect to dogma, and progress with respect to the same dogma. For relative to discipline there is room not only for progress, but also for a true transformation by adding, subtracting, changing, reforming, abolishing whatever is convenient in matters that are merely disciplinary.

These two functions — the conservation and the explication of dogma itself — are correlative but distinct, and deserve our careful attention.

Every living or developing thing conserves itself as it develops and develops as it conserves itself. Without the conservation of something that remains fixed and identical, there would be not only progress but also *transformation*; without the unfolding or acquisition of something *new* within the same conserved thing — if the new thing came from *without*, it would be *addition* and not merely development —, there would be no real, but only nominal, progress.

<sup>83</sup>St. Vincent of Lerins is commonly quoted in theological treatises by the name of Lirinensis.

<sup>84</sup>ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*

<sup>85</sup>VATICAN COUNCIL, *loc.cit.*

<sup>85</sup>LIRINENSIS, *Communitorium*, c.23.



According to St. Thomas, there are *two* different elements in revelation: the revealed *object*, and its proposition or *explication*. (139) Thus when God and the Apostles conveyed to the Church the revealed deposit of the Scriptures and Tradition, they conveyed to her two things: 1. a sum total of divinely revealed truths or propositions; 2. a certain quantity or degree of explication or *explicit meaning* of those propositions. Hence, the primitive Church received from the mouth of the Apostles both a revealed *object* and a *divine explication* of the object. This is called the *primitive datum*: it is the *starting point* of dogmatic progress. (55)

To preclude transformism it is necessary that the revealed object and its divine explication should remain substantially *immutable*; however, if true, and not merely nominal, progress is to exist, it is necessary that the starting point should *unfold itself*, i.e. should acquire something *new*.

Since in the starting point there are two things: revealed object, and divine explication of the same object, the acquisition of something new can come from only two sources: from an increase of *new* revealed *objects*, or from an increase of *new* divine *explication* of the object already revealed. The former is not admitted by Catholic teaching since the death of the Apostles. Therefore, if true progress, and not mere *conservation*, of the revealed deposit is to exist, it becomes necessary to admit a *new* or a *greater* divine explication of the revealed truth. Such is the purpose of the Church's dogmatic authority, the second of the two functions of the Church with respect to the primitive datum. That is what the church does when she develops and defines the *inclusive intellectual virtuality* of the revealed deposit.

171. DOGMATIC REDEFINITIONS AND DEFINITIONS. — Thus, the definitions of faith or the dogmatic authority of the Church must not be thought of as merely *repeating* the explication already given by the Apostles to, and possessed by, the primitive Church. Undoubtedly the Church often does so; but that would not properly be a *definition*, but rather a *redefinition*; it would not belong properly to the second function of *explicating*, but rather to the first function of *conserving* the *explication already given* by the

<sup>86</sup>The phrases "to declare the faith", "to expound the faith", "to explicate the faith", are employed as synonymous by St. Thomas and the Councils. "The Symbol of the Fathers is *declarative* of the Symbol of the Apostles." (ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.1, a.9, ad 6) "For the subsequent symbol does not abolish the one preceding, but rather *expounds* it." (*Loc. cit.*, ad 4) "In one [symbol] the things, that are contained implicitly in another, are more fully *explicated*." (*Loc. cit.*, ad 2) "To be faithfully safeguarded and faithfully *declared*." (VAT. COUNCIL, Denz.-Schön. n. 3020 "Inviolably safeguarded and faithfully *expounded*." (VAT. COUNCIL, Denz.-Schön. n. 3070) "Furthermore, we define that the *explication* of those words 'Filioque' . . . was licitly and reasonably added to the Symbol." (FLORENTINE COUNCIL, Denz.-Schön., n.1302) We have already seen (134), and we shall see it again (306), that the term "to explicate" means "to unfold the implicit virtuality".

Apostles themselves to the primitive Church by repeating and proclaiming it solemnly. The definitions of faith or dogmatic authority of the Church must be *further* understood as giving, in virtue of *divine* authority or assistance, a *new* or *greater* explication than that given by the Apostles to the Church; thereby something *new* results: not a *new* revealed *object*, nor a new revelation of the same object, but, indeed, a *new divine explication* of the very same object or deposit revealed by God to the Apostles and entrusted by them to the *safekeeping* and *explication* by the Church's divine authority.

It is true, as we have elsewhere pointed out (57), that the Church cannot give a dogmatic explication greater than that which the Apostles received from God; but it is likewise true that the Church can give — and in fact does give — a dogmatic explication greater than that given by the Apostles to the primitive Church.

172. AN EXPLICATION GREATER THAN THAT OF THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. — The primitive Church was in possession of two things: 1. a *determinate* number of revealed articles; 2. a *determinate* degree of divine explication of those same articles.

Future Christian generations have been, are, and will be till the end of time, in possession of something *new*, of a third element acquired by them in virtue of the Church's dogmatic authority. They, or we, are in possession, not of two, but of *three* things: 1. the *very same* revealed articles; 2. the *very same* explication of those articles given by the Apostles. All of these the Church has conserved, and will conserve, unchanged and unchangeable. It is to these two things that the first function corresponds, which is to *conserve* the deposit. But we have besides a *third thing*, which is a *new explication*, which neither is in any way contrary to the previous one, nor comes from without, but is drawn or *deduced* from *within*, and *increases* or unfolds the explication given by the Apostles without changing it.

It is to this third thing that the second function corresponds, which is to *explicate* the deposit, as spoken of by Lirinensis and the Vatican Council. This *new* dogmatic explication passes immediately on to the first function to be *conserved* immutably as an integral and divine part and development of the deposit, whence new explications will issue, and new conservations of the explicated. In such consists the true, living, continuous, perennial and *homogeneous* progress of the Catholic doctrine.

Of this dogmatic progress or development, *human reason*, in all its various endeavours: theological, exegetical, critical, historical, etc., etc., is only the *human* and fallible *instrument*; likewise, the Church, in her ordinary or solemn magisterium, is nothing more than an instrument, but a *divinely assisted* and infallible instrument; and the Holy Spirit, who perpetually assists and guides the Church in her twin progressive function of conserving and explicating the revealed, is the *principal* author or *cause*.

173. GROWTH BY WAY OF EXPLICATION IN THE DOGMA ITSELF. — The foregoing shows clearly the weak point of the common objection usually urged by many beginners against the evolution of dogma. Their argument runs thus: The formal object of dogma or of divine faith is divine revelation; now, after the Apostles there is no longer room for new divine revelation; therefore, there is no room for new dogmas or for dogmatic growth.

If such novice theologians should pay more attention to the two elements comprised in the object of faith, and to the two functions of the Church, they would argue in this other way: the formal object of dogma or of divine faith is not only divine revelation but also the divine explication of the already revealed; now, the divine explication of the divinely revealed can, and does, grow by the Church's definition; therefore, there can be, and there is, a growth in dogma.

CAN IT BE SAID THAT THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH WAS IGNORANT OF SOME OF OUR ACTUAL DOGMAS? — What is not known except implicitly can somehow be said *not to be known*, or that one is *ignorant of it*. "It must be said that as it is implicitly believed, so it is implicitly known. *But that which is not known explicitly is said to be unknown.*"<sup>87</sup> "Explicitly to believe is nothing else but to believe something *in itself*, so that it is the proximate object on which the assent of faith falls. But implicitly to believe is to believe something *only in another*, because what is so believed is *really not known*, nor does the intellect form a *proper concept* of the proposition which is said to be believed only implicitly, but of *another proposition* in which it is contained."<sup>88</sup>

Thus there is no inconvenience in saying that, aside from the Apostles, the primitive Church was *ignorant* of some of our actual dogmas, provided that this be understood only to mean that she did not know them *explicitly*, although she did explicitly know others in which such dogmas were implicitly contained.

Hence, when the councils or the popes employ the phrases "the perpetual sense of the Church", "it has always been the persuasion in the Church of God", "from the very beginning of the Church", and others in the same vein, it is not absolutely necessary to hold in every case that such phrases mean that the Church knew or believed such a truth *explicitly*; in some cases it is enough to hold that the Church knew and believed it *implicitly* in other truths explicitly known and believed by her in which it was implicitly contained. Speaking of the minor Orders, Pesch writes: "What the Council of

<sup>87</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d. 25, expositio textus, towards the end.

<sup>88</sup> SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d. 2, s. 4, n. 2.

Trent says: "From the very beginning of the Church, the names and ministries of the following Orders . . . have been known to be in use", *refers to the time of Pope Cornelius*, for it is certain that the Council Fathers had no such clear information in respect of earlier times."<sup>89</sup> In order to teach and define, the Church need not always ground herself on what is explicit: she can also ground herself on what is implicit in the Scriptures or Tradition.

However, although it can be said that some dogmas were not believed or known explicitly in the first centuries, it would be *false* to say that they have come neither from the Holy Scriptures nor from divine Tradition, for in such a case they could never be dogmas: likewise it would be *extremely* imprudent to affirm without any explanation that such dogmas were *unknown*, since this term uttered without further explanation commonly means that they were denied or rejected by all. Hence Pius X justly censured the article *Pensées sur la question de l'Union des Eglises* published in the periodical *Roma et l'Orient*. The pope declared: "Indeed it, no less rashly than *falsely*, opens the doors to the opinion that the dogma of the Holy Spirit's procession from the Son does not at all flow from the very words of the Gospel nor is substantiated by the faith of the ancient Fathers. Similarly, it *most imprudently* casts doubt on whether the holy men of the first centuries had any knowledge of the sacred dogmas of purgatory and the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin."<sup>90</sup> All the dogmas, without exception, were *explicitly* known by the *Apostles*, and all of them are to be found, at least *implicitly*, in the apostolic statements explicitly known and believed by the primitive Church.

#### SECTION VI

### THE CHURCH'S DOGMATIC AUTHORITY COMPARED TO THE DIVINE AND THE APOSTOLIC AUTHORITY

174. THREE FACTORS PERTAINING TO OUR FAITH. — Three factors intervene, although under different aspects, in any act of our divine faith in the truths of the revealed deposit. With respect to the revealed deposit or public revelation, we believe all, and only, those things committed by the Apostles to the Church; all, and only, those things that the Church teaches us through her ordinary or solemn magisterium. To appreciate with exacti-

<sup>89</sup> *Prælectiones Dogmaticæ, De Sacramento Ordinis*, t. 7, n. 590; 3rd ed. Friburgi Brisgoviae 1909.

<sup>90</sup> PIUS X, *Epistola Ex Qua* to the bishops of the East, *Acta Apostolicæ Sedis* (1911), pg. 117.

tude the different ways in which the authority of God, that of the Apostles, and that of the Church, intervene in that faith or revelation, we must bear in mind two elementary and important distinctions, viz.: 1. that two elements are comprised in divine revelation: (a) the *object* revealed by God to the Apostles and by them conveyed to the Church; and (b) the proposition and *explication* of that same object subsequently made to us by the Church. 2. That one thing is to be mere *organ* or instrument, and quite another thing is to be the original *source* or principal cause.

God intervenes in revelation or in our faith as the original *source* or principal cause, not only of all revealed *objects*, but also of all the divine meaning or *explication* of those objects. No truth can be the object of true divine faith if it has not been really and truly revealed by God. No meaning or explication, even of truly revealed truths, can be the object of divine faith if God, upon revealing such truths, did not really intend to express or signify such a meaning or explication.

Neither the *Apostles*, nor any creature whatsoever, can be the original source or principal cause of any divine or revealed truth, or of the divine explication of that truth. Any truth, or any explication of any truth, that should have its origin in the Apostles, and not in God, would be a *human* truth and a human explication incapable of deserving *divine* faith. However, although the Apostles are not the source of either a revealed object or of a divine explication of such an object, they have been, nonetheless, divine *organs* or instruments of both things; i.e., not only of a new *explication* of that which was already revealed, but also of new *revealed objects* or *new revelations*. The world received through the Apostles, not only the explication of things already revealed (just as we receive it today from the Church), but also new revealed truths or new revelations.<sup>91</sup>

<sup>91</sup> It is well known that the Council of Trent, following the language of the Church Fathers, calls the *Apostles* the *source* of all *revealed* truth. "... as the *source* of all behaviour." (TRIDENTINE COUNCIL, Sess. 4; Denz.-Schön. n.1501) But it is obvious that the term *source* is not employed by the Council in the sense of the *originating* or principal source, but in the sense of a *derived* source, which is what we designate by the terms *channel* or *organ* or *instrument* of God. Thus, theologians divide the *apostolic* truths or traditions into two essentially different classes: *divine-apostolic* traditions, and merely *apostolic* traditions. The former are *divine*; the latter, *human*. The Apostles were merely *organs* of the former, since they received them from Jesus Christ or from the Holy Spirit, as the Tridentine teaches in the aforesaid place; of the latter, they were the *authors* or sources. Hence, the former are of *divine* faith, and *immutable*: with respect to them the Church can do nothing else but *preserve* and *explicate* them. Thus, it is with reference to the former that it is said that neither the Apostles, nor the Church, nor any creature whatsoever can be their *source*, but only their *organ*. (CANO, *De Locis*, lib. 3, c. 5; DE GROOT, *Summa Apologetica*, q. 19, a. 1, 3rd ed. Ratisbonae 1906) Speaking of the revelation of the Old Testament, we employ almost always the disjunctive

The Church coincides with the Apostles in that she cannot be the original *source* of either new objects or revelations or of a new explication. At the same time she differs from the Apostles in that she cannot be the *organ* or instrument of new objects or revelations; but she coincides with the Apostles in being an *organ* of new explications of an already revealed truth. Through the Church's dogmatic magisterium we receive, not new objects or revelations, but, indeed, new *explications* (and not merely the *conservation*) of truths already revealed.

To resume: God is the principal *source* of new *objects* and new *explications*; the Apostles are *organs* both of new *objects* and new *explications*; the Church is an *organ* of new *explications*. It becomes obvious that new *explications* are common to God, the Apostles, and the Church.

175. COMPARISON RELATIVE TO NEW REVELATIONS. When a comparison is attempted between the authority of the Church and that of God or of the Apostles, the comparison can be made either relative to new objects or revelations, or relative to new explications of truths already revealed.

When the comparison is made relative to new objects or new revelations, the Church's authority is evidently inferior to that of the Apostles and of God. Whereas God has revealed to us new truths, and likewise the Apostles have disclosed or taught us new truths, the Church cannot teach us new truths or objects; her dogmatic magisterium is restricted to truths already revealed. But if the comparison is made, not relative to new objects or revelations, but relative to new *explications* of truths already revealed, it can, and must, be said that in this respect the authority of the Church is *the same* as that of the Apostles and that of God; viz., it is a *divine* authority.

Let us make this clear by means of an example. Suppose we go back to the last years of the first century. With the exception of Christ's beloved disciple, who is still alive in Ephesus, all the other Apostles are dead. In Rome, the head of the universal Church is a successor of St. Peter, e.g. St. Clement. In this case there are within the Church three *mediums* to arrive at the *divine* truth: God (Who can, if He so wishes, intervene extraordinarily and reveal or explicate by Himself the revealed truth), the Apostle St. John, and the Pope St. Clement. The authority of God, that of the Apostle, and that of the Church. Let us compare them.

— "new objects or new revelations" because, as we shall see later on, what is called the progress of new *objects* in the Old Testament was in reality only a progress of new *revelations* concerning that which was already implicitly included in the one and the same object of all public supernatural revelation, i.e., in the two most general principles of faith, which constitute the starting point of all dogmatic progress in the Old Testament, just as the apostolic enunciations constitute the starting point of all dogmatic progress in the New Testament. Thus, every time we use the phrase *new objects*, we mean *new revelations* (313).

Obviously God's revealing authority is not limited to the revelations already made by Himself to the Apostles. He could have revealed new truths by the end of the first century, as He could have done on Pentecost. And if He should have done so then, just as if He should do so today, God's authority is always divine and the faith that it deserves is divine.

Similarly, the authority of the Apostle St. John is not restricted to the truths already taught by the other Apostles, since the revelation of new truths, or at least the promulgation and teaching of the same by the Apostles to the Church, was not closed until the death of the last Apostle. The new truths that the Apostle should teach as revealed would be truths of divine faith, and would deserve divine faith.<sup>92</sup> On the other hand, Pope St. Clement's dogmatic authority is confined to the truths taught by the Apostles. He cannot dogmatically teach any truth not yet taught by the Apostles, contained really in the revealed deposit. If we suppose that he did teach any such truth, it would not be a divine truth or doctrine, but an ecclesiastical tradition, nor could it deserve divine faith. Thus, relative to new revelations, the authority of the Church is inferior to that of the Apostles and that of God.

176. COMPARISON RELATIVE TO NEW EXPLICATIONS. — But let us suppose it is not a case of any new object or new revelations, but simply a case of explicating the implicit meaning of a truth already revealed, e.g., in a scriptural text laden with meaning. Let us suppose that God intervenes extraordinarily and by Himself explicates the text to the Church or to one of the faithful; and that, on the other hand, St. John exercises his apostolic charism to explain to another believer or believers that same text; and finally, that Pope St. Clement in turn gives to the universal Church a dogmatic explanation or definition of the same text. We would, then, have a case in which God, the Apostle, and the pope give us at the same time, not a new revealed object, but an authentic explication of a previous revelation. Which of these three authorities or explications would be of greater value? All three would have identical authority; all three would be a *divinely authentic* explication of a divine truth; all three would be deserving of *divine faith*.

Thus, the authority of the Church is inferior to that of God and that of the Apostles relative to new revelations, but relative to the *explications* of all

<sup>92</sup>For our present concern, the debate among theologians on the nature of the faith that ought to be given to private revelations is an accidental question. We have written "the revelation of new truths, or at least the promulgation and teaching of the same by the Apostles", to sidestep the question whether revelation was closed on the very day of Pentecost, as some would have it, or continued until the death of the Apostles, as others would have it. (BANZ, 2-2, q. 1, a. 7; LUGO, *De Fide*, d. 3, s. 5, n. 67; FRANZELIN, *De Traditione Divina*, 2nd ed., pg. 272) All are at least agreed on the fact that the revealed truths were not all promulgated at once by the Apostles, but that their promulgation continued, or could have continued, until the death of the last Apostle. This suffices for our purpose.

the *real content* of the deposit already revealed, it is the same divine authority; it is the authentic and permanent prolongation of the magisterium of Jesus Christ and of the Apostles.

The Apostles combined in their persons the threefold *divine* charism of being *prophets*, *hagiographers* (this existed in some of them, at least), and being *apostles*.<sup>93</sup> The prophetic charism of public *revelation* has ceased to exist in the Church; the hagiographic charism of *inspiration* has likewise ceased to exist; but the apostolic charism of *divine assistance* to conserve and *explicitate* or unfold all the meaning that is truly inclusive or implicit in the revealed deposit continues, and will continue, to exist in the Church till the end of time.

## SECTION VII

### WHETHER THE DOGMATIC EVOLUTION THAT TAKES PLACE AFTER THE APOSTLES IS OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE

177. THE CONSUMMATION AND CLOSING OF CATHOLIC REVELATION. — All Catholic theologians, ancient as well as modern, are agreed in that the deposit of Catholic revelation was completed and closed with the death of the last of the Apostles. The Church has already condemned the contrary doctrine in the following proposition: "The revelation, which constitutes the object of Catholic faith, was not completed with the Apostles."<sup>94</sup> This is the twenty-first among the sixty-five Modernist propositions condemned by the Congregation of the Holy Office in the famous decree *Lamentabili* commonly known as Pius X's "Syllabus against Modernism". St. Thomas had already formulated this traditional doctrine of the Church in these terms: "For our *faith* [the Catholic or universal faith] rests upon the *revelation made to the apostles* and prophets, who wrote the canonical books; but not upon any revelation that may have been *made to other teachers*."<sup>95</sup>

<sup>93</sup>On the question, that has modernly arisen, whether the office of the apostleship carries with itself not only *assistance*, but also a permanent *inspiration* every time that the Apostles explained or explicated the truth already revealed, anyone can, if he wishes, see UBALDI who upholds the theory of permanent inspiration (*Introd. in Scripturam*, Rome 1878, vol. 2, pg. 78), and CRETS who refutes his reasons in detail (*De Divina Bibliorum inspiratione*, n. 20 ff.). PESCH (*De Inspiratione S. Scripturae*, Friburgi Brigoviae 1906, n. 625 ff) treats of the subject more extensively and deals with all the arguments adduced by SCHANZ to defend Ubaldi's opinion with some modifications. For our purpose it is enough that the Apostles had, at least, divine assistance; and on this score all are in agreement.

<sup>94</sup>Denz.-Schön., n. 3421.

<sup>95</sup>*Summa Theologica*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 8.

178. SUBJECTIVE PROGRESS OR PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE. Consequently there can be no doubt that no objective-real progress in dogma, that is, progress of new revelations, is any longer possible. There can be only a subjective progress or a progress of greater knowledge of that which was already revealed by God to the Apostles and by them conveyed to the Church in the twin deposit of Holy Scripture and divine tradition. However, the terms *subjective* progress, and progress of *knowledge* can have various meanings, and some theologians fail to give them all the meaning and scope given them by St. Thomas and traditional theology. To understand them well nothing more is needed than to notice that in all true *progress* there must be two elements: a term *from which* (a quo), or the starting point of the progress, which today usually goes by the name of *primitive datum*, and a term *to which* (ad quem). The term *a quo* has to be something substantially permanent and identical; otherwise there would not only be progress, but also change or transformational evolution (18-19). The term *ad quem* must be truly new or *distinct* from the term *a quo*; otherwise there would be no true, but only a nominal, progress (22-26).

To appreciate, therefore, the nature and extension of the progress made at a given moment, nothing else is required than to take good notice of the *distinction* existing between the term *a quo*, from which the development started, and the term *ad quem*, at which it has arrived; between the *new* or acquired and the *primitive* or permanent. In the case of *dogmatic progress*, notice must be taken of the *distinction* existing between the body of dogmas that the Church believes and teaches today, and the body of dogmas believed and taught by the primitive Church. If no distinction exists at all, there will have been no progress at all; the kind of progress made will depend on the kind of distinction that is found to exist.

There are two kinds of distinction: *real* or objective distinction, and *distinction or reason*, i.e. subjective.<sup>96</sup> All theologians agree in that there can be

<sup>96</sup>It should be obscure to no one that the most learned teachers have held various opinions concerning the number of distinctions. For some have taught that there were eight kinds of distinctions . . . Other teachers, commonly called Nominalists, say that there are only three kinds of distinctions . . .

But it has always been the view of St. Thomas everywhere in his teachings, that there are only two kinds of distinction, to wit, real distinction and distinction of reason, for from Aristotle and other Peripateticians he has gathered but two kinds of being, viz., real being and being of reason, as Aristotle himself has avowed in 5 Metaphys., text 13, and 6 Metaphys., text 8, when with complete sufficiency he divided being into being within the soul, which is the being of reason, and being outside the soul, which is real being.<sup>97</sup> (AQUARIUS, O.P., *Formalitates iuxta doctrinam Angelici Doctoris*, Neapoli 1065, c. 1, p. 2) This teaching is extremely important for determining whether the progress of virtual distinction is formally important for determining whether the progress of virtual distinction is formally objective (outside the soul) or subjective (within the soul).

no real or objective distinction between today's dogmas and those of the primitive Church; the distinction can be only one of reason or subjective. All of our actual dogmas, and whatsoever dogmas may be defined by the Church in the future, must have been, and are really or objectively contained from the very beginning in the revealed deposit. The *distinction* or non-inclusion can only be one of reason, or of knowledge, or subjective. This is what both the Church and traditional theology teach, and herein lies the firm basis against Modernism.

But now comes the important thing, which no theologian should overlook, if he does not wish to be led by the fear of Modernism into the opposite extreme, that of excessively restricting dogmatic progress and disabling himself from understanding and explaining the undeniable facts attested by the history of dogmas, facts that are fully explained in St. Thomas's profound and ample theory.

179. TWO KINDS OR DEGREES OF SUBJECTIVE DISTINCTION. There are, in fact, two kinds of distinction of reason or subjective distinction: a distinction of mere reason (*rationis ratiocinantis*, i.e. of reasoning reason), and virtual distinction (*rationis ratiocinatae*, i.e. of reasoned reason). Both are distinctions of reason, not real distinctions; both are subjective distinctions (23).<sup>97</sup>

But the first is a distinction of mere reason, a distinction grounded on the subject and not on the object, which is why it is said to be merely subjective. The second is not a distinction of mere reason, because it is grounded on the wealth of aspects of the object itself, and thus it is said to be, and truly is, a subjective-objective distinction. This virtual or subjective-objective distinction is that which, as we have so often stated, is found between the conclusions and the principles of mathematical, metaphysical, and theological sciences; whereas between the conclusions and principles of the physical sciences, the distinction is not only virtual or subjective-objective, but real or merely objective (40).

Corresponding to these three kinds of distinction, there will be three degrees of progress: (a) progress of real distinction or merely objective;

<sup>97</sup>But the other member of the distinction, which is called distinction of reason, is of two kinds, as St. Thomas teaches . . . One is a distinction of reason according to the signified or conceived reason, which is called among Thomists distinction of reasoned reason . . . The other is a distinction of reasoning or conceiving reason. (AQUARIUS, O.P., loc. cit., p. 3) It is thus clear, as we have elsewhere noted (23, footnote) that the virtual distinction or distinction of "reasoned reason" is a species of distinction of reason. Consequently, it is "formally", or "simply", (simpliciter), or "in itself" subjective, although it is "in some way" (secundum quid) objective, i.e. on account of its basis.

(b) progress of virtual distinction, or *subjective-objective*; (c) progress of nominal distinction, or *merely subjective* (26).

180. THE DOGMATIC PROGRESS AFTER THE APOSTLES IS SUBJECTIVE-OBJECTIVE PROGRESS. — The foregoing makes it easy to answer the much-debated question today, whether the dogmatic progress after the Apostles is objective or subjective. In the preceding chapters we have seen that the Church can define as of divine faith, true inclusive conclusions, that is, conclusions that differ from the revealed premise or revealed datum neither with a real nor only with a nominal distinction, but with a true virtual distinction. In the following chapters we shall see that the Church has factually defined such conclusions. Now, as we have just seen (179), virtual distinction is neither merely subjective nor merely objective, but subjective-objective.

Hence, after the Apostles, there is in dogma no room for merely objective progress, since that would be transformism and not homogeneous evolution. There is room for merely subjective progress, but that is not enough, for it would be a merely nominal progress, or a progress of mere formulae. Finally, a subjective-objective progress is not only possible but actually exists, which is the view maintained by the great majority of Catholic theologians together with Lirmensis and St. Thomas. We believe that only this view satisfactorily explains the obvious facts of the history of dogmas.

181. THE PROGRESS OF THE BELIEVER IN THE FAITH AND THE PROGRESS OF THE FAITH IN THE BELIEVER. — As a matter of fact, the nominal or merely subjective distinction is a distinction of the subject in itself, that is, of the subject independently of the object. The real or merely objective distinction is a distinction of the object in itself, that is, existing in the object independently of the subject. The virtual or subjective-objective distinction is not only a distinction of the subject in the object, but at the same time a distinction of the object in the subject; for it is a distinction made by the subject in the object, and a distinction received conceptually by the object in the subject.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>98</sup> Virtual distinction or distinction of reasoned reason is described by St. Thomas as a distinction "not only on the part of the reasoner but due to the property of the thing itself." (*In 1 Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2) "For although they signify the same thing, they do not signify the same reason." (*Contra Gentes*, lib. 1, c. 36) "Although they signify one thing, they do not signify it according to one reason." (*In 1 Sent.*, d. 22, q. 1, a. 3) Any reader knows that in these texts the term reason signifies the objective concept or objective reason. On the other hand, the merely mental distinction or distinction of reasoning reason is described by St. Thomas as "only in the intellect of the reasoner" (*Loc. cit.*) "A distinction solely due to the mode of signifying." (*Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 41, a. 3) "Now these two kinds of distinction, although otherwise explained by others, can be conveniently made clear in this way, viz., that the distinction of reasoning reason

Likewise, the progress that is grounded on virtuality, or the subjective-objective progress verified in dogma after the Apostles is not merely a progress of the believer in himself, nor does it attain to a progress of the faith in itself; but it is indeed true progress, not only of the believer in the faith, but also of the faith in the believer: "Progressus tam fidelis in fide quam fidei in fidei."

182. SPEAKING FORMALLY, IT IS A SUBJECTIVE PROGRESS. — Thus, both those who say that the dogmatic progress is subjective and those who say that it is objective are correct up to a certain point, for it occupies a middle place between, and participates in something of both, just as virtual distinction lies midway between the real and the nominal distinction, and participates in something of both.

However, we believe that the dogmatic progress that exists in the Church should not, and cannot, be termed objective without further explanation. There are two reasons for this: the first is that the term *objective progress*, taken without further qualifications, is usually taken today to mean an

is made with reference to the same adequate or simple concept of the same thing, only by a sort of repetition or comparison of it, which is done in the mind. . . . But the latter distinction of reason [that of reasoned reason] is made through inadequate concepts of the same thing; for although the same thing is conceived, nonetheless all that is in the thing is not conceived adequately through either concept, nor is its whole quiddity and objective reason exhausted." (SUÁREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicæ*, d. 7, s. 1, n. 5)

The generic distinction between objective and subjective progress with respect to revelation or divine faith is designated by St. Thomas with the following phrases: relative to the substance of the articles and relative to their explication (2-2, q. 1, a. 7); on the part of the teacher and on the part of the learner, (*ibid.*, ad 2); on the part of the thing believed and on the part of the believer (*ibid.*, q. 1, a. 2); in accordance with object and according to the subject's participation (*ibid.*, q. 5, a. 4); in accordance with itself and in so far as participated in the knower (*De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 12); in accordance with the object and in accordance with the efficaciousness of the act about the object (*In 3 Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1); etc., etc. St. Thomas does not admit any rigorously objective progress, not even in the Old Testament, because everything was already implicitly contained in the primitive revelation of the two most general principles of faith. It was, therefore, not a progress of new objectivity, but one of explication of that which was implicit in such a way that it could not be explicated or known without new revelations. Consequently, there was a progress not by mere human reasoning nor by mere divine assistance, but by revelation. On the other hand, in the New Testament, after the Apostles, there is no progress by new revelations, but an unfolding of that which is implicit in the deposit in such a way that it can be explicated, without revelation, either by mere inclusive human reasoning (theological progress) or by divine assistance (dogmatic progress).

Consequently, a distinction must be drawn between the dogmatic progress prior to the Apostles, the dogmatic progress after the Apostles, and theological progress. The first is progress by divine revelation; the second by divine assistance; the third by human reason. All three are progress by way of explications of the revealed implicit.

objective-real or merely objective progress; after the Apostles, such kind of progress does not, and cannot, exist in dogma. The second is that virtual distinction, although it can be truly called a subjective-objective distinction because it is based on the object, is nonetheless a formally subjective distinction (23); hence, likewise dogmatic progress based on inclusive virtuality, although it can be said to be subjective-objective, is nonetheless *formally subjective*. Thus, dogmatic progress, although it is *objective in a way* (secundum 4-04), remains nonetheless simply (simpliciter) or formally (formaliter), that is to say, *in itself, subjective*, as is exactly the case with the virtual distinction among the divine attributes.

Therefore, although it can be said to be progress of the believer in the faith as well as a progress of the faith in the believer, nonetheless, formally speaking, it must be *rather* said to be a progress of the believer in the faith than of the faith in the believer. "A progress *rather* of the believer in the faith than of the faith in the believer."<sup>99</sup> "An increase *rather* on the part of the believers than of the things believed."<sup>100</sup> "A progress in the *known/ledge* or revelation, not in the *object itself*."<sup>101</sup> "The explication of the faith against rising errors."<sup>102</sup>

#### SECTION VIII

##### WHETHER THE DEFINITIONS OF THE CHURCH COMPLETE OR PERFECT THE DIVINE REVELATION

183. COMPLETION THROUGH REVELATION, AND COMPLETION THROUGH EXPLICATION. — To wind up the study of the relations between the evolution of dogma and the authority of the Church, which constitutes the subject of this long chapter, there only remains to study the question whether the Church, through her definitions, completes or perfects divine revelation. Although this question is as delicate as the previous one, its solution is simply a corollary of the same.

To see it clearly, we need but recall to mind that revelation is one thing, and the explication of revelation is quite another thing. Likewise, a new reve-

<sup>99</sup> ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *In 3 Sent.*, d. 25, a. 1, ad 1; ed. Vivès, t. 28, p. 475.

<sup>100</sup> PETRUS DE TARANTASIA, *In 3 Sent.*, d. 25, q. 5, a. 1, Tolosa 1652.

<sup>101</sup> *Acta et Decreta Concilii Plenarii Americanae Latinae*, n. 26, p. 27, Rome 1906.

<sup>102</sup> ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1.

lation is one thing, and a new explication of the old revelation is quite another. Consequently, one thing is to complete or perfect the revealed deposit through new revelations or through new non-revealed truths, and quite another is to complete or perfect it through new explications of the truths already revealed.

184. NO POSSIBILITY OF COMPLETION THROUGH REVELATION. — If it be a case of completing the revealed deposit with new revelations, we have already seen that all theologians teach that the Church cannot do such a thing, and that this teaching has already been consecrated by the condemnation of its contrary in the 21st proposition of the *Syllabus* of Pius X. (177) The deposit of Catholic revelation was closed with the Apostles, and since then there is no longer any room in the Church for any public revelation or for any hagiographic inspiration, which amounts to the same thing, but only for divine assistance to conserve and explicate what has already been revealed. This has been defined by the Vatican Council.<sup>103</sup>

Similarly, if it be a case of completing the revealed deposit with truths that are not contained in the deposit neither explicitly nor implicitly or inclusively, and which, thus, are not truly revealed, it is obvious that the Church cannot complete or perfect the revealed deposit with such truths by defining them as of faith. No thing can be a dogma of divine faith if it be not truly revealed. That would not be completing or perfecting the deposit, but corrupting it. That would not be homogeneous evolution but heterogeneous trans-formism.

185. POSSIBILITY AND FACT OF COMPLETION THROUGH EXPLICATION. — But if by completing or perfecting the revealed deposit is understood not to perfect it with new revelations or with non-revealed truths, but with a greater explication of the same truths, which is what is meant by implicit virtuality or inclusive conclusions, then there is no doubt that the Church can thus complete and perfect the revealed deposit, and that she thus completes and perfects it every time she defines as a dogma any of those inclusive-consequential truths.

Being truly inclusive in the revealed deposit they are truly and implicitly revealed. Being truly consequential, the Church needs no new revelation in order to arrive at their knowledge, but divine assistance suffices together with the employment of human reasoning as a previous condition or as a mere instrument to deduce, develop, or as the ancients termed it, *explicate* them;

<sup>103</sup> "For the Holy Spirit was not promised to Peter's successors in the sense that by His revelation they should disclose new doctrine, but in the sense that by His assistance they should *inviolably safeguard and faithfully expound the revelation or deposit of faith handed down by the Apostles.*" (VAT. COUNCIL, *De Ecclesia Christi*, c. 4; Denz.-Schön., n. 3070)

for a thing is properly said to be explicated when that which was beforehand included or implicit in it is unfolded. Finally, being a true virtuality of the revealed deposit, and not mere subjective formulae of the believer, its development is a true development of the revealed deposit, whereby the latter is completed and perfected, as any living being that does nothing but unfold its latent or implicit virtualities, completes and perfects itself without any corruption or transformation. This is nothing else than a simple corollary of the doctrine already expounded on the implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit.

Let it not be said that the revealed deposit was completed with the Apostles, and that which is complete admits of no further completion. The revealed deposit was completed with respect to *revelation*; but it was neither closed nor completed, but remained open and completable with respect to the *divine explication* of what had already been revealed.

186. THE TEACHING OF THE VATICAN COUNCIL. . . Let it not be objected either that the Vatican Council teaches that the Church cannot perfect the revealed deposit. The Vatican Council does not teach that the Church cannot perfect the revealed deposit, but that she cannot perfect it *in the manner of a philosophical system*, which is a fruit of human inventions.<sup>104</sup>

As we have elsewhere explained, the development of any philosophical or human system comprises three things: (a) the *subtraction* or rejection of any datum, no matter how long standing it might be, which is shown to be false by either reason or experience; (b) the *addition* of any new datum shown to be true by experience or reason, even if it happens not to be included in the primitive datum; (c) the *modification* of the meaning of the primitive datum whenever reason or experience shows that the old meaning was inexact. This is the manner in which all human systems, all institutions that are fruits of man or of nature, are developed, viz. by withdrawing, adding, modifying incessantly.

<sup>104</sup>For the doctrine of faith, which God has revealed, has not been proposed as a philosophical invention to be perfected by human talents, but has been handed over to the Spouse of Christ as a divine deposit to be faithfully safeguarded and infallibly declared. (VAT. COUNCIL, *De Fide Catholica*, c.4; Denz.-Schön. n.3020) The Church, therefore, does not condemn all perfecting of the revealed deposit, but the perfecting of it "in the manner of a philosophical system". This is seen even more clearly in the formula for the oath prescribed by Pius X: "Likewise, I condemn all errors whereby the *divine deposit* handed over to the Spouse of Christ to be faithfully safeguarded by her is replaced by a philosophical invention or creation of human conscience gradually shaped by the efforts of men, and which is to be perfected in the future through an indefinite progress." (Motu Proprio *Sacrorum Antiquitatum*, Sept. 1, 1910; Denz.-Schön. no.354.) The canons and the doctrine of the Vatican Council as well as the formula against Modernism have been worded with such precision and dogmatic refinement, that the theologian, or reading them, must analyze and carefully weigh each word if he wishes, in his efforts to avoid one error, not to fall into the opposite error.

In the development of the revealed deposit, which is the fruit of neither man nor nature but of God and of a supernatural God, neither the Church nor true theology can do any of these three things. In the process of development through *inclusive* minors of reason nothing of the old is *discarded*, nothing alien is *added*, nothing is *modified*. The inclusive minors are not employed for the purposes of subtracting, adding, or modifying anything in the majors of faith, but simply for the purpose of developing, unfolding, *explicating* the inexhaustible fecundity locked up in the majors revealed by God, and which, being divine, are laden and overflowing with divine truth, with dogmatic sap.

Let then no reader be shocked upon hearing us say that the Church perfects the deposit. She does not perfect it in the manner of a philosophical system, but she does perfect it because she increases the explication of the deposit, and this authentic explication given by the Church becomes a part of the revealed deposit itself to be conserved as a true and legitimate constituent part of the revealed deposit.

We all know from the teaching of traditional theology, and from the Vatican Council's definition, that the Church has the divine mission not only of *conserving* but also of *explicating* the deposit. Nonetheless, an excessive fear of Modernism, or the reading of certain theological textbooks, has made some people so timid or so narrow-minded as to think that the action of *explicating* exercised by the Church is an action that falls, not on the revealed deposit, which they regard as completely immutable and untouchable, but exclusively on the *subjective intellect* of the believers.

These people are, in our opinion, very much mistaken. *To whom* something is *explicated* is one thing; *what* is explicated is another thing. Undoubtedly, those to whom the Church explicates the deposit are the faithful; but that which the Church explicates or unfolds is not the faithful, but the *deposit*.

Thus the action of the Church falls not only on the faithful but also on the revealed deposit itself. Corresponding to every action or dogmatic definition by the Church there occurs in the deposit itself a degree of development or growth, but always with respect to us. It is a growth that occurs not through something coming from without, but through something that issues from within, as is the case with anything that is vital or homogeneous. It is a growth not of new substance, but of explication or greater development of the substance. Nonetheless, it is a case of true and proper growth, of true and proper *evolution*, but never a case of *transformation*.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>105</sup>What we have said about the term "objective progress" (182) must similarly be said of the terms "evolution of dogma" or "new dogmas", notwithstanding the fact that these terms are true, that is to say, such terms must not be employed without an



187. THE TEACHING OF LIRINENSIS. — Lirinensis, whose authority in this matter is recognized by all, has stated well what the Church cannot do, and what she can do with respect to dogma or the revealed deposit.

What the Church cannot do, and does not do, he states in the following terms: (a) she *permutes* nothing; (b) *takes* nothing away; (c) *adds* nothing; (d) does *not* *excise* the necessary; (e) *does not append* the superfluous. (f) *loses* nothing of what is hers; (g) *does not usurp* what is another's. The Church does none of these things with respect to the deposit. Insofar as such behaviour is concerned, the deposit is sacred, immutable, untouchable.

What the Church can do, and does, with respect to the deposit itself (and not only with respect to the faithful), he states in these terms: (a) let it be *cultivated*; (b) let it *flower*; (c) let it *mature*; (d) let it *grow*; (e) let it be *PERFECTED*.

Let our objector take note of the two last terms of Lirinensis. Under the action of the Church, which is none other than the action of the Holy Spirit, the deposit itself *grows* (proficiat), the deposit itself is *perfected* (perficiatur).

The reason for this is that not all the dogmas existed in the primitive deposit *formally* relative to us, but some existed therein in an *unformed* state. To the Church, of which theology is only an instrument, God entrusted the mission not only of *conserving* that which already existed formally or in a finished state, but also of *explicating*, i.e., of developing, maturing, and finishing that which relative to us existed only as something *unformed* and *roughly sketched*. "Let her take care of and finish any things that of old are *unformed* and *inchoate*, and keep safe those that have been *firmed* and *defined*."<sup>106</sup>

Explanation or distinction because they lend themselves easily to a false understanding. When without further qualification a thing is said to evolve, the term is usually taken today to mean *transformistic* evolution; when "new dogmas" are mentioned, the term usually means "completely new"; when "objective progress" is mentioned without further explanation it usually means the progress of the object "in itself", independently of the subject. Taken in these senses, such terms would be false. Hence, this book does not bear the title "The Evolution of Dogma", but that of "The Homogeneous Evolution of Dogma".

<sup>106</sup>,"But perhaps someone might say: Is there, in consequence, *no progress* in the Church of Christ? Let there be progress, and in the *greatest* measure. However, let it truly be *progress of the faith*, not a permutation. For it belongs to progress that each thing be increased *in itself*; but to permutation, that something be changed from one thing into another . . . Therefore, what-ever has been sown by the faith of the fathers in this husbandry of God's Church, let the same *flourish* and *mature*, let the same *grow* and *come to perfection*. But the Church of Christ, being a sedulous and circumspect guardian of the dogmas committed to her, *permutes* nothing in them, *subtracts* nothing,

Thus, through the Church's action the revealed deposit is not perfected in the manner of a philosophical or human system, but it is *perfected*. It is not perfected with regard to the *substance*, but with regard to its *explication*. It is not perfected through new divine *revelation*, but through perpetual divine *assistance*. Since that authority or assistance is divine, the growth is dogmatic. Since it is *assistance*, not revelation, it must, and does, employ all human means; and no human means has been, or will ever be, found to be more connatural to our feeble intellect for the purpose of unfolding or explicating the content or inner fecundity of an *intellectual* deposit, such as the revealed deposit, than *inclusive reasoning*. In other words, by way of theological conclusion, by way of transition "from one to an other according to reason, which is *not other in reality*." (ST. THOMAS)

*adds* nothing; she *excises* nothing necessary, *appends* nothing superfluous, *loses* nothing of what is hers, *usurps* nothing that belongs to another; but with all diligence strives after this one thing: that by faithful and wise treatment of the old heritage, she may render accurate and polished anything that of old is *unformed* and *inchoate*; consolidate and firm anything that is already expressed and clarified, keep safe anything already *firmed* and *defined*." (LIRINENSIS, *Communitorium*, n.23; MIGNE PL 50, 667) St. Thomas expresses himself in a similar vein. "The article is an *indivisible* truth with regard to what is *actually* explicated in the article; but it is *divisible* with regard to those things that are *potentially* contained in the article, for he who says *one thing*, somehow says *many things*; and these are the things that *precede* the article and which are *consequent to it*; and in this regard the article of faith can be *explicated* and *divided* . . . and through the efforts of the Church Fathers [the faith] has been more and more *explicated*." (In 3 Sent., d.25, q. 2, aa.2-4, also a.1, sol.3)

## CHAPTER IV

the way of pure speculation or reasoning -- to which they contemptuously refer as "mere dialectics" -- has had little or no influence at all in its development.

For such theologians dogmatic evolution has taken place, and takes place, only or almost only by way of Christian praxis or Christian sense. The basis for this lies in their belief that the primitive deposit or revealed datum was principally made up of facts or institutions; if any intellectual statements were found in it, such statements were neither explicit nor clear, as required for the possibility of speculative reasoning, but vague and confused, and thus more apt to undergo development through the praxis and experience of the whole Christian community than through the abstract speculative processes of a handful of dialectical theoreticians.

190. AN INTERESTING LETTER. How firmly such ideas have taken root even in great Catholic theologians can be seen from the interesting paragraphs that follow, transcribed from a letter which a renowned writer and professor of theology sent us years ago when we were writing on these matters in *La Ciencia Tomista*.

"Indeed, if we consider dogmatic development *a priori*, it would seem that it should take place as you describe it, and so it would insofar as such a development is realized *dialectically*. However, I believe that such a process has scarcely taken place, if at all. First, because, in my view, a great part of the deposit is not to be found from the beginning, not even *implicitly*, in intellectual statements, but only embodied in facts and institutions, whose explication, based on sound experience and guaranteed by the Church, leads us to recognize such doctrines as *virtually* contained therein; it is in this sense that I usually understand this term. Secondly, because even that which is implicated in certain statements cannot be easily deduced therefrom through *mere dialectics*: (a) because it is not contained in clear statements, as in the case of the first principles of any science, but in expressions that are vague and even confused, from which, with no other light or guide but *dialectics*, I fail to see how anything can be rigorously deduced; (b) because when we are dealing with ineffable and mysterious realities, where terms are not employed in a univocal but in an analogical sense, their supposition at times varies somewhat without our being aware of it, and thus propositions that seem equivalent, are not totally so. Hence, some kind of flaw creeps into the deduction, which, therefore, no matter how logical it appears to be, is not conclusive unless its legitimacy is vouched for by good Christian sense and guaranteed by the Church. Hence, too, the fact that *dialectical* development should so often lead to an aberration, a heresy, an error, or to mere doctrines held by the various schools, with no hope of ever being defined some day.

"In short, dogmatic development very very rarely, or almost never, takes place through *pure dialectics*. Dialectics usually comes in subsequently

## THE DIFFERENT CHANNELS OF THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

188. OBJECT AND DIVISION OF THIS CHAPTER. -- In the preceding chapter we have seen that a true homogeneous evolution is possible in dogma without detriment to its substantial immutability. In the present chapter we shall study the different ways, or channels, or processes through which such an evolution is carried out. At the same time we shall touch briefly on the analogies exhibited by dogmatic evolution relative to the various kinds of evolution in the natural order.

We shall therefore divide this chapter into seven sections:

1. Dogmatic evolution through speculative processes.
2. Historical examples of dogmatic evolution through this channel.
3. Still more examples.
4. Whether dogmatic evolution through assimilation is possible.
5. Dogmatic evolution through affective or experimental processes.
6. Further observations on the affective way.
7. The analogies of dogmatic evolution.

## SECTION I

## DOGMAIC EVOLUTION THROUGH SPECULATIVE PROCESSES

189. AN ANTI-INTELLECTUAL BIAS. -- Even among theologians who admit the evolution of dogma there are those who hold the view that

to justify the development made spontaneously or intuitively by way of Christian praxis or experience. Thus, St. Thomas's dictum is fulfilled: Life comes ahead of doctrine. If such were not the case, you should find it easy to cite concrete, real instances of dialectical development, and you should not content yourself with some hypothetical case.<sup>14</sup>

It is clear that our objector agrees with us in that not only theological, but also true dogmatic development exists in the Church even after the Apostles. He further agrees with us in that the principal cause of this dogmatic progress is the Church's divine authority, or in other words, the Holy Spirit's assistance, which the Church possesses not merely to *conservare*, but also to *explicare*, or unfold, or develop the revealed deposit.

Thus the disagreement is not about the existence of dogmatic progress nor about its principal cause, but solely about the *human instrument* or way or medium of the aforesaid progress. For the Church possesses neither revelation nor even inspiration but only the *assistance* of the Holy Spirit; hence it is necessary to assign some human medium whereof the Church may avail herself for the dogmatic explication or development of the revealed deposit.

We said that the usual medium employed by the Church for the development of dogma is *reason*, or in other words, reasoning, or by another name, the way of theological *conclusion*. Our objector, on the other hand, says or seems to say that dogmatic progress never or almost never takes place by way of reasoning.

At first glance, the disagreement cannot be more radical; however, we suspect that the disagreement is more a question of names than of reality, and that it lies in the peculiar and restricted sense given by our objector to the term *reasoning*. Our suspicion is based on the fact that wherever we have employed the terms *reason*, *argumentation*, *reasoning*, our objector never employs such terms; instead he employs solely and exclusively the terms *dialectics*, *simple dialectics*, *mere dialectics*, as if there were no argumentation other than the formal, i.e., that which is disposed in the form of a reasoning, which is the concern of dialectics.

To preclude such a momentous problem, as this one on the progress of dogma, from turning into a mere question of names, let us recall to mind briefly what St. Thomas understands, and what we have understood by the terms *reason*, *argumentation*, and *reasoning*, when we affirm that this is the more usual channel of dogmatic progress.

191. INTUITION AND REASONING. — Any truth must be either known *in itself*, or known *in another* truth. There can be no middle between being known *in itself* and being known *in another*.

This is applicable both to knowledge that is intrinsic, i.e., science, and to knowledge that is extrinsic, i.e., based on authority. In the case of intrinsic or evident knowledge, every truth is either evident *of itself* or evident *through another*. *Per se notum*, *notum per aliud*, philosophers are wont to say. Like wise, in the case of revealed knowledge or the knowledge of faith, every truth is either revealed *in itself* or revealed *in another* truth. *Revelatum in se, revelatum in alio*, theologians are wont to say. The knowledge of a thing, through itself and without the intervention of another objective truth, in which it is wrapped up, is called *simple understanding* or *intuition*. The knowledge of a truth, not through itself, but through another virtually distinct truth in which the former is wrapped up, is called *reason* or *reasoning*.

According to this doctrine, which we have elsewhere expounded in greater detail, to reason is nothing else but to know one truth through another, or to pass from the knowledge of a truth or proposition to the knowledge of another, or to affirm one truth on the strength of another. The *kind* of that *other* truth on which the former is based, or from which it proceeds, is accidental. It may be a revealed or a non-revealed truth; a metaphysical, physical, or moral truth; speculative, or practical; a truth of fact, or a truth of law; a theory, or an experience. . . . there will be different kinds of reasoning, but there will always be reasoning because it will always be knowledge of a truth not through itself but *through another* that differs virtually from it. All of it is argumentation or reasoning; all of it is science; all of it is conclusion — something quite different from simple understanding or intuition, which is knowledge of a truth through itself; and something quite different from faith, which is knowledge of a truth simply and solely through authority. (61-64).

192. CONSCIOUS REASONING, AND SPONTANEOUS OR UNCONSCIOUS REASONING. — This reasoning or comparison of one truth with another is not always consciously done by us; rather it is often done in a spontaneous or unconscious manner. There are very many truths that seem clear and obvious to us, and undoubtedly so they are. However, they are not clear of themselves but in virtue of other truths that our minds habitually

<sup>14</sup>To understand means the simple acceptance of something, hence principles which are known of themselves without any comparison are properly said to be understood. To reason is properly to arrive from one to the knowledge of another. Hence, we properly reason about conclusions, which are made clear by the principles." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 83, a. 4) "And thus it is necessary that one apprehended term be combined with or divided from another, and that advance be made from one combination or division to another, which is to reason." (ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, q. 85, a. 5) "These habits [understanding and science] differ insofar as understanding views the true that is known of itself, whereas science considers the true that is known through another." (ST. THOMAS, *op. cit.*, p. 1-2, q. 75, a. 2)

possess and with which our minds continuously compare them without our being aware of doing so. This is proven by the fact that if someone doubts the truth of any of those statements, or asks us why we hold any of them, we readily proffer the reason or proof on the strength of which we affirm it to be so, thus evidencing that what seemed to be clear of itself was in reality clear through another truth existing in our minds, which served as the ground or basis of our statement even when we were not explicitly aware of it.

Consequently, whenever there exists in our minds a "why" or intrinsic reason for our statements or opinions, a reasoning also exists. If we point out the "why", or are aware of it, the reasoning is conscious. If the "why" exists in our minds without our being expressly aware of it, the reasoning is unconscious or spontaneous. But, in any case, where an objective or intrinsic reason for what we affirm exists in our minds, there reasoning exists, not simple understanding or intuition.

**193. REASONING IN FORM OR DIALECTICAL, AND FORMAL, REASONING.** The conscious reasoning whereby we express the reason for our statement, or whereby we become aware of it, can be done either *in the form* of a reasoning, or done *without such a form*. The various forms of reasoning are well known, and they are dealt with in *dialectics*. The primary form is that in which from a major proposition and another minor proposition prefaced with a *now* or *but*, a third proposition or conclusion is inferred by a *therefore* or *consequently*. When we argue in this manner there is not only a real reasoning — since there is a transition from one truth to another — but also a *formal* or *dialectical* reasoning, i.e., a reasoning done *in dialectical form*.

However, this manner of reasoning is too technical, too formal, too artificial to suit the exercise of such a natural and daily function of our minds, such as reasoning is. Hence, we rarely employ such a formal manner of reasoning. Instead we usually employ the formless mode of arguing, in which we set aside the three distinct propositions with their *nows* and *therefores*, and settle for only one proposition whereby we express our *reason* or reasoning by means of a simple conjunction, an adverb, or a participle. Instead of saying with the dialecticians: "Every spiritual being is immortal; now, the human soul is spiritual; therefore, it is immortal"; we say simply: "being spiritual, it has to be immortal"; or, "since it is spiritual, it is also immortal." This is the usual manner of reasoning. Such reasonings are true reasonings even if they are not cast in dialectical *form*. Instances of reasoning in dialectical form are so uncommon that they are to be found almost exclusively in textbooks or in the intellectual gymnastics of academic *acts* or disputations.

Thus, intuition or simple understanding is one thing; and quite another, reason or reasoning. Likewise, reasoning can be either spontaneous or con-

scious; and the conscious reasoning can be either formless or dialectical. To know a truth through itself and not through another is intuition or simple understanding. To know it, not through itself, but through another in which it is intrinsically wrapped up and from which we deduce it, is always a case of reasoning, although not always a case of formal or dialectical reasoning.

**194. REPLY TO THE OBJECTION.** We said that the most common human instrument employed by the Church in the development of dogma is argumentation or reasoning. This means nothing else but that dialectic development usually takes place through comparing certain truths with other virtually distinct truths; whether it be a comparison of revealed truths among themselves, or with truths of reason.

On the other hand, our distinguished correspondent says that it never, or almost never, takes place through dialectics, through mere dialectics

— if by dialectics our correspondent understands the *formal* argumentation or that which is done *in the form* of reasoning, we find no inconvenience in answering: *transcat*. We could as easily deny it since there has been some instance of dogmatic development effected in dialectical form. However, in view of the fact that when we speak of reasoning relative to dogmatic development, we have never employed the term in the narrow sense of reasoning cast in dialectical form, but in the broad and proper sense of knowing one truth through another virtually distinct from it, we prefer to answer: *transcat*, since it is not good to confuse the issues.

But if by dialectics or speculative processes our correspondent understands any kind of true and proper reasoning, then his statement would be equivalent to saying that dogmatic development has never or very rarely been effected through comparing certain truths with other truths or through a rigorous deduction of some truths from other truths. In which case, his statement is contrary to the common view of traditional theology and to clear facts of the history of dogmas.

Our correspondent asks for concrete and real instances of dogmatic development through speculative channels or reasoning. We think that, although the matter is very delicate, the request poses no great difficulty, and we shall oblige with numerous instances in the following two sections. But first let us touch on his two other observations concerning the scarcity of speculative or intellectual statements in the revealed deposit, and the obscurity or vagueness of such statements.

**195. THE SCARCITY OF INTELLECTUAL STATEMENTS IN THE REVEALED DEPOSIT.** — Intellectual statements are of two kinds: some are expressed in abstract, conceptual, philosophic terms. Cardinal Newman usually designates these with the name of *notional* statements. Others are ex-

pressed in concrete, individual, ordinary terms, which we call terms of *common sense*.

The councils or theologians say: "In God there is a trinity of hypostases in the unity of essence," "The Son is consubstantial with the Father," "In Christ there are two natures and only one person." These are intellectual but abstract or notional statements because the terms "essence," "hypostasis," "nature," "consubstantial", are conceptual or philosophic and not ordinary or common terms.

On the other hand, the Holy Bible says: "There is but one God": "Jesus Christ is the true Son of God"; "He is like unto us in everything except sin". These are also true *intellectual* statements, and not one whit less intellectual than the former, but they are concrete and individual, not abstract or notional, statements because the terms "only one God", "Son of God", "like unto us", are ordinary or common-sense terms, terms of universal usage.

We, therefore, readily grant that, as a general rule, the revealed deposit is not couched in abstract or philosophic statements; but rather in concrete, singular, popular, common-sense statements. The reason for it is obvious. The revealed deposit was not written for the wise alone, as were the works of Aristotle or Plato; but for the whole of mankind, just as much, perhaps even more, for the simple folk than for philosophers or theologians. And when one speaks or writes for everybody and not for a learned group, when one addresses himself to the popular mind and not to specialists, the language employed is, and has to be, concrete, singular, couched in ordinary, common-sense terms. As a general rule, such is the language of the Holy Bible and of divine Tradition. It is the strongest token of its perenniality and catholicity, since thus the language is accessible to all kinds of persons, places, and times.

But if in the revealed deposit there is a scarcity of abstract statements, there is, on the contrary, an abundance of concrete statements. The Holy Bible is replete with such *concrete* statements, which are not less *intellectual* than the abstract or notional simply because they are concrete. The Holy Bible abounds in statements overflowing with divine truth and life, statements that overflow with life precisely insofar as they overflow with truth. This is particularly true of the New Testament, and much more of the fourth gospel and the epistles of St. Paul, which is why so much is being said and written today on the so-called "Theology of St. John and of St. Paul." Dogmatic reasoning takes off from these biblical statements which, we repeat, are not one whit less intellectual for being concrete; from these *theologies* of St. John and St. Paul, which are not one whit less divine or less of a *primitivo datum* than the simplest statements of the Synoptics, since they are all equally divinely inspired. Then it either compares some revealed statements with others, or compares them with clear statements of human reason. The basis or starting point of dogmatic argumentation or reasoning can indifferently be

either an abstract or a concrete statement, provided only that it be divinely revealed. Likewise, if a statement of reason is to intervene as a minor premise without jeopardizing objective homogeneity, it is indifferent whether it be theoretical or practical, of external or internal experience, immediately or mediately evident, provided that it be *evident*, whatever be the source of that evidence.

Thus, for example, although we do not have explicitly revealed the abstract statement that "Jesus Christ is *consubstantial* with the Father", we have instead the *concrete* revealed statements that "Jesus Christ is the true Son of God" and that "There is but one God"; and from these concrete statements mutually compared, the abstract statement of *consubstantiality* follows by true reasoning. Although we do not have divinely revealed the abstract statement that in Christ there are two natures and two operations, we have instead divinely revealed the concrete statements that Christ is not only God but also man "in everything like unto us"; and from these two statements combined with the minor of natural reason that every man has a human nature, and, if he be in either a *perfect* or a *connatural* state, also possesses a human will and all the other powers, there followed the abstract statement of the two natures and the two wills and operations. Although we do not have explicitly revealed the abstract statement that it is necessary to confess all sins stating their species, number, and specific circumstances, we do have revealed the concrete statement that the ministers of the Church are true *judges* in the matter of retaining or forgiving sins; and from this concrete statement combined with the natural minor premise regarding the nature of *judgment*, there followed the abstract statement regarding the species, number, and circumstances. Although the abstract statement regarding the *transubstantiation* has not been explicitly revealed to us, the concrete statement *This is my body* has been revealed to us; and from this concrete statement combined with what is evidently required for the *truth* of this mystery there followed the abstract statement of the transubstantiation. And so of many other dogmas or dogmatic developments, that is to say, of all or almost all derived dogmas.

It is true that all this, which sounds simple enough when stated in a few sentences, has required prolonged labours and experiences, countless trials and discussions, at times even centuries of slow and troubled gestation. But that is one more proof of the fact that the development has been effected through intellectual channels or by way of knowledge, rather than through affective or devotional channels. For as St. Thomas subtly observes, the difference between these two methods of development lies precisely in the fact that the development effected through intellectual methods requires experience and time; whereas time, external experience, or any other external ele-

ment, are accidental to the development effected through affective or devotional channels.<sup>2</sup>

196. ANOTHER REPLY. — But let us gratuitously assume that in the revealed deposit there hardly exists any intellectual statement, whether abstract or concrete; that the revealed deposit reduces to *facts* and *institutions*, as our objector seems to say. Even if such an entirely gratuitous hypothesis were granted, we fail to see that anything could be inferred therefrom against dogmatic progress by way of reasoning. Whether the starting point be an intellectual statement or a fact or institution makes no difference with respect to true theological reasoning, provided such facts or institutions are revealed or divine, as anything included in the deposit necessarily has to be.

Thus, let us take as an example any of those dogmas that do not seem to be contained in the deposit in the form of intellectual statements but in the form of facts or of the constant practice of the Church. For instance, the dogma, already defined as a truth of faith, that the baptism administered by a heretic is valid. This dogma does not seem to be recorded, at least not explicitly, in any statement of the Holy Scriptures, but only in a fact or practice of those who had been baptized in heresy were never rebaptized upon their conversion. Now, then, it is obvious that this mere fact or practice would have been, and is, sufficient to infer by means of true reasoning the dogma of the validity of such baptisms provided that such a fact is related to another revealed truth, viz. the necessity of baptism for salvation. If we posit as major the revealed truth that baptism is necessary for salvation, and as minor the constant practice of the Church not to administer a new baptism to those who were baptized in heresy, it evidently follows that the first baptism, although administered by heretics, has always been considered valid by the Church; and this is the defined dogma.

Similarly, the dogma of the universality of original sin can be inferred from the sole *fact* of baptism being administered to children; the dogma of the real presence from the sole *fact* that adoration has always been given to the host and the wine after their consecration; the dogma of papal infallibility from the sole *fact* that in the Church nothing has ever been considered firm and definitive in matters of faith without the approval of the Sovereign Pontiff. The same can be said of many other dogmas.

<sup>2</sup>Speaking *per se* the increase of the magnitude of *faith* as to steadfastness and devotion is effected in proportion to the readiness of the *will* which comes from *grace*, virtues whereof *require experience and time*; . . . But to *reflect* (cogitare) belongs to the *intellect*, the *knowledge* of the articles, speaking *per se*, grows in accordance with the *difference of time*. (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1.)

Truth to say, St. Thomas frequently bases himself on *facts*, rites, customs or institutions of the Church in order to deduce through rigorous and true reasoning the dogmas that we believe. Thus, in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* (book 3, ch. 1) he deduces the dogma of original sin from the universal practice (according to the common custom of the Church) of administering baptism to children. In the *Summa Theologica* (2-2, q. 75, a. 2) he proves that neither the bread nor the wine remains after the consecration by means of the Church's custom (the Church's rite) of offering the worship of adoration (latria) and of the eucharistic fast. Earlier, in q. 2, a. 1, he had proven that the making of a symbol of faith belongs to the Pope from the constant fact that the graver questions have always belonged to the Pope (to whom the graver and more difficult questions of the Church are referred), and from the fact that no council, not even a general council, has ever been held to be valid without his confirmation (by whose authority a Synod is congregated and by whose judgment it is confirmed). In q. 10, a. 12 of the same part, in order to prove that the children of infidels or of Jews are not to be baptized against the will of their parents, he adduces as a fundamental reason the constant custom of the Church. (This has never been held by the usage of the Church. . . . Beside the custom hitherto observed in the Church). So far is the Holy Doctor from believing that theological reasoning cannot be based on facts or institutions or customs, when they are of divine origin, that he places the custom of the Church above the very authority of the Holy Fathers. "The Church's usage possesses the greatest authority, which should be followed in all things, since the very teaching of Catholic Doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence, one should abide by the authority of the Church rather than by the authority of Jerome or of any other doctor."

So that our objector may palpably see how a true and rigorous reasoning can be grounded on a *fact* or rite or *institution*, and how a true dogma can be inferred from it through what our objector calls *mere dialectics*, we will transcribe literally the reasoning whereby St. Thomas deduces the existence of original sin in children from the constant *practice* of the Church.

"Baptism and the other sacraments of the Church are certain remedies against sin, as will be clear below. Now, in accordance with the common usage of the Church, baptism is administered to newly born children. Therefore, it would be administered in vain if no sin existed in them. But no actual sin exists in them because they are wanting in the use of free judgment, without which no act is imputed to man unto guilt. Consequently, it must be said that there exists in them the sin derived through origin, since there is nothing in vain or useless in the works of God and the Church."

<sup>3</sup> *Loc cit.*

<sup>4</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, bk. 4, ch. 50.

Here we have a true *dogma* deduced by means of true reasoning based on a custom or fact or institution. The particles *now, therefore, since*, are the indecible marks of reasoning, or the bonds of comparison of various truths among themselves. If our objector prefers to call this mere *dialectics* at one time, and *Christian sense or intuition* at another, "What's in a name?" It has always been known by the name of reasoning, and the history of dogmatic progress is replete with such reasonings.

It is obvious that true reasoning and true dogmatic progress or development are no less possible in the case of facts and institutions than in the case of intellectual statements. The profound reason for this is given by St. Thomas in his analysis of the value of *facts*, customs, or institutions: Man has at his disposal two means wherewith to express his interior thought: the first is words; the second, deeds. Both, words or deeds, are alike signs of the thought of him who speaks the words or performs the deeds.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, assuming that we are dealing with facts or institutions of divine origin, that is, contained in the revealed deposit, we come through them to know the *mind* of the inspired author exactly as if he had expressed himself by means of words or intellectual statements instead of facts or institutions. The words or intellectual statements of the Bible are objects of dogma or of faith insofar as they are signs or expressions of the inspired author's thought or of God's thought. Such a thought is expressed no less by facts or institutions than by abstract or concrete statements.

Putting together the two replies to the first objection we have: (a) the revealed deposit does not perhaps contain many abstract intellectual statements, but it does contain a very great number of concrete statements; (b) even if we grant that the greater part of the revealed deposit is made up of facts or institutions, such facts or institutions equally serve the purpose of dogmatically unfolding the deposit through reasoning just as if they were intellectual statements.

197. THE OBSCURITY AND VAGUENESS OF THE STATEMENTS.  
— The second difficulty against dogmatic progress by way of reasoning or revealed deposit. This difficulty is stated by our friend in the following terms:

<sup>5</sup>"Just as man's reason and will in things that are to be done is manifested through words so also it is manifested through deeds... insofar as the interior movement of the will and the concept of reason is most efficaciously made clear by multiplied external acts." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.* p.1-2, q.97, a.3) Boutroux himself acknowledges that every religious fact is always the expression of an idea or intellectual statement. "Indeed, every sentiment, every religious act enfolds ideas, concepts, theoretical understanding."

"In the second place, that which is implied in certain statements is not easily deduced therefrom through mere dialectics because it is not embodied in clear statements, as the principles of a science, but in vague and *confused* expressions, from which, with no other light and guide than dialectics, I find to see that anything can be rigorously inferred." (190)

*Reply.* — In any statement or principle whether it be a statement or principle of science or a statement or principle of faith or revelation two parts must always be distinguished: there is a part that is explicit, formal, determinate, *clear*; and there is another part that is implicit, virtual, vague, *obscure*. If everything were explicit, determinate, clear, there could be no progress, nor would such a statement be a principle. If everything were vague, indeterminate, obscure, there could be no *understanding* nor even *faith*; nor would it deserve to be called a statement or proposition but a logograph or undecipherable riddle.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, no thing can be deciphered if we do not start from something clear just as no equation can be solved if all its quantities are unknown or indeterminate. Thus, there has to be something clear. (55)

This clear part, big or small, of the primitive datum or deposit provides the reasoning with the starting point from which it proceeds to make clear the part that is obscure, to determine the part that is vague, to actualize the part that is virtual. This is precisely that in which reasoning consists. This is the condition for all progress. Provided that there is something clear... and without this no faith is possible — the virtual and obscure part can be the cause for exerting greater effort and consuming more time, but it will at the same time be the source of more ample, more fruitful, more inexhaustible progress.

Indeed, where a principle is more profound, higher, more divine, the greater is the part of implicitness, virtuality, indetermination, vagueness, obscurity, that it contains. Clear and transparent waters are usually not indicative of great depth. On the other hand, insofar as a principle gets to be clear, fixed, determined, it loses implicitness, virtuality, fecundity. A force loses its potential to the degree that its energy is actualized. Hence, the statements of the councils, popes, theologians, are much more clear, more precise, less vague than the statements of the sacred deposit; but the latter are more evocative, more fecund, more pregnant with truth and life than the statements of the theologians, and even of the popes and ecumenical councils.

Thus, if all that is meant is that, even with respect to truths that exist today defined as dogmas of faith, there was in the revealed deposit much that was implicit, virtual, undetermined, obscure, which required a great amount

<sup>6</sup>"For a man would not assent by giving faith to certain proposed things unless he understood them somewhat." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.8, a.8, ad 2).

of effort and time for its explication, actualization, determination and definition — then there is no difficulty in admitting it. But if what is meant is that *everything* in the primitive deposit was obscure, or vague, or undetermined, or virtual, as happens in a seed or in an unformed embryo, then that would render impossible not only theology but also the faith itself; besides, it would be in manifest contradiction to what the history of dogmas teaches and to what is plain from the mere reading of the Holy Bible.

Of course, no one should expect to find explicitly or clearly in the primitive deposit the multitude of dogmatic developments which are found, e.g., in the so-called Symbol of St. Athanasius, in the ecumenical councils, in the papal definitions. If such developments were to be found clearly in the deposit, they would not be developments or progress, nor would there have been any need of Church Fathers or theologians to clarify or determine them, or of councils or popes to define them. To expect to find explicitly, or even (in our opinion) *formally*, in the primitive deposit all the dogmas defined, e.g., by the Tridentine, would be like expecting to find in a sapling the variegated and splendid foliage of a secular tree.

198. THE DOGMA OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY. But if we do not find clearly and explicitly such developments, nonetheless we always find clearly and explicitly certain fundamental concepts out of which such developments have issued. For instance, in the statements of the primitive deposit relative to the Trinity we do not find explicitly, nor anything like it, all that the councils and theologians have determined or said about hypostasis and nature, processions and notions, absolutes and relatives, concepts *in* and concepts *ad*, properties and appropriations. Not even the terms *persons* and *trinity* are primitive terms. But if we find none of these things explicitly, nonetheless we find, on the other hand, clearly and explicitly stated the oneness of God, clearly and explicitly stated the *distinction* between the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, clearly and explicitly stated the *procession* of *divinity* of the Father and the Son, and in clearly equivalent terms the *divinity* of the Holy Spirit.

Well then: from these four primitive and clear concepts of *oneness*, *distinction*, *procession*, and *divinity*, have followed, and follow, through reasoning, and rigorous reasoning, all the dogmatic developments relative to the sacred dogma of the divine Trinity and all the manifold and complicated trinitarian formulae elaborated by councils and theologians culminating in the master formula "In God everything is one and the same except where relative opposition is encountered", which is the key to, and the crowning accomplishment of, the treatise *On the Trinity*.

Of course, not all dogmas are as purely speculative in character as the dogma of the Most Holy Trinity, nor consequently do they evidence as clearly the logical rigorosity that has presided over the development of the

latter. But every one without exception has for its basis one or several formal and explicit concepts found in the Holy Scriptures or in the divine Tradition. From such data theological reasoning, which is the ordinary instrument of dogmatic progress, has always proceeded, on them it has unceasingly grounded itself under the guiding norm of the Christian sense and of the authority of the Church.

#### 199. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND DERIVED CONCEPTS.

To resume: if not all the dogmatic concepts we possess and hold by faith today were explicitly contained in the primitive deposit or revealed datum, neither were all of them merely implicit: if not everything in the deposit was formal, neither was everything virtual: if not everything was clear from the beginning, neither was everything confused.

In the primitive deposit there is an ensemble of actual, formal, explicit, clear, determined concepts: this was the starting point of theological reasoning and of dogmatic progress.

In such a formal and *determined* manner says St. Thomas are contained in the apostolic deposit, not all the dogmas or articles of *faith*, but all the principal dogmas or articles of *the faith*, meaning by articles of the faith not the derived but the fundamental dogmas, and in these fundamental dogmas not the secondary or concomitant concepts but the primary or essential concept, which St. Thomas calls *the essence* of the articles. The secondary or derived concepts, although contained in the deposit, are not contained therein except *by way of consequence* (those things that follow from the articles), and such are not of faith until they are defined by the ordinary or solemn magisterium of the Church. (154)

200. SCIENCE IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT HOLINESS. — St. Thomas's beautiful phrase: "Life is prior to learning inasmuch as *life leads to the knowledge of truth*", on which our objector bases himself to dismiss the speculative channels, means nothing more than the fact that a good life is one of the conditions that contribute to a greater penetration or a deeper knowledge of supernatural truths, because it contributes to the growth of charity and of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and consequently of "the sense of faith", about which we will soon be speaking (216-220), and which is something like "common sense" in the supernatural order.

Thus, everything else being equal, the saint or the fervent will penetrate deeper in the Bible or in sacred theology than the sinner or the lukewarm. "Hence, it follows that, all else being equal, he who possesses *charity* will be more *learned in theology* than he who does not. For without charity these *gifts of the Holy Spirit* are not conjoined to the faith, which *illuminates* the mind and *gives understanding* to little ones."<sup>7</sup> We only need to read the bio-

<sup>7</sup>BÁÑEZ, *in* 2-2, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2.



graphies of the great theologians to become aware at once that almost all of them excelled in holiness of life or in great supernatural fervour. This should never be forgotten by teachers and students of sacred theology.<sup>8</sup>

However, this is not to say that a holy life is the only means or the indispensable condition to be a great theologian or to effect the development of dogma. The want of a holy life can be compensated with a greater talent or a greater industry. A talented and assiduous, albeit not fervent, man can be a greater theologian than another who is fervent but short of talent or busy with other things. Says St. Thomas: "Not everyone who is good has a greater aptitude for prophecy than any sinner, since some men waiting in charity possess minds with greater aptitude to perceive spiritual matters, inasmuch as they are unencumbered with carnal and earthly pursuits, and are endowed with a natural clarity of intellect; whereas others who possess charity are involved in the pursuit of earthly interests and engaged in carnal procreation and do not have a naturally perspicacious intellect."<sup>9</sup> To think that without being a saint one cannot be learned, even in divine matters, would be intolerable ultramysticism.<sup>10</sup>

## SECTION II HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION THROUGH SPECULATIVE CHANNELS

201. IMPORTANCE OF EXAMPLES. — Let us now proceed to give historical examples of true dogmatic developments after the time of the Apostles, which were effected through the speculative channel of reasoning in the proper sense of this term. Among the many that could be given, we will submit ten taken from the different dogmatic treatises. In each example we will point out the majors of faith and the inclusive minors of reason that have

<sup>8</sup>"The moral virtues, especially the virtue of chastity, contribute a great deal to knowledge. . . . They greatly dispose man for the perfection of intellectual operation." (ST. THOMAS, *In 7 Sent.*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 6; *Summa Theol.*, p. 2-2, q. 1-5, a. 3)

<sup>9</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Disputed Questions on Truth*, q. 12, a. 5, ad 6.

<sup>10</sup>As to what is said, that there are many who, not having the gift of understanding but existing in mortal sin, understand many things concerning the Scriptures and the mysteries of faith and also possess great certainty about the faith, the answer is that they can have all these things. . . . Reading, and study, and human effort suffice in order to have an abundant store of knowledge and certainty. . . . Sinners can have even a great certainty of faith, without the gift of understanding, on account of the testimony of divine Truth to which they adhere, and which is of itself most firm. (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus de Donis Spiritus Sancti*, d. 18, a. 3, n. 63; ed. Vivès, t. 6, pgs. 625-626)

entered into the reasoning. At the same time we will quote testimonies of theologians of the first order who have thus understood them.

Of the ten examples, one or another might be debatable or might not satisfy the reader. But we are convinced that, taken together, these ten examples will produce in any unprejudiced theologian the conviction that the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion is not only possible but an obvious historical fact accepted by all the great theologians.

202. FIRST EXAMPLE. — The first example on record of dogmatic development done in a solemn and authentic manner is the celebrated *omnison* or *consubstantial* defined against Arius by the first ecumenical council. In the Holy Scripture it is explicitly stated that Jesus (first as the Only-begotten of the Father, true Son of God, true God as the Father, but it is not explicitly stated that He is *consubstantial*). Yet, as St. Athanasius observes, to slam the door on the subtle and endless quibblings of Arius and his followers, the only thing needed was to define as of faith the concept of *consobstantiality* and the term *omnison*. In consequence, the Teaching Church convened in the Council of Nicea and, basing itself on data collected from the Holy Scriptures and Tradition, defined explicitly the consobstantiality of the Word, and added to the traditional Creed the celebrated formula *consobstantial with the Father*.

This celebrated formula solemnly initiates in the Church the series of dogmatic developments through *philosophical* concepts, or as Cardinal Newman would say, through *notional* propositions, or as our objector would have it, through *intellectual* statements (190), a series that was to continue in *crecendo* up to the Tridentine and Vatican Councils and seemed almost to have reached the summit in the immortal encyclical *Pascendi*, were philosophy and theology at their most technical and abstruse levels are utilized by the Church in the exposition and unfolding of dogma. But let us not digress.

As we were saying, the Nicene Council defined the consobstantiality of the Son with the Father as a truth of faith. That truth was and is a revealed truth, since only that which is revealed can be defined as of faith. But where and how was that truth revealed? <sup>11</sup> It was revealed in *other* truths in which it is implicit and out of which it is deduced through reasoning or inference. Those other truths are the two that follow: first, "Jesus Christ is the true Son

<sup>11</sup> Whenever, with reference to dogmatic progress, the question is asked "How was, or is, a certain truth revealed?", the question refers to how it was, or is, revealed in the statements of the revealed deposit, i.e., in the statements of Holy Scripture or of divine Tradition: it does not refer to how it was, or is, revealed in the *mind* of the Apostles. In the mind of the Apostles every revealed truth existed in an explicit manner or as revealed in *itself*; in the statements of Holy Scripture or of divine Tradition, a great part of what is revealed exists implicitly or as revealed in *another* (57-58).

of God", or "Jesus Christ is true God"; second, "in God there can be no division, but only mere unity, of substance".

Indeed, if to be a true son requires to be of the substance of the Father, since that is the definition of sonship or of generation; and if to be Son of God requires unity of substance with God, since no division is possible in the divine substance; it follows that between the Father and the Son there necessarily is consubstantiality or unity of substance.

This reasoning or combination of concepts, whereby the concept of consubstantiality is inferred from the concepts of sonship and divinity, throbs and even stands out in all the Fathers who have written on the consubstantiality of the Son, whether before or after the Council of Nicea. To avoid lengthening this section with endless quotations from the Fathers, we will confine ourselves to the resumé made of them by three eminent theologians from the ranks of those who have distinguished themselves by outstanding knowledgeability of the Fathers and of the history of dogmas. Two of them, Petavius and Bellarmine are well known; the third, the renowned Greek theologian Emmanuel Calecas,<sup>12</sup> can well be ranked together with Bellarmine and

Let us begin with the immortal author of the *Dognata Theologica*, who has this to say: "The argumentation whereby one thing is proven to be *omoxiston* with another because it is born of it, is common to all the Greek and Latin Fathers, who thence assert against the Arians the Son's equality and identity of substance, so to speak, with the Father, as is obvious from the second and fourth books of this work."<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Manuel Calecas, Greek, distinguished theologian of the Order of Preachers as attested by John Cardinal Torquemada in *Summa de Ecclesia*, lib. 11, ch. 93, did not attend the Council of Lyons, as affirmed by Galeasio, but flourished after the Council during the time of the elder Andronicus Emperor by whom he was harassed out of hatred for the faith and the Roman Church. A very learned man, he wrote four books *Against the Errors of the Greeks*, the book *On Essence and Operation against the Palamites*, the book *On the Principles of Catholic Faith*, which he translated into Latin and our Combefisus published. It is said that the book *On the Trinity* is also his. Some of his sermons are praised by Leo Allatino in the diatribe "De Simeonum Scriptis". The *Grammar of Manuel Calecas* exists in the library of the Most Christian King. Item, excerpts from the books against the errors of the Greeks, in which are found testimonies of St. Augustine and other Latin Fathers excellently translated into Greek. This author's accurate method of dealing with things is sanctioned by the authority and tradition of the Holy Scriptures, Fathers, and Councils. The very learned Turrianus, S.J., in the book the sixth and seventh Synod, extols our Calecas as a man of great learning and faith. Calecas, in the life of St. Bonaventure, ch. 14, affirms that he has added the Roman *Catholic Church with brilliant writings*. (NATALIS ALEXANDER, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, 13th century, ch. 4, a.5, tom. 8, pg. 114)

<sup>13</sup> PETAVIUS, *Dognata Theologica*, De Trinitate, bk. 7, ch. 4, n. 13, ed. Vives, tom. 3, pg. 295.

Bellarmino: "When the Nicene Council defined that Christ is consubstantial with the Father, it deduced the conclusion from the Scriptures in which the assertions that God is one, and that the Son is God, are directly contained; from which it follows necessarily that the Father and the Son are of the same substance and divinity."<sup>14-15</sup>

The eminent theologian Calecas expresses himself in similar vein. Not only does he assert what both Petavius and Bellarmine asserted later on, but goes on to explain it beautifully. "To employ reasoning is not always wrong, except where principles are employed that are not suitable to the question proposed, and where one seeks to demonstrate the faith through natural principles. But if to the point in question one should bring to bear such common principles of faith as are repeatedly said of God, together with established and definite statements of the Fathers, and having laid these down and without overturning any of such as are laid down, should conclude things that are consubstantial with them, as was usually the case with the early Fathers in the disputes over the consubstantial and many other questions of faith, it is nonetheless to be admitted that such a conclusion, which depends on the aforementioned principles and is consonant with the aforesaid causes from which it proceeds, is a statement of the Scripture. In like manner such a conclusion is to be termed *theological* and known through revelation, just as we call conclusions of geometry those that are derived from the principles of geometry. Otherwise we shall have to discard many things that are certain through faith but are not expressly contained in the Scriptures."

Calecas then mentions the reasoning usually employed by the *Church Fathers* in the unfolding of dogma, which are either made up of two premises of faith, or of one premise of faith and another of reason, and goes on to say:

<sup>14</sup> *De Verbo Dei*, bk. 3, ch. 10.

<sup>15</sup> Someone might object that the Gospel text *I and the Father are one* has been interpreted by all the Fathers as referring to the consubstantiality of the Word, and that, consequently, no reasoning was needed to come to know this dogma. The answer to this is quite simple. It is true that all the Fathers have seen the consubstantiality of the Word as *implied* in this text. But it is not quite as certain that *all* of them have seen it as *directly expressed* in it, and not rather as indirectly deduced through reasoning. Thus, e.g., St. Chrysostom interprets this text directly as referring to the oneness in power, and in consequence, to the oneness in substance. And likewise St. Cyril. Thus Petavius: "If both were one solely by consent, Christ would have settled nothing, nor could he have spoken so magnificently of himself, Hence he must profess himself to be one with the Father at least in strength and power. However, *therefrom the oneness of substance is course versed on strength and power*. For if the power of both is one, also the substance is the same," says he, also concluded. "For if the power of both is one, also the substance is the same," says he. With whom also Cyril concurs." (*De Trinitate*, bk. 1, ch. 2, n. 10, ed. cit., tom. 2, pg. 443).

"However, should anyone think that a false conclusion results from any syllogism both of whose propositions are not expressly contained in the Holy Scriptures, such a one is mistaken in his thinking, and slanderously assails all the *Doctors of the Church*, who often have employed arguments of this sort to establish the truth in divine matters. Take for instance the following: 'What is substantially engendered by somebody is of the same substance as the generator; but the Son is engendered by the Father; therefore the Son is of the same substance as the Father'. The first proposition, which is also called the major, is not taken from the Holy Scriptures, but from natural knowledge. And yet what is inferred from it together with the other proposition, which belongs to the faith and the Scriptures, is held with certainty by faith. For if this mode of arguing were not to be allowed, it would be pointless for God to exhort us in the Scriptures to rise to the knowledge of God from the things that we know and which we hold by the teaching of nature."<sup>16</sup>

Lastly we will quote no less than the IV Lateran Ecumenical Council, which in its dogmatic definition against the abbot Joachim expresses itself in these terms: "However, with the approval of this Holy Council, We believe and confess with Peter Lombard that one supreme, truly incomprehensible reality exists, which verily is Father and Son and Holy Spirit. Wherefore, although the Father is someone else, the Son someone else, the Holy Spirit someone else, they are not something else; but that which the Father is, the same entirely is also the Son and the Holy Spirit; so that, in keeping with the orthodox and Catholic Faith, they are believed to be *consubstantial*. [There now follows the *reason* or the *why* the divine Persons are *consubstantial*.] For the Father in generating the Son from eternity gave Him his substance, according to what the Son Himself testifies: 'What the Father has given Me is greater than everything' . . . Now, it cannot be said that the Father gave Him a part of his substance and kept the other part for Himself, since the Father's substance is indivisible *inasmuch* as it is entirely simple. *But neither* can it be said that the Father through generation transferred his substance to the Son, in the sense that He gave it to the Son without keeping it for Himself; *otherwise*, He would cease to be a substance. *Therefore* it is evident that in being born the Son received the Father's substance without any diminution, and thus the Father and the Son have the *same substance* . . . *Consequently*, if any man should presume to defend or approve the opinion or teaching of the aforesaid Joachim with respect to this part, let him be by all confuted as a *heretic*."<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> MANUEL CALECAS, translated and quoted by PETAVIUS, *Dogmata Theologica*, Prolegomena, ch. 5, n. 4; ed. Vivès, tom. 1, pg. 32.

<sup>17</sup> 4th LATERAN COUNCIL, ch. 2; Denz.-Schön., 806.

If our objector does not see in all this not only a *true reasoning*, which is the only thing that interests us, but even *dialectical reasoning*, then we fail to understand what he means by *reasoning*.

203. SECOND EXAMPLE. — Against Nestorius, the Council of Ephesus defined as a dogma of faith that the Blessed Virgin Mary is the true *Mother of God*. This truth was and is a revealed truth.

But where and how was it revealed? It was revealed in *two other* truths in which it is implicit and out of which it is drawn out through reasoning. Those two other truths are: first, "The Blessed Virgin is the Mother of Jesus Christ"; second, "Jesus Christ is true God, there being in Him no person or hypostasis other than the divine". From these two revealed truths there follows as a *conclusion* the truth that the Blessed Virgin is truly the Mother of God, and not merely the Mother of Christ, as Nestorius would have it. Says St. Thomas: "Although it is not expressed in the Scriptures that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, nonetheless it is expressed in the Scriptures that Jesus Christ is true God, as can be seen in I John, last chapter, and that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of Jesus Christ, as can be seen in Matt. 1. Whence it necessarily follows from the words of the Scriptures that she is the Mother of God."<sup>18</sup>

That it is a conclusion becomes even clearer if we take into account that, aside from the two aforesaid revealed truths, a truth of reason must intervene so that the Blessed Virgin may be said to be truly the Mother of God. This truth of reason is the truth that generation or motherhood does not terminate in the nature but in the person. If the act of engendering were *abstractive*, as is the case with the act of *understanding*, and could terminate in the nature, prescinding or abstracting from the person, then the Blessed Virgin would not yet be the true Mother of God but only Mother of Christ's humanity. Hence, to deduce or unfold the dogmatic truth of Mary's divine motherhood this third truth intervened: "To be begotten or to be a son, is not an attribute of the nature but of the hypostasis". Once again St. Thomas writes to the point: "Now, to be conceived and born is attributed to the hypostasis according to the nature in which it is conceived and born. *Therefore*, since the human nature was assumed by the divine person from the very beginning of conception, it follows that it can verily be said that God was conceived and born of the Virgin . . . Hence it follows that the Blessed Virgin is truly said to be the Mother of God."<sup>19</sup>

Still more, the same Ephesian Council, in its definition of Mary's divine motherhood, clearly indicates the *reasoning* that has intervened in the unfold-

<sup>18</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 35, a. 4, ad 1.

<sup>19</sup> *Loc. cit.*, body of article.

ing of this dogmatic truth. Here are its own words: "If any man does not confess that God is verily Emmanuel, and that *on account of this* the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God, *for* she gave birth to the Word of God made according to the flesh: let him be anathema."<sup>20</sup> The terms *on account of* and *for* are the marks of informal reasoning just as the terms *now* and *therefore* are the marks of formal or dialectical reasoning. Both the former and the latter are indications that human *reason* is being employed by the Church as an instrument for the explication or unfolding of dogma, subject to the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, who is the principal cause.

The character of reasoning or *logical derivation* found in the dogma of the divine motherhood and in many other dogmas is, in our view, well elucidated by the learned modern theologian Fontaine in the following terms:

"One becomes quickly aware that some of these secondary dogmas proceed from the fundamental mysteries through some kind of *deduction* that is at once *logical* and *ontological*. . . These explanations, no matter how elementary they may be, are enough to show that the dogma of divine motherhood *follows* from the notion, well penetrated and correctly analyzed, of the incarnation of the Word. On account of this we say that it is a secondary dogma, and even that it is derived from the first; the fact expressed by it flows from the first and remains dependent on it; there exists between the two an essential and necessary relationship . . . To bring into indisputable evidence the dogma of the divine motherhood, the Church had to investigate the essence of the Word, his consubstantiality with the Father, his eternal generation, and his divine personality. Then she needed to determine precisely the kind of union between this Word, that is eternal and consubstantial with the Father, and human nature, which is what we call the hypostatic union. The Greek councils in which this long labour of elucidation took place, consummated it at Ephesus in 431, when they proclaimed Mary to be the true Mother of the Incarnate Word."<sup>21</sup>

204. THIRD EXAMPLE. — The Third Council of Constantinople, sixth oecumenical, defined as a dogma of faith, against the Monothelites, that in Jesus Christ there existed not only two natures, but also *two wills* and two different operations. This was and is a revealed truth. But where and how was it revealed? It was revealed in *two other* truths in which it is implicit and from which it is inferred through reasoning. These truths are: first, "Jesus Christ is not only a true man but also a *perfect* man, or in a *connatural* state, or *like us in everything* except sin or anything opposed to the end of redemp-

<sup>20</sup> Denz-Schön., 252.

<sup>21</sup> ABBE J. FONTAINE, *Le Théologie du Nouveau Testament*, pgs. 272-274.

tion"; second, "no one can be a *perfect* man, or man in a connatural state, or man like us in everything, without a human will and the other physico-natural powers or properties (although one can be truly or essentially man without them)".

This reasoning, one of whose premises is of faith and the other of natural reason, has been the human instrument employed by the Church under the Holy Spirit's assistance to uncover and define the dogma of the two wills in Christ. In previous sections we have indirectly examined this particular point; we have also adduced numerous texts from St. Thomas in confirmation thereof. Suffice it now to adduce some new quotations.

St. Thomas: "It would derogate from the *perfection* of the incarnation of the Word of God if there should be wanting in him any of those things that are *natural* to man. . . But the *faith* confesses Him to be altogether *like us in natural attributes*, without sin."<sup>22</sup> "It must be said that Christ was *altogether like* to the brethren (as the Apostle says in Heb. 2:17) in such things as were necessary for their reparation. Now, these are the things in which the truth of human nature consists, to wit, the parts *essential* to the same, and the *natural properties*, and the sufferings through which the work of redemption was to be carried out."<sup>23</sup>

Báñez: "Previous to the Council's definition that there existed two wills in the Lord Christ, the following was a *theological conclusion*: Christ has two wills, divine and human. For from the principle of faith that Christ is a *perfect man* subsisting out of a rational soul and human flesh, it was evidently inferred through a *valid consequence*: therefore Christ has a created will. By the fact that this truth was defined in a council, the conclusion is now held as *of faith immediately*, and it is proposed to everyone as a truth to be believed under threat of anathema."<sup>24</sup>

Likewise Bellarmine: "Similarly when the Sixth Council defined that there existed two wills in Christ, the divine and the human, it *deduced the conclusion* from the Scriptures in which it is said that Christ is perfect God and *perfect man*."<sup>25</sup>

We could continue quoting a great number of classical theologians in the line of traditional theology, but we would simply be repeating texts similar to those already quoted in other sections. We will, therefore, limit our-

<sup>22</sup> *Summa Contra Gentes*, bk.4, ch.43.

<sup>23</sup> *In 3 Sent.*, d.3, q.5, a.2, ad 1.

<sup>24</sup> BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.5, 5th conclusion.

<sup>25</sup> *De Verbo Dei*, bk.3, ch.10.

selves to three illustrious modern theologians: one a Thomist, the other belonging to Suárez's school, the third independent of any school.

Let the first be Fr. Berthier, who expresses himself as follows: "We call mixed or middle theology that which depends partly on a supernatural and partly on a natural principle. Such is this conclusion, viz., Christ had two intellects, two wills, and the operations connaturally belonging to both powers. This conclusion is obtained, in the first place, from a principle of supernatural theology, to wit, that in Christ there were two natures and both verily perfect; and in the second place, from a natural principle, to wit, that proper operations belong to a *perfect nature*."<sup>26</sup>

Let the second be Cardinal Franzelin who, in his noteworthy introduction to the treatise *On God insofar as He is One*, expresses himself on the present subject with far greater profundity and precision than in his much more quoted work *On Divine Tradition*. Says he: "Hence when it is established that both premises are revealed truths, or when one revealed premise already entails implicitly what is stated in the conclusion, and the other premise, *albeit it is not revealed*, evidently manifests this entailment of the conclusion in the revealed premise [according to Thomists, this is the case for every true and rigorous theological conclusion], it cannot be doubted but that the truth enunciated in the conclusion is a revealed truth. . . . An example of a conclusion of the latter form [i.e., a conclusion drawn from a revealed premise and a premise of natural reason] can be brought against the Monothelites. The revealed proposition that, besides a divine nature, Christ possesses a *perfect* human nature [splendid!] in virtue of which he is true [perfect, is what he means to say] man, already entails the other truth that Christ also possesses a human will and human volitions in addition to his divine will. Therefore when, in order to complete the argumentation, another premise is assumed thus: Christ is true [it would be more exact to say perfect] man, but the power of rational will is essential to any true man [meaning perfect] man, as he has noted earlier], therefore Christ possesses a human will [or, therefore he possesses risibility, or any other physical property], the assumed proposition merely makes manifest the fact that the conclusion is comprehended in the revealed proposition. . . . In truth, in such theological syllogisms *in most instances [always]*, where the reasoning is metaphysical [the naturally certain proposition, especially where the certainty is metaphysical], merely makes clear the fact that the consequent is comprehended in the revealed premise [in St. Thomas's view, that is the true role of every minor of reason in theology]; and thus such conclusions are implicitly contained in the objective

<sup>26</sup> *De Locis Theologicis*, prol., n. 2.

revelation, and consequently they can be explicitly proposed and *defined* by the Church as *truths to be held by faith*."<sup>27</sup>

It is gratifying to note that a writer of Franzelin's stature and affiliation recognizes that the theological conclusion is *in most instances (plerumque) definable* of divine faith, and that this is the case especially where the minor of reasons possesses *metaphysical* certainty.

However, what matters to us at present is his testimony that the dogma of the two wills in Christ, defined by the Sixth Ecumenical Council, is a dogma that has come to be known through reasoning, and even through a reasoning in which one of the premises is not a revealed premise but a premise of natural reason.

Let the third be the, on so many counts, illustrious Cardinal Newman, the modern theologian who had the clearest vision of the existence of dogmatic progress. In his brilliant work, *An Essay on the Development of Catholic Doctrine*, written while he was still a Protestant — it was in the course of writing this work that he became a convert. Newman perhaps gave excessive importance to *sense, life, experience, praxis*, as instruments in the development of Catholic dogma while taking little or almost no account of reasoning, which he seems to regard with the same dislike as our objector. Any man whose reading of Newman is limited to this work, knows him only partially, and will at times be inclined to find in Newman a way of speaking akin to Modernism. But his subsequent years as a Catholic enabled Newman to see more deeply into the great problem of dogmatic development, with the result that instead of giving little or no importance to the role played by reasoning in this matter, he seems at times to overrate it, or rather he gives it the importance that it deserves, that which St. Thomas and the great masters of Scholasticism always accorded it. Thus, in his famous conferences at the Catholic University of Dublin, a good many years after his conversion, he writes the following: "Revelation is all in all the doctrine; the Apostles its sole depository; *the inferential method its sole instrument*; and ecclesiastical authority, its sole sanction." Still many years later, with regard to the dogma of the two wills in Christ, Newman wrote: "The sixth Council condemned the doctrine that there is but one *energeia* in Christ, which is condemned neither by Scripture, except by *inference*, nor by tradition."<sup>28</sup>

But even before all these theologians, the Prince of them all, St. Thomas, had already said the same thing with these words: "Nothing *natural*

<sup>27</sup> *De Deo Uno*, prol.; Rome, 1870, pgs. 20-22.

<sup>28</sup> *Idea of a University*, dis. 9, n. 4; London, 1912, pg. 223. — *Letter to Canon Jenkins* (Dec. 2, 1875); see WARD, WILFRID, *The Life of John Cardinal Newman*, London 1912, vol. 2, pg. 575.

was wanting in Christ who assumed the *whole* nature [nature in its integrity], as has been previously said. *And therefore* the proposition of those who denied that in Christ there are *two knowledges* or two wisdoms was condemned in the sixth Council."<sup>29-30</sup>

Finally, even if the theologians had said nothing, it would be enough to pay attention to the Council's own words in order to see that reasoning was the instrument employed by the Church in order to arrive at knowing and defining this dogma, deducing it from the revealed dogma that Christ is a perfect man or a man like us in all things.

Thus the Council says: "This holy and universal Synod faithfully receives and embraces with outstretched hands the suggestion made by the Most Holy and Blessed Agathon Pope of ancient Rome. . . . Further, it accepts the things written by the Blessed Cyril in the Synodal letters against the impious Nestorius and in those written to the Eastern bishops. It likewise follows the five holy and universal Councils and the holy Fathers deserving of approbation, and consonantly confesses and defines that Our Lord Jesus Christ our true God, one of the persons of the holy and consubstantial and life-giving Trinity, perfect in divinity and *perfect in humanity*, is truly God and truly man, constituted of a rational soul and a body; consubstantial with the Father according to the divine nature, and consubstantial to us according to the human nature, *like unto us in everything* but without sin."<sup>31</sup> "And, in exist indivisibly, inconvertibly, inseparably, unconfusedly, two natural wills and two natural operations."<sup>32</sup>

The reasoning or inference whereby the Council deduces the two wills and the two operations from the revealed principle *perfect man* is even more clearly seen in the dogmatic letter addressed to the Council by Pope St. Agathon, which, as the Council itself attests, was the basis of the dogmatic definition. "*Thus consequently*, just as we confess that he truly has two natures or substances, i.e. divinity and humanity, unconfusedly, indivisibly, incommutably, *so too* does he have two natural wills and two natural opera-

<sup>29</sup> *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 9, a. 1.

<sup>30</sup> "Therefore, since from the positing of one action in Christ it follows that there is in him only one nature and only one will, this position has accordingly been condemned as *heretical* in the sixth synod." (ST. THOMAS, *Quaestio unica de Untione Verbi Incarnati*, a. 5)

<sup>31</sup> *Hebrews* 4:15.

<sup>32</sup> Denz.-Schön., 553-556.

tions, *inasmuch* as he is perfect God and *perfect man*."<sup>33</sup> It could not have been said more clearly.<sup>34</sup>

It is beyond all doubt that *reasoning*, and even reasoning from a premise of faith and a premise of reason, was the human instrument employed by the Church under the assistance of the Holy Spirit to arrive at the knowledge and the definition of the dogma of the two wills in Jesus Christ.

**AN OBJECTION.** Someone might come up with the Gospel text: "Not my will, but thine, be done"; and "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt."<sup>35</sup> To object that there was no need of any theological conclusion, in the proper sense of the term, to define the dogma of the two wills in Christ. We must here note three things:

First, the Church Fathers differ in their interpretation of these texts. The term *will* can be taken in three different senses: (a) the rational or free will (*voluntas rationalis*); (b) a necessary or natural tendency (*voluntas naturae*); (c) the sensory inclination or appetite (*voluntas sensualitatis*). If it is

<sup>33</sup> Denz.-Schön., 548.

<sup>34</sup> The following paragraph from the distinguished Sorbonne theologian, Grandin, is worthy of note: "When two things are connected, if one of them is to be believed, the Church can propose the other as to be believed with divine faith; therefore. . . . The antecedent of the above enthymeme is proven: in the first place, it appears that the Church has already proposed for belief that which was annexed to another that was immediately revealed: for she defined against the monothelites that there are two wills in Christ, a proposition that was only revealed in this one: Christ is God and [perfect] man. . . ."

"I know that it might be said that this proposition concerning the two wills of Christ has been *immediately* revealed. But *where is this verified*, in Scripture or in Tradition? If in Scripture, let the texts that *demonstrate* it be brought forward. Certainly the truth of those propositions can be had only from tradition. Whether they were *immediately* revealed cannot be established. Nor does it appear to be necessary that when he revealed to Peter that he was God and man, Christ should also have revealed that he had two wills: it was enough that he should have left Peter the latter as something to be known in the prior revelation. For to say that *from the fact that the Church has proposed it for belief* it can be gathered that the proposition about the two wills of Christ was *immediately* revealed, *begs the question* and adduces what is in dispute, viz. whether the Church can propose for belief anything that is not immediately revealed in itself." (GRANDIN, MARTIN, *Opera Theologica. De fide*, d. 1, sent. 2, "punctum post-remum"; Paris 1756, tom. 3, pgs. 48-49) Very well said! Many theologians fall into that begging of the question. Since they see that the Church defines a truth as *revealed*, they at once think that it must be *immediately* revealed, when that is precisely the point under discussion (482).

<sup>35</sup> *Luke* 22:42; *Matt.* 26:39.

true that many of the Fathers have understood these texts in the first sense, it is no less true that others have interpreted them in the second and third senses. St. Thomas himself employs the three interpretations.<sup>36</sup> The interpretation commonly given to these texts seems obvious to us because we know beforehand that Our Lord was a *perfect* man. Without such previous knowledge this interpretation would not have any rigorously demonstrative value.

Secondly, whatever be the meaning of these texts (even if all three should be admitted), it is beyond doubt that the councils, the popes, and many theologians of the first rank expressly attest as we have seen that the dogma of the two wills of Christ has been defined by the Church *heretice*; it was deduced from another fundamental dogma, viz. the dogma of the two perfect natures. To any true Thomist it is obvious that this dogma has been deduced through a conclusion in the proper sense of the term.<sup>37</sup>

Thirdly, - and principally, - the Church has defined not only that there are two wills in Christ, but also that there are in him two operations, two intellects, and even two knowledges. Now, the latter cannot be formally seen in the text "Not my will, but thine, be done" nor in any other Gospel text; it can be seen only by way of a strict conclusion from the dogma *perfect* man. Thus St. Thomas: "Nothing *natural* was wanting in Christ who assumed the whole [integral or perfect] nature, as has been said above. And therefore the position of those who deny that there existed in Christ two knowledges or two wisdoms was *condemned* in the sixth Synod."<sup>38</sup> "Thus *inasmuch* as from the fact that someone asserts one single action in Christ, it follows that there is in him one single nature and one single will, therefore this position was *condemned as heretical* in the sixth Synod."<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 19, arts. 1, 2, 5.

<sup>37</sup> "In supernatural matters it must be proportionally said that when the consequent is inferred by a similar adroit consequence, it is a *conclusion found out by inquiry* [prior to the Church's definition] as a *theological conclusion*, not *per se* primarily as a proposition immediately of faith; as in the case of that syllogism: Christ is man, therefore Christ is risible; for here a *property is inferred from the subject*, which belongs to *science*.

"The same should be said of that proposition 'Christ has two wills' if it had not been defined by a General Council; for it would be a *theological conclusion* since it is inferred by this consequence: every intellectual nature has its own will, but Christ the Lord has two intellectual natures, therefore he has two wills." (DIDACUS NUNO, *Expósito in san. Divi Thomae partem, Supplementum*, q. 20, a. 3; Vallisoletti 1609, pp. 628)

<sup>38</sup> *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 9, a. 1.

<sup>39</sup> *Quaestio unica Unione Verbi Incarnati*, a. 5.

Thus it is unquestionable that reasoning, including the reasoning made up of a premise of faith and a premise of reason, has always been the human instrument employed by the Church under the Holy Spirit's guidance, to come to know and to define the dogma of the two wills, two intellects, two knowledges, and two operations in Jesus Christ.

205. FOURTH EXAMPLE. - The Fourth Lateran, and 12th ecumenical, Council defined as a dogma of faith the following proposition: "The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are one supreme reality, a reality which is *neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding*."

The abbot Joachim had denied this proposition against the Master of the Sentences. The Council was not satisfied with upholding the latter but also defined his teaching as a dogma of faith and condemned as heretics all who presumed to defend or approve the contrary. "Hence we condemn and reprobate the pamphlet or treatise published by the abbot Joachim against Peter Lombard concerning the oneness or essence of the Trinity, calling him heretic and senseless for having said in his Sentences: 'For the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, are one supreme reality, a reality which is neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding...' But we, with the approval of this holy Council, *believe and confess* with Peter Lombard that there exists one supreme reality, which is indeed incomprehensible and ineffable, and which truly is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit... and this reality is *neither generating, nor generated, nor proceeding*... Therefore if anyone should presume to defend or approve the opinion or teaching of the aforementioned Joachim with regard to this part, let him by all be confuted as a heretic."<sup>40</sup>

This is, consequently, a revealed truth. But where and how is it revealed? It is revealed in *other truths*, in which it is contained virtually, and from which it follows, and can follow only through reasoning. These other truths are: first, in the Trinity there exists a real distinction of persons but not of essence; secondly, if the essence generated or were generated, spired or were spired, there would exist a real distinction in the essence, since neither generation nor spiration are possible without a real distinction of terms. Out of these two truths, one of faith and another of reason, but of inclusive reason, there follows through rigorous reasoning the dogmatic truth defined by the IV Lateran Council, at least insofar as that definition was understood by St. Thomas and by the theologians generally.

That reasoning, simple in form but inwardly laden with metaphysical profundity, is expressed by St. Thomas in these terms: "I answer that it must

<sup>40</sup> Denz.-Schön., nn. 803-806.

be said that the abbot Joachim erred in this matter when he asserted that, as it is said that God engendered God, so it can be said that the essence engendered the essence, for he considered that on account of the divine simplicity God is not something other than the divine essence. But there he was mistaken, for with regard to the truth of what we say, not only the things signified but also the mode of signifying must be taken into account, as was previously said. Now then, although in reality God is the same thing as *Dei*, the mode of signifying is not the same in each case. For this term, *God*, because it signifies the divine essence as existing in one who has it, is naturally able, on account of its mode of signifying, to suppose for a person; hence the things that are proper of the persons can be predicated of this term, *God*, so that it can be said that God is engendered, or engenders, as was previously said. But this term, *essence*, cannot suppose for a person on account of its mode of signifying, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form; hence the things that are proper of the persons, whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence, for *then* it would be understood that there exists a distinction in the divine essence just as there exists a distinction in persons.<sup>41</sup>

If all of this is not reasoning, and even dialectical reasoning, then we do not know what some people mean by reasoning. Neither do we understand what can be contributed by *feeling* to this kind of purely speculative dogma, where only the most profound metaphysico-dialectical speculations intervene as a means of explicating or unfolding the revealed teaching on the unity of essence and distinction of persons in the august and fundamental dogma of the adorable Trinity.

Melchor Cano presents the same reasoning and the manner in which it was employed by the Council as follows: "Item, the Lateran Council under Innocent III, through *theological reasoning* against *Joachim* elucidated that the divine essence neither is engendered nor engenders. It is plain that the thing engendered and the thing that engenders must differ really: hence if the divine essence engendered the [divine] essence, it would differ from itself not merely in thought but also in reality."<sup>42</sup>

206. FIFTH EXAMPLE. — The II Council of Lyons, 14th ecumenical, defined as a dogma of faith that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not as from *two*, but as from *one* principle: "Faithfully and devoutly we confess that the Holy Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father

<sup>41</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 39, a. 5.

<sup>42</sup> *De Locis*, bk. 12, ch. 6, septima praeceptio.

and the Son, not as from *two* principles, but as from *one* principle, not through two spirations, but through one single spiration."<sup>43</sup> The definition of faith was repeated by the Florentine Council: "We define that the Holy Spirit eternally . . . proceeds from the Father and the Son as from *one* principle and through one single spiration."<sup>44</sup>

Consequently, this is a truth of faith, a revealed truth. But how and where is this truth revealed? It is revealed in *other* truths, in which it is virtually contained, and from which it follows through reasoning, and only through proper and rigorous reasoning. Those other truths are: first, "Wherever relative opposition is not found, everything in God is one and the same". Second, between the spiration of the Father and the spiration of the Son there exists no relative opposition. From these two truths, one of faith and the other of reason, the defined dogma follows through rigorous reasoning.

This reasoning, to all appearances simple and brief, but likewise laden with metaphysical profundity, is expounded by St. Thomas thus: "I answer that it must be said that the Father and the Son are identical in everything wherein they are not distinguished by relative opposition; *consequently, since* they are not relatively opposed in being the principle of the Holy Spirit, *it follows* that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit."<sup>45</sup>

And Melchor Cano: "The Council of Lyons under Gregory X similarly demonstrated by means of a firm *theological reason* that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not as from two principles but as from one, not through two but through one spiration. *For indeed*, according to the faith, the Father and the Son are one God: one power, one wisdom, in short, one in all things where relative opposition is not encountered, for the unity of divine nature cannot otherwise be maintained in two persons. Hence, since there is no distinction of the Son from the Father in the act of spirating, it follows that the Father and the Son are not two but one principle of the Holy Spirit. From which it can be understood that both Erasmus and Ambrose Catharism were greatly mistaken: the former because he believed that this conclusion has nothing to do with the faith, the latter because he counted it among the *first principles*, i.e., the *articles of faith* [non-derived dogmas] whereas it is a theological conclusion in the proper sense."<sup>46</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Denz-Schön., 850.

<sup>44</sup> Denz-Schön., 1300.

<sup>45</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 36, a. 4.

<sup>46</sup> *De Locis*, bk. 12, ch. 6, septima praeceptio.



Báñez, the great commentator of St. Thomas, is no less explicit and interesting. "The holy Church has many times defined as of faith propositions which are not expressly found in the Holy Scriptures but were steadfastly affirmed by all theologians generally, and were *theological propositions*, e.g. that Christ has a human will, which the theologians inferred from the fact that, according to the faith, Christ is true man [i.e., *perfect* man, as Báñez repeats time and again], and every man has a will; or that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle, which is proven *from the fact* that in God everything is one and the same if no relative opposition intervenes. *Therefore, since* the Father and the Son are not relatively opposed to each other in the act of spiring the Third Person, it follows that they are not two but one principle. Hence similarly *all those truths concerning which the whole community of theologians is in accord could be defined as of faith*: consequently it would be erroneous to contradict such truths [even before they are defined by the Church]. For instance, all theologians firmly teach that from the moment of his incarnation Christ Our Lord saw the divine essence. This is not found in the divine Scriptures nor has it been defined by the Church to be held as a truth of faith. But the theologians deduce it through a good consequence from other texts of the Scriptures and other sources of faith, and it is so universally accepted that no one could deny it without censure of error, and the Church could define it as of faith."<sup>47</sup>

This text from Báñez, as so many others we have quoted that abound in his invaluable commentaries to the *Summa Theologica*, are worthy of being meditated by any one desirous of studying the Thomist doctrine on dogmatic progress by way of reasoning or conclusion.

### SECTION III FURTHER EXAMPLES

207. SIXTH EXAMPLE. — The V Lateran Council, 18th ecumenical, defined as a dogma of faith the transcendental and fruitful truth that no true opposition can exist between science and faith or between human reason and divine revelation: "We define that any assertion contrary to the truth of illumined faith is utterly false."<sup>48</sup> This same definition was repeated, and in more expressive terms, by the Vatican Council: "If any man should say that

<sup>47</sup>BÁÑEZ, *In I*, q.1, a.8.

<sup>48</sup>Denz.-Schön., 1441.

<sup>49</sup>Denz.-Schön., 3042.

<sup>50</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, bk.1, ch.7.

<sup>51</sup>Denz.-Schön., 1441.

human disciplines are to be treated with that degree of liberty that their assertions, notwithstanding their being opposed to revealed doctrine, may be kept as true and may not be proscribed by the Church, let him be anathema."<sup>49</sup>

Thus this is a revealed truth. But where and how is it revealed? It is revealed in *other* truths in which it is virtually contained and from which it is inferred through rigorous reasoning. These other truths are: first, the affirmations of revelation and the legitimate demonstrations of reason or science are both *truths*, and to say that one truth is opposed to another truth involves a contradiction. Second (and this is the root of the preceding one), both the natural and the revealed truth, or both the principles of reason and the principles of faith, proceed from God, and God cannot fail or deny Himself. Thence issues through rigorous reasoning the dogmatic truth defined by the Lateran and Vatican Councils.

This reasoning employed by both Councils had already been expounded by St. Thomas thus: "It is plain that those things that are naturally inscribed in reason are utterly true, so much so that it is even impossible to think them to be false. Neither is it allowable to believe that which is held by faith is false, since it is so obviously confirmed by God. *Consequently, since* only the false is contrary to the true, as is clear from a consideration of their definitions, it is impossible for the aforesaid truth [the truth of faith] to be contrary to the principles which reason naturally knows. Item: the teacher's knowledge contains the same thing that is induced by the teacher in the mind of the disciple, unless the teacher is merely feigning, which is impious to say of God. *Now*, the knowledge of naturally known principles is inscribed in us by God, since God Himself is the author of our nature. *Consequently*, these same principles are contained in the divine wisdom. *Therefore*, whatsoever is opposed to these principles is opposed to the divine wisdom: *thus* it cannot come from God. *Consequently*, the truths held by faith on account of divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural knowledge."<sup>50</sup>

That this same reasoning has been the human instrument employed by the Church to define the aforesaid dogma is clearly indicated by the very words of both Councils. They do almost little else than transcribe in briefer form St. Thomas's argument. "*Since truth in no way contradicts truth*, we define that any assertion contrary to the truth of illumined faith is utterly false."<sup>51</sup> "However, although faith is above reason, nonetheless no true dis-

sensation can exist between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals the mysteries and infuses the faith, has also placed the light of reason in the human mind: *but* God cannot deny himself, *nor* can truth ever contradict truth. Hence, we define that any assertion contrary to the truth of illumined faith is utterly false."<sup>52</sup> We have already observed in the previous section that the terms *for*, *since*, *but*, *hence*, are the signs of ordinary or informal reasoning in everyday language, just as the terms, *now*, *therefore*, are the signs of dialectical or formal reasoning in logic textbooks. When these terms appear in dogmatic definitions, they are usually indicators of *derived* dogmas, i.e., of dogmas contained implicitly in the revealed deposit, and known and defined by way of reasoning under the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit.

208. SEVENTH EXAMPLE. — The Council of Trent defined as a dogma of faith the Blessed Virgin's most singular privilege of being immune from all actual sin, including even venial sin. "If any one should say that a man, once he is justified . . . is capable, throughout his whole life, of avoiding all sins, including venial sins, except through a special privilege from God, as the Church holds concerning the Blessed Virgin, let him be anathema."<sup>53</sup>

This is, thus, a revealed truth. But where and how is it revealed? It is revealed in *other* truths in which it is virtually contained and from which it follows through reasoning. These other truths are: first, the Blessed Virgin is a worthy Mother of God; second, she would not be a worthy Mother of God if she were stained by a single venial sin. The dogmatic truth defined by the Council follows by reasoning from these two truths, of which the former is a truth of faith and the latter a truth of reason.

St. Thomas delivered this reasoning thus: "Now, the Blessed Virgin was divinely chosen to be the Mother of God . . . *But*, she would not be a simply allowed that the Blessed Virgin never committed any actual sin, whether mortal or venial."<sup>54</sup> The following passage from Ripalda clearly shows that this reasoning was the human instrument employed by the Church to unfold the dogma in question: "The Apostles believed in the *immunity of the Mother of God from actual sin*, and their own future blessedness, because they perfectly understood the Scriptures expressing the *dignity of divine motherhood* and their own confirmation in grace, on account of which the Church declared the former to be *truths of faith*."<sup>55</sup>

<sup>52</sup> Denz.-Schön., 3017.

<sup>53</sup> Denz.-Schön., 1573.

<sup>54</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, q. 3, a. 27, a. 4.

<sup>55</sup> RIPALDA, *De Fide*, d. 8., s. 2, n. 26.

St. Augustine had earlier indicated the same view with sufficient clarity in these terms: "With the exception, therefore, of the Blessed Virgin Mary, with respect to whom, for the sake of the Lord's honour, I wish to move no question in the matter of sins: *for we know* that she was given more grace to conquer sin totally *for the reason that she was worthy to conceive and give birth* to him who, it is plain, never had any sin."<sup>56</sup>

209. A DIGRESSION ON THE DOGMA OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION. — In our opinion, the dogma of the immunity of the Mother of God from all stain of *original* sin flows from the same principle, through the same logical process, and with the same certainty or demonstrative value as the dogma of her immunity from all *actual* sin. To see it, one needs only to consider attentively where lay the obscure and controverted issue in the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

As a matter of fact, all theologians, irrespective of school affiliation, including those who seemed to have distinguished themselves most by their opposition to this dogma, have admitted the following principle as beyond any doubt: "To Mary, in her capacity of worthy Mother of God, must be attributed all that degree of grace or holiness, all that degree of immunity from sin, that is compatible with the honor of her Son, that is, with her *redemption* by Christ." On this principle there never has been any doubt, any debate; for the principle expresses nothing more than the traditional understanding of the Gospel's *full of grace*.

The doubts and the debates were centered not on that major of faith, but on the minor of reason, which was as follows: "Now, it is possible at once to be *conceived without original sin* and to be *redeemed by Jesus Christ*." This minor of reason constituted the focal point of all the doubts and debates in the history of the development of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

So long as in the idea of original sin the concepts of *guilt* and *due* were not clearly distinguished, and so long as in the idea of redemption no clear line was drawn between the concepts of redemption *after contracting the sin* and *preservative* redemption, that minor formulated in such absolute terms and without distinctions was false, and the conclusion had to be erroneous, if not heretical. Indeed, an Immaculate immune from *everything* included in the idea of original sin, i.e., immune from all guilt and from all *due*, obviously is an Immaculate that is in no way redeemed, not even with a preservative redemption, is clearly an erroneous Immaculate. In short, an Immaculate *without distinctions* is an erroneous, if not heretical, Immaculate.

<sup>56</sup> *De natura et gratia*, ch. 36.

Now then, the spontaneous piety of the faithful ordinarily expresses itself without making distinctions. Thus, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was, in its beginnings, asserted without distinctions. Formulated thus, St. Bernard, St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, and other saintly and eminent theologians qualified it as erroneous. In so doing they did inestimable service to the true progress of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, due credit for which is now beginning to be given them.<sup>57</sup> If they did not completely steer the development of this dogma along the correct path, they at least totally precluded its taking the wrong turn. It might even be said that it was they who steered or caused it to be correctly steered, since by qualifying a non-redeemed Immaculate as erroneous, if not heretical, they forced the piety and knowledgeability of subsequent theologians to look for a *redeemed* Immaculate, that is, they spurred them to look for some means of harmonizing the idea of an Immaculate Conception with the idea of redemption.

The glory of having *initiated* the true solution to the problem undoubtedly belongs to the illustrious Scotus and his, on this matter, immortal school. It was he who began to apply to the idea of original sin the distinction between guilt and due, and to the idea of redemption the distinction between redemption *after having contracted the guilt* and preservative redemption.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>57</sup> If the Blessed Virgin's body had been preserved from all taint of original stain prior to the infusion of the soul, it seems clear that there would not be in her any proximate personal due, nor consequently any redemption by Jesus Christ since the person is posterior in nature to the infusion of the soul. Now then, not only the simple faithful but even the liturgical office itself of the Church of Lyons seemed to affirm the faithfulness of the Blessed Virgin's body prior to its animation. "When about the year 1140 the canons of Lyons introduced into their Church the feast of the Conception, and seemed to understand it in such a manner as to believe that the *passive material conception* itself was to be venerated (for in the missal of Lyons the following could be read: 'O God, who has foreordained that the *body* of the Blessed Virgin Mary be *holy* and *preserved it from all stain*'), St. Bernard," etc. (GODIS *De deificatione Bernardi* *universalis Desparae*, ch. 3, a. 2; Bruxellis 1904, pg. 25) If this is true, St. Bernard and all the other Doctors rendered a great service to the dogma by opposing the feast understood in such a manner.

<sup>58</sup> To all the authorities for the contrary position the answer is that *any and every* child of Adam is a *debtor* of original justice, and owing to Adam's demerit is destitute of it and therefore every such one has that wherefrom he may contract original sin. However, if *grace* is given to some man in the first instant of the soul's creation, this man will never be destitute of original justice. But he does not have it *of himself*, but *owes it to the merit of another*, if grace is conferred on him because of merit; for he would have original sin unless by his mediation another prevented it. And the *authorities should be interpreted in this sense* that every man naturally descended from Adam is a sinner, that is because he receives his nature from Adam he has that wherefrom he should be destitute of the justice due him, unless it be conferred on him from another

With these two distinctions, the notions of which time and discussion eventually defined with perfect exactness and clarity, the formulation of the celebrated minor of reason emerged in the following terms: "Now, the immunity from all original sin, provided that a true personal or proximate *due* is contracted, is compatible with a true and proper *preservative redemption* by Jesus Christ." Thus, distinguished and formulated, the minor is no longer false, it is no longer doubtful, it is even no longer probable; it is certain, clear, evident, as Cajetan himself is forced to admit. Accordingly, source. But just as grace could be conferred *after the first instant* so it could be conferred *in the first instant*.

This also clears the way to the reasons offered for the first opinion, for Mary should *have had the greatest need of Christ the Redeemer*, for she should have contracted original sin on account of the common descent, unless she were *prevented* by the Mediator's grace. And just as others stood in need of Christ so that by his merit the *sin already contracted would be remitted them*, so Mary stood in greater need of a *Mediator* preventing the sin so that *she would not contract it*.

And if against this it be argued that she was naturally the *child of Adam* prior to having grace, because she was a *person* prior to having grace, and consequently in that prior instant she was under obligation to original justice as a natural child of Adam, but was destitute, of it, therefore in that prior instant she *contracted original sin*. I answer that when two contraries are compared to each other according to the *order of nature*, they are not both found simultaneously in the subject, but only one exists in it, and the other which is said to be naturally prior does not since in the same instant its opposite is in the subject; however, it is said to be *naturally prior* because insofar as the subject is concerned it *would have then existed* unless it were impeded by something extrinsic." (SCOTUS, *In 3 Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1) See *Quaestio Ioannis Duns Scoti de Immaculata Conceptione B. M. Virginis*, Quarachi 1904, pg. 19. We believe that these passages suffice to crown Scotus with immortal glory with regard to this question of the Immaculate Conception.

Without intending to diminish in the slightest degree the undeniable merits of Scotus in this matter, we said that he must be credited with the honour of *initiating*, and nothing more than *initiating*, the true solution to the problem. Although he makes the distinction between guilt and due, still he does not speak in clear terms of the necessity of a personal or proximate due, in the absence of which it hardly appears possible to affirm a true and proper personal redemption. The learned Fr. Honorato del Val, whom no one will accuse of bias in this instance, has rightly written: "In this respect, Scotus's argumentation has perhaps gone *out of bounds* inasmuch as he seems to have excluded from the B. Virgin the due of incurring sin, *in the proper sense*. Hence it is not sufficiently explained in what manner was the B. Virgin properly redeemed by Christ." (HONORATO DEL VAL, O.S.A., *Sacra Theologia Dogmatica*, Madrid 1906, tom. 2, n. 265).

In our opinion, it was Cajetan who, of all theologians, best distinguished the terms and stated the problem of a truly redeemed Immaculate in his celebrated opusculum *De Conceptione B. Virginis*, so much so that subsequent theologians have done little else than copy his distinctions. In this sense, Cajetan, without defending the Immaculate Conception and even opposing it, has done as much or even more than any other theologian for the evolution and definition of the dogma of the true Immaculate Conception.

with a major of faith admitted by everyone, and an evident minor, the dogmatic conclusion of the Immaculate Conception was assured. To get itself accepted by all and defined as of faith, only one more thing was needed, viz., to overcome the tremendous deadweight of school and partisan preoccupations, which are so conatural and entrenched that they often are the reason why many people continue to maintain a position long after the reason foundation and support on which it was based by its original authors has been overthrown. In our view, this is, in general lines, the path and course of development followed by the history of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.

*The reasoning of the theologians, the assent of the faithful, and the authority of the Church with respect to this dogma.* — Thus, we do not agree with those who think that in the development of this dogma there has been no logical process; nor do we agree with those who, while admitting such a logical process, seem to convey the idea that, viewed from this angle, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception either is not contained in the dogma of the divine motherhood or does not follow from it except in a *probable* manner. It is our view that this dogma is contained in that of the divine motherhood and follows from it with *certainty* through exactly the same process employed by Tradition and theology to demonstrate that the Mother of God had to be immune from all *actual* sin.

Finally, neither are we in complete agreement with those who attribute the development and definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception totally, or almost totally, to the common *sentiment* of the faithful, and believe that *theological reasoning* played no part, or simply a minimal part, in it. That a common, fervent, and overpowering sentiment existed among the faithful with regard to this dogma is beyond doubt. But, in our opinion, it is also beyond doubt that this sentiment would never have become unanimous, nor been able to last a long time, nor, above all, would it have been able to avoid getting disoriented and going astray without the brakes, the help, and the guidance of *theological reasoning*. The theological reasoning of the great masters of the XIII century, by demonstrating that a non-redeemed Immaculate was erroneous, set up an unsurmountable dam to that sentiment when it threatened to spill all over into wrong channels. The theological reasoning of the theologians that came after, by pointing out the true distinctions whereby a *redeemed* Immaculate could, and should, be defended, opened up to that sentiment a safe and true channel, which was the only thing it needed to become universal, ardent, irresistible. In all of this, the principal factor must never be overlooked, i.e., the authority of the Church which, under the Holy Spirit's infallible assistance, provided gentle, constant, and sure guidance both to the sentiment of the faithful and the reasoning of the theologians toward the development and the dogmatic definition of the true Immaculate Conception by Pius IX.

*Comparison between the Scotist and the Thomist schools with respect to the dogma of the Immaculate Conception.* — As we see it, St. Thomas and Scotus, together with their respective powerful and loyal schools, have, in this matter of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, played respectively the roles of the rudder and the steam in the movement and course of a ship. The steam, not the rudder, makes the ship move; but the rudder, not the steam, causes it to move in the right direction and arrive at the true port without going astray.

Scotus and his school, coming out in support of the fervent sentiment of the faithful, clamoured with all their strength that the Mother of God was and had to be, immaculate. In order to arrive at this port, deserted by their ardent devotion to the Blessed Virgin, they were more concerned with getting up more steam and acceleration than with accurately determining the route to be taken.

St. Thomas and his school, accustomed to bridling sentiment with reason and not making new advances in the delicate terrain of dogma without the beacon of the old, already defined dogmas, clamoured with no less vigour that the Mother of God, as every other child of Adam, had to be truly and personally redeemed by the blood spilled on Calvary, and were ready to cut off the advance of the Mother of God herself as long as they did not see her frankly and clearly marching along the path of personal due, which is the only path of the Cross and Calvary, the only path of redemption. Under the sway of these two factors — the Scotist steam and the Thomist rudder or rudder — the ship of the Immaculate Conception advanced slowly but surely for centuries. Without Scotus and his school the ship would have advanced not at all or very little. Without St. Thomas and his school the ship would almost certainly have gone astray. After God and his Church, to Scotus and his school we owe the definition of the *Immaculate Conception*, but to St. Thomas and his school we owe the definition of the *true Immaculate Conception*. Other schools have also intervened, and very creditably, but all have taken from the Scotists the urgency of motion, and borrowed from the Thomists the firm norms of direction.

Thus, the human factors most seemingly opposed have all contributed to the unfolding of the dogma, harmonized by the visible magistristerium of the Church and by the invisible but perpetual assistance of the Holy Spirit.

*Through what inclusive reasoning has the dogma of the Immaculate Conception been deduced from the revealed datum.* — Having written the foregoing, we find that the learned Fr. Gardiel, while giving his approval to our doctrine on the problem of the evolution of dogma, suggests that it would be interesting to indicate clearly the process or reasoning whereby the dogma of the Immaculate Conception inclusively follows from the dogma of the divine motherhood. (*Revue des Sc. Philos. et Theol.*, Oct. 1922, pg. 689)

We think that in the preceding paragraphs we have shown how the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is deduced from that of the divine motherhood through exactly the same process and with the same certainty as the dogma of the immunity from all *actual sin*. If the latter met with no difficulties whereas the former was assailed by very grave ones, this was not because of any difference relative either to the inclusion or the deduction: it was because the former, despite its being as *logical* as the latter, appeared to be at odds with the dogma of redemption. In the matter of dogmatic progress account must be taken not only of the speculative *logic* between the conclusion and the dogma or principle from which it is inferred, but also of the concordance of that conclusion with *all* the other dogmas. The difficulties, debates, and delays did not alter the deductive process or make it more evident, but simply cleared away its seeming opposition to another dogma. As soon as it became clear that *Immaculate* and *redeemed* were not inconsistent, the conclusion became assured and definable. The only other thing to be kept in mind is that in the inference of both the exemption from actual sin and the immunity from original sin, the Christian *sense* must needs be joined to speculative reasoning.

Both dogmas are deduced from the fundamental dogma expressed with the traditional formula "worthy Mother of God". Now, the determination of what is or is not due to a "worthy mother", let alone to a "worthy Mother of God", is better achieved by the loving heart of a *son* than by the cold logic of a *scholar*. Hence, the Christian sense of the "sons of God", that is, the filial faith and devotion of the Christian people towards Mary, their Mother and Mother of God, has been with respect to this dogma the best and greatest aid to speculative logic, as it has been and will be in any dogmas that do not concern the intellect alone but also concern the heart.

In short, we think that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was included in the revealed deposit as a *particular* in the *conditioned universal*. Its deductive process is as follows:

To the Mother of God are owed *all* the degrees of purity, *provided* that they are consistent with her redemption by Jesus Christ.

Now, original purity qualified by personal due is consistent with her redemption by Jesus Christ.

Therefore, to the Mother of God is owed original purity qualified by personal due.

The *major* of this reasoning is a revealed conditioned universal, and it is admitted by *all* the Church Fathers and theologians, including those who to all appearances were opposed to this dogma. St. Thomas formulates it in these terms: "Beneath Christ *who*, as the *universal Saviour*, had no need of *being saved* [behold the condition for the Blessed Virgin], the *purity of the*

*Blessed Virgin was the greatest*."<sup>59</sup> The minor does nothing but verify the *condition* included in the revealed major. Therefore, the conclusion is also implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith, since as we shall see later on (256), anything contained in the revealed deposit as a particular in the universal is definable as of divine faith.

Nevertheless, the conclusion is not implicit-formal but implicit-virtual, since the universal in which it is implicitly contained is not an unconditioned but a conditioned universal (32). Indeed, its condition is such that its verification requires a *proper*, and even a profound and very difficult, reasoning. It requires the intervention of a *new concept*, to wit, the concept of "conception with due and without stain." The dogmatic concept of "conception with due and with stain, which is the concept of the ordinary concept of already known in revelation. Likewise known was the dogmatic concept of "conception without stain and without due," which is the concept of Christ's "conception. But the concept of "conception with due and without stain" was as yet unknown, and this was precisely the concept needed to bring the concept of Immaculate into accord with the concept of redemption, or in other words, to verify the condition of the revealed major. All the doubts, disputes, and delays boiled down to unearthing this *new concept*, which is precisely the new dogma of the Immaculate Conception — new with regard to explication, but not new with regard to objectivity or substance, since it was already implicit in the revealed major.

But one must remember that in the deductive process whereby Mary's exemption from either actual or original sin is inferred, the Christian *sense* must be added to speculative reasoning. These two dogmas are derived from the fundamental dogma expressed in the traditional formula of "worthy Mother of God". And where it is a question of gathering what is or what is not owed to a worthy *Mother*, let alone to a "worthy Mother of God," the loving heart of a *son* is in a better position to judge than the cold logic of a scholar. This is the reason why, relative to this dogma, the Christian sense of the "sons of God", i.e., the filial faith and piety of the Christian people towards Mary, their Mother of God, has been the best and most powerful auxiliary of speculative logic, as it has been and will be, relative to all dogmas that appeal not only to the intellect but also to the heart of man.

210. EIGHTH EXAMPLE. — The same Tridentine Council defined as a dogma of faith the conversion, in the Eucharist, of the whole substance of the bread into the body of Christ, and of the whole substance of the wine into his blood. This is known as the dogma of the Transubstantiation. "If any one should say that in the Holy Sacrament of the Eucharist there remains the substance of the bread and of the wine together with the Body and Blood of Our

<sup>59</sup> *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 27, a. 2, ad 2.

Lord Jesus Christ, and deny that marvelous and unique conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the Body, and of the whole substance of the wine into the Blood, only the species of the bread and the wine remaining, the which conversion is indeed most aptly called by the Catholic Church transubstantiation: let him be anathema."<sup>59a</sup>

This is, thus, a revealed truth. But where and how is this truth revealed? It is revealed in *other* truths, in which it is included and from which it follows through reasoning. Those other truths are: first, in the consecration the words of Christ must truly be verified: "This is my body", "This is my blood."<sup>60</sup> Second, without the transubstantiation these words of Christ cannot be truly verified. By means of reasoning the defined dogma follows from these two truths, one of faith and the other of reason.

The reasoning is stated thus by St. Thomas: "I answer: It must be said that there were some who asserted that in this Sacrament the substance of the bread and of the wine remain after the consecration. But this position . . . is contrary to the form of this Sacrament, in which it is said, *This is my body*; which will not be true if the substance of the bread remains therein, for the substance of bread is never the Body of Christ; but it rather ought to be said, *'Here is my body*."<sup>60</sup>

The Tridentine itself makes it rather clear that this was the reason or reasoning employed by the Church to come to the knowledge of, and to define, the dogma. "But since Christ our Redeemer said that that which he was offering under the appearance of bread was *truly* his Body, it has accordingly always been the persuasion in the Church of God, and this Holy Synod declares it anew, that by the consecration of the bread and of the wine is effected the conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the wine substance of the Body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his Blood. This conversion, the Holy Catholic Church has conveniently and properly called transubstantiation."<sup>61</sup> The terms *since*, *accordingly* — we will not tire of repeating — are the indicators of reasoning.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>59a</sup> Denz-Schön., 1652.

<sup>60</sup> *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 75, a. 2.

<sup>61</sup> COUNCIL OF TRENT, sess. 13, ch. 4; Denz-Schön., 1642.

<sup>62</sup> "Although Christ's words openly and formally signify the *presence* of his body substance of the bread. But this notwithstanding, the *conversion* of the whole substance have always provided the ground for its persuasion that Christ's body is made present through conversion. Hence the Council judges that even if those words contain conversion only *virtually*, this mode of signifying per se suffices to *generate faith*." (GUILLELMUS WILMERS, S.J., *De Fide Divina*, n. 250; Ratisbonae 1902, pg. 252).

Melchor Cano explains in the following terms how this reasoning was the instrument of the dogmatic definition: "Likewise, as the Fathers to a man *argued* from the principle, 'This is my body', to the fact of the conversion of the bread into the Body of Christ, without which they could understand neither the truth of the aforesaid words nor all the other things that the Catholic faith confesses regarding the true inclusion of the Body of Christ under the species of bread."<sup>63</sup>

The following paragraph from the incomparable Domingo Soto is also worth mulling over: "But Scotus says: This [viz., transubstantiation] the Church received through revelation of the Holy Spirit. We, too, confess it indeed as something absolutely true. However, since the Church is not privileged with *immediate revelation*, as the Apostles, but with *divine power and help* [divine assistance] so as not to err in *unearthing* the articles of faith from the sacred pages, it is *not enough* for the theologian to say, 'The Church has so decreed in truths of faith', but it is also his function to show from what places of Holy Scripture she *has gathered* it. For the Synod of Nicea would have never accepted the term 'homousios', i.e., consubstantial to the Father, if it had not been *called* for by the Gospel text, 'I and the Father are one.' In like manner, the Fathers would have never made use of the words conversion and transubstantiation, had they not weighed them carefully in Christ's words, 'This is my body.' Indeed, since He had taken bread but given nothing but his body, *through an excellent consequence* the Fathers understood that by those very words he converted the bread into his body. Hence I do not know why Scotus said that it does not matter whether Christ said, 'This is' (Hoc est), or 'Here is' (Hic est) my body, when he having said, 'This is' matters to such a degree that if he had merely said, 'Here is', i.e., in this place, *the Church would have never admitted the sacramental conversion*. Thus, not to place greater value on 'This' than on 'Here' is to sever the very *fibers* and *straws* of truth. Nowhere but *thence do we gather* that the bread does not remain together with the body; authority against heretics, who refuse the sanctions of the Church unless they are founded on Scripture, withers and grows feeble. In the third and last place, let it be said that after the holy Fathers *had gathered* this conversion from the Gospel, they very aptly gave it the name of transubstantiation . . . For if you review all the aforementioned canons of the Fathers, you will find that *the Church came to the knowledge of the conversion for no other reason* than that of verifying the words of Christ, 'This is my body.'"<sup>64</sup>

Even more profound and important, as usual, are these words of the illustrious John of St. Thomas: "Nothing of the substance of the bread and of

<sup>63</sup> MELCHOR CANO, *loc. cit.*

<sup>64</sup> DOMINICUS SOTO, *In 4 Sent.*, d. 9, q. 2, a. 4; Lovanii 1573, pgs. 245-247.

the wine remains after the consecration, but all of it is converted into Christ. This is the second and third points we earlier enumerated as pertaining to the faith with respect to this Sacrament. Both are expressly defined in the Tridentine Council, sess. 13, ch. 4, where it is defined that the substance of the bread and of the wine do not remain together with the Body and Blood of Christ, but are converted into his Body and Blood, the species of bread and of wine remaining. And the Council adds the reason and foundation whence the Church gathers that this conversion must be asserted: "Since (says the Council) Christ our Redeemer said that that which He was offering under the species of bread truly was his Body, it has accordingly always been the persuasion in the Church of God," etc., etc.

He then enumerates some objections that can be made against this reasoning of the Church and the Council, and adds: "Moved by these foundations, some among Catholics feel that, although it is plain from the Church's definition that the substance of the bread and of the wine does not remain in this Sacrament, nonetheless, this is not deduced from the precise meaning of the words. . . . However, this position overthrows the whole foundation of the Council and must, therefore, be rejected. . . . Nor can it be said that it is not gathered precisely from the fact that it is truly said in an absolute sense, but from the fact that it is truly said in such a manner, i.e., as Christ actually wanted [it understood] and was understood by the Church. Indeed, this is the very thing the Council wanted to prove, why the Church has thus understood it,"<sup>65</sup>

We believe that these last quoted words from John of St. Thomas are most deserving of attention: "Indeed, this is the very thing that the Council wanted to prove, why the Church has thus understood it."

As a matter of fact, there are theologians who, in their examination of the factors of dogmatic progress, or in their investigation of how this or that truth (which at first sight does not seem to be contained formally in the primitive deposit) could have been subsequently defined as a dogma of faith, do little else but cite a greater or lesser number of passages from the Church Fathers who assert such a truth, and conclude with no small amount of self-satisfaction in these or like terms: "This truth belongs to Tradition because it is thus taught by the Church Fathers and has thus been understood and continues to be understood by the Church."

Well and good. However, such theologians seem unaware of the fact that progress and development are possible in both Tradition and the understanding of the Church. Consequently, there remains one further question: "Why has it been thus understood by the Church Fathers and the Church?"

<sup>65</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Sacramento Eucharistiae*, d. 28, a.1.

The true answer to this last question, where unfolded or derived dogmas are concerned, almost always is that the Church and the Church Fathers have thus understood it, and not in any other way, because of such and such a reason. Which almost always is the same as saying that they have thus understood it because of some proof or reasoning, always, of course, under the Holy Spirit's assistance, inasmuch as we are dealing with dogmatic definitions. This is, in our opinion, what is gathered from the history of dogmas, and what clearly transpires from the very texts of the Ecumenical Councils,<sup>66</sup>

211. NINTH EXAMPLE. — Prior to his ascension into heaven, Our divine Saviour addressed to his Apostles, and in their persons to their legitimate successors, the following words: "Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained."<sup>67</sup>

Basing itself on these words, as they were always understood by the Church Fathers and the Church, the same Tridentine Council defined as dogmas of faith, aside from the institution of the sacrament of Penance, the four following truths: (a) sacramental confession is by divine law necessary for salvation; (b) by divine law this confession must include each and every mortal sin committed after baptism, of which one is aware; (c) including even hidden, or internal, sins; (d) and including also the circumstances that change the species. These are the Council's own words: "If any one deny either that sacramental confession has been instituted by divine law, or that it is by divine law necessary for salvation: let him be anathema. If any one say that, to obtain the forgiveness of sin in the Sacrament of Penance, it is not by divine law necessary to confess each and every mortal sin of which memory is had with due and diligent previous reflection, including those that are hidden

<sup>66</sup> If some theologians are of the mind that no dogma, and particularly the dogma of the transubstantiation, was known by way of conclusion, this is because they have a mistaken notion of the theological conclusion in its proper sense. Thus, e.g., Battifol: "The transubstantiation, or to use the ancient term used by St. Thomas, the conversion, is not properly a theological conclusion, and the development that has explicated it must not be confused with that which is called theological development, which presupposes the assimilation of an extrinsic element by theology." (*L'Eucharistie*, 2nd ed., Paris 1931, pg. 500) If theology were as the author thinks, the assimilation of an element extrinsic (!) to revelation, it is obvious that no dogma can be a theological conclusion in the proper sense. But this is a very poor and very physicist idea of theology and the theological conclusion. Similar to Battifol's is the idea of the true theological conclusion given by Fr. Poulpique in his otherwise excellent book *L'objet intégral de L'Apologétique* (Paris 1912). Everything said by the author in pgs. 507-513 is nothing but a physicist and extrinsicist conception of theology, besides evidencing a great confusion between theology and the theological systems or opinions.

<sup>67</sup> John 20:22-23.

and those against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances that change the species of sin: let him be anathema."<sup>68</sup>

Thus, these four truths are revealed truths. But where and how are they revealed? They are revealed in other truths in which they are virtually contained and from which they follow through reasoning. These truths are: first, Jesus Christ made the Apostles and their successors true judges of sins with the power of absolving from them or of retaining them. Second, this power of judging, or of absolving or retaining, cannot be equitably exercised without the act of confession, i.e., without confessing each and every mortal sin, even the hidden, together with their specific circumstances. The four defined dogmas have been derived through reasoning from these two truths, one of faith, and the other of reason.

The Salmanticenses have succinctly expressed the reasoning as follows: "Sacramental confession has not only been instituted, but also commanded by Christ the Lord; hence there exists a divine precept with regard to it. . . . Now, this divine precept is gathered from those words of John, 20: 'Receive ye the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained', as the Tridentine teaches in the aforesaid fourth session, ch. 5. For there can be no power of retaining that does not entail the necessity of judgment on the part of the priests with reference to remission and absolution; and thus when Christ says that there is in priests the power of retaining sins, He also said that their judgment is necessary for absolution, and consequently that mortal sins are never remitted without order to this judgment. Thus all theologians. . . . Nor will it suffice to confess all mortal sins in general, but one is obliged to confess them indicating, so far as is morally possible, their number and species, as the same Tridentine Council sufficiently indicates in ch. 5, when it says that all sins are to be declared not only in general, but stating their kind, and singly. The Council gives the reason for this truth: that priests are constituted by Christ as judges in the forum of Penance; but they cannot correctly exercise this judgment nor observe equity in the imposition of penalties, if sins are declared to them only in general and not rather in kind and singly."<sup>69</sup>

No one has better expounded the reason for all these dogmas than the Tridentine itself. Let us quote its own words: "From the institution of the Sacrament of Penance, which has already been explained, the whole Church has always understood that the Lord also instituted the integral confession of sins and that it is by divine law necessary for all who have sinned after

<sup>68</sup> Denz.-Schön., 1706-1707.

<sup>69</sup> SALMANTICENSES, *Cursum Theol. Moralit. De Sacramento Poenitentiae*, ch. 7, n.1, and ch. 8, n.2.

baptism, *forasmuch* as [this is the major of faith] Our Lord Jesus Christ, in view of his ascension from earth into heaven, left behind in his stead the priests as presiders and judges to whom all the mortal sins into which the Christian faithful have fallen are to be brought, so that, in virtue of the power of the keys, they may pronounce sentence of remission or of retention of sins. For it is clear [this is the reason, i.e., the evident minor of reason] that the priests could not exercise this judgment where the cause is not known, nor could they observe equity in the imposition of penalties if the faithful should declare their sins only in general and not rather singly and in kind. From these it follows [another dogmatic corollary or another derived dogma] that penitents ought to declare in confession all the mortal sins, even those that are entirely concealed or private, of which they are conscious after a diligent examination of themselves. . . . It follows besides [another corollary or derived dogma] that the circumstances that change the species of sin are also to be disclosed in confession, since without them [the same minor of reason again] the sins themselves are neither integrally disclosed by the penitent nor become known to the judges, and it becomes impossible for the latter correctly to appraise the grievousness of the sins and to impose on the penitents the convenient penalty for such sins."<sup>70</sup>

There clearly appears in the above example the factor to which we have already called attention in the other examples, to wit, the reason or reasoning employed by the Church, under the Holy Spirit's assistance, as the human instrument of dogmatic development. As explained by the Councils themselves, the process is quite simple. Certain truths are defined as dogmas of faith or as contained in the revealed deposit "because the Church Fathers or the Tradition of the Church has thus understood them." This is the common criterion or touchstone generally employed by the Church in defining dogmas, be they primary or derived. But in the case of derived dogmas (and it is precisely of these that dogmatic progress is made up) there is one further step, which some people apparently fail to notice, viz., that there was a reason why the Church Fathers and the Church have understood them thus. This is exactly what is understood — or what we understand — by reasoning. However, inasmuch as these reasons are — as indeed they are — intrinsic to the revealed datum, or implicit in the revealed datum, or intellectually explicative of the revealed datum, since they are taken from the very gut or essence of the revealed datum, it is obvious that they do not objectively add to the said datum, but merely explicate, or unfold, or develop it in a continuous line of real identity or objective homogeneity.

In passing, here we have the answer to a very common objection submitted by those who deny all true dogmatic progress, at least when it is

<sup>70</sup> Sess. 14, ch. 5; Denz.-Schön., 1679-1681.



effected by means of argumentation or reasoning. The best evidence, they say, that there is no progress in dogma, or that reasoning does not intervene in its development, lies in the fact that when the ecumenical councils seek to define a dogma, they always and above all look to what the holy Fathers and the Church have held on the matter.

Quite true. But those who object in this manner fail to notice that reasoning had many times already intervened *beforehand* to form that persuasion of the Church Fathers and that Tradition of the Church, the very same grounds on which the Councils base themselves.

212. TENTH EXAMPLE. — It would be easy to continue submitting many more instances of such dogmas as are known and defined by the Church through reasoning.<sup>71</sup> The Tridentine is a rich mine of them, and many can also be gathered from the Vatican Council. However, we believe that those we have submitted are sufficient for our purposes. We will add only one more which, in our opinion, is of no small importance.

Many, perhaps the majority of theologians, consider as proximate to faith or as definable as of faith, and consequently as *revealed*, this very fundamental truth: "The Church's infallibility is not limited to what is formally or immediately revealed, but extends itself also to what is virtually or mediately revealed." This same truth is also usually expressed in these other terms: "The Church's infallibility is not limited to what is revealed *in itself*; but extends itself to everything that is necessarily *connected with* the revealed deposit or to all that is *necessary* for the conservation of the said deposit."

<sup>71</sup>With respect to the relations between the soul and the body in man, the Church has defined as dogmas of faith these three truths: (a) In man there is *but one* soul, the rational soul; (b) it is the *form* of the body; (c) it is the form of the body *per se* and essentially. (4th Council of Constantinople, can. 11; and Council of Vienna, *Constitutio de Fide Catholica*; Denz-Schön., 657-658, 900, 902).

Those who maintain that the Church can define nothing as of divine faith except truths *formally* contained in the revealed deposit, are necessarily driven to affirm that these three truths are likewise formally revealed and that they are deduced from the revealed deposit through *improper* reasoning.

On the other hand, we believe that any theologian free of prejudices in this matter will sincerely acknowledge that these three truths — particularly the third — are not found except *virtually* in the revealed deposit since they *need* to be deduced through reasoning in the proper sense of the term (64).

Hence we think that instead of arguing *a priori*: "The Church can define only what is formally revealed, therefore everything that she has defined is formally revealed", it would be much more in keeping with the historical and scientific method to argue *a posteriori* or *from the facts*: "these truths obviously belong to the virtually revealed; they have been defined by the Church; therefore the Church can define the virtually revealed."

The distinguished Cardinal Franzelin expresses himself in these words: "This extension of infallibility is, with the concurrence of all theologians, so logically certain a truth that its denial would be a most grievous error, or even, in the view of many, a heresy, notwithstanding the fact that up to now it has not been explicitly condemned as heretical."<sup>72</sup> The no less distinguished Cardinal Billot expresses himself in similar terms: "This infallibility is most certainly gathered from revealed principles; indeed, *in many* it is held as formally revealed, even if it has not yet been authentically proposed as a dogma of divine faith."<sup>73</sup>

Now then, how and where is this truth revealed? It is revealed in *other* truths, in which it is virtually contained, and from which it does not issue except through reasoning. Those other truths are: first, the Church has received the divine commission of safeguarding the revealed deposit; second, the Church would not be able to safeguard the deposit if she were not infallible with respect to what is mediately revealed. The truth with which we are now concerned follows by rigorous reasoning from these propositions, one of which is of faith, and the other, of reason.

Such a reasoning can be found in any handbook of theology. De Groot, always concise and clear, states it as follows: "The means must be proportionate to the end; now, unless infallibility is extended to include theological conclusions, proportionate means would be wanting for the safekeeping of the deposit of faith; *therefore*, theological conclusions are also the object of infallibility."<sup>74</sup> The theological conclusion is typical of all that is mediately revealed, thus the same reasoning is applicable to all of the latter, including the dogmatic facts.

Someone might here remark: "The reasoning advanced by De Groot and all the theologians is all right. But, over and above that reasoning, there is the persuasion of the Church Fathers and the praxis of the Church. The truth we are dealing with, in the supposition that it is dogmatic, is based on the persuasion of the Fathers and the praxis of the Church, and not on any reasoning."

Very well. But in turn we ask again: where did that *persuasion* of the holy Fathers and that *praxis of the Church* originate? They originated in a principle of *faith*, which is the divine commission to conserve the deposit, and a truth of *reason*, consisting in the natural *evidence*, both speculative and practical, of the impossibility of safeguarding the deposit without being infallible with respect to what is mediately revealed. In other words, they origi-

<sup>72</sup>*De Traditione*, th. 12, scholium primum.

<sup>73</sup>*De Ecclesia Christi*, th. 17, §2.

<sup>74</sup>*Summa Apol.*, q.10, a.2.

nated precisely in the aforementioned reasoning, which is a reasoning explicative of the revealed major premise, but nonetheless a true, proper and rigorous reasoning. When dealing with other similar objections involving the persuasion of the Church Fathers and of the Church, as if this were inconsistent with the intervention of reason or reasoning, the theologian ought to recall always the already quoted luminous remark of John of St. Thomas: "Indeed, this is exactly what the Council wanted to prove, viz., why the Church understood it thus" (210)

Whatever be the judgment concerning the ten instances offered above, no one can now say that we limit ourselves to one or another hypothetical example, without descending to concrete and real instances, as our learned objector chided us in his letter. (190)

#### SECTION IV

##### WHETHER DOGMATIC EVOLUTION BY WAY OF ASSIMILATION IS POSSIBLE

213. — The *speculative* and the *affective* channels — inclusive reasoning, and vital experience — are the two great channels through which dogmatic development is effected. Having examined the former, we will, prior to the study of the latter, briefly deal with the so-called way of *assimilation*.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHYSICAL LIFE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL LIFE. — Ever since Cardinal Newman wrote his brilliant *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, there is mention, even by Catholic writers, of assimilation as one of the channels of dogmatic development. In our opinion no such assimilation exists, not only in dogma, but not even in the sciences. All that is being written to the contrary comes from extrapolating the laws and material processes of vegetable and animal life, in the proper sense of the terms, to the spiritual life of the intellect.

As a matter of fact, there is no need whatsoever of any assimilation of foreign matter for the growth and development of an intellectual principle or statement in the intellect. What is needed is a simple comparison with other intellectual statements coming either from speculative or practical reason, from internal or external experience. St. Thomas rightly observes that every and any intellectual statement is *light*,<sup>75</sup> and the contact or application of

<sup>75</sup> "The intelligible itself is called a *beacon* (lumen) or *light*," (*Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 12, a. 5)

light — without adding to, or modifying, the objectivity of that which is seen — increases the seer's power of vision, and even the visibility of the object or of what exists in the object latently, implicitly, virtually. Herein lies the force and the value of what in ordinary speech is called *comparison*, or contact of two or more truths among themselves, and in logic is technically called *reasoning*. Every statement is developed upon contact or comparison with another, or every major premise is developed upon comparison with an inclusive minor, because, upon contact, the light of the minor makes visible in the major new aspects, new relations, new predicates, new truths, new positions, which in spite of their being already there, were not visible previously, just as upon contact of the film with the developer, the features that already existed in the film become clear, or better still, just as upon contact with the known values, the unknown values in an equation are disclosed.

According to St. Thomas, this is the true psychology of intellectual progress and of the life of *our* intellect. Consequently, this is also the true psychology of the progress and life of faith and of dogma, since faith is formally an *intellectual* virtue. To speak of assimilations in the development of dogma is to confuse the life of the intellect with the life of an animal or of a plant. On account of their *material* character, plant or animal organisms admit no development or evolution save through intussusception and assimilation of foreign elements; and to say assimilation is to say *transformation*. On the other hand, intellectual life develops itself, not by transforming the primitive principles or statements, but by comparing them among themselves or with other statements, so that by the light of one what was concealed in the other may become visible. Intellectual life is not to be likened to chemical assimilation or combination, nor even to mathematical addition or subtraction. Rather it is like the *development of an equation*, the purpose and process of which is neither to increase nor to decrease in any way the true value of the unknown quantities but to solve or explicate their implicit or hidden values through known values.

214. Such is, according to the Thomist school, the true and only function of the much bandied about inclusive *minors of reason* with respect to the unfolding of dogma. The very serious problems related to the evolution of dogma — considered as new by many to such an extent that they almost accuse the great masters of Scholasticism of having ignored them — were examined and solved by these same masters, and above all by St. Thomas and his school, with a profundity and breadth that stand out in contrast to the superficiality with which they are studied not only in heterodox works, but even in many Catholic handbooks. What we call today the contact of revelation with the different philosophies and civilizations, the schoolmen called the contact of the majors of faith with the minors of reason. What we study today under the name of dogmatic evolution, they studied under the name of theological conclusion. What we discuss today under the question whether

dogmatic progress is the result of the assimilation of rational data by the truths of faiths, they debated under the question whether the major of reason is a true principle or co-cause of the conclusion, or simply a helper or instrument. The modern question whether true development or evolution is possible in dogma was debated by them in terms of whether theological conclusions are of divine faith or rather definable as of faith.

The solution proffered to these problems by St. Thomas and his school has always been that in the theological reasoning the *minors of reason* are merely instruments of the majors of faith or mere helpers of our mind in the unfolding of what already exists in a latent state in the majors of faith, and that it is not their purpose to increase, diminish, or modify the objectivity of the majors of faith, but only to explicate or unfold their implicitness or virtuality; that the conclusion is not contained in both the major of faith and the minor of reason, but only and exclusively in the major of faith, and conclusion is not gathered from the major and the minor, but solely from the major with the help of the minor; that the minors of reason are not *proper loci* theological or *formal* principles of the conclusion but mere *attributiones* principles; that, consequently, theology or the theological conclusion is not an *objective* addition to the major of faith or revealed deposit, but rather its intellectual *explication*;<sup>76</sup> that, finally, such an explication is a *divino-human* explication or an explication of the divine deposit made by human reason whenever it is effected solely through inference by mere men, i.e., by theologians, but on the other hand, it is a *divino-divine* explication, that is, an explication of the divine deposit by the authority of God Himself, when it is effected with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, as is the case in each and every infallible definition by the Church.

Thus, both the truths of revelation and the truths of reason are, for our minds, sources of light. They differ vastly in nature and value: nonetheless, they are always *light*. Brought into contact, they cannot but illumine one another mutually.<sup>77</sup> The truths of faith have served to develop the truths of

<sup>76</sup> "The *premise of faith alone* contains the whole truth and certainty of the conclusion, and the other which is known by natural light is assumed only accidentally (per natural light in order to acquire science, hence, in the science, who stands in need of the position 'Christ is man' [that is, *perfect man*] as in its perfect cause."<sup>77</sup> (GONZALEZ, *Thomistic Theology*, d. preoccasionalis, a.1, n.38) This is common doctrine among Thomists (96, 246).

<sup>77</sup> "For not only can faith and reason never come into conflict with each other, but they also give aid to each other, inasmuch as right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith and illumines it by its light, cultivates the science of divine things, and manifold knowledge."<sup>78</sup> (CONC. VATICANUM I, *De Fide Catholica*, ch. 4; Denz.-Schön., 3019)

reason; the truths of reason have served to unfold the truths of faith. With the truths of faith we have been able to discover in those of reason truths which philosophers would otherwise have been unable to unearth. With the truths of reason we have discovered in those of faith or in the revealed deposit truths that otherwise would have remained forever concealed from the faithful or the theologians. In neither case is there any assimilation of the truths of the theologians by the truths of faiths, or vice versa, but rather mutual illumination. The assimilation of a truth of reason by a truth of faith would not make for the progress of faith or even of theology; it would rather corrupt them. Nothing truly belongs to the faith or to theology unless it is truly included in the principles of theology and of faith, and the true principles of faith and of theology are not, and can never be, the truths of reason, but the truths of divine faith.

In a nutshell: the relationship of the premises of faith to the premises of reason, or of the revealed deposit to the different human philosophies or civilizations with which it has come into contact, is not the *assimilating* relationship of the stomach to food, but the *instrumental* or auxiliary relationship of a telescope or microscope to sight, or of the chemical developer to the exposed film, or of the known values to the unknown ones in a mathematical equation. Their purpose is not to add, or subtract, or change, or assimilate anything, but solely and exclusively to uncover or unfold what was already *implicit*, which is why the ancients very aptly called it the *explication* of the revealed datum.

#### THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PLATE EXPOSED TO THE DIVINE THOUGHT

215. When a photographic plate has been exposed to an object, it does not require any new exposure. It needs only to be *developed*. It is, therefore, a *developable* plate.

But in order to develop it, one cannot indifferently use any kind of liquids or any kind of manipulations. Only such liquids and such manipulations are to be employed as will not erase, blur, or modify the image already impressed, but will only bring it out or *develop* it.

What we call the revealed deposit is nothing but a photographic plate exposed to the word of God. In such a plate there exist from the beginning certain features that can be clearly perceived, and which, consequently, require no manipulation or development of any kind in order to be seen and understood. This is what we call the *explicitly revealed*, or, in short, the *revealed*, as St. Thomas calls it.

However, there are in the same plate many other features which likewise are already impressed on it. But these features lie underneath, hidden, imperceptible to the eye, *implicit*. They need to be processed, brought out,

developed. They constitute the implicit-virtually revealed, or, in one word, the *revealed*, to borrow St. Thomas's term, features of the plate.

The chemicals or processes employed to develop or explicate this divine plate, this premise of faith, bear the name of premises of reason or reasoning. Now, one may not use any kind of chemicals or processes, that is, one may not employ any kind of premises, but only such as will not erase, blur or modify the features already impressed on the premise of faith. This is achieved when the premise of reason is of the essence or the *understanding* of the premise of faith, when the former is perfectly matched or proportioned to the nature of the latter (96 and 107). In this case, it is certain that the features of the image that are brought out or developed in the conclusion would not have been perceived without the manipulation or the liquid of the minor of reason; but it is no less certain that the features do not come from the liquid or the manipulations used in developing the plate, but from the plate itself, i.e., from the object to which the plate has been exposed.

This is the profound and true meaning of those golden phrases with which St. Thomas describes the nature of theology and of the theological conclusion in the proper sense of the terms: "Therefore, since the Sacred Doctrine [Sacred Theology insofar as it is a science properly speaking] considers certain things *inasmuch as they are divinely revealed* [i.e., the explicitly revealed, the features that were already perceptible in the plate from the beginning, the features *already revealed*] all the things that are divinely *revealed* [all the features already impressed on the plate, but that are still *implicit* and explicable or *developable* by human reason] share in the *one reason* of this science.<sup>78</sup> And thus the sacred doctrine is like the IMPRESSION OF DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, which being one and simple, encompasses all things."<sup>79</sup> Every rigorous and proper theological conclusion, as well as every definition of the Church, is nothing else but the explication or development of the plate, i.e. of the revealed deposit on which God has made certain impressions. Hence what is given by theology and by the Church is nothing else but the *implicitly* revealed. "*Everything is implicitly contained in the Holy Bible*", says Capreolo in his commentary to this same article. (378)

215. CARDINAL NEWMAN'S GENUINE THOUGHT. - The learned Cardinal Newman speaks of the process of assimilation because he is dealing with the development not only of doctrine but also of the rites and discipline and the other things accidental to Christianity. Such things are ordinarily external things, which admit not only assimilation but also transformation, as

<sup>78</sup> *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.3.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, ad 2.

a man transforms his clothing or his nourishment without transforming his specific nature.

Truth to say, by "additions" or "assimilations", in the matter of *doctrines*, Newman means exactly the same thing that traditional theology designates with the terms "unfolding" or "explication" of the implicit virtuality, Newman maintained during his whole life the habit of calling "additions" or "assimilations" everything that was not "explicit" from the beginning. However, there are times in which he expresses himself so clearly, that there can be no doubt as to what he meant by such terms.

In 1849, four years after his conversion, Newman expressed his thinking in the following manner: "It is well known, though the creed of the Church has been *one and the same from the beginning*, yet it has been so deeply lodged in her bosom as to be held by individuals *more or less implicitly* instead of being delivered from the first in those special statements, or what are called definitions, under which it is now presented to us, and which preclude mistake or ignorance. These definitions which *are but the expression of portions of the one dogma which has ever been received by the Church*, are the work of time; they have grown to their present shape and number in the course of eighteen centuries, under the exigency of successive events, such as heresies and the like, and they may of course receive still *further additions* as time goes on."<sup>80</sup>

Twenty-five years after his conversion he wrote Dr. White: "The time may come when it will be seen how those traditions are compatible with *additions*, that is, with *true developments*, which those traditions indeed do not explicitly teach."<sup>81</sup>

His *Essays Critical and Historical*, published in 1871, contain the following: "The hypothesis about the *depositum fidei* in which I gradually acquiesced was that of doctrinal development, or the evolution of doctrines *out of certain original and fixed dogmatic truths, which were held inviolate from first to last, and the more firmly established and illustrated by the very process of enlargement.*" And Newman immediately subjoins that when he wrote of "*new shapes foreign to each other*" (in the book's first edition) he was borrowing the language of a theory that was not his own: "Whereas here I have given utterance to a theory, not mine, of a certain metamorphosis and recasting of doctrines into *new shapes* - 'in nova mutatas corpora formas' -"

<sup>80</sup> *Difficulties of Anglicans*, London 1901, vol. 1, pgs. 394-395.

<sup>81</sup> Letter to Dr. White of 12 April 1870. See WARD, WILFRID: *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, London 1913, vol. 2, pg. 296.

Those old and new shapes being *foreign to each other*, and connected only as symbolizing or realizing certain immutable but nebulous principles.<sup>82</sup>

Here is a new text, which is no less interesting. It is found in Newman's conferences on the *Difficulties of Anglicans*: "To the Apostles the whole revelation was given, by the Church it is transmitted; *no simply new truth* has been given to us since St. John's death; the one office of the Church is to guard 'that noble deposit' of truth, as St. Paul speaks to Timothy, which the Apostles bequeathed to her, *in its fullness and integrity*."<sup>83</sup>

Let us, finally, recall the terms in which Newman delivers his thinking on the development of dogma: "*Revelation is everything in Catholic doctrine, the Apostles its sole depositary; the inferential method its sole instrument; and ecclesiastical authority, its sole sanction.*" (204)

In his celebrated *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, Newman determines seven marks or characteristics of the legitimate or homogeneous development. In the third place he names the "power of assimilation," and in the sixth place the "preservative additions", but he expressly requires that these truths, which he calls assimilations or additions, should not be opposed to the revealed datum, whether by excess or by defect (as happens in the case of every *contrary* concept), nor even totally unconnected with, or foreign to, it (as happens in the case of every *diverse* concept), but that there truly be affinity between them and the revealed datum, which is precisely what the great schoolmen termed *concordant* (consona) concepts or mutually implicit concepts (20). As a matter of fact, there can be no affinity between *ideas* without an internal connexion; if that connexion is absolute or metaphysical, the so-called affinity is nothing other than true *implicit identity* (247), in which case that which in physiological language both psychologists and Newman call assimilation or addition, is, in the truly philosophical and theological language of the School, no more than a true *explication of what is implicit*. That is also the meaning given by Newman to his phrase "new dogmas", that is to say, not *objectively new*, but *explicitly new*.

Hence, we believe that Newman has been the victim of a grave injustice, not only on the part of the Modernists who pretend to see in him a forerunner of their doctrines, but also on the part of certain Catholic theologians who believe that Newman's ideas on the evolution of dogma are not thoroughly consistent with Catholic teaching merely on account of the fact that his peculiar phraseology in this matter is rather different from that

<sup>82</sup> *Essays Critical and Historical*, London 1919, vol. 1, pg. 288. See BREMOND, HENRY: *Newman*, Preface, ed. 8 Paris 1908, pgs. 33-34.

<sup>83</sup> *Difficulties of Anglicans*, London 1900, vol. 2, pg. 327.

commonly employed by scholastic theologians.<sup>84</sup> His Holiness, Pius X has rightly said of Newman: "Indeed, nothing is found in the great abundance of his [Newman's] works that seems *foreign to the common teaching of theologians*: nothing that can cast suspicion on his *faith*."<sup>85</sup>

We believe that Newman's *ideas* on the evolution of dogma are not only perfectly orthodox, but also thoroughly traditional at bottom; however, his theologico-philosophical vocabulary is at times as poor and deficient as his psychological observations and his historical synthesis of dogmatic evolution are unfailingly rich and penetrating. His immortal book *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* — Newman began it while still an Anglican, and became a convert to Catholicism while working on it — embodies, in our view, the clearest view of the nature and development of the Catholic Church that is possible to one who is outside but so close that it is almost touching her. Newman's book is like the bridge through which one passes from Anglicanism to Catholicism; this constitutes its great merit. But, by the same token, it is also the bridge through which one can, either through carelessness or mistake, pass from Catholicism to Anglicanism or Modernism; this constitutes its possible danger. To approach this conception of the Catholic Church as seen from the outside, which Newman offers in his book, is, for a Catholic, to approach the extreme confines wherein Catholicism borders on Protestantism, whereas, for a Protestant, it is to approach the extreme confines where Protestantism borders on Catholicism.

This is why we usually refrain from indifferently advising any Catholic young man to read this and certain other works of Newman unless he possesses solid philosophico-theological grounding, and yet we would advise — as we have always advised — any Protestant or agnostic to read, and read frequently, this and all of Newman's other works, in the persuasion that his writings will do more to attract them to Catholicism than all other theological and philosophical apologies written by the greatest Catholic theologians and metaphysicians, but with a rather speculative and intellectual tenor.

<sup>84</sup> "Today no one is unaware that Newman was for a long time viewed with suspicion. But, if I were allowed to speak of skill in such matters as these, where only absolute sincerity is admissible, I would say that nothing is more groundless and more unjust than this suspicious attitude towards *one of the most Catholic spirits that have ever existed*." (BREMOND, HENRY: *Newman*, ed. 8, Paris 1908, Introd., pgs. 10-11)

However, it must be admitted that there are some very weak points in his philosophy, e.g., his theory on the origin of knowledge and on the nature of certainty. But this has nothing, or almost nothing, to do with his theological theory on the origin and nature of dogmatic evolution.

<sup>85</sup> PIUS X, *Thaum illud opusculum* epistola ad Rmum, Episcopium Limiticensem 10 martii 1908.

We believe that if the illustrious Newman had been as great a theologian or philosopher as he was a psychologist and historian, he could have written one of the best apologies for the Catholic religion that could be dreamt of.

But he himself realized, and was not ashamed of owning it, that he was not a good theologian and had no hopes of being one. In February of 1869, he wrote to Sister Maria Pia: "Really and truly I am not a theologian . . . I am not, and never shall be."<sup>86</sup>

This lack of theology, or rather of precision in theological nomenclature, accounts for Newman's use of the terms additions or assimilations with respect to dogma, despite the fact that in his own mind such terms signify nothing else but homogeneous developments or explications of what was already contained in the primitive datum virtually, but truly *impliciti*. This is the only evolution possible in dogma. To speak of additions or assimilations in any other sense would not be homogeneous or explicative, but transformist, evolution.

#### SECTION V DOGMATIC EVOLUTION THROUGH THE AFFECTIVE OR EXPERIMENTAL CHANNEL

216. If there is no such thing in dogma as progress by way of assimilation, there is another channel of dogmatic development entirely apart from the channel of reasoning. We are here referring to the channel of affection, of the will, of piety, of feeling, the experimental way, the mystical way, in short, that way of which St. Thomas so often speaks, and describes as the way by mode of *connaturalness*, by a certain *affinity*, quasi *experimental*, by *contact*, and other like qualifiers. This is the way of which the holy doctor always speaks in contrast to the way *by study*, *by inquiry*, *by reasoning*. To understand well this new channel, it is necessary to pay attention to three things, to wit, to the role played in our judgments by: (a) the affective life in general; (b) the natural habits; (c) the supernatural habits.

THE AFFECTIVE LIFE IN GENERAL. — The important role played by the affective life with respect to our judgments is well-known to all. Love excites and concentrates our attention, it makes one dwell on the loved object more constantly and with greater fixedness. This concentration of attention is tantamount to an increase in cognitive power for, as the well-known Latin proverb has it, "pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sensus" (power grows weaker as it is diffused). This concentrated attention is a great

<sup>86</sup>*Loc. cit.*, pg. 281.

advantage for the understanding and the development of any truth. The physicist, or the chemist, who wishes to study thoroughly the properties of any phenomenon or body, begins, first of all, by attempting to isolate it from any other body or phenomenon, so as to be able to study it in all its purity, without any admixture of foreign impressions that usually and frequently lead to error or confusion. Love performs exactly the same function with respect to the loved one. The lover fixes his gaze intensely, and even exclusively on the beloved; he thus receives its impressions with greater force and greater purity, and discerns more quickly certain properties or features that others fail to notice, or come to notice much later.<sup>87</sup> It is the Beloved Disciple who before all others recognizes the risen Christ on the shore, and exclaims: "It is the Lord."

But to this known advantage of love there is at times associated a similarly known disadvantage. To appraise things duly and well, we often need to compare them with other things, since our knowledge, in contrast to that of the angels, is rather much more relative or comparative than absolute or intuitive. The man who fails to pursue varied and comparative studies, who limits himself to one order of ideas, or even worse, to one sole object, the specialist, in short, runs the risk of being narrow and myopic in his judgments, and exclusivist in his appraisals. He is liable to scorn anything outside his speciality, to grow blind to whatever lies beyond his own field, and to exaggerate the object of his predilection as if alone had any value and deserved any attention.<sup>88</sup> Experience bears abundant witness to the fact that often there is but one step separating the specialist or the impassioned from the myopic or the visionary. There must be some reason for the fact that love is usually shown blindfolded.

At any rate, if love's advantages or disadvantages, whatever they be, reduce solely, as some people believe, to facilitating or obstructing attention and, through attention, theoretical judgment, then the affective life taken as a whole would respectively be a spur or a hindrance to reason but not a second autonomous channel, distinct from it. But, as we shall see, the affective life includes much more than that.

<sup>87</sup>"The lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the loved one, but seeks to investigate those things that inwardly belong to the beloved, and thus he penetrates into the latter's interior." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1-2, q.28, a.2) "For we busy ourselves with greater attention and greater perseverance in those things which we perform pleasurable." (*Ibid.*, q.4, a.1, ad 3)

<sup>88</sup>"We pay great attention to those things in which we take delight; but when attention is forcefully engaged in a certain thing, it grows weaker with regard to other things, or is totally withdrawn from them." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1-2, q.33, a.3)

217. THE NATURAL HABITS OR DISPOSITIONS. — Habit constitutes a *second nature*. A good or virtuous habit is one that is in conformity with *reason*. Thence it follows that anyone equipped with a virtuous habit or a good natural disposition possesses within himself, and without any need of going beyond himself, a real, physical, immanent, and at the same time objective, element whereby he is able experimentally and without reasoning to form a judgment concerning the object of such a habit comparable to, or even better than the judgment formed by another solely through science or speculative reasoning without the benefit of the habit.

It can be said, and it is said, that he who possesses a virtuous habit or natural disposition, possesses a *new sense*. Thus we commonly speak of a sense of art, a sense of modesty, a sense of humour, a sense or feeling of anything in any order whatsoever. Just as with our external senses we perceive the external objects through immediate contact, without any comparison or reasoning, through simple and genuine intuition, so he who possesses, e.g., the habit of chastity, spontaneously and intuitively perceives the purity or impurity of an action or of a doctrine related to such matters more speedily and keenly, and at times with even greater certainty, than can be achieved with all the skills of reasoning by the theoretical moralist, if he is not chaste himself. Much of the same happens in art, education, religion, in all orders of life. This is the effect of any natural disposition, or of any acquired habit, which is a kind of internal sense or *instinct* whereby we are able to judge experimentally or connaturally on account of the fact that in the habit we carry within ourselves a second nature, that is to say, a likeness or participation that is not merely intentional or ideal, but real and objective, of the object judged. Just as by the sense of taste we perceive and discern the various flavours, so, says St. Thomas,<sup>89</sup> through the habits we perceive and discern, without reasoning, the conformity of disconformity, the truth or falsity, of the acts or doctrines relative to each habit.

218. THE SUPERNATURAL HABITS. — What happens in the natural order, happens even more truly in the supernatural order. Better still, what in the natural order is merely a *likeness*, is in the supernatural order reality and *identity*.

As a matter of fact, Catholic doctrine holds that grace, together with the virtues and gifts derived therefrom, is a real participation of the Divinity. More: through sanctifying grace, the Deity itself, in its Unity and Trinity of

<sup>89</sup> Later on in this section, in the paragraph entitled "Texts from St. Thomas", the reader will find gathered together the passages that confirm all that we say here on the *habits*, particularly the supernatural habits of faith, grace, charity, the virtues, and the gifts.

Persons, dwells in our souls, not merely by similitude or metaphor, but in an objective and most real, albeit mysterious and ineffable, manner. This indwelling of the Divinity itself within the most intimate recesses of our being is virtually initiated with the supernatural faith possessed by every Christian, even if he be a sinner. It is formally consummated with sanctifying grace, together with the virtues and gifts, with which every just man is endowed.

Thus, he who possesses divine faith, and to a much greater degree, he who possesses sanctifying grace with its virtues and gifts, possesses and carries within himself, in the manner of a *nature*, the very same object from which all the statements of faith proceed, and with which they all are concerned: the object from which, and from which alone, all dogmatic progress ensues, and can ensue, since nothing can ever be dogmatic or belong to divine faith if it is not a real expression of the Divinity. Thus, the believer, and, even more so, the saint, possess within themselves a *new sense*, which St. Paul calls the *sense of Christ*, and which we might very well call the *sense of faith*, or the *eyes of faith*.

Now then, by history and experience we know that, on the natural level, the aesthetic sense, for example, or the moral sense have contributed to the appreciation and development of the arts or ethics as much as, or perhaps more than, theoretical rules. Let us imagine what would be the case if, instead of being simply the patrimony of a few geniuses or a few noble souls, artistic feeling or moral virtue were universally diffused, and the world were made up exclusively of brilliant artists, or of souls endowed with a high and exquisite moral sense.

Now, what in the natural order is mere supposition, is a reality in the supernatural order. By the habit of faith, all Christians carry within themselves an inchoate, but nonetheless real, participation of the Divinity; an inestimable number of them possess sanctifying grace, and together with grace, charity, the virtues and the divine life: some — many more than we think — possess that life and those gifts in that heroic degree known as sanctity, in which the *life of God* becomes almost normal in them.

That faith, that grace, that charity, those virtues, those gifts — especially the gifts of wisdom, understanding, and knowledge — are objective supernatural realities, *second natures* grafted onto what in modern parlance would be called the *subconscious* of our being. By means of them we are able to perceive, judge, and develop connaturally, intuitively, through contact, quasi experimentally, many supernatural truths which the speculative theologian comes to know only through science, as a conclusion, through study, through laborious reasoning.

Thus, as the history of dogmas shows, it frequently happens that some saintly person, or someone possessed of a pure and lively faith, feels or anti-

cipates a certain dogmatic conclusion or development even before it has been deduced, or indeed even surmised, by speculative theology. Such a person then proceeds to share his feeling with other faithful who spontaneously receive it as the genuine expression of their own sentiments or faith. The process is repeated until the feeling is so widely spread that it becomes the *common feeling* of all the Christian people.

Of course, no sooner does such a seemingly novel sentiment externally manifest and propagate itself than it is seized by speculative theology and subjected to strict accounting by being compared with the sources of revelation, viz., the divine Scriptures and Tradition, and with the authentic criteria represented by the Church Fathers, Councils and Popes. It will frequently happen that speculative theology will succeed in *demonstrating* that this sentiment of the faithful, albeit its appearances of novelty, is merely the explication or conclusion of what was already implicitly contained in the sources of revelation or in other defined formulae. On the other hand, it might also happen that speculative theology will not be able rigorously to *demonstrate it* and will have to be satisfied with a greater or lesser degree of *probability*. But whether theology succeeds in demonstrating it or not, the common sentiment of the faithful is *of itself alone*, even without theological reasoning, a sufficient criterion enabling the pontiff or the council to define, under the Holy Spirit's assistance, a truth as a dogma of faith. In order to define a truth, the Church is bound neither to the reasoning of the theologians nor to the feeling of the faithful, since she is not a disciple but the teacher of both the faithful and the theologians. Any human means that certifies her on the explicit or the implicit existence of a truth in the revealed deposit, is sufficient to enable her to define such a truth with the Holy Spirit's assistance. The *feeling* of the body of the faithful is one of such means, equal to, or even more than, theological reasoning. And such a feeling is moulded by the *habits* of faith, grace, charity, the virtues and the gifts in a manner that is connatural, i.e., without reasoning, as much as or more than by speculative theology through study and reasoning.

219. TEXTS FROM ST. THOMAS. — To confirm all that has been said in this section we will here transcribe collected together some passages from the Angelic Doctor. We will quote only a few and those that are shortest, but sufficient to indicate the constitutive elements of these two ways of knowing which we have called the *way of reasoning* and the *way of affection*.

"The rectitude of *judgment* can happen in *two ways*: one, through the perfect *use of reason*; another, on account of a certain *connaturalness* to things that are to be judged. For instance, in matters belonging to chastity, he judges correctly through the *inquiry of reason* who has learned the *science of*

morals; but he who has the *habit* of chastity judges correctly through a certain *connaturalness* to such matters."<sup>90</sup>

"Just as the sense of *taste* detects flavours according to its disposition, so man's *mind* adjudicates concerning what is to be done in accordance with its *habitual disposition*."<sup>91</sup>

"Knowledge is *twofold* . . . One, *speculative* . . . another, *affective* or *experimental*, insofar as one experiences in himself the taste of divine sweetness."<sup>92</sup>

"Now this sufficiency [in knowing] is accounted for in some people by study and instruction together with keenness of intellect; but in some others it is accounted for by a certain *affinity to things divine*, as Dionysius asserts of Hierotheus."<sup>93</sup>

"And also in this manner the moral *virtues* are said to operate with greater certainty than art, insofar as they are by reason moved to their acts *after the manner of nature*."<sup>94</sup>

"Some people possess certain virtues on account of a *natural disposition* . . . and, in consequence, they *naturally* possess a correct *judgment*."<sup>95</sup>

"The habit of science inclines to the knowables *after the manner of reason* . . .; but the habit of *faith*, inasmuch as it does not rest on reason, inclines *after the manner of nature*, just as the habits of the moral virtues and the habit of principles."<sup>96</sup>

"Now the light of faith is like an impression made by the First Truth. Hence, this light is sufficient in order to *judge*. But this habit does not move by *way of the intellect*, but rather by *way of the will*."<sup>97</sup>

"The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Spirit unless it be *united to Him in some way*, as a tool is not moved by the artisan unless *through contact* or through some other kind of *union*. Now the first union of man [with God] is effected through *faith, hope and charity*."<sup>98</sup>

<sup>90</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.45, a.3.

<sup>91</sup>Loc. cit., q.24, a.11.

<sup>92</sup>Loc. cit., q.97, a.2, ad 2.

<sup>93</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, a.35, q.2, a.1, sol.1.

<sup>94</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.18, a.4.

<sup>95</sup>Loc. cit., q.47, a.15.

<sup>96</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, q.3, a.3, sol. 2, ad 2.

<sup>97</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium, De Trinitate*, q.3, a.1, ad 4.

<sup>98</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1-2, q.68, a.4, ad 3.



"For man is in the first place united to God through *faith*."<sup>99</sup>

"For *faith* is the *life of the soul*, according to Rom.; *The just shall live by faith*."<sup>100</sup>

"And thus the fact that *charity* resides in the *will* does not make it alien to *reason* . . . through a certain *affinity* to *reason*."<sup>101</sup>

"And this is what God does by increasing *charity*, that the *likeness of the Holy Spirit* be more perfectly participated in the *soul*."<sup>102</sup>

"*Grace* and *glory* are referred to the same genus."<sup>103</sup>

The wisdom which is a *gift* is much more excellent than the wisdom which is an *intellectual virtue*, inasmuch as it attains to God *much more closely* through some sort of *union of the soul* with Him."<sup>104</sup>

"By some kind of *conaturalness* or *union* with things divine which is achieved through *charity*."<sup>105</sup>

"Through some kind of *union* with things divine, with which we are not united except through *love*."<sup>106</sup>

"Uncreated Wisdom which first *unites itself* with us through *charity*, and in consequence *reveals the mysteries to us*, the knowledge of which is *infused wisdom*. Hence, infused wisdom is not the cause, but rather the effect, of *charity*."<sup>107</sup>

"But that man be *united* to such highest causes, being *transformed into their likeness*, in the same way as one who clings to God, is one Spirit."<sup>108</sup> "so that he comes to judge of others *from his own inmost self*, as it were . . . this is *achieved* through the *gift of wisdom*."<sup>109</sup>

"As the *intellectual* virtue of *wisdom* is to the *understanding of principles*, inasmuch as it comprehends the latter, so is the *gift of wisdom* to

<sup>99</sup>Op. cit., p.2-2, q.12, a.1, ad 2.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., ad 2.

<sup>101</sup>Op. cit., p.2-2, q.24, a.1, ad 2.

<sup>102</sup>Loc. cit., q.24, a.5, ad 3.

<sup>103</sup>Loc. cit., a.3, ad 2.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., q.45, a.3, ad 1.

<sup>105</sup>Loc. cit., a.4.

<sup>106</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.35, q.2, a.1, sol.1.

<sup>107</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.45, a.6, ad 2.

<sup>108</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In I ad Corinth.*, 6.

<sup>109</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.34, q.1, a.2.

*faith*, which is the *simple knowledge* of the articles which are the principles of all Christian wisdom. For the gift of wisdom proceeds to a sort of *deiform* and somehow *explicit contemplation* of the articles which *faith* holds in a manner that is somehow *infolded* and in a *human way*."<sup>110</sup>

"Hence, if there be certain things that are at once apprehended *without reason's discourse*, there, not reason, but *understanding* is said to exist . . . And this is done by the *gift of understanding*, which illumines the mind concerning the things that are heard [in the matter of faith], so that upon being heard they are immediately found good in the *same way as first principles*."<sup>111</sup>

"The soul is *made like God by grace*. Hence, in order that a divine Person be sent to someone by grace, it is necessary that through some gift of grace, the latter be made like the divine Person that is sent. And since the Holy Spirit is *love*, the soul is made *like* the Holy Spirit through the gift of *charity*. Thus the mission of the Holy Spirit is considered in relation to the gift of charity. Now, the Son is not any kind of Word, but one *spiriting love* . . . Hence, Augustine significantly says that 'the Son is sent when he is *known and perceived* by anyone.' But perception signifies a certain *experimental knowledge*. And it is properly called *sapientia* [wisdom] as if to say *sapientia scientia* [sapid or savoury knowledge]"<sup>112</sup>

"The divine persons themselves leave behind certain *gifts* as if by a certain *imprint* of themselves in our souls . . . Hence, this *knowledge* is *somehow experimental*."<sup>113</sup>

"*Wisdom* is called an *intellectual* virtue insofar as it proceeds *through the judgment of reason*; but it is said to be a *gift* insofar as it acts *through a divine instinct*."<sup>114</sup>

"And thus divine knowledge is not *discursive* or *ratiocinative*, but *absolute* and *simple*. The *knowledge* which is said to be a *gift* of the Holy Spirit is *similar* to it, inasmuch as it is its participation and likeness."<sup>115</sup>

"Not everyone who understands has the *gift of understanding*, but he who understands *as it were from the habit of grace*; thus too only they possess the *gift of knowledge* who from the infusion of *grace* possess a correct

<sup>110</sup>Op. cit., d.35, q.2, a.1, sol.1, ad 1.

<sup>111</sup>Loc. cit., a.2, sol.1.

<sup>112</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.43, a.5, ad 2.

<sup>113</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In Sent.*, d.14, q.11, a.2, ad 2.

<sup>114</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1-2, q.68, a.1, ad 4.

<sup>115</sup>Op. cit., p.2-2, q.9, a.1, ad 1.

*judgment* concerning the things to be believed and to be done . . . And such is the *knowledge of the Saints*.<sup>116</sup>

Finally, these two ways of knowing and unfolding dogma have already been indicated by St. Thomas at the very beginning of his masterpiece, the *Summa Theologica*, that is to say, in the very first question, where he writes: "Since judgment pertains to wisdom, wisdom is taken in two ways in accordance with the twofold way of judging. One way in which a man happens to judge is by way of inclination, as e.g., one who has the habit of virtue judges rightly of such things as are to be done in keeping with the virtue insofar as he is inclined to them. Thus, in book 10, chapter 5 of the *Ethics* it is said that the virtuous man is the measure and rule of human acts. Another way is by way of cognition, as e.g., one who is instructed in the knowledge of morals would be capable of passing judgment on the acts of a virtue even if he did not possess the habit of that virtue. Accordingly, the first mode of judgment about things divine pertains to the wisdom which is said to be a gift of the Holy Spirit, in accordance with 1 Cor., 2:15: The spiritual man judges all things. And Dionysius in chapter 12 of *The Divine Names*, says: 'Hierothicus has been taught not only by learning but also by undergoing divine things'. But the second mode of judgment belongs to this doctrine [i.e., speculative theology] insofar as it is acquired through study, although its principles are had from revelation."<sup>117</sup>

We have already seen that what the Holy Doctor here says of the gift of wisdom is likewise applied by him proportionally to all the other habits of a real participation of the Divinity and the gifts, since every supernatural habit is both dogma and all dogmatic developments.

220. TWO SOURCES AND TWO WAYS. — Accordingly, there are two sources of dogma and of dogmatic development: one is a derived and conceptual source, viz., the revealed formulae; the other is the primordial and real not independent either in their origin or in their possession by us. Not in their origin, since the former derives and issues from the latter, inasmuch as the revealed statements or the dogmatic formulae are only conceptual and partial, but nonetheless true, expressions of the Divinity. Not in their possession by us, since no possession of the Divinity through grace is possible without faith in the revealed statements, at least in the two most general statements concerning the existence of a supernatural and remunerating God.

<sup>116</sup> *Loc. cit.*, a.3, ad 3.

<sup>117</sup> *Op. cit.*, p.1, q.1, a.6, ad 3.

Correlative to these two sources there also are, and there must be, two different ways of perceiving, judging and developing dogma. One is the way of the statements or revealed formulae, which compares them among themselves or with statements of reason. This is the way of reasoning. Another is the way of the Divinity itself, with which we come into immediate contact through the habits of faith, grace, virtues and gifts. This is the affective way.

A review of the passages quoted in the preceding paragraph will make it clear that St. Thomas designates the first way with the following expressions: (a) through the use of reason; (b) through the inquiry of reason; (c) after the manner of cognition; (d) speculative knowledge; (e) by study and instruction; (f) after the manner of reason; (g) by way of the intellect; (h) in a human way; (i) through the judgment of reason; (j) discursive or ratiocinative knowledge.

St. Thomas designates the second way with even more varied expressions: (a) through connaturalness; (b) in the manner of an inclination; (c) affective knowledge; (d) experimental knowledge; (e) through affinity to things divine; (f) in the manner of nature; (g) by way of the will; (h) by contact; (i) through union with God; (j) through love; (k) from the inmost in one; (l) through deiform contemplation; (m) in the manner of first principles; (n) without discourse; (o) by divine instinct; (p) absolute and simple knowledge; (q) as if by habit.

The first of these two ways is the way of reason; the second, the way of the heart. The first is the way of logic; the second, the experimental way, or to use the expression current today, the way of life. The first is the way of speculative Theology, or of the science of the learned; the second, the way of mystical Theology, or of the science of the Saints.

The bloodstream of dogma, of supernatural life, courses and develops itself along both of these two channels. Both must be taken into account, both must be equally esteemed by every true theologian and every true scholar of the history of dogmas. But, in order not to go astray, they must above all look to the beacon that sheds light on both ways, which is none other than the infallible authority of the Church assisted by the Holy Spirit, who alone is the principal cause of dogmatic development, and of whom both the learning of the wise and the holiness of the saint are mere instruments.

TWO EXAMPLES OF THE KEENNESS OF THE SENSE OF FAITH. — We will adduce only two examples to show how keen and strong the sense of faith can be at times, even independently of any theoretical reasoning.

We cite as our first example the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. For centuries prior to its definition, the sentiment in favour of this dogma was already so intense among the faithful that merely to hear anything contrary to it caused veritable torment and scandal. Even those who opposed

its definition were forced to admit that such was the case. Thus, Melchor Cano writes: "If the Church were to entrust to the ears of the populace the matter of ascertaining which propositions are consonant and which are dissonant, we should assuredly judge this proposition, 'The Blessed Virgin conceived original sin from our first parents', to be ill-sounding and offensive to pious ears. For upon *hearing* it, the populace is certainly *smitten, shocked, tormented*."<sup>118</sup> The populace, to which Cano somewhat contemptuously refers, was, in the 16th century, all of the Christian people, simple villagers and learned alike, provided that the latter were not excessively obsessed with school rivalries. The holy and no less learned archbishop of Valencia, St. Thomas de Villanueva, similarly asserts: "And how, pray, will not the serpent — whose head She crushed — take pride at having had her in his power even for one instant, for one moment? *I refuse to listen, our ears will not tolerate hearing* it said that the Blessed Virgin was in bondage to the devil even for one instant, even for one moment."<sup>119</sup>

Something similar has occurred with almost every other dogma relative to the Most Holy Mother of God and ours, e.g., her perpetual virginity, her divine motherhood, her immunity from all actual sins — which have already been defined as dogmas — and her glorious Assumption into heaven, which we hope will some day be dogmatically defined.<sup>120</sup>

It would seem as if all the dogmas concerning Mary have been entrusted for their safekeeping and explication to the loving heart of the simple Christian faithful rather than to the reasoning of speculative theology. The reason is that, as we have said, all the dogmas concerning the Blessed Virgin derive from her being the worthy Mother of God, and the prerequisites or postulates of a "worthy Mother" are better perceived by the living and loving heart of a son than by the cold and dry logic of a scholar.

St. Theresa of Jesus provides us with *another example* typical of the strength and liveliness of the sense of faith. Misled by what some books and masters of spiritual life taught or seemed to teach, the Saint was for some

<sup>118</sup> *De Locis*, bk. 12, ch. 9.

<sup>119</sup> *4th Sermon on the Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary*.

<sup>120</sup> How much would it please us if the Church were to add to the Litany of the Blessed Virgin the invocations corresponding to these two truths: "Queen, bodily assumed into heaven", "Dispenser of all graces", or some other formula to this effect. As a matter of fact, there is nothing better than the liturgy to express the sentiments of faith and to hasten the definitions of the Church. "Lex orandi, lex credendi." (The rule of prayer is the rule of belief). [The author's wish has been granted in part. The Litany of the Blessed Virgin now includes the invocation, "Queen assumed into heaven", as a result of the dogmatic definition by Pope Pius XII of Mary's bodily assumption into heaven. — *Transl. note*]

time persuaded that upon attaining certain higher stages of prayer it was proper to prescind completely from meditating on any sensible thing including the most sacred Humanity of Our Blessed Saviour, so as to meditate exclusively on the Divinity. However, the experimental sense derived from her ever growing faith and holiness soon made the error and danger of such a doctrine obvious to her and made it equally clear that not only Christ's Divinity, but also his Humanity was the way and the sure guide on all the levels, lower or higher, of contemplation or supernatural life. So lively and clear was her intuition on this point that she held fast to it against all and whatsoever contrary arguments were raised by theologians and by her confessors, and defended it with that energy and determination with which we defend things that we feel and experience and which are rarely employed to defend things that are perceived only through reasoning. Let the Saint speak for herself:

"You might also think that anyone who has enjoyed such eminent things [i.e., the divine communications of the *Sixth Dwelling*] will have nothing more to do with meditating on the mysteries of the most sacred Humanity of Our Lord Jesus Christ, since he will be entirely busy with love. I have elsewhere written long on this subject, and although they have *contradicted me on this point and told me that I have not understood it* (because these are ways through which Our Lord brings us, and when one has left the beginnings behind it is better to busy oneself with matters pertaining to the Divinity and steer away from things that are bodily), *yet they will never make me confess that it is a good way* . . . For the same Lord who says that He is the way, also says that He is the light and that no one can come to the Father except through Him; and he who sees Me, sees my Father. *They will say that these words are to be taken in another sense. . . . I know no other senses. . . . With this one, which in my soul I feel to be the truth, I have always done very well. . . . and no one, no matter how spiritual he might be, will make me believe he will do well going this way.*"<sup>121</sup>

Here we have an unlettered woman maintaining against numerous and learned contradicators a dogmatic truth of the greatest moment, and grounding with rare determination and energy her interpretation of the Holy Scripture on this supreme consideration: *In my soul I feel it is the truth.*

Such is the attitude and the formula of the sense of faith, a sense that, in spite of her want of theoretical training, existed in the Saint with more vigour and more certain insight than in all the confessors and theologians that milled around her.

"Although contemplative, and, so to say, *experimental* knowledge is so unlike the knowledge acquired principally through rigorous scientific study,

<sup>121</sup> *Sixth Dwelling*, ch. 7, nn. 5 and 10; Madrid 1851, tom. 2, pgs. 88-89.

of faith the common sentiment of the faithful people carries no small weight."<sup>125</sup> "In the definitions of faith the consensus of the faithful must be taken into account. Indeed, inasmuch as they make up the Church, it is they who, with the Holy Spirit's assistance, conserve divine revelation so purely that it is impossible for all of them to wander astray."<sup>126</sup> "The Church may declare which book is to be held as canonical, and this is not to be done rashly and arbitrarily, but on the basis of the testimonies of the ancients and the similarity of the Books that are in dispute with those that are not in dispute, and finally on the basis of the common feeling and taste, as it were, of the Christian people."<sup>127</sup> "For such a definition it is enough that a supernatural truth be implicitly contained in Tradition or in Scripture in such wise that, with the growth of the common consensus of the Church, through whom the Holy Spirit frequently explains the traditions or declares the Scriptures, it finally becomes possible for the Church to attach her definition."<sup>128</sup> "Something can be declared of faith through the consensus of the whole Church, when all the faithful concur in firmly believing a certain dogma. Falsity and deception is inconsistent with such unanimous agreement, since God assists the Church to preclude her being deceived as a whole."<sup>129</sup> "Except the case in which all the faithful, or the greater and better part of them, i.e., all the theologians and the experts in canon law, should concur in believing and teaching that a certain truth is contained in the Holy Scriptures or in the traditions of the Church and common doctrine of the Fathers, and should spread this estimation in writings and public discourses, for in such a case the Pontiff could define such a truth as of faith, without any other previous examination."<sup>130</sup> "From what do we draw the certainty that the Mother of God was sanctified at least before her birth, if not from the common feeling of the faithful? What makes us certain that the same Blessed Virgin was taken up into heaven in soul and body? Therefore if no one entertains any doubt on this matters, how is it possible to entertain any doubt on the Immaculate Conception, which is held and defended by all the faithful?"<sup>131</sup> Modern theologians generally express themselves in similar vein.

<sup>125</sup>MELCHOR CANO, *De Locis*, bk.5, last chapter, de postremo argumento.

<sup>126</sup>VALENCIA, *De Fide*, bk.8, ch.9.

<sup>127</sup>BELLARMINE, *De Verbo Dei*, bk. 1, ch.10, ad 2.

<sup>128</sup>SUÁREZ, *De Christo*, q.27, d.3, s.6, n.4.

<sup>129</sup>LUGO, *De Fide*, d.1, s.13, n.277.

<sup>130</sup>RIPALDA, *De Fide*, d.8, s.2, n.24.

<sup>131</sup>ST. ALPHONSUS LIGUORI, bk.7, n.258.

that it may subsist without the latter, nevertheless, as a general rule, it is closely linked to it. Except in the case where the former is produced by a formal miracle, it should be prepared and supported by the latter. Conversely, the former not only gives the latter greater force and insight (innajkti-intimacy), but also so powerfully aids in its acquisition and improvement that there have been saints who, with comparatively little study, have reached greater heights than others with greater natural talents and more laborious endeavour."<sup>122</sup>

The doctrine upheld here by St. Theresa on the basis of her keen experimental sense of the faith, is almost identical to that which was a century later defined by the Church when she condemned the following position of Molinos: "It is unbecoming of souls versed in this interior way . . . nor should they elicit acts of love towards the Blessed Virgin, the saints, or the Humanity of Christ for, inasmuch as these objects are sensible in nature, so also is the love for them."<sup>123</sup> Another similar doctrine had already been defined by the Council of Vienne when it condemned the following proposition of the Beghards and Beguines: "That they should not rise to their feet at the elevation of the Body of Jesus Christ, nor exhibit any token of reverence towards it. For they assert that it would be an imperfection on their part to come down so low from the purity and height of their contemplation as to busy their minds on things concerning the ministry or the sacrament of the Eucharist or the passion of Christ's humanity."<sup>124</sup>

Truth to say, a very great number of dogmatic propositions defined or infallibly condemned by the Church, which today seem so obvious and so easy to prove from the Holy Scriptures or by theological reasons are obvious only on account of our lively and universal Christian sense. Frequently, such propositions were first detected by this Christian sense. Frequently, subsequently confirmed by reasoning of a more or less conclusive character, and defined by the Church with the Holy Spirit's assistance. But they might have remained undetected and never been defined, were it not for the sense of the faith. This sense exists in the saints in a very special manner, but it also exists in every soul in the state of grace, and is even found somehow in all the Christian faithful.

Thus, all the great theologians have acknowledged the immense value possessed by the common feeling of the faithful with respect to the development of dogma. Here are some brief and pertinent passages: "In any question

<sup>122</sup>SCHIEBEN, *Handbuch der Katholischen Dogmatik*, vol. 1, n.1005; Freiburg im B. 1873, pg 412.

<sup>123</sup>Denz.-Schön., 2235.

<sup>124</sup>Denz.-Schön., 898.

As long as this "sense of the faith" is found only in a few faithful even if these be saints —, or in a part of the Church, its theological value is very small.

But as soon as it spreads and comes to be regarded as the common patrimony of bishops, theologians and faithful, it is of itself and prior to all definition an argument whose value is the equal of the most evident theological reasoning.

And so, either one or the other — evident *reasoning* or Christendom's certain and universal *sentiment* relative to the inclusion of a doctrine in the revealed deposit — is for the Church a sufficient criterion of its definability.

**DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SENSE OF THE FAITH AND THE ORDINARY MAGISTERIUM.** — However, it is necessary to distinguish well between the sense of the faith, of which we have spoken in this section, and the Church's ordinary magisterium, of which we spoke elsewhere (135).

The former exists in all the faithful, especially in those who are in the state of grace, and much more in those who truly are saints, even if they are neither theologians nor bishops. The latter is exclusive of the bishops or shepherds.

The former is neither teaching nor magisterium but mere experimental persuasion of a truth. When it happens to be general among all the faithful it is a sufficient criterion or preparation for that truth's definition by the Church, but of itself it is not a definition. The latter is not only a persuasion of a truth but also a magisterium or a teaching of that truth. When such a teaching is universal and definitive, it is a definition of faith through the ordinary magisterium with a value equal to the definitions of faith through the solemn magisterium.

To possess the former, i.e., the sense of the faith, it is enough to be in the grace of God, or, at least, to have true divine faith. To possess the latter, i.e., the power of ordinary magisterium, it is necessary and sufficient to have episcopal jurisdiction, which of its own nature is a doctrinal jurisdiction, although one may not have grace or even faith.

The common consensus of the faithful that is consequent to a definition of either the solemn or the ordinary magisterium of the Church is not to be confused with the consensus that is antecedent to any definition or teaching of the Church. The former is relative to a truth already defined, and therefore is as infallible as the definition. The latter refers to a truth not yet defined or taught. Consequently, it can be based only on either of two things: either on theological speculative reasoning, or on the intuitive and experimental sense of the faith. Both of these are absolutely fallible as long as the Church does not intervene with either a solemn or an ordinary definition. It is

to the latter alone that the divine assistance or infallibility has been promised, with them alone is it bound.

**THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR OF DOGMATIC DEVELOPMENT.** — This makes it clear that the principal or truly efficacious factor of dogmatic development is exclusively the Church's definition or the Holy Spirit's infallible assistance, since these two things — definition and assistance — are inextricably conjoined and are but one thing. On the other hand, all other factors, whether speculative or practical, are but mere channels or human and fallible instruments of the infallible exercise of the Church's magisterium.

Thus, the Church's magisterium or dogmatic definition is not merely a recording machine or a sounding board of the social awareness of the Christian community, as Modernism heretically pretends.<sup>132</sup> It is above all a true source, whence all consequent consensus flows explicitly or implicitly, and a true judge and true divine rule of all antecedent consensus of the social consciousness of Christian people, whether such consensus be formed through theological reasoning or through the practical and experimental sense of the faith. Consequently, every definition of the Church's magisterium, whether solemn or ordinary, is of itself infallible, independently of the antecedent, concomitant, or consequent consensus of the theologians or of the faithful. On the contrary, no consensus of either theologians or faithful, no matter how unanimous and permanent, is or can be infallible except insofar as it is an expression of a previous definition or insofar as it is confirmed by a subsequent definition of the Church's solemn or ordinary magisterium.

## SECTION VI

### FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE AFFECTIVE WAY

220<sup>1</sup>. **THE AFFECTIVE WAY AND THE DEPOSIT OF FAITH.** — All that we have been saying goes to show that the affective way, no less than the speculative way, is grounded on faith and lives of it. "The gifts of the present life are compared to the *faith* as to the *principle* presupposed by them."<sup>133</sup>

<sup>132</sup>—In defining truths, the learning and the teaching Church collaborate in such a manner that there is nothing left to the teaching Church but to ratify the common opinions of the learning Church. This is the sixth among the propositions condemned by Pius X in the Decree *Lamentabili* issued by the Congregation of the Holy Office on 3 July, 1907. (Denz.-Schön., 3406)

<sup>133</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.4, a.8.

"For all supernatural illuminations, as long as we are exiled from the Lord, faith is itself the steady *foundation*, the guiding *lamp*, the introducing *gate*; it is according to its *measure* that the *wisdom* given us by God must needs be *measured*."<sup>134</sup>

Neither the speculative theologian nor the mystic see the Divinity in itself's nor, consequently, does either see any truth directly in God. Here on earth, the biblical statements constitute the only *objective* source of supernatural knowledge.<sup>135</sup>

The difference between the theoretician and the mystic, from the viewpoint of penetration into the truths implicit in the revealed deposit, lies in that the former as such has no other means of reaching such truths except study and reasoning, whereas the latter relies more on grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which permit him to reach in an experimental manner a number of latent truths either completely unknown to the theoretician or reached by him at the price of strenuous labour.

Thus, unlike the revealed deposit, God is not an immediate *objective* source of knowledge for the mystic; He is only the *efficient cause* of the revealed statements — the *objective source* — and of grace, the gifts, and the supernatural lights — the *subjective aids* that introduce the mystic into the depths of the sacred deposit.

For the role of the *intellectual* gifts of the Holy Spirit — especially the gift of understanding — is to penetrate the wealth of truths hidden in the

<sup>134</sup> ST. BONAVENTURE, *Breviloquium*, prol.; Quaracchi 1890, pg. 2.  
<sup>135</sup> Excepting, of course, the case of a transitory vision granted perhaps to Moses and St. Paul (ST. THOMAS, *Disputed Questions on Truth*, q.10, a.11, ad 1.) Consult *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.180, a.5) "For in this life contemplation", says ST. THOMAS, Prado, O.P., "might extend in passing up to the vision of the divine essence." (*De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, Friburgi 1907, tom. 1, p.185)

<sup>136</sup> "The spirit of man is not moved by the Holy Spirit unless it be somehow united to him just as an instrument is not moved by the craftsman unless by contact or by some other kind of union. Now, the first union of man to God is accomplished by faith, hope, and charity. Hence, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts as being the roots of the gifts. Thus, all the gifts belong to these three virtues as derivations of the said virtues." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.68, a.4, ad 3) "The gift of understanding [as all the other gifts] supposes a mind united to God in order to render it movable by the Holy Spirit to understand the mysteries. . . . Consequently the gifts will not formally accomplish this union, but suppose it and are regulated by it. But the union of the mind to God is done through faith in the state of the present life, through vision in heaven." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus De Donis Spiritus Sancti*, d.18, a.3, n.67; ed. Vivès, tom. 6, pg. 628)

revealed datum. "To penetrate as it were inwardly the many kinds of things that are hidden in the interior."<sup>137</sup>

The mystic avails himself of his connatural penetration of the truths of faith, achieved thanks to the gift of understanding, in order to judge *con-naturally* of divine and human things as well as of human acts, by means of the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and counsel. "Thus, relative to those things proposed to faith [the deposit of faith], two things are required on our part. First, that the things understood be penetrated or grasped, and this belongs to the gift of understanding. Secondly, that man have a correct judgment of them. . . . This judgment, then, relative to divine things, belongs to the gift of wisdom: relative to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge; and relative to singular deeds, belongs to the gift of counsel."<sup>138</sup>

Of the seven gifts that constitute the basis of all mystical life, these four belong to the order of knowledge; the other three — fortitude, piety, and fear of God, — to the appetite.<sup>139</sup>

The first four have the intellect as their subject, since it is obvious that mystical knowledge, which constitutes the *affective* way, essentially resides in the intellect, but they have the will, i.e., charity, as their cause. "Accordingly, wisdom, which is a gift, has its cause indeed in the will, i.e., charity: but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge correctly."<sup>140</sup>

Thus the experimental way is caused by love, but it is essentially a keener *intellectual* penetration and a more correct judgment of the implicit content of the revealed deposit. It is in this way that it contributes to the development of dogma.<sup>141</sup>

<sup>137</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.8, a.1, *De dono Intellectus*.

<sup>138</sup> *Loc. cit.*, a.6

<sup>139</sup> "God, by the instinct of the Holy Spirit, moves man to taste and perceive by an experimental tasting that the Lord is delightful, and thus, so to speak, *inviscerates* and *connaturalizes* the divine realities known in this life through faith, which is a habit that is permanent and regulative of charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. On account of this connaturalness to, and invisceration of, divine realities, man becomes more capable of penetrating the divine realities themselves and the mysteries of faith, as well as of judging whether in accordance with inferior or in accordance with supreme causes, or of liberating practically about the things that are to be done. And thus the mind comes to be furnished with four gifts, viz., the gift of understanding in order to penetrate and grasp well divine realities, and the gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, in order to judge about divine realities according to those three modes." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *In 1-2 S. Thomae, loc. cit.*, a.2, n.13, pg. 486)

<sup>140</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.45, a.2.

<sup>141</sup> "Hence, St. Thomas himself is of the mind that wisdom has to do with the same truths as faith, and that it achieves, as it were, an explicit contemplation of the articles that faith attains to in an *infolded manner*." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, a.4, n.40) See *In 3 Sent.*, d.35, q.2, a.1, ad 1.

It is extremely important never to lose sight of this teaching of St. Thomas: the only *objective* source of all supernatural knowledge is the truth of *faith*: thence issue the special relations of dependence and subordination that bind speculative or mystical theology to the revealed deposit and the authority of the Church.

Thus it is that mystical theology, despite being capacitated by the intuitive channels of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to grasp more easily and more quickly a greater number of truths, is nonetheless incapable of attaining them if they are not implicitly contained in the revealed datum. According to St. Thomas, the *extent* of any knowledge is measured by the *objective medium*. "The perfection of knowledge, insofar as it is considered on the part of the *thing known*, is determined *in accordance with the medium*."<sup>142</sup> Since in this case the revealed deposit is the only objective resource for knowing, neither mystical nor speculative theology can ever go beyond its *implicit virtuality*, no matter how extensive might be the development of their *subjective* mediums.

Thus St. Thomas concludes that the relation between these two theologies to the deposit of faith is exactly that of *conclusions* to their *principles*. "All the *certainty* of understanding and knowledge, insofar as they are *gifts*, proceeds from the knowledge of *faith*, as the *certainty of conclusions* comes from the certainty of the *principles*."<sup>143</sup> The bloodstream that nourishes them and the source from which they spring is one and the same: the revealed virtuality, the "revealable". But the process of deduction differs: abstract study for the theoretician, immediate and vital experience for the mystic. The principal agents differ even more: in the former case it is the theologian and his own reason; in the latter it is the Holy Spirit whereof the gifts are only the instruments. But in either case the objective source whence everything comes is one and the same: the revealed deposit which is the one and only starting point of *all* dogmatic progress. No attempt at development, whether speculative or affective, will exceed its inexhaustible virtuality.

220<sup>2</sup>. THE AFFECTIVE WAY AND PRIVATE REVELATIONS. — What, then, is the role played by private revelations, visions, and similar phenomena which occur so frequently in the lives of the saints? Do they not constitute an objective source of dogmatic knowledge over and beyond the revealed deposit?

There are three answers to this difficulty.

In the first place, these phenomena do not belong *per se* to the mystical life, since they require in the subject neither grace nor faith itself. God can

<sup>142</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 10, a. 4, ad 1.  
<sup>143</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 2-2, q. 4, a. 8, ad 3.

bestow them on a sinner, or even on an unbeliever. Hence, they do not disclose the "sense of the faith" inasmuch as they originate neither in a *life* nor in a habit intrinsic to the subject. They proceed *extrinsically* from God, and are counted among the so-called graces "given gratis" (*gratis datae*). On the other hand, the sense of the faith, which is the principle of the affective way, is something *vital* that comes from the supernatural habits that enable the Christian, and above all the saint, to judge connaturally the content of the revealed deposit. Only of this "sense of the faith" have we affirmed — is it not obvious? — that it cannot exceed the limits of the revealed virtual precisely on account of its being a *sense*.<sup>144</sup>

In the second place, we observe that, although as a matter of right these private revelations could include *new teachings* by reason of their divine origin, nonetheless they never do so as a matter of fact. After the Apostles, they are limited to the revealed doctrine or to the direction of human behaviour. Such is, in St. Thomas's view, the divine economy: "But in the *New Testament* there have been many who, having the *spirit of prophecy*, have predicted many things concerning future events . . . And in every age there have not been wanting men *possessing the spirit of prophecy, not for the purpose of putting forth a new doctrine* of faith, but of *directing human acts*."<sup>145</sup>

In the third and principal place, the Church does not employ private revelations to determine the content of revelation, but instead proceeds contrariwise.

Private revelations are never a source of definitions for the Church. But they might be the occasion to find out whether a doctrine, unsurmised perhaps by the theologians, is contained or not in revelation.

Once this is verified, the Church can define it, not insofar as it is a private revelation, but insofar as it is contained in the revelation handed down by the Apostles.<sup>146</sup>

<sup>144</sup> However, these gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the *instinct* whereby they are directed, are *not given in order to form any vision* whether intellectual or imaginary. Accordingly, the divine *instinct* moves to *know* or to *direct those things the principles whereof are grasped in themselves through faith*, not as in the case of prophecy, to form a vision of those things the principle whereof the vision does not grasp. And therefore these gifts are given in a *habitual manner*, but *prophecy is not*. Nonetheless, we admit that *at times* these gifts are perfected and grow as a result of *some illumination given in the manner ofapture or prophecy*. But they do not precisely *per se* require this by their nature, but it comes from an abundance of light. *For the gifts are per se required for salvation, whereas those illuminations are not.*" (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, a. 2, nn. 14-15, pp. 586).

<sup>145</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 2-2, q. 95, a. 2, ad 3; and q. 174, a. 6, ad 3.

<sup>146</sup> But has not the feast of the Body of Christ been instituted because of the private revelation made to a certain virgin? Has not the worship of the Heart of Jesus

Even if the hypothesis advanced by certain theologians were admitted, viz., that many saints have in their lifetime briefly seen the divine essence, no new objective source of dogma or of dogmatic evolution would result therefrom. There is no revelation other than the Catholic, which was definitively constituted and sealed with the death of the Apostles; and there are no channels of dogmatic evolution other than those that consist in explicating its content. "For our faith rests on the revelation made to the Apostles and Preceptors who wrote the canonical books, but not on the revelation made, if any, to other teachers."<sup>147</sup> "In the time of grace, the whole faith of the Church is founded on the revelation made to the Apostles . . ."<sup>148</sup>

220<sup>3</sup>. THE MECHANISM AND FUNCTIONING OF THE AFFECTIVE WAY. — The foregoing throws some light on the mechanism and functioning of both the speculative and the affective ways.

In the speculative way, the *objective* source is the inexhaustible fecundity of the revealed datum, the first principles of which are known to every believer. The *subjective* instrument of development is the intellect "informed" by faith and acting as *reason*. The more active and more constant the use of the instrument, the greater the growth of the acquired light, the penetration of the revealed datum, and the number of truths unearthed in it.

In the affective way, the *objective* source is the same, but, in addition to faith, the *subjective* instruments are grace, charity and the gifts of the Holy Spirit which constitute the patrimony of the just and operate through acts of love of God. The more intense and permanent this love is, the greater the experimental light of the intellect, the depth of its penetration, and the number of truths connaturally attained in the revealed deposit.<sup>149</sup>

been thus established? We answer that in God's Church this is *not the way* in which truths are accepted or norms given for public worship. Those holy virgins who have been instructed by heaven on the institution of a certain feast or on fomenting a certain devotion, have by no means given the Church a new doctrine or addressed themselves to her as teachers. They only afforded the occasion whereby the Church would be aroused to examine whether, in accordance with the truth of the doctrine already received, it would be expedient to institute such a feast or to practise such a cult. In other words, the Church is not taught by those virgins, but judging what they had to say, decreed whether what was being proposed should be carried out in accordance with the norm of the old revelation and the common faith." (GUIDO MATTIUSI, S.J., *Utrum corporea Virginitas Assumptio ad Fidei Catholicate Depositum spectet, Disputatio*, Aquisquindii 1922, pg. 42)

<sup>147</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.8, ad 2.

<sup>148</sup> *Op. cit.*, p.2-2, q.174, a.6.

<sup>149</sup> Accordingly, it must be said that *love* and *affectio* can be considered in two ways. First, insofar as it applies itself and the other powers to operation, and in this sense it is related to those operations *effectively* and *executively*, that is, in the manner

Indeed, inasmuch as, according to St. Thomas, the Divinity itself dwells in us through sanctifying grace and charity, it follows that anyone in possession of the latter necessarily produces in the soul by means of acts of love a deeper rooting of God, a more intense supernatural light and a more comprehensive penetration of the revealed deposit.

In short, the acts of love of God produce in the soul the growth of the following: first, sanctifying grace, then charity, next the possession of the Divinity, and lastly the intellectual gifts, which are a true intellectual light that increases the penetration of the implicit *virtuality* of the revealed deposit.<sup>150</sup>

This sequence is illustrated by the following comparison from St. Thomas. As the keener is the mind the more it penetrates the *virtuality* of the principles of reason, so also, the more intense is the supernatural light of the mind the more it is able to penetrate the *virtuality* of the principles of faith. For — says he — the supernatural light is to the revealed principles as the natural light is to the principles of reason.<sup>151</sup>

of one that applies to action. Second, insofar as it applies to itself the object, and unites to itself and inviscerates within itself the object through a sort of fruition of, and, as it were, a connaturalness and proportion to such an object, so that it, so to say, experiences it by affective experience. In this sense, *affectio patens on to become a condition of the object*, insofar as, because of such an affective experience, the object is made more conformable and proportionate and united to the person and more suitable to him. Thus, then, the intellect tends to the object as experienced and in contact with itself. In this manner love is not precisely a mover in the genus of effective cause, but also in the genus of objective cause inasmuch as by such an experience the object is rendered proportionate and suitable in a different way . . . "Hence, to the argument [Fr. Suárez] that says that the will or affection does not add more light to the intellect, the answer can be gathered from what has been said, that the will does not formally enlighten the intellect, but nonetheless it can *causally* give more light, or perfect [it] insofar as it renders the object more united by love to itself, and more immediately attained (attantum) in itself and tasted, and thus, it is represented anew to the intellect with a different convenience and proportion to the affection." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, a.4, nn.11-15, pgs. 537-539)

150. "All of the Trinity dwells in the mind through sanctifying grace (per gratiam gratum facientem)." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.43, a.5) "An invisible mission [of a Divine Person] is also effected in accordance with the progress of virtue or the increase of grace . . . when a man advances into a new act or a new state of grace." (*Loc. cit.*, a.6) "And this is what God does by increasing charity, viz., that the likeness of the Holy Spirit be more within and more perfectly participated." (*Op. cit.*, p.2-2, q.24, a.5, ad 3) "In his effects, which are the enlightening of the intellect and the inflaming of man is called the gift of understanding." (*Op. cit.*, p.2-2, q.8, a.1) "Hence, as the gift of charity exists in all those who have grace, so also the gift of understanding." (*Loc. cit.*, a.4)

151. "In accordance with a greater intellectual capacity, one man has greater knowledge of the virtuality of the principles than another." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.2-2, q.5, a.4, ad 3) "The more perspicacious intellect sees better the same principles



This makes it clear that in both ways the progress of knowledge is intrinsic and vital. In the speculative way, because it is of its essence that the intellect, which is the subject of divine faith, should proceed conaturally, and because this same intellect activated by the comparative study of the revealed principles and the principles of reason, produces in turn a speculative knowledge that is more luminous and more extensive. Likewise, in the other

taken formally. It is clear that the more outstanding mind can penetrate better the same principles taken virtually; to it is given to discover and see from such principles the truth of the conclusions." (CAJETAN, *loc. cit.*)

"The superadded light [the gift of understanding] is to such things as *super naturally become known to us* [the revealed deposit], as the natural light is to those things that we *primordially know*." (ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2)

"It is common doctrine among the Fathers, indeed even among schoolmen, that anyone who has sanctifying grace and charity, also has in some degree the seven gifts. And the more he grows and is perfected in charity, so also in the gifts.

"One of these gifts is the gift of understanding, whereby the things that are of faith are somehow penetrated, discerned, and understood, by the fact that the reasons of wisdom possessed by them in a perfect degree are as it were participants in the counsels and secrets of God, his familiar friends, by Him assiduously enlightened, and stand in some kind of contact with the sun of uncreated wisdom; they also by an internal supernatural and abundant taste (gustum) know and relish (sapunt) the divine credenda, and their affection towards them; so also by virtue of the gift of conformity and conaturalness of they are adorned in a perfect degree, they understand the things of faith with utmost clarity, certainty and subtilty, together with the connexion and order of the credenda and the supernatural credibility of the Catholic truth; and they have the faith together with the reasons of the credenda and the understanding of a purified mind....

"Such are ordinarily all those who assiduously experience the mystical theology. Hence, this illumination is bestowed neither on all, nor only on those dedicated to the study of theology, but on those who are more proficient in purity of heart and charity; rather, 'I know God.' And above all, the seraphic Francis." (DIONYSIUS CARTHUSIANUS, *In 1 Sent.*, prolog., q. 1; Opera Omnia, Montsolii, tom. 19, pg. 65). [Reasons of faith, "reasons of the credenda". The term reason here does not stand for motivation, proof, or reasoning. Neither does it signify the power of reason. The term is here taken objectively to mean the objective concepts, or better still, the reality (which is in this case the divine reality) insofar as it intelligibly or conceptually exists in our mind. See ch. I, sect. III, footnote iii. — *Transl.*]

"Indeed, how can one explain the undeniable fact that so many simple and unlettered souls have, in one moment of loftiest contemplation, acquired such prodigious knowledge as presently to surpass the greatest theologians? And such souls exist in great numbers; they are called Hildegarda, Angela of Foligno, Catherine of Sienna, or Catherine of Genoa, or Catherine of Bologna; Rusbrock, Giuseppe de Cupertino, Nicholas Factor, Theresa of Jesus, Rose of Lima, Marina de Escobar, Agreda, Emmerich, Taigi, Sor Barbara, Gemma Galgani, Benigna Consolata, etc., etc., for there are many of them even in our own days.

way, sanctifying grace, which is the soul of supernatural life, gives birth to charity and to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, whence proceed, through the exercise of love, a growth of light and of affective knowledge.

But, to repeat it once more, Christian reason and study in the speculative way: grace, the gifts and love in the affective way, are nothing more than subjective principles. The objective source on which they operate, is the revealed datum, which is the intimate patrimony of every believer, speculative or mystic. Consequently, development in either case cannot but relate to the implicit content of the revealed deposit.

It is true that the source of mystical life is the Holy Spirit, God Himself; however, it is not God seen face to face, but God known under the veils of faith, since mystical life does not cease to be a life of faith because it is divine. When together with all the Fathers and theologians, the Council of Trent teaches that faith is the root of justification and thus, of supernatural life, including the mystical life, it does not mean to say that the truths of faith are merely the starting point that is quickly left behind and forsaken, it means to say that faith is the true root of the bloodstream of our supernatural life in this world, whereas charity or the action of the Holy Spirit plays the role of assimilating warmth.

In short, Christianity with its two branches of knowledge, speculative and mystical, and with all the progressive manifestations of its supernatural life — the purgative, illuminative, and unitive — can be compared to a living tree, one and homogeneous, the roots of which are sunk in the revealed deposit. The Catholic Church, infallibly assisted by the Holy Spirit, is in charge of its care and cultivation. The light of faith and study, the warmth of grace and love, both efficaciously contribute to its growth but leave it always rooted in the revealed deposit from which it extracts all the sap on which it lives.

Thus, every explicitly new dogma — as well as every new saint — is nothing but a new fruit out of the seed (revealed datum) deposited by Christ and the Apostles in the bosom of the Church. Under the Holy Spirit's perpetual assistance, which is similar to light and heat, the Church conserves and develops this divine seed.

220<sup>4</sup> COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AFFECTIVE AND SPECULATIVE WAYS. — We have said that the affective way of the "sense of faith"

"We have had the opportunity to be acquainted with some of such who, with no other book to read but Jesus crucified, the true book of life, have left us astonished at the sublime and marvelous experimental knowledge they had of the adorable mystery of the Trinity and of the mysterious workings of the Spirit of love in the hearts of the just." (ARINTERO, J., *Evolución Mística*, ch. 8, 5th ed. Salamanca, 1908, p. 519)

has contributed to dogmatic development as much as, or even more than, reasoning. But this is not to say that there are many dogmas that have been developed *exclusively* through the former. What is meant is that many dogmas have been developed through the frequent and signal services rendered by the affective to the speculative way.

The *sense of the faith* is in the *supernatural* order what *common sense* is in the *natural* order. In almost every instance they intervene in the exercise of speculation, and do so in three ways:

First, by affording an *intimation* of the solution of the problem: prior to any acquaintance with the arguments that demonstrate it.

Secondly, by *rejecting* instinctively as inadmissible certain solutions that are nevertheless based on specious reasons. These solutions are rejected exclusively on the basis of their opposition to common sense.

Thirdly, by effecting the *acceptance* of a teaching by the whole Christian community, including those of its members who are unable to comprehend the force of the arguments for the teaching.

To facilitate its acceptance is to facilitate its definition. The influence of the sense of the faith appears most obviously in matters relative to the affective order, to Christian morals and piety. Let anyone review in Denzinger any of the series of propositions relative to morals or mystical life maintained by Batus, Molinos and the laxists which were later condemned by the Church<sup>152</sup>, and it will be obvious that there are many propositions whose error is manifest to the Christian sense, but which is difficult to refute through reasoning alone. For instance, "fornication and 'mollities' [self-abuse] are *intrinsically evil*"<sup>153</sup> is a proposition engraved in the heart of every godly person, yet frequently it becomes an obsession with a theologian challenged to demonstrate it *evidently* and to answer the objections levelled against it.

As in earlier times the Christian sense rejected with horror the heresies of Arius and Nestorius from the moment of their appearance and for quite some time prior to their condemnation in the Councils of Nicaea and Ephesus, because they went against dogmas dear to the heart; so, too, the Christian sense instinctively rejected from the beginning the aberrations of mystics and moralists even before the theologians demonstrated their falsity and the Church condemned them.

<sup>152</sup> Denz.-Schön., 1901-1980, 2201-2268, 2101-2166, 2290-2332.  
<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, 2148-2149.

The "sense of the faith" does not attain its *perfection* except in those souls in which faith, grace, charity, and the gifts are found to exist. Without the latter there is, absolutely speaking, no true experience of divine things.<sup>154</sup>

But it can be said to exist, although imperfectly, in every believer, including one who is momentarily in the state of mortal sin. There are three reasons for this.

First, because, in accordance with the Tridentine, faith is the principle, the ground and the root of grace, charity and the gifts. Thus, to have faith is to have everything else in germ.<sup>155</sup>

Secondly, in St. Thomas's view, the virtue of faith is by its own nature a *tendency to every thing* that is contained — in any manner whatsoever — in the revealed deposit. "Faith, insofar as it is itself concerned, sufficiently *inclines to every thing* that accompanies, or follows, or precedes the faith."<sup>156</sup> Since every habit is a second nature that instinctively inclines to its object as, e.g., chastity makes a man judge connaturally anything relative to itself as much as, and some times even more than, science alone —, the virtue of faith, accordingly, frequently enables us to appraise instinctively anything relative to itself. "For as the sense of *taste* judges of *flavours* according to its disposition, so the *mind* of man judges of something that is to be done according to its *habitual . . . disposition* . . . e.g., he who has the *science* of morals judges correctly through the *inquiry of reason* of matters relative to *chastity*, but he who has the *habit of chastity* judges correctly of such matters on account of a certain *connaturalness to chastity itself*."<sup>157</sup>

<sup>154</sup> "Sinners living without grace can *acutely discern* and dispute, and treat of divine things, *even of mystical experience itself* and of affective understanding, insofar as they are the *object and matter of study* and debate, but they are unable to make use of them as the principle and the motive of knowing. As, for instance, I can treat of the intuitive vision of God and of the experimental cognition of sensible things as objects and subject matter with which I am dealing and about which I am debating, but by this I do not have either the experimental contact with such things or the intuitive vision of God. . . . In like manner, he who is in sin is unable to make use of such an experimental affective cognition as the reason and formal motive [of knowing] . . . But he can argue about it as about an object and subject-matter. . . . And in this regard no great change is felt when one passes from grace to sin. But in regard of the experimental and affective cognition and inward touch a great change or even oblivion is felt." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, a. 8, n. 23, p. 707)

<sup>155</sup> "Faith is the *beginning* of human salvation, the *foundation* and *root* of all *justification*." (FRID. COUNCIL, sess. 6, ch. 8; Denz.-Schön., 1532) "For *faith* is the *life of the soul*." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q. 12, a. 1, ad 2) "The *root* is said to be *virtually* the *whole tree*." (*Loc. cit.*, q. 19, a. 7, ad 2)

<sup>156</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, q. 24, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2.

<sup>157</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q. 24, a. 11, and q. 45, a. 2)

Finally, although the acts of supernatural habits do not engender another habit, they nonetheless produce a disposition or natural facility, which persists even when the supernatural habit has ceased. It is not surprising, therefore, that any Christian who has been in the state of grace should some times continue exhibiting inclinations similar to those of grace and the supernatural virtues, even if for the moment he should be in a state of mortal sin.<sup>158</sup>

At any rate, it is a matter of history that in the case of dogmas "accessible to the heart" the sense of the faith has manifested itself in all of the Christian people, making no distinction between just and sinners, although it exhibited itself more intensely in the former than in the latter, in the fervent that in the lukewarm. This has happened in the dogmas of the consubstantiality of the Word, the divine Motherhood of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and her Immaculate Conception.

If with respect to the affective way we have almost always employed the term "sense of the faith" instead of "sense of the faithful", we have done so to preclude the danger of making it exclusive of the common faithful at the expense of the theologians, the bishops, and the Pope.

In each and every believer — his hierarchical position is here immaterial — this sense is proportional to the degree of faith, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. On this count, it has been rightly called by some, e.g., Fr. Gardeil, "the social sense of the Church". (10)

It must be observed, however, that this sense might be neutralized in some theologians by either the frequency or the excess of speculative reasoning. On the other hand, in certain common faithful it can be found at times more purely and with greater intensity, but with less guarantee against deviation than when it is guided by speculative reason.

220<sup>5</sup>. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO WAYS. — The term "mystical theology" can mean two different kinds of knowledge: (a) that which results in the saints and contemplatives from their own personal mystical experiences; (b) that which results from the study of the mystical experiences of others.

158<sup>a</sup>. Acts produced out of an infused habit do not cause any habit, but confirm a pre-existing habit." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 1-2, q.51, a.4, ad 3 "It must be said that such a man finds himself prompt and ready to believe and love, not because he has any acquired habit, but because he had an infused virtue. . . . Just as a man who has lost the habit of science by becoming insane, in the very state of insanity finds himself prompt and ready to reason and argue, not because he actually has the habit of science but because he had it." (MEDINA, *Commentarium in D. Thomam*, loc. cit.)

In the former sense it differs specifically from speculative theology and is superior to it. It was thus understood by earlier writers, and St. Thomas usually calls it the "Wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Spirit".<sup>159</sup>

In the latter sense, which is the more usual today, as a human science acquired through study in the same manner as speculative theology, it is inferior to it since it is nothing but a branch thereof.<sup>160</sup>

As a matter of fact, speculative theology is divided into: (a) dogmatic theology, and (b) moral theology. The former considers God in Himself, and as the principle of created beings. The latter considers God as the ultimate end of human acts. These acts, if they are ordinary acts, produced in a "human manner", i.e., under the influence of the virtues, constitute the object of ordinary moral or ascetic theology. But if they are perfect acts, produced in a "divine manner", i.e., under the influence of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, they constitute the object of mystical theology.

159<sup>a</sup>. The wisdom which is said to be a gift of the Holy Spirit differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue: for the latter is acquired through human effort, but the former comes down from above as is said in James 3:14. (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.45, a.1, ad 2) "Wisdom which is a gift is more excellent than the wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, inasmuch as it attains God more closely by a certain union of the soul to Him." (*Ibid.*, a.3, ad 1)

"Nor does it follow from this that the gift of wisdom does not by its own nature differ in substance, but only in the mode of acquisition, from acquired theology, as inferred by Suárez against the first mode of saying. . . . For, to the contrary, the gift of wisdom is not theology infused accidentally (per accidens) and identical in species to our theology, viz., that which we learn through sweat and schoolwork, but a mystical and affective wisdom that judges by internal experience and relish of the divine. . . . Consequently, the distinction between our theology and the gift of wisdom lies in that theology regards the truths as virtually revealed and as known and inferred in a metaphysical and quidditative manner from the principles of faith. But the gift of wisdom does not regard the virtually revealed as quidditatively known through metaphysical discourse, but as experimentally known in affection. Thus it is infused not only as the other per se infused virtues by reason of the supernatural object with which it deals, but also by reason of the supernatural experimental affection on which it is founded." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, loc. cit., a.4, n.42, pgs. 647-648).

"Let us, then, demand from the mystic no metaphysical reasonings, but simply the conclusions of this clairvoyant intuition, which, according to Jørgensen, lies at the basis of all psychic sensitivity, and which effortlessly affirms, with astounding certainty, what metaphysicians offer in their weighty folios after laborious demonstrations." (HOORNAERT, *St. Theresa, the Writer*, Desclée, Paris 1922, pg.544; JØRGENSEN, *St. Catherine of Sienna*, Beauchesne, Paris 1919, pg.78)

160<sup>a</sup>. Theology is one according to ultimate species, whether it proceeds from premises that are both of faith, or from a premise of faith and another of natural reason, or whether it treats of speculative or of moral matters. This proposition is taken from St. Thomas." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *In I. am P.*, vol. I, d.2, a.7)

As we have said, considered ontologically in itself, mystical knowledge, which is the fruit of personal experience of things divine, is superior in nobility and value to the speculative knowledge acquired by means of study. The reason is obvious. Mystical knowledge, which is the fruit of the motion of the Holy Spirit exercised through the gifts, is formally infused, supernatural, divine. On the other hand, speculative knowledge, which is the fruit of study and produced by human reason "informed" by faith, is formally natural, acquired, human, albeit materially or objectively divine and supernatural. (309)

However, relative to the evolution of dogma, the speculative way has played a more important, or at least a more visible, role than the mystical way. The latter unfolds itself through *subjective* or personal experiences which are very evident, perhaps, to the favoured individual but which are hardly evident to others; whereas the speculative way is based on *objective* reasons that are open to anybody's examination and appraisal. On the other hand, history shows that whenever a dogma of faith is up for definition, the councils and the popes seek the advice of speculative theologians, even of those who are not mystics, rather than that of godly persons or mystics without theological science.

220<sup>6</sup>. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO WAYS AND THE CHURCH'S AUTHORITY. — Both the speculative and the affective ways depend equally on the deposit of faith. Inasmuch as this deposit has been entrusted by God exclusively to the Church for its safekeeping and explanation, it follows that all and any theology depends intrinsically and essentially on her authority, and not only extrinsically and accidentally as in the case of the human sciences.

Besides, compared to the common faithful, every theologian, far from being less dependent on and having less need of, the Church than the former, is on the contrary even more dependent and more indebted to her in direct proportion to the depth of his knowledge. The ordinary believer does not in any manner go beyond the surface of the revealed datum, whereas the theologian is the more eminent the deeper he penetrates into the wealth of this treasure entrusted by God to the Church for exclusive safekeeping. Thus he falls under her jurisdiction in the measure of his mastery.

Not to mention the fact that to attempt the exploration of the depths of a deposit that is *supernatural*, i.e., superior to human reason and of an order different to it, is always fraught with dangers. In this mysterious and slippery terrain it is easy to go astray or to stumble if one is not possessed

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of the divine help promised by Christ to no one, however wise and holy, but the Church his spouse.

The theologian is frequently liable to be deluded about the force of a demonstration. "Man is *often mistaken* in that he believes something to be demonstrative, which is not so."<sup>161</sup>

In the case of the mystic there is the no less frequent danger of mistaking the weaknesses of his own imagination or the overexcitations of his sensibility for divine experiences, not to mention the fact that the angel of darkness often transforms himself into an angel of light. "For Satan himself disguises himself as an angel of light."<sup>162</sup> At any rate, since both the one and the other are dealing with *divine* matters, the deficiency of reason is very much in evidence. "Human reason is *very much deficient* in divine things."<sup>163</sup>

For this reason, "to be in accord with the Church" (*sentire cum Ecclesia*) will always be the essential norm for both the learned and the saint in any matters relating to revelation which is the source of theology.

220<sup>7</sup>. THE UNITY OF CHRISTIAN LIFE AND DOCTRINE. — There are in man three different principles of action: (a) *natural reason* together with the acquired virtues; (b) *Christian reason* together with the supernatural or infused virtues; (c) the *Holy Spirit* who by means of the gifts makes use of Christian reason as an instrument.

Hence three kinds of acts: (a) acts that are *entirely natural* both as to their substance and as to their mode; (b) acts that are *supernatural* as to substance and *natural* as to mode; (c) acts that are *entirely supernatural* both as to substance and as to mode.

In the first category, the substance and the mode are *human*; in the second, the substance is *divine* and the mode is *human*; in the third, the substance and the mode are *divine*.<sup>164</sup>

<sup>161</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium, de Trinitate*, lect. 1, q. 1, a. 1.

<sup>162</sup>2 Cor. 11: 14.

<sup>163</sup>ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*

<sup>164</sup>..The *human virtues* [whether acquired or infused] perfect man insofar as man is naturally disposed to be *moved by reason* in the things he does interiorly or exteriorly. Thus it behooves that there be in man some higher perfections in accordance with which he be disposed to be *moved by divine influence*; and such perfections are called the *gifts*. (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 1-2, q. 68, a. 1) "Thus, the *gifts* of the Holy Spirit

*Ethics* deals with acts of the first category; *ascetic* moral theology with those of the second; *mystical* theology with those of the third.

Between acts of the first kind and acts of the second kind — the acts of an unbeliever and the acts of a Christian — there is an *essential* difference. Between acts of the second kind and acts of the third kind — the acts of an ordinary or lukewarm Christian and the acts of a perfect Christian or mystic — the difference is *modal*.

Similarly, there is an *essential* difference between ethics and moral theology; but the difference between these two branches of theology, as well as between the ascetical and mystical life, is *modal*. The latter differ as the imperfect and the perfect within the same species, as the sapling and the tree, as the child and the adult. The mystic is nothing but a perfect Christian, the mystical life is Christian life fully developed.

Thus the *unity*, not only of doctrine, but also of *life*, in the Christian becomes manifest. Just as the degrees of the former are nothing but stages of the *homogeneous development* of the *same doctrine*, so also all the degrees of the latter embody the *homogeneous evolution of the same life*.

What the Holy Spirit bestows upon the mystic is not *another life* but only *another mode of action*, the *divine mode*. Likewise, in the definitions of faith the Holy Spirit provides the Church not with *another doctrine* but with a *new mode of knowing*, the *divine* or *dogmatic mode*.

Thanks to the intervention of the Holy Spirit, the ascetical life — which already is substantially supernatural — becomes mystical; likewise, theological knowledge — which substantially is revealed knowledge — becomes dogmatic. In both the former and the latter cases there is a change of *mode* but not of *substance*. (304, 309)

Consequently, there is no such thing as *two Christian lives*, or *two Christian teachings*, but only different degrees of the *same life* and the *same teaching*.

are to man with respect to the Holy Spirit as the moral virtues are to the appetitive power with respect to reason." (Loc. cit., a.3) "The gifts differ from the virtues in that the virtues perfect the acts in a human manner, but the gifts perfect them beyond the human manner." (ST. THOMAS, In 3<sup>a</sup> Sent., d.34, q.1, a.1) "The reason of a gift is not retained in the virtues, including the infused virtues, because the mode of operation, in the virtues is in keeping with the human condition, although the substance of the habit is due to divine generosity." (Ibid., ad 2) "The gift is not superior to the infused virtue except by reason of its mode." (Ibid., ad 5)

220<sup>8</sup>. THE FIRST ROOT OF THE TWO WAYS OF DOGMATIC DEVELOPMENT. — Inasmuch as the Divinity itself is the immediate source and the central subject of the revealed statements, and since its is also the source and principal cause of faith, grace, and the supernatural habits, it can be truly said that, albeit obscurely known under the veil of faith, it is even in this life the *first root* from which the tree of Christian doctrine and life draws sap and warmth through all the channels of its evolution.

Neither the root nor the sap nor the tree need be replaced in the next life, only the veil of faith needs be removed for there to flow from the Divinity seen intuitively a torrent of light, love, and life that will engulf and deify eternally the soul and the powers of the elect.<sup>165</sup>

On earth the speculative and the mystical ways sometimes exist separately; in heaven they will be united definitively. There will then be no theologian who is not a mystic, no mystic who is not a theologian. The beatific vision will necessarily engender love, and speculative intuition will always be accompanied by mystical experience.

*Evolution* will then no longer be possible because the supernatural tree will have achieved in every sense the fullness of growth. All *implicit virtuality* will cease to be, not because the object will have disappeared, but because it will not exist for the subject, i.e., for the human spirit. Here below the human spirit labours under the necessity of explicating little by little, piecemeal, the inexhaustible "divine revealable"; there it will contemplate it fully manifested in the beatific vision.<sup>166</sup>

165. I answer that it should be said that God is the subject of this science . . . which also becomes manifest from the principles of this science, which are the articles of faith. Now, the subject of the principles is the self-same subject of the whole science, since the whole science is contained *virtually* in the principles." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.1, a.7)

"Sanctifying grace is compared to beatitude as the seminal reason (ratio seminalis) in nature is compared to the natural effect; hence in 1 John, 3, grace is said to be the seed of God." (Ibid., q.62, a.3) "The light of grace is a participation of divine nature." (Op. cit., 1-2, q.110, a.3) "A kind of inchoation of glory in us." (Op. cit., 2-2, q.24, a.3, ad 2). "Since grace imports no defect in its reason, it becomes glory by an increase of itself. Nor is there said to be a different perfection of nature in the state of pilgrimage and in heaven, as regards grace, because of a different perfecting form, but because of a different measure of perfection." (ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q.27, a.5, ad 6).

166. There are two ways of explicating the article of faith. One, as regards the substance of the articles themselves insofar as a man distinctly grasps the articles themselves. The other, as regards those things that are implicitly contained in the articles

There will be no need in heaven of any ecclesiastical magistratum or of any external rule. First, because the formal reason for such magistratum, viz., the safekeeping and the explication of the revealed datum, will no longer exist. Secondly, because each and everyone of the blessed will possess within himself, in the vision of God, the ultimate rule of all judgment and all truth, which guarantees an absolute rectitude in all his speculative and affective acts, without any external regulation.

But prior to the beatific vision, the obscurely revealed deposit is the only *objective source*, and the Church's authority the only *proximate rule* of all our dogmatic development. Hence the necessity of *faith* as the foundation, and of the *Church* as the rule, for both the speculative and the affective ways, and for both the ascetical and the mystical lives. "For we walk by *faith* and not by sight."<sup>167</sup> "But *faith* adheres to *all* the articles on account of *one medium*, that is to say, on account of the First Truth proposed to us in the Holy Scriptures, in accordance with *the teaching of the Church* who has the sound understanding thereof."<sup>168</sup>

#### SECTION VII

#### THE ANALOGIES OR NATURAL IMAGES OF THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

221. OUTSTANDING ANALOGIES. — As a complement to the ways through which the evolution of dogma is effected, it will not be amiss to say something about the different analogies between dogmatic evolution and the cases of natural evolution observed in the natural order. Three analogies give rise to the various metaphors commonly employed to describe the evolution of dogma.

Only three of such images seem to us to be worth considering. The first is the image of the seed, or better still, of the plant. The second is the image

*themselves* and this happens when a man grasps those things that follow from the articles. . . Now, no man is under obligation to the total latter explication of the articles, to wit, that he should know everything that is contained in the same articles concerning salvation, for this is impossible except in heaven where the substance itself of the articles will fully be seen." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, a.2, q.2).

<sup>167</sup> 2 Cor. 5:7.

<sup>168</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.5, a.3, ad 2.

of the human body. The third is the image of the first principles of a science. The first is taken from plant life, the second, from animal life; the third, from intellectual life.

These three metaphors are currently accepted and in use. However, there is a very marked difference in their meaning accordingly as only merely subjective progress or progress of mere formulae, or also a subjective-objective progress or a progress of true implicit virtuality, is deemed admissible in dogma.<sup>169</sup>

222. THE IMAGE OF THE PLANT OR SEED. — Those who reduce dogmatic progress to a merely subjective progress or progress of reasoning reason, compare it to a field or panorama, of which a man sees one part today and another part tomorrow, or which he sees first at twilight and then in the full light of day. In this case the field or panorama is exactly the same; there is no development of any kind except solely and exclusively in the man's seeing. Such an image of dogmatic progress seems childish to us and in no wise in accord with either traditional theology or the history of dogmas.

In our opinion, if one were to compare dogmatic progress to a field or garden, one should compare it to a field or garden the plants of which upon being inspected today are found at a certain stage of growth, and upon being inspected another day the same plants are found at a stage of further growth with new shoots, flowers, and fruits. Inasmuch as they are the same plants (and not some other plants or seeds surreptitiously introduced), the

<sup>169</sup> Some theologians offer, as a further image of dogmatic progress, the parable of the yeast or leaven mentioned in the Gospel (Matt. 13:33) Just as a little yeast is enough to leaven a great mass of dough, so the teaching of Christ, small to all appearances, flung into the midst of human civilizations and doctrines, gave them new life by giving them a goal and harmony and by providing new orientations and provoking enormous progress.

Very true and beautiful. But beside the point as an image of dogmatic progress. Yeast develops the mass, but it itself neither progresses nor is developed. Furthermore, it does not develop the mass except by mixing itself with the mass and losing its own being.

Now, the crux of the problem of dogmatic progress does not consist in explaining how dogma causes the progress of human doctrines, but in explaining how the dogma itself develops and progresses. At the same time, dogma does not, and cannot, progress by mixing itself with anything human, nor by assimilating anything alien, but simply by an internal or explicative evolution.

Consequently, as an image of dogmatic progress, yeast is the most imperfect of all such images. It hardly deserves to be called an image. For this reason we make no mention of it in the text.

progress is fully homogeneous; but inasmuch as the plants have *grown some more*, the progress is not merely subjective or merely in the spectator's vision, but a development of intrinsic and inclusive *virtuality*. This second image, and not the first, is the traditional image of dogmatic progress.

The great teacher of dogmatic progress, who enjoys the rare privilege of being quoted by the Vatican Council, has the following to say:

"For example. A long time ago our fathers sowed in this field of the Church wheat grains of faith. Now, it would be very wicked and absurd that we, their descendants, should gather the surreptitious error of cockle instead of true and honest grain. On the contrary, it is right and congruous that the beginnings and the ends should show no discrepancy between themselves, and that from the growth of the wheat sown we should now also reap grains of wheat or dogma, so that if, with the flow of time, anything has *evolved* from those first seeds, it ought to be tended with joy, but *nothing should be changed of the characteristic quality* of those sprouts. Let beauty, form, distinction be added; nonetheless, let the same *nature* of each kind remain. God forbid that those tender rose-plants of Catholic teaching be changed into thistles and thorns. God forbid, I say, that cinnamon and balsam saplings in that spiritual paradise should suddenly yield damel and acornite. Accordingly, it is seemingly that what has been sown by the faith of the fathers in this tillage of the field of God's Church, the same should by the children's industry be *cultivated and tended*. For it is right that the old dogmas of heavenly philosophy be carefully fostered, polished, refined. But it is unlawful to *exchange* them; it is unlawful to *detruncate*, to *mutillate* them. Although they may receive clarity, light, distinction, yet it is necessary that they retain their fullness, integrity, proper nature."<sup>169a</sup>

223. THE IMAGE OF THE HUMAN BODY. — Similarly, if we should take, not plants, but the human body as the image of dogmatic progress, a *purely subjective* progress would be represented by the body of a full grown man, of which we see some members today and some other members tomorrow, or which we first see in half-light and later in full light. In this case progress would lie merely and exclusively in the *seeing*, with no progress or development in the thing seen.

On the other hand, virtual-inclusive progress would be represented by the image of a child or youth whose bodily members we see today at a

<sup>169a</sup> LIRINENSIS, *Commonitorium*, 22; MIGNE, PL 50, 668.

certain stage of growth, and after some time we see again the very *same* bodily members but at a more developed stage. In this case there has been progress not only in our *seeing* but also in the thing seen. However, it is an inclusive and homogeneous progress of the *same* organism we saw before. This second image, and not the first, is the traditional image of dogmatic progress.

"Let the religion of the spirit *imitate* the condition of bodies, which with the passing of years evolve and unfold their mass but without remain the *same* that they were. There is a *great difference* between the flowering of *childhood* and the *maturity of old age*, yet the old are the same as those who were young. Although the state and condition of one and the same man change, there is nonetheless one and the same *nature*, one and the same person. The members of the suckling infant are *small*; those of the youth are *big*, but they are the *self-same*. There are as many articulations in grown men as there are in little children; and if there be any that are brought forth at a more mature age, they have already been presown in the germ, so that nothing new later comes to light in the old that was not already ensconced in the young. Hence there is no doubt that this is a legitimate and correct rule of progress, a valid and excellent order of growth, to wit, that progressive age should uncover in the grown-ups the same parts and forms that the Creator's wisdom had preformed in the little ones. Now, if the human form should afterwards be changed into some effigy which is *not of its nature*, or something be added or subtracted from the number of its *members*, it is necessary that either the whole body should perish, or become monstrous, or be certainly weakened. So, too, it behooves the *dogma* of the Christian religion to follow these laws of *progress*, i.e., that it be *firmed* with the years, *enlarged* with time, *refined* with age, yet without remain *uncorrupted* and *unimpaired*, that it be *fulfilled and perfected* in all the capacities of its parts which are as it were its own members and senses; that furthermore it admit no *permutation*, not suffer any *squandering* of its property or any *diversity* of definition."<sup>169b</sup>

This image taken from a young *body* is a very beautiful one. It is even better than the first one proposed by the same Lirinensis, which was taken from the seed. In the seed everything is *virtual*, whereas in the young body there already are *formed and actual* members in which the organism's future homogeneous growths are virtually contained.

<sup>169b</sup> LIRINENSIS, *ibid.*

It would be erroneous to affirm that in the revealed deposit everything is *virtual* since the *articles* or fundamental dogmas existed therein actually and formally (in determinate articles; ST. THOMAS). But these same articles contain virtually and inclusively many subsequent dogmatic developments.<sup>170</sup>

Still, it must be kept in mind that these two images of dogmatic development, taken from the growth of the plant and of the human body, are no better than *metaphors*, since anything *bodily* or physical employed as an illustration of *divine* realities necessarily assumes the nature of a metaphor. These two metaphors describe well the existence of a true development in the dogma itself within the identity of nature, but they are inadequate with respect to two points relative to the manner in which the development is effected. The plant and the human body develop by the absorption and assimilation of *foreign* matter, and not by the mere internal unfolding of only the same matter of the primitive germ. At the same time, the growth of the plant and of the human body takes place in the external world of *objective reality*, and not in the purely inner world of *intellectual ideality*. If plant and animal life could develop without having to absorb anything foreign, and if that development should take place within, and only within, the human intellect,

<sup>170</sup>Every time that St. Thomas speaks of the natural *intellectual progress* — this is for the holy Doctor the real, albeit, analogous, model of *dogmatic progress* — he compares it also to the progress of plant life or to the progress of the human body. "There preexist in us certain *seeds* of the sciences, to wit, the *first conceptions* of the intellect . . . Now, from these *universal principles* all principles follow as from certain, as it were, *seminal reasons*." (*De Veritate*, q.11, a.1, ad 5). "For he has marked the soul itself with an intellectual light, and impressed on it the knowledge of the *first principles* which are, as it were, the *seeds* of the sciences, just as He has impressed on other natural things the *seminal reasons* of all the effects that are to be produced." (*Loc. cit.*, a.3). "Of this natural knowledge there is a beginning and a term. Its beginning lies in a certain *confused cognition of everything insofar, viz., that in man there is to be found the knowledge of universal principles* in which, as it were in *seeds*, all the *knowables* that can be known through natural reason pre-exist *virtually*. But the *term* of this knowledge is reached when the things that exist *virtually* in the same principles are *explicitated* actually, as the term of an animal's generation is reached when from the *seed* of an animal, in which all the animal's members *virtually* pre-exist, the animal is produced having all its members *differentiated* and *perfect*. . . And just as nothing that belonged to the perfection of his [Christ's] body was to be found not actually *explicit* in his body so whatever existed *seminally* or *virtually* in the *first principles* of reason was all of it *explicit* in accordance with perfect knowledge." (*De Veritate*, q.18, a.4). "The *first principles* are as it were *seminal virtualities* of knowledge." (*Loc. cit.*, a.6) All of this terminology and teaching of St. Thomas on *intellectual progress* must be kept in mind in order to understand subsequently his teaching on *dogmatic progress*, which the Saint always compares to intellectual progress.

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then we should have a perfect image of *dogmatic* development as described by Lirinis and explained by St. Thomas.

224. THE IMAGE OF HUMAN INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT. — Now then, what does not take place in either plant or animal life, takes place literally in man's intellectual life. There is in it a genuine unfolding or progress of inclusive virtuality which is true of any primordial or fecund truth, or of any first intellectual principle; which requires no absorption of anything *foreign*, no addition or subtraction or any mixture of *objective reality*; which is effected by mere conceptual and homogeneous unfolding of the virtuality already implicit since the beginning in the one and same object known.

Hence, according to St. Thomas, the true image of dogmatic progress must be taken from *intellectual*, rather than from plant or animal, growth because of the fact that faith is *intellectual knowledge*, and the *life* of faith and of dogma is above all an *intellectual* life. The revealed deposit was communicated by God to the prophets and apostles not as a collection of *experiences* or an ensemble of *life of feeling* — as Modernism maintains —, but as a body of *objective, intellectual* statements. Hence the reception, life and unfolding of the revealed deposit must follow laws analogous to the reception, life and unfolding of any and every intellectual statement. The law of any intellectual statement in man is that it *really* contains more objectivity than it *formally* delivers (hence the so-called fecundity or *virtuality* of a principle or idea), and that it proceeds to unfold little by little, within the intellect itself, the fecundity which it really contains without need of any absorption or mixture of any foreign element, but simply by developing its own virtuality solely through the contact of, or comparison with, the *transcendent* principles of the human intellect. These principles are in no way physico-connexive with respect to anything; they are *inclusive* and can be really, albeit analogically, applied to *everything*, whether human or divine, natural or revealed.

Thus, according to St. Thomas, the proper and real image of *dogmatic* progress is human *intellectual progress*, that is to say, the progress of inclusive virtuality or of *intellectual explicitation* that takes place in man with regard to the inclusive consequences of the first principles of natural reason. However, this image is analogical, since any *created* thing, whether bodily or intellectual, becomes analogical when it is extrapolated to the *divine*.

"In the doctrine of faith the *articles* of faith are as the *self-evident* principles in the doctrine that is *acquired by natural reason*."<sup>171</sup> "The intellectual power, inasmuch as it is *comparative*, proceeds from certain things to arrive at other things: hence it is not related equally to all the intelligibles that

<sup>171</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.1, a.7.



can be known. *Some* things it sees at once, as e.g., those that are *self-evident*, in which are *implicitly* contained *some other things* which it cannot understand except through the function of *reason*, by *explicating* that which is *implicitly* contained in the principles.<sup>172</sup> "And this was the reason why it was necessary to bring forth *several symbols*, which differ in nothing but that in one are found *more fully explicating* things that in another are found *implicitly*."<sup>173</sup> "When many things are *virtually* contained in one, they are said to be *implicitly* in it, as *conclusions* in the principles."<sup>174</sup>

With this procedure — which is neither one of addition nor of subtraction nor of change nor of mixture, but one of inclusive-intellectual explication — the two characteristics of substantial immutability and explicative progress, proper of any homogeneous evolution, are maintained in dogma.

This makes clear how rightly the Church has condemned the following proposition, the 54th in Pius X's *Syllabus* against Modernism: "The dogmas, sacraments, hierarchy, either with respect to their notion *or with respect to their reality*, are nothing but the interpretations and developments of Christian understanding, which have increased and perfected a *small hidden germ with external increments*."<sup>175</sup> This proposition contains three errors at least. First, it posits as the starting point a *germ* that is *small* and *hidden* or potential; whereas the starting point to be posited must be something *actual* and *explicit*, and of such breadth that it already encompasses implicitly and intrinsically all subsequent developments. Secondly, it posits a development that is carried out by *external additions*; whereas dogma admits of only *intrinsic* development. Thirdly, it posits not only a notional progress but also a progress of *objective reality*; whereas dogmatic progress can only be *notional*, never objective-real. (182)

<sup>172</sup>ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2.

<sup>173</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q. 1, a. 9.

<sup>174</sup>ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q. 14; *De Fide*, a. 11.

<sup>175</sup>Denz.-Schön., 3454.

## CHAPTER V

### SCOPE OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION AND REFUTATION OF THE MODERN ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH

225. PURPOSE AND OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER. — Having considered the various channels through which the implicit virtuality of the revealed datum — which is, as it were, the sap that nourishes the evolution of dogma — courses and unfolds itself, we will now consider the scope of its evolution.

To the title "Scope of Dogmatic Evolution" we have added "Refutation of the Modern Ecclesiastical Faith" because these two questions are intimately linked and are fundamentally similar. Indeed, if we were to succeed, as we hope, in demonstrating that the whole object that is today ascribed to the so-called ecclesiastical faith is definable as a dogma of divine faith, we shall thereby have proven that dogmatic evolution embraces the whole of that same object (theological conclusions, dogmatic facts, the canonization of saints), and that the so-called ecclesiastical faith is totally useless.

That is the purpose of this chapter, in which we shall examine, in all its aspects, the history and nature of the so-called ecclesiastical faith. We believe that the study we undertake in this chapter is the most extensive and thorough that has been written on this subject, since the majority of modern theologians, even of those who have devoted whole volumes to the study of faith or revelation, are satisfied with taking this ecclesiastical faith for granted, and hardly take the trouble of pausing to examine it.

In order to make this study sufficiently thorough, we will divide it into four sections:

1. The origin and meaning of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

2. Ecclesiastical faith and the theological conclusions.
3. Ecclesiastical faith and the dogmatic facts.
4. Ecclesiastical faith and the canonization of saints.

Thus, the present chapter aims to show not only that dogmatic evolution exists, as we have seen in the previous chapters, but also that its scope is so vast that it coincides exactly with the scope of the Church's infallibility.

#### SECTION I

### THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF THE MODERN ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH

226. THE MODERN VIEW. — The majority of contemporary theologians teach and almost submit as certain the two following propositions:

First. Mediatly or virtually revealed truths cannot be defined by the Church as truths of *divine* faith, but they can be defined as *infallible truths*.

Second. When the Church infallibly defines such truths, we are obliged to give them not an assent of *divine* faith, but an assent of *ecclesiastical* faith.

Of these two propositions the latter is nothing but a corollary of the former. In the preceding chapters we have attempted to show that the first proposition is contrary to all theological tradition prior to Molina, and to all the principles of Thomism. It goes without saying that that is exactly what we think of the second proposition. Nonetheless, since we have frequently promised to deal in particular with that brand of faith called "ecclesiastical," we will do so now. Let us begin by explaining what is meant today by *ecclesiastical faith*.

227. THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH —

According to modern theologians, the material object of ecclesiastical faith comprises all the truths that are revealed only in a mediate or virtual manner. In other words, all those truths that notwithstanding their not being formally or immediately contained in the revealed deposit, are nonetheless necessarily connected with that deposit, or are necessary for its conservation. It comprises, in accordance with the classification made by contemporary theologians, six things: (a) *theological conclusions*, properly speaking; (b) *propositions condemned* with a censure inferior to that of heresy; (c) the *universal laws* of the Church, as regards their morality; (d) the definitive approval of the rule and constitutions of *religious orders*; likewise as regards their morality; (e) *dogmatic facts*; (f) the *canonization of saints*.

This sixfold classification seems to us to be extremely empirical since it arises from no intrinsic principle of classification. Nonetheless we accept it both because it is common enough among modern theologians, and because it contributes to clarity. It would appear to be more philosophical to classify the mediatly revealed, and consequently, the secondary object of infallibility, into two: (a) mediatly revealed *teachings*; (b) mediatly revealed *facts*. However, for our present purpose one or the other classification makes little difference, provided that everything that is *mediatly revealed*, or everything that is *necessarily connected* with the revealed deposit, or everything that is *necessary for* its conservation, be included. Such is the true material object of the so-called ecclesiastical faith. Since such is also precisely the material object of sacred theology, it can very well be said that the material object of *ecclesiastical* faith is none other than *theology defined* infallibly by the Church.

Meanwhile, we beg the reader to take note of the vast field of truths withdrawn from divine faith and assigned by modern theologians to ecclesiastical faith. It is a commonplace that Catholic doctrine, taken in its whole extent, comprises four degrees: (a) the revealed datum; (b) dogmas of faith; (c) infallible truths; (d) theological conclusions. According to the modern view, the first and second degrees are made up exclusively of immediately revealed truths; the third and fourth degrees, of mediatly revealed truths. Thus, the first and second degrees constitute the proper field of divine faith; the third and fourth, the proper field of ecclesiastical faith. Hence, it is obvious that two whole degrees, or one-half of Catholic doctrine, belongs, or can belong, to ecclesiastical faith, but can never belong to divine faith. Now, no matter how much we might wish to juggle with names, there can be no middle between the divine and the human. Thus, to ascertain whether the so-called ecclesiastical faith is a true divine faith, or not, is tantamount to ascertaining whether one-half of the teachings with which Christ's Church nourishes our supernatural life, and to which she obliges us to give an absolutely unconditional assent under pain of eternal damnation, is *divine*, or merely *human*, teachings.

As a matter of fact, any inquiry into whether a teaching is divine or human is always of extreme importance, for it is no less serious to attempt to pass as human what is truly divine, as to attempt to pass as divine what is merely human. And the matter assumes much more serious proportions if, as we have observed, it is not a case of one isolated proposition or truth, but of one-half, or even the greater part of the Catholic doctrine.

<sup>1</sup>"The measure of faith is made up of two things, viz. that nothing that falls under faith be excluded from it, and that nothing that does not fall under faith be attributed to it. For in both these ways there is an excess from the measure of faith and a deviation from what is contained in the Holy Scriptures which express the measure of faith." (DURANDUS, In 4 Sent., Prob. Paris 1527, fol. 1 vto.)

228. THE FORMAL MOTIVE OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH. — The supporters of ecclesiastical faith consider the two following motives as specifically different: (a) *divine revelation*; (b) *divine assistance*. These two motives are also usually expressed in the following manner: (a) the authority of God; (b) the infallible authority of the Church. Divine revelation or God's authority is the formal motive of *divine faith*; God's assistance or the infallible authority of the Church, they say, is the formal motive of *ecclesiastical faith*. Thus, the act of divine faith is formulated in these terms: "I believe such a truth because God has revealed it." On the other hand, the act of ecclesiastical faith is formulated thus: "I believe such a truth because Holy Mother Church thus infallibly teaches it."

Since habits are specified by their formal motives, and those two motives differ specifically in the opinion of modern theologians, divine faith and ecclesiastical faith likewise are, and have to be, specifically different. Since that which specifically differs from the divine is not divine, modern theologians commonly admit that ecclesiastical faith is *not a divine faith*.

229. THE NATURE OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH. — Consequently, if ecclesiastical faith is not divine faith, what is it? Is it a merely human, faith? Is it a mixture of human faith and divine faith?

It is at this point that these modern authors get themselves into a tangle, and it is delightful to observe the balancing feats they perform with words in the attempt to classify this new species of faith. Some of them affirm that ecclesiastical faith is *almost or quasi divine*; others, that it is *mediately divine*; others, that it is *indirectly divine*; others, that it is a *middle between divine faith and human faith*; others, that it is *human*; others, that it is *divino-human*; finally, others, that it is *not faith*, whether divine or human, but *science*.

To preclude anyone from thinking that we are exaggerating or attempting to ridicule such a serious matter, it will be proper to quote some passages, taken at random, but the briefest possible.

"This faith, by some denominated *ecclesiastical*, we might call a *mediately divine faith*." (FRANZELIN)

"*Ecclesiastical faith, or mediately divine faith*." (VACANT)

"As regards the *mediately* and *indirectly divine* faith, it seems not to differ from ecclesiastical faith." (DE GROOT).

"*Neither purely divine nor purely human*." (BECANO).

"*Middle* between divine faith and human faith." (ANTOINE)

"*A human* and ecclesiastical faith." (PÉREFIXE)

"Of ecclesiastical, or *divino-human*, faith." (PÉGUES)

"A human faith of utmost certainty, *almost* pertaining to divine faith, and only a *short* distance away from it." (GRANADOS)

"Theological assent which is grounded on *discourse*." (MOLINA)<sup>1a</sup>

It is obvious that the terminology describing this new faith cannot be more varied. For this reason, other authors prefer, with greatest prudence, to speak abundantly of this ecclesiastical faith as if it were something self-evident, without bothering to say whether it is divine faith, or human faith, or a middle between the two.

230. THE ORIGIN OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH. — A distinction must be made between the origin of the *name*, and the origin of the *idea*.

The name is of very recent origin. It dates no later than the celebrated debates with the Jansenists on the faith that must be given to the definitions of the Church with respect to dogmatic facts, and consequently it goes no farther than the second half of the 17th century.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1a</sup> "Hanc quam aliqui appellant fidem *ecclesiasticam*, possumus dicere fidem *mediate divinam*." (FRANZELIN)

"Foi *ecclesiastique* ou foi *mediatement divine*." (VACANT)

"Quantum ad fidem *mediate* et *indirecte divinam*, a fide *ecclesiastica* non differre videtur." (DE GROOT)

"*Nec pure divina nec pure humana*." (BECANO)

"*Media* inter fidem divinam et fidem humanam." (ANTOINE)

"Une foi *humaine* et *ecclesiastique*." (PÉREFIXE)

"*De foi ecclesiastique, ou divino-humana*." (PÉGUES)

"*Fides humana* certissima, *fore* ad fidem divinam pertinens, et *parum* ab illa distans." (GRANADOS)

"*Assensus theologicus qui discursu* innititur." (MOLINA)

<sup>2</sup> It is well known that the true nature of *dogmatic* facts was neither analyzed nor discussed thoroughly by Catholic theologians until the notorious and interminable sophistries wherewith the Jansenists sought to evade the Church's condemnation of Jansen's five propositions. Prior to the first Bull condemning Jansen's doctrine, and even for quite some years afterwards, when dealing with the Church's authority relative to facts or the meaning of a text, Catholic theologians generally understood the term "facts" to signify "particular" facts, viz. those that had no necessary connexion with dogma, and the term "meaning" of an author to designate the "subjective" meaning that the author had in his mind. This explains why theologians of such orthodoxy and stature as Belarmino, Baronius, and Pallavicini, who wrote prior to Jansen, and Gonet and Contenson, who wrote some years afterwards, seem to deny the Church's infallibility on such matters, and to provide aid to Jansenist resistance. With the various Bulls issued by Innocent X, Alexander VII, and Clement XI against the Jansenist evasions a clear distinction began to take shape between "particular" and "dogmatic" facts, and between the "subjective" and the "objective" meaning of an author. Hence Contenson writing in 1668 says that this question began to be debated *about fifteen years earlier*.

The first to employ it was the archbishop of Paris, Mons. Péréfixe, in a pastoral against Jansenism dated 7th June, 1664.

The occasion that led to the adoption of the term by archbishop Péréfixe seems to be the following.

His predecessor on the see of Paris, Mons. De Marca, had written in a pastoral against the Jansenists that the definition of dogmatic facts made by the Church was something that affected the "substance of dogma", and therefore, something to which *divine faith* was due. This extremely unsettled the Jansenists. Worse still, there were orthodox theologians whose opinion coincided with that of the Jansenists against the archbishop. Archbishop Péréfixe, wishing to deliver his pastoral of 1664 against the Jansenists, first called Grandin and other Sorbonne theologians to a meeting. From what Fénelon says of him, we are led to think that this archbishop harboured such narrow ideas on divine faith, that in his opinion divine faith could not be given except to things revealed *immediately, nominally, and expressly*. Since it is evident that dogmatic facts are not revealed in such a manner, it was agreed that an assent of divine faith could not be given to definitions of dogmatic facts as Archbishop De Marca had believed. On the other hand, an assent of human faith, as propounded by the Jansenists, was not enough since the faith in question is an infallible faith. Thus, what was required was a faith less than divine, but more than human. How was such a faith, positioned midway between the divine and the human, to be called? To cut short the subtle cavils of the Jansenists, the generic term *faith* was insufficient, a specific term was needed. Various sessions were spent in consultation and debate. Since the faith in question was a faith to be given to the infallible authority of the

If we subtract fifteen from that year we get 1653, which is exactly the year in which Pope Innocent X published his famous Bull condemning as heretical Jansen's five propositions. It can therefore be stated with all certainty that prior to 1653 there was no mention of the term *ecclesiastical faith* with respect to the infallible definitions of the Church. However, since the divine and Catholic faith given by us to the dogmas of faith is not merely the faith of this or that individual but the *faith of the whole Church*, and on the other hand, inasmuch as anything pertaining to the *faith of the whole Church*, and is in fact so denominated by Archbishop Guitmundus as early as the 11th century in his treatise on the Eucharist against Berengar. Having cited the testimonies substantiating the Church's perpetual faith in the dogma of the Transubstantiation, the Archbishop concludes with these words: "Let us then unwaveringly draw the conclusion, which very evidently and necessarily follows, viz. that God effects the change of the bread and the wine into the substance of the body and the blood of Christ, Wherefore let the unreasonables, false, unprofitable, and worthless inventions of impudent men be stilled among all men of good judgment. Let all things, I say, yield to ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH." (GUITMUNDUS, *De Corporis Christi veritate in Eucharistia*, lib. 3, n. 47.) It is obvious that the term *ecclesiastical faith* is given here an essentially different meaning from that given to it in the 17th century by Archbishop Péréfixe.

Church, it was agreed to call it *ecclesiastical faith*. The name was a success because it was brief and expressive. The archbishop used it in his pastoral. The theologians who had agreed on it in the conferences with the archbishops, dictated and spread it among the students in the handwritten lessons given out daily. Soon the great Sorbonne writers, e.g., Tournely, D'Argentre, and Grandin, employed it in their printed works giving it, as it were naturalization papers in theological circles. Such are, we believe, the circumstances that gave birth to the term *ecclesiastical faith*, or, at least contributed most to its adoption and spread. This can be gathered from Fénelon's authoritative account, and appears to be confirmed by Tournely and Grandin, writers extremely well versed in everything relative to the debates with the Jansenists, in which both took part.

231. TESTIMONIES FROM FÉNELON, TOURNELY AND GRANDIN. — In his reply to the bishop of Saint-Pons, Fénelon writes the following: "You say that Mons. de Marca required this *divine faith* . . . But Mons. de Péréfixe, who has examined what was the most rigorous language used by the most recent *scholastics*, is of the belief, which is shared by M. Grandin and some other famous doctors whom he admitted into his council for the purpose of deliberating on this matter, that the name of *divine faith* should not be given except only to the assent to truths *revealed expressly, nominally, and immediately*. Now, the heretical nature of Jansen's book is not found to be revealed *expressly, nominally, and immediately*. Indeed, it is nothing of the kind. Thence Mons. de Péréfixe concluded that, speaking with full scholastic precision, it cannot be said that it is necessary to believe with *divine faith* the heretical nature of Jansen's book. This view, which is accepted by M. Grandin, by this prelate, and some other competent doctors, is very clearly found in the writings dictated at the Sorbonne, which are still in the hands of a great number of bachelors. This worthy prelate, and these authoritative doctors, believe that it is necessary to employ the term *ecclesiastical faith* to shut the mouth of Jansen's supporters."<sup>3</sup>

The well-known Sorbonne theologian, Honore Tournely, writing a few years after Fénelon, clearly gives us to understand that Mons. de Marca, Mons. Péréfixe's antecessor in the archbishopric of Paris, had taught that *divine faith* was to be given to the definitions of the Church bearing on dogmatic facts, and that his successor, Mons. Péréfixe, to appease Jansenist clamours, was the first to employ the term *ecclesiastical faith*. Writes Tournely:

<sup>3</sup> *Oeuvres de Fénelon, Réponse à la deuxième lettre de Mgr. L'Evêque de Saint-Pons*, n. 15, Ed. Paris 1882, tom. 12, pp. 546-8.

"With regard to this question thus set forth, theologians offer various opinions.

"The first is the view of those that not only acknowledge the Church as infallible in the matter of doctrinal facts, but also hold that these facts pertain to the *faith* itself, and think that, after the Church's definition, they may not be denied without the mark of *heresy* on account of the inseparable conjunction between the fact and the right [iuris] or dogma . . . It is astonishing to see how *impetuously and vigorously* have Jansen's supporters attacked this view, with what *black colours* have they painted it, as if it totally overthrew the foundations of divine faith by obtruding a new and non-revealed fact in lieu of the object of faith . . . The Most Illustrious de Marca, archbishop of Paris, appears to have adopted this position when he said that the definitions of the Church concerning these doctrinal facts *belong on the side of dogma.*"

He then recounts four views extremely contrary to the preceding one, advanced by those siding with the Jansenists in the denial of the Church's infallibility with regard to dogmatic facts, and submits his own opinion in the following terms:

"Lastly, the sixth opinion, *which we here adopt*, deems that the Holy Spirit is present to the Church with such exceptional power and assistance when she judges the meaning of propositions or books, that it is impossible for her to deviate from the truth. Hence, the faithful are obliged to acquiesce to her judgment not merely with what they call a religious silence, but also with the mind's judgment, consent, and approval. Thus, the motive of this interior assent and adherence is the Church's supreme authority itself. There are some, *after the Most Illustrious Péréfixe, archbishop of Paris*, who call this *faith ecclesiastical*, which is middle between simply divine faith and simply human faith, just as ecclesiastical precepts are said to be neither simply divine nor simply human."

Tournely describes in the following passage the mind of Mons. Péréfixe in inventing the term ecclesiastical faith:

"You will urge: The Most Illustrious Péréfixe, archbishop of Paris, in his order of 8th June of the year 1664, said that only through malice or ignorance can it be affirmed that the definitions of fact belong *to the faith*."

"I answer that it was the Most Illustrious Archbishop's mind only to assert that equal faith was not due to a definition of fact and to a definition of right or dogma, as if the motive of one and the other were one, and their authority equal in all things. For dogma is believed because of immediate revelation, the fact because of the Church's authority; the latter is believed with *ecclesiastical*, the former with *divine faith*. That the Most Illustrious Archbishop required the obsequy of the mind to the definitions of fact is shown by the following words, which immediately follow in the cited order

and which should not have been omitted by the adversaries: 'Let them demand', said he in French, 'seulement pour cet égard une foi *humaine et ecclésiastique*, qui oblige à soumettre avec sincérité son jugement à celui des supérieurs légitimes.'"<sup>4</sup>

These statements by Fénelon and Tournely are confirmed by Grandin, who was, as we have seen, one of the theologians present at the consultations with archbishop Péréfixe. He writes: "You will ask: by what *name* is that *faith* to be called, which is founded on the Church's judgment and declaration concerning *facts*? I answer that it can be called human and *ecclesiastical* . . . And, indeed, *by this name it was called by the Most Illustrious Archbishop* . . . And, indeed, *in his order issued on 7th June of the year 1664*. If the *name* should seem new to anyone, the thing itself should not appear new."<sup>5</sup> Péréfixe's pastoral carries exactly the date given by Grandin: "Given in Paris this seventh of June, sixteen hundred sixty four."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> TOURNELY, *De Ecclesiâ Christi*, q.5, a.5, c.d. Paris 1727, pp.447-605.

<sup>5</sup> MARTIN GRANDIN, *Opera theologica, Tractatus de Gratia*, q.3, s.3, punct.2, Paris 1710, vol.2, pg.276.

<sup>6</sup> Here are some passages from Mons. Hardouin de Péréfixe's, pastoral letter: "Hardouin, by the grace of God and of the Holy Apostolic See Archbishop of Paris, to all who see these present letters greetings in Our Lord. Just as there can be no question that there is no Catholic who is not obliged to submit his judgment in matters of religion, to the judgment of his superiors and legitimate pastors, so too this submission cannot be more strongly recommended than by the words of St. Vincent de Lérins: *that it is through practice or through contempt that the disciples save themselves or hang themselves*."

"And this brings us to the subject of the five propositions drawn from the book entitled *Augustinus* written by Jansen, bishop of Ypres. . . .

"It is for this reason that no one can sufficiently praise the wisdom and the paternal charity of our Holy Fathers Popes Innocent X and Alexander VII who, in order to preclude all pretexes on the part of those who in the future would be of a mind to maintain these five propositions, by their Constitutions of the years 1653 and 1656 have not only condemned them as they are in themselves, but have furthermore declared, particularly Alexander VII, that the five, condemned propositions are drawn from Jansen's book entitled *Augustinus*, and that they have condemned them in the sense in which the said author has taught them. To which my Lords the Archbishops and Bishops of this realm being desirous of manifesting their conformity, they are of the belief that they can do so no better than by drafting a formula of profession of faith in the very same sense as that of the said Constitutions. Upon being signed, this formula will of course make evidently known those who have submitted themselves sincerely to the said Constitutions. From these Constitutions, as well as from the said formula, it is certain that no one, unless he is malicious or ignorant, can draw any excuse for saying that they demand a submission of divine faith, for as to the fact, they only require in this respect, as it is frequently said, a *human and ecclesiastical faith*, which obliges one sincerely to submit his judgment to that of his legitimate superiors, since otherwise it would be easy by this contrivance to evade the condemnation of all kinds of errors, and under the pretext of the question of fact it will always be possible for anyone to maintain the liberty of defending his own opinion with respect to the right. . . .

We beg the reader's indulgence for these long quotations. They are extremely important in order to determine the origin of the so-called ecclesiastical faith. We believe that these passages clearly establish two things. First, that the term ecclesiastical faith dates from the 7th June, 1664, which is the date of archbishop Péréfixe's pastoral. Second, that the coining of this new ecclesiastical faith obeyed the demands of an *apologetic opportunism*, to wit, the desire to appease the clamours of Jansen's followers, who could not tolerate any mention of *divine faith* with respect to the dogmatic fact of the condemnation of Jansen's book.

By the way, we have noted with satisfaction that after the publication of this study of ours in *La Ciencia Tomista*,<sup>7</sup> a number of theologians have accepted as commonplace, although without citing us, the origin, date, and author that we have given of the modern ecclesiastical faith, and even go so far as to cite in confirmation of it the same authors and passages quoted by us. This makes us feel well rewarded for the not inconsiderable effort and time spent in clarifying this important historical point, the vestiges of which seemed to have vanished without a trace in the theologians posterior to the 18th century. We think that it will not be long before archbishop Péréfixe will be widely known among theologians as the father of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

232. THE FORERUNNERS OF ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH. — If the name of ecclesiastical faith is quite recent, the origin of the thing signified by it is not much older. It dates from the close of the 16th century.

Indeed, the first forerunner of what today goes by the name of ecclesiastical faith is, undoubtedly, the famous author of the *Scientia Media*, Luis Molina. Prior to this celebrated theologian from Cuenca, all theologians, irrespective of schools, had admitted that the revealed mediate or virtual could be defined by the Church as of divine faith, and that, after its definition, it was worthy of an assent of true divine faith.

<sup>7</sup>Given in Paris, the seventh of June, sixteen hundred sixty four." (*Ordonnance de Monseigneur l'illustrissime et Révérendissime Cardinal de Péréfixe, Archevesque de Paris*. A Paris, chez Francois Muget 1164, pp. 3-4-5-7).

It seems evident that the phrase "as it is frequently said" (*comme il a été si souvent dit*), refers to the term "human", and not to the term "ecclesiastical" which appears here for the first time. The "meaning" of this word is old, but the word is new, as Grandin observes (*loc. cit.*).

Our heartfelt thanks to the learned Fr. Mandonnet, O.P. for providing us with a copy of Mons. Péréfixe's letter.

<sup>7</sup>March, 1921

Molina was the first to deny that the revealed mediate or virtual could ever deserve divine faith, even if it were to be defined by the Church as dogmatically as the two wills in Christ. But if the definitions made by the Church of such virtuos do not deserve divine faith, what kind of assent are they to be given? *Theological* assent, replies Molina, since it is an assent based on reasoning. The theologians assent to such a defined truth on the basis of the same scientific reasoning employed by the Church to state and define such a virtual. And the following reasoning is sufficient for the faithful: "The Church cannot be wrong in her definitions. Now, the Church has defined such a truth. Therefore, it is certain."<sup>8</sup>

Obviously, Molina calls such an assent not by the name of ecclesiastical faith but by that of theological assent. However, since according to Molina, the reasoning on which the faithful base such an assent is an improper reasoning, the assent is rather one of faith than of science. And since, according to Molina, it is not an assent of divine faith because it is concerned with things that are mediately revealed, nor an assent of merely human faith because it is infallible, we come up with an assent that is identical or very similar to that

<sup>8</sup>"There have been some who have said that we must also count among the principles of theology those definitions whereby the Church has established certain things because she sees that they are evidently deduced from revealed truths, as e.g. the proposition that there were two wills, divine and human, in Christ the Lord, which, although it is not expressed in the Holy Scriptures, is nonetheless evidently gathered from them. . . This opinion does not please me. . . You will therefore ask, what habit is it whereby the faithful assent to Church-defined conclusions from revealed truths, if they do not assent to them immediately by the habit of faith? I answer: If they know how to gather them from revealed truths, as the Church gathers them, then they assent to them by a *theological habit* in two ways. One, by the same *reasoning* itself, whereby, not otherwise than the Church herself, they deduce them. Two, by this other *reasoning* grounded on the authority of the Church, which is common to both the learned and the non-learned: The Church cannot err in her definitions; but this or that has been defined; therefore it is certain and true." (MOLINA, *Commentaria in Primam D. Thomae*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 2) Navarrete alludes to this opinion of Molina when he says: "This opinion contains many false things, which as of now we do not wish to mark with a *censure* because the thinking of this author is not sufficiently clear. However, we take it for granted that it is *heretical* to say that the Church, in defining matters of faith [the subject under discussion is the definitions of the revealed virtual or mediate] does not have an assistance as infallible as the assistance had by St. Paul or any sacred writer." NAVARRETE, *Controversiae in D. Thomae et eius Scholae defensionem*, t. 1 cont. 7, Vallisolen 1605)

That the Church's infallibility extends itself to the revealed mediate or virtual has always been considered by the Thomist school as a truth of faith, and its denial as *heretical*. Modern theologians also fairly generally admit it as a truth of faith, or at least as a revealed truth definable as of divine faith. However, they deny (albeit inconsistently, as we shall see in due time) that thence it follows that the thing defined is of divine faith. The infallible authority to define the virtual is, they say, of divine faith, but the thing defined is only of *ecclesiastical* faith.

which goes today by the name of ecclesiastical faith. Thus, Molina can well be considered as the father or the first forerunner of ecclesiastical faith.

The second forerunner of ecclesiastical faith is Granados, who, like Molina, is also a Jesuit and a Spaniard. Granados<sup>9</sup> undertakes to defend Molina on the question of the revealed virtual from attacks, particularly those of the renowned Navarrete. However, he corrects Molina with respect to two things. First, he is not pleased — and quite correctly — with Molina's example of the definition by the Church of the two wills in Christ. All theologians have always been unanimous in affirming that to this definition an assent of true divine faith must be given.

The second point on which Granados corrects Molina refers to Molina's contention that the assent given by us to the Church's infallible definitions of the virtually revealed is a *theological* assent based on reasoning. Granados correctly observes that the simple faithful do not bother with theologues or with reasonings; they limit themselves simply to giving faith to what the Church infallibly teaches them.

In which case, what kind of faith is it if, as Granados agrees with Molina, it is not divine faith? It is, Granados replies, a *human faith of utmost certainty*, and so close to divine faith that when one is not speaking with

9. "And it is thus, in Molina's opinion, that the two wills or operations in Christ were defined in the Sixth Council. However, the *example* does not seem good, for it appears that *express* testimonies of this truth are found in Scripture. But of this elsewhere." (GRANADOS, *loc. cit.*, n.20) To this view propounded by Granados and Molina, John of St. Thomas replies in these terms: "But to the contrary, in the first place, if he [Granados] ever grants that we assent to that defined truth *without benefit of reasoning*, then in that case it loses the nature of a theological conclusion which is held through discourse, and thus this was the opposite foundation [of Molina and Granados] who say that it does not belong to the faith *because it is attained through discourse*. In the second place, such a truth thus defined rests upon *divine* authority, and not only on the *human* and *created* authority of the Church, which is obvious from two things: first from the fact that the Church does not define anything because it seems right to herself, but *because it seems right to the Holy Spirit*; therefore, if the Church proposes that truth as seeming right to the Holy Spirit, then we hold it on the *sole authority* of the Holy Spirit. . . . Nor is there any difficulty in the instance taken from the canonization of saints. . . . Hence in the canonization of saints it is *plausibly believed* that the Holy Spirit assists so that the Church will not err, as St. Thomas says, but it *does not have the certainty of faith*, as he says in the same place. But it is *certain with the certainty of faith* that the Holy Spirit assists in defining matters of faith and that the definition proceeds from His guidance; hence the assent given to it is not grounded on human, but on *divine*, authority." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De sacra theologia*, q. 1, d. 2, a. 4, n. 8) Later on (283) when we deal with the canonization of saints, we shall see what meaning is to be given to the term "it is plausibly believed", to which John of St. Thomas alludes.

theological precision, as was the case before Molina, it is usually called divine faith.<sup>10</sup>

Obviously, with Granados the germ of the future ecclesiastical faith has advanced one little step forward. In Molina it was still a *theological* or scientific assent. In Granados it is a true faith, but a faith middle between the divine and the human. Only one thing is wanting, the name *ecclesiastical* with which archbishop Péréfixe christened it in Paris later on.

The third forerunner of ecclesiastical faith — but in a rather peculiar way — is the Jesuit Becano. He does not restrict what is known as ecclesiastical faith to virtually revealed truths, but broadens it to include even formally revealed truths, such as the articles of faith. For Becano, the distinction between divine faith and non-divine faith lies not at all in the matter but in the motive. There are three specifically different motives of belief, to wit: *divine* authority, *human* authority, and the authority of the *Church*. If we believe, says Becano, the articles of faith because of divine authority, the act is an act of divine faith. If we believe them because of human authority, the act is an act of human faith. If we believe them because of the Church's

10. "Besides, when the matter with which we are dealing in this section is not treated rigorously it is usual for everybody, without making distinctions in most instances, to call certain as of faith all the propositions defined by the Church because they cannot be denied at least without error, and because they are *altogether proximate to the faith* inasmuch as they are evidently deduced from matters of faith and rest upon infallible testimony, and since what is but a *little distance apart* does not seem to be apart at all, they are thus *recognized* as principles of theology and truths of faith. . . . To the first [objection] the reply is that St. Nazianzen only maintains that propositions *evidently* deduced from Holy Scripture *almost* pertain to the faith because they are a *short distance* away from it. . . . To the second, we reply, from what has just been said, that although the said assent is given without a proper and formal discourse, it does not properly pertain to the faith because it is not grounded immediately on the word of God but on the *authority of the Church*. . . . To its proof we say that there are two ways in which a man can assent to these propositions defined by the Church: one way is by deducing them from the revealed principles, as the Council or the Pope have deduced them, and he who thus deduces them elicits an act of theology, to which such an assent belongs. The other way is *without benefit of discourse* but on account of the *testimony of the Church herself*, and this is the act which is in most instances elicited not only by the unlearned but by the most learned as well; however, it is not elicited by means of an act of divine faith, as has been said, nor by means of the habit of theology inasmuch as it is not discursive, but it pertains to a kind of *human faith possessing utmost certainty* because it is grounded on the infallible *authority of the Church*. This kind of faith is easily perceived in the uneducated, as also that other faith whereby those who are inscribed by the Pope in the number of Saints are believed to have gone to their rest in the Lord and to be enjoying His most happy vision, notwithstanding the highly probable opinion of those authors who think that this truth does not pertain to divine faith but is contained in some other degree of lesser infallibility yet without of certainty." (JACOB GRANADOS, S.J., *Commentarii in Summam Theologicam Sti. Thomae*, vol. 1, q. 1, d. 3, nn. 22-24; Mussiponti 1664).

authority, the act is not an act of divine faith, but of a *faith of a lesser order*, of a faith that is *quasi middle* between purely divine and purely human faith.<sup>11</sup>

The future ecclesiastical faith appears here in clearer relief than in Granada. Becano passed away in 1624, exactly 40 years prior to archbishop Péréfixe's pastoral. Becano's *Summa Theologiae Scholasticae*, one of whose numerous editions was done in Paris itself in 1658, must have been one of

11. You will say: we can still advance further as follows: why do you believe that God has revealed this? Because the Church teaches so. — I answer: if you believe on account of the Church's authority, then it is not the assent of theological faith but an assent of some other inferior order. It will be well to repeat here briefly what I have suggested in ch. I, q. 11, §9, viz., that a distinction can be drawn between three kinds of assent of faith. There is in the first place the assent of *divine* faith, e.g., I believe the articles of faith on the authority of the revealing God: I believe that God has revealed this or that; I believe God who reveals. Then there is the assent of *human* faith, e.g., I believe the articles of faith on the authority of Luther or Calvin. Thirdly, there is the assent of a faith that is *neither purely divine nor purely human*, but *somehow intermediary*, e.g., I believe the articles of faith on the authority of the Church. The first assent, which is the one we are speaking of, is not resolved further but comes to a stop in the revealing God alone. You will say: as God is infallible in revealing so also is the Church in proposing. Therefore the assent grounded on the Church's authority is as infallible as the assent grounded on God's authority. Therefore both assents are assents of divine or theological faith. I answer: God is infallible by his own nature or of himself; the Church is not infallible of herself but in virtue of the assistance and guidance of the Holy Spirit. Hence God's infallibility is of a higher order than the Church's infallibility. For the latter is created and dependent on another, the former is uncreated and independent. I say the same thing of the assent inasmuch as the assent grounded on God's infallibility is infallible in virtue of an uncreated and independent infallibility, whereas the assent grounded on the Church's infallibility is infallible in virtue of a created and dependent infallibility. The former pertains to *divine* faith, the latter does not." (BECANO, *Summa Theologiae Scholasticae*, De Fide, c. 9, q. 8, § 8.) To all the foregoing said by Becano, and repeated today by so many theologians in Becano's wake, Cardinal Cajetan had already given a beautiful answer in these terms: "God's infallibility or authority and the Church's infallibility or authority are two infallibilities or authorities, but they are not two formal motives; they are only one formal motive, which is God's infallible authority, and one applying and explicating condition that applies and explicates the formal motive, and this is the Church's infallible authority. Since the two authorities constitute one formal motive, and that one formal motive is divine, from both authorities there issues but one act, and that act is an act of divine faith." (CAJETAN, *In 2-2*, q. 1, a. 1.) Becano seems to consider God's infallibility and the Church's infallibility as two parallel motives, or as "two men pulling a ship", in Molina's phrase, instead of viewing the Church's infallibility as an instrumental or ministerial cause. "Ministra of the object of faith, . . . whereby the First Truth explicates itself and other credenda." (CAJETAN, *ibid.*) According to Thomist doctrine, the act of the so-called ecclesiastical faith must be expressed as follows: "I believe such a thing because God has revealed that the Church is infallible in teaching it to me." An act formulated in such terms is an act of *divine* faith. It is this faith that is today called *ecclesiastical* faith.

those scholastic works that, as Fénelon wrote, were avidly read by Grandin and his colleagues at the Sorbonne, who were archbishop Péréfixe's consultants in the conference of 1664, where agreement was reached on the name to be given to the faith that was middle between the divine and the human.

Lastly, if not among the forerunners, we might mention among those who have contributed to the modern ecclesiastical faith, all those theologians who concurred with Molina in his contention that theological conclusions can be infallibly defined by the Church, but not as of divine faith. Such were Küber among the great Jesuit theologians, and the *Salmanitanenses* (at least apparently) among the great Thomist theologians. But these theologians belong to the second half of the 17th century and their works are posterior to archbishop Péréfixe's pastoral where ecclesiastical faith is mentioned by name.<sup>12</sup>

233. AMONG THE THOMISTS OF THE 18th CENTURY. — By the beginning of the 18th century mention of ecclesiastical faith is commonplace in a great number of non-Thomist theological works, particularly in Antoine and Tournely.<sup>13</sup>

12 We have not mentioned Suárez among the forerunners of ecclesiastical faith because no man has defended with so much vigour and decision, as Suárez, the proposition that the definitions of the Church concerning the revealed mediate or virtual are deserving of *divine* faith. And yet, very oddly, it was Suárez who, more than any other man, contributed to what today goes by the name of ecclesiastical faith. The reason for it is the fact that Suárez defined the revealed virtual in such a manner that in order to maintain that it could be defined and believed as a truth of divine faith, it would be necessary to have recourse to the theory of new revelations, which is what Suárez did. But since new revelations are inadmissible, the upshot was the view that the definitions of the revealed virtual could not be given divine faith, and consequently, that they deserved nothing but an *ecclesiastical* faith.

13 "Secondly, I say that a dogmatic text's orthodoxy or heterodoxy, once it has been decided by the Church, must be believed at least with *ecclesiastical* faith. For there are three kinds of faith, viz.: *divine* faith which immediately rests on *divine* authority; *human* faith which is immediately based on human authority; and *ecclesiastical* faith which *somehow occupies a middle position*, and rests on the infallible authority of the Church when she defines something with the assistance of the Holy Spirit. This latter act is expressed as follows: 'I most firmly believe that such a passage or such a book is heterodox because the Church has so declared it to be'. It is an *ecclesiastical* faith, and not a merely human faith, because it is an assent most firmly given on account of the Church's infallible authority which is as the intrinsic motive upon which it rests and comes to a halt, . . . But if I should believe that such a passage, which has been condemned as heretical by the Church, is in fact heretical because God who is supremely truthful has in the past revealed that the Church is infallible in approving or condemning dogmatic passages, in that case it would be an act of *divine* faith [very well said!] because it would have the authority of the revealing God for its immediate formal object." (ANTOINE, *Theologia Universalis*, De Fide Divina, sect. 1, a. 7, § 4.) The reader will please note the concession made by Antoine, viz.: that if we believe the Church's infallible



Among Thomists the new faith appears to be considered with misgivings, and its name is not found as yet either in *Contenson*, or in the *Salmanicenses*, or in *Gonet*, or even in *Gotti*. Among classical Thomists, the first who mentions it is *Billuart*, but even he cannot bring himself to say clearly whether dogmatic facts — and it is on this sole occasion that *Billuart* mentions ecclesiastical faith — are worthy only of ecclesiastical faith, or on the contrary, worthy of divine faith. Both in the treatise *On Faith* and in that *On the Incarnation* *Billuart* touches on the problem ex professo, but he contents himself with offering both solutions ("I answer in the first place . . . I answer in the second place . . ."), leaving it to the reader to opt for either.<sup>14</sup>

During the remainder of the 18th century, the more reputable Thomists follow *Billuart's* example; the other theologians, with the exception of *St. Liguori*, *Muzareilly* and a few others, lean gradually towards ecclesiastical faith. They begin by applying it to dogmatic facts and end by extending it also to theological conclusions.<sup>15</sup>

definitions concerning dogmatic facts "because God has revealed that the Church is infallible in this regard", then the act is not an act of ecclesiastical, but of divine faith. But this is the way in which all the faithful believe such definitions by the Church. Consequently, the so-called ecclesiastical faith, as distinct from divine faith, is superfluous.

<sup>14</sup> *Contenson* wrote his *Theologia mentis et cordis* in 1668; the *Salmanicenses* their treatise *De Fide* in 1676; *Gonet* his last work, *Manuale Thomistarum* in 1680; *Gotti* his *Theologia Scholastico-dogmatica* in 1717-1735. Thus they all come after *archbishop Péréfixe*, and *Gotti* is somewhat posterior to *Antoine* and *Tournely*. However, if our memory does not fail us, none of them makes any mention of ecclesiastical faith. *Billuart* published the *Summa St. Thomae* in 1746-51, and he speaks of ecclesiastical faith in the treatise *De Fide*, dissert. 3, a. 7, §3, and in the treatise *De Incarnatione*, dissert. 4, *Digestio secunda historica de Eucharistia*, a. 5, *Solutio objectiones*. *Gazzaniga* expresses himself in these terms: "There is a problem that not too long ago was being debated with great vehemence and which even today is not yet settled, viz. whether the Church is infallible in regard of dogmatic facts at least. The affirmative view is upheld and vigorously defended by a great number of theologians of the century just elapsed. However, they do not quite agree on the kind of faith with which the dogmatic fact is to be believed, whether with divine or only ecclesiastical faith." (*GAZZANIGA, Praelectiones Theologiae, De Fide*, 4, 2, n. 301)

<sup>15</sup> Although not all the propositions condemned by the popes are heretical, but some only temerarious, others erroneous, scandalous, etc., nonetheless, upon being defined by the pope, it must be held as of faith that such propositions are truly temerarious or infected with some other stigma with which the pope has declared them to be tainted. And thus the man who would follow or maintain them as true and lawful would be truly a heretic, as *Viva* correctly says. (*SAINT LIGUORI, Theologia Moralitatis*, lib. 1, n. 104) — "Nevertheless, together with many other theologians I am of the view that it can also be maintained that the definitions of dogmatic facts can be, and are truly an object of theological faith. . . . Although the reasons I am going to present in favour of theological faith are almost evident, nonetheless I am aware of the great regard that should be shown to the view of many learned Catholics who hold the opposite opinion.

The notion of ecclesiastical faith continued to make headway during the 19th century — the first half of which was so unproductive for theology — and what has transpired of the 20th. Today it is accepted by almost every author, if we except the Jesuit *Fr. Schiffini* and the Dominican *Fr. Tuyvaerts*, both of whom combat it ex professo, and the well-known *Fr. Gardel*, and a few others, who do not oppose it directly but nonetheless clearly indicate their distaste for it.

We believe that the foregoing roughly sketches the true history of ecclesiastical faith.<sup>16</sup>

234. PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT STUDY. — Throughout this whole chapter we shall be examining, with as much conciseness as we can muster, the so-called ecclesiastical faith. However, we are not concerned with the modern name *ecclesiastical faith*, but with its true nature. We intend to find out, in the light of the teachings and principles of *St. Thomas* whether ecclesiastical faith is specifically distinct from divine faith, or, on the contrary, whether it is the self-same divine faith under a new label and with purely accidental differences. The issue is one of extreme gravity, since what is not truly and specifically divine — call it ecclesiastical or civil — differs essentially and infinitely from what is essentially and truly divine. The difference between the truly divine and the truly not divine can never be a difference of degree, it is a difference of species, or even of genus; nay, more than a difference of genus, it is the radical and infinite difference that separates God from the creature.

For this reason I am satisfied with the assurance that the opinion I have embraced is very probable." (*MUZARELLY, Un fait dogmatique décidé par l'Eglise est il objet de foi catholique?*, translated from the Italian, Avignon 1826)

<sup>16</sup> Thesis XVIII: The faith, which by some people is called *ecclesiastical* because it proximately rests upon the infallible magisterium of the Church whether considered in itself or in its object, is not to be distinguished from *infused and theological faith*. (*SCHIFFINI, De Viribus Infusis*, n. 127) — "We are justified in concluding that the magisterium has not been given to the Church except for the purpose of teaching what God has revealed without ever going beyond it, and that, consequently, everything that the Church teaches must be believed with *divine faith* so much so that there is no room for a pretended *ecclesiastical faith*." (*TUYVAERTS, L'évolution du dogme*, c. 3, a. 5, p. 122) — "This interpretation makes it unnecessary for me to appeal to what has been called *ecclesiastical faith*, a new name and reality, unknown to *Thomist theology*, a kind of *fourth theological virtue* invented to signify the assent to common theological conclusions, or better still to those that are supported by an infallible act of ecclesiastical authority, e.g. the condemnation of a proposition." (*GARDEL, Le Dogme révélé*, 2nd ed., p. 186) We think that the notion of an ecclesiastical faith, specifically distinct from divine faith, which *Fr. Gardel* so justly criticizes, will gradually disappear from theological handbooks, at least from those that are truly Thomist.

235. OUR STARTING POINT. — In dealing with this issue we take for our starting point the principles of St. Thomas, or those principles that are admitted by all, or almost all, theologians.

All theologians admit — since it is now a dogma of faith — that all formally or immediately revealed truths can be defined by the Church as of divine or Catholic faith, and not merely as of ecclesiastical faith. Hence, in this discussion of ecclesiastical faith we are not concerned with formally or immediately revealed truths, but only with mediately or virtually revealed truths.

All, or almost all, theologians also admit that the Sacred Congregations are not infallible when they teach aside from the pope. Likewise, that the pope himself is not infallible when he teaches without any intention of defining *ex cathedra*. Thus, when speaking of ecclesiastical faith, we are not speaking of the faith given to the non-infallible teachings of the Church, which is commonly denominated "religious assent". What we have to do here is with the faith given to the Church's infallible teachings or definitions.

Finally, all, or almost all, theologians admit that the proposition that the infallibility of the Church extends to the mediately or virtually revealed is a truth of *divine* faith already defined by the ordinary or practical magisterium, or at least, that it is a truly *revealed* truth and thus definable as of divine faith.<sup>17</sup>

Consequently, whenever mention is made of ecclesiastical faith we understand by this term the assent that is due to those truths that are: (a) virtually revealed; (b) infallibly defined by the Church; (c) whose infallibility, the Church's, is established by divine revelation.

236. CRITERIA FOR SOLVING THE ISSUE. — The essential or specific distinction between two habits can come only from either of these two sources: (a) the formal object; (b) the formal motive.

<sup>17</sup>"Indeed such infallibility [relative to the virtually or mediately revealed] is most certainly gathered from the revealed principles, and furthermore it is by many also held as formally revealed, albeit it has not yet been *authentically* proposed as a dogma of divine faith." (Card. BILLOT *De Ecclesia Christi*, th. 17, §2) — "In the view of many also a heresy, although to date it has not yet been condemned *explicitly* as a heresy." (FRANZELIN, *De Traditione*, th. 12) — "This infallible authority is a truth *revealed* by God. . . . It is not a defined truth of faith. . . . It is assuredly *definable*." (CHOUPIN, *Valeur des décisions doctrinales et disciplinaires du Saint-Siège*, pp. 22-47) — "If any one says that the Church's infallibility is restricted exclusively to the things contained in divine revelation [formal revelation or that which is revealed *in itself*] and does not extend to other truths that are necessarily required in order to safeguard the deposit of revelation in its integrity: *let him be anathema*." (VATICAN COUNCIL I, Schema of the dogmatic constitution on the Church of Christ, can. 9)

The formal object of divine faith is that which is *truly revealed by God*. The formal motive of divine faith is the *divine authority* of the revealing God. We do not believe with divine faith anything but what God has revealed, and we believe what God has revealed because of the divine authority inherent in, and due to, the word of God.

Consequently, all the criteria employed in finding out whether ecclesiastical faith is divine faith, or not, are reducible to two: (a) Is the object of ecclesiastical faith, viz., the mediately revealed, truly revealed or not? If it is, it deserves divine faith. If it is not, it neither deserves nor can be given divine faith. (b) Is the authority of the Church, when she defines the mediately revealed, truly divine authority or not? If it is, it deserves divine faith. If it is not, it neither deserves nor can ever be given divine faith, but only a faith of an inferior order, essentially distinct from divine faith.

237. OUR OPINION. — It is our opinion, or better still, our most deeply held conviction, that, in accordance with the teaching and principles of St. Thomas, the revealed mediate or virtual is implicitly and really revealed; that the authority whereby the Church infallibly defines the virtually or mediately revealed, whether doctrines or facts, is really and truly a divine authority; that the so-called ecclesiastical faith that we give or ought to give to such definitions does not differ essentially, but only accidentally, from the divine or Catholic faith that we give to the definitions of the formally revealed. In short, we hold that *ecclesiastical faith is divine faith*, and not a human faith, nor a faith midway between the divine and the human faith.

In the following sections we will state as clearly and concisely as possible both the principles of St. Thomas, and the theological arguments on which we ground our conviction.

## SECTION II

### THE SO-CALLED ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH AND THE THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS

238. — In this section we will attempt to make it clear that, in the light of the teaching of St. Thomas, the so-called *ecclesiastical faith* given to theological conclusions *infallibly* defined by the Church is truly a *divine* faith, of the same species as the faith given to the articles of faith.

We will present in the first place some proofs taken literally from St. Thomas, and then we will introduce others taken from theological reasoning. We will always begin by stating these proofs in the form of a concise argument with a view to stating them clearly.

239. FIRST PROOF. — The ecclesiastical faith is an infallible faith. Now, no infallible faith is possible unless its formal motive is the word of God.

Therefore, the formal motive of ecclesiastical faith is the word of God. Which is to say: therefore, ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

The major of this argument is admitted by all, since that is what we mean by ecclesiastical faith. The key to this whole issue lies in the minor testimony of either man or angel will not lead us infallibly to the truth, unless the testimony of God is considered to exist in it." Which is to say in plain language: "No man — patriarch, prophet, apostle, or pope —, and no angel or any other creature, deserves infallible faith unless their word is at the same time truly the word of God."

This text is clear enough. But since the most obvious texts are liable to doubts, cavils and subterfuge when taken off their true and integral context, we shall take the liberty of transcribing almost entirely St. Thomas's article where those words are found. The article in question is the eighth of the fourteenth question of the Disputed Questions on Truth. Question XIV is wholly devoted to divine faith. The title of article 8 reads: "Whether the First Truth is the proper object of faith." This is the same as asking whether the formal motive of divine faith is the word of God. The holy Doctor answers:

"I answer that it must be said that the First Truth is the per se object of faith. This can be made clear thus. No habit has the nature of virtue unless it be a habit whose act is always good. For otherwise it would not be the perfection of a power. Now, since the act of the intellect is good inasmuch as it considers what is true, it follows that no habit existing in the intellect can be a virtue unless it be such that by it truth is infallibly held. For this reason it is said in Ethics VI that opinion is not an intellectual virtue, whereas science and understanding are such.

"Now, faith is not counted as a virtue on the strength of the evidence of things because faith is of things that are not evident. Hence, it follows that it is counted as a virtue because it adheres to a testimony in which truth is infallibly to be found.

"Now, just as created esse is of itself empty and defectible unless it be held together by uncreated esse, so all created truth is defectible unless it be rectified by uncreated truth.

"Hence, the assent given to the word of either a man [e.g., the pope or the council] or an angel will not lead infallibly to the truth except insofar as we take into account the testimony of God who speaks in them.

"Thus, it is necessary that the faith which is counted as a virtue [that is any faith whereby truth is infallibly held, as said earlier] should make the intellect of man adhere to the truth which rests upon divine knowledge, transcending the truth of his own intellect . . .

"And consequently, faith, which through assent unites man to the divine knowledge, has God himself as its principal object, and any other things as consequently adjoined."<sup>18</sup>

"Hence, the First Truth is related to faith [to any faith "whereby truth is infallibly held"] as its medium and its object."<sup>19</sup>

We recommend to all our readers, especially to any Thomist reader, the reading and rereading, the analysis and meditation on this article of St. Thomas. It is a fundamental article from the treatise on Faith. In it St. Thomas lays the foundation of the whole treatise by proving that the formal object or formal motive of any infallible faith must of necessity be the divine testimony.

The kernel of the article is found in this proposition: "There is no infallible faith without an infallible testimony", and there is no infallible testimony except the testimony of God." That is exactly the minor premise of our argument, which we intended to prove.

For those who are unfamiliar with the language of St. Thomas the aforesaid article can be synthesized in the following propositions:

1. Divine faith is an intellectual virtue.
2. It cannot be an intellectual virtue if it does not always incline to the truth.
3. It cannot incline always to the truth if it does not have for its formal motive an infallible testimony.
4. It cannot have for its formal motive an infallible testimony if its formal motive is not the very testimony of God.
5. Therefore divine faith has for its formal motive the testimony of God, that is, the First Truth.

We ask the reader to turn his attention to the fourth proposition. This proposition is the basis of St. Thomas's reasoning. If it is denied or distinguished, the conclusion and the whole article collapse altogether. On the other hand, if it is admitted without reservations, as it should be admitted, then we have the proof required to establish that all infallible faith, and consequently, also the ecclesiastical faith, is divine faith.

<sup>18</sup> ST. THOMAS, loc. cit.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., ad 9.

The proof of the fourth proposition is given by St. Thomas in these beautiful words: "Just as *created esse* is of itself empty and *defectible* unless it be held together by *uncreated esse*, so all *created truth* is *defectible* unless it be rectified by *uncreated truth*."

Having laid down this principle, which is obvious, the holy Doctor argues thus: either faith has for its formal motive the *created truth* as it is in itself, in which case it is not an *infallible*, and consequently, not a *divine* faith; or it has for its formal motive the *created truth* insofar as it is rectified by the *uncreated Truth*, in which case its true formal motive is not the *created truth*, but the *uncreated Truth*, and consequently it is a *divine* faith.

If we apply this same teaching of St. Thomas to the *ecclesiastical* faith, it will be seen that the *ecclesiastical* faith is a *divine* faith. The matter is crystal clear. We say that *ecclesiastical* faith has for its formal motive the *authority of the Church*. Let us now apply St. Thomas's reasoning. The Church's authority is either a *created authority not rectified* by *uncreated authority*, or it is a *created authority rectified* by *uncreated authority*. If the former, then it is not an *infallible* faith, and hence, not the *ecclesiastical* faith in question. If the latter, then, in St. Thomas's view, to say that the formal motive is the *created truth* as *rectified by the uncreated Truth* is the same as saying that the formal motive is the *uncreated Truth*, and consequently it is a *divine* faith.

Readers who have grown used to the specific distinction between *divine* faith and *infallible* faith, as propounded in modern textbooks, will undoubtedly either deny or distinguish some of those propositions on which St. Thomas's argument is grounded. The force of schooling and habit is very great indeed, and, when it is supported by these two, imagination is a very fertile source of distinctions and evasions. However, it is not our concern at present to demonstrate whether or not what St. Thomas says is true, but simply to show that St. Thomas did in fact say it.

We urge every sincere Thomist to look up the passages parallel to the one quoted.<sup>20</sup>

In article 2 of a parallel passage in the Commentary on the Sentences the following text is found: "The believer believes in a *man* [prophet, apostle, pope, or council] not insofar as he is a *man*, but insofar as *God* speaks in him."<sup>21</sup>

In article 4, *ibid.*, we read as follows: "The reason [i.e., the *formal motive*] inclining the will to believe the articles is the *First Truth itself*, which

<sup>20</sup> *In 3 Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, aa. 2, and 4; *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q. 1, a. 1, q. 4, a. 5.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* ad 3.

is *infallible*; but the *reason* that inclines to believe *other things* is either some *fallible* token, or the word of some knower who is *capable* both of *being deceived* and of *deceiving*. Hence, in the case of the intellect assenting to *other believables*, the intellect is not endowed with *infallible truth* by the will; but it is *endowed by the will with infallible truth* when it believes the *articles of faith*; and on account of this the latter faith is a virtue but not so the former."<sup>22</sup>

In St. Thomas's thinking there can be no middle term between *created* and *uncreated* being, and every being is either *created* or *uncreated*. In like manner, there can be no specific compounds or middle terms between *created* and *uncreated* truth, or between *human* and *divine authority* or *faith*. Any authority is either specifically human or specifically divine. Any human authority that is not rectified or guaranteed completely by divine authority is a *fallible* authority; hence the corresponding faith is specifically a human and a *fallible* faith, whether we call it *civil* or *ecclesiastical*. On the other hand, whenever the human authority is rectified and guaranteed completely by divine authority — and such is the case of every *infallible* definition by the Church — then, according to St. Thomas, the authority is specifically *divine*, and when we give it our assent we do not *formally* assent to the word of *man*, but to the word of *God* whose divine authority envelops, or rectifies, or guarantees, or divinizes the word of the Church in each and every one of her *infallible* definitions. Such is the meaning of the aforementioned passage of the holy Doctor: "Just as *created being* is of itself empty and defectible unless it be held together by *uncreated being*, so all *created truth* is defectible unless it be rectified by *uncreated Truth*. Hence, the assent given to the word of either a man or an angel will not lead *infallibly to the truth*, except insofar as we take into account the word of *God who speaks in them*."<sup>23</sup>

We ask the reader never to forget this fundamental principle laid down by St. Thomas: No *infallible* faith is possible unless its formal motive is the *word of God*. And this is exactly tantamount to saying: all *ecclesiastical* faith is *divine* faith, or else it is not *infallible*.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* sol. 1 ad 2.

<sup>23</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> It might probably occur to someone to raise the objection that St. Thomas (*Quodlibetum* 9, a. 16) expressly admits that the Church is *infallible* in the canonization of saints, and yet nonetheless he does not affirm that it is of *divine* faith, but simply of *pious* faith: "It must be piously believed." Therefore for St. Thomas *infallible* faith is not the same as *divine* faith.

We will examine at length this objection and other similar ones when we come to deal particularly with the canonization of saints. In the meantime we ask every Thomist

Ever since in modern times theologians began to distinguish between definitions of divine faith and merely infallible definitions, a number of them have taken to considering the latter as something of little account, or as pronouncements that the Church makes rather frequently. Thus every time that the Holy See addresses a doctrinal document to the whole Church, one can safely predict that some theologian is bound to raise the question whether such a document is infallible or not. Often the question is resolved by some theologians in the affirmative and by others in the negative. Whereupon we are left in the dark much the same as before, since any document whose infallibility is not evident but dubious or debatable, is not infallibly certain, or at least not infallibly certain for all practical purposes. We believe that in such disputes two things are often overlooked. The first is that, far from being

to take notice of the radical difference between the two propositions that follow: *First*, "It is *piously believable* or theologically *certain* that the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints". Second, "It is *infallibly certain* that the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints". When St. Thomas spoke of this particular problem the canonization of saints, he affirmed the first proposition, and this is what is meant by the phrase "it must be piously believed". But he neither affirmed nor denied expressly the second proposition. If he had affirmed the second proposition, that would have been equivalent to affirming that the canonization of saints is of *divine* faith, since for St. Thomas *infallible* faith is the same as *divine* faith.

Now then, that which St. Thomas did not affirm with respect to the canonization of saints, both he and all his commentators prior to the Salamancenses have always affirmed with respect to the *theological conclusions*. And today, after the Jansenist debates, all or almost all theologians affirm it with respect to *dogmatic facts*, viz., that the Church's infallibility with respect to such matters is not only *certain* but also *infallibly certain*, and even *proximately definable as of divine faith*, if it has not already been defined by the ordinary magisterium. And our line of reasoning is that, according to St. Thomas, in matters of faith and testimony *infallible certainty* is impossible without *divine testimony*, and where there is divine testimony there is *divine* faith, and not merely a human or ecclesiastical faith.

What could be debated today in this regard, although it is an issue entirely accidental to the subject with which we are dealing in this section, is whether something more than St. Thomas's "it must be piously believed" ought to be affirmed with respect to the canonization of saints, to wit, something equivalent to what St. Thomas affirmed relative to theological conclusions, and to what almost all theologians affirm today relative to dogmatic facts, viz., that the Church's infallibility in such matters is not only already *certain*, but also *infallibly certain*, and consequently that they are definable as of *divine faith*. We shall deal with this question in due time. It is our view that the question of the canonization of saints is but a particular instance of the general question concerning dogmatic facts, just as the question of dogmatic facts is but a particular instance of the more general question concerning theological conclusions, or those things that are necessarily connected with the revealed deposit or are necessary for its conservation. We think that the decisions of the Church against the Jansenists and the document of the Vatican Council have shed abundant light on these matters.

commonplace or frequent in papal pronouncements, infallible definitions occur rarely, or even *very rarely*. Cardinal Van Rossum very wisely observes: "It must be said that the Supreme Pontiff *rarely*, better still, *very rarely* employs his extraordinary magisterial authority or *infallibility*."<sup>25</sup> The second is that no papal document must be taken as an infallible definition so long as there is no evidence that it is so. The provision of the new Code of Canon Law with respect to dogmatic definitions must likewise be applied to infallible definitions, since the reason is the same for both: "Nothing shall be understood to have been declared or defined *dogmatically* unless this be established by manifest evidence."<sup>26</sup>

The tendency manifested by some to regard all papal doctrinal documents as infallible is not always a sign of abundant faith and obedience to the Church. On the contrary, it may sometimes betray a want of obedience and faith, for such an attitude comes from the view that the teachings of the Church merit neither faith nor obedience unless they are infallible. Granting that they do not merit divine or infallible faith, nonetheless they do merit a human faith — one that is both internal and certain — so long as there is no evident proof, and the eventuality of such a proof would be rare, that the Church has in fact erred. This human faith which we give to the non-infallible teachings of the Church is known today by the name of *pious assent*. It is this human faith that should be called *ecclesiastical faith* in the same manner that we call ecclesiastical laws the human and changeable laws promulgated by the Church to distinguish them from those laws that are truly divine and unchangeable.

240. THE SECOND ARGUMENT, taken likewise from St. Thomas, to prove that the so-called ecclesiastical faith is truly a divine faith, can be formulated thus:

Everything that has been truly *said by God*, or is merely an *explication* of what God has said, is definable as a truth of *divine* faith and merits the assent of divine faith after it has been defined.

Now, anything that is revealed in a mediate or consequential manner is truly *said by God*, or is merely an *explication* of what God has said.

Therefore, the faith that is to be given to the mediately or consequentially revealed after its definition by the Church is a divine faith. Or, in other words, ecclesiastical faith is *divine faith*.

The major premise is common teaching among theologians. By the way, the reader should take note of the manner how we have formulated this

<sup>25</sup> *De Essentia Sacramenti Ordinis*, n.415, Friburgi Brigisoviae 1914.

<sup>26</sup> Canon 1323, 3. Of the old or pre-Vatican II Code x. — *Transl.*

major premise and how it ought to be formulated, if we are truthfully to label it as *common teaching*. If instead of saying "definable as a truth of faith," we were to say, as the textbooks frequently say, that it is "of faith" (i.e., *formally* a truth of faith) even *prior* to its definition by the Church, then the major would not state the common teaching, but the particular teaching of Vázquez and Vega, whose views have been constantly opposed by the Thomist school. But this is totally incidental to our present concern. The essential thing is that the major, as formulated by us, embodies the common teaching of theologians.

The minor premise, which is the key premise on which the whole issue turns, is the express teaching of St. Thomas, which is repeated by the holy Doctor in different places and in different forms. Let us quote some passages, beginning with the article in which the holy Doctor examines precisely the problem whether true dogmatic progress is possible. The title of the article reads: "Whether faith has progressed with the passing of time." Answering the fourth objection, he says:

"To the fourth objection it must be said that the article is an *invisible* truth with respect to what is *actually explicated* in the article, but it is divisible [capable of explication, of development] with respect to those things that are *contained potentially* in the article, insofar as he who *says one thing* somehow *says many things*, and these are the things that *precede* the article or *follow* it; and in this regard the article of faith is capable of *explication* and *division*."<sup>27</sup>

In this passage St. Thomas clearly says the two things affirmed in our minor premise, to wit: first, that what *God has truly said* comprises not only the articles or the formally revealed, but also all the consequences of those articles (the things that follow it), i.e. the mediately revealed. Second, that these consequences are nothing but the *explication* of the articles ("And in this regard the article of faith is capable of *explication* and *division*").

Here is another similar and no less expressive text: "There are two ways of *explicating the articles of faith*. One is with respect to the substance itself of the articles, insofar as a man knows the *articles themselves* distinctly; the other is with respect to the *things implicitly contained in the articles themselves*, and this takes place when a man knows the *things that follow from the articles*."<sup>28</sup>

In this passage the holy Doctor affirms once more that the mediate or consequential ("those things that *follow from the articles*") is truly *implicit*

<sup>27</sup>In 3 Sent. d.25, q.2, a.2, ad 4.

<sup>28</sup>Loc. cit., d.25, q.2, a.1, sol 3.

in the articles of faith or in the word of God ("things *implicitly* contained in the articles themselves"), and thus is simply an *explication* of what God has said ("explicating the articles of faith"). Hence, both the theologian who fallibly deduces those consequences, and the Church who defines them infallibly, are engaged in no other task but that of *explicating* what God has already said implicitly. There is but one difference between them: the explication done by the theologian carries *human* authority, that done by the Church carries *divine* authority.

Here is a third passage equally or possibly more expressive than the two previous ones. "That which is contained in an article can be explicated in two ways. The first occurs in the case where one article is contained in another, or two articles in one common to both, as for instance, the resurrection of the dead is somehow contained in the Resurrection of Christ, and the Passion and the Incarnation are contained in this common article which is the Mystery of Redemption. And in this manner *implicit* faith is explicated in determinate articles of faith. *This explication has been completed by Christ*; hence nothing may be added or subtracted from his teaching with regard to the essentials of faith, as the last chapter of the Revelation declares. But prior to the coming of Christ this explication was not yet completed, and consequently it continued to grow at different times, even with respect to the elders."

In this text the holy Doctor refers to the development of some *articles* into other *articles* which took place in the Old Testament, and which can no longer take place in the New Testament. Subsequently he speaks of the development of the *articles* into their *consequences*. This is the development which is still possible in the New Testament. The holy Doctor continues:

"The other way occurs in the case where that which is contained in the article is not an article but something *concomitant* to the article, and in *this regard* the faith can be *explicated day by day*, and has been in fact *more and more explicated* through the efforts of the Fathers (the ecumenical council Fathers)."<sup>29</sup> "Since *faith* does of itself sufficiently incline to all the things that are *concomitant* to the faith, or *precede*, or *follow from* it."<sup>30</sup> When St. Thomas speaks of the *consequences* of the articles, he obviously takes the term to mean not only the improper, but also the proper consequences, i.e. anything whose denial would entail the denial of something directly revealed: "those things that are *potentially* contained in the article." (466-469)

<sup>29</sup>Loc. cit., d.25, q.2, a.2.

<sup>30</sup>Loc. cit., d.24 q.1, a.2, sol.2.

Thus, the true object of ecclesiastical faith is something implicitly said by God. Consequently, ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.<sup>31</sup>

241. THIRD PROOF. — No man is truly a heretic unless he denies something that truly is of *divine faith*.

Now, according to St. Thomas, he who denies a truth mediately, or consequentially, or indirectly revealed, after its infallible definition by the Church, is truly a heretic.

Therefore, according to St. Thomas, ecclesiastical faith is truly *divine faith*.

The major premise is obvious and admitted by everybody. The minor premise is a proposition expressly and frequently affirmed by St. Thomas whenever he deals with any of these two questions: (a) "Whether it is allowable to have a contrary opinion of the Notions"; (b) "Whether heresy properly concerns the things that are of faith."

We briefly quote some passages: "The same judgment applies to the latter [the indirectly revealed] and to the former [the directly revealed], *videlicet* the one follows from the other."<sup>32</sup> "In such a matter no error is possible without heresy."<sup>33</sup> "And on this account, many things are now considered as heretical, which heretofore were not reputed as such, because it is now much more evident what consequences follow therefrom."<sup>34</sup> "He who would resist such an ordination would be considered a heretic."<sup>34</sup>

242. A REMARK. — Someone might remark that if this teaching of St. Thomas is held as true, then it would follow that a man is to be considered a

<sup>31</sup>The following parallel passage from St. Thomas is also worthy of attention. "Faith can be said to be a proof in three ways. First, inasmuch as faith itself makes another thing manifest [and this happens in two ways] either insofar as one article manifests another article, as e.g., the resurrection of the dead manifests the future resurrection, or insofar as from the articles themselves some other things are SYLLOGIZED in theology." *In 3 Sent.*, d.23, q.2, a.1, ad 4) A comparison between the *either*. . . or. . . clear that by the other way, i.e. by the indirectly or potentially revealed, the holy Doctor understands not only that which is secondary in the Holy Scriptures but also the *theological conclusions* in the proper sense: "Insofar as from the articles themselves some other things are syllogized in theology." The term *are syllogized* indicates one of two channels, the speculative channel, whereby the primitive datum has developed or explicated itself, or evolved homogeneously.

<sup>32</sup>*In 1 Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5

<sup>33</sup>*Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.32, a.4

<sup>34</sup>*Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.11, a.2, ad 3.

heretic not only if he denies what the Church defines as a truth of *Catholic faith*, but also if he denies what the Church defines as an *infallible truth*.

The answer to such a remark is that no man is *formally a heretic* on the mere teaching of St. Thomas, but on the word or teaching of the *Church*. As of now the Church teaches that he who denies anything defined as truth of *Catholic faith* is a heretic; but she does not teach as yet that he who denies anything defined as an *infallible truth* is a heretic.

But it is one thing to say that the Church does not teach it as yet, and quite another to say that she might not teach it some day. The following dogmatic canon was already prepared for consideration in the Vatican Council: "If anyone should say that the Church's infallibility is exclusively restricted to those things that are contained in divine revelation [i.e., *formal revelation*], and that it does not extend itself also to other truths that are necessarily required in order to safeguard the whole deposit of revelation: *let him be anathema*."<sup>35</sup>

The suspension of the Vatican Council precluded it from discussing this dogmatic canon that was already prepared. If and when, perhaps in the not distant future, the Church should resume the suspended council, and should approve or define the aforesaid dogmatic canon, it shall be a truth of *divine faith* that the Church is infallible in the definition of the consequentially revealed, or what amounts to the same thing, that anything consequentially revealed is infallibly true upon its definition by the Church. Consequently, it shall have been defined that it is *heretical* to deny that the Church is infallible in defining what is consequentially contained in revelation, or what is equivalent, that the consequentially revealed is infallibly true upon its definition by the Church.

Since the mediately or consequentially revealed, upon being infallibly defined by the Church, is precisely the proper object of the so-called ecclesiastical faith, it follows that if and when, in the not distant future, the Church should define the aforesaid dogmatic canon, she will have indirectly defined that the so-called ecclesiastical faith is truly a divine faith. To define as of divine faith that the Church is infallible in her definition of the mediately revealed is the same as to define as of divine faith that the mediately revealed is infallibly true once it is defined, and the same as to define that it is obligatory to give the assent of *divine faith* to the truth of the mediately revealed once it is defined by the Church.

Let us add that in the past the Church has actually defined as dogmas of divine faith a great number of theological conclusions and dogmatic facts.

<sup>35</sup>*Schema Constitutionis dogmaticae de Ecclesia Christi*, can. 9.

This has always been recognized by traditional theology, and is obvious from the history of dogmas.<sup>36</sup>

243. FOURTH PROOF. — Every theological conclusion deduced from two formally revealed premises is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not only as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

Now, every theological conclusion deduced from one formally revealed premise and another of natural reason, is of the same specific nature as that which is deduced from two formally revealed premises.

Therefore, every truly theological conclusion is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not only as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

The major premise is commonly admitted by theologians. The minor premise is the common and constant teaching of St. Thomas and all Thomists. It is based on the specific and indivisible unity of sacred theology, and hence of all its conclusions, whether inferred from premises that are both of faith or from premises one of which is of faith and the other of reason. "Theology is one according to ultimate species, whether it proceeds from premises that are both of faith, or one of faith and another of natural reason, whether it considers speculative or moral matters. This proposition is taken from St. Thomas."<sup>37</sup>

<sup>36</sup>Someone might perhaps come up with the opposite observation, viz., that anyone who denies the conclusion even prior to its definition by the Church is a heretic, since St. Thomas expressly says "after it has become manifest, and especially if it be determined by the Church." (*Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 32, a. 4) To this objection the distinguished commentator Philip of the Most Holy Trinity replies with as much profundity as clarity in these terms:

"To [the difficulty taken from] St. Thomas (*Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 32 a. 4) it should be said that his meaning is that a man commits an error in the faith when he denies something from which there follows something contrary to the faith, not because he denies it, but because he is persuaded that from its denial there necessarily follows the denial of something that is of faith. But he would not commit such an error if being led only by his own reasoning he should suspend judgment and think, as he ought to, that he could be deficient in his reasoning: for no matter how evident it appears to be it is nonetheless not altogether infallible; thus it might indeed be sufficient for the certainty of science, but not for the certainty of faith, which is greater. And for this reason St. Thomas added: 'Principally if it be determined by the Church', in order to show that an error in the faith is absolutely committed by anyone who denies something contrary to the faith; but that such an error is not committed absolutely, but only in the sense already explained, by anyone who denies something such that from its denial he infers through his own reasoning something contrary to the faith." (PHILIPPUS A STA. TRINITATE, *Disputationes Theologicae*, t. 1, pp. 28-29, Lugduni 1653) Cajetan, Porrecta, and the other commentators express themselves in the same vein.

<sup>37</sup>JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Curus Theologicus*, t. 1, d. 2, n. 7.

The view held by those who think that there exists a specific distinction between conclusions deduced from two premises of faith on the one hand, and conclusions deduced from one premise of faith and one of natural reason on the other hand, is traceable to the fact that such persons are used to considering this and many other similar issues from a merely material viewpoint. They overlook the fact that the nature and specific distinction of cognitive habits stem not from the matter or reality of the thing known, but from the formal medium of knowing. Now, either the formal medium of knowing some conclusions is distinct from the formal medium of knowing other conclusions, or it is one and the same in both cases. If it is distinct, then it will be necessary to distinguish various species of theology against the clear and constant doctrine of St. Thomas. If it is one and the same, then it is impossible that some conclusions should be definable as of divine faith while others are not. Since divine faith is specifically distinct from theology, to be definable as of divine faith, or not, constitutes a different species.

There are those who think they can evade the horns of this inescapable dilemma by distinguishing a la Vázquez between conclusions as conclusions and the same conclusions as truths or consequents. Or, to employ the stock terms: conclusions taken formally and conclusions taken specifically. With this distinction the stock answer is that conclusions deduced from two premises of faith are definable as truths of faith taken specifically, i.e. inasmuch as they embody revealed truths; but not if they are taken formally, i.e. precisely as deduced conclusions. Hence the further distinction of two assents: one is the assent given to the conclusion taken formally or precisely as a conclusion, and this is the theological assent; the other is the assent given to the conclusion taken specifically or precisely as a revealed truth, and this is, they say, the assent of divine faith.

To this we answer, in the first place, that if the distinction of the two assents, one theological and another of divine faith, is valid for conclusions deduced from two premises of faith, it is equally valid for conclusions deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason. Both the former and the latter are known through reasoning, and neither the former nor the latter can be known without reasoning. Consequently, if it is possible in some cases to prescind from reasoning for the giving of assent, it should be equally possible to do likewise in all cases.

In the second and principal place, it is possible to consider one and the same conclusion under two different aspects, and therefore to give it two specifically different assents, only when that conclusion can be known by us through two specifically distinct mediums, that is to say, when it can be known by us either without reasoning or with reasoning. This happens when a truth is contained explicitly or without reasoning in one part of the deposit, and also contained virtually or with reasoning in another part of the deposit,



as for instance, in the case of God's eternity. It also happens when we know a truth through the Church's definition or without reasoning, and also through theological deduction or reasoning, as in the case of the two wills in Christ.

But when we cannot know a truth except through *deductive reasoning*, and hence when such a truth is known by us through only one medium of knowing, i.e. as a *conclusion*, it is an absurdity in Thomist doctrine to say that such a truth can be given *two assents*. If it is not known except as a conclusion, it cannot be given any assent other than the assent corresponding to a conclusion, which is to say, theological assent, whether it is deduced from two premises of faith or from one of faith and one of reason. "There is no such thing as *two assents* to a conclusion, one given to it considered by itself, another given to it considered as inferred, because the *conclusion*, whether *considered by itself or as inferred*, always belongs to the same habit, viz. *science*."<sup>38</sup> "But with respect to the *conclusions* themselves there is but *one assent*, which belongs to *theology*, and by which the mind is led to the *conclusions considered both inferentially and entitatively*."<sup>39</sup> This is an elementary and constant teaching in the Thomist school with but one exception, the Salmanticenses, on account of their failure to unravel the Suarezian confusion relative to the revealed virtual.<sup>40</sup>

Thus, prior to the Church's definition, every true theological conclusion, whether inferred from two premises of faith or from one of faith and

38. GOTTI, *Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica*, t.1, tt.1, q.2, dub.3, n.14.

39. BANCEL, *Brevi Universae Theologiae Cursus*, q.111, De Sacra Theologia, a.9,

52.

40. With regard to conclusions deducible from two premises of faith two assertions are made today by many theologians, including even some Thomist authors:

1. that such conclusions are theological conclusions *improperly speaking*;
2. that they are formally of divine faith and can be given the assent of divine faith *before* they are defined, by anyone who comes to know them with evidence.

Both assertions are certainly antithomist. According to Thomist doctrine, such conclusions not only are theological conclusions properly speaking but they are even much more properly theological conclusions than those deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason. All Thomists, including the Salmanticenses, are unanimous on this point. Furthermore, according to Thomist doctrine, such conclusions are not formally of divine faith, nor can they be worthy of being given the assent of divine faith by anyone for so long as they are not defined by either the solemn or the ordinary magisterium of the Church. On this point too all Thomists are agreed, with the exception of the Salmanticenses.

It would be easy to prove both these points to the hilt with passages ready to the hand. But since all theologians admit the *definability* of such conclusions, and this is the only thing that matters for the problem of the evolution of dogma, we will set it aside for the moment.

one of reason, is known through the sole medium of theology, i.e., through *revelation unfolded by reason*. After the Church's definition, they are *all* known also through *another* new medium, i.e. through *revelation unfolded by the Church*, which is the medium of divine faith. Hence, prior to the Church's definition, all such true conclusions merit one and the same assent, viz. theological assent, but in no case the assent of divine faith. After the Church's definition they merit two specifically different assents: theological assent, and the assent of divine faith.

This is the only theory that maintains these two fundamental theses of St. Thomas: (a) the *specific unity* of sacred theology; and hence of all truly theological conclusions; (b) the *specific distinction* between theology and divine faith.

244. FIFTH PROOF. — Anything that is *truly identical* with the divine deposit, or anything that is *of the essence* of the revealed deposit, is definable as a truth of divine faith.

Now, every conclusion that is truly and rigorously theological has to be really identical with, or of the essence of, the revealed deposit.

Therefore, every truly and rigorously theological conclusion is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not only as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

The major premise is admitted by almost every theologian both ancient and modern. It describes precisely what Suárez and Lugo termed the *formal confused*, and what the *moderns usually designate as the virtual implicit*, or *virtual identical*, or the *connexive-essential* virtual. (73)

The minor premise has been proven in many previous sections. (109) For the present suffice it to recall to mind the following: no conclusion is rigorously theological if it is bereft of theological certitude; no conclusion can have theological certitude if, absolutely speaking, it is possible for it to be false; absolutely speaking, it is possible for any conclusion to be false if it is not deduced through a link of real identity or of essential connexion; therefore, where no link of real identity or of essential connexion exists, no truly and rigorously theological conclusion exists.

Anyone who doubts this has the remedy at hand. Let him present just one argument of which the conclusion is *absolutely certain* despite the fact that there is *no real* identity or no essential connexion between the conclusion and the principle from which it is deduced. Such a discovery would overthrow all that Aristotle and St. Thomas teach on the nature of absolute certainty, and on the radical distinction obtaining between the sciences or conclusions of absolute certainty — mathematics, metaphysics, and theology — and the sciences or conclusions whose certainty is not absolute, such as the physical or the behavioural sciences or conclusions. (39)

In the stock example, "Christ is *man*"; therefore, he is actually risible" — this is the example in which many get confused — the term *man* does not stand for *bare* human nature, but for *integral* and *perfect* human nature. Now, although actual risibility, or any other actual property, is not an essential requirement in order to be a *man*, it is an essential requirement in order to be an *integral* and *perfect* man. There exists true and real inclusion or identity between the predicate "actually risible" of the theological conclusion, and the predicate "integral and perfect man" of the revealed premise. This is always the case in every rigorously theological conclusion.

Therefore, every truly and rigorously theological conclusion is really identical with, or of the essence of, the revealed major, and, consequently, it is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not only as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

245. SIXTH PROOF. — Everything that is really and truly *within* the revealed deposit is definable as a truth of divine faith.

Now, everything that is necessarily or theologically connected with the revealed deposit is really and truly *within* the revealed deposit.

Therefore, every thing necessarily connected with the revealed deposit is definable as a truth of divine faith.

The major is commonly admitted by theologians. Thus, the difficulty lies in the minor. As a matter of fact, there are many who think that what is connected or related to the deposit it not *within*, but *outside* the deposit. They are of the belief that it is not something *of* the deposit, but something other than, or really distinct from, the deposit although necessary for its preservation and defense. They imagine that these connected truths are to the revealed deposit as the walls to the city, or better still, as the fence to the orchard. The fence is necessary for the custody and defense of the orchard, but it is not a part of it. It is external, not internal, to the trees growing within the orchard. In like manner, they say, that which is connected with the deposit is necessary for its preservation and defense, but it is not part of the deposit. It is without, not within, the deposit.

In our opinion, this is a very great mistake, to which many theologians have succumbed and still succumb because they look at these matters from a *material* point of view. The *formal viewpoint* whereby truths connected with the deposit fall under the Church's infallibility is not their *matter* but their connexion or *relation* to the deposit. But — and this should never be overlooked by any theologian —, this *relation* is a *mutual* relation. It is not only the *relation of other things* to the revealed deposit, it is also the relation of the revealed deposit to other things. It is from the latter — and only from the latter — point of view that such relations come under the Church's infallibility, i.e., not insofar as they are relations of other things, but insofar as

they are *relations of the revealed deposit*. Thus, they are relations *of* the revealed deposit, something or a part *of* the revealed deposit, something from *within* the revealed deposit, and, consequently, something definable as a truth of divine faith.

The same or a similar misunderstanding occurs when we speak of the Church's power. It is a commonplace to say that the power of the Church extends itself not only to *spiritual* things, but also to some other things that are not spiritual but *temporal*. This manner of speaking is *materially* true, and therefore very convenient and useful in canon law and in any science of a practical or empirical character. However, it is *formally* false, and consequently liable to mislead the mind of the philosopher or theologian, who should focus only on the formal viewpoint whereby powers and habits are specified and distinguished. Since the Church is formally a *spiritual* society, its power cannot extend itself, *formally* speaking, except to what is *spiritual*. If we commonly say that it also extends itself to what is temporal, the latter is not taken insofar as it is temporal, but insofar as it is *related* to the spiritual. Now — and this is what many overlook —, the Church does not, and cannot, consider such relations insofar as they are *relations of the temporal* sphere, but considers them exclusively insofar as they are *relations of the spiritual* sphere. Consequently, they are relations of what is spiritual, spiritual relations. Thus, and only thus, is the object of ecclesiastical power truly homogeneous, to wit: (a) *spiritual* affairs; (b) *their* relations, i.e. *spiritual* relations.

Finally, such is also the case with any power or habit, e.g. the power of sight. Sight does not have as its formal object *colour* and some *other* things, but *colour* and the *coloured*. Thus, those *other things* we speak of, e.g. extension and substance, do not come under sight precisely as extension or substance, but precisely as *related* to colour, which is to say, insofar as they are *coloured*.

Likewise, then, the infallibility of the Church does not have for its object divine revelation and *other non-revealed things*, but divine revelation and its relations. Infallibility does not create or invent these relations; it merely discovers and defines them. They already existed *in* the revealed deposit, which is why St. Thomas designates them with the classical term *reveatable*, that is, *discoverable* in the revealed deposit in which they already existed from the beginning. Thus they are relations or conclusions *of* the revealed deposit, relations *implicit* in what is said by God, and hence definable as truths of divine faith. Their definition by the Church gives us nothing new with respect to *substance* or objectivity since they were already implicated or *implicit* in the primitively revealed, but only something *new* with respect to *explicitation*.

246. SEVENTH PROOF. — Where a conclusion is completely included in the premise of faith, in such manner that the premise of reason serves no

purpose but that of explicating or manifesting the inclusion, such a conclusion is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not merely as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

Now, in every truly and rigorously theological reasoning the conclusion is completely included in the premise of faith, and the premise of reason serves no purpose but that of explicating or unfolding the conclusion.

Therefore, every truly and rigorously theological conclusion is definable as a truth of divine faith, and not merely as a truth of ecclesiastical faith.

The major premise is commonly admitted by theologians. Cardinal Franzelin formulates it in the following words: "When a revealed premise already contains implicitly what is stated in the conclusion, and the other premise, even if it itself is not revealed, evidently manifests this inclusion of the conclusion in the revealed premise, there is no doubt that the truth contained in the conclusion is a revealed truth." As an instance of such conclusions he cites, and with very good reason, the conclusion that "Christ has two wills", which is deduced from the revealed major "Christ is perfect God and perfect man" and the minor of reason "Every perfect man has a human will".<sup>41</sup> We repeat that theologians are commonly agreed on this major premise.

Thus the difficulty lies in the minor premise. Many, not to say almost all, modern theologians think that in theology it is not only possible but also necessary to distinguish between *explicative* and *completive* minors. The former merely *explicate* or unfold what was already really contained or implicit in the revealed major; hence the conclusion is itself also revealed and definable as of divine faith. The latter, the *completive*, are not restricted merely to unfolding or explicating what is implicit in the revealed major, but further *add* to it something objectively distinct. Hence the conclusion is neither revealed nor definable as of divine faith because it is not completely contained in the revealed major, but contained partly in the minor of reason.

We wholeheartedly agree to this division of minors, and therefore of conclusions, into *explicative* and *completive*. It is a basic division which should never be forgotten. But the modern error, derived from Suárez, lies in reducing theology in the proper sense of the term to completive conclusions, when such conclusions, far from being the only properly theological conclusions, are, on the contrary, in no case rigorously *theological*, but purely physical and of themselves incapable of any *theological certainty*. We believe that this has been fully demonstrated in many of the previous sections. Every rigorously theological conclusion is an *explicative* conclusion. (89-109).

<sup>41</sup> FRANZELIN, *De Deo Uno*, prolo.

Those who opine the contrary have given scant thought to the nature of true theology or to the radical distinction obtaining between the sciences of physico-contingent certainty and the sciences of metaphysical or absolute certainty, such as metaphysics and theology. *Sacred* theology is nothing but supernatural metaphysics, just as natural theology is natural metaphysics.

In the purely physical sciences the minors, and hence the conclusions, always express something really distinct from the majors; consequently, the minors and conclusions are *completive*, never *explicative*. On the contrary, in mathematics, metaphysics, and theology, the minors, and hence the conclusions, always express something that is of the essence of the majors, something that issues out of the majors — and out of them exclusively — not by addition, but by analysis. Hence, in mathematics, as well as in metaphysics and theology, their true and proper and rigorous conclusions are *explicative*, never *completive*: they are *analytical* conclusions.

For this reason, finally, the genuine Thomist school, and likewise any school that establishes a distinction between true theology and true metaphysics on the one hand, and the poor and contingent physical sciences on the other hand, have always maintained that the theological conclusion is completely contained in the revealed majors and in no wise in the minors of reason, these latter being only instruments or causes of *explication* but not of objectivity.<sup>42</sup>

247. EIGHTH PROOF. — The eighth proof can be clearly formulated in the following propositions:

1. It is impossible for the Church to condemn any proposition as infallibly erroneous unless a true *opposition* exists between such a proposition and the revealed deposit.
2. There can be no true opposition between a proposition and the revealed deposit unless between the former and the latter there really is a true *implicit contradiction* in meaning.

<sup>42</sup> "The premise of faith alone contains the whole truth and certainty of the conclusion, and the other that is known by natural evidence is only assumed per accidens and on account of the imperfection of the subject." (GONET, *Cyprus*, d. proem., a. 1., n. 38) "In theological demonstration the per se cause of the conclusion is the premise of faith alone and the conclusion is ultimately resolved into it alone; but the natural premise is only a condition that applies and explicates the supernatural principle and is required on account of the deficiency of our intellect." (GONET, *Loc. cit.*, a. 4, n. 58). Such is the perpetual doctrine of St. Thomas and of all true Thomists. The learned Fr. Garigou-Lagrange, who does not seem to share our views on this matter of the theological conclusion, speaking of another question says: "Besides, the question is to be solved not by means of religious experience, but by a *metaphysical analysis of the revealed doctrine, as theological conclusions are deduced.*" (*De Revelatione*, t. 1, p. 509). Very well spoken! Thus have all true Thomists spoken, and thus should they all always speak. But

3. There can be no true implicit contradiction in meaning between the erroneous proposition and the revealed deposit unless the erroneous proposition denies a meaning *identical* to a meaning affirmed in the revealed deposit.
4. The erroneous proposition cannot deny a meaning identical to a meaning affirmed in the revealed deposit unless the *theological conclusion* affirms a meaning identical to that affirmed in the revealed deposit.
5. Therefore, every theological conclusion affirms a meaning identical to that of the revealed deposit and is, thus, definable as of divine faith, and not merely as of ecclesiastical faith.

then, if the theological conclusion is nothing but *metaphysical analysis of the revealed teaching*, it evidently follows that the theological conclusion is not, and cannot be, a *new teaching*, nor can it be an *objective complement* of the revealed major; it can only be an analytical unfolding or *intellectual explication* of the same major, and therefore, definable as of divine faith. No analysis or explication is possible except with respect to what is truly *implicit*, and whatever is implicit in the revealed deposit is definable as of divine faith. Thus every true and proper theological conclusion is *virtual* because it is truly a *conclusion*, and it is *implicit* because it is truly *theological*, i.e., a true analysis of the revealed deposit.

As a matter of fact, if the theological conclusion, properly speaking, were *objectively* contained partly in the premise of faith and partly in the premise of reason, three things would evidently follow: 1. That not only the principles of faith, but also the principles of reason should be taken as the true *principles* of theology. 2. That theology would be a subaltern or *subordinate* science not only with respect to God's knowledge and that of the blessed, but also with respect to the natural sciences. 3. That the ninth of the loci theologici, i.e. natural reason, would be not only an improper, but rather a *proper* and an eminently proper locus theologicus. For every true Thomist these are three such absurdities that it would be difficult to say which is the most absurd. We have heard it said by a modern theologian that, although the theological conclusion is not contained objectively in itself in the premise of reason, still it is therein contained objectively with respect to us. It is not surprising that any Thomist head capable of admitting, without exploding, the phrase *objectively with respect to us*, should find it possible to admit ecclesiastical faith and . . . almost any other thing. Such a phrase is in Thomist doctrine a contradiction in terms. What is contained *in itself*, since "objectively" and "in itself" are identical things. On the other hand, what is contained only with respect to us, cannot for the same reason be contained *objectively*, but subjectively. What a mess in such simple matters! *Reasoning is essential for any and every* theological conclusion, since without either formal or virtual reasoning there is no science but merely understanding. The use of a premise of faith is also essential, since although without such a premise science is possible, still without it no *theological* science is possible, if this term is taken to denote sacred theology. But the *premise of reason* is altogether *accidental* with respect to the conclusion, since such a premise is not necessary on account of the *object*, but on account of the *subject*, i.e., on account of the feebleness of *our reason*. Hence it is not an *objective* premise or a source of objectivity, but a subjective aid or instrument for the explication of the premise of faith. "For the *natural premise* is not necessary in the angels and the blessed, as has been explained above, but *natural dis-*

The first proposition is evident and admitted by all. The Church cannot define a truth or proscribe an error on account of the conformity of that truth or the opposition of that error to the principles of natural reason, but on account of the conformity or opposition they respectively display to the revealed principles or revealed deposit.

The second proposition is likewise obvious. Contradiction is implicit in any kind of opposition. We will demonstrate this at length elsewhere (340-351) with a number of arguments and abundant passages from St. Thomas. For the present let the following text suffice: "Contradiction is included in all the other kinds of opposition."<sup>3,4</sup>

The third proposition is the definition of contradiction: "To affirm and deny the same thing of the same subject according to the same aspect."

Contradiction is impossible unless the *same thing* is affirmed and denied between two extremes.

The fourth is the definition of the erroneous proposition. Every erroneous proposition has to be the contradictory of a theological conclusion.

The fifth is manifest. To say that a meaning is *identical* to that of the revealed deposit amounts to saying that it is definable as of *divine* faith.

In short: every opposition includes a *contradiction*, and every contradiction is grounded on an *identity*.<sup>44</sup>

course, whether formal or virtual [ormal in ourselves, virtual in the angels ] belongs to the essential constitution of any science, either of theology or of purely natural science, because it is that whereby natural sciences differ essentially from the habit of the principles, and theology from faith, and this must be diligently kept in mind." (GONET, *loc. cit.*, d. proem., a.6, n.70) Inasmuch as *natural discourse is essential for every theological conclusion, no true theological conclusion, even the conclusion deduced from two premises of faith, can be formally supernatural or formally of divine faith prior to the Church's definition, inasmuch as the premise of reason is accidental for every true theological conclusion, the conclusion being thus objectively implicit or contained in the major of faith alone, for this reason every true theological conclusion, even the conclusion from a premise of reason, is definable of divine faith. Therefore, we believe it to be contrary to Thomist teaching either to admit that there are true and proper conclusions (e.g. those from two premises of faith) that are of divine faith even prior to the definition, or to admit that there are true and proper theological conclusions that are not of divine faith even after the definition. But to admit those two propositions at the same time, as the Salmanticensis apparently do seems to us, with all the respect due to such distinguished authors, the most complete antithesis that can be made of the true Thomist notion of sacred theology. We would like to be shown just one classical Thomist prior to the 17th century who maintains either, and much less both, of those two assertions. All of them always maintain or take for granted the two contrary assertions.*

<sup>43</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In Metaphysicos* 1, 10, lect. 6.

<sup>44</sup> Observe in the next place that among theologians that proposition is *theologically condemnable* which has some kind of opposition to the doctrine of faith. . .

248. NINTH PROOF. — The foregoing arguments, especially the first and the third taken from St. Thomas, are good not only for truly theological conclusions, but also for dogmatic facts; nevertheless, they apply more directly to the former rather than to the latter. The arguments that follow apply *equally* to the mediately revealed *doctrines*, known by the name of theological conclusions, and to the mediately revealed *facts*, designated by the term *dogmatic* facts. Let us begin with an argument taken from the teaching of the Vatican Council, which can be stated thus:

Whatever does not constitute a substantially *new doctrine*, but is the *same doctrine* revealed by God to the apostles and *conserved* and *explicated* by the Church, can be defined as of *divine* faith.

Now, the Church's infallibility cannot give or propose any *new doctrine* but only the same doctrine revealed by God to the Apostles.

Therefore, every truth infallibly defined by the Church is a truth of *divine*, not only of ecclesiastical, faith.

The major is evident and admitted by all theologians. The minor is, in our view, rather clearly taught in these two passages of the Vatican Council: "For the doctrine of faith, which God has revealed, has not been proposed in the manner of a philosophical discovery to be perfected by human inge-

For, in order to be a theologically condemnable proposition, it is not enough that it should contain falsehood as regards other things that in no way pertain to the faith; otherwise all propositions that are false in philosophy would be theologically worthy of censure, which is absurd and contrary to the common practice." (SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, d.9, n. 38, pg.425) "The opposition of propositions is the affirmation and the negation of the identity of the predicate with the subject, or to affirm and to deny the same thing of the same thing. Hence propositions having a different matter can in no way be opposed." (ZIGLIARA, *Summa Philos., Dialectica*, l.2, c.4, a.1)

Inasmuch as the meaning is the formal element in teachings (19), there can be no opposition between two propositions if in one of them is not affirmed the same meaning that is denied in the other. Hence, there is an identity of meaning between every rigorously metaphysical or theological conclusion and the principle from which it is deduced. The conclusion is nothing but a part of the principle. Otherwise, to deny the former would not imply a true opposition to the latter.

"The principle from which the syllogism proceeds is to the conclusion as the whole to the part, and the conclusion is to the principle as a part to the whole." (ST. THOMAS, *In Post. Analyl.*, lib.1, lect.38) "The consequent is a certain part and something of the antecedent." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Clarus Philos., Logica*, p.1, c.2, ed. Vivès vol. 1, pg 67) "Opposites have regard to the same thing." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.17, a.1)

Since the revealed principles are the true and only formal principles of theology, every rigorously theological conclusion is a true, albeit implicit, part of the revealed deposit. There is an identity of meaning between them. This will emerge even more clearly when we explain the nature of opposition according to St. Thomas. (333-345)

nity, but it has been entrusted to the Spouse of Christ as a divine deposit to be by her inviolably safeguarded and infallibly declared . . . Let, then, the understanding, knowledge, wisdom both of each and every one, both of one man and of the whole Church, grow . . . and advance extensively and intensively in the course of time and the flow of centuries, but only within its kind, that is to say, in the same dogma, the same understanding, and the same meaning."<sup>45</sup> For the Holy Spirit was not promised to Peter and his successors so that by His revelation they should disclose a NEW DOCTRINE, but so that by His assistance they should inviolably safeguard and faithfully expound the revelation handed down by the Apostles or the deposit of faith.<sup>46</sup>

We ask any theologian to read and reread without prejudices these two Vatican Council texts, especially the second. They explicitly say that the Holy Spirit's assistance, which is tantamount to saying infallibility, was not promised to the Church nor is the Church endowed with it in order to propose any new doctrine, but to preserve inviolably and expound faithfully the same doctrine that was revealed to the Apostles.

Consequently, either the doctrine defined by the Church is substantially or in its meaning the same as that which God revealed to the Apostles, or it is a new doctrine. If the former, then it is obvious that it is definable as of divine, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith. If the latter, then it does not fall under infallibility, since the Council expressly says that infallibility was not promised to the Church in view of new doctrines.

Someone might here interpose that the Council does not say precisely that the Church cannot infallibly teach us new doctrine, but that in the teaching of new doctrine she cannot count on new revelation but only on new assistance or infallibility. This is a childish evasion. The Council expressly says that it is precisely on account of the fact that the Church cannot count on new revelation but only on mere assistance to safeguard and expound the doctrine already revealed to the Apostles, that she cannot propose to us any new doctrine, but only the same doctrine handed down by the Apostles inviolably safeguarded and faithfully expounded.

In consequence, any doctrine of which it can be truly said that it is simply the revelation handed down by the Apostles inviolably safeguarded and faithfully expounded (Vatican Council), is obviously a truth of divine faith. On the other hand, according to the Vatican Council, no doctrine of which the same cannot be truly said can be the object of infallibility nor, consequently, of ecclesiastical faith.

249. TENTH PROOF. — Any truth expressly taught by the Apostles to the Church is definable as of divine, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith.

<sup>45</sup> *Constitutio de fide catholica*, c.4; Denz.-Schön. 3020.

<sup>46</sup> *Constitutio de Ecclesia Christi*, c.4; Denz.-Schön. 3070.

Now, the Apostles taught, or could have taught, the Church many truths that were known, not immediately through revelation or inspiration, but simply through infallibility or the Holy Spirit's assistance.

Therefore the object of infallibility or divine assistance, which is identical to the object of ecclesiastical faith, is definable as a truth of divine faith.

The major is commonly admitted by theologians. It is established by the constant praxis of the Church. The Church has always looked on *apostolic teaching and doctrine definable as a truth of divine faith* as identical definitions of faith.<sup>47</sup>

The minor will also be clear to anyone who considers these two things. First, the Apostles, during their lifetime, did not have less authority than that which the councils and the popes have today. Hence, if the councils or popes can define and infallibly teach not only the things expressly revealed or inspired by God, but also the things necessarily connected with them, each and every one of the Apostles could do the same. At the time when the pope St. Clement and the apostle St. John were both alive, there was nothing that the former could teach that the latter could not likewise teach. Thus, if St. Clement could define and teach a theological conclusion or a dogmatic fact, the apostle St. John could do likewise.

Second, a great many theologians of solid reputation are of the opinion that it is not necessary that the apostles should have been favoured with either revelation or inspiration every time they preached or wrote, as were the sacred writers. In the case of the apostles it is enough that they should have had divine assistance or infallibility. (176, footnote)

Now, it is obvious that the Church has always held anything taught by the Apostles to be definable as a truth of divine faith, without ever requiring therefor that the apostles should have declared that they were teaching it in virtue of revelation or inspiration and not in virtue of mere assistance or infallibility. Hence it is clear that infallibility or divine assistance suffices for divine faith. Otherwise we will be constrained to say that the Church has no criterion whereby to discern what things are of divine, and what things are of ecclesiastical, faith in the preaching of the apostles.

What we have just said concerning the preaching of the Apostles appears even more clearly when we apply it to the preaching or tradition of the sub-

<sup>47</sup> Things pertaining to religious doctrine are shown to be divinely revealed by the same token that they are proven to be handed down by the Apostles. Hence, to inquire into a teaching's apostolicity and to inquire into its divine revelation have always been considered in the Church as utterly one and the same thing." (FRANZELIN, *De Divina Traditione*, th. I, n. 2)

sequent Church or to the unanimous agreement of the Church Fathers. The ecumenical councils have always based themselves on the tradition of the Church and on the unanimous agreement of the Fathers of the Church. Now then, an examination of the proceedings of all the councils, from the Nicene to the Vatican, and of all the testimonies from Tradition or from the Church Fathers quoted by these councils, makes it clear as the light of day that the councils have never required that the constant Tradition of the Church or the unanimous testimony of the Church Fathers should have taught such or such a truth as of *divine faith* or as formally revealed, but simply that such or such a doctrine that is *inadmittible and obligatory* for the Christian, or some such other formula equally suitable to doctrines of divine faith and to doctrines of ecclesiastical faith. And yet this, and only this, sufficed to enable all the councils to define such truths as dogmas of faith, as truths of divine and Catholic faith. If, to define as dogmas of faith the consubstantiality of the Word in the Council of Nicea, or Mary's divine motherhood in the Council of Ephesus, or the two intellects and two wills of Christ in the Council of Constantinople, or the transubstantiation in the Council of Trent, or the Immaculate Conception in the Bull of Pius IX, or papal infallibility in the Vatican Council, the Church should have had to rely on a constant tradition or a unanimous teaching of the Holy Fathers in which such truths were affirmed to be of *divine* faith or formally revealed, then such dogmas could never have been defined.

Moreover, not only would the ecumenical councils be left without any criterion whereby to determine which of the things contained in the preaching of the Apostles or in the tradition of the Church or in the doctrine of the Fathers of the Church are of divine faith, and which of ecclesiastical faith, but we ourselves would be deprived of any reliable gauge whereby we might know which things are of divine, and which of ecclesiastical, faith in the definitions of the councils or popes. It is true that, in the dogmatic definitions given after the dispute concerning the distinction between divine and ecclesiastical faith, the Church has often taken pains to express in the definition itself that the defined truth was a *revealed* truth, as for instance, in the definition of the Immaculate Conception by Pius IX, or in the definition of papal infallibility by the Vatican Council.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>48</sup> In the Bull *Ineffabilis Deus* the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is defined to have been revealed by God. (Denz.-Schön, 2803) Similarly, in the Constitution *De Ecclesia Christi*, the formula "we define that it is a *divinely revealed dogma*" is used in defining papal infallibility. (Denz.-Schön, 3073) On the other hand, as every theologian knows, in a very great number of earlier dogmatic definitions the formula employed, is merely that of "we firmly believe", or "we declare and define", or some such other formulae, without mention of the term *revealed*. Thus, e.g., in the dogmatic Bull *Benedictus Deus*, in which it is defined that souls already purged enjoy the im-

But it is no less true that prior to the invention of the new so-called ecclesiastical faith, and hence, prior to the 17th century, the Church frequently issued dogmatic definitions or definitions of divine faith under the simple formulae of "We firmly believe," or "We declare," or "We define," or some other similar formula, without further mention of whether the defined truth was a *revealed* truth or not. And yet, this notwithstanding, all such definitions have always been considered as definitions of divine faith, as true dogmas of faith.

In the professions of faith that we all make, as e.g., Pius IV's profession of faith, which no one will deny is a profession of divine faith, we simply say "I believe and profess," or "hold unswervingly," without any mention of the fact that the faith in question is *divine*. In these professions of faith the formula "I believe and profess" extends itself not only to what the councils have defined as of divine faith, but to *everything* that the councils have defined, thus giving us clearly to understand that *everything defined* by the councils is of *divine faith*.<sup>49</sup>

250. ELEVENTH PROOF. — Leaving aside, so as not to make this chapter excessively long, other proofs or confirmations<sup>50</sup>, we conclude with

mediate beatific vision of God, it is simply said: "By apostolic authority we define" (Denz.-Schön. 1000). Yet all such definitions have always been considered as definitions of divine faith. Furthermore: in the two definitions of the Immaculate Conception and of papal infallibility the Church has been satisfied with defining that they were *revealed* doctrines, but without mentioning whether they were immediately or mediately revealed.

<sup>49</sup>"I, N. firmly believe and profess each and everything contained in the Symbol of faith, . . . I likewise undoubtedly accept and profess all the other things that are taught, *defined* and declared by the Sacred Canons and the ecumenical Councils, especially by the holy Synod of Trent, . . . This true *Catholic faith*, . . ." etc. (Tridentine profession of faith, Denz.-Schön. (nn. 1862-1870). Finally, should we care to press the point, if this modern ecclesiastical faith were not truly a *divine* faith it would follow that we would be left in a state of uncertainty as to whether the Athanasian Symbol itself is of divine faith or not. This Symbol merely states that "This is the *Catholic faith*, and no man can be saved unless he faithfully and firmly believes in it." Now then, in the Church's language ecclesiastical faith is as *Catholic* as public divine faith. Witness the following passage: "In the thirteenth place: if you have believed and still believe that it is only the Roman Pontiff who can put an end to the doubts that arise concerning the *CATHOLIC faith* by means of an authentic determination to which adherence must be inviolably given, and that *whatever he, by the authority of the keys entrusted to him by Christ, determines to be TRUE is true and CATHOLIC* . . ." (CLEMENT VI, Epist. *Super Quibusdam* ad Consolatorem Catholicorum Armenorum, 29 Sept. 1351; Denz.-Schön. 1064). The terms *infallible* faith, *divine* faith, *Catholic* faith, when employed with regard to doctrine *defined* by the Church, have always been taken as identical or synonymous in all the documents of the ancient Church and by all theologians prior to Molina.

<sup>50</sup> Among others, the following reasons or confirmations might be adduced:  
1. In every infallible definition the Church says, or can say, with complete truth: "It has seemed good to the Holy Spirit," And the view or judgment of the Holy Spirit is not a matter of ecclesiastical, but of divine, faith.

an argument which, in our opinion, is one of the clearest as well as fully conclusive. It can be formulated in the five propositions that follow:

1. God has revealed that the Church is infallible in defining the mediate or connected.
2. Hence, God has revealed that the definitions of the mediate or connected made by the Church are infallibly true.
3. Therefore, it is of divine faith that the definitions made by the Church of the mediate or connected are infallibly true.
4. But, the proper and specific object of ecclesiastical faith are the definitions made by the Church of the mediate or connected.
5. Therefore, ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

3. The Church can change, or give a dispensation from, anything she does by ecclesiastical authority. Thus the Church can change, or dispense from all laws that are not divine but ecclesiastical, and even in those cases where a law is partly divine and partly ecclesiastical, the Church can change, or dispense from it, with respect to that part which is ecclesiastical. But it is evident that the Church can neither change, nor dispense from, whether totally or partially, any infallible definition once it has been made. Therefore, the authority whereby the Church makes such a definition is not ecclesiastical, nor partly ecclesiastical and partly divine, but wholly divine, and, consequently, of divine faith.

3. The word of man, if it is formally guaranteed by God, has the same authority as the word of God. Every infallible definition is formally guaranteed by the word of God.

4. What pertains to an instrument, *insofar as it is an instrument*, is not attributed properly to the instrument but to the principal cause. Now then, the Church possesses infallibility not of herself, but insofar, and only insofar, as she is God's instrument. It is true that when the pope defines his *action* is not an *instrumental action* of God (this is where some authors have been mistaken), as was the action of the sacred writers when they wrote, and for this reason the definitions of the Church are not *divine Scripture*. But it is not less true that the pope's infallible *authority* in defining is as much an *instrumental authority* as that of the sacred writers, and for this reason it is a *divine authority* and worthy of divine faith.

5. Since there is no room for any *discourse* in any act of faith, whether divine or human, anything that enters as a *formal motive* into an act of faith has to enter into it *immediately* inasmuch as *mediate* is equivalent to *discourse*. Consequently, either divine authority in one way or another enters as a formal motive into ecclesiastical faith, or not. If it does not enter in any way, there can be no infallible faith. If it enters, it has to enter *immediately*, and hence the faith is divine. To say that both the ecclesiastical and the divine authority enter immediately as two *parts* of one and the same motive would be to fall into Lugo's discredited *mediate faith*.

6. Lastly, either *reasoning* enters as a formal motive into the assent of the so-called ecclesiastical faith, or not. If it enters, such an assent cannot be an assent of *faith*, whether divine or ecclesiastical, since faith and reasoning are inconsistent. If it does not enter as a formal motive, the foundation on which our opponents base themselves in order to deny that such a faith is divine, collapses.

The first proposition is admitted by all or almost all, theologians, ancient as well as modern.

The second is the very same proposition in another form, or put into passive form. It is evident that to say that "the Church is infallible when defining the mediate or connected" is *the same* as saying that "the definitions made by the Church of the mediate or connected are infallibly true".

The third is the same second proposition where the phrase "God has revealed" is replaced by the phrase "it is of divine faith".

The fourth is the definition itself of ecclesiastical faith.

Therefore, the fifth proposition is evident, viz., that ecclesiastical faith is divine faith.

We are absolutely certain that any reader who considers those five propositions with unjaudiced eyes, will clearly see that they are really identical and that the subsequent ones are nothing but the simple explication of the previous ones. To affirm, as some people affirm, that the infallibility of the Church when defining the mediate or connected is of divine faith, but that the infallibility or truth of the thing defined is not of divine faith, does not make sense. To say that the "the Church is infallible in what she defines" is the same as saying that "that which is defined by the Church is true". Hence to say that "it is of divine faith that the Church is infallible in what she defines" is the same as saying that "it is of divine faith that that which is defined by the Church is true" or that "the truth of that which is defined by the Church is of divine faith", or that "that which is defined by the Church is of divine faith".

251. A LUMINOUS CONFIRMATION. — Finally, even at the risk of making less clear what is of itself transparently clear, we will add one confirmation. Suppose that God or Jesus Christ should today come in person to tell us: "I testify that everything that the Church has defined up to this moment is true". We believe that in such a hypothesis no theologian will dare seriously assert that the definitions of the Church are not of divine, but of ecclesiastical faith.<sup>51</sup>

But that which God would tell us *today*, He has already told us *before*, and every theologian knows that the difference of before and after does not

<sup>51</sup>In their famous propositions on the nature of the effects of subsequent revelation, Lessus and Bonifertus are undoubtedly mistaken when they affirm that a human book, if it were posteriorly approved by a public divine revelation, would become an inspired book or Sacred Scripture. But they would not have been mistaken but, on the contrary, they would have stated a great truth if they had limited themselves to saying that such a book or doctrine would be truly the word of God and truly a revealed truth. Franzelin himself acknowledged this. "From such an attestation of the book's veracity made by God himself through a Catholic revelation it would indeed follow that

alter in any way the species of faith. Instead of telling us now that "everything that the Church has defined is true", God had already told us from the beginning that "everything that the Church would define is true". Consequently, such definitions are of divine faith, not precisely because the Church says so, but because God has said so.

In a nutshell, the formal motive of the faith we give to infallible definitions is not really the authority of the Church, nor even precisely the authority of the assisting God; it is really and formally the authority of the revealing God. The act of faith, which has modernly been termed ecclesiastical, is not formulated by saying: "I believe such a truth because the Church is infallible when she teaches it to me." Neither is it formulated by saying: "I believe such a truth because God assists the Church when she teaches it to me."

But it is, and should be, formulated with entire truth in the following terms: "I believe in such a thing because God has revealed that the Church is infallible when she teaches it to me." Which is exactly the same as saying: "I believe with divine faith that what the Church has defined is true, because God has revealed that what the Church has defined is true." Such an assent is obviously an act of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith.

Consequently, if divine faith extends itself to all theological conclusions defined by the Church, the evolution of dogma likewise extends itself to all such conclusions. Hence, the modern ecclesiastical faith is useless.

### SECTION III

#### THE ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH AND DOGMATIC FACTS

252. — WHETHER DOGMATIC FACTS ARE OF DIVINE FAITH. — All theologians agree with St. Thomas that nothing can be the object of divine faith unless it is really and truly revealed by God. "For the faith of which we speak, does not assent to anything except on account of its being revealed by God."<sup>52</sup> This is the foundation laid down by St. Thomas from the very first article of his immortal treatise on divine faith.

Thus, if dogmatic facts, or any other of the objects of the so-called ecclesiastical faith, are to be held by truly divine faith, it is indispensable that

the things contained in a book of human origin would be divine truths and thus the word of God to be believed. But it would not therefore be an inspired book or Sacred Scripture in the proper sense of the term. (*De Divina Traditione et Scriptura*, Rome 1885, pg. 374). Very well said. But the same thing should be said of every infallible definition of the Church, since it has God's express approval through antecedent revelation, which is of equal value as consequent revelation. Cf. what we have to say later on, in No. 304, on whether the definitions of the Church are the "word of God" or not.

<sup>52</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q. 1, a. 1.



they should have been truly revealed by God. But have dogmatic facts been truly revealed by God? If the answer be affirmative, in what manner have they been revealed, or in what manner are they truly contained in the revealed deposit?

Such is the object of this section. The importance of the subject should be obvious to any theologian.

253. THREE KINDS OF FACTS. — In the first place, let us say something very briefly about what is meant by *dogmatic facts*.

There are three kinds of facts: (a) *expressly revealed facts*; (b) merely *particular facts*; (c) *dogmatic facts*. The problems or questions concerning these different facts are respectively denominated by theologians as: (a) the question of the *revealed fact*; (b) the question of the *particular fact*; (c) the question of the *dogmatic fact*.

By *expressly revealed facts* we understand, as the name itself indicates, those facts that the Apostles expressly bequeathed to the Church in the deposit of the Holy Scripture or Divine Tradition. Examples of such facts are the facts that our beloved Saviour was born in Bethlehem or the fact that His most Holy Mother remained always a virgin.

By *particular facts* we understand all those facts that are neither expressly contained in the revealed deposit nor have any *necessary relation* with it. These facts are either totally unrelated to the *doctrine* of faith or morals, or if related, concern only *particular persons*, and not the whole Church, and consequently, are not absolutely necessary for the preservation or explanation of the revealed deposit. Instances of these facts, aside from exclusively *profane facts*, are the fact whether such a marriage is valid or not, or whether such a person committed or not the crime with which he is charged or whether this piece of property belongs to this or the other individual. "As when it is a question" says St. Thomas, "of possessions or crimes, or some such other things."<sup>53</sup>

In between these two extremes — the expressly revealed facts on the one hand, and merely particular facts on the other hand — there is the third kind of facts which, since the time of Jansen, have been termed *dogmatic facts*. These facts are not expressly contained in the revealed deposit, and in this they are like the particular facts; however, they differ from these in that they do have a necessary relation with the preservation, explanation, or application of the *revealed doctrine*, and thus they concern not only one or several particular persons, but the *whole Church*. Such facts, among others, are the facts relative to the *orthodoxy* or *heterodoxy* of passages or books, as e.g.,

<sup>53</sup> *Quodlibetum* 9, a.16.

whether the book of Jansen is or not heretical, or whether it contained or not the notorious five heretical propositions that the Church declared were contained in it.<sup>54</sup>

254. WHAT IS CERTAIN AND WHAT IS DEBATABLE. — With respect to the first category of facts, viz. those *expressly revealed*, all theologians are agreed — the thing being obvious of itself — that they are objects not only of infallibility or ecclesiastical faith, but also of divine and Catholic faith, at least when the Church defines them either through solemn or ordinary magisterium. "All those things are to be believed with *divine* and *Catholic* faith that are contained in the word of God whether written or handed down and are by the Church proposed for belief as *divinely revealed*, either through its solemn pronouncement or through its ordinary and universal magisterium."<sup>55</sup> If all things that are *divinely revealed* can be the object of divine faith, then the same is doubly true of that which is *expressly revealed*. Where it is a case of divine revelation or inspiration, the same faith is due to doctrines and facts. The word of God possesses divine and equal authority with respect to *anything*.

With regard to the second category, viz. the *particular facts*, all theologians are likewise agreed in affirming with St. Thomas that they can neither be the object of divine faith, nor even of ecclesiastical faith or of the infallibility of the Church. "But in the other pronouncements, which relate to *particular facts*, as when it is a question of possessions, or crimes, or some such other things, it is *possible for the Church's judgement to be mistaken*."<sup>56</sup>

Lastly, with respect to the third category, the so-called *dogmatic facts* — and it is with these that we are now concerned — there is a point on which

<sup>54</sup> We cite as examples of dogmatic facts "the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of texts", e.g. of Jansen's book, omitting the facts of whether such a council is infallible, or such a version of the Bible is authentic, or such a pope is a true pope, etc., etc., in order to avoid the impression that with such examples as are accepted by everybody as instances of *divine* faith, we seek to prejudice the very same question we are going to deal with. But, in reality, both the former and the latter are equally dogmatic facts, and nothing more than dogmatic facts. Modern authors, when dealing with dogmatic facts, ordinarily cite Jansen's fact and not the fact of whether such a council is infallible, etc., because otherwise they would be equivalently making obvious the inconsistency or incoherence into which they later fall by accepting certain facts as of divine faith, and certain others as of ecclesiastical faith. As we shall see, the *dogmatic character* of all those facts is exactly the same. There is but one *atom species of dogmatic facts*, just as there is but one atom species of *theological conclusions*. To say otherwise is, in our view, pure empiricism.

<sup>55</sup> VATICAN COUNCIL, sess.3, c.3; Denz-Schon, 3011.

<sup>56</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Quodlibetum* 9, a.16.

all theologians are agreed since the Jansenist debates, and there is a point on which they disagree. They agree on affirming that such facts can be *infallibly* defined by the Church and that to such infallible definitions must be given, at least, the assent of an absolutely certain and unconditional faith, which they denominate *ecclesiastical* faith. But they disagree on whether this ecclesiastical faith is truly a *divine* faith or, on the contrary, a new species of faith lying midway between divine and human faith.

As we have said, nothing that is not divinely revealed can be of divine faith. The issue then depends on whether these dogmatic facts are truly revealed by God or not. If they are, then they can become an object of divine faith, and not merely of ecclesiastical faith. We shall attempt to make it clear that the dogmatic facts are truly revealed and to show the manner in which they are revealed.

**255. THE IMPLICIT REVELATION OF THE PARTICULAR IN THE UNIVERSAL.** — The first and most essential division of divine revelation is its division into *explicit* and *implicit* revelation. It is obvious that dogmatic facts have not been explicitly revealed. If, then, they have been revealed, they can only have been revealed implicitly.

What is meant by implicit revelation or what is the scope of the implicitness of divine revelation is a question on which, since Molina up to the present, the theologians are not in accord. However, there is one point on which all or almost all theologians are in agreement, viz., that when a *universal* proposition is explicitly revealed, all the particular propositions certainly contained in it are by the same token implicitly and truly revealed and are consequently definable as of divine faith.

Thus, if it is revealed that *all* things have been created by God, it is *implicitly* revealed, and definable as of divine faith, that *this* particular thing, e.g., the angels, have been created. If it is revealed that *this* particular thing, redeemed by Christ, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as of divine faith, that *this* man has been redeemed. If it is revealed that *all* ecumenical councils are infallible rules of faith, it is implicitly revealed, and definable as of divine faith, that *this ecumenical council*, e.g., the *Tridentine*, is an *infallible* rule of faith. If it is revealed that *all* the popes accepted by the universal Church are successors of St. Peter, it is implicitly revealed that this pope, e.g., our Most Holy Father Pius XI, is a successor of St. Peter, or a true pope. On this point all, or almost all, theologians are today agreed. But precisely because it is admitted by almost all theologians, it becomes necessary to tarry awhile in its analysis in order to be able later to pass on from what everybody admits to what everybody should admit if he were logical.

It is said, and said truly, that it is implicitly revealed that the Tridentine is infallible, that the Vulgate is authentic in matter of faith and morals, that

the actual pope is a true pope. Now, then, we all know that the deposit of divine revelation was closed upon the death of the last of the apostles and that no new public or Catholic revelation was thenceforth possible. How then, is it possible for such facts as the Vulgate, the Tridentine, or the actual pope, to have been truly revealed by God when they took place many centuries after the apostles? Do not such facts constitute a true *addition* to the revealed deposit? Is this not tantamount to an admission that the Church is capable of giving us *new dogmas*?

Any student of theology knows the answer — and a good answer it is — given to these questions. The revealed deposit was closed with the last of the apostles with respect to *new Catholic revelation*; however, it was not closed, but remains and will remain open, with respect to the infallible *explication* or *application* of the old revelation. The Church cannot give us *new dogmas* in the sense of being *new unqualifiedly* (simpliciter), or *new in substance*; but she can give us new dogmas in the sense of being *new only somehow* (secundum quid, i.e., in some manner), i.e., new as to their *explication*, provided that such explication is not done through new revelations, as was the case until the death of the last of the apostles, but only through mere infallibility or *assistance* of the Holy Spirit.<sup>57</sup> Now, this, and only this, is what the Church does when she applies a proposition that has been revealed in a *universal* form to a *particular* proposition.

**256. CONDITIONED PROPOSITIONS.** — To see clearly that such particular propositions are merely the *explication* or *application* of the revealed *universal* we need only consider the nature or meaning of such universal propositions. They are *conditioned* universals. The universal proposition, "*every ecumenical council is a rule of faith*" means to say that *every* council is a rule of faith *if it is ecumenical*. Thus, it is true that no *particular* council, e.g., the Tridentine, was celebrated until many centuries after the

<sup>57</sup>—The Apostles and their successors are God's vicars as regards the government of the Church already constituted by faith and the sacraments of the faith. Hence, just as they are not allowed to constitute *another Church*, so neither are they allowed to teach *another faith* or to constitute *other sacraments*. (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.3, q.64, a.2, ad 1) "There are two ways of *apposing* [or *adding*]: either [by *affixing*] something that is *contrary or diverse*, and this is erroneous or presumptuous; or by *expounding* something that is *implicitly* contained, and this is praiseworthy." (ST. THOMAS, *In I Sent.*, divisio textus prolog.) "Consequently, by no human authority can *new things* be introduced *for belief*, but only an *explication* of what has been revealed to the *Apostles and Prophets* by the Word of God." (CAJETAN, *In Epist. ad Romanos*, c.10) "Neither the Supreme Pontiff nor the whole Church when we ask whether the Supreme Pontiff can err in *defining* matters of faith, we understand this to mean the *explication* of matters of faith by his definition." (BÁÑEZ, *In 2.2, q.1, a.10*)

apostles, or after the revealed deposit was closed. But it is no less true that before the revealed deposit was closed, and while the apostles were still alive, it was already truly revealed that "any council, e.g., the Tridentine, is a rule of faith if it is *ecumenical*". Merely by *purging* or infallibly verifying that condition, the conditioned proposition, "it is revealed that the Tridentine Council is a rule of faith, if it is *ecumenical*", is converted into this *absolute* proposition, "it is revealed that the Tridentine Council is a rule of faith".

Hence, without any new revelation, and simply by the purging or verifying of a *condition*, any particular proposition contained in a universal or conditioned proposition can become a proposition of divine faith. This is the case at least when infallibility exists in order to verify or remove the condition. Such infallibility exists in the Church, according to all theologians.

Even at the risk of being called redundant and tedious, we will reduce the foregoing considerations to the form of reasoning, for once this is grasped it will be easy to understand the nature of any and all truly dogmatic facts. Let the reasoning be as follows:

It is revealed that every *ecumenical* council is infallible<sup>58</sup>, or what amounts to the same thing, it is revealed that "every council is infallible if it is *ecumenical*".

Now, such a Council is certainly *ecumenical*.  
Therefore, such a Council is infallible.

We ask the reader to pay attention to the conclusion, which is precisely the fact with which we are now concerned. It will be clear that it is simply a particular case of the revealed universal major, the only difference being that the *condition* has disappeared. If he now looks at the minor, he will see that it neither adds nor subtracts anything *doctrinal* from the major; the minor merely verifies or purges the *condition*.

Hence the minor does not enter the reasoning as the *formal motive* or as the cause of the conclusion, but only as a *condition*. Now, then, it is a commonplace among theologians that in any case where the minor enters the reasoning, not as the formal motive, but simply as the condition to explicate of *divine* faith, the conclusion is also revealed and definable as of divine faith, and not only as of ecclesiastical faith, that such a Council, e.g. the Vatican, is infallible, or that such a pope, e.g. the actual pope, is a true pope.<sup>58</sup>

58. "Whenever a universal proposition is of faith, the singular propositions that are contained in it pertain likewise to faith; and the natural proposition that is necessary is only a *condition* for assenting by faith to such a singular proposition. . . . The minor is only a required *condition*, not the *formal reason* of the conclusion." (DIDACUS NUNO,

257. JANSEN'S NOTORIOUS BOOK. — Everything hitherto said is commonly admitted by modern authors when it is applied to the aforementioned facts, viz., the ecumenicity or infallibility of such a council or the legitimacy of such a pope. On the issue whether such facts are of divine, or only of ecclesiastical, faith, the answer given is that they are of *divine* faith, and no distinction is made between the question of the principle and the question of fact.

However, when the issue is raised regarding other dogmatic facts commonly grouped under the general label of "the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of books or passages", as, e.g., whether Jansen's book *Augustinus* contains, or not, the five heretical propositions which the Church declared it contained, the same authors suddenly change their tune and distinguish the question of principle from the question of fact. The question of *principle* is the following: "Are such propositions heretical or not?", and that can be defined by the Church as of *divine* faith. The question of *fact* is as follows: "Are such propositions found, or not, in Jansen's book?", and that, they say, cannot be defined by the Church as of divine, but only as of *ecclesiastical*, faith. The reason, according to them is that the question of principle is a *revealed* truth whereas the question of fact is not, and it is a commonplace that no thing that is not truly revealed can ever be defined or believed as a truth of divine faith.

Offhand we might ask these theologians why they have not made such a distinction in the case of whether such a council is truly infallible. Why is it that they have not answered that the question of the principle, viz. that "every ecumenical council is infallible" is a matter of divine faith, and the question of fact, viz., that "such a council is ecumenical" is only a matter of ecclesiastical faith.

They will doubtless say that they have not made the distinction because the question of fact is nothing but a particular instance of a revealed universal proposition, and consequently it is also revealed and a matter of divine faith. We will now attempt to make it clear that the question of *fact* relative to Jansen's book, or relative to any other dogmatic fact of whatsoever kind provided that it truly be *dogmatic*, is nothing but a *particular* instance of a revealed *universal*, and that, consequently, the fact concerning Jansen is as

O.P., *Expositio in 3 am D. Thomae partem*, q. 20, a. 3, Vallisoleti 1609, pg. 627) "For we say that it has been revealed by God that *this* individual man, to wit, Our Most Holy Lord Urban VIII, is the Supreme Pontiff, by the *universal* revelation whereby He revealed that the Church would not err in acknowledging this individual as true head." (LUGO, *De Fide*, d.1, n.330) "That *particular* truth is sufficiently contained in the universal dogma of faith." (SUAREZ, *De Fide*, d.5, s.5, n.10) "And the subsumed natural proposition is a mere *explication* of the *universal* proposition and its *application* to a determinate and *particular* subject." (SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, d.4, n.36)

truly revealed by God as the fact concerning such a council, and that it is revealed in exactly in the same manner, i.e., as a *particular* in the *universal*. But first let us permit four brief remarks:

258. **FIRST REMARK.** — When the Church defines that such or such heretical propositions are found in such a book, she does not mean to say, nor is it necessary to understand, that such propositions are found in the book as to their *material* words, but only as to their *meaning*. The reason is obvious. In revelation, as in faith, what is essential is the meaning. The words, provided that they express the same meaning, are accidental.

Hence, to define that such a book contains such propositions means nothing more than that it contains the same meaning as such propositions. Vice versa, to contain the same meaning as such propositions, is to contain such propositions. All theologians are agreed on this point.

259. **SECOND REMARK.** — The deposit of the Holy Scripture and divine Tradition is not only revealed or inspired *in general*, but *each and every one* of the parts, or truths, or propositions that make up the deposit is likewise revealed.

Thus the nature of heresy applies not only to what is contradictorily opposed to the *whole* deposit, but also to what is contradictorily opposed to *this* or that part, truth, or proposition of the deposit.

260. **THIRD REMARK.** — Consequently, the Church can condemn a book as heretical in two ways. First, by condemning it simply as *heretical*, or as contradictorily opposed to the revealed deposit *in general*, that is to say, without specifying the *particular* heresy it contains, or the particular doctrine condemning it as heretical *in particular*, that is to say, indicating the particular heresy it contains, or the particular portion or proposition of the revealed deposit to which it is opposed.

261. **FOURTH REMARK.** — God has truly revealed the two following universal propositions. *First*, "Every book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit, contains heresy". Second, "Every book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such a truth or proposition of the revealed deposit, contains such a heresy or such a *heretical proposition*". As we observed in our first remark, to contain *such a proposition* means nothing more than to contain the *meaning* of such a proposition.

We believe that these four remarks will be admitted by every theologian, and even regarded by some of them as platitudes. We will now submit two instances or reasonings: one in which the Church condemns a book as containing heresy *in general*, and another in which she condemns a book as containing *such a heresy* or *such particular heretical propositions*. These are the

two ways in which the Church usually condemns books written by heretics. Many books or writings before and after Jansen have been condemned in the first manner. Jansen's book *Augustinus* was condemned in the second manner. But in either case we shall see that the so-called *question of fact*, i.e. whether *such* a book contains heresy, or contains *such a heresy* or *such heretical propositions*, is neither more nor less than a *particular* proposition or instance of a *revealed universal*.

262. **FIRST INSTANCE.** — Every book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the *revealed deposit*, contains *heresy*. Or equivalently, *any* book contains heresy *if it contains* a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit.

Now *this* book contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of the revealed deposit.

Therefore, *this* book contains *heresy*.

263. **SECOND INSTANCE.** — Every book that contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of *such particular propositions* of the revealed deposit, contains *such heretical propositions*. Or equivalently, *any* book contains *such heretical propositions* if it contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of *such propositions* of the revealed deposit.

Now, *this* book (e.g., Jansen's book) contains a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of *such propositions of the revealed deposit*.

Therefore, *this* book contains *such heretical propositions*.

We beg the reader to consider attentively the foregoing conclusions, and it will be obvious that they state precisely the *question of fact*, with which we are now dealing. Let him then compare them with the revealed universal majors, and it will be clear that they are neither more nor less than a *particular* instance of those *universals (every-itis)*, with no other difference than that the *condition* has disappeared. Let him finally, examine the minors, and it will be clear that they neither add nor subtract anything *doctrinal* from the majors and that they are limited exclusively to verifying or purging a *condition* of those revealed majors.

It is the common teaching of theologians that every proposition contained in the revealed deposit as a particular in the universal is of divine, and not only of ecclesiastical, faith. Furthermore, it is likewise common teaching that every conclusion to which the minor contributes only as a *condition* is of divine, and not only of ecclesiastical, faith. Consequently, every theologian ought to admit that dogmatic facts are of divine, and not only of ecclesiastical, faith.

*Inconsistencies of some theologians.* — In our opinion, almost all modern text books are guilty of a manifest inconsistency in this matter. To prove the *infallibility* of the Church in the matter of dogmatic facts they offer as an argument the constant *praxis* of the Church, and as instances of this *praxis* they cite the condemnation of the book of Arius by the Nicene Council and of the writings of Nestorius by the Council of Ephesus, the declaration of the Vulgate's authenticity by the Tridentine and of the absence of all error in the Canon of the Mass by the same Council, and other infallible definitions of dogmatic facts made by the Church.

Van Noort, who is always clear and concise, says: "In the second place it is proven by the *praxis* of the Church who has frequently rejected in a definitive manner heretical writings, as, e.g., Arius's *Thalia* in the Council of Nicaea, the writings of Nestorius in the Council of Ephesus; in the Council of Trent she has declared the Vulgate to be authentic and the Canon of the Mass to be free from all error."<sup>59</sup>

De Groof<sup>60</sup> and almost all textbooks express themselves in similar vein. Well then, let anyone examine the records of the aforementioned Councils and it will be obvious that such facts have been defined by the Church not only as *infallible* or as of ecclesiastical faith, but also with the very same formula *anathema sit*, which is the classical formula of definitions of *heresy* and of *divine faith*. Suffice it to quote the Tridentine's definition relative to the Canon of the Mass: "If any man say that the Canon of the Mass contains errors and is therefore to be abrogated: *let him be anathema*."<sup>61</sup> The reader has here a true *dogmatic fact*, which is nonetheless defined not only as of ecclesiastical, but as of *divine faith*. With this same formula *anathema sit* or *anathematizamus* the Church condemned the book of Nestorius, the writing of Arius, the writings known by the name of "The Three Chapters", and other dogmatic facts. This constitutes a new argument to prove that dogmatic facts can be defined as of *divine faith* and that, in consequence, the so-called ecclesiastical faith is a truly *divine faith*.

Almost all textbooks, particularly Thomist textbooks, are also guilty of another contradiction. Having denied that theological conclusions and dogmatic facts are definable as of *divine faith*, they of course affirm that they are objects of *infallibility*. To prove this they quote passages from St. Thomas that refer to the indirectly revealed<sup>62</sup> in which the Saint expressly affirms that the denial of the indirectly revealed corrupts the faith. Well then, either

<sup>59</sup> VAN NOORT, *De Ecclesia Christi*, n.89.

<sup>60</sup> *Summa Apologetica*, q.9, a.3.

<sup>61</sup> COUNCIL OF TRENT, sess.22, can.6; Denz.-Schön, 1756.

<sup>62</sup> *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.11, a.2 and other parallel passages.

St. Thomas includes theological conclusions and dogmatic facts in the term "indirect", or not. If they are not included, then such passages are beside the point, and apart from them there are no other passages in the Holy Doctor that are applicable to the secondary object of *infallibility*. But if they are included, then they are definable as of *divine faith*, since St. Thomas expressly says that once it is defined by the Church the indirectly revealed is of *divine faith*, and to deny it is truly *heresy*.

264. THE ROOT OF THE CONFUSION. — In our opinion, the confusion in which many theologians find themselves mired in these matters has its root in the wrong formulation or in the misunderstanding of the division of the dogmatic facts into a question of principle and a question of fact. These theologians formulate or understand the division as follows:

*Question of Principle*: "Whether these or those propositions are *heretical*". *Question of fact*: "Whether these or those propositions are contained in such a book". (The reader will please observe that in the *question of fact* the term *erroneous*, or of anything that indicates a relation to the *revealed deposit*)

Having *thus formulated* the division, they concede that the question of principle is definable as of *divine faith*, but they deny that the question of fact can ever be of *divine faith* although it can be, and is, of *ecclesiastical faith*.

To this we answer, as every theologian ought to answer, that *thus formulated* the question is not, and cannot be, of *divine faith*; but neither is it, nor can it be, of *ecclesiastical faith* since it lies outside the Church's *infallibility*. For a very simple reason. Thus formulated the question is not a question of *dogmatic fact* but a question of merely *particular fact*, and where the fact is not dogmatic but particular no *divine faith* is possible, but then neither is *infallibility* possible. That division is of Jansenist origin and a great many theologians continue formulating it in the same manner without becoming aware that all the *dogmatic* character of the fact has been lodged in one of the members (in the question of principle), leaving the other member (the question of fact) entirely bereft of any *dogmatic* traces. Hence it is not in the least surprising that the question of fact *thus formulated* should be alien to *divine faith* since it is likewise alien to any *infallible faith* inasmuch as it is not a question of *dogmatic fact*. Let us see if we succeed in explaining this matter with some degree of the evidence that it inherently possesses and with which we believe we see it.

That which puts anything within the ambit of the Church's *infallibility* is not precisely its character of *principle* or of *fact*; it is exclusively its *dogmatic* character or the quality of being necessarily connected with the revealed deposit. Without that dogmatic character no question falls within the ambit of the Church's *infallibility*, be it a question of principle or a question of fact.

On the other hand, where that dogmatic character is present, any question, be it a question of principle or a question of fact, lies within the compass of infallibility.

Thus, the question whether "such a mathematical proposition is true or false" is a question of principle; the question whether "that same proposition is found, or not, in this book by Euclid" is a question of fact. Yet neither the one nor the other fall within the scope of the Church's infallible authority. They are both wanting in dogmatic character.

On the other hand, the question whether such a proposition is heretical is a question of principle; the question whether that same heretical proposition is found in such a book is a question of fact; both the one and the other fall within the scope of the Church's infallibility, but this is accounted for exclusively by the dogmatic character of both the one and the other, i.e., by the quality of being heretical or opposed to the revealed deposit that they both exhibit. Remove that character from any of these two questions, and infallibility vanishes.

Hence, if the dogmatic fact concerning Jansen is to be divided into two questions in such a manner that both should fall within the ambit of infallibility, it must be divided not into a question of principle and a question of fact but into a question of dogmatic principle and a question of dogmatic fact, making sure that both members exhibit the character of heretical or of being opposed to the revealed deposit, as follows: *Question of dogmatic principle*: "Whether such propositions are heretical". *Question of dogmatic fact*: "Whether such heretical propositions are found in Jansen's book".

If we remove from either question the term heretical or the character of being opposed to the revealed deposit, its dogmatic character vanishes and by the same token not only divine faith but infallibility or ecclesiastical faith vanishes as well. On the other hand, if we preserve in both their dogmatic character, then not only the question of principle but likewise the question of fact is of divine faith because the question of dogmatic fact is nothing but a particular instance of a revealed universal. This will be obvious to anyone who cares to review the second instance of reasoning mentioned earlier. The *conclusion*, which is precisely the statement of the question of fact, that is, of a dogmatic fact, is merely a particular instance (*every—this*) of the *major*, which is a revealed universal.

265. THE DOGMATIC FACT IS INDIVISIBLE. — Truth to say, the dogmatic fact considered with respect to the Church's authority or to our question of dogmatic principle and question of non-dogmatic fact; (a) question of dogmatic principle and question of dogmatic fact.

The first division is useless for our present purpose since no infallibility is possible with respect to any non-dogmatic fact. The second division is a merely nominal division and goes against the elementary rules of logic. Logic prescribes that no member of a division may include any of the other members nor be adequate to the whole that is divided. This would happen if we should divide man into animal and rational animal, i.e., into animal and man, which would not be a true division since the second member includes the first and is adequate to the whole that is divided.

Similarly, the so-called question of fact, if it be a dogmatic fact, essentially and inseparably includes the question of principle. This is the reason why both the one and the other are equally of divine faith since both constitute one and the same judgment. The act whereby sight perceives colour and the act whereby it perceives the existence or the location of the coloured thing are one and the same act of vision because colour is the ratio sub qua of every act of bodily sight. "Just as matter and form", says St. Thomas, "are one in being (unum in esse), so the reason of knowing and the thing known are one as known (unum cognitum), and on this account both are attained by one knowing (una cognitio), understanding by this term the act as well as the habit."<sup>63</sup>

Thus, to anyone who keeps in mind the fact that the dogmatic character is the ratio sub qua of the whole authority of the Church it will be obvious that every question of principle, i.e., of a truly dogmatic principle, is at the same time a question of fact. And vice versa, any question of fact, i.e., of truly dogmatic fact, is at the same time a question of principle.

In effect, to say that "such a proposition is (question of principle) heretical", is exactly the same as saying that "such a proposition contains (question of fact) a meaning contradictorily opposed to the meaning of such a portion or proposition of the revealed deposit".

Similarly, to say that "such a book contains (question of fact) such a heretical proposition" is exactly the same as saying that "the meaning of such a book is (question of principle) contradictorily opposed to such a portion or proposition of the revealed deposit".

266. THE DEEPER ROOT OF THIS CONFUSION. — The ultimate root of all this is to be found in the fact that the judgments of the Church are not judgments of mere principle or of intrinsic analysis of the subject or the predicate of a proposition, but judgments of fact or of confrontation between the proposition or book on the one hand and the revealed deposit on the other. The Church has divine authority for such a confrontation. If she

<sup>63</sup>In 3 Sent., d.14, q.1, a.1, q.4

does not, no divine faith in any of her decisions would be possible, neither in those that concern principles nor in those that concern facts. But if she does, someone should imagine that she has divine authority for every and any confrontation, unless short proposition or five loose propositions are to be confronted with the revealed deposit, whereas she has only ecclesiastical authority for cases where the propositions are longer or are stitched together or bound in a book.

It is being overlooked that the *revealed deposit*, and *only* the revealed deposit, is the eyes or the spectacles of the Church. Without these spectacles she sees nothing, be it a question of principle or a question of fact, a *pro-dogmatic*, and *only* what is *dogmatic*, be it facts or principles. Place before the Church this proposition: "A triangle is equal to two right angles", and, notwithstanding the evidence of such a proposition, the Church as such sees nothing because there is nothing dogmatic. Place before her this other proposition: "Christ is (or is not) God", and the Church sees at once its orthodox or heterodox character. Her *divine* spectacles detect it.

Similarly, place before her a profane or a secular book; she sees nothing. Place before her a dogmatic book or one in which the profane and the dogmatic are intermingled, and those *divine* spectacles detect at once the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of whatever dogmatic propositions are found in the book.

The place where the Church sees those orthodox or heterodox propositions is Jansen's book; but the medium or the spectacles whereby she sees them is the *revealed deposit*, divine revelation. Grammar, philology, history, all the labour of human reason employed by the Church are neither the spectacles nor the act of vision since they *precede* the definition or *vision of the Church*; they are not even required of the Church except as *previous conditions*. Infallibility itself is not the *medium of vision*, it is merely assistance: assistance to perform infallibly the act of vision, to apply the spectacles of the revealed deposit perfectly and without error to Jansen's book.

We ask the reader to reread the two instances of reasoning given above, and he will clearly see that the *minors* of those reasonings — it is in these minors that the labour of the Church is embodied — are simply a *confrontation* between Jansen's book and the revealed deposit. Jansen's book is the subject or object of these minors; the meaning of the revealed deposit is the *predicate* or the spectacles; the verb or copula is nothing but the result of the act of confrontation: the *vision*.

267. DIVINE SEARCHLIGHT. — If we had no misgivings that some people would misinterpret as anthropomorphic bodily images or metaphors on

account of their inability to extrapolate them properly to the intellectual order, we would compare the revealed deposit to a divine searchlight which, when focused by the Church with infallible certainty on Jansen's book, would, analogously to certain chemicals, reveal or colour all, and only, those portions or propositions in the book which are written either with *orthodox* or with *heterodox ink*. Whatever else is in the book written with any other kind of ink appears blank for the Church as such no matter how brightly coloured and legible it may appear to *human reason*. Infallibility (we will keep repeating it time and again) is given not for the purpose of increasing, or diminishing, or modifying the beam of that divine searchlight which is the *revealed universal major*, but for the purpose of focusing or *applying* it without error to the *particular* conclusion. This is the reason why what the Church sees — in this case it is precisely the particular conclusion or dogmatic fact — is seen by means of *divine light*, by the same light of the revealed deposit or of the revealed universal. This, finally, is the reason why the conclusion or dogmatic fact is not something *human* or *ecclesiastical*, but something *divine* since it is nothing but the infallible *application* of the *revealed universal* to a particular instance or proposition.

268. ANOTHER PROOF. — There is a simpler way to prove that the dogmatic fact, once it has been infallibly defined by the Church, is not only a truth of ecclesiastical faith, but a truth of truly divine faith.

Take the following universal proposition: "*It is a revealed truth that the Church is infallible in the definition of any and every dogmatic fact*". This proposition is commonly admitted by theologians, even by those who deny or seem to deny the definability of faith of theological conclusions.<sup>64</sup>

This universal proposition, by simply changing it into passive form is exactly the same as the following: "*It is a revealed truth that any and every dogmatic fact defined by the Church is infallibly true*", or what amounts to

64. There are some who answer that the Church's infallibility relative to dogmatic facts is indeed of *faith* considered in itself, but that it is not of obligatory faith because the Church has not defined it. However, others maintain that it is also of *obligatory faith* because, although the Church has not defined it in *express* terms, nonetheless she has defined it through constant use and *practice* by *anathematizing* the heretics who would resist her decrees regarding dogmatic facts." (BILLUART, *De Regulis Fidei*, d.3, a.7, §3, *sobvuntur objectiones*) "Indeed this infallibility is most certainly gathered from the revealed principles, and by *many* it is even regarded as also formally *revealed*, although it has not been yet *authentically* proposed as a dogma of divine faith." (Card. BILLOT, *De Ecclesia Christi*, th. 17, §2) "In the opinion of *many* it is also a *heresy*, although up to now it has not been *explicitly* condemned as heretical." (Card. FRANZELIN, *De Traditione*, th. 12)

the same thing. "It is a revealed truth that any and every dogmatic fact is infallibly true if the Church defines it".

With this evident presupposition it is easy to make it clear that not only the question of principle but the question of dogmatic fact as well is truly revealed as a particular instance in the universal, and consequently that it is of divine faith. The argument follows:

*It is revealed that any and every dogmatic fact is infallibly true if the Church defines it.*

Now, the Church has defined this dogmatic fact, e.g., that the five heretical propositions are found in Jansen's book.

Therefore, it is revealed that this dogmatic fact is infallibly true.

We ask the reader to view and review this reasoning without biases. It will be obvious that the conclusion is neither more nor less than a particular case (*any and every - this*) of the revealed universal major. It will also be obvious that the minor does nothing but purge or infallibly certify a *condition* in the major.

If, according to all theologians, whatever is contained in revelation as a particular in the universal is truly revealed; furthermore, if, also according to all theologians, every conclusion in whose deduction the minor does not intervene except as a *condition* is revealed, it follows that every dogmatic fact defined by the Church is of divine faith.

Finally, the reader will please note that in the aforementioned reasoning the major is the formal motive of the assent to the conclusion since the minor does not intervene except as a *condition*. Inasmuch as all of the labour effected by the Church's authority or infallibility reduces to the minor, i.e. to verifying the condition, it becomes obvious that the authority of the Church does not intervene as the formal motive, but as the *condition*, of the act of faith given by us to the conclusion, which is precisely the dogmatic fact. The *formal motive* is its inclusion in the revealed universal major, in other words, *divine revelation*.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>65</sup>Since it has not been revealed that "every host contains the body of Christ", but that "every consecrated host contains it", the fact whether this particular host contains the body of Christ or not necessarily depends on one *condition*: whether the host is consecrated or not. Now then, on the one hand, since that condition depends on a number of *falible* elements, it cannot be by us established with complete certainty about the intervention of an infallible definition by the Church. On the other hand, it is not possible for the Church's infallibility to intervene, nor does it extend to such a fact because it is a particular fact which does not concern the faith of the whole Church but the faith of the few particular persons. Hence, as St. Thomas says, such a fact cannot be the object of divine faith, but of *human* faith or prudence. The same thing must be said of every other fact that meets these two conditions: that it is impossible to know it with

269. If nonetheless, no one who denies a dogmatic fact is called a heretic, this is because, although the universal and therefore its particular conclusion are *truly revealed*, still it *has not yet been defined*, at least clearly, that they are revealed. For any man to be called a heretic it is not enough that what he denies be truly revealed, it is furthermore required that it be defined by the Church as revealed. Now, the major of the aforementioned reasoning is commonly admitted by theologians as a *revealed truth*; however, its revelation *has not yet been defined* by the Church, at least clearly.

270. AN OBJECTION. - A very learned theologian, who deals with every problem with remarkable depth, seems to be aware of the inescapable force of this second argument that we have adduced, and attempts an indirect reply to it as follows:

"You will object: Nothing that has been defined by the Church's infallible magisterium can be rejected without *heresy* because by its very denial the *infallibility* of the Church, which has been *revealed* by God, would *also* be denied. Now, whatever cannot be rejected without *heresy* must be held by *divine* faith. Therefore.

"Now, it would seem that there is a flaw in the minor, which you will distinguish thus: That must be held by divine faith which cannot be rejected without *heresy*. I distinguish: without *heresy directly* incurred by the rejection of such an object, I *concede*: without *merely concomitant* *heresy*, I *deny*. Now, even granting that one would incur *heresy* by denying a dogmatic fact defined by the Church, this would happen not on account of rejection of the dogmatic fact *by itself*, but only on account of the *concomitant* denial of the Church's infallibility in the definition of such matters. This infallibility could certainly be defined as a dogma of faith, although up to the present it has not been expressly so defined. Hence we have *carefully* said in the thesis

complete certainty without a definition, and that it cannot be defined because it does not concern the whole Church. Such facts, even when invested with a *religious* character, do not go beyond the category of *particular* facts and fail to qualify as *dogmatic* facts.

On the other hand, prior to the definition or acceptance or approval of the Church, a mistake or error is also possible with respect to the facts whether such a council is ecumenical or infallible, whether such a pope is a true pope, whether such a version of the Bible is authentic, whether such *orthodox* or *heterodox* propositions are contained in such a symbol or book, etc., etc.; and thus no divine faith is possible in spite of all the universal revelations. But since such facts are related to the doctrine or the faith of the *whole* Church, and not only to that of these or those particular persons, they can be infallibly defined by the Church, and after such definition they are of divine faith. This divine faith accrues to such facts not precisely from the definition or the authority or the infallibility of the Church, but from their being *contained* in the *revealed* universal, a containment that is made infallibly known to us by the definition. Thus, the authority of the definition of the Church is not the cause of their *being contained*, but only of *our infallible knowledge* of such containment.



that the things dealt with at present cannot *per se* and of *themselves* be a matter of heresy."

In the first place, the terms *it would seem* and *carefully* clearly indicate that the author himself does not have full confidence in the proposed solution. They give the impression that the author, seeing that the argument was conclusive but unable, on the other hand, to admit the conclusion, is at a loss whether to distinguish the major or the minor, and finally makes up his mind, although warily, to distinguish the minor. "It would seem that there is a flaw in the minor."

In the second place, notwithstanding so much wariness, our objector ends up by conceding that dogmatic facts are truly of divine faith, since what he denies is only that they are of divine faith *by themselves*, but not that they are of divine faith although on account of some other truth. What we are after is whether they are, or not, of divine faith; whether they are so for this or that reason is of little importance.

In the third place, our objector appears to have momentarily forgotten that to be of divine faith, yet not on account of *their own selves* but on account of some other truth is proper not only of dogmatic facts but also of everything that is *indirectly revealed*, including those things that are expressly contained in the Bible. The fact that Samuel was Helcana's son and all the other secondary facts in the Holy Scriptures are objects of truly divine faith, yet not on account of *themselves* but on account of *another revealed truth* that is involved in them or in which they are involved, a truth that is affirmed or denied when such facts are affirmed or denied. That other revealed truth is: "The Holy Scriptures are inspired by God and, therefore, cannot be false". Since this truth would be denied by the denial of the fact that Samuel was Helcana's son for this reason, and only for this reason, and not for their own selves, are such facts of divine faith. "But *indirectly* all those things pertain to the faith from which something would follow contrary to the faith, as, e.g., if someone were to say that Samuel was not Helcana's son, for thence it would follow that the *divine Scriptures are false*."<sup>66</sup>

In the fourth place, and this is the principal point we wish to stress and which has escaped the attention of the learned theologian, the fact that Samuel was Helcana's son is of divine faith not precisely because the Bible is revealed or inspired *in general*, but because it is revealed or inspired *in every-thing*, and consequently also revealed and inspired in that particular fact. Otherwise that fact would not be of divine faith.

When, therefore, we affirm or deny that fact, we not only affirm or deny the revelation of *another* truth, but we deny the revelation of *that* fact.

<sup>66</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.4. Cf. also 2-2, q.11, a.2; in 1 Sent., d.32, q.1, a.5; and in 4 Sent. d.13, q.11, a.1.

Hence that fact is capable of divine faith or of heresy not only concomitantly, but also immediately or in itself. Although the fact is not revealed on account of itself, nonetheless *the fact itself* is revealed.

In exactly the same manner not only has it been revealed in general that the Church is infallible but also that the Church is infallible in the definition of every dogmatic fact, and consequently in the definition of *this dogmatic fact*. Hence, when one denies this dogmatic fact, one not only denies the revelation of *another* truth, one also denies the revelation of *this* truth. *The fact itself* has been revealed, although it has not been revealed on account of itself.

Consequently they are in error who think that the formal motive of the assent to the definition of a dogmatic fact is the *infallibility of the Church* which is why the corresponding faith is *ecclesiastical*. The formal motive is not the Church's *infallibility* but the divine revelation of that infallibility in the definition of every dogmatic fact, and therefore of *this* dogmatic fact. Because divine revelation is involved that faith is divine; because it is divine revelation of *this* dogmatic fact that divine faith is not concomitant but proper, formal, and immediate.

As a matter of fact we would ask this question of any theologian: If Christ were personally to come down from heaven and tell us that such a dogmatic fact, e.g., the fact that the five propositions are found in Jansen's book, is *true*, would that fact be of divine faith, or not? Now then, what Christ would tell us *today*. He had already told us twenty centuries before. When He said or revealed that the Church is infallible in the definition of every dogmatic fact, and therefore in *this* dogmatic fact about Jansen, He had already told us that *this* dogmatic fact about Jansen, once defined, is *true*.

271. The foregoing also provides the solution to another objection indicated by the same learned theologian, to wit, to be able to say that a particular proposition has been revealed in its universal it is necessary that in both the universal and the particular propositions the *subject* be identical as, for instance, "Every council is infallible", and "This council is infallible". However, in the case of dogmatic facts the revealed universal is "The Church is infallible", and the particular is "This dogmatic fact is infallible", where the subjects are different.

From what has been said the reader knows the answer to this dialectical subtlety. The revealed universal proposition does not merely state that "the Church is infallible", but that "the Church is infallible in the definition of every dogmatic fact", which is the same as "all dogmatic facts, once defined, are infallible". The latter proposition has the same *subject* as the following: "This dogmatic fact, once defined, is infallible". Which is why it is of *divine* faith.

272. THE THOMIST OPINION. — Contemporary Thomists who deny that theological conclusions are definable as of divine faith also deny, and with greater vehemence, that dogmatic facts are definable as of divine faith. In so doing they are being consistent with themselves.

However, since these Thomists in arguing for the view denying that theological conclusions are definable as of faith often quote Billuart as a representative of the Thomist tradition and accordingly attach great importance to his testimony, it will not be amiss that we in turn should briefly quote Billuart's opinion on the subject of the definability of dogmatic facts. This is what he says:

"You will urge: Faith comes from hearing, and hearing from the Word of God. But the fact about Jansen is not contained in the Word of God. Therefore.

"Besides, the Church has no new revelations, and the articles of faith do not grow with the passage of time. But it would seem necessary to admit both these things if the fact about Jansen is held to be revealed and of divine faith. Therefore.

"I answer that the solutions to both instances can be had from what has been said.

"To the first, I distinguish the minor: The fact about Jansen is not contained in the Word of God explicitly and immediately, I concede; proposition: Every text condemned by the Church is deserving of condemnation.

"To the second. The revelation of the universal proposition just mentioned is not a new revelation, but it was given from the beginning. Consequently the condemnation of Jansen's text is not a new article of faith, but the explication and application of the revelation of the universal to a particular and determinate object. When a man is born, it is of faith that he sinned in Adam; however, there is neither a new revelation nor a new article of faith, but only the explication and application of the revelation of this universal proposition, all men sinned in Adam, to a particular object."

A little earlier Billuart had said: "Now, it is has been universally revealed that every text, every proposition, every book condemned by the Church is truly deserving of condemnation, since this is included in the revealed infallibility of the Church; therefore also this text of this proposition, e.g., Jansen's."<sup>67</sup>

<sup>67</sup> BILLUART, *De Regulis Fidei*, d.3, a.7, *solvuntur objectiones*.

Now then, how is it possible that Billuart, who clearly appears to deny that theological conclusions can be defined as of divine faith, could have gone so far as to admit that dogmatic facts are definable as of divine faith? For it must be noted — and this is the funny part — that Billuart's admission of the definability of divine faith of dogmatic facts is grounded, and grounded well, on the argument that "the Church's infallibility with respect to every dogmatic fact has been truly revealed", without adverting to the fact that it is likewise revealed that the Church is infallible with respect to *everything* truly connected with the revealed deposit, and therefore with respect to *every* truly theological conclusion, as almost every theologian concedes today. (212)

273. Billuart's oversight has a very simple explanation. It is common knowledge that Billuart frequently does little else but summarize, albeit with characteristic French clarity, the teachings of John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses. These two eminent theologians failed to discern the Suarezian muddle relative to the revealed *virtual* or theological conclusion, and thus denied, and did well in denying, that the *mere* virtual (*virtuale tantum* — connexive *tantum*) was definable as of faith since it is not a rigorous theological conclusion, but a merely physical conclusion. However, they employed such a phraseology as to seem to deny the definability of faith of every true virtual, including the identical or *implicit* virtual, and consequently of every truly and rigorously theological conclusion. In this matter, as in almost everything else, Billuart simply summarized these two theologians.

On the other hand, neither John of St. Thomas nor the Salmanticenses dealt with the issue of dogmatic facts since theologians had no cause to deal with the subject until it was raised by the evasions of the Jansenists. This made it possible for Billuart to do his own thinking on the subject of dogmatic facts which led him, as it ought to lead every Thomist, to the conclusion that dogmatic facts are implicitly revealed as particular instances in the universal, and that consequently they are definable as of divine faith. Thus on the two occasions that he touches on this problem,<sup>68</sup> he places the view which holds that dogmatic facts are of *divine* faith alongside the other then rather current view that held them to be of ecclesiastical faith, and takes pleasure in providing extensive solutions to whatever objections were marshalled by the Jansenists against it.

274. If John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses had lived somewhat later and had dealt with this subject, they would certainly have come to the

<sup>68</sup> *Loc. cit.* Also *De Incarnatione*, d.4, digressio secunda de Euthichianismo, s.5, *solvuntur objectiones*.

same conclusion. On the question whether it is of *divine* faith that "the present pope is a true pope" or that "the Council of Trent is a legitimate council" — these were the only *facts* then commonly discussed in connexion with faith — both give an affirmative answer on the ground that such facts are truly contained in divine revelation as the particular in the universal.<sup>69</sup>

But every dogmatic faith is contained in just the same manner, and hence it is definable as of *divine*, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith.

275. If such early Thomists as Torquemada, Cajetan, Cano, etc., denied that certain dogmatic facts, including the fact that "such a pope is a true pope," were of divine faith, this is explained by taking into account that the revealed status of the Church's infallibility with respect to those facts was not yet clear at the time. Those great Thomists have never been guilty of the glaring inconsistency involved in admitting the *revelation* of the Church's infallibility with respect to something and denying that that same thing is of *divine* faith once it has been defined. Since today both Thomists and non-Thomists concede the revealed status of the Church's infallibility with respect to dogmatic facts, everybody should concede that such facts are of *divine* faith once they have been defined.

276. THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH. — There has been progress in Catholic theology in the matter of dogmatic facts as in so many others. As it almost always happens, the practice or attitude of the Roman Church has been a principal factor of this progress. Clement VIII's forceful attitude, at the beginning of the 17th century, against the supporters of Alcalá's notorious thesis ("It is not of faith that this individual man, e.g., Clement VIII, is a true Pontiff"), oriented the thinking of theologians in the study of that dogmatic fact in particular, and since then almost everybody admits that the fact is of *divine* faith.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>69</sup> "Since the particular proposition contained in the universal revealed to the whole Church is immediately of *faith*, as the universal itself; but *this* proposition, 'Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church,' is contained in a *universal* proposition revealed to the whole Church; therefore this proposition is immediately of *faith*. . . The containment is declared in this syllogism: Every man duly elected by the Church to succeed Peter is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church; but Innocent XI is duly elected by the Church. . . The subsumed natural proposition [i.e., the *minor* of such reasonings] is a pure *explication* of the universal proposition, and its *application* to a determinate subject. Hence, if the universal proposition is but *once* taken to be immediately of *faith*, the middle natural proposition whereby it is *applied* and *explicated*, will not in the least hinder the *particular* proposition, which has the nature of a consequent, from being also immediately of *faith*." (SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, d.4, nn.33 and 36)

<sup>70</sup> "This view was given *great weight* by Clement VIII, who incarcerated some teachers for maintaining the contrary, and commanded them to go to Rome to give an account of the opinion which that See considered *deserving of punishment*." (PETRUS

Subsequently, the no less forceful attitude of Popes Innocent X, Alexander XII, and Clement IX against the resistance and the interminable quibbles presented by the Jansenists, similarly oriented Catholic theology in the study of the dogmatic fact in general. Since then there is almost no theologian who does not admit that it has been revealed that the Church is infallible with respect to every dogmatic fact. For every Thomist this is equivalent to saying that *every dogmatic fact* has been revealed, and consequently that it has been revealed that this dogmatic fact is infallibly true once it has been defined. Or in other words, that it is of *divine* faith since divine faith extends itself not only to what God reveals but also to what God reveals as *true*. However, although such a fact is of *divine* faith inasmuch as it is contained as a particular in a revealed universal, nonetheless it is *not* of *divine* faith that such a fact is of *divine* faith inasmuch as the revelation of the universal has not yet been defined. Hence, *no one who denies it is a heretic*.

We beg the reader's indulgence for so much insistence and repetition, but all of it is necessary in order to uproot ideas that are so widespread as that of the modern and heterogeneous ecclesiastical faith. In our opinion the term *ecclesiastical* faith would have perfectly described the kind of faith or *human* — not *divine* — religious assent given by us to the *non-infallible* teachings of the Church.

277. APPLICATIONS. — Everything that has been said in this section about dogmatic facts applies equally to such facts as whether this law, discipline or custom of the universal Church, or this Rule or these Constitutions of this religious order are *morally right* (the fact in question is the fact of their *morality*, not of their timeliness or prudence), or to any other truly dogmatic fact, to wit, one that is necessarily connected with the divine deposit or necessary for its preservation, explication or application, and has been infallibly defined or approved by the Church. The morality of such a fact is not only of ecclesiastical, but of *divine*, faith.

HURTADO, *De Fide*, d.3) Confronted by this attitude of Rome the theologians of the Society as well as the Thomists made such haste to support the papal directives that presently Lugo writes that "our later teachers *commonly*," teach this doctrine (*De Fide*, n.326); and the Salmanticensis, after quoting for their view almost all the Thomists posterior to Clement VIII, qualify it as "the *common opinion*" (*loc. cit.*, n.30). Thus, to argue for the view that dogmatic facts are of *divine* faith once they have been defined by the Church, the modern theologian needs do no more nor less than apply to dogmatic facts in general exactly the same principles that have been applied by almost all theologians since Clement VIII to the fact of "whether it is of *divine* faith that such a pope is a true pope once he has been accepted by the Church," or "whether it is of *divine* faith that such a council is a rule of faith once it has been accepted by the Church as *ecumenical*." Neither more nor less.

There is not the least difference between defining the *truth* of this conclusion or fact, and defining the *morality* of this Rule or Constitutions, of *divine* faith that "This council is infallible" inasmuch as the Church can define as particular instance or application of the revealed universal, "Every ecumenical council is infallible," so too she can define as of divine, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith that "This law, or custom, or Rule, etc., is *morally right*" inasmuch as here we have only a case of the particular application of the revealed universal, "Every law, or custom, or Rule, etc. in conformity with the morality of the revealed deposit, is morally right." The *divine* faith due to such a particular proposition does not derive from the Church's authority or infallibility but from its being *included* in the revealed universal or revealed deposit. The Church's authority or infallibility does not effect such inclusion, it only makes us *know* that inclusion infallibly. It does not intervene as the formal motive, but as the condition or the application of the formal motive, which is none other than divine revelation. It is, therefore, a case of *divine* faith, not of ecclesiastical faith or of human faith.<sup>71</sup>

278. Finally, the canonization of the saints is very probably nothing but an accidental variant case of dogmatic facts, and hence, also an object of divine faith. However, since its dogmatic character, that is, its necessary relation to a revealed universal or to the revealed deposit is not clear at first glance, and above all, since it has been expressly discussed by St. Thomas and by almost every Thomist (although we have already mentioned that there has been progress in the theology relative to these questions concerning facts), we shall study it in a separate section for we think that the subject deserves a separate treatment.

71. "Just as the proposition 'every man is mortal' and the proposition 'this man is mortal' are of faith in the same manner, so also the proposition 'the morality of the laws of the pope is in every instance good' and the proposition 'the morality of the laws is good' are of faith in the same manner." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis*, d. 3, a. 3, n. 10) Those who think that to hold as of divine faith the truth of every new defined dogmatic fact, or the morality of every new Church law or of every new dogmas in a prodigious and unheard-of manner, have failed to take note of the fact that such a dogmatic novelty is not a novelty in doctrine but simply a new application of the same one and unchangeable doctrine, and that such a dogmatic novelty can be effected not only by the Holy Father, but that it can be, and is in fact, effected every day by any father. Merely by procreating a new child, every father gives us a new dogma: the dogma that *this* new child — of whom, we can be sure, the Apostles were not thinking — was redeemed by Christ, etc. But all such novelty reduces simply to a particular application of what the Apostles had already taught us in universal form. What any father does by the act of procreation, the pope does by the act of *definition*. We omit many other proofs of this same truth, with which we have already dealt, (239, 248-252)

For the present suffice it to have demonstrated, as we believe we have, that every truly *dogmatic* fact has been implicitly revealed by God as a particular in the universal, and consequently, once it is infallibly defined, it is an object of a faith that is truly and properly *divine*, and not only of that modern discovery called *ecclesiastical* faith. By the same token it has also been demonstrated that the scope of the evolution of dogma includes not only theological conclusions but also dogmatic facts.

#### Section IV THE CANONIZATION OF SAINTS AND ECCLESIASTICAL FAITH

279. MEANING OF THE PROBLEM. — In the previous section we have attempted to show that every dogmatic fact is definable as of divine, and not only as of the so-called ecclesiastical, faith. Since the canonization of saints is only a particular instance of dogmatic fact, it would not have required a separate study, it would have sufficed to apply to it the teaching already expounded in the previous section. Nonetheless, we shall deal with it separately in order to explore the mind of St. Thomas who expressly treated the question of the canonization of saints.

In the first place, it is one thing to have the *power* to canonize, and quite another thing to be *infallible* in canonizing. That the Church has the power to canonize is a truth of Catholic faith; to deny it would constitute heresy. "In this question it must be assumed as certain that it is of *faith* that the Pope and the Church have the power to canonize Saints. For to say that the Church has the power to canonize Saints is very different from saying that the Church cannot err in their canonization."<sup>72</sup> "It is *heretical* to deny that the authority to canonize Saints exists in the Church and the Pope."<sup>73</sup>

In the second place, canonization and beatification are two different things. Canonization is the Church's *definitive* judgment concerning the holiness and eternal glory of the canonized saint, and further includes a precept to pay him religious worship. On the other hand, beatification is a judgment that is *not definitive* but amendable, it does not carry a precept but only a permission to pay worship to the beatified person. Inasmuch as without a *definitive judgment* infallibility is not possible, almost all the theologians concede that the Church is not infallible in the beatification of the blessed, although it would be rash to assert that she has in fact erred in this or

72. JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis*, d. 3, a. 2, n. 8.  
73. BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q. 1, a. 10, dubium 7.

that beatification. "Although from this it could be inferred that any one who dared to affirm that the Roman Pontiff has erred in this or that formal beatification deserves to be branded with the mark of *temerity* or of a more grievous theological censure . . ., nonetheless it cannot be concluded with certainty that the judgment itself is *infallible* or that it is of faith inasmuch as it is always permissive, *never preceptive*, and it does certainly lead to a final judgment, but it is itself not the last word."<sup>74</sup>

In the third place, a distinction must be made between canonization on the one hand, and the miracles, private revelations, apparitions, historical events, or relics of the canonized saint, on the other hand. When the Church in the process of canonization approves the miracles performed by a saint, or includes them in the lessons of the breviary; when she institutes a special holiday to honour the apparition of a saint, e.g., the feasts of the Apparition at Lourdes, the Apparition of St. Michael the Archangel, the Transfer of the House of Loreto, etc., etc.; when she approves the private revelations made to a saint, e.g., those made to St. Bridget, or the authenticity or veneration of his relics, it is a fairly common opinion that such miracles, apparitions, revelations, historical events, or relics are not thereby infallibly defined, albeit they are always deserving of the pious assent and the reverence due to the teachings of the Church, including those that are not infallible. "When the Church makes an inquiry or a pronouncement concerning *revelations, apparitions, miracles*, she does not intend to acquire anything other than a *human probability* or certainty of a practical order, that is to say, sufficient to foster worship. The same goes for the authenticity of *relics*."<sup>75</sup>

In the fourth place, canonization is one thing, inscription in the martyrology is another. Since the Church inscribes in the martyrology not only the names of those who have been canonized but also of those who have been

<sup>74</sup>BENEDICTUS XIV, *De Senorum Dei Beatificatione*, lib. 1, c.42, n.10.  
<sup>75</sup>BAINVEL, *De Magisterio Vivo et Traditione*, n.107, Paris 1905. We are amazed at reading in a distinguished contemporary Roman theologian the following statement: "The fact, e.g., of the *Presentation of the Bl. V. Mary* in the temple, cannot be denied without *detriment to the faith* since concerning it there is a feast regarding the whole Church." By the same token we should also hold with divine faith the fact of Lourdes, of the House of Loreto, etc., etc., which are also commemorated by a feast in the whole Church. In our view, such facts are not only not of divine faith but neither of ecclesiastical or infallible faith, but merely of practical or prudent religious assent, which does not require infallibility. Benedict XIV writes: "But certain other things pertain to *religion* in such a manner that they cannot be rejected without *culpable arrogance*, e.g., that *the Most Bl. Virgin was presented in the temple*. Indeed, to such things the Church does not attribute the character of *undoubted truth*, although it is not lawful to teach otherwise, at least publicly: for in such things only the *nature of practical truth* is required, to wit, the congruence with the dictate of *prudent reason*." (*De Servorum Dei Beatificatione*, lib.1, c.43, n.13)

beatified, and even of those who are simply venerable, it is obvious that the mere inscription in the martyrology is not an *infallible* argument of sanctity.

The present problem, then, concerns *canonization* exclusively and none of the other things mentioned. Canonization is usually defined as "the last and *definitive* judgment whereby the Church declares that a person has led a holy life and has been received among the dwellers in heaven, and proposes him to all the faithful to be worshipped and invoked by them."<sup>76</sup>

280. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. — In the previous section we have seen that modern theologians usually distinguish two questions when dealing with dogmatic facts, viz., the question of *principle* and the question of *fact*. "To the first," they say, "we give the assent of divine faith, but to the second we give the assent of ecclesiastical faith." (257)

They make a similar distinction when dealing with the canonization of saints inasmuch as the latter is nothing but a variant of dogmatic facts. Although no express mention is made of the question of *principle* or of the question of *fact*, the attentive reader will notice that they make a distinction between these two questions: (a) What kind of faith do we give to the question "Whether the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints", which is a question of principle; (b) What kind of faith do we give to the question "Whether this canonized saint is truly a saint or is truly in heaven", which is a question of fact.

Not only do they make a distinction between these two questions, although without express mention of principle or of fact, but they also give a different reply to each of them. The faith given to the first question, "Whether the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints", is, they say, *divine* faith. On the other hand, the faith given to the second question, "Whether this canonized saint is truly a saint or truly in heaven", is, according to them, *ecclesiastical* faith.

Thus, even if modern theologians usually make a distinction between the case of dogmatic facts and the case of the canonization of the saints, nonetheless, the force of logic has led them to apply to the canonization of the saints a solution identical or similar to the one given by them to the problem of dogmatic facts.

In the previous section we have seen that the question of fact, if it is truly dogmatic, includes the question of principle, and hence, both the one and the other are equally of divine faith. In this chapter we hope to show that the case of canonization is exactly the same by making clear that the ques-

<sup>76</sup>DE GROOT, *Summa Apologetica*, q.9, a.5.

tion, "Whether this canonized saint is in heaven" deserves the same kind of faith as the question, "Whether the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints", and that, consequently, the faith in question is divine faith.

As a matter of fact, every attentive reader of St. Thomas, and even of every Thomist prior to the Jansenist disputes, will notice at once that they hold that the faith we give to both questions is one and the same. Hence, they reduce the problem to finding out whether the Church is infallible or has divine assistance in the canonization of saints and ascertaining the kind of faith we give to that infallibility, since once we have ascertained what kind of faith we give to the Church's infallibility on a certain issue, we have also ascertained the kind of faith we give to that same issue once it has been infallibly defined by the Church. John of St. Thomas says to the point: "Thus the doubt *reduces to this*: whether the *judgment* made by the Church in the canonization of a saint is *infallible*, and with what *degree* of certainty it is to be held that the *Pope cannot err in such judgment*."<sup>77</sup>

Everything, as we shall see, turns on this point, i.e., on the kind of faith with which we believe the authority or infallibility of the Church in the matter of facts connected with the revealed deposit. However, inasmuch as there has been progress on this subject in Catholic theology since the time of St. Thomas, and even since the time of John of St. Thomas, we shall briefly explain: (a) the mind of St. Thomas; (b) the views of subsequent theologians up to the debates on the Church's authority in the matter of dogmatic facts, i.e., up to the rise of Jansenism; (c) the view of modern theologians.

281. THE MIND OF ST. THOMAS. — *Doctrine* is one thing, *facts* are another thing. The Church is infallible when she defines a *doctrine* of faith or of morals. This is a fundamental dogma that has always been believed in the Catholic Church without any need of definition by any council. It was defined from the very beginning in the teaching itself of the apostles inasmuch as it is the basis or indispensable condition for every other dogma. The Vatican Council did not define the infallibility of the *Church*, which it took for granted, but the infallibility of the *Pope*, declaring that the latter possesses the very same infallibility given by Christ to his Church. "We define that the *Roman Pontiff* . . . when he defines a *DOCTRINE* of faith and morals . . . enjoys the *same infallibility* with which the Divine Redeemer willed that his Church be equipped."<sup>78</sup>

However, although everybody believed that the Church was infallible in matters of *doctrine*, St. Thomas, to our knowledge, was the first to touch expressly on the Church's infallibility in the matter of *facts*, devoting a whole

<sup>77</sup> *Loc. cit.*, n.9.

<sup>78</sup> Denz.-Schön. 3074.

article to the infallibility of the Church in the *fact* of the canonization of saints. As usual, in dealing with this particular problem of the canonization of saints, St. Thomas rose to the general level of principles; introducing for the first time in the history of theology the distinction between *doctrine* of faith and morals, *particular facts*, and *facts connected with the doctrine*, he laid down the future bases of a whole new treatise on *dogmatic facts*, whereof the canonization of saints is only a particular case. Let us then carefully examine the process employed by the holy Doctor, since that is the surest means to penetrate well his mind.

The question of the canonization of saints is treated by St. Thomas in *Quodlibetum* 9, art. 16, with the title "Whether the Saints canonized by the Church are in heaven, or some of them in hell." The whole article is given in a footnote so as to enable the reader to appraise by himself the analysis we are going to make of it.

<sup>79</sup> Art. 16. "Whether all the Saints canonized by the Church are in heaven or some of them in hell.

[Objection 1] "Next it is asked, as regards heaven, whether all canonized saints are in heaven, or some of them in hell; and it seems that some of those who are canonized in the Church can be in hell. For no one can be certain of somebody else's state, as he himself is of his own state, for 'no man knows the things of a man save the spirit of the man which is in him' as is said in 1 Cor. 2:11. But no man can be certain of himself, i.e. whether he is in the state of salvation: for it is said in Eccles. 9:1, 'No one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or of love.' Therefore, much less can the pope know; therefore, *he can be mistaken in canonizing*.

[Objection 2] "Besides, whosoever depends on a fallible medium when making a judgment can err. But the Church, when canonizing saints, depends on human testimony, since she inquires through witnesses about their life and miracles. Therefore, inasmuch as the testimony is fallible, it seems that the Church can err in canonizing saints.

"But to the contrary: In the Church there cannot be any damnable error. But this would be a damnable error if someone who was a sinner should be venerated as a saint, because those who know his sins would believe this to be false; and if this should happen, they could be led into error. Therefore, the Church cannot err in such things.

"Besides, Augustine says in a letter to Jerome that if any lie be admitted in the Canonical Scriptures, our faith, which depends on the Canonical Scriptures, would falter. But just as we are obliged to believe that which is contained in Holy Scripture so also that which is commonly determined by the Church. Hence he who judges contrary to the determination of the councils is considered a heretic. Therefore, the common judgment of the Church cannot be erroneous; and thus the same as before.

"[Preliminary consideration] I answer: it must be said that something can be judged possible when considered in itself, which is found to be impossible when considered in relation to something extrinsic. I thus say that the judgment of those who preside over the Church can be mistaken as regards anything whatsoever, if their persons alone are taken into account. However, if divine providence is taken into account, which guides his Church by the Holy Spirit, so that she should not err, as He himself promised,

In a brief preliminary observation the Saint notes that every man considered in himself is fallible and can be infallible only through divine assistance. Having established this point he begins his argument with a *major premise* made up of the three propositions that follow:

- (a) "It is certain that the judgment of the universal Church *cannot err* in anything that pertains to the *faith* [doctrine of faith or morals]."  
 (b) "But in other decisions that concern *particular facts* . . . it is possible . . . to *err*."  
 (c) "The *canonization* of saints is *midway between these two*."

Hereto the argument's *major premise*. With it alone no conclusion could be inferred relative to the Church's infallibility or non-infallibility in the canonization of saints. If we knew nothing else about canonization than that it is *midway between doctrine* which is an object of infallibility, on the one hand, and *particular facts* which are not objects of infallibility, on the other hand, we would be left in the dark as to whether infallibility in canonization is possible or not.

For this reason the holy Doctor introduces a *minor premise*, which is the root and the central point of the whole article, and which reads thus: "But *nonetheless*" — the reader will please note that *nonetheless*, which means to say, *in spite of* being "midway between these two" — "inasmuch as

John 14, that the Spirit who was to come would teach all truth, viz., concerning the things necessary for salvation:

"[Major premise] it is certain that it is impossible for the judgment of the universal Church to *err* in the things that pertain to the *faith*. Hence one should abide by the faith, more than by the opinion of whatsoever learned men in matters of Scripture, for without knowing, because he was the Chief Priest, but in the case of other decisions regarding *particular facts*, as when it is a question of possessions or crimes or something similar, it is possible for the judgment of the Church to *err* because of false witnesses. The canonization of saints is *midway between these two*."

"[Minor premise] NONETHELESS, since the honor we exhibit to the saints is a kind of profession of faith whereby we believe in the glory of the saints,  
 "[Conclusion] it is piously to be believed that even in these matters the judgment of the Church cannot *err*."

"To the first [objection] it must be said that the pope, whose it is to canonize saints, can become certain of the state of a man by the examination of his life and the attestation of miracles, and especially by the impulse of the Holy Spirit who "scrutinizes all things even the depths of God" (1 Cor. 2:10).

"To the second it must be said that divine Providence preserves the Church from being deceived in such matters by the fallible testimony of men." (ST. THOMAS, *Quodlibetum*, 9, a.16; ed. Fretté or Vivès, Paris, vol. 15, pg. 566)

the honour that we exhibit to the saints is, a kind of profession of faith whereby we believe in the glory of the saints." In other words, although canonization is midway between the doctrine of faith and particular facts, nonetheless (*tamen*) it is a particular application of the doctrine of faith (*quædam professio fidei est*), it is something related to the dogma of faith of the glory of the saints (*qua sanctorum gloriam credimus*). Thus, although it is not purely doctrine, but a fact, it is a doctrinal fact, or, as we would call it today, a dogmatic fact.

Thus, although in the major premise canonization appeared as midway between the doctrine of faith and particular facts, or as an island isolated from those two extremes, the holy Doctor, by means of the minor premise, has succeeded in discovering a bridge, viz., the doctrinal character of the fact of canonization. That bridge or doctrinal character links canonization not with the particular facts and, consequently, with those things relative to which infallibility is impossible, but with the doctrine of faith, and, therefore, with those things which of their own nature fall within the Church's infallibility.

Of course, once that bridge has been established it comes as no surprise that the holy Doctor should very naturally infer the following conclusion: "It is to be piously believed that it is impossible for the Church's judgment to err even in these things."

Having summarily seen the process employed by the holy Doctor in his reasoning, let us briefly consider the exact meaning of these two celebrated phrases: (a) "Canonization is midway between these two", which appears in the major premise; (b) "It is to be piously believed," which is found in the conclusion. These two phrases have been the butt of innumerable conjectures on the part of the supporters of the modern ecclesiastical faith.

282. MEANING OF THE PHRASE "CANONIZATION IS MIDWAY BETWEEN THESE TWO". — In the first place, if the reader will please carefully consider the whole article of the holy Doctor he will reap the confirmation of what we have previously said, viz., that in St. Thomas's mind these two questions are identical: (a) What certainty do we have that this canonized saint is in heaven?; (b) What certainty do we have that the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints? Thus in the article's title he places the first question and then in the objections, the arguments to the contrary (see contra), the body of the article, and the solution to the objections, he always replies with the second question. Therefore, the kind of faith we give to the first question depends on the kind of faith we give to the second question. For St. Thomas the two questions are one and the same.

In the second place, the reader will please note that the phrase "is midway between these two" does not make reference to the phrase "it is to be

piously believed," but to the term "canonization." Hence, St. Thomas does not say that the "to be piously believed" occupies a middle place; what he says is that such a middle place is occupied by canonization. *Canonization is midway between these two.*

In the third place, the reader will please note that the minor premise or key to the whole reasoning is to be found not in the proposition that "canonization is midway between these two", but in the proposition that canonization or the worship of saints "is a kind of profession of faith." Consequently, the conclusion "it is to be piously believed" is not deduced by St. Thomas from the assertion that "canonization is midway between the two," but from the assertion that "canonization is a kind of profession of faith." Indeed, so far as St. Thomas from saying that the conclusion "it is to be piously believed" is deduced from the term "midway between the two," he explicitly states that it is deduced *in spite of it*: "But nonetheless", etc.

We insist on such a clear thing because certain supporters of the modern ecclesiastical faith read this article of St. Thomas as if the holy Doctor had reasoned thus: "Canonization is midway between these two; therefore, it is to be piously believed." Whence they argue that the pious belief whereof St. Thomas speaks is a faith midway between divine and human faith, or in other words, the modern ecclesiastical faith. They have missed the point that St. Thomas has reasoned in a completely contrary manner, to wit: "Canonization is midway between these two; but, nonetheless, it is a kind of profession of faith; therefore, it is to be piously believed", etc. In other words, it is not to be piously believed because it is midway, but in spite of being midway, inasmuch as although it is midway between the doctrine of faith and the particular facts, nonetheless (tamen) it somehow belongs to the first member, i.e., to the doctrine of faith (it is a kind of profession of faith), because it is necessarily related to the dogma of the glory of the saints.

Thus, the holy Doctor argues in the following manner. We know for certain that the Church is infallible in one field, to wit, the doctrine of faith and morals. We also know for certain that the Church is not infallible in another field, which is that of particular facts. If canonization directly belonged to either of those two fields, the issue would have been decided in favour of infallibility if it belonged to the former, or in favour of non-infallibility if it belonged to the latter. But it so happens that canonization belongs directly neither to the first nor to the second of those two fields, but lies midway between the two: "Canonization is midway between these two." Therefore, if we had only those two principles or categories of things it would be impossible for us to know anything for certain relative to the Church's infallibility or non-infallibility in the canonization of saints.

But this notwithstanding (nonetheless) — the holy Doctor goes on — there is a third principle or way to find out. That way is the indirect path of

relation or consequence. Although canonization is not directly the doctrine itself of faith since it is a fact, it is nevertheless necessarily related to the doctrine of faith. Why? Because in canonization the worship of the canonized saint is prescribed to the whole Church, and this worship or homage is a kind of profession of faith in the dogma of the glory of the saints. Consequently, if the Church is infallible in the doctrine of faith, it would be impious to believe that she is fallible in the profession of that same faith, i.e., in the canonization of the saints.

In a nutshell: in the phrase "canonization is midway between these two" the two are not two faiths, one divine and one human, and the midway is not a third faith midway between divine and human faiths. Such a notion, invented four centuries later, never passed through St. Thomas's mind. The two are two categories of objects, viz., the doctrine of faith and the particular facts, and the midway is a third category of objects, i.e., the doctrinal facts connected, as in the case of canonization, with the doctrine of faith or the first category. It was not the purpose nor the merit of St. Thomas to invent a third or middle faith, but to examine that middle object and discover a connexion or bridge whereby it could break away from its middle status or isolation, and remain linked to the first extreme. Thus, this whole article of the holy Doctor can be synthesized in a simple enthymeme as follows: Canonization is necessarily connected with the doctrine of faith, therefore it must be piously believed that the Church is infallible in the canonization of saints.

283. MEANING OF THE PHRASE "IT IS TO BE PIOUSLY BELIEVED" — What is for St. Thomas the value or the meaning of the phrase "it is to be piously believed"?

Obviously it does not mean that it is to be believed with divine faith since here we have only a simple consequence deduced exclusively through reasoning or connexion with the doctrine of faith. It is common knowledge that, according to St. Thomas and his school, no consequence or connexion is of divine faith as long as it has not been defined by the Church.

Much less does it mean that it is to be believed with ecclesiastical faith. The reason is clear. As understood by its supporters, ecclesiastical faith presupposes the Church's infallibility since it is grounded on it. Now, it is precisely this infallibility which the holy Doctor intends to prove, and it is of this infallibility that he says that it is to be piously believed. Hence, to say that the Church's infallibility must be piously believed, and at the same time to take "pious belief" in the sense of believing with ecclesiastical faith, is tantamount to saying that the Church's infallibility must be believed on account of . . . the infallibility of the Church. St. Thomas is never guilty of such theological twaddle.



Consequently, the assertion "it is to be piously believed", deduced as a mere consequence of a reasoning, has for St. Thomas no meaning or value other than *scientifico-theological* value, the value of a *theological conclusion*; the same value proper of any and every thing *indirectly* revealed or necessarily connected with the revealed; the same value inherent in anything of which, as long as it remains undefined by the Church, is not of divine faith except "indirectly" or "reductively", and belongs directly and formally to *theology* for anyone who evidently perceives the connexion, or to *human faith* for anyone who, without perceiving the connexion, assents to it on the authority of the theologians who perceive it.

Since that consequence was not yet of divine faith, as it was not yet defined by the Church, St. Thomas did not say, nor could he have said, that "it is to be believed with divine faith" or that "it is heretical." However, since that consequence was *sufficiently certain*, and furthermore involved a matter that was not merely *speculative* — as, e.g., the conclusion that divine grace is a *quality* — but a matter related to the virtue of *piety*, viz., the *worship* of the saints, St. Thomas was not satisfied by the phrase "it is certain", but instead employed the phrase "it is to be piously believed," thus, qualifying as *impious* the contrary view.

All the foregoing has been well expressed by John of St. Thomas in the following terms: "That *causal* proposition of St. Thomas [viz., *Nonetheless since* the honour we exhibit to the saints is a kind of profession of faith whereby we believe the glory of the saints, *it is to be piously believed*," etc.] is to be explained in this manner: that *inasmuch* as canonization is a judgment *about the honour and veneration* to be exhibited to the saints, whereby in the very act of passing such a judgment we *profess* the special glory of a certain saint, *for this reason it reductively, so to say, pertains to the faith*, and therefore *it is piously believed* that the pope cannot err in such matters . . . We therefore say that it is . . . *impious* because it is contrary to the *veneration and worship* due to the saints themselves . . . However, we do not *expressly* brand as a *heretic* anyone who denies it . . . However, we do *certainly and expressly defined in particular* that such a canonization is a definition of faith, but only that from things already held by faith *it follows as something unsuitable* that error could be found in such a canonization . . . And thus it is not of faith *directly*, but *reductively*."<sup>80</sup>

To resume: the phrase "it is to be piously believed" with which St. Thomas qualified the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints, signifies human *certainty* or *human faith* since any certainty or any faith that is

<sup>80</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Loc. cit.*, nn.11-16.

solely based on theological reasoning is formally *human* albeit materially divine. Such is, e.g., the certainty of the theologians, or the faith of the faithful, regarding the theological conclusion that "Christ's soul enjoyed the beatific vision from the very first instant of his conception," or of any other theological conclusion that has not yet been defined by the Church. Such conclusions are *certain*, but they are not *infallibly certain* or certain as truths of *divine faith*. To deny them is *temerarious* or *impious* but not *heretical*.

284. SUBSEQUENT THEOLOGAINS UP TO THE 17th CENTURY. — Since St. Thomas' discussion of the canonization of saints almost all subsequent theologians dealt with the subject. The vast majority maintained the position defended by St. Thomas, viz., that the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints, and hence, the sanctity of the canonized saint, were theologically certain, albeit not infallibly certain or certain with the certitude of divine faith.

However, there were some theologians who denied such infallibility. Others went to the opposite extreme and affirmed that it was already a truth of divine faith so that to deny it was heresy.

There thus emerged three opinions which John of St. Thomas concisely describes as follows: "The *first opinion* teaches that the pope *can err* in the canonization of saints. On the opposite extreme, the second opinion considers that *it is of faith* that the pope *cannot err* in the canonization of saints, and hence, after the canonization *it is of faith* that such a saint is *in heaven*. The *third middle opinion* holds that it is indeed *certain* that the pope *cannot err* in the canonization of saints, and that he who says the contrary is *worthy of censure, however, he would not be a heretic but temerarious, impious and scandalous*, or even *close to error or savouring of heresy*. This opinion is lately the *more common* . . . and is taken from St. Thomas (Quodlib. 9, a.16)""<sup>81</sup> These three opinions are similarly, although more extensively, described by Benedict XIV.<sup>82</sup>

The first opinion, which denies the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints, is upheld by a few and not very noteworthy theologians, although the eminent Cardinal Cajetan is usually cited as one of them. The third opinion, which not only affirms that the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints is certain but also that it is already a truth of divine faith, is likewise upheld by relatively few theologians, although among them we find such prestigious names as the Franciscan Alfonso de Castro and the Jesuits Valencia and Tirso González. Finally, the

<sup>81</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, nn.9-11.  
<sup>82</sup> *Loc. cit.*, c.43.

second opinion, that of St. Thomas, which affirms that the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints is certain, but not infallibly certain or certain as a truth of divine faith, is upheld by the vast majority of theologians, not only of the Thomist but of all schools. Benedict XIV cites names and passages from all those theologians in chapters 43 and 45 of his aforementioned book.<sup>83</sup>

The Thomist view, which has been just stated by John of St. Thomas, is also described by Suárez in the following terms: "Likewise, the faithful may not licitly place the glory of a canonized saint in doubt, for that is commanded under precise obligation by the popes in the very act of canonization. Therefore it is necessary that such a precept should *not be liable to error*, otherwise God would be found wanting in a matter most necessary to the Church, which is contrary to his providence and his promises. And thus, although *this INFERENCE is not of faith*, I hold it as *fairly certain*, and its contrary as *impious and temerarious*."<sup>84</sup>

Although during this period, from the time of St. Thomas up to the second half of the 17th century, the status of the question has remained almost the same, there are two things worthy of note:

1. All those theologians, irrespective of their partiality to any of the three aforementioned positions, concur with St. Thomas in considering as identical these two questions: (a) What is the certainty with which we believe in the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of saints? (b) What is the certainty with which we believe in the sanctity or the glory of the canonized saint?

<sup>83</sup> Benedict XIV ends the whole question by saying that the Church has as yet defined nothing on this matter, and fairly inclines to the view that the fact of canonization is of divine faith. "Up to the present no definitive judgment has been passed on these matters, and many Catholic and pious teachers deny that he who says that it is not of faith either that the pope is infallible in canonizing or that a man canonized by him is a saint, will be a formal heretic. . . . Thus it seems to us that both opinions are to be left in their probability until such time as a judgment should issue from the Apostolic See. . . . However, we also willingly admit that it favours not slightly the view that maintains that it is of faith that whoever is canonized is a saint and is in eternal glory." *Loc. cit.*, c. 45, nn. 26-27) Whoever attentively reads Báñez, John of St. Thomas, Benedict XIV, and almost everyone of the great theologians of this period, will at once notice that they say that canonization is not of divine faith as yet, that he who denies it is not a formal heretic or evidently a heretic, etc. Such phrases are not employed with respect to things that cannot be of divine faith, but with respect to those things that can be of faith but are not yet of faith. If by ecclesiastical faith modern theologians were to mean the faith we give to certain truths that can be defined as of divine faith but have not yet been so defined, we would have no qualms in admitting such ecclesiastical faith.

<sup>84</sup> SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d. 5, s. 8, n. 8.

2. All of those who with St. Thomas deny that the second question pertains to divine faith, do so because with St. Thomas they deny that the first question pertains to divine faith, or in other words, that the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints is of divine faith.

285. FROM THE 17th CENTURY TO THE PRESENT. — As we mentioned earlier when we outlined the history of ecclesiastical faith, the debates on the question of fact concerning the five propositions of Jansen's book, which took place in the second half of the 17th century and persisted even long after, were fruitful for the study of the problem of "the infallibility of the Church with respect to *dogmatic facts*." Besides, they provided the occasion for bringing the so-called ecclesiastical faith into Catholic theology. Since the canonization of saints is nothing more nor less than a *dogmatic fact* or a fact *connected with dogma*, any development in the doctrine on dogmatic facts was bound to have repercussions sooner or later, if the theologians were consistent, on the doctrine on the canonization of saints.

In the face of repeatedly issued papal bulls that infallibly defined not only the question of principle but also the question of fact about the propositions of Jansen's book, and demanded from all the faithful not only an external obedience or religious silence but also an internal and unconditional obedience, all Catholic theologians, some sooner and some later, eventually agreed on the following proposition: "It is absolutely certain that the Church is infallible in the definition of dogmatic facts", i.e., in the definition of any fact *necessarily connected with the preservation or explication of the revealed deposit*. Inasmuch as the canonization of saints is but a particular instance of dogmatic fact, no theologian subsequently denied the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of saints.

Once the issue of the Church's infallibility relative to dogmatic facts was thus decided, a second question arose: "What kind of faith must be given to such *dogmatic facts* after they have been defined?"

On this point there was a division among theologians. Some of them maintained that such a faith was *divine faith* based on *divine revelation*. Others said that it was *ecclesiastical faith* based on the *infallibility of the Church*. Those who upheld the so-called ecclesiastical faith in the matter of dogmatic facts subsequently extended it, and quite consistently, to the canonization of saints.

Finally, this second question was necessarily bound to raise, although somewhat later, a third question, to wit: "With what kind of faith do we believe in the *Church's infallibility* relative to dogmatic facts?" If we believe the dogmatic facts on account of the Church's infallibility, with what kind of faith do we hold that infallibility itself?

The answer to this third question necessarily had to be unanimous. Hence that they maintained that dogmatic facts were worthy of divine faith, and maintaining that the Church's infallibility had an even more compelling reason for also a truth of divine faith since the Church's infallibility relative to any and every revealed thing has always been considered as of divine faith. Likewise, those who maintained that dogmatic facts were objects of ecclesiastical faith had to come sooner or later to the same conclusion. To maintain that we believe in dogmatic facts with ecclesiastical faith means that we believe in the Church were to be believed with ecclesiastical faith we would fall into the absurdity or vicious circle of believing in the infallibility of the Church on account of the infallibility of the Church. If the infallibility itself of the Church cannot be believed with ecclesiastical, but with divine, faith. Which is tantamount to saying that the infallibility of the Church is a truly revealed truth.

The reader will now be able to appreciate the vast progress in Catholic theology from the 17th century to the present on the question "Whether the Church is infallible in the matter of *facts connected* with the revealed deity of Catholic theologians prior to the rise of Jansenism was that "it is to be *certain* but not yet of *divine faith*. After the definitions and the attitude maintained by the Church against Jansenism, and even much more after the Vatican Council, all, or almost all, theologians answer that the infallibility of the Church in the matter of facts connected with dogma is a truth of *divine faith* already defined by the Church's praxis or ordinary magisterium, or at least that it is a truth that is *revealed* and *definitive* as of divine faith.

Although this is clear enough, and even at the risk of being accused of repeating the same things, we will briefly quote some passages:

"Hence it is inferred, in the first place, that the Pope *cannot err in the canonization of saints*, even if he does it outside of a council. In accordance with Bonaventura, Valencia, Bellarmine, Amico, theologians more commonly teach that this is *of faith*; however, others teach, in accordance with Suárez, Azorio, Granados, that it is *proximate to the faith*."<sup>85</sup> "Indeed, this infallibility . . . is by *many* reputed to be likewise formally revealed. . . .; indeed, this infallibility could be *defined as a dogma of faith*."<sup>86</sup> "In the opinion of

<sup>85</sup> DOMINICUS VIVA, S.J., *Damnatæ Theses, Quaestio Prodoma*, n.11; Patavii 1724, pp.6

<sup>86</sup> Card. BILLOT, *De Ecclesia Christi*, th.17.

many it is a *heresy*, although up to now it has not been condemned explicitly as a *heresy*."<sup>87</sup> "This faith [viz. the ecclesiastical faith given to dogmatic facts] is said to be revealed mediately because its assent is grounded on the Church's infallible authority which we believe with *divine and Catholic faith*."<sup>88</sup> If any man deny that the Church is infallible in defining such matters, he would by the same token be formally a *heretic*."<sup>89</sup> "Perhaps the controversy could be settled by advertising to the fact that it is one thing to say that the *Supreme Pontiff is infallible in decreeing the canonization of a given saint*, and it is another thing to say that this saint, canonized by the pope, is one of the blessed in heaven. And, indeed, the first is of *divine-Catholic faith*."<sup>90</sup>

286. SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. — With this presupposition it becomes very easy to show that the fact "this canonized saint is in heaven" is an implicitly revealed truth and, consequently, definable as a truth not only of ecclesiastical, but of *divine faith*.

For this purpose we need only apply to this fact the same principles we applied in the previous section to dogmatic facts in general, and which all contemporary theologians apply specifically to these facts: whether such a council is a rule of faith, or whether such a pope is a true pope.

As the reader will recall, those principles are two, to wit: (a) where a universal proposition is revealed, all the particular propositions contained therein are also revealed; (b) in these cases the minor premise does not intervene as the formal motive but as the *explication* or *application* of the universal major premise to the particular conclusion. These two principles are generally admitted by all theologians.

By this process of inclusion of the particular in the universal we could marshal many arguments to prove that the fact that such a canonized saint is in heaven is of divine faith. We will limit ourselves to two arguments: one based on the revealed universal that the Church is infallible in the canonization of every saint, and the other based in the similarly revealed universal concerning the glory of all the saints in heaven.

287. FIRST ARGUMENT. — According to all, or almost all theologians of today it has been truly revealed that "the Church is infallible in the canonization of the saints", or, in other words, in the canonization of every saint.

<sup>87</sup> Card. FRANZELIN, *De Traditione*, th.72.

<sup>88</sup> HURTER, *Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae*, t.I. n.663, footnote, 3rd ed. Oeniponte 1880.

<sup>89</sup> LEPICIER, *De Stabilitate et Progressu Dogmatum*, Rome 1910, pg. 47.

<sup>90</sup> LEPICIER, *op. cit.*, pg.88.

This proposition converted into its passive form is exactly identical to the following: "It has been revealed that every saint canonized by the Church is infallibly a saint and that he is infallibly in heaven". This is what we all understand by canonization.

Restating it in conditional form, so as to reveal the texture of the reasoning and the function of the minor in it, we obtain the following exactly identical proposition: "It has been revealed that every saint, if he is canonized by the Church, is infallibly a saint and is infallibly in heaven".

Let the argument, then, be as follows:

It has been revealed that every saint, if he is canonized by the Church, is infallibly a saint and is infallibly in heaven.

Now, this saint (e.g., St. Isidore) has been canonized by the Church. Therefore, it has been revealed that this saint is infallibly a saint and is infallibly in heaven.

We invite all our readers to examine without biases the three propositions of this argument. The major, according to all modern theologians, is a universal that is revealed and definable as of divine faith, if it is not already defined as such. The minor is limited to verifying a condition of the revealed major. The conclusion is exactly the same revealed major with no other difference than that of universal and particular (every-this). Consequently, if it is true that when a universal is revealed all the particulars contained therein are similarly revealed, it is clear as the light of day that the conclusion "this canonized saint is in heaven" is likewise revealed and worthy of divine faith.

The fact that St. Thomas and the vast majority of theologians prior to Jansenism did not hold that particular conclusion to be of divine faith, is explained by the fact that they did not hold the universal major premise to be of divine faith, but only of *pious belief*. But today almost all theologians admit that universal major as of divine faith.

288. SECOND ARGUMENT. — Instead of assuming as our major premise the infallibility of the Church in the canonization of every saint, let us take as our universal major the glory that is due in heaven to every saint. This is likewise a truth of divine faith. Let, then, the argument be as follows:

It is of divine faith that the souls of all true saints are in heaven enjoying God himself. Restating it in conditional form we obtain the following: It is of divine faith that every soul, if it was truly holy, is in heaven enjoying God.

Now, this soul (e.g., that of St. Isidore or of any other canonized saint) was truly holy.

Therefore, it is of divine faith that this soul is in heaven enjoying God.

Again we invite the reader to examine the three propositions of this argument. The major is a revealed universal, and was defined as of divine faith by Benedict XII.<sup>91</sup> The minor is the very same formula that the Church employs in the canonization of saints, and has no other purpose but that of verifying a condition of the major of faith. The conclusion is exactly identical to the major of faith with no other difference than that of universal and particular (every — this).

Consequently, either we must deny the *principles* commonly admitted by all theologians, or we must admit that the *fact* that "this canonized saint is in heaven" is of divine faith or definable as of divine, and not only as of ecclesiastical, faith.

289. THE SALMANTICENSES AND JOHN OF ST. THOMAS. — To confirm the foregoing we will adduce the testimony of two theologians, who are precisely the two who hold out the least promise on this subject, viz., the Salmanticensis and John of St. Thomas.

These two, as well as almost all theologians prior to the decisions of the Church on dogmatic facts, maintained with St. Thomas that the dogmatic fact of canonization was not a matter of divine faith, but of theological certainty or of human faith. However, they gave to understand fairly clearly that the *fact* of canonization was not of divine faith because the *infallibility* of the Church was not yet of divine faith.

When the Salmanticensis maintained that the fact that "this pope is truly the pope", is of divine faith, they put to themselves objection: "Just as the universal Church accepts Innocent XI as the Supreme Pontiff, so too she accepts, e.g., St. Isidore as one of the saints in heaven. But it is not im-

<sup>91</sup>By this Constitution which shall remain in force forever, we define in virtue of Apostolic authority that in accordance with what God has commonly ordained the souls of ALL the Saints . . . are, and will be in heaven . . . and see the divine Essence with intuitive vision . . . and that thus seeing it they enjoy the same divine Essence." (BENEDICT XII, Constitutio Dogmatica *Benedictus Deus*, Jan. 29, 1336; Denz.-Schön. 1000) The usual formula of canonization is given by Benedict XIV in the following paragraph: "Meanwhile we must treat of the formula of the sentence pronounced in the act of canonization, which is conceived as follows:

"Unto the honour of the Holy and individual Trinity, unto the exaltation of the Catholic faith and the growth of the Christian religion, by the authority of Our Lord Jesus Christ, of the Blessed Apostles Peter and Paul, and Our own, after mature deliberation and frequent imploration of divine assistance, with the advice of Our Venerable Brothers the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, the Patriarchs, Archbishops, and Bishops who are in the City, We decree and define that the Blessed N. and N. are saints, and inscribe them in the Roster of Saints, ordaining that their memory be piously honored again by the Universal Church every year on [such a] day, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen." (*Loc. cit.*, c.36, nn.20-21).

mediately of faith that *this* canonized man is a saint and is in heaven. Therefore it is not immediately of faith that Innocent XI is the Supreme Pontiff.

Here is their truly noteworthy reply: "To the confirmation. The major must be denied because this proposition 'every man duly canonized and accepted by the Church as one of the saints is a saint and is in heaven' is not immediately of *faith*, as Ferre correctly shows. Hence the inferred consequent, viz., that St. Isidore is truly a saint and is in heaven is not immediately of faith. [Comes now something truly remarkable.] But if the contrary supposition is made and it is assumed that the universal 'Every man duly canonized' etc. is immediately of faith, it must consequently be said that it is immediately of faith that St. Isidore is in heaven and is truly a saint."<sup>92</sup>

The reader will please note what the Salmanticenses already conceded even then, viz. that if it is admitted as of divine faith that all canonized saints are in heaven, then it must also be logically admitted that it is of divine faith that *this* saint is in heaven. Now then, modern theologians already generally admit to be of divine faith that all canonized saints are infallibly in heaven when they admit that it is of divine faith that the Church is infallible in the canonization of all saints.<sup>93</sup>

John of St. Thomas provides us with another no less clear confirmation. Granados had cited the example of the canonization of saints in support of his position denying that theological conclusions are of divine faith even after their definition by the Church. Replying to this objection John of St. Thomas writes: "As St. Thomas says, Quodl. 9, art. 16, it is *piously believed* that the Holy Spirit assists the Church in the canonization of saints, so that she will not err, however, this is *not certain with the certainty of faith*, so that she will there. On the other hand, it is *certain with the certainty of faith*, as he says Holy Spirit assists her in defining the things that pertain to the faith, and it is from his guidance that the definition proceeds; hence [the reader will please

<sup>92</sup>SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, d.4, dub.2, n.46.  
<sup>93</sup>The following passage from the Salmanticenses is also worthy of note: "If there be any who maintains that the blessedness of the saints is of faith, he will not find it difficult to indicate in the Holy Scripture the universal revelation in which this truth is formally included: for in the Sacred Writings it is revealed what true holiness consists in, and that all who die in grace are brought to heaven; and it belongs to the Church to discern true holiness, and to judge who have died in grace; for in view of this discernment she has also been promised the prompting of the Holy Spirit, who scrutinizes all things, even the depths of God." (*De Fide*, d.1, dub.4, n.149) From the phrase "he will not find it difficult" we can see how close were the ancient Thomists, even the most rigid ones, to admitting canonization as of divine faith. By the way, what the Salmanticenses term "formal inclusion" is in our view "virtual inclusion", because the condition of the revealed universal is not a self-evident condition; on the contrary, its verification requires reasoning, and is even susceptible to error. For this reason neither the fact that "this council is a true rule of faith", nor the fact that "this pope is a true pope", nor the fact

take note of that hence] the assent to it does not rest on *human*, but on *divine*, authority."<sup>94</sup>

It is obvious that the reply given by John of St. Thomas is equivalent to the following. If the Holy Spirit's assistance to the Church in the canonization of saints were not only a matter of "pious belief", but a truth of *divine faith*, then the fact of canonization or that this canonized saint is in heaven would also be a matter of *divine*, and not of human, faith. But we all know that theologians admit today that the Holy Spirit's assistance to the Church in the canonization of saints is of divine faith by the same token that they admit that her infallibility is of divine faith, since *infallibility* and *Holy Spirit's assistance* amount to the same thing.

In one word: St. Thomas and all the early theologians have always considered as identical the faith with which we believe in the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints and the faith with which we believe in the glory of the canonized saint. Since at that time the former was not yet of divine faith, neither was the latter admitted by them as of divine faith.<sup>95</sup>

that such a translation of the Bible is authentic," nor the fact that "this book contains such heretical propositions", nor the fact "this saint is truly in heaven", nor the fact that "this canon of the mass is free from error", nor any other *fact* (nor, likewise, any *conclusion*) that requires the labour of *human* and *falible* reason, is or can ever be of faith prior to its definition or its acceptance by the Church's solemn or ordinary magistratum. Where *human* labour exists without *divine* assistance, error is possible, and where *error* is possible, *divine faith* is not possible. In the case of divine faith, all its elements (the *object* and its *explication* or application) have to be *divine* or *rectified by God*. (156-239)

<sup>94</sup>JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Sacra Theologia*, q.1, d.2, a.4, n.8.

<sup>95</sup>This is also clearly discernible in the attitude of Billuart. This distinguished theologian already admits, at least as probable, that dogmatic facts are of divine faith, because he already admits that the Church's infallibility in such facts is probably of divine faith. On the other hand, if he still persists in denying that canonization is of divine faith, it is because, as he himself confesses, such infallibility is not yet clearly defined. These are his words: "I say, in the second place: It does not appear to be of faith that the Church is infallible in the canonization of Saints; consequently, (the reader will please take note of this *consequently*) neither that whoever is canonized by the Church is a saint and one of the blessed. The first part is confirmed by the fact that *there is no definition of her infallibility*, as a truth of divine faith, in the canonization of saints, nor can this be gathered from her praxis. The second part follows from this. For if it is not of faith that the Church is infallible when she canonizes someone, then a fortiori neither is it of faith that this canonized person is a saint, since it is not elsewhere revealed either immediately, as is per se obvious, or *mediately in the infallibility itself of the Church*, inasmuch as *this is not certainly a truth of faith*, as has been said." (BILLUART, *De Regulis Fidei*, d.3, a.8) It is plain that Billuart confesses that if the Church's infallibility in the canonization of saints were revealed or a truth of faith, the sanctity and the glory of the canonized saint would likewise be revealed or of divine faith. Well then, we know of no theologian today who denies that the infallibility of the Church with respect to everything truly connected with the revealed deposit is a revealed truth and definable as of divine faith.

Today the former is generally admitted as of divine faith. Therefore anyone who wishes to be faithful to the principles and the spirit of St. Thomas and the other great theologians must also admit the latter as of divine faith. To do otherwise is to stick to the material letter of traditional theology while foregoing its spirit and its guiding principles in the treatise on faith.

290. A FURTHER CONFIRMATION. — As a final confirmation we will briefly sketch another argument which we have already adduced when we dealt with the problem of dogmatic facts in general.

Suppose that Christ were to come down in person from heaven and say to His Church: "All the saints that you have canonized to date are with me in heaven." In this supposition there would be no one to deny that such a statement would be of divine faith inasmuch as "God had said", it.

Well, then, we invite all theologians to advert to the fact that what Christ would be telling us *today* He had already told us *before*, and the differences of today and before make no difference in the species of faith. To admit, as the greater part of theologians admit today, that "it is a revealed truth that the Church is infallible in the canonization of all saints" amounts to admitting that "God has said it", and the faith due to what God has said is *divine*, and not merely ecclesiastical, faith.

Hence, the act of faith given to the canonization of saints (or to any other *infallible* definition by the Church) is not described correctly by the formula: "I believe that such a saint is in heaven because the Church says so." Nor is it exactly formulated by saying: "I believe that such a saint is in heaven because the Holy Spirit assists the Church in the canonization of saints." With full truth it is, and should be, formulated thus: "I believe that such a canonized saint is in heaven because God has revealed that the Church is infallible in the canonization of all saints". Obviously, such an act is an act of *divine faith*.

291. REPLY TO OBJECTIONS. — Almost all the objections that are usually raised concerning this matter boil down to the following: that sanctity is an internal fact or phenomenon incapable of being verified with complete certainty; that the witnesses are capable of deception; that it is possible, even for the holiest of men, to fall into sin at the last moment and be damned in spite of all external appearances to the contrary; that, even in the supposition that he has escaped damnation, it is not possible to know whether he is still in purgatory or not, etc., etc.

The discerning reader will already have noticed that with respect to the point at issue all these objections miss the target since they would prove not only that divine faith in the fact that such a saint is in heaven is impossible, but also that infallibility, and consequently ecclesiastical faith, are similarly impossible.

Thus these are one identical and very simple solution to all such objections. Either divine assistance, which is tantamount to infallibility, is admitted in the canonization of saints, or not. If divine assistance is not admitted, then obviously no divine faith is possible; but equally no ecclesiastical faith is possible. On the other hand, if divine assistance is admitted, all those objections are left without support since even if sanctity is an internal fact about which every man can be mistaken, nonetheless it is not fact about which either God or man assisted by God can be mistaken.

Likewise, without divine assistance, the Church can err in judging whether such a council was ecumenical or not (or even whether such a council existed or not), whether such a pope is a true pope, whether such a translation of the Bible, e.g. the Vulgate, is correct, etc., etc. Where error is possible, divine faith is impossible. However, since there is divine assistance to verify the particular fact, there is no room for either error or fallibility in the determination of such a fact. On the other hand, since that particular fact is an instance of a *revealed universal* (every council, every translation of the Bible, every canonized saint, . . .), it is for this reason, and not precisely because of the divine assistance, although not without such divine assistance, that such particular facts are of *divine faith* once they are defined.<sup>96</sup>

292. A FURTHER OBJECTION could be raised as follows: the fact that *this particular* saint is in heaven is *something more* than the revealed universal that all saints *in general* are in heaven. But if it is something more and it is also of divine faith, which is the same as that it is *revealed*, then there is an *increase*, no matter how small, in *revelation* after the Apostles, which is inadmissible.

We must confess that every time we read or hear this objection we cannot help conceiving a very poor opinion of those that raise it. In our way of thinking, it reveals an extremely narrow idea of the divine authority of the Church as if it had no other purpose but the *preservation* of the revealed deposit not including therein also its *explication* and *application*. Such theologians seem to imagine that for anything to be capable of divine faith it must

<sup>96</sup> Every time a man comes into this world by way of carnal generation, it is of divine faith — so say the theologians — that *such* a man sinned in Adam or that he was redeemed by Christ. In the same manner, every time a man exits from this world by way of sanctity, it is of divine faith that he goes to enjoy God in Heaven. The *only* difference between these two cases is that with our own eyes we perceive with certainty the fact that this man is a true man, whereas with our own eyes we do not perceive with certainty the fact that this man is truly a saint at the moment of death, and error is possible. Well then, this difference ceases from the moment that we suppose the Church's infallibility in canonizing, which is the same as the infallibility of the Church in her judgment of sanctity. Let any theologian weigh it carefully, and he will find that the two cases are substantially *equal*.

have come from the lips of the apostles down to its last detail, and that the Church has no function other than that of transmitting or repeating faithfully like a gramophone what the apostles said without adding, developing, or introducing any novelty in the least. This extremely narrow conception of the Church's dogmatic function and of the development of dogma is the reason why many modern theologians, haunted by a childish fear of falling into transformistic Modernism, fail to grasp the whole scope of the ample theory proposed by Lirinensis and St. Thomas, which is the only theory capable of explaining successfully the authentic facts exhibited by the history of true *dogmatic development* by way of true connexion or *theological conclusion* or by way of *dogmatic fact*.

We concede, therefore, that the theological conclusion is *something more* than the revealed principle from which it is deduced. But if such a conclusion is deduced through an inclusive or *implicit* process — and only thus is it definable as of divine faith — then it is something more not of *doctrine* or objectivity, but something more of *explication* of one and the same revealed doctrine. We also concede that every dogmatic fact and every canonization of a saint is *something more* than the revealed universal with which such facts are connected; but they are not something more of objectivity or doctrine, but of *application* to particular instances of one and the same doctrine, ready revealed in general.

Thus the only thing that follows therefrom is that the Church has divine authority for *something more* than the *preservation* of the revealed deposit, for she has it also in order to *explicate* and *apply* the deposit provided that the explication and application can be done without any *new revelation*.

293. Finally, THE THIRD OBJECTION that might be urged by some people is that if it be granted that the canonization of saints and every *infallible* definition by the Church are of divine faith, then there appears to be no distinction left between what is defined as a *dogma of faith* and what is defined as merely *infallible*, between what is condemned as *heretical* and what is condemned as *erroneous* or with any other censure inferior to that of heresy.

The answer to this objection is that although both definitions are of divine faith, and consequently there is between them no specific or formal differences, there always have been, as there are, two accidental or material

The first difference consists in this: what is expressly defined by the Church as a *dogma of faith* or the contradictory of which is condemned as *heretical*, not only is *itself* of divine faith, but also it is of divine faith that it is of divine faith. Thus he who denies it is a *heretic*. On the other hand, what is defined by the Church simply as an infallible truth or whose contrary is condemned with a censure inferior to that of heresy is itself indeed of divine

faith but it is not of divine faith that it is of divine faith, and thus he who denies it is not a heretic. The reason for this difference is the fact that the Church has already defined that anything defined by her as *revealed* must be believed with divine faith and under pain of heresy. However, she has not yet defined that there is any obligation to believe with divine faith or under pain of heresy anything she defines as infallible.<sup>97</sup>

The second difference lies in this: it is of *divine faith* that whatsoever is defined by the Church as a dogma of faith or whose contrary is condemned as heretical is a *revealed* truth; on the other hand, it is of *divine faith* that whatsoever is defined by the Church only as an infallible truth or whose contrary is condemned with a censure inferior to that of heresy is an *infallible truth* but it is not yet of divine faith that it is a *revealed truth*. The reason for the second difference lies in the fact that, not being discursive, faith limits itself to assenting to what is *defined* and only to what is defined. Now then, in definitions of the first kind the Church not only defines the *truth* but also the *revelation* of such a truth. On the other hand, in definitions of the second kind the Church defines the truth but without defining expressly the revelation of such a truth. Yet both the one and the other are equally revealed. God has revealed the former *in particular*, He has revealed the latter *in the universal*. When God revealed that the Church is infallible in the definition of *any and every* dogmatic fact and in the canonization of *any and every* saint He revealed implicitly, but truly, that *this* dogmatic fact or *this* saint are infallibly certain once they have been defined.

Thus the differences between the so-called ecclesiastical faith and divine faith are accidental or material. In either one what is essential or formal in faith, i.e., the *formal motive* of belief, is one and the same: *divine revelation*. Therefore both are *divine faith*.

294. SUMMARY. — We believe that with this study of the question of the canonization of saints together with those previously done on theological conclusions and dogmatic facts, a sufficient examination has been made of both the nature of the modern ecclesiastical faith and the scope of dogmatic progress.

The reader, especially the truly Thomist reader, will have noticed that the nature of the so-called ecclesiastical faith necessarily and totally depends

<sup>97</sup> "There are some propositions where it happens that not only are they of faith, but their respective reflexive propositions are likewise of faith, that is, that they are also of faith, that such propositions are of faith, as e.g., Christ's incarnation and the Trinity of Persons are of faith in such a way that it is also of faith that they are of faith. But some times the propositions themselves are of faith but their respective reflexives are not of faith because there is still some controversy regarding their definition." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Auctoritate Summi Pontificis*, q.2, a.2, n.5)

on the nature of the faith we give to this proposition: "The Church is infallible with respect to *everything* necessarily connected with the revealed deposit". If this is a proposition of *divine faith*, as almost all theologians today admit, then every true Thomist, who is acquainted not only with the letter but also with the spirit of St. Thomas's principles, must admit that the so-called ecclesiastical faith is truly divine faith. On the other hand, anyone who thinks that the Church's infallibility in such matters is not *per se* of divine faith but merely a *theological conclusion* (as the early theologians maintained in the case of *dogmatic facts*), must logically admit that ecclesiastical faith is formally *human*, inasmuch as any faith or any certainty grounded only on theological connexion is formally human. At any rate, and whatever be the supposition made, the so-called ecclesiastical faith must, for every true Thomist, be either a divine or a human faith. A faith that is *specifically a mean* between divine and human faith is an evident inconsistency in Thomist doctrine.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>98</sup> Every conclusion proceeds from the major premise through the minor. Thus, in order to know how the minor enters into the reasoning — that is to say, into the assent to the conclusion — it is only necessary to take note of the *difference* between the case in any and every dogmatic fact. If they differ only in a condition — and this is into the reasoning except as a *condition* that applies the revealed universal major to a particular instance.

If the reader will consider one of the examples we have given of dogmatic facts (any one will do), he will see that the predicate of the conclusion is exactly the same as the case of physico-connexive conclusions; not virtual distinction, as in the case of meta-physico-inclusive conclusions; not even a nominal distinction, as in the case of meta-physico-inclusive conclusions; since there is no difference at all in doctrine or in meaning. The only difference is that the condition has been verified and has been removed. This is the reason why the minor premise does not enter into the assent to the conclusion except as a *mere condition*.

There is no doubt that, apart from *divine assistance*, we can scarcely have anything better than a *moral certainty* as regards the verification of the condition, and that, absolutely speaking, there is always room for error. But if we presuppose God's assistance, which is assured in every infallible definition, it follows: (a) that the defined dogmatic fact in no way differs from the revealed major except as a mere condition; (b) that this condition is, consequently, infallibly and divinely applied. Therefore, in accordance with the principles accepted today by all theologians, any truth that satisfies these two conditions is of *divine faith*.

Thus, it is understandable that, before the distinction between particular facts and dogmatic facts had been clarified, some theologians should have denied the Church's infallibility with regard to facts. Likewise, it is understandable that, once such infallibility had been accepted, though not as a truth of faith, they should have persisted in refusing to admit that the defined dogmatic fact is of divine faith. But we cannot understand how some theologians find it possible to admit that the Church's infallibility with respect to

Thus, although the definability as of divine faith of both the *dogmatic facts* and the canonization of saints is intimately linked to the rigorously and truly theological conclusion's definability as of divine faith, the Thomist theologian should not confuse these two questions as if they were of equal value.

Truly and rigorously theological conclusions, i.e., conclusions absolutely connected with the revealed deposit, are definable as of *divine faith*. We hold this to be an evident and fundamental truth; a truth expressly affirmed by St. Thomas and all traditional theology up to the confusion introduced in the 17th century with regard to the "revealed virtual"; a truth without which it is impossible to explain the authentic facts of the history of dogmas.

On the other hand, the question of whether dogmatic facts, and hence the canonization of saints, deserve divine or only human belief is a question we consider secondary and of little importance or significance for the fundamental problem of dogmatic progress. Although we are persuaded, and we think we have proven, that the faith we give to dogmatic facts and the canonization of the saints is truly a divine faith, it would make little difference to us that anyone should deny it provided that he admits that the Church can define as dogmas of divine and Catholic faith all those *theological conclusions* that are deduced from the revealed deposit by a process of *real identity*, or *essential connexion*, or *absolute certainty*.<sup>99</sup> This is what Suárez and Lugo

dogmatic facts is a truth of divine faith, or at least definable as of divine faith, and then deny that such facts can be defined as of divine faith. Hence it is with satisfaction that we have called attention to the fact that many theologians, in their reviews of the Spanish edition of our work, agree with us in rejecting the pretended ecclesiastical faith as specifically distinct from divine faith. Among them are two Thomist theologians of the first rank, Fathers Ramírez and Pégues.

"We harbour the persuasion that the ecclesiastical faith, theologically unjustifiable, will disappear from Thomist theology, and even from Catholic theology." (S. Ramírez, O.P., in *La Ciencia Tomista*, Nov-Dec, 1923, pg.395. J. PEREZ DE URBEL, O.S.B., in *Revista Eclesiástica*, 15-50 Nov. 1923, pg.654. JUAN MANUEL LOPEZ, O.S.A., in *España y América*, Feb. 1924, pg.290)

"The ecclesiastical faith, presented as a faith different in nature from divine faith and inferior to it, seems, as a matter of fact, something entirely inadmissible." (THOMAS MAS PÉGUES, O.P., in *Revue Thomiste*, Jan., 1924, pgs. 66-67).

<sup>99</sup> In the present case, *absolute inseparability* is the same as essential connexion and *real identity*. There can be no absolute inseparability without essential connexion, nor can there be essential connexion without *contradiction* to its opposite, nor can there be contradiction if it is not grounded on real identity. Hence, every rigorously metaphysical or rigorously theological consequence is really identical with the principle or antecedent from which it is deduced. The conclusion is but a *part* of the principle. "The principles from which the syllogism proceeds, are to be concluded as the *whole* to the part, and the conclusion is to the principle as the *part to the whole*." (ST THOMAS, in



called the *formally-confusedly* revealed, what the moderns call the *identico-material* or *connexive-essential* virtual, and what traditional theology had simply termed *implicit* or *virtual*, since if it is to be rigorously scientific or theological, implicitness has to be virtual, and if it is to be rigorously theological and not merely physical, virtuality has to be *connexive-essential* and, therefore, objectively implicit.

295. THE CONCLUSION that follows from this chapter on ecclesiastical faith is that the evolution of dogma is of such magnitude that it encompasses the four degrees of Catholic teaching. These four degrees are: (a) the *revealed datum* or truths expressly revealed; (b) truths already defined as *dogmas of faith*; (c) truths defined as *infallible* but not yet as dogmas; (d) truths not yet defined but *necessarily connected* with any of the three previous degrees: such truths are known as *theological conclusions* and *dogmatic facts*.

The difference between these four degrees is not expressed in terms of revealed and not revealed, but in terms of the revealed explicitly and the revealed implicitly. Since anything truly revealed by God, whether explicitly or Catholic teaching commonly possess two characteristics: (a) they are *revealed truths*; (b) they are *infallible truths*.

The Church may, if she so wishes, define at once the characteristic of being *revealed* or of *divine faith* of any of the propositions of those four degrees, without previously defining its characteristic of being an *infallible truth*.

*Postea, Analyt.*, lib. 1, lect. 38. "The consequence is a part and something of the antecedent." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Logica*, p. 2, q. 7, a. 2) Since the true and only formal principle of theology are the revealed principles, every rigorously theological or essentially-connexive conclusion is really identical to the divine deposit and truly implicit as distinguished as Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange: "On the other hand there are relations, not accidental but essential, which are implicated in a determinate essence or in one of its faculties. And the concept that expresses this essence, expresses at the same time the relations which it contains. Thus being designates that which has a relation to existence, this relation is implicated in the very nature itself of that which exists . . . That which we have said of being in general and of its properties is true of all the absolute analogous perfections which common sense attributes to God, as e.g. intelligence, wisdom, providence, free will, mercy, justice." (*Dieu*, n. 56, pgs. 542-545) We also read in the learned Fr. de Regnon: "This proposition, 'The world is created by God', in spite of its learned appearance, is nonetheless an analytic judgment, for the intimate notion of the world contains the notion of an infinite cause." (*Études sur la Sainte Trinité*, vol. 1, pg. 22) Of this same nature is every rigorously theological conclusion, i.e., that which is essentially-connexive. They are not judgments that are synthetic or that add to the revealed deposit but analytic or really identical to the deposit. This is why they are homogenous to it and definable as of faith.

She thus defined as of divine faith, e.g. the theological conclusion concerning the two intellects and two wills in Christ, or the obligation of confessing the circumstances that change the species of sin, and the dogmatic facts that the Vulgate is authentic, or that the Canon of the mass is free from all error.

On the other hand, the Church may also first define a theological conclusion or a dogmatic fact as infallible truths without as yet defining them as revealed or of divine faith. This is the more usual procedure. Thus, e.g., she has already defined as infallible the need of jurisdiction in the confessor, or the dogmatic fact about Jansen's book, without as yet defining them as revealed or of divine faith. However, although she has not yet defined them as revealed, she may so define them should she wish, or should it become necessary to do so. Just as the Church has said: "If any man say that in order to obtain the remission of sins in the sacrament of Penance it is not necessary by divine law to confess. . . the circumstances that change the species of sin; let him be anathema", and, "If any man say that the Canon of the mass contains error and should therefore be abrogated: let him be anathema", so she could likewise say: "If any man say that in the sacrament of Penance it is not necessary for the confessor to have jurisdiction: let him be anathema", or, "If any man say that the Symbol said to be of St. Athanasius contains error, or that Jansen's book *Augustinus* does not contain errors: let him be anathema." The necessity of confessing the specific circumstances of sins is as much a theological conclusion as the necessity of jurisdiction in the confessor. The freedom from error of the Canon of the mass is as much a dogmatic fact as the orthodoxy of the Symbol of St. Athanasius and the heterodoxy of Jansen's book. And the same thing can be affirmed of any other conclusion, provided it is rigorously theological, and of any other fact, provided it is truly dogmatic.

Consequently, the difference between infallible definitions and definitions of divine faith — and thus between ecclesiastical faith and divine faith — is not a specific difference of teaching or objectivity, but a difference of stage through which one and the same teaching passes, or can pass, before reaching the supreme stage of dogma of faith. There is no truth definable as of divine faith that might not be first defined as an infallible truth, and there is no truth defined or definable as infallible which may not be defined as of divine faith. In our opinion this is a traditional teaching of utmost certainty in the case of rigorously theological conclusions, and most probable, not to say certain, teaching in the case of truly dogmatic facts.<sup>100</sup>

<sup>100</sup>This merely accidental difference between definitions of divine faith and infallible definitions might perhaps become clearer to some people by means of the following historical example. In the Tridentine Council the following dogmatic canon had already been prepared: "If any man say that, in accordance with the evangelical and apostolic teaching, the bond of matrimony can be dissolved on account of the adultery

296. THE CAUSE OF TWO TRENDS. — If some modern Thomists do not accept this teaching, it is because they fancy that for any thing to be implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith it is necessary that it be contained in the revealed datum *directly*, and not only indirectly; *formally*, and not only virtually or consequently.

On the other hand, we consider it obvious that St. Thomas and all of traditional theology prior to the confusion introduced into these matters in the 17th century, held as also implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith everything contained in the apostolic deposit *indirectly*, everything contained in it in a rigorously theological, or virtual, or consequential manner, everything from whose denial there follows with *absolute* necessity the denial of that which is formally revealed. Says St. Thomas:

"It must be said that the article is an indivisible truth with respect to what is *actually explicated* in the article, but divisible with respect to those things that are contained **POTENTIALLY** in the article, insofar as he who says one thing, somehow says many things: and such things are those which precede the article or are *consequent to it*: and in this regard the article of faith can be *explicated* and divided."<sup>101</sup> "To explicate the articles of faith

of one of the spouses. . . . let him be anathema". In this canon, the teaching denied by the Greek Church was defined as a teaching of Catholic faith, and thereby the Greek Church itself stood condemned as heretical. Since this could cause a considerable cooling off among the Greeks and render union more difficult, diplomacy or prudence intervened as usual, and without altering in the least the *doctrine* of the dogmatic canon, its *formulation* changed by rewriting and redefining it in the following manner: "If any man say that the Church has erred when she taught, and teaches that, in accordance with evangelical and apostolic doctrine, the bond of matrimony cannot be dissolved on account of the adultery of one of the spouses: let him be anathema." (TRID. COUNCIL, sess. 24, can. 7; Denz.-Schön. 1807). What difference is there between these two canons, or between these two doctrinal versions? There is no essential difference or difference in meaning at all, but merely a difference in formulation or wording. "Merely the sound, but not the meaning, has been changed", says with good reason the great historian of the Tridentine, Card. Pallavicini. Indeed, if it is of divine faith that the Church does not err when she teaches that doctrine, it is also of divine faith, or definable as of divine faith, that the Greeks err when they teach or practice the opposite. Well then, let the following canons be considered without biases: (a) "If any man say that such a theological conclusion is not true, or that such a dogmatic fact is not true: let him be anathema." (b) "If any man say that the Church has erred when she taught and teaches that such a theological conclusion is true, or that such a dogmatic fact is true: let him be anathema." Those who defend the modern ecclesiastical faith must say, and do say, that the Church can define the second of those two canons as of divine faith, but that she cannot define the first. But anyone who considers them without preconceived ideas will plainly see that if the Church can define one as of divine faith, she can similarly define the other. To say that the Church does not err when she affirms a given teaching is the same as saying that they err who deny it, and the same as saying that such a thing is true. There is no difference other than that of implicit or explicit. Therefore, if one of them is definable as of divine faith, so is the other.

<sup>101</sup>In 3 Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5.

can happen in two ways: first . . . ; Secondly, with respect to those things that are **IMPLICITLY** contained in the articles themselves: and this takes place when a man knows the things that follow from the articles."<sup>102</sup> "And in this regard the faith can be explicated day by day, and has been more and more explicated through the efforts of the Fathers, (*ibid.*) "A thing can pertain to the faith in two ways . . . But indirectly those things pertain to the faith from the denial of which there follows something contrary to the faith."<sup>103</sup> "Those things from which there follows something unstatutable article."<sup>104</sup> "Those things from which there follows something unstatutable and contrary to the faith."<sup>105</sup>

When such an inclusive, or indirect, or consequential virtual is defined by the Church "the same judgment applies to the latter [the indirect] and to the former [the direct] which are already determinate in the faith because the one follows the other." (See place last quoted) "And for this reason many things are now considered heretical which were not so reputed previously, because it is now much more clear what follows from them."<sup>106</sup> "The answer is that by the term *indirectly* pertains to the faith St. Thomas understands that which is by a necessary consequence deduced from any proposition that is immediately of faith, As, e.g., he who denies that Christ is risible commits consequently and indirectly an error in the Catholic faith. . . . because to date the Church has not yet defined that Christ is risible. But if the Church should define it, then he who denies that Christ is risible would be a heretic."<sup>107</sup> All the early Thomists express themselves in similar vein.<sup>108</sup>

297. THE THOMIST FORMULA. — Thus, the truly Thomist and traditional formula of the scope of dogmatic progress is not the narrow formula given by the Salmanticenses as follows: "The Church never defines as a dogma of faith anything that is not presupposed to its definition as *formally re-*

<sup>102</sup>Loc. cit., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3.

<sup>103</sup>Summa Theol., p. 1, q. 32, a. 4.

<sup>104</sup>Summa Theol., 2-2, q. 11, a. 2.

<sup>105</sup>In 1 Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 5.

<sup>106</sup>Summa Theol., p. 1, q. 32, a. 4.

<sup>107</sup>BÁÑEZ, In 2-2, q. 11, a. 2, and In p. 1, q. 1, a. 2.

<sup>108</sup>In the sciences whose reasoning process is essential or inclusive or intellectual, and such is the case with metaphysics and theology (Theology is intellectual in the highest degree — ST. THOMAS) what we denominate mediate or virtual or potential is so denominated relative to us, but in itself it is neither mediate nor virtual nor potential, but immediate or formal or actual. This is obvious to every Thomist who has penetrated St. Thomas's teaching on the "per se notum quoad se" and the "non per se notum quoad nos". "Any proposition, the predicate of which is included in the reason of the subject is immediate and self-evident insofar as it itself is concerned." (ST. THOMAS, In

vealed"<sup>109</sup>, but this other truly ample formula given by Báñez: "The Church has never to this date proposed to the faithful or defined as something to be believed, anything that is not contained in the Holy Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions expressly or virtually included in such a way that it is deduced therefrom by evident consequence."<sup>110</sup>

This Bañezian formula is the true formula of traditional theology: the formula of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus; the formula of all theologians prior to Molina; the formula of Suárez and Lugo; lastly, the formula of the vast majority of subsequent theologians, although many of them sometimes appear to say the contrary because of the use they make of Suárez's new and ambiguous terminology.

Hence the scope of dogmatic progress is as large as the implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit.<sup>111</sup> This implicit virtuality, explicated or unfolded by the individual reason of theologians through a reasoning of real identity or essential connexion, constitutes the true and rigorous science of theology or the truly and rigorously *theological conclusion*. The same implicit virtuality explicated or unfolded by the Church's divine authority, with the

*Post. Analyt.*, lib.1, lect.4) "For it is on this account that a proposition is *self-evident* [or immediate], that the predicate is included in the reason of the subject." (*Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.2, a.1) Hence metaphysics, and theology in its connexive-essential conclusions, and the Church in her definitions, do not change the purely mediate (that which is *only* mediate) into immediate, but they change what is immediate in itself (the implicit mediate or the implicit virtual) into immediate to us. In this sense there is no objection to saying that the Church can define as of faith nothing but the *immediately revealed*; but in this sense everything really identical or connexive-essentially immediately revealed, that is, immediate in itself, although mediate relative to us. It is in this sense that the term *immediate* is understood by a great many theologians after Suárez, with the result that many become confused and are led to believe that they deny the definability as of divine faith of every true mediate or virtual, whereas they only deny the definability of the virtual or mediate that is *merely connexive*. (82-168)

<sup>109</sup> SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, dub. 4, n.146.

<sup>110</sup> BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.7.

<sup>111</sup> This implicit virtuality, which is attainable by us only by way of theological

conclusion, existed and exists in such wealth and abundance in the revealed deposit that according to St. Thomas, explicate and unfold it is as much as she may, the Church will never exhaust it until we see it in its totality clearly and explicitly in the facial vision of the divine essence. "The explication of the articles of faith happens in two ways. *One*, with respect to the substance of the articles themselves insofar as the articles themselves are *distinctly* known. The *other way* is with respect to those things that are contained implicitly in the articles themselves; and this happens when a man knows the things that follow from the articles. . . . But no man is totally obliged to the *second explication* of the articles so as to know *everything* that is contained in the articles concerning salvation for this is *not possible except in heaven* where the substance itself of the articles will be fully seen." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, a.2, q.3)

Holy Spirit's assistance, constitutes the *dogma of faith*. The explication made by the individual reason of the theologians, no matter how evident and clear the reasoning, is a formally human or theological explication, it is never of divine faith (either for the theologian himself or for others) so long as it is not defined by the Church. On the other hand, the Church possesses *divine*, and not only human or ecclesiastical, authority in order to *explicate* or unfold, and not only to *preserve*, *everything that is truly implicit* in the revealed datum. It makes no difference whether the implicitness is formal, or virtual, provided that it is *true implicitness* and that it can be explicated or unfolded without any *new revelation*.

maintaining the definability as of divine faith of non-implicit conclusions, and consequently affirming that that which is not-revealed can become a dogma; (b) or by those who accuse us of lapsing into "theologism" (119) believing that we affirm with Vázquez that theological conclusions are formally of faith prior to their definition, or in other words, that we confuse *human* theological reasoning with *divine* faith.

Hence — and the reader ought to be aware of this from the beginning — our position will consist in insisting repeatedly, against Modernism, that truly implicit theological conclusions alone are definable, and, against Vázquez, that *no* theological conclusion is of faith prior to its definition by the Church.

Thus all the objections are as a matter of fact aimed against the adversaries of the traditional teaching which we maintain.

Furthermore, we are firmly persuaded that every impartial reader of chapter 6 (Solution to the Objections) and, especially, chapter 7 (The Voice of Tradition) will: (a) either fully accept the traditional thesis upholding the evolution of dogma by way of truly theological conclusions; (b) or confess that the debated question is, at least, entirely free.

This will eventually lead theologians to adopt our theory. For, even discounting the fact that it accords better with tradition, it allows — as everybody admits — for an easy, clear, and impartial solution of the problems that arise from evident and numerous facts in the history of dogmas, which is not the case with the opposed theory.

Let us, then, proceed to the objections that have been raised.

## SECTION I

### OBJECTIONS AGAINST DOGMATIC EVOLUTION IN GENERAL

299. FIRST OBSERVATION. — The objections we will be dealing with were submitted to us in the form of *observations*. We will transcribe them in the same form. The *first* one follows:

"By a dogma of faith I understand every truth *formally* or *immediately* revealed by God in the divine Scriptures or in Tradition and as such proposed by the Church to all the faithful."

*Reply.* If our objector begins by assuming that nothing is a dogma of faith, except what is *formally* or *immediately* revealed, then he assumes the very issue in dispute and takes for granted precisely that which he should prove.

For anything to be definable as of divine faith the Church has never demanded that it be formally or immediately revealed, but simply that it be

## Chapter VI

### SOLUTION TO THE OBJECTIONS

298. LIGHT AND SHADOW. — With the exception of truths of immediate evidence — and unfortunately, our poor minds are in possession of only a very limited number of such truths — all other truths always exhibit two faces: one bright, the other dark. The bright side provides the ground for the demonstrations or proofs of the truth; the dark side gives rise to the objections against it.

In the previous chapters we have submitted the proofs for our position on the evolution of dogma. There remains the task of solving the objections that may be raised against it. We intend to do so in this chapter.

All the objections or observations we are going to deal with have been submitted to us by four distinguished theologians. We will not disclose their names, since three of them are still alive, but we will transcribe their words literally so as to maintain all their vigour intact.

We will allow ourselves only the liberty of italicizing certain words of phrases in order to focus the reader's attention on them.

We will divide this chapter into four sections:

1. Objections against dogmatic evolution in general.
2. Further objections against it.
3. Objections against the identification of the scope of dogmatic evolution with the scope of the Church's infallibility.
4. Objections against one of the principal arguments for dogmatic evolution.

The reader will have noticed, after the perusal of these four sections, that almost all the objections against our position are raised: (a) either by those who consider us as a theoretician of transformism and charge us with

revealed. The Vatican says: "Further, everything that is contained in the word of God, whether written or handed down, and is by the Church proposed for belief as divinely revealed, whether through a solemn pronouncement or through the ordinary and universal magisterium, is to be believed with divine and Catholic faith." It is clear that the text simply and only speaks of being revealed, not one word about being formally or immediately revealed.

If from the teaching of the Church we pass on to the teaching of traditional theology we will find that, with the sole exception of Molina, all the great theologians prior to Suárez, Suárez himself, Lugo and a multitude of theologians after Lugo and Suárez teach that *mediate* or *virtual* revelation suffices to make a thing capable of being defined by the Church as a dogma of faith. The following passage from Suárez perfectly resumes theological tradition. Let it suffice for the moment: "In the third place it must be said that the *theological conclusion* that before was contained *only virtually* in revelation, after its definition by the Church is most properly and formally of faith . . . This assertion is in my judgment certain and taken from the *common consensus of theologians*. . . . Nor do I find any theologian contradicting it."<sup>2</sup>

Our objector is free to hold a view contrary to what Suárez with good reason calls *certain* doctrine and the *common* view of theologians. But he should not make the mistake of taking his own view as a starting point, and much less of introducing it as a necessary element in the very definition of dogma, even if certain theological compendiums — among them some of Thomist authorship — do so. In the definitions of theological concepts, as in the concept of *dogma*, no elements should be introduced except those that the Church teaches or that are admitted unanimously by theologians; never those that are disputable, and much less those that are contrary to the almost common opinion of the great masters in theology.

300. SECOND OBSERVATION. — "Likewise, by theological conclusion in the strict and proper sense I understand every *virtually* or *mediately* revealed truth, that is, everything that is deduced from the revealed deposit as 'effect from the cause' or as 'property from the essence'. This, I take it, is the definition given by the Salmanticenses and Billuart."

*Reply.* The definition of the theological conclusion is well given. It is the traditional definition. (42) But the difference or defect is not in the definition but in the manner it is understood. The Salmanticenses — and Billuart does little else but resume them — understood the revealed virtual or theological conclusion after the fashion of Suárez and Lugo, and thus understood,

<sup>1</sup>VATICAN COUNCIL, Const. *De Fide Catholica*, ch.3; Denz-Schön. 3011.  
<sup>2</sup>SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d.3, s.11, n.11.

they did very well and very logically in denying their definability as truths of faith.

Indeed, one can reason or pass from cause to effect or from essence to property along two radically different ways, to wit: (a) the way of meta-physico-essential connexion, and this is a connexion of identity or objective inclusion, which cannot be made to fail even by God Himself; (b) the way of *natural* or purely physical connexion, and this is a connexion bereft of identity or objective inclusion, which, consequently, can be made to fail by God every time it pleases Him to do so.

Hence the whole meaning of that classical definition depends on how we take the cause or the essence, and how we take the effect or the property when we reason or pass from the one to the other extreme.

If to deduce as a conclusion an *actual* effect we take as a principle or major premise the cause in a purely *natural* or physical sense, i.e. the so-called *real* cause or cause *in essendo*, e.g., "It is fire, therefore it *burns in fact*", the conclusion is not a *theological* conclusion — a theological conclusion demands absolute certainty — but a *physical* and fallible conclusion. Likewise, if to deduce as a conclusion an *actual* property we take as a principle or major premise, not the *integral* or the *perfect* essence, but the *pure* or bare essence — between the latter and the actual properties there is no other but a *natural connexion* — e.g., "he is a *man*, therefore he is *actually* risible", the conclusion is not and cannot be a theological conclusion; it is a physical conclusion, (98, 107)

Well, then, an attentive reading of the Salmanticenses will make it clear that this is what they, together with Suárez and Lugo, understand by theological conclusion or revealed virtual, although at times they mix other concepts proceeding from the traditional Thomist notion. The same thing happens with many modern compendiums.<sup>3</sup>

3. We answer by denying the major understood in the sense of the *natural* cause, or cause *in esse et apparere*, of which we have spoken in our third conclusion, (SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, d.1, dub.4, n. 132). "Or it could be said that the cause, is understood in two ways, viz.: in the first act, and in the second act. Thus although the express revelation of a cause causing in the second act is the formal revelation of the effect that terminates its causality, such is not the case in the revelation of the cause considered in the first act, for on the strength of this revelation there is signified only that there exists in it the power to produce a given effect, but not the actual production of the effect, which is necessary for considering the existence of such an effect to be formally revealed." (*Loc. cit.*, n.150) It is obvious that the cause in which there exists a distinction between its productive power and the actual production, is the physical cause or cause *in essendo*, not the metaphysical or virtual cause, as we have elsewhere observed. (50)

Thus, when the authors deny the definability as of divine faith of the theological conclusion or revealed virtual, what they in effect deny is only the true revealed virtual. On the other hand, when they affirm the definability as of divine faith of the revealed formal-confused, they affirm the definability of true theology because without being aware of so doing they have nonetheless included within the revealed formal-confused the whole of the true, proper and only theology, the existence of which is impossible without the essential, premise and the conclusion. (82)

301. THIRD OBSERVATION. — "The Salmanticensis, in *De Fide*, disp. 1, n.124, quote St. Thomas and a large chorus of early Thomists against the definability of the revealed virtual or theological conclusion as of divine faith."

*Reply*. Our objector should distinguish two questions that ought always to be distinguished in these matters.

The first question is "whether the revealed virtual or theological conclusions are of faith *per se*, that is, prescinding from the Church's definition". This is the true question treated by the Salmanticensis in the cited numbers 124 to 127. To this first question the Salmanticensis reply, and do very well in replying, *negative*; and cite, and very aptly too, St. Thomas and that large chorus of Thomists mentioned by our objector. Against Vázquez and Vega, we subscribe to everything said by Salmanticensis in those numbers, and every Thomist would do likewise.

The second question is "whether the theological conclusion or revealed virtual is definable by the Church as of divine faith, or equivalently, if it is formally of divine faith *after* its definition." The Salmanticensis do not touch upon this question until number 143 ff., and then on the occasion of an objection, *negative*. Having understood the Salmanticensis likewise reply, it is true, as Suárez and Lugo, they had to reply in the negative. But in this second question the Salmanticensis do not cite — and nobody will ever cite — even one single text from St. Thomas, or from any distinguished Thomist before the Suarezian confusion, *contrary* to the definability of the truly theological conclusion as of faith. On the other hand, passages from every one of them can be adduced in favour of definability.

Anyone who reads the Salmanticensis on this subject should pay attention to three things:

First, the Salmanticensis, far from opposing Molina's opinion as every previous Thomist, including John of St. Thomas, had done, quote him, on the contrary, in their favour.

Secondly, every time they cite Suárez and Lugo in order to impugn them, the citations refer to passages in which Suárez and Lugo speak of the virtual physico-connexive and not to the passages in which they speak of the formal confused or the virtual metaphysico-inclusive.

Thirdly, every time they adduce the stock example of the theological conclusion, viz. "man, therefore risible", not once do they mention the term "perfect man" in lieu of "man".

All these clues, and many others that could be mentioned, point to the fact that the Salmanticensis take the terms formal confused and pure virtual in the same sense as Suárez and Lugo, or at least that they employ the new Suarezian and Lugonian terminology quite unaware of the anti-Thomist contraband hidden in it. In any case the question whether the Salmanticensis and Billuart were truly of this or that mind is for us a problem of secondary importance, as it should be for every Thomist, in view of the fact that the mind of *all* classical Thomists prior to the 17th century and of great many other subsequent Thomists is quite plain on this point. This is definitely established by the clear and positive passages that the reader can see for himself in the last chapter of this book.

302. FOURTH OBSERVATION. — "That which is not known by revelation, but by reason, cannot be of faith. But the theological conclusion is known by reason, not by revelation."

*Reply*. That the theological conclusion is not known by revelation? No Thomist should be guilty of such a faux pas. *Divine revelation* is the *formal medium* whereby every truly theological conclusion is known, although the *minor* of reason is the *instrument* — only the instrument — of which *our* theology stands in need on account of the weakness of our minds. For our objector's benefit we quote here what St. Thomas laid down at the very beginning of the *Summa Theologica* in the very first question, and the commentaries of his two chief commentators:

"They are known by the *light of divine revelation*."<sup>4</sup> They are known by *divine light*."<sup>5</sup> "The proper knowledge of this science is by *revelation*."<sup>6</sup> The *reason of knowing* in theology is the *light of divine revelation*."<sup>7</sup> The *medium shining with divine light* constitutes the theological knowable."<sup>8</sup> "The *divine revealing light* is the *ratio sub qua* of *our theology*."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica*, q.1, a.1, ad 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, a.4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, a.6, ad 2.

<sup>7</sup> CAPREOLUS, *prol. In I Sent.*, q.4.

<sup>8</sup> CAJETAN, *In I Partem*, q.1, a.2.

<sup>9</sup> CAJETAN, *ibid.*

Hence both divine faith and sacred theology have for their object what is *truly revealed*. With no other difference but this: that which is truly revealed, but revealed *in itself*, is known simply by divine authority, without the instrument or *medium* of reasoning, and is for that reason called *revealed without medium* or *immediate*. Whereas that which is truly revealed, but revealed *in another* cannot be known by *us* unless we employ the instrument or *medium* of reasoning, and is for that reason revealed *mediate*. It is clear then, that it is not a difference of revelation on the one hand, and no revelation on the other, but a difference of two different *modes* of true revelation, or of two different *media* of knowing what is truly revealed.

*Important Distinction.* — Certain theologians, posterior to the 16th century, do not seem to distinguish well these three things: (a) formal revelation; (b) the *revealed formal*; (c) the *revealed virtual*.

Both formal revelation (revelation in the active sense) and the revealed formal (revelation in the objective sense) are designated by St. Thomas and his early commentators with the term "divine revelation". (114, 215)

Of these three things, the first, i.e. formal revelation or active revelation, is the formal motive or *reason sub qua* of divine faith. The second, i.e., the revealed formal or objective revelation, is the material object of divine faith and simultaneously the formal motive or *reason sub qua* of theology. The third, i.e. the revealed virtual, is the material object of theology.

Indeed, with divine faith we believe the revealed formal *because of* formal revelation; and we theologially know the revealed virtual *because of* formal. Now then, *that which* is known or believed is always what is material in every cognitive habit, whereas *that by which* anything is believed or known is what is formal. "Every cognitive habit *formally* looks to the *medium whereby* something is known, but *materially* looks to *that which* is known by the *medium*".<sup>10</sup>

The revealed virtual or theological conclusion is not known immediately by active revelation which is the formal motive of divine faith; but is indeed known by means of or *through* objective revelation or the principles of faith, which constitute the formal motive of theology. However, since the principles of faith or objective revelation are themselves known by active revelation, the result is that the theological conclusion is proximately known by the principles of faith or revealed formal, and mediate by formal or active revelation, which is the formal motive of divine faith. For this reason, it was common among the early theologians to say that the theological conclusion is immediately a truth of theology, but mediate a truth of divine faith.(453)

<sup>10</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.9, a.2, ad 3.

The so-called "virtual revelation" is nothing but the second of the three aforementioned things, i.e. the revealed formal insofar as it contains and makes known the third thing, which is the revealed virtual or theological conclusion. Thus, of these four things: (a) formal revelation; (b) revealed formal; (c) virtual revelation; (d) revealed virtual, the second and the third are really identical in the case of inclusive virtuality. To say that the revealed virtual or inclusive conclusion is known by means of virtual revelation is the same as saying that it is known by means of the revealed formal. Since the revealed formal is none other than *objective* revelation, St. Thomas and all the early theologians prior to the introduction of the physico-connexive virtual, affirmed briefly and truthfully that the theological conclusion is known "by divine revelation" or "by the light of divine revelation" (objective).

The twofold meaning, active and objective, of the term "revelation", as well as the different meaning of the terms "immediate" and "mediate" in the schools of Aquinas and Duns Scotus (169), which was further complicated with Suárez's introduction of the mediate or physical virtual (73), have contributed to the awful confusion of terminology in this matter. And it is a well known fact that when terms begin to get mixed up, ideas end up by following suit.

303. FIFTH OBSERVATION. — "As you have said repeatedly, the formal or specific object of divine faith is the *immediately* revealed, and the formal or specific object of theology is the mediate revealed. Now then, the formal or specific object of the sciences or habits are unchangeable, as happens likewise in the case of species, unless we are ready to admit *transformationism* in dogma as advocated by the Modernists. Hence, the Church cannot change the mediate revealed into immediately revealed. Not even God can do that, as the Salmanticensis correctly observe. You have dealt with this difficulty in an article, however, you did not reply to it directly but with 'circumlocutions'. I believe that Fr. Matías called your attention to it in his *Boletín Teológico*."

*Reply.* Here goes our direct reply without "circumlocutions" since the point is completely clear for anyone who has penetrated the Thomist doctrine on the true nature of sacred theology whose procedure is always *inclusive*.

Whatever is known through deductive reasoning is said to be *mediate*; whatever is known simply through authority is said to be *immediate*. But every Thomist knows that if the reasoning is *inclusive* — as in the case of the mathematical, metaphysical, and theological sciences — what is said to be mediate is mediate only *with respect to us* but is *immediate in itself*. St. Thomas says: "Any proposition whose predicate is *in the reason of the*

*subject is immediate and per se evident so far as it itself is concerned.*"<sup>11</sup> "It is on this account that a proposition is *per se evident*, that the predicate is included in the reason of the subject."<sup>12</sup>

Thus, in the case of inclusive conclusions — and such are all truly theological conclusions — that which so alarms our objector, to wit, "that the Church would be changing the mediate into immediate", reduces to the following simple case: "The Church would be changing that which is *immediate with respect to itself* into *mediate with respect to ourselves*." Nobody will deny that the Church can do this. That, and only that, is what the Church does when she defines theological consequences, or better still, theological consequences as dogmas of faith.

The case of the *non inclusive* mediate or virtual understood a la Suárez and Lugo is an altogether different one. The predicate of the minor is not really included in the subject. Neither therefore is the conclusion really included in the revealed major premise. In which case not even God can change such a mediate into immediate barring a new revelation. And on this point the Salmanticenses were right.

Our objector adds that the species and the specific objects are unchangeable. He is right, but only in the case where the medium of knowing remains unchanged. If the medium of knowing is changed, then whatever belongs to a certain habit comes *ipso facto* to belong also to another habit on account of the fact that the formal or specific element in cognitive habits — theology and faith are cognitive habits — is the *medium of knowing*, not the *matter* or reality known. "Every cognitive habit *formally* depends on the *medium* whereby something is known, but materially on *that which* is known by the medium."<sup>13</sup> "The species of any thing is chiefly judged by taking into account its *formal* reason and not by taking into account the *matter* or *subject*."<sup>14</sup>

Now then, when the Church intervenes with the dogmatic definition of a theological conclusion the *medium* whereby the conclusion is known changes for us. Before the definition we knew it solely by *revelation* is known changes which is the formal medium of theology. After the definition we come to know it by *revelation without reasoning*. After the definition we come to know it by *revelation without reasoning*, that is to say, by *revelation explicated and proposed by the Church*, which is the formal medium of divine faith.

<sup>11</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In Poster, Analyt.*, lib. 1, lect. 4.

<sup>12</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>13</sup> ST. THOMAS, *op. cit.*, 2-2, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 99, a. 2.

There is a change in the mediums of knowing and, thus, also a change of habits and assents. But there is no change at all of matter or objective reality, and, therefore, no transformism or Modernism.

In a nutshell: the Church does not, and cannot, change the *non inclusive* mediate into immediate; but undoubtedly she can, and does, change the *inclusive* mediate into immediate. Which is simply to change that which is *immediate in itself* into *mediate to us* (168)

"Our objector may now accuse us of being unnecessarily repetitious given his keen intelligence, but he cannot now accuse us of not replying directly and without "circumlocutions".

304. SIXTH OBSERVATION. — "No thing is, or can be, of divine faith if it is not said by God. I do not believe that theological conclusions are what God said; they are rather what we deduce from what God said. They are our deductions, not divine sayings."

*Reply.* It is obvious that no thing can be of divine faith if it is not truly said by God; but it is false, in the teaching of St. Thomas and of traditional theology, that only the principles have been said by God, whereas the conclusions have not been said by Him in any manner whatsoever. St. Thomas says: "Whoever says one thing, *somehow* says many things, and *these* are the things that precede the article and are consequent to it, and in this regard the article of *faith* can be *explicated* and divided."<sup>15</sup>

In this text St. Thomas with his habitual precision employs the term somehow because there are two ways of saying something or two sorts of sayings: (a) to say something *explicating* it fully; (b) to say something but *without explicating* it fully. Thus there are two sorts of divine sayings: fully *explicated sayings*, and *not explicated*, that is, implicit sayings. The former are the articles of faith or major premises of faith; the latter, the theological conclusions. Let us quote St. Thomas again: "The *explication* of the articles of *faith* happens in two ways. . . . The other way refers to the things that are *implicitly* contained in the articles themselves, and this takes place when a man knows *the things that follow from the article*."<sup>16</sup> "For there are certain things that are contained in the *faith* of the Church as *conclusions* in the principles."<sup>17</sup>

Thus, the First Truth or God ceased speaking or revealing with the death of the last of the apostles; but He has not ceased, nor will He cease *explicating* what was said or revealed. Each and every definition of the

<sup>15</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 4 Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6.



Church is nothing but an explication given by God of what He had already said through the apostles. Hence Cardinal Cajetan graphically describes the Church as "the minister of the object of faith. . . whereby the First Truth proposes and explicates itself and other credenda."<sup>18</sup>

Consequently, both the theologian submitting his conclusions without definition, and the Church defining those same conclusions give us nothing but the *explication* of what God has implicitly said.

The difference between them lies in this: the theological conclusions, if they are *inclusive*, are what God has *truly said* because they are *included* in what God has said; nonetheless, as long as they are not defined by the Church, they are what God said *explicated by man*. On the other hand, those same conclusions, once they are defined, are what God said *explicated by God*, even if God makes use of the Church's ministry in order to explicate them.

For this reason, the theologian, for all his wisdom and holiness and for all the evidence of his deduction or conclusion, can only say: *It is my view. . .* On the other hand, the Church in all her infallible definitions — and infallibility comprises not only the principles but also all theological conclusions — can, and does, say without any metaphor: *It is the view of the Holy Spirit. . .*

ARE THE DEFINITIONS OF THE CHURCH "THE WORD OF GOD"?  
— The foregoing makes plain the answer that must be given to the question or not.

The term "word", as also the term "scripture", can be taken in two different senses: the objective or material sense, and the subjective or formal sense. One thing is "what is written" (objective scripture), another thing is "the writing" (formal or subjective scripture). Likewise, one thing is "what is said" (objective word or saying), another thing is "the saying or the diction" (subjective word or saying). Peter can write down his own ideas, or he can write down what John said. In the first case, both what is written and the writing itself are Peter's. In the second case, the writing is Peter's but what is written is John's. Similarly if Peter speaks his own mind, both what is spoken and the speaking are Peter's. But if Peter says or repeats what John said, then the diction or speaking (subjective word or speech) is Peter's but what is said (objective word or speech) is John's.

In the case of the Holy Scripture, or inspired authors, both what is said or written and the speaking or writing are God's. Holy Scripture is, thus, the

<sup>18</sup>CAJETAN, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.1; and q.5, a.3.

word of God in both the objective and subjective senses. In the case of the definitions of the Church, what is said is God's, since the Church does nothing but repeat in a more explicated manner what was said implicitly by God. But the speaking or saying is not God's because God does not *move* her to say it, as is the case in inspiration, but simply assists her in saying it, so that is *she*, and she alone, who says it. Thus, the definitions of the Church are the word of God in the *objective* sense, but not in the *subjective* sense. And this explains why her definitions are not *Holy Scripture*.

A great number of theologians, including classical ones, deny that the definitions of the Church are *divine words*. But anyone who reads them attentively will clearly notice two things: (a) that this denial is made not only with respect to infallible definitions but with respect to definitions of divine faith as well, and no one will deny that the latter are the word of God in the *objective* sense; (b) that they take the term "divine word" in the sense of "Holy Scripture" or "inspired word", and in this sense every theologian must deny that the definitions of the Church are "the word of God."

305. SEVENTH OBSERVATION. — "The revealed deposit was closed and completed with the Apostles. This is the common teaching of theologians. It has already been consecrated by the Church in the twenty first proposition of Pius X's *Syllabus* against the Modernists."

*Reply.* The revealed deposit was closed and completed with the Apostles with respect to revelation; but it was neither closed nor completed, but remained open and to be completed by the divine magisterium of the Church with respect to the *explication* of the truths already revealed. Such divine or dogmatic explication by the Church covers, as we have seen in St. Thomas, not only the principles of the deposit but also the conclusions ("the things that follow from the principles"), without ceasing to be in the latter case an explication of what is revealed; an *explication of the faith*.

Our objector should not confuse these two radically different propositions: (a) Catholic *revelation* was closed and completed with the Apostles; (b) The *divine explication* of Catholic revelation was closed and completed with the Apostles. The first proposition is true. It is the proposition taught by the unanimous agreement of the theologians and consecrated in Pius X's *Syllabus*. The second proposition is false.

306. EIGHTH OBSERVATION. — "The theological conclusion in the strict and proper sense does not require that the conclusion should express new objectivity. I agree with this. But, as you say yourself, it does require the expression of a *new concept*, and not merely a new formula.

But, new concept is the same as *new meaning* or *new dogma*. Consequently, if the Church should propose to us as of divine faith any theological conclusion in the proper sense, we would have *new dogmas*. This is

inadmissible. The Church cannot give us new dogmas, although she can, and does, give us new formulae of the same old dogmas."

*Reply.* New concepts are of three kinds: (a) concepts that are new, but not completely new because they are deduced or come out of the old concepts. These are called *derived* or *consonant* concepts. (b) Concepts that are not only new, but *completely* new since they do not come out of the old ones. However, they are not incompatible with the latter. They are called *diverse* concepts. (c) Concepts that are not only *completely* new inasmuch as they do not come out of the old ones, but are also incompatible with them. For this reason they are called *contrary* or *opposed* concepts.

Thus we have three kinds of new concepts: (a) derived or consonant; (b) diverse; (c) contrary or opposed.

Instances of the first kind are absolute immutability and eternity, or spirituality and immortality, or immateriality and cognoscibility, and, in short, all those concepts which like the attributes in God are distinguished only in the manner of the *implicit* and the *explicit*. Instances of the second kind are quantity and quality, or colour and taste. Instances of the third kind are the concepts of spiritual and material, uncreated and contingent, white and black.

Derived or consonant concepts come out the one from the other by means of *inclusive* reasoning. Concepts that are diverse, or opposed, do not and cannot come out the one from the other since nothing can come out that was not within.

When something new is acquired which does not come out of what was already possessed, it is called in Thomist teaching *new in substance*. When what was already possessed, it is called *new in explication*.

Thus *diverse*, or *contrary*, concepts are new not only in *explication* but also in *substance*, whereas *derived* concepts are new in *explication* but not in *substance*.

We can now clearly spot the weak point of the argument. When our distinguished objector argues, as so many modern writers argue, that if the Church could define inclusive theological conclusions as of faith, we would in that case have new concepts, new meanings, new dogmas, the solution to the argument lies in a simple distinction in any of these forms:

First distinction: New, that is, completely new, *denied*; new, but not completely new, *conceded*.

Second distinction: new, that is, either contrary or diverse, *denied*; new, however, neither contrary or diverse, but totally derived from the old concepts, *conceded*.

Third distinction: new, that is, new in *substance*, *denied*; new, that is, new in *explication*, *conceded*.

These three ways of distinguishing say exactly the same thing.

WHAT IS THE KIND OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION THAT HAS BEEN CONDEMNED BY THE CHURCH? — The Church has not condemned the evolution of dogma in the same meaning — as in the case of homogeneous evolution —; what she has condemned is the evolution of dogma into diverse meanings, and, therefore, much more dogmatic evolution into *contrary* meanings, as happens in all transformist evolution. "I utterly reject the heretical phantasy of dogmas evolving into other meanings diverse from the meaning previously held by the Church."<sup>19</sup> The evolution of dogmas keeping within the same meaning is so far from being condemned that it is taught by the Church: "Let it therefore grow . . . but in the same sense."<sup>19a</sup> Or in the words of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure: "There are two ways of adding: either by adding what is *contrary* or *diverse*, and this is erroneous or presumptuous; or by exposing to view what was *implicitly* contained, and this is praiseworthy."<sup>20</sup> "There is an addition whereby what is added is *contrary*; another whereby what is added is *diverse*; and another whereby what is added is *consonant*. The first addition pertains to error; the second, to presumption; the third, to faithful instruction since it *explicitates* what is *implicit*."<sup>21</sup> What is to be understood by *implicit* is explained by the same St. Thomas: "Whenever many things are *virtually* contained in one thing, they are said to be in it *implicitly*, as the conclusions in the principles."<sup>22-23</sup>

<sup>19</sup>Formula of the anti-Modernist oath prescribed by Pius X's motu proprio *Sacrorum Antistitum* of Sept. 1, 1910; Denz. Schön. 3541.

<sup>19a</sup>VATICAN COUNCIL, Const. *De Fide Catholica*, ch.4; Denz.-Schön. 3020.

<sup>20</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, division of the text of the Prologue with its exposition.

<sup>21</sup>ST. BONAVENTURE, *In 1 Sent.*, exposition of the Prologue.

<sup>22</sup>ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q. 14, a.11.

<sup>23</sup>Another question arises on account of what he [the Apostle St. Paul] says: *Other than that which we have preached*. Therefore no one may teach or preach except what is written in the Epistles and the Gospels. But this is false since in I Thess. 3:10, it is said: *That we may supply those things that are lacking to your faith*.

"I answer that nothing should be preached other than that which is contained in the Gospels, the Epistles, and the Holy Scripture *implicitly* or *explicitly*. For the Holy Scripture and the Gospel preach that faith is to be given to Christ explicitly. Hence, whatever is contained implicitly in them that is conducive to his teaching and to faith in Christ may be preached and taught. And hence, when he says: *Other than that which you received*, i.e., adding something that is altogether alien. Apoc., last chapter, 18: *if anyone shall add [viz., altogether alien] to them, God will add unto him the plagues*. And Deut. 4:2: You shall not add to the word that I speak to you [i.e., anything contrary or

"The distinction of reason *changes nothing on the part of the thing.*"<sup>24</sup> Thus, the so-called new dogmas introduce no change at all in the primitive or revealed datum, provided that they do not differ really, but only conceptually, from the primitive dogmas. The newness is conceptual or subjective, not real. Something *somehow* new (secundum quid), not substantially new. There is a new mode, a new aspect; but the *objectivity*, which is the substance, is not new but the same. The Lirimensis expressed it felicitously: "When you say, *newly*, do not mean *new*."<sup>25</sup> "From one to an other according to reason which is not an other in reality."<sup>26</sup> Such is the case with every conceptual conclusion, with every rigorously theological conclusion.

When an old tree puts forth a new branch, the branch is new, but it is neither totally new nor new in substance since it grows out of the same substance or sap of the tree. This analogy of the tree and the revealed deposit is not a perfect analogy because in the case of the tree the sap is made up of elements originating from without, if the tree's sap were exclusively made up of the substance itself of the tree without any intussusception of any foreign element, there would be a more adequate analogy between the development of dogma and the development of the tree. (223) Such is the case with the new dogmas defined by way of implicit virtuality: they are new shoots of the ancient tree of the revealed deposit.

For this reason we have elsewhere (180) said, and we say it again now, that dogmatic development after the Apostles is neither merely subjective nor

alien], neither shall you take away from it." (ST. THOMAS, *In Epist. ad Galatas*, ch. 1, lect. 2)

<sup>24</sup>Catholic conclusion: Addition to the Symbol of the Apostles has been, and may be, licitly made by the Church. . . .

<sup>25</sup>That which is added to the Symbol is neither contrary to, nor diverse from it. Contrariety induces blasphemy; diversity, want of knowledge. Only what was already faith, is determined by explication, but nonetheless it was not outside of the scope of the principles since it lay hidden in it.

<sup>26</sup>Thus to add anything contrary to the faith is heretical perversity; to add anything diverse or not pertinent and beside the faith is madness; but to explicate what was contained in the articles of faith is Catholic piety and erudition.

<sup>27</sup>To add anything in the first manner is against the rule of faith; in the second manner, beside the rule of faith; in the third manner, it is in accordance with the rule of faith to draw conclusions from its principles, and it is in this manner that it was, and is, lawful for the Church to make additions to the Symbol." (GRAVINA, O. P., *Catholicae Praescriptiones*, 1.4, a.4, p.358; Neapoli 1619)

<sup>24</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.75, a.7.

<sup>25</sup>*Communitorium*, c.23.

<sup>26</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium De Trinitate*, q.6, a.1.

merely objective, but subjective-objective. To speak in rigorous scholastic terms it is formally or "simpliciter" subjective, but "secundum quid" objective.

It is "simpliciter" subjective because the *distinction*, and thus the newness of the development are not in the object itself independently of the subject, but are effected by the subject, as happens in every virtual or conceptual distinction.

It is "secundum quid" objective because the *foundation* of the distinction, and thus of the newness, is not in the subject alone, as happens in the case of any merely logical distinction or in any distinction of mere formulae, but is found in the object itself, viz. in the fecundity and wealth of objective aspects, already implicitly contained from the very beginning, in the object itself, that is, the primitive deposit.

Some excessively scrupulous theologians shy away from saying that the deposit itself grows, and imprison themselves in the sacred phrase that which grows is "our" explication of the deposit. They overlook the fact that what they call "our explication of the deposit" does not, simply because it is "ours", cease to be also an explication "of the deposit". Since that new explication, or better still, since the explication made by the Church becomes incorporated into, and made an integral part of, the deposit, to say that the explication of the deposit grows is the same as saying that the deposit itself grows as regards its explication. (186)

It is one thing, therefore, to say that the deposit grows with regard to itself, that is with regard to its real objectivity and quite another thing to say that the deposit itself grows, not with regard to its objectivity, but with regard to its explication. The definitions of the Church do not make the deposit grow with regard to itself; nonetheless the deposit itself grows because its explication grows and that same new or greater explication becomes an integral part of itself. It is a development of explication but a development of the revealed deposit itself. (173)

307. NINTH OBSERVATION. — "John of St. Thomas expressly says and repeats several times that no thing can be defined by the Church as of divine faith unless it is *immediately* revealed."

*Reply.* In the passage referred to by our objector (*De Sacra Theologia*, d.2, a.4) John of St. Thomas expressly and clearly says five things:

1. That the question whether the truly theological conclusion is of divine faith or not cannot be answered without drawing a distinction between *before* or *after* the Church's definition.

<sup>27</sup>With regard to the certainty of the conclusions deduced by theology a distinction must be made: for they are either attained *solely* through theological reasoning, or, in addition to theological reasoning, they are vouched for by the *definition* of the Church." (*Loc. cit.*, n.1)

2. That *before* the Church's definition the truly theological conclusion does not pertain to the faith immediately but mediately, and consequently, of itself it belongs to *theological* science. He adds that this is the more common opinion of the theologians against Vázquez, and makes it his own.<sup>28</sup>
3. That *after* the Church's definition *that same* conclusion becomes an object of *divine faith* and a true principle of theology. This is, he says, the opinion commonly followed by Thomists against Molina.<sup>29</sup>
4. That even if such true conclusions are known *solely through reasoning* prior to the definition, this notwithstanding, the Church does not define them as of faith insofar as they are known precisely through reasoning, but in so far as they are intended, albeit in a *hidden* manner, by the Holy Spirit. In

<sup>28</sup> "In the first case [i.e., prior to the Church's definition] there are two opinions . . . Others think, and theirs is the *more common* opinion, that the conclusions thus evidently deduced do not pertain immediately, but *mediately*, to the faith, but pertain *per se* to theological science . . . I say in the first place: the certainty of the theological conclusion deduced by evident consequence from the principles of faith is not as *such* [i.e., before its definition] immediately of faith, but a *scientific* and *theological* certainty . . . The contrary opinion [Vázquez's] seems to make the certainty of the theological conclusion equal to the definition of the Church, and this is altogether intolerable." (*Loc. cit.*, nn.1, 4-5)

<sup>29</sup> "If the certainty of theology is considered in the second case [i.e., after the Church's definition] . . . Molina and some others quoted by him, with whose opinion Gramados concurs, hold that the propositions deduced and thus defined by the Church are not, on the strength of the definition, *immediately of faith*, but continue belonging to *theological science* as *conclusions*, not as *principles*. But to allay the fears of anyone who might think that these authors deny, absolutely speaking, that the propositions defined by the Church are of faith, Gramados distinguishes *two ways* in which the Church proceeds: for if she declares something as *immediately* revealed by God, it undoubtedly *pertains immediately to the faith*. But if she defines something deduced from the revealed principles, it *does not pertain to the faith*, but to *theological conclusions*. Hence they [defined propositions] are not *principles* of theology, unless they are defined in the *first manner*, since the Holy Spirit does not assist the Church to make new revelations. Consequently, *if a thing is not immediately revealed, but only deduced through reasoning, the Church cannot turn it into something immediately of faith*." Hereto John of St. Thomas has been describing the opinion of Molina and Gramados. He goes on to say: "The *third opinion* holds that propositions *evidently deduced* from the principles of faith, *if they are defined by the Church, pertain immediately to the faith*, and become principles of theology; they rest no longer on reasoning, but their certainty derives from the divine testimony proposed by the Church in conformity with the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit given for the purpose of defining matters of faith. *Thomists commonly are of this opinion*, as can be seen in the aforesaid Navarrete and in Master González. Gramados cites Belarmino, Vega, Cano, Vázquez, and others, as being of this view . . . I say in the *second place*: the truths which the Church defines by a definition [that is declarative of the faith, whatsoever be the manner in which she defines them, distinguished] *pertain immediately to the faith*, and can be *principles* of theology." (*Loc. cit.*, nn. 2, 3-6)

order to know or discover this hidden intention of the Holy Spirit the Church is endowed with divine assistance.<sup>30</sup>

5. If we call *immediately revealed* everything that is *intended by the Holy Spirit*, it follows that no thing can be defined by the Church as of divine faith unless it is immediately revealed, at least in a hidden and implicit manner.<sup>31</sup>

These five propositions faithfully condense everything said by John of St. Thomas. Now then, does our objector fully admit these five propositions, particularly the first three, and above all the third, of which John of St. Thomas says, "Thomists commonly follow this opinion"? If he admits them, then we both are in agreement with respect to every substantial point. There still remains an imprecision of language regarding the terms *immediate* and *mediate*, an imprecision dating from Suárez, from which some posterior Thomists, John of St. Thomas among them, are not entirely free.

This imprecision or vagueness of terms is found in the fifth proposition, the only one which seems to have caught the attention of our objector. John of St. Thomas there employs the term *immediate* as a synonym of *intended by the Holy Spirit*. If the term *immediate* is taken in this sense, it is obvious that no thing not *immediately* revealed, that is, not intended by the Holy Spirit, can be defined as of divine faith. If the term *immediate* is understood thus neither the debate between Thomists and Vázquez on the hand, nor the debate between Thomists and Molinists on the other hand, would make any sense since everyone admits that no thing is definable as of divine faith unless it is truly revealed, or truly intended by the Holy Spirit. On this point no differences exist among the schools. But the things that are truly revealed or truly intended by the Holy Spirit have always been classified into two members: (a) that which is revealed or intended *in itself*; (b) that which is revealed or intended in another. With reference to our minds, the former is called revealed *immediate* or formal never mediate or virtual; the later, re-

<sup>30</sup> "Hence the Church cannot define anything precisely on account of its being deduced by *theological reasoning*, as if this were the *formal* reason, although debate and reasoning precede as a previous disposition for the purpose of inquiring whether it is contained in divine revelation; but because it is so in the eyes of the Holy Spirit." (*Loc. cit.*, n.8)

<sup>31</sup> After the words just quoted, John of St. Thomas goes on immediately to say: "But because it is so in the eyes of the Holy Spirit, and therefore because it is *immediately* revealed by God, although to us it is *implicit* and *concealed* until it shall have been declared by the Church." (*Loc. cit.*, n.8) We ask the reader to take notice of the term and therefore, and he will plainly perceive the sense in which John of St. Thomas understands the term "*immediately revealed*". It is a manner of speaking which lends itself to confusion, if John of St. Thomas had only added to the term "*immediate*" the qualifier "*in itself*", no one would be misled by it.

vealed *mediate* or *virtual*, never *immediate* or *formal*. The former is not only revealed in *reality* but also *in itself*; the latter, again with reference to our minds, is revealed in *reality* but not *in itself*. Herein precisely lies the specific difference between *faith* and *our theology*.

This small imprecision or vagueness in describing as *immediate* everything revealed or intended by the Holy Spirit is responsible for the contradiction in terminology incurred by John of St. Thomas, who ends by calling, and correctly so, *virtual implicit* and *revealed IN REALITY* that which previously he had ambiguously called *revealed IMMEDIATE*.<sup>32</sup> That is exactly what St. Thomas denominates *immediate in itself* but *mediate TO US*.

That is the true name of the truly theological conclusion: *virtual implicit* or *revealed IN REALITY*. All truly theological conclusions are such. *Virtual* since we need true reasoning in order to know or explicate or deduce them, it being impossible for us to know them without reasoning. *Implicit* inasmuch as the reasoning is a reasoning of real identity or of intellectual inclusion.

Thus, and setting aside ambiguous terms, the teaching of John of St. Thomas, which is the one that "Thomists commonly follow", lies *midway*

<sup>32</sup>"Hence you may gather that something can be virtually contained in the truths belongs to theology which has for its object the things inferred from the truths of faith. The second is in a *virtually implicit* manner, that is, things that *in reality* are revealed and intended by the Holy Spirit, but are hidden to us and therefore reached by *reasoning*. These things the Church can, and does, define." (*Loc.cit.*, n.16) It is obvious that John of St. Thomas's teaching is in substance identical to that of all previous Thomists, but with two imprecisions of language. First, that of calling *immediate implicit* what he eventually admits is only a *virtual implicit*, since before its definition we know it only through reasoning (*attained solely through reasoning*, *loc.cit.*, n.13). Secondly, that of being too vague in explaining the distinction between *virtual implicit* and *virtual inferential*. If the inference is truly *theological*, the *virtual inferential* is always *implicit*.

However, although John of St. Thomas concurs with all Thomists in maintaining against Molina the definability of conclusions that are truly and properly theological, there is in him a small weakness or flaw. This flaw lies in his failure to assign an objective criterion, or one that is *prior to the fact*, which would enable us to tell which conclusions are definable and which are not. Those conclusions are definable, he says, which were intended, even if in a hidden manner, by the Holy Spirit. And the Holy Spirit intended in a hidden manner all those conclusions which the Church defines with divine assistance. Which is tantamount to saying: those conclusions are *definable* which have been *de/med*. The learned Fr. Gardel, in his excellent book *Le donné révélé*, p. 173 had already called attention to this flaw in John of St. Thomas. What we need, what the Church herself needs, is an *objective criterion of definability* since the Church has not been given *revelation* but only *assistance*. According to St. Thomas, that criterion is the characteristic property of every *truly theological conclusion* of being *intellectually explicative* or *implicit* with regard to the revealed major. The *minor* is merely an *instrument of explication*.

between the *extreme* opinions of Vázquez and Molina, and comprises two parts: (a) Vázquez's opinion, which asserts that the true conclusion or true *mediate* or *revealed virtual* is of *divine faith before* the Church's definition, is false; (b) Molina's opinion, which asserts that the truly theological conclusion is not of *divine faith after* the Church's definition, is false.

Anyone who would demand incontrovertible evidence that John of St. Thomas's true meaning is such as we have described it is invited to look up the treatise *On Faith*, where John of St. Thomas, referring expressly to the same art.4 cited by our objector, says the following:

"From the foregoing it can be gathered that *virtual* or *mediate* revelation or that which is *deduced by reasoning*, as is found in theology, *differs specifically* from *immediate* revelation which is had on the testimony of the witness and has to do with what must be believed by faith. We have dealt with this at greater length in the first part, q.1, d.2, *article four*, where we *rejected two extreme* positions: one, that of Vázquez, who holds that the conclusion *deduced* from premises of faith is, relative to the knower's reasoning, just as certain as any proposition defined by the Church; the other, that of Molina, who holds that, even if the Church's definition should be added to a proposition that was *not of faith before*, such a definition would not make it be *of faith*, but that the Holy Spirit assists the Church so that she does not err, but not so as to *make of faith what was not of faith before*. *These opinions* can be found *impugned in the aforesaid place*."<sup>33</sup>

Any student of theology knows that Molina and Vázquez, both of whom John of St. Thomas impugns, speak of the true and proper *mediate* or *virtual*.(409,495)

308. TENTH OBSERVATION. — "The 'starting point' of theology, or what is commonly known as 'the principles of theology' is or are what is 'revealed'. Consequently, if a truth is truly revealed, it is not truly a conclusion or development but purely the starting point or principle. Vice versa, if a truth is truly a conclusion, it cannot be something truly revealed for in that case it would be a principle, and not a conclusion of the theology."

*Reply*. The starting point or first principle of theology is not what is revealed purely and simply, as our objector says, but what is revealed *immediately* or *formally* or *in itself*, or better still, what is revealed *explicitly*. (31)

But in the explicitly revealed there is a lot of content or of *implicitly* revealed, and the implicitly revealed makes for *development* and for *conclusions*. Where the implicitness is one solely relating to names or formulae,

<sup>33</sup>*De Fide*, d.1, a.2.

that is, an implicitness so shallow and superficial that for its explication or unfolding no proper reasoning involving different concepts is required, but only a mere explaining of terms, then the development or conclusion is also *improper*; in this case no true virtual or mediate exists as yet. This is known as the *formal implicit* or the *immediate implicit*. This is the sort of implicitness obtaining between the defined and its definition, between correlatives, between the whole and its parts, and between the unconditioned universal and its particulars.

On the other hand, if the implicitness is so recondite and profound that its explication or development requires a combination, not only of terms, but also of *concepts*, and thus true and proper reasoning, then the development and the conclusion, while remaining a true explication of the *implicit* and thus an explication of what is truly *revealed*, constitute now a true and rigorous development of concepts or ideas and not simply of mere formulae; they now are truly and properly conclusion, not principle. Such is theology in the true, proper, and rigorous sense. (33)

The Church possesses *divine* authority not only to *propose* what is revealed, but also to *explicate* all that is *implicit* in what is revealed. When she defines such a conclusion as a truth of divine faith, then what was a conclusion comes to be a principle of sacred theology: what did not formally belong to the faith, but to theology comes to belong formally to the faith.

In the case of the human habits of *simple understanding* and of *science*, what belongs to science can never come to belong to simple understanding because on the human level we cannot avail ourselves of some other medium which will enable us to know *without reasoning* or immediately what we could not know before except *through reasoning* or mediately. But in the case of habits that have reference to the supernatural or the divine or the revealed, as in the case of divine faith and of sacred theology, we have at our disposal another medium that enables us to attain without reasoning or through *divine authority* the same thing that we could not attain before except by means of reasoning. Hence we have at our disposal a medium which enables us to convert conclusions into principles, or theology into divine faith. That medium is the Church's divine authority or the dogmatic definition made by the Church, which presupposes reasoning as an *instrument* or as a *previous* condition but is not formally grounded on reasoning but on *divine* assistance. For this reason John of St. Thomas utters a profound insight when he says that theology has something proper and exclusive which is not had by the other sciences, *viz.*, that its conclusions can come to be principles. "And thus this is *peculiar* in *theology*: that that which at some time was a *conclusion* can be changed into a *principle*."<sup>34</sup>

<sup>34</sup>De Summo Pontifice, d.2, a.2, n.5.

By the way, our objector has there a new proof that John of St. Thomas speaks of the true and proper conclusions when he maintains that the theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith. *Improper* conclusions can become, and are, principles not only in theology, but in every other science. That is not something *peculiar* to theology.

309. ELEVENTH OBSERVATION. — "For this reason the greater part of Thomists maintains, against Contenson, that theology is not *formally*, but only radically, supernatural."

*Reply.* With the majority of the Thomists we hold, against Contenson, that theology is a habit that is not *formally*, but only radically supernatural. But in Thomist teaching *radically* means *objectively* or with respect to the *thing known*, just as *formally* means with respect to the *mode* of knowing. Thus, theological conclusions are objectively supernatural or revealed although *modally* natural or acquired. Now then, what *formally* specifies the cognitive habits is the *mode* or medium of knowing, not the known thing, and for this reason the habit of theology is formally a natural or acquired habit in spite of being objectively supernatural.<sup>35</sup> Thus the difference between the majors of faith or the habit of faith and the theological conclusions or habit of theology is not a difference of the *objectivity* known but a difference in the *mode* of knowing that objectivity. Says John of St. Thomas:

"To the arguments, starting from the beginning, we reply: To the first we say that the *object* of theology is *something supernatural*, but disposed, and penetrated or gathered in a *natural manner*; thus, it belongs to a natural and acquired habit. . . . And so although it deals with and infers many *supernatural* truths about God, nonetheless it attains them in a natural and inferential *manner* through its own industry and effort. . . . Hence when it is said that the medium of proof is supernatural, *viz.* the truths of faith, I distinguish: the truths of faith as connected and penetrated in a natural *manner* and by an acquired studious skill, I concede; the truths of faith *precisely* as

<sup>35</sup>"The different genera of knowables are distinguished according to the *different mode of knowing*." (ST. THOMAS, *In Post Analyt.*, lib.1, lect.39) "Indeed, any cognitive habit *formally* regards the *medium* by means of which something is known, but *materially*, that which is known by means of the medium." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.9, a.2, ad 3) "The difference between the *explicit* and the *implicit* [which is the difference between *faith* and *theology*] can be referred to different things. And if it is referred to *that which* is said to be implicitly or explicitly, then it is certain that they *do not change the species*, as in the case of act and potency. For man in act and man in potency are of the same species, and the implicit truth is one with the explicit. But if it is referred to the *modes* themselves, or to the things that require such *modes*, then the *species is changed*, as is obvious in the case of *principles* and *conclusions*, and of their respective *habits*. (CAJETAN, *Ibid.*, q.10, a.5) "The habit of theology is somehow *supernatural*, i.e., radically and *objectively*, as is *commonly* held. This we readily concede." (BILLIART, *Dissertatio proemialis de Sacra Theologia*, a.6).

standing under a supernatural light, I deny. Now, a dependence of whatever kind does not suffice for the reason of supernatural light, but it is necessary that the *manner* itself of illumination be supernatural and not disposed and acquired and penetrated in a natural *manner*. . . . and by this we determine the *formal* reason."<sup>36</sup>

In the foregoing passage from John of St. Thomas our objector will notice how insistently he repeats that the difference between the objects of faith and of theology lies in the *manner* of knowing and not in the objectivity known. Above all we ask him to take note of the profound and masterly definition of the *object* of theology, i.e., of the theological *conclusion*: "The *object* of theology is *something supernatural*, but disposed in a *natural manner*." The conclusion or thing known is supernatural or revealed; the *manner* whereby it is deduced or known is natural or scientific or acquired.

310. THEOLOGICAL EQUATIONS. — Many modern textbooks believe — and our objector appears to agree with them — that there exists a distinction of *objectivity* where there exists only a distinction of *modality*. There is no objective-real distinction between faith and theology; both contain the *same thing* but with a different *manner* or degree of explication. The one is only a greater *explication* or penetration of the other.

The idea conveyed by these modern textbooks, and apparently held by our objector, of the *formal* objects of divine faith, sacred theology, and purely human sciences can be stated in the following formulae or equations:

divine faith = revealed  
sacred theology = not revealed  
human sciences = not revealed

The third equation is obviously correct. But we believe that there are two basic deficiencies in the first two equations.

The first deficiency is found in the first formula relative to divine faith. It lies in the fact that therein no mention is made at all of "the *proposition* and *explication* by the Church". Our objector will say that the Church is an *accidental* condition for divine faith. We reply that, according to St. Thomas and the Thomist school, the Church is an *essential* condition for divine faith considered *in itself*, but she is an *essential* or formal condition for *our* divine faith, i.e., for the faith of those of us who have not received revelation immediately from God as the angels, the patriarchs and the apostles, but have received it only mediately. (146) Our objector will also say that the Church is a requisite for *Catholic*, but not for *divine* faith. We reply that the distinction between Catholic faith and divine faith is or might be good in the case of

<sup>36</sup> *De Sacra Theologia*, q.1, d.2, a.8, n.12.

*private* revelations; but in the case of the public or *Catholic* revelation, such as the revealed deposit, without private revelation of any kind, then no divine faith is possible that is not also *Catholic* faith. In other words, no divine faith is possible without the Church's proposition or explication. The contrary is precisely Vázquez's teaching.<sup>37</sup>

The second and even more serious, deficiency is found in the second formula or equation relative to *sacred* theology. For all those *three formulae* there are, and there can be, no more than *two* genera of objects, viz. the *revealed* and the *non revealed*. The defect lies in putting sacred theology in the same boat as purely human sciences, as if they were two branches or subdivisions of one and the same main trunk, the *non-revealed*; whereas St. Thomas and the whole of tradition have always placed sacred theology on the same side as faith, as two branches or subdivisions of the *revealed*. (323-325)

If sacred theology had for its object or conclusion the *non-revealed* much the same as the profane sciences, such a theology would be *sacred* only in name since in truth it would be just as *profane* and *alien* to supernatural life as any of the purely human or natural sciences.

<sup>37</sup> "As happens in the case of almost all terms that are old and full of meaning, the word 'dogma' has a history which I have resumed elsewhere. Let us bear only this in mind: *etymologically*, 'dogma' is at first said, in general, of a subjective opinion, a subjective affirmation, only to settle itself immediately in the language of *the law* with a firmer and denser meaning, coming then to signify an ordinance, a decree issued authoritatively. Having, at this stage, come into *ecclesiastical* usage, its meaning shifts gradually towards the *intellectualist* sense and eventually becomes settled there. Since the beginning of the 5th century, a dogma is a *truth revealed by God*, which as such imposes an irreversible adherence on the spirit of the faithful. In *current* usage a distinction is sometimes drawn between *dogmas of divine faith*, revealed truths that impose themselves prior to any formal definition, and *defined dogmas of faith*, revealed truths proposed by the Church's infallible teaching." (GRANDMAISON, *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique*, 1908, pp.522)

The different and successive senses — etymological, juridical, and ecclesiastical — of the term "dogma" given by the distinguished Fr. Grandmaison are correct. But the last distinction of dogma into dogmas of divine faith and defined dogmas of faith or dogmas of Catholic faith, is false, although Fr. Grandmaison correctly observes that such a distinction is actually drawn by some theologians. This distinction is only a derivation from Vázquez's teaching (85). As we have already seen elsewhere (156), Thomists hold that neither Catholic nor divine faith with respect to any truth in the revealed deposit is possible prior to the Church's definition, whether by solemn or by ordinary magisterium; after the Church's definition not only divine, but also Catholic faith is possible. Such a distinction could possibly be maintained only with respect to *private* revelations, to which, in the opinion of many theologians, an assent of divine faith might be given, but which, nonetheless, can never become truths of Catholic faith. However, with respect to the revealed deposit, the terms Catholic faith and divine faith are synonymous and inseparable in our faith.

It will be said that although sacred theology has for its object or conclusions the *non-revealed*, still it has the *revealed* as its *origin*, which is not the case in the profane sciences. This retort makes no difference. The value of any thing resides in its *being*, not in its *origin*. Origin itself has no value except insofar as it is capable of introducing some distinction in the being. The man who was born blind miraculously received his sight from Christ, but the nature of his sight was no different from the sight of other men because although its *origin* was different or supernatural, it had the same natural *being*. His *sight* was entirely *natural in its substance*, it was supernatural only in its *mode*. On the other hand, the case of sacred theology is, and has to be *exactly the reverse*, that is to say *supernatural in its object* or subject matter, and *natural only in its mode*. As John of St. Thomas reminds us: "The *object* of theology is something *supernatural* but disposed in a *natural manner*."<sup>38</sup> (309)

311. Hence, the formulae or equations describing divine faith, sacred theology, and the profane sciences are, in our opinion, as follows:

DIVINE FAITH = the *revealed*, explicated by the Church.  
 SACRED THEOLOGY = the *revealed* explicated by reason.  
 PROFANE SCIENCES = the *non-revealed*, explicated by reason.

In these three formulae three things of the greatest and transcendental importance become immediately obvious: (a) between sacred theology and the profane sciences there exists a difference of *substance* (revealed and non-revealed); there is agreement only in the mode (explication through human reason in both cases); (b) on the contrary, the *substance* is the same in sacred theology and in faith (the revealed in both cases); the difference is only in the *mode* (the way of divine authority or of the Church in the case of divine faith, and the way of human reasoning in theology); (c) the possibility of theology passing into divine faith simply by changing the *mode* or medium of knowing that is to say, simply by having the Church propose or explicate with divine authority or assistance the *same thing* that the theologian proposed and explicated by way of human reasoning. Such is, we believe, the true Thomist teaching.

## SECTION II

### FURTHER OBJECTIONS AGAINST DOGMATIC EVOLUTION IN GENERAL

312. FIRST OBSERVATION. — "What the Church can, and does in fact define as of divine faith is that which requires nothing but *improper* reasoning for its deduction from the revealed deposit, and which is called

<sup>38</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*

*formal implicit*. For example: "Indeficient foundation of the Church; therefore, infallible"; or likewise, 'Full of grace, therefore, immaculate'. Such conclusions, even prior to their definition were already included *formally*, and not only virtually, in the revealed deposit."

*Reply*. We admit that the Church can define as of faith all that is deduced from the revealed deposit through *improper* reasoning. We also admit that anything which requires only an improper reasoning for its deduction is called, and is, *formal implicit*. But we are surprised that our objector should consider those two examples as instances of *improper* reasoning or of the formal implicit. They are not instances of formal implicit but of the virtual implicit and the true virtual. They are not instances of improper but of proper reasoning and even of proper reasoning in the highest degree.

As our objector himself grants, the improper reasoning or formal implicit requires that the deduced conclusion should not express a *new*, but the *same* concept. Where a new concept intervenes the reasoning is no longer improper but proper, what is deduced is no longer formal but virtual. Now then, the concept "indefectible foundation", which is a Gospel concept, and the concept "infallible on account of itself not on account of the consent of the Church", which is the concept defined by the Vatican, are not one and the same concept but *two concepts*, albeit one *implicit* in the other. Similarly, the concept "full of grace", found in the Gospel, and the concept "conceived without taint of original sin in the first instant of her conception on account of the foreseen merits of her Son", which is the concept defined by Pius IX, are not the same concept but *two concepts* or different aspects, albeit of the *same thing* or reality. It is true that they are not *contrary*, nor even *diverse* concepts, but they are indeed *new* or *different* concepts derived the one from the other. Such is the true theology, the true virtual implicit: virtual inasmuch as there exists a distinction of concepts, which is what constitutes virtual distinction; implicit inasmuch as one concept comes out of, or is derived from, the other.

To convince himself of it, we ask our objector to open any dictionary, look up the *formal* meaning or *definition* of "indeficient foundation" and verify whether in that definition there is any mention of "personal infallibility" or "without the consent of the Church". Let him also look up the definition of "Mother of God" and see whether there is in it any mention of the concepts "free from original sin", "first instant", and "on account of the foreseen merits of her Son's death". What is not mentioned in the definition cannot be, with respect to our minds, *formally* contained in the defined term.

On the other hand, if he looks up the definition of "wholes" he will find in it the concept of "parts"; if he looks up the definition of any correlative, e.g., "father" he will find in it the concept of the other correlative, "son"; if



he, finally, looks up the definition of "universal" he will find in it the concept of "singulars". For this reason, anything contained as a part in the whole, as a correlative in its correlative, or as a particular in the actual unconditioned universal, is *formal*, because, insofar as the one enters into the *definition* or *simple understanding* of the other, there is only *one concept* under *two different words*. Everything else is not formal but virtual for anyone capable of distinguishing *our science* or *our theology* from simple understanding or faith.

Our objector will retort that even if in the given instances one concept does not enter *explicitly* into the definition of the other, it nonetheless enters *implicitly* because the *analysis* of the concepts "indeficient foundation", or "full of grace", uncovers the defined concepts. Such is indeed the case. But that is precisely what, in our opinion, constitutes the true virtual implicit or the true and proper reasoning of the superior sciences, viz. the *analysis* of a concept whereby it is broken up into *two* or more concepts, thus giving us *new concepts*. All the superior sciences are *analytic*. Sacred theology is nothing but the intellectual analysis of the revealed deposit.

It might also be said that in the foregoing examples the transition from one concept to the other is clear and obvious. Nothing else is required than to penetrate correctly all the biblical meaning of "indeficient foundation", or of "full of grace" in order to see at once the other concepts that have been defined by the Church.

We admit that those other concepts become obvious or come out of the previous ones provided that the *whole* meaning of these is correctly penetrated. But this is exactly what constitutes the nature of the true conclusion and the true virtual: delving correctly into the *whole* meaning, without stopping at the shallow or formal meaning. If our objector takes as formal *all* the meaning contained in the principles or major premises of the reasoning, then it is obvious that every conclusion reached by inclusive reasoning is formal. But the term *formal* has never been understood to include *all* the meaning of proposition or principle but only its explicit meaning, or perhaps also that meaning which is so shallowly implicit that its explication requires only a simple definition or explanation of the *words*. When the explication of the implicit meaning requires conceptual analysis, the implicitness is no longer formal but virtual; it is no longer a case of simple understanding or faith but of science or theology. Any one who penetrates correctly *all* that is contained or implicit in any mathematical or metaphysical principle or theorem would clearly see at once all its true conclusions. But this does not prevent such conclusions from being conclusions in the true and *proper* sense — and thus truly new concepts and virtual in the true sense — with respect to *our* minds which are not capable of understanding or penetrating *all* the meaning at one stroke.

We take it that there is only one reason that leads our objector to look upon the two aforementioned instances as *formal-implicit* and not as *virtual-implicit*. And that reason is that he is *a priori* persuaded that the Church cannot define as of divine faith anything but the *formal*. Since it is a *fact* that the Church has defined those two instances as of divine faith, he has no other alternative but to juggle terms so as to be able to maintain that those two cases are instances of *formal*, albeit of *formal-implicit* as he calls it, or of *formal-confused* in the more delightful terminology preferred by others. We believe that instead of reasoning thus: "The Church cannot define anything but the formal; therefore, those instances are instances of the formal," we should reason as follows: "Those instances are obviously cases of the virtual; therefore, the Church can define the virtual". Thus did our early theologians reason. Thus does the history of dogmas compel us to reason.

A DIGRESSION ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN.  
— We have elsewhere observed that it is not necessary that the primitive Church should have *explicitly* known a truth for it to be definable as of faith. It is enough that it should have been *implicitly* known in other explicit dogmas, (173)

Thus, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that the primitive Church should have explicitly accepted the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of Mary.

These dogmatic truths — of which the former has already been defined, and the other is likely to be defined in the not too distant future — are implicitly contained, as are almost all the dogmas referring to the Blessed Virgin, in the scriptural texts, "I will put enmity", "Full of grace," and "Mother of Christ", all of which the Christian sense of faith has translated as "Worthy Mother of God", and "New Eve". *Inclusive* reasoning suffices to deduce the two former truths from these latter truths. And whatever could have been wanting in the evidence of the reasoning has been amply supplied by the sense of faith inasmuch as where this sense of faith turns out to be the firm adherence of the whole Church, it suffices by itself to establish the definitivity of a truth.

We cannot but praise those theologian-historians who have devoted themselves to researching and gathering all the texts and monuments of antiquity relative to these dogmas. Often it turns out that the explicit belief of the Church has begun much earlier than we commonly think.

However, it is also necessary that these theologians should not forget that it is not absolutely required for the definitivity of these dogmas that they should have been *explicitly* taught by the Apostles.

Suárez has admirably resumed the traditional teaching on this matter in the following passage:

"What is necessary for a thing to be defined by the Church? In the first place, I say that this truth, viz., that the Virgin was conceived without original sin, can be defined by the Church whensoever she thinks it expedient . . . In the second place, this can thus be made clear: this is a supernatural truth that is greatly relevant to the utility and piety of the Church, and things can come to such a pass where, without a new and explicit revelation, the Church possesses sufficient motives to define this truth on account of God's *implicit and tacit revelation* sufficiently proposed to her. Therefore, the antecedent is clear from the fact that many times the Church has by her authority and with the Holy Spirit's assistance defined similar controversies without a new express revelation; this can be shown by manifest instances in the questions of the *infused habits*, the *canonical authority of certain books of the Holy Scripture*, the *freedom from all venial sin* in the Virgin herself. Other examples can be added, e.g., *her resurrection, her glorious Assumption*, and the *holiness of her birth*. Of these some already pertain to the faith, others are proximate to the faith and no one doubts that *these can be eventually defined*. For this definition it is enough that a supernatural truth be *implicitly contained* in the Scriptures or in Tradition so that with the *growth of the common consensus of the Church* — it is through her that the Holy Spirit often explicates the traditions or clarifies the Scriptures — the Church may eventually give her definition, which has with respect to us the force, as it were, of a revelation on account of the Holy Spirit's infallible assistance."<sup>39</sup>

Cajetan had condensed the same teaching in the following terms:

"It makes no difference whether a thing has been explicitly or implicitly revealed in the Holy Scriptures and other sources . . . except that ingenuity, effort, reason and intellect are needed to make manifest that such things as are said to be *implicitly* contained are necessarily *connected* with those things in which they are said to be contained."<sup>40</sup>

Thus, even if a truth has not been the object of explicit faith during the first centuries, it can nonetheless be defined provided that it is implicitly connected with the primitive dogmas, and connected in such a manner that it can be evidently demonstrated either through reasoning or through the sense of faith.

It is in this manner that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is

<sup>39</sup>SUÁREZ, *De Virginis Mariæ Sanctificatione*, d.3, s.6, n.4, ed. Vivès, vol.19, pp.8.47-48.

<sup>40</sup>*Opusculum de Conceptione B. Virginis*, ch.1, on two ways of discerning matters of faith.

implicitly connected with the dogma of her divine Motherhood, and the dogma of her Assumption with these two.<sup>41</sup>

As Christ is of his own nature the "New Adam", so Mary is by the merits of Christ the "New Eve". Tradition has always regarded her in this light.

Christ, of his own nature, was free from all the consequences of original sin — aside from such consequences, as, e.g., death and the bodily defects common to all mankind, which he voluntarily assumed in order to redeem us, — and the Blessed Virgin had to be exempt from them by the merits of her Son.

Of his own nature Christ was entitled to the freedom from bodily corruption, the resurrection, and the ascension. Mary, inasmuch as she had been preserved, through the merits of her Son, from original sin, must have had been endowed *in fact* with these three privileges since bodily corruption, death, and debasement from heaven are simply *consequences of original sin*. Consequently, even if we suppose that the Apostles had *explicitly* taught nothing concerning the Blessed Virgin except the dogma of her being the "worthy Mother of God", they would have, by the same token, *implicitly* taught all the others. This capital dogma accounts for the definability of the dogmas of her Immaculate Conception and her Assumption. To call this implicitness *formal* as our objector wishes, or *virtual* as we prefer, makes no difference at bottom, provided that it be truly *implicit*. The Church can dogmatically define *everything* that is truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit, provided that this "implicitness" is not so profound that it cannot be uncovered except through a new revelation.

313. SECOND OBSERVATION. — "During the whole of the Old Testament there was, it is true, progress not only of formulae but also of *new concepts*, since there was a progress of *new revelations*. But after the Apostles no new revelations are admissible, and what progress there is, is merely a progress of *formulae*, each clearer and more precise, of the *same concepts* revealed by God to the Apostles and by them bequeathed to the Church."

<sup>41</sup>"It certainly does not help our purpose to exclude *explicit* tradition from the beginning. Indeed, if that clear tradition is admitted, belief in the Assumption becomes more evident. However, it is not our wish that such a clear affirmation since the beginning be considered *necessary*, nor do we maintain that the Assumption's definability depends on such a condition, which would certainly make our purpose more difficult. For just as it is to be denied that the Immaculate Conception was *explicitly* believed and affirmed in the first centuries, although it is today of faith that this same truth was *implicit* and contained in the revelation handed down by the Apostles and in the teaching of the Fathers, so also we hold that this is sufficient in the case of the Assumption." (GUIDO MATTIUSI, S.I., *Utrum corpora Virginis Assumptio ad fidei catholicae depositum exspectet disputatio*, Aquispendi. 1922, pp.2-4)

*Reply.* Our objector mixes up and almost identifies two radically different statements. First, in the Old Testament there was a progress of *new revelations*; in the New, after the Apostles, there is none. Second, in the Old Testament there was progress of *new dogmatic concepts*; in the New, after the Apostles, there is and can be none.

The first of these two statements is indubitably true, but the second is so far from being indubitably true, that it is contrary to what Suárez with good reason calls certain teaching and the common consensus of traditional theology.

According to St. Thomas, neither in the Old nor in the New Testaments has there been any development as to the *substance* but only as to the *explicitation*. This is accounted for by the fact that all the dogmas revealed by God, in both the Old and the New Testaments, as well as all the dogmas that the Church has defined and will define, were truly *implicit* from the beginning in the two most general articles of faith. Some were implicit *by the very nature of things*, as, e.g., those concerned with the divine being; others were implicit by the determination of the *divine will*, as e.g., those concerned with the supernatural divine *providence* of God the Remunerator. But all, with no exceptions, were and are truly implicit in one way or another. Thus all that we term revelations of the Old and New Testaments up to the Apostles, or dogmatic definitions after the Apostles have one thing in common: they are but *explicitations* of what was already implicit in the two universal articles of faith.

The difference between the Old and the New Testaments is not a difference or progress as to the *substance*; it is a difference in the *degree of implicitness*, and consequently in the *medium* of explicitation.<sup>42</sup>

42. All the articles of faith are *implicitly* contained in certain primary credibles, viz., that it is to be believed that God exists and that He has provided for the salvation of men, in accordance with Hebrews, 11: "For he who comes to God must believe that God exists and is a rewarder to those who seek him." For in the divine being are included all those things that we believe are in God eternally, in which our happiness consists. But in the belief in *Providence* are included all the things that God dispenses in the course of time for the salvation of men, and which are the way to happiness. . . . Thus it must be said that, as regards the *substance* of the articles, no increase has taken place in the course of time, since whatsoever things later men believed, were contained in the faith of the earlier Fathers, although *implicitly*. But, as regards *explicitation*, the number of articles has grown because certain things were known by men who came later, which were not explicitly known by those who went before." (ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q. 1, a. 7) "For this reason, not even the Lord Jesus Christ himself made any new article of faith, as regards the *substance*." (BANEZ, *ibid.*, a. 10) Thus, the progress of *new revelations* should not be confused with the progress of *new substance*, although many textbooks are guilty of this confusion. The former existed in the Old Testament, but it no longer exists in the New Testament. The latter does not exist either in the New, or in the Old Testament.

For it must be borne in mind that there are two different degrees or levels of implicitness. There is one level of implicitness that is so profound and recondit that even if the *thing itself* is truly implicit, nonetheless, with respect to *human reason* it is the same as if it were not implicit because reason and human means are not sufficient to explicate or unfold it, and *divine revelation* is necessary for this purpose. Such is the implicitness whereby the dogma of the Trinity is implicit in the dogma of the existence of a supernatural God, or the dogma of the Incarnation in the dogma of God the Remunerator. Such truths, although truly implicit *in themselves* are not so for us. They are called *fundamental* dogmas or *articles of faith*.

It was this kind of implicitness that God undertook to unfold more and more throughout the whole of the Old Testament. Thus, although in the Old Testament there was no progress as to the substance but as to the explicitation, nonetheless it was a progressive unfolding of *new articles* or fundamental dogmas, and consequently a progress of *new revelations*. This kind of explicitation ended with Christ and his Apostles. "This explicitation was completed by Christ". (ST. THOMAS)

But there is another level of implicitness. This one is not so shallow as to require only an explanation of terms; but neither is it so deep or recondit as to demand revelation. For its explicitation or unfolding one thing is both necessary and sufficient, namely, human reasoning. Such is the implicitness wherewith the dogma of the two intellects and two wills of Christ is contained in the dogma of the two perfect natures or the dogma of the Immaculate Conception in the dogma of the divine Motherhood.

Such truths, inasmuch as they are truly implicit, are truly revealed truths; but inasmuch as their implicitness is explicable by human reason they do not require any new revelation. The implicitness of the New Testament

Even with regard to the Old Testament, PETER DE TARANTASIA says the following: "The number of *implicit* credenda was not increased, but the number of *explicit* credenda. But this sort of increase is *accidental* to the faith, not substantial; and it exists more on the part of the believers than on the part of the things believed." (*In 3 Sent.*, a. 25, q. 5, a. 1, Tolosae 1652)

"Fourth objection: The number of credenda is determined from eternity; therefore, it cannot be increased.

"I answer: Although the number of credenda is determined in itself, nonetheless, it is not determined with respect to us; hence it is possible for it to grow in us." (*ibid.*)

With respect to what is meant by explicit, implicit, and distinct faith, the following beautiful passage is worthy of note: "Explicitly to believe is to believe in the particular; implicitly to believe is to believe in the universal; distinctly to believe is to know how to distinguish the articles. To give an example: grains exist in the ear explicitly but not altogether distinctly; in the seed neither explicitly nor distinctly; but in the barn explicitly and distinctly." (*Loc. cit.*, a. 2, expositio litterae)

after the Apostles is made up of such truths. If their explication is done by human reason *alone* with no divine assistance or authority, such an explication is called Theology or theological progress. If their explication is done by reason with divine assistance or authority, as in the case of dogmatic definitions, then it is called dogmatic progress; however, it is not a dogmatic progress of *fundamental* dogmas or *articles of faith*, but dogmatic progress of *derived* dogmas or simple *truths of faith*.

All of this — profoundly and pithily expressed as usual — had been taught by St. Thomas in the following terms: "To the fifth [objection] it must be said that what is contained in an article can be *explicated* in two ways. The first, insofar as *one article* is at times contained in *another*, or two articles in a *common one* [the reader will please note that it is a case of *articles* being contained in *articles*], as, for instance, the resurrection of the dead is somehow contained in the resurrection of Christ, and the Passion and Incarnation in this common one which is the Mystery of the Redemption. In *this manner* implicit faith is explicated in *determinate* articles of faith, and *this explication* was completed by Christ [i.e., by Christ and his Apostles]. Hence, with regard to the *essentials* of faith, it is not lawful either to add or to subtract anything to his teaching, as is said in the last chapter of the Revelation. But before the coming of Christ it was *not yet completed* [the Saint is still speaking of the *articles*], and thus even with respect to the elders it *continued to grow* at different times. [Hereto the Saint has been speaking of the dogmatic unfolding of *articles into other articles*, that is, of the dogmatic progress in the Old Testament. There follows now the dogmatic unfolding of the *articles* into *their consequences*, that is, the dogmatic progress in the New Testament.] The second way takes place when that which is contained in an article is *not an article* but something *concomitant* to the article; and in *this regard the faith can be unfolded day by day, and has been more and more unfolded through the efforts of the Fathers*.<sup>43</sup> These words deserve to be indelibly engraved for the benefit of all who are engaged in the study of the scope of dogmatic progress. What St. Thomas means by "something concomitant to the article" is common knowledge, to wit, "*those things that follow from the articles*."<sup>44</sup>

Today it is already commonplace to call every *dogma* of faith an *article* of faith. Such a practice can be found in almost all textbooks. Not only is such a terminology improper but it also contributes to make many people fail to achieve an understanding of St. Thomas and our classical theologians, and to achieve a true idea of the immense scope of dogmatic evolution after the Apostles. St. Thomas has always made a distinction between *dogmas-articles*

<sup>43</sup>In 3 Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 5.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1.

and *dogmas-conclusions*. There was a growth of the former throughout all of the Old Testament, but there neither is nor can there be any such growth after the Apostles. Of the latter there is, and will continue to be, a progressive unfolding until the end of time inasmuch as the revealed deposit possesses such a fecundity that we shall not be able to exhaust it until we see the divine essence itself. "But no one is obliged totally to the second explication, that is, to be able to explicate everything that is contained in the articles concerning salvation, because this is not possible except in heaven where the truth itself of the articles will be fully seen."<sup>45</sup>

In short, the difference between the Old Testament and the New does not consist in the presence or absence of new concepts, but in the *kind* of new concepts. In both Testaments there has been, and there is, a progress of new concepts. In the Old Testament there was a progressive development of *concepts-articles*, for which *revelation* is necessary. In the New Testament there is a progressive development of *concepts-consequences*, for which it is enough to have divine assistance in the use of the human means available to us, viz. inclusive reasoning and the sense of faith. The divine assistance is operative in the definition of faith.

314. THIRD OBSERVATION. — "For this reason St. Thomas does not use the term *virtually* when he speaks of the dogmatic progress in the Old Testament and of the manner whereby all posterior dogmas were contained in the prior ones, instead with admirable profundity and precision, he always says *implicitly*."

*Reply.* In the first place, our objector has fallen unawares into a manifest contradiction. He has already told us that in the Old Testament there was a progress of *new concepts*, which is true. Now he tells us that St. Thomas has with good reason never described such a progress as a progress of *virtually* but of *implicitly*. But if it was a progress or a containment of new concepts, it had to be a case of *virtuality* since virtual is the same as new concept. The mistake lies in thinking that if it was virtual then it could not be implicit, when it was precisely an implicit-virtual.

In the second place, it is true that St. Thomas uses profoundly and with precision the term *implicit*; but it is simply because in this matter implicit containment is for St. Thomas the same as virtual containment. In a parallel passage where the holy Doctor deals with exactly the same question, our objector will find him speaking in these terms: "When many things are *virtually* contained in some one thing, they are said to be in it *implicitly*, as the conclusions in the principles."<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3.

<sup>46</sup>De Veritate, q. 14; De Fide, a. 1.

If our objector takes the trouble of reading the holy Doctor where he deals with the question of how the New Law was contained in the Old Law, which is identical to asking how the dogmas of the New Testament are contained in those of the Old Testament, he will find the holy Doctor expressly saying that, they were contained "virtually, as the tree is contained in the seed."<sup>47</sup>

Let our objector also take the trouble of looking up any of the great commentators of the holy Doctor, e.g., Báñez, and he will find that where St. Thomas says *implicitely* Báñez always says *virtually implicitely* or *virtually*, period.<sup>48</sup> What is even more serious, even with respect to the New Testament he says the following: "Secondly, it is proven by the fact that the Church has up to now never proposed for belief to the faithful or defined anything that was not contained in the Holy Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions expressly or *virtually* contained therein in such a manner that it was gathered therefrom by an evident consequence."<sup>49</sup> There our objector can see for himself the term *implicitely* clearly translated as *virtually*, which is exactly what we have said time and time again. That is the true Thomist teaching.

Consequently, the term *implicit*, when applied both to the Old and the New Testaments, is generally taken to mean the same thing as *virtual*, and the same thing as *new notions*. However, when the term is said of the Old Testament it signifies such a depth of virtual implicitness as to require *new revelations* for its unfolding. But when the term is said of the New Testament, it signifies a virtual implicitness for the unfolding of which no new revelations are required but *divine assistance* suffices. Such a divine assistance, precisely because it is merely assistance and not revelation, necessarily requires the use of human means. And for purposes of explicating or unfolding an intellectual deposit, the human means most conatural to man is *reasoning* or the way of *new concepts* within the same reality. "From one to another according to reason, which is not other according to reality." "The diversity of reason changes nothing on the part of the thing."<sup>50</sup>

315. FOURTH OBSERVATION. — "In my opinion, dogmas are contained in the revealed deposit not in the *virtual* manner in which the genus contains its differences which are *extrinsic* to itself, but in the *implicit* manner in which being contains all the other notions, or in the manner in which the *Divinity* contains all the 'simpliciter simple' or pure perfections, which is to say, in a *formal* and *actual*, not *virtual* or *potential*, manner."

<sup>47</sup> *Summa Theol.*, 1-2, q.107, a.3.

<sup>48</sup> BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.7, conc. 1-2.

<sup>49</sup> *Loc.cit.*

<sup>50</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q.75, a.7.

*Reply.* We admit that no dogma can be contained in the revealed deposit as the specific differences are contained in the genus, that is, in an extrinsic manner. Hence we also admit that if the virtual is taken to mean the *extrinsic* or non-implicit virtual, which is the sense in which our objector always takes the term, then no dogma is contained *virtually* in the deposit. Such an *extrinsic* or non-implicit virtual cannot become a dogma -- as the Salmanticensis so clearly saw -- but neither is it nor can it be a true theological conclusion. Every true theological conclusion is truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit inasmuch as it is deduced therefrom by an *inclusive* process; and since every truly theological conclusion is a *virtual*, it follows that every truly theological conclusion is at once *implicit* and *virtual*. The reason for it is that in theology, as in metaphysics and mathematics, the rational process is always *analytic* as we say today, or *intellectual* in terms of the schoolmen. "Hence it is obvious that metaphysical or theological consideration is *intellectual* in the highest degree."<sup>51</sup> Hence, the implicit is not opposed to the virtual, nor the virtual opposed to the implicit. It is exactly a *virtual-implicit*. Such is the nature of true theology. Inasmuch as it is virtual and not formal, it is reason or science and not simple understanding nor faith. Inasmuch as it is *implicit* it is *definable as of faith*. Hence the twofold characteristic or every truly theological conclusion: (a) it is not *per se* or formally of faith; but (b) it is definable as of faith. Vázquez failed to appreciate the first characteristic; Molina, the second. The Thomists have always positioned themselves in between Vázquez and Molina by affirming both the first and the second.

Coming now to what our objector says about the manner in which the subsequent concepts are contained in *being* or in the *Divinity*, we think that our objector fails to make a distinction between two manners of containment which are markedly different with respect to *our* human reason, viz.: (a) the manner in which such concepts are contained in the objective *reality* of the *Divinity* or of being; (b) the manner in which they are contained, not in the reality of being or of the *Divinity* but in the *concept* that we have of that reality.

All the concepts that we deduce from the divine reality, e.g. wisdom, immutability, eternity, etc., are contained in that same *reality* not only *virtually* but *formally*. God is not *virtually wise* or *immutable* or *eternal*, but *formally*.

On the contrary, the *concept* that we form of the *Divinity* does not contain formally but *virtually*, albeit with intrinsic or implicit *virtuality*, all the attributes that are deduced in the treatise on *The One God*. The proof of it lies in the fact that in order to affirm such attributes *our* reason requires a

<sup>51</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium*, q.6, a.1.

true and proper demonstration, and true and proper demonstration is the same as true and proper *virtuality*. Anyone who thinks that once the existence of God is demonstrated in the second question of the *Summa Theologica*, all the questions that follow concerning the divine attributes are not truly and properly conclusions but conclusions in the improper sense, would reveal his ignorance of what theology, or a conclusion, is. The ensuing questions on the divine attributes are formally contained in the *reality* of God whose existence is demonstrated in the second question; however, they are not formally but *virtually* contained in the abstract and fragmentary concept that *our* minds have of that reality. And, on the contrary, anyone who believes that inasmuch as we have here a true and proper conclusion and a true and proper *virtuality*, there is therefore no *implicitness*, would only show that he confuses the metaphysical or theological *virtuality* with the *physical* *virtuality* and destroys all the absolute or transcendent value of theological reasoning.

Thus, the medium constitutive of the whole treatise on *God*, which is to say of every and any *theological* treatise, is the *virtual implicit*. The reason for it, as has just been explained, is that at the beginning of the *Summa* or of theology we possess or know the concept of God, not his reality and although in God's reality everything is contained formally, in the concept that we have of God it is not contained except in a virtual manner.

Now then — and here lies the root and the key to the whole matter — what we call divine revelation or revealed deposit is not the revelation of the divine *reality* itself, as is the case of the revelation or vision given to the blessed in heaven, but *only* the revelation of a complex of formulae or concepts concerning that same and only divine reality which remains inevident and obscure to us. Consequently, when it is asked, How are the dogmas contained in the *divine deposit*?, the question does not refer to the manner in which they are contained in the deposit's divine *reality* which we do not know, but to the manner in which they are contained in the *concepts* or formulae about that reality which God has revealed to us.

Thus, if we speak of the *revealed deposit's reality*, all the dogmas are formally contained in the deposit; but if we speak, as in fact we do, of our *concept of that reality*, then not all dogmas are formally contained therein, but many are contained *virtually*, albeit with implicit or inclusive *virtuality*.

ACTUAL INCLUSION 'WITH RESPECT TO THE THING ITSELF', BUT POTENTIAL INCLUSION 'WITH RESPECT TO US'. — Inasmuch as in the conceptual order of our reason *formal* is equivalent to *actual*, and *virtual* to *potential*, speaking with respect to ourselves, not all dogmas are *actually-implicitly* contained in the revealed deposit, as our objector says; but many of them are contained *potentially-implicitly*, as the Thomist school has always maintained. Says St. Thomas: "The article is an indivisible truth with

regard to what is *actually* explicated in the article, but it is *divisible* [unfoldable, explicable, definable] with regard to those things that are *POTENTIALLY* contained in the article, insofar as he who says one thing *somehow* says many things, and *these* are the things that precede the article and are *consequent* to it, and *with respect to this* [to what is *potential* or *consequential*], the article of faith can be *explicated* and divided."<sup>52</sup> "And *with respect to this* [the faith can be explicated] day by day, and was *more and more* explicated through the efforts of the Fathers."<sup>53</sup>

Let us add the following passage from Gravina: "Whether any *addition* could and can be made by the Church to the Symbol of the Apostles? . . . Catholic conclusion: Additions to the Symbol of the Apostles have been by the Church lawfully made and can be lawfully made . . . Growth or addition commonly so-called can be understood in two ways.

"*One* is when one thing is added to another, the former being extrinsic to the thing's substance either because it is a form that is *contrary* to the subject to which it is added, as heat to water, or because it is simply *beside* its essence, as whiteness added to body.

"The *other* is when something is added to another by way of *narrowing* and *determining* that which existed only in the potentiality of that which is determined . . . and it is in this way that *conclusions* are *added* to the principles. *And it is in this same way* that we *must think about additions* to the symbol . . . for as food which was [flesh] in *potentiality* comes to be alive and flesh in *actuality*, and yet [the living organism] remains *numerically the same* without change, so it happens in the *unfolding of the dogmas*, as the Lyrinensis says: 'Let the religion of the souls imitate the ways of bodies, which remains the same that they were despite the fact that as the years go by they develop and unfold their parts'. And later on: 'The members of sucking infants are small, those of the youth are big, nonetheless they are the same.' For whereas the rule remains intact in its own order, that which lay hidden in *potentiality* is unfolded through the addition and explication of subsequent synods, and what pertained to the faith *potentially with respect to us* is made *actually* of faith by the declaration."<sup>54</sup>

Here our objector can see how dogmatic progress can also extend to what for us is contained in the deposit in a *potential* or *consequential* manner, albeit a potential that is truly *implicit*.

<sup>52</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.1, sol.1, ad 4.

<sup>53</sup> *Loc.cit.*, ad 5.

<sup>54</sup> DOMINICUS GRAVINA, O.P., *Catholicae Praescriptiones adversus omnes veteres et nostri temporis haereticos*, 1.4, a.4, Neapoli 1619, pgs. 356-358).

An example from Cajetan follows. It illustrates a case of inclusion which is *actual* "on the part of the thing" but *potential* or *virtual* "on our part".

"To the second we say that the Father does not understand the *essence* and the *paternity* as two formal objects in themselves, but as *formally one* and *virtually many* . . . This is *not to be understood* as if the *paternity* and the *essence* are *virtually* in that supreme REALITY and formal reason; but it is to be understood that therein they are *formally* and *formal* reason; but it *distinction* is there *virtually* . . . Thus Augustine and the Doctors speak of the *essence* and the relation as of two things *formally distinct*. Now on the *part of the thing* this is grounded on the fact that they are *formally distinct virtually*, although *not actually*. But on our part it is grounded on the fact that relative to us they are *actually distinguished* by their objective reason."<sup>55</sup>

As we have already observed elsewhere and shall presently do so again (306, 571), the distinction obtaining between the primitive datum and the dogmas that can be defined by the Church is exactly the same as the distinction obtaining between the divine Essence and the divine Persons, or between the divine Essence and its attributes, or between the divine attributes themselves. It is a distinction "in the manner of the implicit and the explicit", and not "in the manner of the excluding and the excluded". This explains why, *considered in themselves (quoad se)*, all our dogmas were *actually* contained in the revealed datum; but *considered with respect to us (quoad nos)*, they were contained therein *potentially, not actually*. "Those things that are contained *potentially* in the article." (ST. THOMAS)

We hope that the foregoing has made it clear to our objector how it is possible for dogmatic progress to encompass also those things that, with respect to ourselves, are contained in the deposit in a *potential* or *consequential* manner, provided that it be a potential that is truly *implicit*. (296)

316. FIFTH OBSERVATION. — "A clear distinction must be drawn between the *virtual implicit* and the *virtual connexive*. The former can be defined as of divine faith; the latter, cannot be so defined."

*Reply*. — If the virtual connexive is not implicit, as the virtual understood in the sense of Suárez is not implicit, then we agree that it must be clearly — very clearly and very radically — distinguished from the virtual implicit. But if the virtual connexive is implicit — and it is implicit in every truly theological conclusion — then absolutely no distinction need be drawn at all between the one and the other; the *virtual implicit* is exactly identical to the *theologico-connexive* virtual.

<sup>55</sup> CAJETAN, *In p. 1*, q. 39, a. 1.

Hence, if our objector concedes that the virtual implicit is definable as of faith, as indeed it is, he concedes by the same token that every theological virtual is definable as of faith. All else is mere quibbling about names. We ask our objector to consider just this one thing. No conclusion is a *theological* conclusion if it is capable of falsification absolutely speaking, or by divine power. So much is evident. On the other hand, any conclusion is necessarily *implicit* if it is incapable of falsification even by divine power, since only that which is *of the essence* or *of the understanding* of a thing is incapable of falsification. Therefore, every truly theological conclusion is *of the understanding* of the revealed principles or revealed deposit. There can be no clear case of *implicitness* unless we wish to play around with names.

On the other hand, since in every body's judgment the revealed *formal* constitutes the *proper* or *per se* object of divine faith, and the revealed virtual the *proper* or *per se* object of theology, every theologian must always draw a clear distinction between the *formal* and the *virtual*, and consequently no theologian should ever confuse the *formal* implicit with the *virtual* implicit. Anyone who fails to make this distinction, as our objector seems to do at times, confuses theology and faith, or confuses their respective specific nomenclatures. The formal-implicit does not, and relative to our minds cannot comprise any other conclusions but those involving only *nominal* distinction. As for instance, conclusions that pass from the definition to the thing defined, from one correlative to the other correlative, from the whole part, from the universal to the singular. But where *conceptual* unfolding intervenes, that is to say, a combination of multiple concepts within the same reality, there, relative to our minds, it is no longer a case of formal or immediate, whether explicit or implicit, but a case of *virtual* or mediate. (61, 64) Dogmatic progress is a development of new concepts within the objectivity itself of the revealed datum; it is the *virtual implicit*. It is not only a progress of *formulae*, but a progress of *meaning*, that is, of *implicit* meaning. It is a progress of the *unfolding* of the meaning: *in the same* 587192.

317. SIXTH OBSERVATION. — "Hence, the virtual connexive conclusions, as for instance, the conclusion that 'Christ possesses infused knowledge', cannot be defined as of divine faith by the Church, because it is not a revealed truth."

*Reply*. — We concede that the conclusion concerning Christ's infused knowledge is truly and properly a theological conclusion. Thus, we also concede that it is not *revealed*, that is to say, not revealed *formally* or *in itself*, since whenever the term *revealed* is employed without qualifications it is taken, or should be taken among technical theologians to mean the

formally revealed. The language of the true theologian is always formal, and it is obvious that relative to us the truly and properly theological conclusion is not formally, but *virtually*, revealed. So much is clear. But on what grounds does our objector say that that conclusion cannot be defined by the Church as of divine faith?

If he is led to say it because he regards the conclusion as doubtful or non-demonstrable since it cannot be deduced with absolute certainty from any revealed principle, then *transcat* to the statement that it cannot be defined as of divine faith. We say *transcat* because in that case the example is wholly irrelevant since what cannot be deduced with certainty from any revealed principle is not a truly theological conclusion but a theological opinion or system, and we are not concerned now with the latter.<sup>56</sup>

On the other hand, if our objector believes that it is a truly theological conclusion, then he has no choice but to admit that it is definable as of divine faith. Why? For a very simple reason which we hope will be easily understood by anyone who is familiar with the treatise *On the Incarnation*. The conclusion regarding Christ's infused knowledge is deduced from the *same revealed principle*, and by the *same logical process*, or by the *same minor of reason*, by which the other conclusions are deduced, e.g., that Christ possesses a human intellect, a human will, human knowledge, all the virtues, etc., etc.

Let the reader look up St. Thomas or his commentators, and he will verify that the process employed to deduce all those conclusions is one and the same, to wit:

<sup>56</sup>"I answer that, as has been said above, it was fitting that Christ's soul should be altogether perfect by having all its potentiality reduced to act. Now, it must be borne in mind that in the human soul — as in every creature — there is a twofold passive potency. . . . Now, both these potencies of Christ's soul were reduced to act by virtue of this divinely infused knowledge." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 3, q. 11, a. 1)

"And it is proved by the reason given by St. Thomas. For it was befitting that the soul of Christ which was assumed by the Word should not remain imperfect. But it would have remained imperfect if it did not have a per se infused knowledge distinct from beatific knowledge. Therefore, it did have such a knowledge." (SALMANTICENSES, *In loc. cit.*, ed. Palmé, vol. 15, pg. 53)

"The more common and more probable opinion of theologians admits the existence in Christ of a per se infused knowledge distinct from beatific knowledge. Thus St. Thomas and others whom Suárez mentions and follows in the passage above. He [Suárez] correctly observes that the contrary opinion deserves no censure of any kind. For, although everyone must admit that there existed in Christ some kind of knowledge even during his infancy, nonetheless, the fact that this knowledge is distinct from the beatific knowledge, or even that it is a per se infused knowledge and not per accidens does not appear to be conclusively gathered from the Scriptures or the Fathers." (LUGO, *De Mysterio Incarnationis*, d. 20, n. 3, ed. Vivès, t. 2, pg. 626)

*Major premise of faith:* "Christ is not only a man, but a perfect man." This major premise or principle of faith, as the Church understands it, means that Christ is perfect in all orders, the natural and the supernatural, and in all those perfections that involve no imperfection or are not opposed to the purpose of the Incarnation.

*Minor premises of reason:* Now, the human intellect is a perfection; now, the human will is a perfection; now, infused knowledge is a perfection; now, acquired knowledge is a perfection; now, all the virtues are perfections, etc., etc.

*Theological conclusions:* Therefore, Christ possesses a human intellect; therefore, he possesses a human will; therefore, he possesses infused knowledge; therefore, he possesses acquired knowledge; therefore, he possesses all the virtues; etc., etc.

There is no escape here. Either any of those minor premises is denied (as it has been denied by some people), in which case its respective conclusion is not truly a conclusion and we are out of bounds; or each and every one of them is admitted as certain, in which case all those conclusions are of the same nature since their principle and their deductive process are the same.

Now, the conclusion that Christ possesses a human intellect and a human will is not only definable as of divine faith, but has been so defined. Likewise, the conclusion that Christ possesses all the virtues has either been defined by the ordinary magisterium, or is admitted by everybody as a definable truth. Therefore, the conclusion that Christ possesses infused knowledge, or any other perfection, is also definable as of divine faith.<sup>57</sup>

We have time and again observed that many are led into confusion in this matter by the stock example: "Christ is man; therefore, he is risible." In this example, they take the term *man* to mean man in his bare essence, whereas it should be taken to mean *perfect* man. If nothing else had been revealed except that Christ is a "man", then not one of the conclusions mentioned above would be a truly theological conclusion, since absolutely or theologially speaking, it is possible to be a man without any of those non-essential

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The reader might think that if it is of faith that "Christ is a perfect man", and from the term "perfect" it can be deduced by an inclusive process that he possessed all the properties and all actual perfections, then nothing forbids us to deduce that he also had a human personality, since it is an actual perfection, and that he was free from all physical defect, including hunger and thirst.

But then our objector has overlooked the fact that the revealed principle is not simply that "Christ is a perfect man", but that "Christ is a perfect man in everything that is not opposed to the hypostatic union or to the purposes of redemption" (100). With this qualification, exactly the contrary conclusions are deduced from this principle.



properties or perfections. But if it has been revealed, as indeed it has been revealed, that Christ is a perfect man, then all those conclusions are truly and properly conclusions, since not even God himself can effect that someone be perfect and at the same time not possess perfection. But in this case all those conclusions are also definable as of divine faith because they are deduced by an implicit or inclusive process.

Thus, the conclusion that "Christ possesses infused knowledge" is not only a case of virtual connexive, as our objector holds, but also a case of virtual connexive-implicit. Hence it is a truly and properly theological conclusion, and by the same token definable as of divine faith. The conclusion is implicit not in the term *man* but in the term "perfect man". All truly theological conclusions have to be, and always are, similarly implicit.

Consequently, if this teaching about Christ's infused knowledge cannot be defined as of divine faith *as yet*, the reason is not that it is not a matter that is definable as of faith. The reason is that, not having been as yet evidently demonstrated nor accepted by the common and certain consensus of theologians, it has not yet acquired *relative to the Church*, the status of a rigorously theological conclusion.

Hence, either this example is irrelevant since it is not a truly theological conclusion, or if it is admitted as a truly theological conclusion, it must also be admitted as definable as of divine faith. This conclusion is deduced from the revealed deposit by exactly the same inclusive process whereby other theological conclusions concerning the perfections of Christ have been deduced, some of which have already been defined as truths of faith.

318. SEVENTH OBSERVATION. — "Otherwise, one would have to say that the Church can define as of divine faith the whole of the *Summa Theologica*. This is plainly inadmissible."

*Reply.* — Our objector exaggerates and attempts to carry things to extreme lengths. Given the premise that every rigorously theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith, it does not follow that the whole of the *Summa Theologica* is likewise so definable. From the fact that a house is made of marble it cannot be inferred that everything in the house is of marble, since in a marble house one may find silk curtains, wooden picture frames and many other kinds of furnishings that exist in the house without being an essential part of it. In like manner, not everything in the *Summa Theologica* is rigorously theological, albeit everything is of theological usefulness, or of theological ornament.

Let us, then, in the first place, set aside all the conclusions that have no necessary relationship with the revealed deposit, since they belong exclusively to the physical sciences, as for example: "Whether Light is a Body";

"Whether it is a Quality"; "Whether the Semen is Taken From the Surplus of Nourishment";<sup>58</sup>

In the second place, let us also set aside all those conclusions that, albeit being not physical but metaphysical, nonetheless have similarly no necessary connexion with the revealed deposit, as for instance, "Whether the Reason of the Good consists in Mode, Species, and Order", "Whether Hope is the same as Desire or Cupidity", "Whether Habit is a Determinate Species of Quality";<sup>59</sup>

In the third place, let us set aside all those conclusions that might in themselves be related with certainty to the revealed deposit, and thus, considered in themselves, could be truly and rigorously theological conclusions, but which, relative to human reason in general or, at least, to the majority of men, bear only a doubtful or merely probable relationship to the deposit and have thus been and will continue to be everlastingly debated among the various schools. Such conclusions do not make up the science of theology in the rigorous sense of the term, but only the theological systems or opinions. The *Summa Theologica* abounds in these, as well as in the two preceding kinds of conclusion. "The *Summa of St. Thomas is full of such questions.*"<sup>60</sup> Many instances of this kind of conclusions could be adduced, but it is advisable not to do so since what today seems doubtful or only probable might within a century become certain. Nevertheless, as long as they are doubtful or merely probable they cannot be considered conclusions in the rigorous sense of the term, and are, consequently, irrelevant with respect to the question of definability.

Thus, out of the whole of the *Summa Theologica* there remain only those conclusions that are rigorously theological, that is to say, those that even to our minds bear an absolutely certain and evident connexion with the revealed principles. If our objector refers to these conclusions, then we will readily admit that *all* of them are definable as of divine faith, and that, far from being inadmissible and unheard of, such is the common teaching of all traditional theology.

What to our objector and to many others today seems unheard of and inadmissible was regarded as most natural and commonplace by St. Thomas and all his disciples, by St. Bonaventure and Scotus and all their followers. The only discordant view was voiced in the 17th century by Molina. But is our objector aware of the reception accorded to Molina's new and strange opinion both within and outside the Society? The Thomists, in the person

<sup>58</sup> *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 67, aa. 2-3. Also q. 119, a. 2.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, q. 5, a. 5. Also 1-2, q. 40, a. 1, and q. 49, a. 2.

<sup>60</sup> MELCHOR CANO, *De Licitis*, 12, 4.

of Navarrete, greeted it with this broadside: "This opinion contains many falsehoods, which as of now do not wish to brand with any censure because it is not sufficiently clear what this author really means."<sup>61</sup> And the great Suárez, who was fully familiar with the tradition of the School, could only bless himself in bewilderment (*It is amazing!*, these are Suárez's own words) and declare it contrary to the common view of the theologians.<sup>62</sup> All of this is authentic history, fairly forgotten by certain modern textbooks, which we have extensively recounted elsewhere. (84)

Let us draw an example from the *Summa Theologica*, an example embodying an extreme case so to speak, to wit, the real distinction between essence and existence. There can hardly be any other example more to the liking of our objector, who would assuredly say that such a conclusion is not definable as of divine faith, and would perhaps even say that it is not a theological but a purely philosophical conclusion. Well then, every true Thomist will regard this conclusion *not* as a purely philosophical, but as a truly and properly theological conclusion, and precisely because it is truly theological it is objectively contained in the revealed deposit, which is the only requisite necessary for its *definiteness* as of divine faith. We will quote here a witness above suspicion, the very learned Cardinal Billot. "And thus it is also clear that the real distinction between essence and esse in creatures is also established by theological reasoning . . . This, I say, is a very plain analysis of the revealed principle . . . Hence it follows that the unity of the act of esse [in Christ] is objectively contained, according to the holy Doctor, in the teaching that asserts the union in subsistence, which is a doctrine of faith."<sup>63</sup> All the rigorous conclusions in the *Summa Theologica* are of this kind: an analysis of a revealed principle. That is why they are objectively contained in revelation. That is why they are *definiteness* as of faith. By this same process of analysis the Council of Vienne defined that other seemingly purely philosophical truth, viz., that the human soul is the *per se* substantial form of the body. By this same process many, not to say all, of the propositions from the Thomist Syllabus of Pius X could be defined.

The following passage from Báñez deserves to be read and thoughtfully considered in order to obtain an idea of the ample conception held by our great theologians of the scope of dogmatic progress even after the death of the Apostles. "It must be noted, in the fifth place, that just as neither the

q. 1.  
<sup>61</sup> NAVARRETE, *Controversiae in D. Thomae et eius Scholae Defensionem*, t. 1,

<sup>62</sup> SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d. 3, s. 11, nn. 3 and 11.

<sup>63</sup> BILLOT, *De Verbo Incarnato*, q. 2, th. 7.

Supreme Pontiff nor the whole Church can institute a new sacrament, so also it is not in their power, or rather, much less is it in their power to allow a substantially new article or new dogma, since faith is the pre-eminent foundation in the Church. Hence, even Christ the Lord Himself did not institute or make any substantially new article of faith, although He did institute new sacraments. For, just as all the truths of the sciences are contained in this principle, a thing either is or is not, so also no truth of faith exists that is not contained substantially in that principle laid down by the Apostle in Heb. 11: 'He who comes to God must believe that God exists and is a rewarder to those who seek him.' Whence it follows that when we raise the question whether it is possible for the Supreme Pontiff to err in defining matters of faith, we mean to say in explicating by his definition matters of faith. Let us explain this by an example. Suppose someone were to seek counsel from a moral philosopher concerning some moral doubt and the latter were to reply in accordance with moral principles, in such a case indeed the philosopher would be unfolding that which lay hidden rather than be himself the author of the truth. In the same manner when the Supreme Pontiff defines something as a truth to be held by faith, he is in the position of one who explicates a hidden truth, not of one who is the author of the truth. And it is thus that St. Thomas is to be understood in the article when he says that a new edition of the Symbol pertains to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, this is to be understood with respect to a new explication. It follows from this that the heretics wrongly object against us that the Supreme Pontiff would be making a new faith [which is the same objection leveled by our illustrious friend against our theory]<sup>64</sup> "For the Church has to date never proposed to the faithful for belief or defined anything that was not expressed in the Holy Scriptures or Apostolic traditions or virtually contained therein in such a manner that it could be gathered therefrom by evident consequence."<sup>65</sup> "Therefore [the Church] could likewise presently define as of faith those truths concerning which the whole school of theologians is in agreement."<sup>66</sup> That is exactly what we have said and say again. That is exactly what all the theologians prior to Molina, and what the great majority of theologians posterior to Molina have said. We will in due time submit the supporting passages. (353-448).

<sup>64</sup> BÁÑEZ, *In 2-2*, q. 1, a. 10.

<sup>65</sup> BÁÑEZ, *loc. cit.*, a. 7.

<sup>66</sup> BÁÑEZ, *In p. 1*, q. 1, a. 8.

319. EIGHTH OBSERVATION. — "But the Church", says our objector, "can define nothing as of divine faith except 'the revealed'."

*Reply.* — This term "the revealed" always gets our objector confused because of its ambiguity. The Church can propose as of divine faith not only "the revealed", but also "the explication of the revealed". That is what traditional theology teaches and what the Vatican has already defined. Now, the truly theological conclusion is nothing else that the intellectual explication of the revealed. Says St. Thomas: "There are two ways of *explicating* the articles of faith . . . The other way is with respect to those things that are *implicitly* contained in the articles themselves, and this is done when a man knows the things that follow from the articles."<sup>67</sup>

Thence follows that other fundamental affirmation made by St. Thomas: "Of itself *faith* sufficiently inclines to all the things that accompany or follow or precede the faith."<sup>68</sup> What does traditional theology understand by the things that are consequent to the faith? St. Thomas gives the answer in the same quotation. But it will be good to add St. Bonaventure's authority: "In other to understand the foregoing it should be observed that the doctrine of faith has some things as antecedents, some things as consequents, some things as principles or objects . . . Consequents, as the corollary conclusions . . . or such things as can be gathered from those articles and have it in them to be consecutive to those articles."<sup>69</sup> Or as Scotus similarly says: "For the substance of the faith in such a manner that every one, even the simple faithful, are bound to believe them explicitly . . . Other things also similarly pertain to the substance of the faith, but are to be explicitly believed only by the elders in the Church . . . Finally some other things belong to the faith in such a way that neither the simple faithful nor the elders in the Church are obliged to believe them explicitly; and of this sort are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles believed: for no one is bound to hold them explicitly by faith before they are declared by the Church and proposed as objects of faith . . . and these have a regard to the order of conclusions included virtually in the articles of faith."<sup>70</sup> As we have already observed, the

<sup>67</sup> *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.1.1, a.1, so1.3.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, d.24, q.1, a.2, so1.2.

<sup>69</sup> ST. BONAVENTURE. *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.1, a.1.

<sup>70</sup> IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, *Summa Theol.*, per H. de Montefortino, p.1, q.3.

view that the truly theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith is the position commonly held by all theologians prior to Molina.

320. NINTH OBSERVATION. — "If every theological conclusion were definable as of divine faith, the Church would not spend such a long time in order to define a dogma, or in finding out whether a truth is definable or not."

*Reply.* — It is one thing to say that something is *definable* as of divine faith, and quite another to say that it is *proximately* so definable. For the definability of a truth two conditions are sufficient: (a) that it be explicitly or implicitly contained in the revealed deposit, and we have already said that virtual-implicit containment is a truly implicit containment; (b) that such containment be *capable of being known* with certainty by human reason without any new revelation. However, for the proximate definability of a truth a third condition is required, to wit: (c) that such containment be not only *capable of being known*, but also *known in fact* with certainty.

Now, the Church has available at her disposal not revelation, but only divine assistance, and divine assistance is nothing more than the infallible preservation from error in the use of human means. It follows that no truth is proximately definable as long as the fact of its containment in the deposit is not known with certainty through some human means. As Melchor Cano very aptly remarks, the human means available to the Church in defining are the same means available to the theologian in deducing, that is to say, the *loci theologici*. "In defining these matters [the Supreme Pontiff and the Councils] consult not only the Holy Scriptures, but also the Apostolic institutions, the prior Councils, the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, the writings of the early Fathers, the doctrines of the scholars, right philosophical reason. To put it briefly, they submit the case at issue to the criteria or loci about which their book is being written. For there are no other sources from which they can gather arguments for the solution of questions of faith or of theology. To look for new revelations or Sacred Writings is characteristic of the Jews who are even now waiting for new prophets."<sup>71</sup>

Thus the following general rule can be laid down: "Any truth is proximately definable as of divine faith if its explicit or implicit containment in the revealed deposit is established with *theological certainty*, that is to say, through any of the *certain loci theologici*."

There are many such loci theologici. The Church is not tied down to any one of them in particular. The pope can define without basing himself on

<sup>71</sup> MELCHOR CANO, *De Locis*, 5, 5.

the Bible and basing himself solely on Tradition, he can likewise define without taking account of primitive, but only of later Tradition; he can, finally, define by taking into account the present Tradition, and when looking up the present tradition he is free to take into account either the consensus of the theologians or that of the faithful of the actual Church.<sup>72</sup> Any one of those theological criteria or loci is a theologically certain criterion when it meets the true conditions; and the Holy Father is not merely an organ that registers the social consciousness of the Church, as Modernism pretends, nor is he tied down to one or another of the loci theologici, on the contrary, he is the judge and infallible teacher of the doctrinal awareness of the whole Church, and the supreme rule of the doctrinal awareness of the application of each and every one of the loci theologici.

However, notwithstanding the theoretical truth, already defined by the Vatican Council, that the Supreme Pontiff is infallible of himself, and not in dependence on the consent of the Church, and that that infallibility and antecedent consent of the Church, but with respect to all and any consent whether antecedent, concomitant, or consequent, it is no less certain, speaking historically and practically, that the Church does not usually define a truth without the common agreement of the theologians of a given period, that is, either such an agreement in which all concur, or, at least, the few who hold the contrary view are considered insignificant, or obviously mistaken, or

<sup>72</sup>Petavius correctly observes that, in defining questions of faith, the majority of the ecumenical councils were satisfied with the testimony of the Fathers who existed much later than the 1st. century. "What were the authorities with which the early Church armed herself in the general councils, or with which she defended a dogma of faith brought into question against the heresies that thereafter rose from time to time? In those cases where the proceedings have been lost altogether, we can form no judgment. But in all the other cases, where we have a fuller record of the things acted and debated upon, one will find that such councils drew their arguments and testimonies not from the earliest, but rather from the latest and more recent doctors. We find that this was done in the ecumenical councils of Ephesus, Chalcedon, the Fifth, and the Sixth, not to mention others. In the first of these, the truth that it was no mere man but God who was born of the Virgin is proven by the testimonies of Cyprian, Peter of Alexandria, Athanasius, Pope Julius, Pope Felix, Theophilus of Alexandria, Ambrose, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Basil, Atticus, and Amphilocheus. The earliest of these, viz. Cyprian, antedated the Council of Ephesus by not quite two hundred years, the others were of more recent memory. . . . Likewise, the Council of Chalcedon records writers who lived hardly one century earlier. . . . Similarly, when the Fifth Council enumerates the Fathers which it professes to follow in all things, it names Athanasius, Hilary, Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, John Chrysostom, Leo, Proclus, and none earlier. The Sixth Council did not behave otherwise. Against the Monothelite heresy it did not cite any Fathers earlier than those (PETAVIUS, *De Incarnatione*, lib. 14, c. 15)

blinded by school or party passions, as in the case of the few theologians who persisted in denying the Immaculate Conception or papal infallibility on the very eve of their definitions.

Thus, as a practical rule of proximate definability we may lay down the following: "Any truth is proximately definable as of divine faith if its explicit or implicit containment in the revealed deposit is affirmed as certain by the common agreement of the theologians."

Finally, since we maintain, as we believe that every theologian should together with the traditional view, that the implicit-virtual inclusion or the rigorous theological conclusion is a truly implicit inclusion, the aforementioned rule can be reworded as follows: "Every truly theological conclusion is proximately definable as of divine faith if it is held as absolutely certain by the common consent of the theologians." This is the truly Thomist rule which Bález formulates in these terms: "All those truths could presently be defined as of faith concerning which the whole school of theologians is in agreement."<sup>73</sup>

No one need ask us for a true index of propositions proximately definable as of divine faith. He can easily draw one up if he wants it. Let him pick up the Denzinger and mark all the propositions that have been already defined infallibly. Next let him pick up any theological course or treatise and mark all the truly theological propositions held as absolutely certain either by the common agreement of the theologians or by the common agreement of all the faithful. This is the "ultimate previous disposition" to definability. The "sense of the faith" contributes equally or even more than reasoning towards effecting this common agreement of the theologians and of the faithful, that is, of the whole society of the Church, especially in the case of dogmas of a practical or affective character. This is the reason why, as we have already observed (220), the sense of the faith, when it spreads and becomes the common sentiment of bishops, theologians, and faithful, is a sufficient criterion of definability for the Church.

This common and social agreement of the Church does not have for its purpose the creation of a heretofore non-existent implicitness in the revealed datum, but to confirm such implicitness where it has already been uncovered through speculative reasoning, or to uncover it by way of the affective process when, despite its being there from the very beginning, it cannot be detected with certainty through reasoning alone.

<sup>73</sup>Id. p. 1, q. 1, a. 8.

We thus see that, although it is *theoretically* certain that the pope does not necessarily depend on the consent of the Church in order to define a truth, it is no less certain that in *practice* the Holy Father always, or almost always, takes such consent into account. In this sense, we believe that Fr. Gardeil was right in affirming that the "social sense of the Church" or "lived theology" is, as it were, the *ultimate previous disposition* to a dogma's definability.<sup>74</sup>

We have time and time again repeated the term "*truly theological conclusions*" in order to stress the fact that not all the conclusions that can be found in theological courses are rigorously theological, but only those conclusions "from the denial of which there follows with absolute necessity the denial of the premise of faith". That the Church bides her time in defining such truths is traceable to two causes: the first is theologians are not always in agreement about such truths, and without it the Church usually does not proceed to a definition. The second is that neither are there always heretics who deny them or pressing requests for their definition from the people. These are the two occasioning causes without the concurrence of which — at least of one of them — the Church is not wont to define a truth.

321. TENTH OBSERVATION. — "But", our objector insists, "how is it possible to define as of divine faith anything that is only *connected* or *related* to the revealed? For anything to be capable of being defined as of divine faith it is not enough that it be *related* to the deposit, it is necessary that it exist *in* or be *within* the deposit."

The reply to this last insistence provides, we believe, the key to the whole question. Our objector focuses only on the fact that the conclusions are the *relations of other things to the deposit* whereas he ought to focus on the fact that they also and principally are the *relations of the deposit to other things*. This latter viewpoint, and it alone, constitutes the *formal point of view* from which such relations are considered by the Church and by theology, that is, not as relations of other things to the deposit, but as relations of the deposit to other things. Thus, they are the *relations of the deposit*, something pertaining to the deposit itself. Sacred theology does not, and cannot consider things *other* than dogma; it does not, and cannot consider anything but the dogma and *its relations* to other things. And that is precisely what we call conclusions. In other words, relations of *the dogma itself, dogmatic relations*. Such relations or conclusions would not be known to *our* human reason without the help of the so-called minors of reason, but these minors

<sup>74</sup> GARDEIL, *Le don'te révélé*, pps.180-181.

do not create or effect those relations, they merely *unfold* or *uncover* them in the majors of faith. (245)

Thus, St. Thomas's *Summa*, insofar as it is rigorously theological, is nothing but the *explicitation* of the *implicit* virtuality of the revealed deposit, and the same holds for all true theology. If, upon giving us the revealed deposit, God had deigned to *explain himself some more*, we would have, instead of the deposit, the *Summa* of St. Thomas. The Gospel or the revealed deposit is nothing but the *substance of the "Summa Theologica"*. The *Summa Theologica*, i.e., those parts of it that are rigorously *theological*, is simply the *Gospel explicated*.<sup>75</sup>

Of the four degrees or stages that make up the whole complex of Catholic doctrine, to wit: *primitive datum, dogmas of faith, infallible truths, and theological conclusions*,<sup>76</sup> the first degree can be compared to a sapling, small in size and development, but prolific and charged with divine substance, sap, virtuality and life. The other three degrees that sprout and issue homogeneously from the first, are the *same* sapling, exactly the same as to *substance*, but now fully grown and turned into a gigantic *tree*, displaying *new* branches, flowers and fruits.

Two gardeners have joined, and will always continue to join hands in order to conserve, cultivate and develop this sacred sapling of the primitive deposit of the faith, One of them is human, the other divine: the theologian and the Church. Both of them — the theologian with his human and fallible reasoning, and the Church with her infallible and divine authority — have an analogous mission, which is not that of adding, subtracting or changing

<sup>75</sup> The painter Louis Edouard Fournier recounts that as he was spending a last winter season in Chateau de Sully-Prudhomme's portrait, he found his model one day reading a *compendium* of St. Thomas Aquinas's *Summa*. "As you see", the poet told him, "I am educating myself . . ." Then, after looking at the book for quite some time, he added, "It is as *extraordinary* as it is complicated . . . To think that all of this has come out of the Gospel." This remark states in familiar, almost trivial, terms the *problem of dogmatic development*. (LEONCE DE GRANDMAISON, "*Le développement du dogma chrétien*", in *Revue Pratique d'Apologétique*, 1908, pg.521)

<sup>76</sup> The order in which the four degrees or levels are enumerated in the text is the order of *perfection*, in the order of *generation*, the enumeration would be as follows: (a) primitive datum; (b) theological conclusions; (c) infallible truths; (d) dogmas of faith. What first comes out of the primitive datum as soon as it is deposited in human minds is the conclusions, whether improper or proper. Out of these, two kinds of conclusions come the infallible truths. Out of the conclusions and infallible truths come the dogmas of faith. Out of these dogmatic definitions come new conclusions; out of these new conclusions, new infallible truths and new dogmas. Thus, in the life of dogma we find analogically verified that continuous and *circular* movement, which in biology is termed *cycle*, and which is characteristic of every vital and homogeneous development.

anything in the sapling, but that of preserving and explicating it. In the pursuance of this sacred mission the theologian is a pope with neither divine authority nor divine assistance, the pope is a theologian with divine authority, a divinely assisted theologian.

### SECTION III

#### OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE SCOPE OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION WITH THE SCOPE OF THE CHURCH'S INFALLIBILITY

322. THE FORMAL VIEWPOINT OF THE CHURCH'S INFALLIBILITY. — When we dealt with the six types of reasoning or connexion, we stated that the conclusions or connexions of type 4 are not objects of the Church's infallibility. Subsequently, when we dealt with the scope of dogmatic evolution, we said that its scope was identical to that of the Church's infallibility.

In this section we are going to reply to various observations that have been raised against those two statements which are intimately linked among themselves and with the evolution of dogma. But before we do so, it will be advisable to dwell briefly on the formal viewpoint of the Church's infallibility. This is the only way whereby we will be able to appreciate well its relations to revelation, faith, and theology, and, thus, to the evolution of dogma.

The correct and profound appraisal of any question whatsoever requires that one should get himself from the very beginning on to its *formal* point of view, which is often denominated by St. Thomas the *per se* viewpoint. The *per accidens* or *material* viewpoints often result in a disorientation of thinking unless one takes sedulous care in considering them only and exclusively in relation to the formal viewpoint.<sup>77</sup>

Well then, infallibility was given by God to the Church not for the sake of new revelations or of doctrines unrelated to revelation, but solely and exclusively for the sake of integrally preserving and faithfully expounding the *divine revelation* or the deposit of the *faith* handed down by the Apostles to the Church.

<sup>77</sup> "Nothing that is *per accidens* constitutes the species, but that which is *per se*." (ST. THOMAS, 1-2, q.118, a.5) — "Every single thing is judged rather according to what is found in it *formally*, and *per se*, than according to what is found in it *per accidens*." (ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.110, a.1) — "In every science that which is *per accidens* is set aside, and that which is *per se* is taken." (ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium, De Trinitate*, q.5, a.4, ad 1) — "As the Philosopher says, *in art no account is to be taken of that which is per accidens*." (ST. THOMAS, *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.2) — "All knowledge *perishes* if it does not settle on things that are *per se*." (CAJETAN, *In 2-2*, q.154, a.2)

Thus the preservation and exposition of *divine revelation* or of the deposit of the *faith* is the *formal* viewpoint or the "ratio sub qua" of the Church's infallibility. Consequently, *nothing* can pertain to the Church's infallibility except *divine revelation* or by reason of a relation to *divine revelation*; except the deposit of the *faith* or by reason of a relation to the deposit of the *faith*. On the other hand, *any and everything*, insofar as it is the object of *divine revelation* or of the deposit of the *faith*, or insofar as it has a necessary relation to the preservation and exposition of *divine revelation* necessarily is an object of the infallibility of the Church in the same degree and measure as it has to do with revelation and *faith*.

The Vatican Council has the following to say: "For the Holy Spirit was not promised to Peter's successors in the sense that by his revelation they should disclose new doctrine, but in the sense that by his assistance [infallibility] they should inviolably  *safeguard and faithfully expound the revelation* or deposit of the *faith* handed down by the Apostles."<sup>78</sup> "We teach that the object of infallibility stretches out to the very reaches of the deposit of the *faith* and as far as required by the office of safekeeping it, and therefore that the infallibility, with which the Church of Christ is endowed, comprises within its ambit both the whole of the *revealed* word of God and everything that, although not revealed *in itself*, is nonetheless such that without it the revealed word cannot be securely preserved, nor certainly and definitively proposed for belief, nor explicated nor validly asserted and defended against the errors of men and of falsely called science."<sup>79</sup>

Schatzler and Franzelin: "And thus the Church's magisterium, whose function it is to apply the light of *divine revelation* to rising questions of *faith*, considers by that same light many things which, taken *in themselves*, fall outside of the object of revelation, but nonetheless fall under its light insofar as they are referred to the question of *faith* to be judged by the Church in the light of *divine revelation*. Now then, it is *solely on this account*, that is, solely insofar as such truths, although belonging to the natural order of *themselves*, are nonetheless illumined by the supernatural light of *divine revelation*, that they are subject to the Church's magisterium."<sup>80</sup> "Consequently, the Church's magisterium teaches these truths and is capable of judging infallibly of these errors, *not* by teaching human sciences *in the light of their own principles*, but by judging them *in the light*

<sup>78</sup> VATICAN COUNCIL, Constitution *De Ecclesia Christi*, ch.4.

<sup>79</sup> Const. Dogm. *De Ecclesia Christi*, c. 9.

<sup>80</sup> SCHAFFZLER, O.P., *Introduccio in Sacram Theologium*, pg.185.

of her own principles. Hence, the infallible Church never judges, nor can the Holy Spirit ever allow that she should by her definitions judge, either truths or errors except with regard to the deposit which is to be kept safe, and in virtue of the divinely enjoined office of watching over the deposit.<sup>81</sup>

Let us examine these two propositions. First: Infallibility extends itself not only to the faith and theology but also to philosophy, sociology, etc. Second: Infallibility extends itself solely to the faith and theology. Both propositions are true. However, the first is materially true and formally false or inaccurate. The second is formally true and accurate. Philosophy, sociology, etc. are not subject to infallibility except solely and *insofar* as they are necessarily related to the revealed deposit. But, taken from that point of view, they are no longer formally philosophy, nor sociology, nor politics, nor history, etc., but *theology*.

This is to say that the concept of the Church's infallibility is not an absolute concept, or a concept of indefinite scope, as the concept of God's infallibility. It is an essentially relative concept, one that is essentially restricted to the preservation and exposition of revelation and of the faith. Its field cannot extend beyond the fields or departments of the faith and revelation. Hence, inasmuch as the Church's infallibility is a concept that is relative to divine faith and divine revelation, one has to appraise accurately the scope or the departments of divine faith and divine revelation if one wishes duly and formally to appraise the scope and the departments of the object of the Church's infallibility. This is the only scientific and safe procedure to employ in the examination of any relative concept.

323. TWO GREAT DEPARTMENTS OF DIVINE FAITH. — The Angelic Doctor, whose treatise *On Faith* ranks among the most excellent and accomplished that have ever been written<sup>82</sup>, divides the whole field of truth into two great departments, essentially and radically distinct one from the other. The first contains the truths that in one way or another belong to divine faith. The second includes the truths that in no way belong to divine faith. Since there are two different ways of belonging to divine faith, viz. directly or principally, and indirectly or secondarily, the holy Doctor divides the first department into two parts corresponding to these two ways of belonging to the faith. Thus, the whole field of truth is divided by St. Thomas into three departments, which we list separately to do justice to the importance of the subjects:

<sup>81</sup> FRANZELIN, *De Divina Traditione*, th.12, schol.1, pg.126. Romae 1882, ed.3.

<sup>82</sup> "In the treatment and development of this virtue of faith St. Thomas proceeded in a most excellent and scientific order." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Fide*, prol.) — "St. Thomas, whose treatise on faith is a most accomplished one..." (MAZELLA, *De Virtutibus infusis*, n.799, Romae 1894, ed.3, pg.423)

*First department:* Truths that directly or principally belong to divine faith.

*Second department:* Truths that indirectly or secondarily belong to divine faith.

*Third department:* Truths that in no way belong to divine faith.

In Thomist teaching these are the three formal departments of: (a) divine faith; (b) sacred theology; (c) mere human reason.

Whoever wishes to understand St. Thomas and his commentators when they speak of the faith, infallibility, or theology, should never overlook this division into three departments and the remarks we are going to make on them. But let us first quote a brief passage from St. Thomas. "I answer that it must be said that we now speak of heresy insofar as it involves the corruption of the Christian faith. But that someone should entertain a false opinion in matters that are not of faith, for instance, in matters of geometry or in other like matters that are altogether incapable of pertaining to the faith [here we have the third department which contains those things that in no way are or can be of the faith], this has nothing to do with the corruption of the Christian faith, which takes place only when a man entertains a false opinion concerning those things that pertain to the faith. [Here begins the division of the first and second departments of divine faith.] As has been said above, a thing pertains to the faith in two ways: one, directly and principally, as in the case of the articles of faith [this is the first department of faith]; the other way is indirectly and secondarily, as in the case of those things from the denial of which there follows the corruption of some article [this is the second department of faith]. And heresy can exist with respect to both [that is, the truths of both the first and second departments] in the same way as faith."<sup>83</sup>

In this same article, in the solution to the third objection, the holy Doctor explains how the truths of the second department, that can be objects of faith and of heresy, begin actually to pertain directly to the faith and that their denial becomes a heresy. "And thus some teachers [the Fathers of the Church] appear to have disagreed, either about things with respect to which to hold one opinion or another has nothing to do with the faith [the third department], or even about certain things pertaining to the faith which had not yet been determined by the Church [the second department]; but after they have been determined by the authority of the universal Church [whereby they pass on to the first department], he who should pertinaciously resist such a determination, would be adjudged a heretic."<sup>84</sup>

<sup>83</sup> ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q.11, a.2.

<sup>84</sup> *Loc.cit.*, ad 3.

This is the classical and most accomplished article from the pen of the holy Doctor on the subject, for it is taken from the *Summa Theologica*, and from the treatise *On Faith*. As parallel passages the first part of the same *Summa*'s together with Cajetan's commentaries, and the Commentaries on the *Sentences*,<sup>86</sup> where the saint deals with the same subject, can be looked up. As examples of the second department the holy Doctor often cites the secondary matters of the Bible, e.g., that "Abraham had two sons", however, it is plain that he also includes in the second department all truly *theological conclusions*. This is clear on several counts: it is obviously gathered from the context; the holy Doctor applies this teaching to the treatise *On the Divine Notions*; theology cannot fit into the third department which is altogether profane, nor can it fit into the first department which is of itself and formally of faith; and lastly because the saint himself says so expressly in the last of the parallel passages earlier quoted. (467-468)

The holy Doctor's mind on the *indirectly* revealed has been accurately expressed by Bññez in these terms: "The question is raised, what does St. Thomas understand by pertaining *directly* and *indirectly* to the faith? For either it is understood . . . or understood . . . or, *finally*, by the term *directly* is understood something that *immediately* falls under the habit of faith, that is, without benefit of any inferential processes of reason, and, on the other hand, that is said to pertain *indirectly* to the faith which is by a *necessary consequence* gathered from some proposition that is immediately of faith. To this doubt we reply that St. Thomas is to be understood in *this last manner*. And although he cited as examples the articles of faith, which directly pertain to the faith, he nonetheless did not exclude some other things from pertaining directly to the faith. For everything that is found in the Holy Scriptures pertains directly to the faith. The traditions of the Apostles and the definitions of the Councils also pertain directly to the faith. But those things are *indirectly* of the faith from whose denial it follows by a *valid consequence* that what is asserted by faith is false. For instance, he who denies that "Christ is risible" is guilty of error in the Catholic faith *consequently* and *indirectly*. For it validly follows by a consequence known by natural light that "Christ is not a PERFECT man".<sup>87</sup>

324. OBSERVATIONS ON THE TWO DEPARTMENTS OF DIVINE FAITH. — The third department, being as it is altogether profane or bereft of any necessary relationship with the faith, must by the same token be utterly alien to infallibility and theology. Hence, we will set it completely aside, and

<sup>85</sup> Q. 32, a. 4.

<sup>86</sup> Lib. I, d. 33, q. 1, a. 5; lib. 4, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6.

<sup>87</sup> BÑÑEZ, *In 3 Sent.*, q. 1, a. 2.

limit ourselves to making, with St. Thomas, the following observations concerning the other two departments.

1. In the first department are included all the truths *revealed* by God and *defined* as such by the ordinary or solemn magisterium of the Church, and nothing else. In other words, the first department is exclusively limited to all the *dogmas of faith*.
2. To the second department belong all the truths that necessarily *follow* from the former, or are *necessarily* connected with the former, or from whose denial there follows the *denial* of the former, or from whose corruption there follows the *corruption* of the former. All these phrases mean the same thing, and St. Thomas employs them indifferently.
3. *Divine faith* has for its *primary* (or *per se*, or direct, or immediate, or formal — all these terms mean the same thing —) object the truths of the first department; and for its *secondary* (or *per accidens*, or mediate, or indirect, or virtual — all these terms mean the same thing —) object the truths of the second department.
4. The Church's infallibility, inasmuch as it exists only with respect to divine faith, must have and does have the same object as the faith itself, viz. the truths of the first department as its *primary* object, and the truths of the second department as its *secondary* object.
5. It is well known that the starting point of *sacred theology* is dogma, and its conclusions or proper object is everything that is necessarily connected with dogma. Consequently, sacred theology has as its starting point or *principles* the truths of the first department, and as its *conclusions* or proper object the truths of the second department. Thus, the second is the proper, or specific, or *per se* department of theology, just as the first is the proper, or *per se*, or specific department of divine faith.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>88</sup> St. Thomas usually cites the *articles of faith* as true instances of the first department, since the articles were, and had to be, in the revealed deposit in a *definite* manner since the beginning. It was Jesus Christ himself who *determined* or defined them, and they were found from the beginning in the daily preaching or ordinary magisterium of the Church. "The faith is explicated in *determinate* articles, and this explication was completed by Christ; hence, with regard to the essentials of the faith, it is not lawful either to add to, or subtract from, his teaching." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 5) Nonetheless, any other truth (even if it is not an article) whose *meaning* has been defined from the beginning, or afterwards, belongs to the first department. On the other hand, every truth whose meaning *has not been defined* by either the solemn or the ordinary magisterium of the Church, is assigned by St. Thomas to the second department, since according to St. Thomas, without the Church's definition, nothing can formally be of faith *for us*, who have not received revelation *immediately* from God (156). The definition or the understanding of the dogma by the Church is not the *formal object* of our faith, but it is the *integral* condition, or the *sine qua non* condition, of its *formal object*. "Pertaining to the *integrity* of the formal object of our faith."



6. If there be truths that simultaneously satisfy the requirements of both the first and the second departments, viz., truths that on the one hand are revealed and have been defined (the *medium of knowing* of the first department or of divine faith), and on the other hand are a necessary consequence (the *medium of knowing* of the second department or of theology) of other revealed and defined truths, then such truths will at once pertain directly both to faith and to theology. (126)

7. The truths of the second department, considered *per se* or *apart* from the Church's definition, that is to say, when they are known solely through reasoning or through the necessary connexion they bear to the truths of the first department, have properly, rigorously, and exclusively the nature of theological conclusions, and deserve solely and exclusively theological assent. However, since theological assent is neither an assent of mere natural reason, nor an assent of mere divine faith, but an assent of *reason-faith*, its object is, in this sense, said to pertain *mediately* to divine faith. In St. Thomas's teaching to be *mediately* of divine faith means exactly the same as to be *immediately* and *formally* of theology and of mere theology. It is in this seventh observation that *Vázquez* and *Véga* differ from St. Thomas on account of their failure to draw a good and formal distinction between theology and faith. (85)

8. Those same truths of the second department pass on to the first department *once they are defined* by the Church as of divine faith ("after they have been determined by the authority of the universal Church"), that is, they become true *dogmas* of divine faith, and their denial comes to have

(CAJETAN, *In 2-2*, q.5, a.3) Consequently, St. Thomas places in the second department two kinds of truths. First, whatever is *secondary* in the Holy Scriptures, so long as the Church does not define it — and she rarely does so. With respect to this *secondary* object, the Church has only defined that it is *inspired* by God just as much as the primary object; hence, everything in the Holy Scriptures belongs to the first department insofar as its *inspiration* and *inerrancy* is at stake, but not insofar as its *meaning* is concerned. Secondly, all theological conclusions prior to their definition, since after the Church defines them as of faith they pass on to the first department. These two kinds of truths that make up the contents of the second department — viz., the secondary object of the Holy Scriptures, and theological conclusions — have one thing in common, which is that they do not belong to the faith of themselves or *per se*, but only because of their *relation* to what is *per se* revealed. This relation or connexion with what is *per se* revealed, when known exclusively through human reasoning, is called *theology*, which is of divine faith when it is known through the definition of the Church. The Church is, likewise, a defining agency, but a *divine* defining agency, of things divine. Neither theology nor the Church invent, or add to, or modify what is divine or revealed; they only explicate, or unfold, or define what is undefined or virtual in the revealed datum; further, they also conserve whatever is already unfolded, or formal, or defined.

the nature of true *heresy*. From conclusions of theology they come to be *principles* of theology and of the faith, inasmuch as now they are known through a new medium. That is to say, not solely through their connexion with the revealed, which is the formal medium of theology, but through their revelation explicated by the Church, which is the formal medium of divine faith. On this point *Vázquez*, *Véga*, and Cano followed faithfully the teaching of St. Thomas and of the whole Thomist school, whereas Molina deviated from it, and Kilber and some others who followed Molina.

These eight observations, which we recommend to the meditation of every Thomist theologian, contain, to our way of thinking, the true key to the whole teaching of St. Thomas on the subject of divine faith, and consequently, on infallibility and theology, two subjects which are essentially relative to divine faith.

325. TWO GREAT DEPARTMENTS OF DIVINE REVELATION. — Since divine revelation is the formal object of divine faith, the departments of the former have to be exactly identical to those of the latter. Or, to speak with greater logical precision, the departments of divine faith, which we have described, must have been derived from the departments of divine revelation, which we are going to describe briefly.

Thomist theology divides the whole field of truth into two great departments altogether and radically distinct one from the other: (a) truths that have been revealed by God *in one way or another*; and (b) truths that *in no way* have been revealed by God.

Since there are *two ways* of true divine revelation: one whereby God reveals a thing *in itself*; the other whereby God reveals something *in another thing*, in which it is necessarily infolded and from which it can be unfolded or extracted or taken or deduced, it follows that the first department is subdivided into two parts: one, containing the truths that have been revealed *in themselves*; the other, containing the truths that have been revealed *in another truth* or truths.

The Thomist school regards the term *in itself* as identical to "formally" or "immediately", and the term *in another* as identical to "virtually" or "mediately". Thus, the whole field of truth is divided by Thomists into three great departments, which we will list down separately.

*First department:* Truths revealed *in themselves*, or *formally* revealed, or *immediately* revealed.

*Second department:* Truths revealed *in another*, or *virtually* revealed, or *mediately* revealed.

*Third department:* Truths *not revealed* in any way, either in themselves or in another, either formally or virtually, either immediately or mediately.

No one who wishes to obtain a good understanding of St. Thomas and his school should overlook this division into three departments, to which correspond the other three earlier mentioned when we spoke of the faith.

The third department is entirely alien to divine revelation, and consequently to divine faith, infallibility, and theology. Only the first two have to do with theology, infallibility, and faith, since they are the two departments into which divine revelation is divided. The same eight observations made earlier about the two departments of divine faith must be proportionally applied to these two departments of divine revelation. We refrain from so doing since it would mean repeating them again almost word for word. We will only recall the eighth observation, which is the most important, viz. that the truths of the second department are definable by the Church, not only as of ecclesiastical, but also as of divine faith, and that this is the teaching not only of Vázquez, Vega, Cano, and Bellarmine, but of the entire Thomist school. This is not the peculiar doctrine of Vázquez and Vega, as commonly affirmed by the majority of modern theologians. Their peculiar opinion is stated in the seventh observation, to wit, that the truths of the second department are formally of divine faith, even prescinding from the Church's definition, provided they are known through evident human reasoning.

326. REVEALED "IN ITSELF" AND REVEALED "IN ANOTHER". We have seen that, according to the Thomist school, the first and the second departments of divine revelation, which are respectively the proper or specific departments of divine faith and of theology, are constituted and distinguished the former by the revealed *in itself*, and the latter by the revealed *in another*.

However, it must be carefully borne in mind that for Thomists the revealed *in itself* and the revealed *in another* are two members of the revealed *or divine revelation*. Consequently, the revealed *in itself* and the revealed *in another* are not respectively equivalent to revealed and *not revealed*, since in this case we would not have a division of revelation, but are to be regarded as equivalent to two different *modes of true revelation*.

Something similar happens in the commonly known divisions of the known and being, viz., known *in itself* (principles) and known *in another* (conclusions), or of existing *in itself* (substance) and existing *in another* (accidents). To be known *in itself* and known *in another* is not to say known and *not known*, but to say two different *modes of true knowing*. Likewise to exist *in itself* and to exist *in another* is not say to exist and *not to exist* but to say two different *modes of truly existing*.

Hence, to deny that a thing is revealed *in itself* (or formally, or immediately) does not mean for Thomists to deny its revelation. It only

means to deny *one* of the modes of revelation, which does not in the least eliminate *the other* mode of revelation, that is, that the thing can have been revealed *in another*.

Likewise, to affirm that a thing is revealed "in another" (or virtually, or immediately) is not to affirm its improper or metaphorical revelation, but to affirm *another mode* of true and proper revelation.

There are two *modes* of true revelation, as well as of true evidence: the immediate, or *in itself*, or formal mode, and the mediate, or *in another*, or virtual mode. "He who says one thing, *somehow says many things*." (ST. THOMAS) (304).

327. THE CONNEXIVE IMPLICIT AND THE CONNEXIVE NON-IMPLICIT. — To say "revealed in another" is the same as saying "necessarily connected with the revealed in itself".

However, it must be remembered that connected and implicit are not two opposed concepts, or two concepts that are mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the connected is divided into implicit and non-implicit. To understand this one need only consider that all true reasoning involves a connexion of the conclusion to the major premise by means of the minor premise. Thus, every conclusion is connexive. However, some minor premises, and consequently their respective conclusions, are implicit or inclusive in the major premises, whereas other minor premises are not implicit or not inclusive but merely connexive. Thus there are connexions that are implicit or inclusive, and there are connexions that are neither implicit nor inclusive. The former constitute the *virtual implicit*, the latter constitute the merely connexive virtual, or the *merely virtual*. (40-41) These latter correspond to the type 4 virtual or connexive; the former to the other five types of virtual or connexive. (46) To maintain that the *virtual* cannot be *implicit*, or that the truly implicit cannot be truly virtual, means that one has lost the concept of *implicit virtuality*, the concept of true theology, one of the keys to dogmatic progress.

328. REPLY TO SOME OBSERVATIONS RAISED AGAINST US. — The foregoing makes it easier to reply to some observations that have been addressed to us. We said that the type 4 connexive or conclusion cannot be the object of infallibility (89-99). A learned theologian believed that this was equivalent to restricting the Church's infallibility and addressed to us the following observations.

FIRST OBSERVATION. — All theologians, without exception, teach that the Church's infallibility extends itself to *everything that is necessarily connected* with the revealed. Likewise, Church praxis in the infallible con-

denation of errors teaches the same doctrine. Now, according to Fr. Marin, the Church's infallibility does not extend itself to everything that is connected with the revealed. Therefore, Fr. Marin excessively restricts the Church's infallibility against the unanimous opinion of theologians and against the praxis of the Church herself.

*Reply.* — The alert reader will have noticed at once the fundamental defect in this argument. The major premise says *necessarily connected*, while the minor premise merely says *connected*, as if everything "connected" were also "necessarily connected". This is the covert flaw in our objector's argument. He takes for granted that we deny that the Church's infallibility extends to everything that is *necessarily* connected, which is simply not true. To make it plain, let us examine separately the major and the minor premises of the argument.

The major premise is flawless. All theologians maintain, and the Church's praxis teaches, that the Church's infallibility extends not only to whatsoever is formally revealed but also to *everything that is necessarily connected* with it. But so do we. Thus, let it be stated once and for all that the major premise is fully accepted by all and sundry. Let us hear no more about it. That is not the point at issue, for that is elementary in theology.

Consequently, the whole force of the argument, if there be any, must be found in the minor premise, which states that, according to us, the Church's infallibility does not extend to everything that is "connected". But what does our objector mean by the "connected"? If he refers to any of the five earlier mentioned connexives, then it is not true that we exclude them from the secondary object of infallibility. Not only do we hold them to be the secondary object of infallibility, but we also maintain that they are definable, not merely as of the modernly termed *ecclesiastical*, but as of *divine* faith. Consequently, relative to those five connexives, which comprise all rigorously theological conclusions deduced by means of inclusive minors, far from restricting the Church's infallible authority, we actually give it a broader extension than that which certain authors, among them our objector, seem to give to it.

Does he refer exclusively to the type 4 connexive? In that case he ought to know that we have said that this type of connexive is *not* NECESSARILY connected with the revealed deposit, which is, according to all theologians, the indispensable requisite for any truly theological conclusion. (89-102) Consequently, our objector has the burden of proving that, "according to all theologians and to the praxis of the Church", a connexive of this type is *necessarily* connected. On this point he says absolutely nothing, nor will he ever produce a proof.

329. SECOND OBSERVATION. — The same argument is submitted by our objector in another form, which can be resumed in these terms. All theologians extend infallibility not only to whatsoever is really revealed, but also to everything that is necessarily connected with it. But Fr. Marin restricts infallibility only to what is really revealed. Therefore . . .

*Reply.* — The argument again confuses two essentially different questions. One: whether infallibility extends to everything necessarily connected with whatsoever is revealed. Two: whether whatsoever is necessarily connected, by way of conclusion, with anything revealed is really revealed. The first question is the only one that has to do with the scope of infallibility, and to it all theologians give an affirmative answer, and so do we. The second question has absolutely nothing to do with the present question of infallibility, but with the question of definability as of *divine faith*. To this second question there is no unanimous answer given by theologians, as our objector seems to believe. On the contrary, there are two opinions. The first opinion answers affirmatively, and we are of this opinion. The second opinion answers negatively, and our objector seems to be of this opinion.

The first opinion, to which we subscribe, far from restricting the Church's authority, as our objector believes, extends it. Any one who maintains that whatsoever is necessarily connected is not really revealed and at the same time maintains that the Church's infallibility extends only to what is really revealed, would restrict the Church's infallibility since he would exclude from it whatever is necessarily connected. But any one who maintains that whatsoever is necessarily connected is really revealed, and at the same time maintains that "the Church's infallibility extends only to what is really revealed", would extend the Church's infallibility as far as it should, that is, as far as including all the necessarily connected, and *besides* he also extends to the same boundaries the Church's authority to define as of divine faith. Let us not mix altogether different questions and formulae. Infallibility comprises two things: (a) whatsoever is formally revealed, and this is its primary object; (b) whatsoever is necessarily connected with anything formally revealed, and this is its secondary object. We are all agreed on this. The question whether that secondary object is really revealed or not is irrelevant to the question about the scope of infallibility.

330. THIRD OBSERVATION. — A passage from the bishop of Brescia who, in one of the Vatican's preparatory sessions, stated that *absolutely all theologians* admit that it would be an utterly grievous error to restrict the Church's infallibility to what is revealed *in itself*, and not extend it to everything *necessarily connected with the revealed*.

*Reply.* — That is exactly what we say. But that is not the question at issue. Our objector seems unable to distinguish these three propositions: (a) *All theologians extend infallibility to everything that is necessarily connected*

with the revealed deposit; (b) *All* theologians admit that the type 4 connexive is necessarily connected with the revealed deposit; (c) *All* theologians admit that what is necessarily connected with the revealed deposit is not really revealed. Our objector devotes all his energies to proving the first proposition, which nobody denies, and forgets to prove the second and third propositions which are the only ones that require proof. The bishop of Brescia affirms — and so do we — the first proposition, but he says nothing — nor could he say anything — about the second and the third.

The question whether the virtually revealed or the necessarily connected as a conclusion with the revealed is really revealed or not, and therefore definable as of divine faith, remains as free and debatable after the Vatican Council as it was before. On this point there were — and there are — two opinions. Commenting on the Vatican Council, Vacant says: "We hold as true the things that God has revealed, *ab eo revelata*. Behold the matter, or to use scholastic language, the material object of the act of faith. The faith, of which we are speaking now, is, in effect, the divine faith, that is, the faith grounded on the authority of the revealing God. Hence, only the assent to the truths revealed by God constitutes an act of faith, and, reciprocally, every truth revealed by God can become the matter of an act of faith. But are we to count among *revealed* truths only those that are *formally* revealed, or can we also include therein the *virtually* revealed truths? *This is a question that our Council allows theologians freely to debate.*"<sup>89</sup> And further on: "We have already said that *one school* requires that the newly defined dogmas be formally contained in the primitive dogmas of Catholic faith and that they be deduced therefrom by a reasoning whose universal principle is a revealed principle. *Another school* maintains that it suffices that they be virtually contained therein and that they be deduced by a reasoning whose universal principle is furnished by reason."<sup>90</sup> However, one of the Council Fathers submitted an amendment requesting the Council to determine that only the *immediately* (or formally, or *in itself*) revealed could be defined as of divine faith, but the Council took no account of the request. "An amendment submitted to the Council demanded that in our text be inserted 'quae in verbo Dei scripto vel tradito *immediate* continentur . . .'. But this amendment was not taken into consideration."<sup>91</sup> Thus, on the question whether "infallibility extends not only to the formally revealed but also to whatsoever is necessarily connected with it", there is unanimous agreement among theologians,

<sup>89</sup> VACANT, *Constitutions du Conc. du Vatican*, vol. 2, n. 559, pg. 28.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 848, pg. 293.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 618, pg. 87, footnote.

and that is exactly what we have said and say. But on the question "whether the virtually revealed or the necessarily connected as a conclusion with the revealed is really revealed or not, and therefore definable as of divine faith", there is no unanimity, as some people believe there is. On the contrary, there are *two opinions*. This is an entirely debatable question before and after the Council. These two altogether different questions should not be confused.

331. FOURTH OBSERVATION. — The Supreme Pontiffs have defined *ex cathedra* necessarily connected propositions, as can be seen in various propositions cited in particular, e.g., proposition 37 from the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, in which it is defined that jurisdiction is necessary for the power of absolving.<sup>92</sup>

*Reply.* — Always the same confusion. The Supreme Pontiffs have defined propositions belonging to the five connexive inclusive types, which are irrelevant to the present discussion, but they have never defined any proposition belonging exclusively to type 4, or physico-connexive, which is the only one relevant here. To make this plain, one need only open the Denzinger. No better proof can be given than this same proposition 37, which our objector cites as an example or model. Does our objector believe that the necessity of jurisdiction is deduced from the power of absolving (which is a revealed truth) by a connexion of type 4, or as a physico-distinct property? No. It is deduced by the other types of connexion, by an *essential* or *inclusive* process, by an *analysis* of the concept of judicial power, from the *reason* or *nature* of judicial judgment.

The argument or reasoning through which the Church has deduced that truth or condemned its contradictory, is the following, as every theologian knows:

"The Sacrament of Penance was instituted *in the manner of a judgment* (revealed major or premise of faith); but, the nature or *essence* of judgment (*natura et ratio iudicii*) includes the jurisdiction or authority of the judge over the culprit (*inclusive*, not physico-distinct, minor of reason); therefore, every

<sup>92</sup> "The teaching of the Synod [of Pistoia] concerning the authority to absolve received through ordination, that declares that, *after the establishment of dioceses and parishes, it is fitting that one should exercise this judgment over persons that are subject to oneself, whether by reason of territory or by reason of some personal right*, because *otherwise confusion and disorder would be introduced*; insofar as it only declares that, once dioceses and parishes have been established, it is befitting that the power to absolve be exercised over subjects in order to preclude confusion, if understood to mean that for the valid use of this power there is no need of the ordinary or subdelegated jurisdiction, without which the Tridentine declares that the absolution given by a priest is of no worth whatsoever, is false, temerarious, pernicious, contrary and insulting to the Tridentine, erroneous." (Constitution *Auctorem Fidei*, prop. 37; Denz.-Schön. 2637)

absolution without ordinary or delegated jurisdiction is invalid or non-sacramental" (theological conclusion, object of infallibility, in the opinion of all, because it is necessarily connected, and, in the view of the Thomist school, definable as of faith because it is inclusive).

In our opinion, one would need to have a complete confusion of ideas concerning the "connexive" in order not to see that the argument and its minor premise are not of type 4 but of the other types, since it is plain that the conclusion is deduced from the *reason* or the *essence* of the judicial or imperative act, if anyone should still entertain any doubts, let him look up the *Summa Theologica*,<sup>93</sup> where St. Thomas analyzes and deduces that same conclusion by analyzing the essence of the act of command which includes authority or jurisdiction. Or let him look up the Tridentine (reference to which is made in the very condemnation of the proposition), and there he will find the following: "Hence, since the *nature* and *reason* of judgment demand that sentence be pronounced only on subjects, it has always been the persuasion in the Church of God, which this Synod confirms as absolutely true, that the absolution which a priest pronounces upon him over whom he has neither ordinary nor subdelegated jurisdiction, is of no worth whatsoever."<sup>94</sup> 4-95

What has happened to our objector with respect to this proposition cited by him as a model of non-inclusive connexive on account of the reliance he places on textbooks, will similarly happen with respect to any other proposition culled from Denzinger.

332. FIFTH OBSERVATION. — The traditional opinion maintains that every *virtual* is the object of infallibility.

<sup>93</sup> *Summa Theologica*, Suppl., q. 8, a. 4.

<sup>94</sup> TRIDENTINE COUNCIL, sess. 14, ch. 7.

<sup>95</sup> By the way, notice the phrase "it has *always* been the persuasion in the Church of God" that the Council employs, despite the fact that here we have a theological conclusion in the proper sense of the term. That a truth is properly a theological conclusion is not inconsistent with its being known since the Church's very beginning; the inference of such a conclusion can be so evident and obvious as to require neither effort nor time. Ease and evidence are not inconsistent with the character of being a conclusion; on the contrary, the conclusion is all the more perfect and pure the greater the ease and evidence with which it is known. "Hence, the evidence and certainty of the consequence does not eliminate theology but makes it, does not take it away, but brings it in." (CANO, *De Locis*, 12, 2, at the end) We say this even in the supposition that the Council's "always" is to be taken strictly, which is not always the case as we have already observed (173, footnote). Among some theologians there is today a manifest tendency not to consider as pure theology or pure conclusions except those that are difficult or being debated. This is a wrong notion of theology.

*Reply.* — The traditional opinion does not maintain that every *virtual* is the object of infallibility, but that every *revealed* *virtual* or every *theological* *virtual* is the object of infallibility. Now, the physico-connexive *virtual* is neither revealed nor theological, since it has no absolutely necessary connexion with the revealed deposit. It is impossible for anything rigorously theological to be false; but the physico-connexive *virtual* can be, and is false whenever it so pleases God. There is no difficulty to calling it "theological" in the same sense that uncertain or probable conclusions are called theological. However, such conclusions are not *rigorously* theological inasmuch as theology is a science of absolute certainty. (89)

333. SIXTH OBSERVATION. — On the other hand, no truly *virtual* thing can be of divine faith. The *virtual* cannot be deduced except from one premise of faith and another of reason, and the rule of every syllogism states that "the conclusion always follows the weaker part".

*Reply.* — We admit the maxim that the conclusion always follows the weaker premise. Thus, if the premise of reason is physico-connexive, and consequently an *objective addition* to the premise of faith, then the conclusion is also an *objective addition*. If the minor is *metaphysico-inclusive*, and therefore an *objective explication* of the premise of faith, then the conclusion is also an *objective explication* of the premise of faith and nothing else. If the objective explication or metaphysico-inclusive minor is employed by human reason alone, then the conclusion is not of faith inasmuch as *reason*, explicating the revealed, is the "weaker part" compared to the premise of faith. The conclusion will only be the human explication of the premise of faith, that is, theology. But, if in lieu of the minor we place the Church's definition, then there is no *weaker part* inasmuch as the explication made by the Church is not *weaker*, but *equal* to revelation itself or the premise of faith. With regard to the *explication* of the revealed the authority of the Church is neither weaker nor less, but equal to that of God and of the Apostles. (176)

The syllogistic rule that "the conclusion always follows the weaker part" validly proves that no theological conclusion can be *formally* of divine faith before it is defined by the Church, but it is not a similarly valid proof with regard to a conclusion that has been defined by the Church. With respect to our *human* minds the minor of reason is part and parcel of the theological reasoning, and essentially determines the nature of the "habit" and of the certainty of the assent to the conclusion; but with respect to the Church's definition it is nothing more than a *preliminary condition* and does not in any way determine the nature of the "habit", the certainty, and the assent to the definition. Consequently, whereas in the case of theology the assent given to the conclusion depends *on ourselves*, depends necessarily on the nature and value of the minor premise of reason, in the case of the Church's definition, the assent is altogether independent. (132-133)

334. SEVENTH OBSERVATION. — That which is virtually revealed is not revealed *simpliciter*, but only revealed *secundum quid*.

*Reply.* — If the virtually revealed is an implicit or inclusive virtual, then it has been revealed as to its *substance*, and lacks only *explicitation*. It is not, therefore, “simpliciter” revealed if by “simpliciter” is meant the *explicit*, but it is “simpliciter” revealed if by “simpliciter” is meant the *implicit*. It is properly called the *revealable*, that is, the *explicitable* by the revelation already made by God, in which it is truly implicit. The image is really impressed on the photographic film, if imperceptibly, and only needs developing. (214)

335. EIGHTH OBSERVATION. — Reality is one thing, truth is another. From the fact that two propositions express the same reality it does not follow that they express the same truth.

*Reply.* — Reality and truth differ logically or subjectively, but not really or objectively. Hence, two propositions that have really identical subjects and predicates, have identical objective meaning. They differ only subjectively, although the difference is founded upon the object's fecundity. This is the nature of all identico-real conclusions. It is also the nature of all the successive formulae of dogmatic progress. (515)

It is true that the *real identity* of two propositions does not suffice to make them belong to the same “habit”, if they are not known through the *same medium*. We have extensively explained elsewhere (123), in accordance with St. Thomas and Capreolus, that the specific distinction of habits is not taken from the reality that is known (*res cognita*), but from the *medium* of knowing (medium cognitions), or, as aptly put by Cajetan, it is not derived from the object *insofar as it is a thing*, but from the object *insofar as it is knowable*.

Thus, relative to one and the same reality, God, there is room for various specifically different habits: faith, theology, theodicy. The theological conclusion, which is really identical to the revealed datum, pertains not to the faith but to theology as long as it has not been defined, because in such a case it is known only through human reasoning, which is the instrument of theology with the exclusion of faith. But it follows that this same conclusion, once it has been defined or explicated by the Church's divine authority, is then known through another medium, to wit, “revelation explicated by the Church”, which is the formal medium of faith. After it has been defined, the theological conclusion is of faith, without ceasing to belong to theology, be-

<sup>96</sup> *In* 2-2, q.1, a.3, n.4.

cause it is known in two different ways. We must, then, draw a careful distinction between these three mediums of knowing:

- (a) *Explicit* revelation. This is revelation explicated by God himself.
- (b) *Implicit* revelation prior to its definition, known solely through reasoning. This is revelation explicated by human reason, the theological conclusion before its definition.
- (c) *Implicit* revelation defined by the Church. This is revelation explicated by God through the Church, the theological conclusion after its definition.

Of these three mediums of knowing, the first and the third have the same value; the value of divine authority, of faith. Since the Church has truly divine power to explicate everything that is truly implicit in the revealed datum, the value of implicit revelation explicated by the Church (third medium) is the same as that of explicit revelation (first medium), that is, revelation explicated by God. The authority of the Church is certainly less than the authority of God or of the Apostles relative to new revelations and even relative to truths not contained implicitly in the primitive datum, but it is equal to the divine and the apostolic authority relative to everything that is truly implicit provided that its explication does not require any new revelation. (175-176)

On the contrary, the second medium — implicit revelation explicated by the theologian's individual reason — possesses no other than a *human* theological value, specifically different from the value of the other two mediums. Thus, the theological conclusion is of faith in the third case, but not in the second case.

In these matters every true Thomist ought carefully to avoid two extreme theories: Molina's and Vázquez's. (87, 119)

To believe, with Molina, that the properly theological conclusion possesses an *altogether new content*, renders it undefinable as of faith. There is an error here. It is true that the theological conclusion, provided that it be *inclusive*, contains something new on account of the fact that it truly is a conclusion; but since it is implicit, the newness refers to the *explicitation* of the *same doctrine*. Consequently, by her definition the Church does nothing but *explicate* the revealed datum; and hence the conclusion is of faith after its definition. (306)

But one would fall into the opposite extreme if one were to believe, with Vázquez, that, since it is truly inclusive, the theological conclusion must contain *nothing new*, and consequently that it is of faith not only after, but even before its definition for any theologian who deduces it evidently.

This latter notion, unlike that of Molina, is not contrary to dogmatic evolution but rather favours it to excess. However, we believe it to be no less mistaken inasmuch as it takes no account of the specific difference between theology and faith and overlooks the totally divine character of the latter habit. (156)

As a matter of fact, every truly theological conclusion, howsoever implicit it may be, contains *something new*. Not a new doctrine, but a new explication; otherwise it would not truly be a conclusion. A glance at the following equations will make it plain:

Theological conclusion = revealed datum

Theological conclusion = revealed datum + explication.

The first equation is formally false because it makes conclusions identical to principles, and science to simple understanding. Furthermore, it confuses theology with the faith.

The second equation is accurate, but it also shows that the conclusion contains a *new element*, something *more* than was found in the principle or revealed datum. When I make an act of faith with respect to this conclusion, I take in not only the revealed datum, but also *something new*. Now, this requires that this "something new" be *formally divine* inasmuch as nothing formally human should enter into the *object* of the act of faith. Hence, prior to the Church's definition, this new element constitutive of the conclusion is *formally human*, as is the case with theology. (309) Consequently, the act of faith requires the intervention of the Church, who alone possesses the requisite *divine* authority for the explication of the revealed datum. The explication made by a theologian is formally human; the explication made by the Church is formally divine, and consequently of faith. Therefore, the Church's definition is not only necessary so that the definition will not be erroneous; it is, in the first place, necessary so that the deduction will be formally *divine*.

Now, the fact that the conclusion is *really identical* to its principle, the revealed datum, is the cause why the conclusion is *implicit*, which in turn makes it *definable* by the Church. But neither its real identity nor its implicit definable character suffice to render it formally of faith so long as it is not defined, that is, known through "revelation explicated by the Church", which is the medium of our faith.

Before the definition there obtained between the conclusion and the datum the "identity of the *thing*" (*identitas rei*), but not the "identity of the *knowable*" (*identitas scibilis*). After the definition there obtains not only the "identity of the *thing*" but also the *identitas scibilis*, or better, the "identity of the *credibilis*" because the conclusion is not known now through rational demonstration — the medium of science — but through the Church's explicit

tion — the medium of knowing proper of faith. Before the definition it is merely theological; after the definition it is, besides, credible with divine faith. "Every cognitive habit *formally* has regard to the *medium* whereby something is known; but *materially* it regards *that which* is known by the medium . . . But the *formal* reason of the object in the case of *faith* is the First Truth *manifested by the teaching of the Church*, just as the formal reason of *science* is the medium of *demonstration*."<sup>97</sup>

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSE OF DOGMATIC PROGRESS. — As we have earlier said (160-161), the psychological cause of human intellectual progress — whether in the natural order, or in the order of faith — must be sought for in *our* connatural mode of knowing "by way of enunciabiles". Not being entirely intellectual or intuitive, as God and the angels, but rational, discursive, it is impossible for us to know at once everything that is implicit in our starting point, and we are compelled to employ partial and successive enunciata, deducing the ones from the others by means of inclusive reasoning.

As long as these enunciata or statements are limited to the unfolding of what was from the beginning truly implicit in our starting point, the *objectivity* of science or faith is preserved notwithstanding the *plurality* of statements.

The reason for this — as St. Thomas profoundly observes — is the fact that the act of faith, as well as that of science, does not terminate in the statement but in the *objective reality*. "But the act of the believer does not terminate in the *enunciabile*, but in the *thing*: for we do not form enunciabiles except for the purpose of achieving knowledge *about things* by means of them. And this is true in *science* as in *faith*."<sup>98</sup>

From this viewpoint, the holy Doctor gives us at the beginning of the quoted article the reason for this assimilation of science and faith. Faith is a knowledge. All knowledge is achieved according to the knower's connatural mode. The *human* mode of knowing proceeds by statements. Consequently such will also be the human *mode* of knowing and developing the super-natural datum. "Things known are in the knower according to the *knower's mode*. Now it is the *proper mode of the human intellect* to know the truth by *joining and dividing*, as has been said."<sup>98a</sup> "And thus things that in *themselves* are simple are known by the human intellect in accordance with a *kind of complexity*."<sup>99</sup> "The fact that *our* intellect understands by *discourse*, and

<sup>97</sup> *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.9, a.2; *QQ.DD. De Charitate*, a.13, ad 6.

<sup>98</sup> *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.1, a.2, ad 2.

<sup>98a</sup> *Op.cit.*, p.1, q.85, a.3.

<sup>99</sup> *Op.cit.*, 2-2, q.1, a.2, at the beginning of the article.

by joining and dividing, proceeds from the same source, that is, from the fact that upon the first apprehension of something that is first apprehended (the natural datum or the revealed datum) it cannot at once see whatsoever is virtually contained therein, and this happens on account of the weakness of the intellectual light in us.<sup>100</sup> "And accordingly it [our intellect] needs to join one apprehended object to another and to divide one from another, and to proceed from one composition and division to another, which is to reason."<sup>101</sup>

These successive "compositions and divisions", these multiple statements are in some instances implicitly contained in the primitive datum but cannot be seen by our reason except through reasoning. Such instances have always been described by the Thomist school as *immediate* or "per se notum *quoad se*" and *mediate* or "non per se notum *quoad nos*". They are said to be immediate or "per se nota *quoad se*" because they are objectively and truly implicit, and they are said to be mediate or non per se nota *quoad nos* because they demand from our reason a true demonstration. (165)

This is why St. Thomas — who always displays astonishing depth and logic in his writings — begins his treatise *On God* with the question "Whether it is per se notum that God Exists",<sup>102</sup> since on it hinges the nature of all our knowledge of God. Similarly, at the beginning of his treatise *On Faith* he raises the question "Whether the Object of Faith is something *Complex as an Enunciative*",<sup>103</sup> a question to which scant attention has been given by so many authors, including Thomists, notwithstanding the fact that on it depends the whole nature of the genesis and development of our faith.

It gives us great pleasure to notice that some modern Thomists have at last become aware of the fundamental importance of these questions. We allude to the beautiful articles by Fr. Chenu, O.P., *Contribution a l'histoire du traité de la foi: commentaire historique de la 2-2, q.1, a.2, and La raison psychologique du développement du dogme d'après Saint Thomas*.<sup>104</sup>

Nine years ago we wrote in *La Ciencia Tomista* the following: "It is impossible to delve deeply into and provide a correct solution to the

<sup>100</sup> *Op.cit.*, p.1, q.58, a.4.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, q.85, a.5.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, q.2, a.1.

<sup>103</sup> *Op.cit.*, 2-2, q.1, a.2.

<sup>104</sup> The first article is found in *Mélanges Thomistes*, Le Saulchoir (Kain, 1923),

pg.123. The second, in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, Jan. 1924, pg.44.

questions so fiercely debated today concerning the modernist and the Catholic versions of the evolution of dogma without delving deeply into those *per se notum* and *per modum enuntiabilitatis*, which many consider as next to, if not actually, museum pieces; but which provide the key to the understanding of all those extremely momentous questions in which the nature and distinction of faith and science, the Church and the individual reason, modernist dogmatic evolution and Catholic dogmatic progress are implicated. There must be a good reason, we repeat, for the fact that the holy Doctor, who always proceeds with admirable logic from the principles to the conclusions, from the essential to the accidental, has seen fit to place those concepts at the head of his immortal treatises *On God* and *On Faith*. It is for this reason that we insist so much on these things, even at the risk of being accused of digressing or of repeating things of which many of our readers perhaps need not be reminded."<sup>105</sup>

336. SIXTH OBSERVATION. — If, for instance, St. Thomas laid down a principle and the Thomists draw out its consequences, no one will say that we do not have here *two* teachings.

*Reply.* — Obviously no one will attribute to an author the conclusions implicit in his writings if he has not foreseen them and hinted at them. But if we assume that he has plainly seen such implicit conclusions and that he has entrusted to his followers the task of bringing them to light, then it is plain that they are attributable to him.

Now then, although God plainly saw all the consequences implicit in the Holy Scriptures and Tradition revealed by Himself, He nonetheless went on to institute the Church's magisterium for the purpose of explicating them. Therefore, such consequences, upon their explication by the Church, are *divine*, i.e., *dogmatic* conclusions.

This distinction between the authors of human books and God, the author of Holy Scripture, is one of the principal arguments anticipated by St. Thomas in order to prove the existence of a multiplicity of meanings in Holy Scripture as contrasted to purely human works. Besides those already quoted, the following passages from St. Thomas merit consideration.

"Whether several senses lie hidden in the same words of Holy Scripture.

"*Fifth objection.* Besides, no meaning gathered from certain words of the Holy Scripture, is its proper meaning if it was *not intended* by the author, inasmuch as the author could not by any *one* writing intend but *one thing*, since according to the Philosopher many things do not happen to be un-

<sup>105</sup> *La Ciencia Tomista*, March 1915, pg.23, footnote.



derstood simultaneously. Consequently, it is impossible that there be several proper meanings of the Holy Scripture.

"To the fifth it must be said that the principal author of Holy Scripture is the Holy Spirit, who in one word of the Holy Scripture has understood many more things than those expounded or detected by the expositors of Holy Scripture."<sup>106</sup>

"Whether the aforementioned senses should also be distinguished in other writings.

"Third objection. Further, the Philosopher says that he who says one thing somehow says many things. Thus it seems that also in the case of other sciences several meanings can be indicated in one meaning.

"To the third it should be said that he who says one thing somehow says many things, that is, *potentially* insofar as the *conclusions* exist potentially in the principles, since many conclusions follow from one principle. But this is not to say that in the case of other sciences what is said of one thing by way of signification, is also taken as signified of other things as well, although it can be gathered therefrom through argumentation."<sup>107</sup>

"Whether the faith has grown with the passage of time.

"Fourth objection. Further, the article is an *indivisible* truth. But what is indivisible cannot be further distinguished. Hence, inasmuch as the faith has always been comprised under certain articles, it appears that it cannot be subjected to further distinction so as to make the articles *explicitly* known.

"To the fourth it should be said that the article is said to be an *indivisible* truth relative to what is *actually* explicated in the article, but it is *divisible* with respect to the things that are *potentially* contained in the article, insofar as he who says one thing somehow says many things; and these are the things that precede the article and the things that are *consequent* to it; and in this regard the article of faith can be *explicated* and *divided*.<sup>108</sup> "And in this regard the faith can be *explicated* day by day, and has been more and more explicated through the efforts of the Fathers."<sup>109</sup>

A careful comparison of these passages from St. Thomas will make two things obvious: (a) that by *potential* or *consequential* containment ("The things that are *potentially* contained in the article . . . the things that are *con-*

<sup>106</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Quodlibetum* 7, q.6, a.14, ed. Vivès, vol.15, pgs. 512-513, 107 *Ibid.*, a.16, pgs.515-516.

<sup>108</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.2, sol.1, ad 4, ed. Vivès, vol.9, pgs.394-395.

<sup>109</sup> *Loc.cit.*, ad 5.

sequent to it") he understands the conclusions in the proper sense of the term; (b) that whereas men do not always foresee and give a hint of these conclusions in what they have written, God, on the other hand, always does so in the Holy Scripture.

Assume that St. Thomas laid down a principle; assume that we are speaking of consequences *implied* in that principle; assume, further, that St. Thomas saw those consequences and saw that his school would deduce them; assume, finally, that St. Thomas appointed his school to deduce those consequences. In such a case, every one will say that when such consequences are eventually drawn out by his school, it does nothing but unfold or explicate St. Thomas's own teaching. Such is truly the case with God and his Church.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>110</sup> Together with the text quoted from the *Commentary on the Sentences*, whose authenticity is beyond doubt, we felt we had to quote also texts from the 6th question of *Quodlibetum* 7, so as not to omit anything of St. Thomas's teaching. On the authenticity of this 6th question, cf. the very interesting observations, made by Fr. Beltrán de Heredia in *La Ciencia Tomista*, May 1924, pp.3-74, and by Fr. Synave in *Bulletin Thomiste*, May 1924, pp.41.

On the consequences of St. Thomas's teaching, Nuño says the following: "Fr. Suárez contradicts His Grace Cajetan without any reasonable cause and basis. And in the first place he says that the negative proposition is *not found in St. Thomas* . . . which Cajetan concedes - viz., that contrition is not essentially a part of the sacrament of Penance . . . But, indeed, Master Suárez either did not understand His Grace Cajetan, or under the latter's name, wanted secretly to impugn St. Thomas. And thus we will prove, in the first place, that that proposition is *plainly gathered in him*." (DIDACUS NUÑO, *In 3 partem*, q.90, a.2, pgs.251-252) Thus, everything that is evidently deduced from the teaching of St. Thomas is *implicitly contained* in it; and to deduce such evident consequences is not to teach *another doctrine*, but to *explicate*, or unfold, or develop, or evolve homogeneously the *same doctrine*. When the Molinists or the Scotists disagree with what we, Thomists, consider evident consequences of the principles of St. Thomas, we do not merely say that they disagree with us, but that they disagree with the *teaching of St. Thomas*. And if they disown such charges, it is because they deny that the propositions at issue are evident consequences of the holy Doctor's teaching; but they would certainly not deny the charges if they held them to be evident consequences of the Saint's teaching. Cf. the quotations from Berther and Pesch on the consequent sense of the Holy Scripture in nos. 444 and 447.

In this regard, we will quote a brief passage from Cardinal Cajetan, one of a thousand that could be quoted. Commenting on those words of St. Thomas: "The remission of guilt cannot be UNDERSTOOD if there were no infusion of grace", Cajetan writes: "For it is certain that if it were possible by [God's] *absolute power*, it could be UNDERSTOOD." (*In 1-2*, q.113, a.2) Thus, anything that is possible by God's absolute power is *intelligible*, and everything that is impossible by his absolute power is *unintelligible*. Since any *metaphysico-connexive* consequence is the same as an *absolutely necessary* consequence, it follows that every theological metaphysico-connexive consequence is *of the understanding* of the revealed deposit, and that by defining it the Church gives us nothing more than the *understanding* of the revealed deposit. Such is the nature of the inclusive or *intellectual* character of the true theology (103-109)

337. TENTH OBSERVATION. — "The certainty of divine faith has to be infinitely superior not only to physical, but also to metaphysical certainty. Consequently, the metaphysico-inclusive conclusion is as far removed from divine faith as the physico-connexive conclusion."

*Reply.* — A conclusion necessarily has to be metaphysico-inclusive if it is to be definable as of divine faith, not because metaphysical certainty has anything to do with the certainty of faith, which is infinitely superior to it, but because where metaphysical connexion is present the conclusion is identical with, or objectively included in the revealed major, which is of faith. The conclusion is definable, not on account of its metaphysical connexion, but on account of its inclusion. Thus, metaphysical certainty has nothing to do with the certainty of faith, but the inclusion or implicitness of the conclusion in the premise of faith, not only has something to do with its definability as of faith, but it is the only thing that is required and suffices to render it definable, if its inclusion can be evidently known without new revelation.

338. ELEVENTH OBSERVATION. — What is really identical with the revealed is contained therein *quoad se*, but it is not contained therein *quoad nos*.

*Reply.* — If our reason cannot evidently deduce it without the aid of a new revelation, then it is contained therein *quoad se*, but not *quoad nos* as, e.g., the Trinity of Persons in the Unity of God. But if our reason is capable of deducing it evidently by its own resources, then it is contained therein also with respect to our reason.

339. TWO LAST OBJECTIONS. TWELFTH OBSERVATION. — "Nothing exists but pure connexion between what is said by God and its theological conclusions."

*Reply.* — In theology, as well as in metaphysics, taking these sciences in the rigorous sense, there can never be *pure connexion*, but connexion together with inclusion. Theological and metaphysical conclusions, considered *objectively*, are not connected but identical to their principles. They are connexive only when they are considered *subjectively*. The *virtual* distinction, upon which they are based, is not in the object, but in the *subject*. THIRTEENTH OBSERVATION. — No fact can be defined as of divine faith, and consequently as *revealed*, if it has taken place after the Apostles and, thus, after the closure of the deposit of revelation.

*Reply.* — It is false to say that contingent facts that took place after the Apostles cannot be truly revealed facts and definable as of divine faith. The celebration of the Council of Trent, the drafting of the present Canon of the mass, the Vulgate translation, the election of such a pope, the begetting of this man . . . are contingent facts that have taken place after the Apostles.

Nonetheless, it has been defined, or it is definable as of divine faith and, hence, it is *revealed*, that the Tridentine Council is ecumenical or a rule of faith, that the Canon of the mass is free from error, that the Vulgate is authentic with respect to fundamental matters of faith and morals, that our Holy Father Pius XI is a true pope, that this man has been redeemed by Christ.

It is true that it was possible for the Tridentine not to have been celebrated, and in this sense it is a contingent fact; but having been celebrated as it was celebrated, it is not contingent but necessary that it should be ecumenical or a rule of faith. Similarly, it was possible for Jansen's *Augustinus* not to have been written, and it is only in this sense that it is a contingent fact; but once it was written as it was written, its formal opposition to the revealed deposit, i.e., its heretical nature, is not contingent but absolutely necessary.

Now then, upon the death of the last of the Apostles the Church remained in possession not only of a doctrinal deposit, but also of a dogmatic authority to determine, by means of that deposit, the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of every doctrinal formula. We call attention to the term "every". It means that the Church has authority to pass judgment not only on doctrinal formulae stated orally, but also on those set down in writing; not only on those that are brief, but also on those that are extensive, even if they be so extensive as to make up a whole book; not only on those that had been spoken or written before the closure of the revealed deposit, but also on those that might be spoken or written in the future.

Thus, even before Jansen wrote his book, the Church already possessed the criterion, i.e., the revealed deposit, and the dogmatic authority wherewith to judge it. But she could apply neither the criterion nor the authority to any particular book before such a book existed. But as soon as such a book came to exist the Church needed only to apply to it the criterion of the revealed deposit in order to verify whether the book was in accordance with or in contradiction to it, that is to say, whether the book contained heresy or not. By virtue of such application the revealed deposit itself neither increases nor diminishes nor undergoes any change just as an old meter or thermometer neither changes nor increases nor diminishes when I apply it to measure the length or the temperature of a new object. Consequently, whenever the Church declares a new dogmatic fact as pertaining to the faith, there is no novelty introduced in the ancient teaching, there is simply a *novelty of application* or a new application of the ancient and always identical teaching to a new doctrine in order to judge it.

When the deposit of Catholic revelation was closed upon the death of the last of the Apostles, it was not yet of divine faith that Jansen's book contained heresy, but it was already of divine faith that if a book were written as Jansen's book was written, such a book contained heresy. Thus,

when Jansen wrote his book in just the way that he wrote it, and when the Church declared that such a book contained heresy, nothing took place but a simple verification of a condition that was already contained in the revealed deposit. That dogmatic fact, once defined by the Church, is of *divine* faith not precisely because the *Church* said so in the 17th century, but precisely because *God* had already said so in the revealed deposit. Only God had said so in general, or conditionally, whereas the Church says so in particular, verifying the condition.

The misgivings that prevent many theologians from accepting this doctrine proceed, we believe, from the fact that they have formed such a narrow idea of the Church's dogmatic authority, as if it were restricted solely to the *immutable preservation* of the revealed deposit. The truth is that it does not extend solely to the deposit's immutable preservation but also to its faithful explication and application. The definition of the revealed virtuality or theological conclusions, that is to say, inclusive or implicit conclusions, since these alone are definable, is nothing but the *explication* of the revealed deposit. The definition of facts, viz., *dogmatic* facts, which are the only ones definable, is nothing but the *application* of the revealed deposit.

As a matter of fact these three things — preservation, explication, application — are only three degrees or phases of the same thing. The revealed deposit is a doctrinal deposit, and every doctrine is preserved when it is faithfully explicated, and it is explicated when it is faithfully applied. Dogmatic facts, which embody that application are to the doctrine revealed by God as an author's moral casebook to the same author's moral doctrinal treatise. If in his moral casebook the author does nothing except apply to the solution of the case studies, the same teaching expounded in his doctrinal treatise, then no one will say that he is expounding a new moral doctrine but merely applying the same moral doctrine. In like manner, when the Church faithfully and infallibly applies the revealed deposit to dogmatic facts, she does not offer a teaching other than the divine deposit but an application of the *same teaching*; and all theologians admit, or should admit, that anything which is not a new teaching, but the same teaching revealed by God, is definable not merely as of ecclesiastical but as of divine faith. Thus, with the death of the last Apostle the revealed deposit was closed as regards new revelations and new teachings, but not as regards new explications or new applications of the *same teaching*.

Finally, since the Church's infallibility extends to these three things (preservation, explication, and application), and to them alone, it becomes plain that the scope of the Church's dogmatic or divine faith authority is exactly the same as the scope of her infallibility or of the so-called ecclesiastical faith. Such also is the exact extent of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

## Section IV

## OBJECTIONS RAISED AGAINST ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS FOR DOGMATIC EVOLUTION

340. -- Among the many arguments we submitted to prove the fact and the extent of dogmatic evolution, the eighth argument was based on the opposition to the revealed deposit that must necessarily exist in any theological error. Since no objective opposition is possible without entailing a true contradiction, and since contradiction is impossible without a basis of true identity, we deduce that any truly theological conclusion necessarily has to be objectively identical to the revealed deposit, and hence definable as of divine faith or, in other words, an object of dogmatic evolution. (247)

In an article published in *La Ciencia Tomista*<sup>111</sup> we wrote the following: "When the Church infallibly defines a theological conclusion, or infallibly condemns the opposite error, her formal viewpoint is not precisely the conformity or the opposition of such a conclusion or such an error to the principles of natural reason but to the revealed deposit. Errors that are not really opposed to the revealed deposit do not fall under the jurisdiction either of infallibility or of theology, no matter how great or how plain their opposition to the principles of natural reason. The real opposition to the revealed deposit, is, so to speak, the *ratio sub qua* both infallibility and theology regard error." In that same article we went on to say: "Now, then, there can be no true opposition between two doctrines or assertions, if one of them is not the *denial of something* really contained in the other; if one does not *imply* even if it does not express it, a real *contradiction* to the other; if there does not exist in both *one* common and really identical meaning, asserted in the one and denied in the other. This," we concluded, "is what St. Thomas teaches, and what can be found in any textbook of logic where the nature of opposition is dealt with."

This statement of ours, viz., that all opposition implicitly entails a contradiction, and the reference we made to logic, earned us the following observations.

341. FIRST OBSERVATION. — That is not required by what logicians teach on the opposition of propositions. As Fr. Urráburu observes, that teaching has no bearing upon the *material* opposition of propositions, i.e., by reason of the matter dealt with [in the propositions], inasmuch as the subject-matter is no concern of logicians, e.g., "Peter is running", "Peter is standing still", but upon the *formal* opposition, or the opposition by reason of the form or structure of the propositions... To judge of the *real* opposition, or opposition by reason of the subject-matter is not the province of logicians, but of theologians.

<sup>111</sup> July, 1911.

tradition and, consequently a really identical meaning affirmed in one of two opposed propositions and denied in the other. This was the only point we wanted to establish and which our objector denies.

Since quotations from logical sources concerning real opposition do not seem to satisfy him, let us set logic aside and turn to metaphysics, for it belongs to this science, as John of St. Thomas points out, to treat of real opposition. And let us keep in mind that sacred theology is the metaphysics of God in the supernatural order or the order of revelation, just as theodicy is the metaphysics of God in the natural order or the order of reason.

If we look up St. Thomas's immortal Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics, book 10, lesson 6, we will find the following: "*Contradiction is included in all the other species of opposition, as something that is prior and more simple. For it is impossible that things that are opposed according to any species of opposition should exist simultaneously. And thus, indeed, happens on account of the fact that one of the opposites of its own reason contains the denial of the other.*"<sup>113</sup> Nothing could be more plainly said. Every opposition includes a contradiction.

If, notwithstanding the fact that metaphysics is a transcendent science, our objector should still be reluctant in accepting guidance from metaphysical sources in matters of sacred theology, let him look up the First Part of the Second Part of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica*, question 67, article 3. The holy Doctor discusses there a question related to nothing short of divine faith, and there he writes: "I answer that it must be said that opposition is the proper and per se cause of the exclusion of one of the opposites from the other insofar, that is, that in all opposites is included the opposition of affirmation and negation."<sup>114</sup>

Consequently, every opposition, even that which is not a formal contradiction, that is, consisting of terms and structure that are expressly contradictory, involves or entails a real contradiction or a contradiction in meaning. Since no teaching is erroneous in the theological order or in the order of infallibility, unless it is opposed to the revealed principles or revealed deposit, it follows that a real contradiction or contradiction in meaning is involved or implicitly exists between every theologically or infallibly erroneous proposition and the revealed deposit. Since there cannot be a real contradiction or contradiction in meaning between two teachings or assertions unless there is one same and identical meaning affirmed in the one and denied in the other, it follows that there is in the revealed deposit or prin-

<sup>113</sup> ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, ed. Coll. Angelicum, Rome, no. 2041.

<sup>114</sup> ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*

*Reply.* — We agree with our distinguished objector on the fact that logic deals directly with formal opposition or the opposition of terms, and not with real opposition or the opposition of meaning. But one thing is the things that logic deals with, and quite another the things that are dealt with in logic. For instance, in the treatise on faith sacred theology deals directly not with human, but with divine faith. And yet, there is no theology textbook and no theologian who, in order to explain divine faith, is not constrained to explain what is faith in general, and what is human faith, since this is the only way to get a good understanding of what divine faith is. Likewise, there is no logician and no textbook of logic, if it is complete, that, in order to explain correctly logical or formal opposition, is not constrained to deal with, and does not actually deal with the nature of opposition in general and the nature of real opposition, since there is no other way of explaining and achieving a thorough understanding of formal opposition, inasmuch as, if the object of logic is formal opposition, formal opposition in its turn has real opposition for its object and end. The classic logician, John of St. Thomas, has this to say: "One kind of opposition is real, the other is logical, that is, opposition is either an opposition of things or of propositions. And these two are related in such a way that the real or physical opposition is, as it were, the object of logical opposition, since the to-be and the not-to-be that is encountered on the part of reality and in the objects themselves is signified by opposed propositions. Hence, although it belongs to the metaphysician to treat of real opposition, nonetheless, inasmuch as it belongs to the logician to treat of the opposition of propositions, he must also somehow touch on what concerns the opposition of things insofar as things are the object of the opposition of propositions."<sup>112</sup>

We mentioned logic so that anyone could see for himself in any logic textbook, and above all in St. Thomas, that every opposition entails a con-

<sup>112</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Logic*, part 1, q. 7, a. 1. — See also GOUDIN who, after dealing with opposition in general and with formal opposition, devotes almost an entire article to real opposition with these words: "There is an opposition of propositions, of which we have already spoken at length; and there is an opposition of things, which is our sole concern here." And all of this in *Logic*. (GOUDIN, *Logica Maior*, p. 1, d. 2, q. 7, a. unicus). Likewise Fr. Zigliara, who prefaces his treatment of formal opposition with this observation: "We have spoken elsewhere of what the opposition of ideas consists in." This opposition of ideas, also known as the incompatibility of ideas, is precisely none other than real opposition, and the "elsewhere" to which Zigliara remits the reader is found in *logic* itself. (ZIGLIARA, *Logica*, 8, 7, and 28, 1). Similarly Fr. De Maria, S.J., who observes that it also belongs to logic indirectly to deal with the postpredicaments, and then goes on to treat in detail of the postpredicament of opposition in general, and of its four species of real opposition, and even expressly employs St. Thomas's principle that "a contradiction is included in every opposition." And Fr. De Maria treats of all these things in *logic*. (P. MICHAEL DE MARIA, S.J., *Logica Minor*, p. 1, c. 2, a. 7) We could thus go on citing other authors of *logic*. Let us agree, then, that not only formal, but also real opposition is dealt with in *logic*.

principles of faith a meaning that is identical to the meaning denied in the theological or infallibly erroneous proposition. Which is to say that in the revealed datum or dogma (the first and second levels of Catholic doctrine), on the one hand, and in the infallible and the theological truth (third and fourth levels), on the other hand, there is an identity of meaning, which is designated by the term *real* or *objective homogeneity* of all the four levels of Catholic doctrine. It follows, finally, that whenever the Church defines a doctrine as infallibly true or erroneous, or whenever sacred theology deduces a conclusion as demonstratively true or false, the Church does not define and theology does not deduce a conclusion that is *alien* to the revealed deposit or even objectively *distinct* from the meaning of the revealed deposit, but a meaning that is *really identical* to the meaning of the revealed deposit, a meaning which, although not formally expressed, is nonetheless really included or *implicit* in the revealed deposit.

These consequences will infallibly be reached by any one who seriously ponders on and penetrates these two principles: first, in both the order of infallibility and the order of theology, truth and error are relations of conformity with or opposition not precisely to the principles of reason, but to the principles of faith or of the revealed deposit; second, every true opposition does not always express, but it always entails or implies a contradiction. The first is a fundamental principle in theology; the second is likewise an elementary principle in philosophy. Both are expressly taught by St. Thomas. Both are plainly evident.

If notwithstanding the plain evidence of the foregoing, and influenced perhaps by the familiar notion of theology given by most modern textbooks, our objector still hesitates to admit a true contradiction between the revealed deposit and theological error — and, hence, a true identity between the same deposit and theological truth — let him consider that other elementary and indubitable principle according to which “God can do any thing that does not entail a contradiction”. Well then, is it at all possible for God ever to falsify a true theological conclusion? Can He ever make it false? Or can He ever verify in the other sciences to be *contrary* to the truth of this science [sacred theology], is all of it considered as *false*.<sup>115</sup> Sacred theology — the Wisdom of wisdoms, the Queen of the sciences — possesses an objective *certainty* superior to that of all natural sciences whether physical, mathematical or metaphysical. “I answer that it must be said that this science, being as it is speculative in some respects and practical in other respects, transcends *all other sciences* both the speculative and the practical. Among speculative sciences one is held to be worthier than another on account of *certainty* as

<sup>115</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2.

well as of the *dignity* of its *subject matter*. And on *both counts* this science exceeds other speculative sciences.<sup>116</sup>

Consequently, if it is impossible for God ever to falsify any true mathematical or metaphysical conclusion, much less will it be possible for him to falsify a true theological conclusion. And if it is impossible for God to do so, it is because a *contradiction* is therein entailed. And if a contradiction is entailed, there also is entailed a *real identity of meaning*. The principles of contradiction and identity are correlative.

342. SECOND OBSERVATION. — The argument earlier taken from Fr. Marín-Sola lacks force. Is it the case that the Church, in the act of pronouncing infallible definitions, looks to the revealed deposit which she has been commissioned to safeguard, and that she regards the same defined truths from the viewpoint of their conformity with or *opposition* to the revealed deposit? Fine! Such indeed is the case. But it does not follow that conformity is *identity*. That which conforms to something is not the thing itself, although it bears a *similarity*, *proportion*, or *correspondence* to it. That which is identical to something is indeed the thing itself.

*Reply.* — To begin with, our objector admits, as every theologian must admit, that the infallible and the theological truth, as well as the infallibly condemned and the theological error, are truths or errors respectively on account of their conformity with or opposition to the revealed deposit. Now, we have just seen that according to logicians, as well as metaphysicians and theologians, and according to the prince of them all, St. Thomas, every opposition between two statements implies or entails a contradiction between them. It is obvious that contradiction presupposes identity, and not merely extrinsic proportion, similarity or correspondence. Therefore, it is plain that if theological or infallibly condemned error is truly opposed to the revealed deposit, there has to be an implicit contradiction between those two extremes, and that if a contradiction exists between those two extremes, then there has to be real identity, and not merely similarity or proportion, between the revealed deposit and the infallible or the theological truth. There are no two ways about it, given what our objector concedes and what every theologian must concede. The concept of *identity* is apodictically deduced from the concept of *opposition* through the concept of *contradiction*.

There are, in our opinion, two reasons why our objector, who admits the concept of opposition, should, however, refuse to admit the concept of contradiction and consequently the concept of identity. The first is that upon mentioning theological conclusions, his mind instinctively hies to the stock

<sup>116</sup> ST. THOMAS, *loc. cit.*, a. 5.

example: "Christ is man, therefore risible". But this example is understood a la Suárez taking "man" in a purely *essential* or abstract sense, and "risible" in the *actual* sense. And, of course, if the example is thus understood, no identity exists, nor can any exist, between "man" and "risible", just as no contradiction exists between "man" and "not risible". But this is simply due to the fact that between "man" (essential) and "risible" (actual) there is no true opposition, and consequently, there is neither true *theology* nor a true object of *infallibility*. We have dwelt at length on this matter elsewhere (89-102), and we shall again return to it at the end of this section.

The second reason why our objector does not perceive true identity or contradiction respectively, in spite of perceiving true opposition, is his seeming failure to draw a distinction between formal identity, which is not our concern here, and *real* identity, which is our only concern now. Furthermore, he also seems not to distinguish between total identity, which is not in the least required, and *partial* identity, which is what we seek and suffices for our purposes. By partial identity we do not mean a *part of identity*, which would not make sense, but *identity with a part of the revealed deposit*, which not with the whole of the deposit.

When two statements or assertions have the same subject and the same verb their identical or contradictory meaning depends wholly on the predicate or predicates. If one affirms or denies the predicate of the other, and affirms or denies it in the *same form*, and consequently in the *same concept* and the *same reality*, the identity or the contradiction is formal. If the affirmation or the denial is made under *another concept*, but within the same reality, the identity or the contradiction is merely real. The propositions "God is eternal" and "God is not eternal" (which is the same as saying "God is not-eternal") are formally contradictory, since the predicate affirmed in one and denied in the other is the same in *all* aspects. But between the propositions "God is eternal" and "God is not immutable" there is only a real contradiction. There is real contradiction because the predicates "eternal" and "immutable" respectively affirmed in one and denied in the other, are the *self-same divine reality*; however the contradiction is not formal because the aforesaid concepts, although signifying the same reality, are nonetheless distinct formalities or *distinct concepts*.

On the other hand, there is a formal contradiction between the propositions "God is merciful and eternal" and "God is merciful but not eternal" since one of the predicates is formally denied, but the contradiction is partial since the other predicate is not denied, which is to say, that the whole predicate of the first proposition is not denied. Likewise, there is a real and partial contradiction between the propositions "God is merciful and eternal" and "God is merciful but not immutable". The contradiction is real and not formal, because the predicates "eternal" and "immutable" are distinct formalities or concepts; partial and not total, because only one of the two

predicates is denied, that is to say, only a part of the whole predicate is denied.

But when all these affirmations and denials refer to *one and the same reality*, that is to say, in every case where one of the predicates is inclusive or implicit in the subject, it is plain that they all always include the affirmation or the denial of *identity*, and not merely of extrinsic similarity, proportion or correspondence.

343. APPLICATION TO THE REVEALED DEPOSIT. — Let us now apply all the foregoing to the revealed deposit. The revealed deposit does not consist of only one revealed proposition or assertion. It is a whole made up of many revealed assertions, and therefore of many revealed meanings. In order that an error be truly contradictory to the meaning of the revealed deposit, or a truth identical to the same deposit, it is not necessary that it be respectively contradictory or identical to each and every one of the deposit's assertions; it suffices that it be either contradictory or identical to just one of its assertions.

Thus, e.g., the first verse of Genesis asserts the creation of the world, and the first verse of St. John's Gospel asserts the Divinity of the Word. Any one who asserts the Divinity of the Word asserts a meaning identical to the revealed deposit, because it is identical to one of the truths contained in it, that is, the first verse of St. John's Gospel, even if this particular assertion is neither identical nor relevant to other truths of the revealed deposit, e.g., the first verse of Genesis concerning the creation of the world.

Similarly, should any one deny one of the truths of the revealed deposit, e.g., the creation of the world, such denial is contradictory to the revealed deposit because it contradicts one of the truths or meanings contained in it, even if that denial has nothing to do, or should have nothing to do with the other truths of the revealed deposit. Hence a true identity with, or a true contradiction to, the revealed deposit does not require identity with, or contradiction to, the whole deposit, that is, to *each and every one of the meanings contained in it*; identity with, or contradiction to, *one of its truths or meanings suffices for the purpose*.

This is common knowledge, which many would even qualify as a theological platitude. But it serves to explain another thing, which everybody knows, yet is often overlooked by some people.

Each of the assertions or propositions of the revealed deposit, even if it expresses only *one* predicate or meaning, implies or can imply *several* predicates or concepts. This is a property of any assertion, whether divine or human.

All those predicates or concepts which are not expressed, but are nonetheless implicit in each of the revealed statements, are not known, nor

can be known by us at one single stroke. Time and study are needed to uncover them. They come to light successively. Profound and complicated reasonings might at times be required, delicate processes of analysis and synthesis, contact with different sciences and cultures, a long chain of internal and external experiences . . . in one word, all the complicated and laborious series of factors that bear upon any instance of human progress, including the progress or development of what was already implicit in the primitive datum or starting point. This is both characteristic and exclusive of our weak and at the same time powerful *human reason*. Weak, because it requires time and effort in order to know, because it advances in knowledge through reasoning, that is, by passing from one to another, which neither God nor the angels require. Powerful, because in making the transition *from one to another*, it is capable not only of passing from one reality to another reality, as the senses, but also of passing from one concept to another concept within the same reality or within the one and self-same primitive datum; thereby participating not only in the rational process, but also in the *intellec-tual* process or process of identity, which is characteristic of the angels and God.

Such a process of absolute identity, of unconditional truth, is available to human reason, not in the domain of the contingent physical sciences, but in that of the eternal mathematical and metaphysical sciences, and even more in that of the eternal and divine science of theology, since the theological process is among all sciences the most intellectual, the closest to the mode of knowing proper of pure intellects, the knowledge of simple understanding. "Theological consideration is in the highest degree intellectual."<sup>117</sup> But let us not digress.

344. AN EXAMPLE OF PLAINEST EVIDENCE: JESUS CHRIST IS GOD. — We were just saying that each assertion of the revealed deposit, even if it should express only one predicate, nonetheless implies or includes many others that are really identical.

Let us, e.g., take this revealed proposition, "Jesus Christ is God." For the sake of greater clarity, let us now prescind from all other revealed truths, or let us suppose that there is no other revealed truth. In order to investigate a sensible phenomenon, science endeavours to isolate it from all other alien factors or conditions. In like manner, in order to analyze a question it is best to isolate or abstract it from others. As the scholastic adage has it: "Abstraction is not untruth". Let us, then prescind from all other revealed truths and suppose that only this proposition has been revealed: "Jesus Christ is God".

<sup>117</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In Boetium, De Trinitate*, q.6, a.1.

The proposition contains only one explicit predicate: *God*. But its implicit predicates are numberless.

Indeed, what *is* God? Observe that the question does not ask what things *distinct* from God are *connected* with God, nor does it ask what things are *similar* or *proportionate* to God. What is being asked is what *is* God? To this question Fr. Astete's Catechism replies: "God is the most excellent and admirable thing that can be spoken (ineffability) or thought of (incomprehensibility); He is an infinitely good, powerful, wise and just Lord, the beginning and the end of all things."

As if nothing had been said at all, that one single explicit concept of God has been broken up into eight concepts implicit in it, viz: ineffability, incomprehensibility, infinite goodness, omnipotence, infinite wisdom, infinite justice, first principle and ultimate end of all things. If instead of asking the Catechism, which could be accused of replying through faith and not through demonstration or theology, we had asked the same question of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica*, which in the matter of divine attributes submits apodictic proof of every one it names, it would give us not only the eight mentioned in Astete's Catechism, but many other divine attributes deduced, in the magnificent treatise *On the One God*, through a rigorous process of real identity from the concept or idea of God. In its definition of God, Astete's Catechism does not even mention the divine simplicity, immensity, immutability, eternity, providence, etc . . .

Thus, the revealed statement, "Jesus Christ is God", expresses only one predicate; nonetheless, in that one single predicate it contains implicitly, really, and *identically* many other predicates. *Formally* it expresses only one meaning, but *really* it implies several meanings or truths.

Thus, after the revelation of this truth, any one who affirms this same proposition, "Jesus Christ is God", would not merely affirm a *meaning* identical to the revealed proposition, but the *whole explicit* meaning of the revealed truth, since he affirms it in the same form in which it is revealed. His affirmation is identical to the revealed truth, not only partially but *wholly*, not only really but *formally*.

Likewise, any one who denies that revealed proposition by saying, "Jesus Christ is not God", would not be denying only *one meaning* of the revealed truth, but the whole explicit meaning of the revealed truth, since he denies it in the same form or concept in which it is revealed. There would be here a contradiction in meaning to the revealed truth, a contradiction that is not only implicit but *explicit*, not only partial but *total*, not only real but

*formal*. It is characteristic of formal opposition or *explicit* contradiction to deny the whole meaning of its contradictory. Which is why logicians say it possesses a *malignant nature*, which sets it apart from the other kinds of opposition which contain only an *implicit* contradiction, and do not deny everything but only a *part*, a real and implicit part, of its opposite, as we shall presently see.<sup>118</sup>

Continuing with the same hypothesis, viz., that only the proposition, "Jesus Christ is God", has been revealed, there comes now a man who expressly neither affirms nor denies that proposition, but affirms that Jesus Christ is one of the many concepts that are virtually distinct but really identical to the concept of God. He says, for instance, "Jesus Christ is ineffable", or "incomprehensible", or "infinitely good", or "wise", etc. When he affirms any of those predicates, which as we have seen are contained implicitly in the term "God" — but which cannot become known to, or developed, or explained by human reason, except by true reasoning, by means of *minors of reason* — when he affirms those predicates, those truly theological conclusions, he would not be affirming something extrinsic to the predicate "God", nor something merely similar or externally in conformity to what God is, but he would be affirming something *intrinsic* to God, something *really identical to the revealed predicate "God"*, something really identical to the revealed proposition. The identity is not a formal identity since the predicates are distinct formalities, distinct concepts, that is, *virtually distinct*; neither is it a total identity since none of those predicates is commensurate to the

<sup>118</sup> "In contradictory propositions, the denial of one is so unmitigated and absolute that it removes all agreement with its opposite extreme. Thus it allows neither being, nor aptitude, nor universality, nor particularity to remain, but *destroys everything* (simpliciter), it is intensively the greatest opposition, and from it, as from the chief source, opposition is derived to all other oppositions which contain so much of opposition insofar as they contain something of contradiction, as St. Thomas teaches, and is said in logic in the chapter on The Opposites." (JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Philosophicus*, p. 1, q. 7, a. 1) "Contradictory opposition is opposition pure and simple (simpliciter), since it purely and simply (simpliciter) takes away what the other posits; but all other oppositions contain so much of opposition insofar as they participate something of contradiction, i.e., of the denial of the other, although not as absolutely as the contradictory: for if they did not deny something, they would not be opposed." (*Op. cit.*, p. 2, q. 20, a. 1) "This is made plain by going through each of the species of opposition, whether on the part of things or of propositions." (*Loc. cit.*, a. 1) "For the consequent is a part or something of the antecedent." (*Loc. cit.*, q. 7, a. 2) If the consequent were not a part or something of the antecedent, no reasoning could be grounded on the principle of identity or on its correlative principle of contradiction. These two principles constitute the everlasting and indispensable basis of every absolute and rigorous demonstration.

predicate "God", just as no property howsoever metaphysical is commensurate to the essence, nor any conclusion howsoever implicit is commensurate to its principle. But it is a *real* identity since those predicates are really identical to the revealed predicate "God". Such is the constitution of theological truth, of theology. Consequently, there is not only a correspondence, a proportion, a similarity between theological truth and the revealed deposit; there is a *real identity* of meaning.

If instead of affirming, we deny any of those predicates by saying, e.g., "Jesus Christ is not ineffable", "is not incomprehensible", "is not omnipotent" . . . such denials would involve not only a disconformity, a disproportion, a dissimilarity, but a true contradiction to the revealed truth, "Jesus Christ is God". The contradiction is not explicit but *implicit*, it is not formal but *real*. To be God and not to be ineffable, or not to be incomprehensible, or not to be omnipotent, are really contradictory predicates, a contradiction is entailed. And the plain proof of it is that not even God can join them together, and God can always do whatsoever does not entail a contradiction. Consequently, theological error entails, even if it does not express, a real contradiction to the revealed deposit. And consequently, theological truth entails a real identity to it.

This analysis of the treatise *On God* ought to suffice for anyone who understands what *theology* is. Theology's proper and primary object is God, and nothing can come into the domain of theology unless by reference to God. Hence, if in the treatise *On God* every theological truth is a truth of real identity, it follows that the process of identity constitutes, and must constitute, the proper and primary characteristic of every theological conclusion and of every truly theological reasoning. But let us practically show that the same thing happens in the case of any other revealed proposition from any other theological treatise.

Second example: Jesus Christ is man. — Let us consider the revealed proposition, "Jesus Christ is man". It contains explicitly only one predicate, "man"; or, if you prefer, there is one explicit predicate, the predicate "man". But in this predicate there are many others involved or implicit, not only as similar or proportionate, but as really identical.

In effect, just as we earlier asked what is God?, we now ask what is man? To this question we get the truthful reply that man is a rational animal. Hereto we are still within the formal since rational animal is the very definition of man. But if we continue asking what the rational is, we will obtain the truthful reply that what is rational is really *immaterial, spiritual, immortal, free*; capable of *morality, merit, happiness*; capable of *powers, wonder,*



"*risibility*", etc. All of it follows by true reasoning, by true *minors* of reason, by a truly *theological conclusion*. And yet, all these conclusions preserve real identity. And the proof of it is that not even God can create a rational being that is not immaterial, spiritual, immortal, or without any capacity (radical properties) for merit, morality, powers, wonder, risibility.

Third example: Jesus Christ is a perfect man. — If instead of analyzing the predicate "man", we analyze the predicate "*perfect man*", or man in the *connatural state*, or man *like us in everything*, we will find that a man in the *connatural* or the *perfect state* is a man possessing all the *actual* properties, viz.: actual intellect, actual will, actual sense of wonder, actual risibility, etc., etc. A man without any one of the actual properties is not a man in the *connatural state*, but a man in a non-connatural state, which is precisely the denial of the revealed predicate. Consequently, the theological conclusions that affirm any of the radical properties of Our Saviour's human nature, affirm a meaning really *included* in the revealed predicate "man"; and those that affirm any of the actual properties also affirm a meaning really *included* in the revealed predicate: not in the predicate "man" since they differ really from it, but in the revealed predicate "*perfect man*", or man in a *connatural state*, or man *like us*.

Just as we have analyzed the predicate "rational" we could have analyzed the predicate "animal", or the predicates "body" and "soul", or any predicate of any other revealed proposition. Provided that if only the essence of the predicate has been revealed, only the radical or essential predicates are deduced therefrom; and if the perfection or the connatural state of the essence are also revealed, also its actual properties are deduced. Such a deduction is rigorously scientific and rigorously theological, and yet nonetheless — or better still, precisely on account of it — the deduction is also really identical and rigorously homogeneous.

345. A COMPARISON OF THESE THREE EXAMPLES. — We have just considered three examples, viz., "Christ is God", "Christ is man", "Christ is a perfect man, or man in the connatural state". The first of these is a model of divine predicate; the second, a model of created-essential predicate; the third, a model of created-accidental predicate. These are the three fundamental kinds of theological predicates, and consequently, of the theological processes. There can be no theological predicate or process that is not reducible to one of these three. We have seen that in each and every one of these three there exists a real identity or an identity of meaning, and not merely proportion, similarity, or extrinsic correspondence. Therefore, the theological truth (4th level of Catholic doctrine), out of which comes the infallible truth (3rd level), is really homogeneous with dogma and the revealed datum (2nd and 1st level). And, thus, there is homogeneity or real identity of meaning in all the four levels of Catholic doctrine.

346. THIRD OBSERVATION. — In the Vatican Council, the Bishop of Brescia asserted that the truths belonging to faith or morals are not each and every one necessary in the *same degree* for the preservation of the deposit. Thus, he clearly indicated that they might not be identical, that it is possible for revealed truths and connected truths not to have one identical meaning, that conformity is not identity.

Reply. — We admit that there are various *degrees* in the truths of faith and morals, that is, relative to their necessity for the safeguarding of the revealed deposit. In support of something so obvious and which no one denies, a greater authority than that of the Bishop of Brescia can be adduced, viz., that of the Vatican Council itself. At the end of its dogmatic constitution *On the Catholic Faith*, no less, we find the following: "It is not enough to avoid the corruption of heresy, unless those errors are also avoided that *more or less* approach it."<sup>119</sup>

But we fail to see the bearing that the existence of *degrees* might have on the presence or absence of *identity*. Our objector again seems to forget that we are dealing not with formal but real identity, not with total but with partial identity, that is, identity with a part of the revealed deposit. In the case of formal or total identity no degrees are possible. But degrees are possible in the case of real and partial identity insofar as a bigger or smaller part of the revealed predicate is affirmed or denied. And degrees are not only possible, but required precisely because the identity in this case is a *real identity*.

In effect, since it is a case of identity, and not merely of similarity or proportion, it has to be *within* and not *outside* the deposit. Since it is real, not formal, it has to be *implicit* and not *explicit*, inasmuch as whatever is explicit is always formal. Now, a truth can be more or less implicit, more or less latent, existing at a greater or lesser depth in another truth. The possibility of various degrees is, therefore, obvious.

The greater or lesser *implicitness* or depth, of a truth relative to the formal content of the deposit or to a defined truth of faith, determines the greater or lesser necessity of the former for the preservation of the latter, since on it depends the greater or lesser *certainty* or evidence wherewith human reason — for the benefit of which the deposit was given, and with regard to which the necessity of safeguarding and explicating it exists — sees the more or less remote or proximate relationship of such a truth to the formal or the defined content of the deposit. The necessity or non-necessity of a truth depends on whether it is related or not to the deposit. The greater or lesser degree of necessity depends on the greater or lesser implicitness of that relationship.

<sup>119</sup>Denz-Schön., 3045.

To illustrate, any teaching or assertion dealing with the Divinity or the Trinity (revealed predicates) has to be true or false by way of real identity, since in the case of God no other way is possible. This notwithstanding, every theologian knows that, with respect to either the Trinity or the Divinity, there are doctrines of faith, or proximate to faith, or simply certain, or more probable, or merely probable, or improbable, or erroneous, or close to error, or simply temerarious, or completely doubtful, or free. A whole gamut of degrees of implicitness in the deposit and of degrees of necessity for its preservation. Nonetheless, all those truths or all those errors agree with or are opposed to the deposit by way of identity, since in the case of either the Divinity or the Trinity no other way is possible.

What is true of the revealed predicate "God", is true of any other revealed predicate provided that the process employed be truly theological, that is to say, provided metaphysical or radical properties be deduced from the revelation of the mere essence, and actual properties be deduced from the revelation of the connatural or perfect essence. Such a deductive process is a process of identity with the revealed datum; however, the identity is not formal but real, and thus it is *implicit*, not explicit; and consequently, capable of various degrees of *implicitness*, and various degrees of *relationship* and various degrees of *necessity*. All homogeneous development carries these two characteristics; since it is homogeneous it is characterized by real identity; since it is a development it is characterized by various degrees or levels of implicitness or development. 120

347. FOURTH OBSERVATION. — Now we come to the root of the confusion that plagues our objector. He goes on to say:

"An example will make it clear. Let us assume that it has not been revealed that Christ is a physically perfect man, but only that he is a true man, a rational animal. Subsequently the Church defines as an infallible truth,

120: The opposition of heresy to dogma is immediate, direct, in a straight line, so to speak; and the straightness of a line excludes more or less, admits no degrees. The opposition of theological error to dogma is mediate, indirect, oblique; and the *obliqueness* or slant of a line admits more or less, admits degrees. The opposition between heresy and dogma is direct and immediate because it is achieved by means of a simple denial, without any middle term, bypassing the circuitous route of reasoning. The opposition between theological error and dogma is oblique, mediate, because it requires the circuitous path of the middle term, the minor of reason, of reasoning; but if the line is oblique, it is not a broken but a continuous line, since it keeps in real touch or within the objective identity with the dogma inasmuch as the middle term and the reasoning possess *implicit* virtuality, are *inclusive*. On the other hand, the non-implicit or Suarezian virtual is a broken line, one in which there is a gap of objectivity or of contact with the dogma: since such a virtual is not in touch with dogma, there is no point at which either theology or infallibility can come in touch with it.

with a mark inferior to that of faith, that Christ possesses *actual* risibility. Will such a definition teach us that this proposition, "Christ possesses actual risibility", is identical in meaning to this other one, "Christ is true man"? Of course not. Actual risibility, inasmuch as it is physical power, is a reality that differs really from the *essence* of man. Thus the two propositions are not identical, albeit they are in conformity."

*Reply.* — Our reply is quite simple and quite obvious: WE DENY THE SUPPOSITION. That is to say, we categorically deny that the Church could define as *infallibly true* the proposition "Christ possesses *actual* risibility", or that she could condemn as *infallibly erroneous* the contrary proposition "Christ does not possess actual risibility", in the *supposition* made by our objector, to wit, that it has not been revealed that Christ is a perfect or connatural man, but *only* that he is truly or *essentially* man.

Our objector, firmly believes — as do many post-Suarezian textbooks, and even imagines that it is the opinion of *all* theologians — that in the stock example of theological conclusion, "Christ is man, therefore he is risible", it is possible to understand the predicate "risible" in an actual sense when the term "man" is taken in a merely *essential* sense.

We think that they are plainly mistaken in their belief, and that this mistake has transcendental consequences with regard to the nature of true theology and of infallibility. We trust we have made this plain elsewhere. (99-102)

We do not deny that the Church can define as infallibly true, and even as of divine faith, the proposition that "Christ possesses radical risibility", since it has been revealed that Christ is truly or essentially man. Neither do we deny that the Church can define as infallibly true, and even as of divine faith, the proposition that "Christ possesses actual risibility", or any of the other properties that really differ from the essence, since it has been truly revealed that "Christ is a *perfect* man". There is in either case a truly theological conclusion; there is in either case true definability. But, likewise, there is in either case true real identity between the principle and the conclusion, not mere similarity, proportion, or correspondence.

What we have denied, and continue to deny, is that the Church could define as infallibly true, and much less as of divine faith, the proposition that "Christ has *actual* risibility", in the *supposition* that it has been revealed *only* that "Christ is *essentially* a man". The reasoning, "Christ is *essentially* a man, therefore he has such or such *actual* property", can hardly be an object of divine faith or of infallibility when it is not even *theologically* certain. It has exactly the same certainty as these other reasonings: "Christ is essentially a man, therefore he has a human personality", or "The Most Holy Virgin Mary is truly a mother, therefore she is not a virgin". Fine examples of theological certainty, indeed!

348. BY THE LIGHT OF OPPOSITION. — To avoid repeating things that have been argued and documented at length elsewhere as cited above, suffice it to examine these reasonings by the light of the concept of *opposition*, which is the object under study in this section.

In the domain of theology, as in the domain of infallibility, nothing can be condemned as erroneous unless, it is truly opposed to the revealed deposit. This is admitted by our objector. Now, it is plain that there is no true opposition between these two propositions, "Christ is essentially a man", and "Christ is not *actually* risible". It is possible to be essentially a man and not to be actually risible, just as it is possible to be essentially a man and not to be actually, or in fact, a human person, or to be essentially a mother without ceasing to be a virgin. In each of these cases, the extremes are, absolutely speaking, *consistent*. Such propositions, which pretend to pass as opposites, can absolutely be *both simultaneously true*. Two propositions which absolutely can be *both simultaneously true*, or two extremes that absolutely are consistent, are not truly opposed, says St. Thomas. "For it is impossible that whatsoever things are opposed by any kind of opposition should simultaneously exist."

And to preclude anyone from being misled by thinking of merely physical impossibility, the holy Doctor immediately adds that the impossibility required for opposition is absolute or *essential* impossibility. "And this, indeed, happens on account of the fact that one of the opposites of its own reason contains the *denial of the other*." This is precisely the basis from which the holy Doctor deduces the fundamental principle that "*contradiction is included in all opposites*."<sup>121</sup>

Now, then, the propositions, "Christ is essentially a man", and "Christ is not *actually* risible", can, absolutely speaking, be both simultaneously true, it is possible for both of them, absolutely speaking, to coexist in the same subject. They are not essentially inconsistent, they do not involve a con-

121. Since there are four ways according to which some things are opposed to another, viz.: first in the manner of *contradiction*, as being seated to not being seated; secondly, in the manner of *privation*, as being seated to not being seated; *trarily*, as black to whiteness; fourthly, in the manner of *relation*, as son to father; the first among these kinds of opposition is contradiction. The reason is that *contradiction is included in all the others* [oppositions] as that which is prior and more simple. For it is impossible that those things that are opposed according to whatsoever kind of opposition should exist simultaneously. And this happens on account of the fact that one of the opposites contains of its own reason the denial of the other. As it is of the reason of the blind to be not seeing. And it is of the reason of the black not to be white. And it is likewise of the reason of the son not to be the father to him whose son he is." (ST. THOMAS, in *Metaphysicos*, lib. 10 Lect. 6, Nos. 2040-2041, ed. cit. In ed. Vivès it is lect. 3, vol. 25, pg. 116).

tradition. Therefore they do not involve a true opposition. Consequently, in the supposition made by our objector that it has been revealed only that "Christ is essentially a man", the proposition that "Christ is not *actually* risible" would not be truly opposed to the revealed deposit. Inasmuch as it is not opposed to the revealed deposit, it would not be possible to condemn it either as *infallible*, or as *theologically*, erroneous.

349. LET IT NOT BE ARGUED that it could, at least, be infallibly condemned as *temerarious*. No doubt it could. But we are not concerned now with temerity which is contrary to *prudence*, but with *error*, which is opposed to *truth*. The Church could condemn as infallibly temerarious the proposition that "The final judgment will take place the following year", and yet from such a condemnation it cannot be deduced that its contradictory "The final judgment will not take place the following year" is theologically certain, or that it is an object of infallibility either as erroneous or as true. It is an object of infallibility or of theology only as imprudent.<sup>122</sup>

122 A friend sent us by letter an observation which is very similar to the preceding one. He writes as follows:

"I agree with you in saying that homogeneity exists between the whole of the department of dogma and the department of infallibility with respect to the defined truths or the condemned errors contained in the latter. I believe that you have demonstrated this very plainly in . . . your articles in *La Ciencia Tomista*. But are you going to extend this homogeneity so as to include also the propositions that have been condemned with a censure inferior to that of error, as for example, with the censure of *temerarious*? You know that there are theologians, e.g. the Salamanicensis, who admit that such propositions might be true, absolutely speaking, even after they have been condemned."

*Reply* — Our objector fails to draw a clear distinction between the truth of a proposition, and the truth of its censure. When the Church condemns a proposition with the censure of "temerarious", what she defines infallibly by such a condemnation is not the truth or the falsity of the condemned proposition, but the truth of the censure with which it has been condemned. Thus when the Church condemns as temerarious the proposition that "The Final Judgment will take place on such a date", that condemnation can be broken up into these two propositions: (a) The Final Judgment will take place (or it will not take place) on such a date; (b) It is temerarious to affirm that the Final Judgment will take place on such a date. It is not the first, but the second proposition that is infallibly defined by the Church's condemnation. To see plainly that this second proposition is perfectly homogeneous to the revealed truth, we need only to formulate the following simple reasoning: "To affirm that the Final Judgment will take place on such a date is to affirm what no man can know. But, it is temerarious to affirm what no man can know. Therefore, it is temerarious to affirm that the Final Judgment will take place on such a date." The major of this reasoning is an expressly revealed proposition. The minor is an *inclusive* proposition, since it is the very *definition* of temerity. Consequently, the conclusion — which is precisely what the Church infallibly defines — is deduced from the revealed datum by way of inclusion, by way of perfect identity and homogeneity. Such is the case with *any and every* proposition that is infallibly censured, even with a censure inferior to that of error.

350. FINAL OBSERVATION. — A final observation from our objector brings to a close this rather lengthy chapter.

"In our view, the Catholic doctrine is the doctrine which the Church, through her solemn or through her ordinary magisterium, whether directly or indirectly, teaches to all the faithful as a *dogma* of faith revealed by God, or as an *infallible truth* in conformity with revelation. *To all of it is applicable* the well-known dictum of the Lirinensis, quoted by the Vatican Council: 'Let, then, the understanding, knowledge, and wisdom of both each one and all, of one man as well as of the whole Church, grow . . . and advance abundantly and forcefully in the course of the ages and the centuries: but only within its own kind, that is to say, within the same dogma, the same meaning, the same teaching.'"

*Reply.* — Very well spoken! We make ours this whole paragraph from our objector. But either he has suffered a slight distraction, or he there admits all that we have said about the real identity of meaning that pervades all the levels of Catholic doctrine, and throws overboard everything he has sought to establish in his earlier observations.

In the foregoing passage our objector effectively says that the Catholic doctrine comprises not only what is defined as a *dogma* of faith (first and second levels), but also what is defined as an *infallible truth* (third level).

In the same passage he also says that the well-known dictum of the Lirinensis, which the Vatican Council made its own, can be applied to the *whole body of Catholic doctrine*.

Now, as every theologian knows, Lirinensis's dictum, "only within its own kind, that is to say, within the same dogma, the *same meaning*, the same teaching", signifies not only similarity, proportion, correspondence, but also true *implicitness*, true *real identity* of meaning.

Therefore, if the dictum of the Lirinensis and the Vatican Council is applicable to the whole body of Catholic doctrine, which comprises the first three levels, it follows that our objector acknowledges that there is an *identity of meaning* in those three levels of Catholic doctrine. We claim nothing more in this book. That alone suffices to establish the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

It is true that our objector says nothing explicitly about the *theological truth* (fourth level), but everybody knows — and our objector certainly will not deny it — that the fourth level is of the same nature as the third, since there is no truly theological conclusion that cannot be an object of infallibility.<sup>123</sup>

<sup>123</sup>Hurter exhibits in the following quotation the same misunderstanding that afflicts our objector: "Hence the revealed truths are not *like stones*, but *like seeds*, and

351. IN A NUTSHELL. — The two principles on which this whole section is based are the following: first, any *theological error*, no less than any infallibly condemned error, necessarily has to be really *opposed to the revealed deposit*, and not only to the natural reason. Second, there can be no true opposition between two statements unless there is *implicit* a true *contradiction* between them. We know of no theologian or philosopher who has denied or doubted either of these principles, and, what to us is more important, they are both taken from St. Thomas.

No man — unless he is misled by a false understanding of the stock "Christ is man, therefore risible" — who serenely meditates on the range of these two principles, will fail to achieve clear evidence, not only of the fact that there exists a real identity or objective homogeneity between all the four levels of Catholic doctrine, but also of the fact that the *virtual implicit* is the constitutive reason of the theological truth or theological conclusion. The latter fact is the basis of the former. Its implicitness in the revealed deposit confers on theology its character of real identity or objective homogeneity to the faith. Its *virtuality* — i.e., the *distinction of concepts* within the same reality, and consequently the need for *true reasoning* — gives theology its character of conclusion and its formal distinction from faith.

Thus, the essence of theological truth consists in the *implicit virtuality of the revealed deposit*. Its *implicitness* in the sacred deposit is admirably condensed in the laconic phrase of the "Prince of Thomists", the great Capreolus, to wit: "ALL SUCH [theological matters] ARE CONTAINED IMPLICITLY IN THE BIBLE." This pithy formula deserves to be graven in the mind of every Thomist and inscribed on the first page of every theological textbook.<sup>124</sup> Its *virtuality* has been described by St. Thomas's foremost

the higher they are, the *more fecund and productive of conclusions*. Thence, too, the human intellect does not behave in a merely *passive way* in the perception of these truths, but is *like a more or less fertile field* with regard to the cultivation and development of the seeds that are received therein, especially if there be added industriousness and the light and warmth of the supernatural sun, that is, the grace of illumination by the Holy Spirit. Vincent of Lérins most admirably treats of *these things* [we ask the reader to notice the phrase of *these things*] in ch. 23 of the *Commonitorium*, where among other things he says thus: Are we, then, to say that no progress of religion will ever be had in the Church of Christ? Yes, let there clearly be the greatest progress, etc." (*Theologiae Dogmaticae Compendium*, t.1, n.223, ed.3a., Gempointe 1880) Very beautifully spoken! But if the quotation from Vincent of Lérins is applicable to such *conclusions*, then such conclusions or *developed seeds* are definable as dogmas, since Vincent of Lérins is speaking not of theological but of *dogmatic* progress.

<sup>124</sup>In the fourth place, Scotus argues: The knowledge that one has of the things that are delivered in the Canon of the Bible is not given in the manner of demonstrative science. Consequently, one who has the habit of these things thus delivered in the *literal sense*, does not have the habit of *science in the proper sense*, but a habit whereby, concerning the *things delivered in the Holy Scripture*, he does not assent to one thing

commentator, Cajetan, in this no less succinct formula: "*Theological science is contained virtually in the principles of faith.*"<sup>125</sup> Both these two characteristics, virtuality and implicitness, are found together in this passage from St. Thomas: "When many things are *virtually* contained in another, they are said to be *implicitly* in it, as conclusions in the principles."<sup>126</sup> Or better still in this other passage: "There are two ways of explicating the articles of faith. The one is with regard to the substance of the articles themselves, insofar as one knows the articles distinctly. The other is with respect to *those things that are contained implicitly in the articles*, and this takes place when one knows *the things that follow from the articles.*"<sup>127</sup>

Every theologian should take notice of the perfect parallel between these two phrases which St. Thomas takes as identical, viz.: (a) "those things that are *contained implicitly* in the articles"; (b) "the things that *follow from* the articles." These are, according to St. Thomas, the two essential characteristics of the theological truth, the theological conclusion, sacred theology. The virtual implicitness is the root of the homogeneity of the Catholic doctrine throughout all its four levels of development. That same *implicitness* plus the *divine authority* which the Church possesses in order to *explicate* it, provide us with the two keys to the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

because of another, but assents *immediately* to each and every one of them all. What is more, if certain things are proven therein, he would thus assent to any of the sayings in account of which he assents *immediately* to everything contained in Holy Scripture, and not to one because of another by way of syllogistic discourse.

"To the fourth objection we say that although the Bible does not proceed in the manner of demonstrative science, nonetheless, from the things contained in the Bible, which are like the *principles* of science, the Fathers have demonstratively inferred *conclusions*, with which theology deals, by arguing against heretics from the principles of theology. Hence, although in the sacred Canon theology is not delivered explicitly in syllogistic style, nonetheless, in the books of subsequent theologians it is explicitly delivered in a scientific manner and scholarly method, **HOWEVER, ALL SUCH THINGS ARE IMPLICITLY CONTAINED IN THE BIBLE.**" (CAPREOLUS, *Prod. In I Sent.*, q. 1, a. 2, ed. Pabon-Pégués, pp. 17) Beautiful! And thoroughly Thomist, Scotus's objection to St. Thomas is equivalent to the following: If the meaning of the theological conclusion is a meaning truly *implicit* in the Bible ("in the literal sense"), then it is not a conclusion in the proper sense ("science in the proper sense"), therefore, if it is a conclusion in the proper sense, then it cannot be implicit in the Bible. To which Capreolus replies: To be a conclusion in the proper sense, and to be, notwithstanding, truly implicit are not inconsistent in the case of theology. In theology, every truly theological conclusion is truly implicit in the principles of the Bible, and yet it is truly and properly a theological conclusion. This is the true teaching of St. Thomas. It is likewise our teaching.

<sup>125</sup> *In. 2-2*, q. 4, a. 3.

<sup>126</sup> *QQ. DD. De Veritate*, q. 14; *De Fide*, a. 11.

<sup>127</sup> *In. 3 Sent.*, d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, sol. 3.

## Chapter VII

### THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA AND THE TRADITIONAL OPINION

352. THE VOICE OF TRADITION. — Anyone who is acquainted with theology only by what modern textbooks say, or seem to say, will be persuaded that the revealed virtuality's definability as of faith, which is the basis of dogmatic evolution, is the private opinion of a few theologians, and that the contrary opinion is the common, or more general, view.

Having established with intrinsic arguments in previous chapters of this book the possibility and the factual existence of dogmatic evolution, we will undertake in this final chapter the burden of making it plain that such was the traditional opinion unanimously held until Molina, and also the more common opinion since Molina up to the present.

We had at first intended to begin this historical study with the great masters of the 13th century, since this problem did not begin to be thoroughly threshed out until then. However, even if this question had not been treated ex professo during the Patristic period, we have thought it convenient to begin by adducing some passages from the Fathers of the Church in order to make it plain that the doctrine concerning the evolution of dogma taught by later theologians is already found in germ in the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers of the first centuries.

Beginning with the 13th century there is a great wealth of testimonies in favour of the evolution of dogma. We will classify them by chronological order. For the sake of brevity, we will try to limit ourselves to one or two brief passages from each theologian, with the exception of St. Thomas and Melchior Cano, who deserve each a separate section.

Finally, since there are some who have utilized history as a weapon against the evolution of dogma, it will be convenient to reply to their observations. Thus this chapter will be divided into seven sections:

1. The traditional opinion up to St. Thomas.
2. The opinion of St. Thomas.
3. From St. Thomas to Molina.
4. From Molina to the present.
5. The mind of Melchor Cano.
6. Reply to historical objections.
7. Examination of a very recent Introduction to the History of Dogmas.

### Section I

#### THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH FATHERS ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

353. THE PRIMITIVE CHURCH. — The first centuries of Christianity were centuries of struggle. The Church preferably had to concentrate her energies in defending her teaching both against those who attacked it from the outside, as the heathens and the Jews, and those who corrupted it from the inside, as the heretics.

Hence the writings of the Fathers of the Church are mostly devoted to the task of vindicating the divine origin of dogma against the former, and its immutability against the latter.

However, there have been Church Fathers who, on the one hand, tenaciously defended against heretics the substantial immutability of dogma, which is the first element of all homogeneous evolution; and, on the other hand, also pointed out its unfolding by way of inference, which is the second element required by homogeneous evolution.

Among these Church Fathers or ecclesiastical writers we find St. Irenaeus, Origen, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Jerome, Vincent of Lérins, and St. Anselm. We will briefly quote from them.

354. ST. IRENAEUS. — "The Church's preaching everywhere constant and equally persevering, having its witness from the Prophets, and the Apostles, and all the disciples . . . and the wonted way of behaving in accordance with the salvation of men, which is *in our faith*: which we keep as perceived by the Church and which by God's Spirit, like an excellent deposit in a good vessel, *ever grows young and rejuvenates the very vessel in which it exists.*"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Contra Haereses*, lib. 3, c. 24, n. 1; MIGNE, PL 7, 966.

It is plain that, according to St. Irenaeus, the revealed deposit possesses two characteristics. First, it develops or rejuvenates the vessel in which it is deposited, which is the minds of the faithful or of the whole Church: "deposit . . . *rejuvenates* the very vessel in which it exists." Second, it not only rejuvenates the minds of the faithful, but the deposit itself rejuvenates itself: "*deposit . . . ever grows young.*" The *subjective-objective* character of dogmatic evolution can hardly be expressed more plainly and more beautifully in such concise terms.

In this passage the Saint very clearly points out at the same time the two factors that intervene in this evolution or rejuvenation: the instrumental factor, viz. the Church, and the principal factor, which is the action of the Holy Spirit: "*by the Church . . . by God's Spirit.*"

355. ORIGEN. — In his brilliant treatise *De Principiis*, outlining what the rule of faith for the Christian is, Origen clearly draws a distinction between two kinds of teachings or truths. One comprises those truths that are plain in the preaching of the Apostles or of the Church: "of such that are manifestly delivered by the Apostolic preaching", "*defined* in the preaching of the Church". The other comprises those truths that are not plain or manifest; that is to say, any and every thing that "is *not* set apart by a *sufficiently manifest* preaching", which "the preaching of the Church has not laid open to view with *sufficient clarity*." The Christian, says Origen who tries to know his faith in a perfect and scientific manner, as commanded by the Prophet Hosea, must ground himself on the first kind of truths and gather from them the *consequences* that are contained in them, since principles and consequences form *but one body* of doctrine. But let us hear from Origen himself:

"It is therefore necessary that these truths [i.e., those of the first kind, those that are plain or defined in the preaching of either the Apostles or the Church] be utilized, as elements and foundations, in accordance with the command that says: *Enkindle for yourselves the light of knowledge* (Hosea 10:12), by anyone who wishes to *accomplish a certain chain and body of all these things*, so that from manifest and necessary assertions one may probe for what is true concerning each of such things soever, and build up, as we have said, *one body* out of such instances and affirmations, *either those which one comes upon in the Holy Scriptures or those which one discovers by an investigation of the consequence itself and the tenor of right.*"<sup>2</sup>

It is thus plain that the idea that, in the case of revealed or Christian doctrine, principles and consequences form *only one body*, begins to be outlined from the earliest times. That is the substance of dogmatic evolution.

<sup>2</sup> *De Principiis*, 1, proem., 10; MIGNE, PL 11, 121

356. ST. BASIL. — Leaving aside an interesting passage from Tertullian,<sup>3</sup> which was written when he had already lapsed into heresy and was by him applied in a heretical sense, we pass on to St. Basil:

"Just as the *growing* seed from something tiny turns into something big, yet remains *the same* in itself, does not change in species but is perfected through increments; so, too, I believe that the *same* doctrine has *grown* through progress, but that it has never been the case that the doctrine that now exists has replaced that which had existed from the beginning."<sup>4</sup>

St. Basil speaks here of the homogeneous increase of dogma in his own soul, from the time he learned it as a child up to the time when he developed it as a bishop; nevertheless, there can hardly be another more appropriate description of the growth of dogma in all the faithful or in the whole Church.

357. ST. GREGORY NAZIANZEN. — Next to St. Basil's we quote the testimony of his illustrious fellow student St. Gregory Nazianzen, who is antonomastically known as *the Theologian*. The Macedonian heretics denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit on the basis that nowhere in the Sacred Scripture is the Holy Spirit called God. The holy Doctor replies that one must believe not only what is expressed in the Holy Scripture, but also what is gathered from it. This is what he says:

"Since such a great difference exists in things and in words, what is it that makes you such a slave to the *letter* and a follower of Jewish wisdom as to *pursue syllables* while *disregarding things*? If from your saying twice five, or twice seven, I should gather ten or fourteen; or from your saying an animal that is endowed with reason and is mortal I should conclude that it is a man, would I seem to you to be talking nonsense? But how could this be since I *am saying what you are saying*? For words are not more ascribable to him who speaks than to him who is the *cause of the necessity of speaking* thus. Consequently, just as in this case I should not pay more heed to what is said than to what is *understood*, so too, if there be something that is *not said* at

<sup>3</sup> "There is *nothing* without a *time*, and everything bides its time. Finally, Ecclesiastes says, 'There is a time to everything.' (Eccles. 3:17) Observe how created things are gradually led to bear fruit. First it is a *grain*, and from the grain *shoots* sprout, and from the shoots a *writhing* grows; then *branches* and *leaves* multiply and the whole tree expands; next comes the *swelling of the bud*, the bud blossoms into a *flower*, and the flower discloses a *fruit*; the latter is for some time shapeless and rough, advancing by *degrees* in age; it ripens into a mellow *flavour*. So, also, holiness (for the God of holiness and the God of creatures are one) in its first *rough beginnings* was nature fearing God; thence by the *Law* and the Prophets it passed into *childhood*; thence by the Gospel it surged into *youth*; now by the Paraclete it settles into maturity." (TERTULLIAN, *De Virginitate*, c.1; MIGNE, PL 2, 938)

<sup>4</sup> *Epistola 223 adversus Eustathium*, MIGNE, PG 32, 827-828.

*all, or certainly not said clearly enough*, but which I find is *understood and gathered* from the Scriptures, should I be so fearful of your *sycophantic servility* to words as to turn away from the enuniated meaning itself?"<sup>5</sup>

Granados, Molina's staunch defender, clearly perceived that this passage speaks of conclusions in the proper sense, and evaded its thrust by saying that St. Gregory here takes divine faith in a broad or improper sense (233). Other later theologians, clearly saw that St. Gregory speaks of divine faith in the proper sense of the term since he is talking about the divinity of the Holy Spirit, but they, too, attempt to evade his thrust by saying that the holy Doctor speaks only of conclusions improperly so called. There is never any want of resources to evade an isolated passage, no matter how clear it is, when it goes against the grain of preconceived opinions.

358. ST. JEROME. — Christ himself gave us the parable of the mustard seed, and established a comparison between its growth and the growth of the Kingdom of Heaven which is the preaching of the Gospel. In the preaching of the Gospel the fundamental thing is the doctrine or dogma ("Going, therefore, teach . . ."). Hence the Doctor Maximus of scriptural exegesis did not hesitate to admit doctrinal or dogmatic growth, and even went on to compare it with the growth of the Gospel's mustard seed in these terms:

"Now, this preaching of the Gospel, which seemed small in the beginning, when sown either in the soul of the believer or in the whole world, does not grow into a shrub, but *becomes a tree* such that the birds of the sky (by which we ought to understand either the souls of the believers, or the powers subject to God's service) come and make their home in its *branches*. By the *branches of the Gospel tree* which grew from the mustard seed, I understand the *different dogmas* in which each of the abovementioned birds rests."<sup>6</sup>

Obviously, the comparison between dogmatic growth and the growth of the mustard seed is only an analogy, which should be understood subject to the limitations we have indicated elsewhere. But it sufficiently shows that the idea of dogmatic development was no less familiar to the Fathers of the Church than the idea of the substantial immutability of dogma.

359. VINCENT OF LÉRINS. — We will not repeat here the passages already quoted from this famous ecclesiastical writer. His formulae concerning the evolution of dogma have become classics. One of them has earned the unique privilege of being literally adopted by the Vatican Council.

When we spoke of the images of the evolution of dogma, we saw how Lérins compared it with the true, but homogeneous, vital development of a seed, and of the human body as well (222-223). When we dealt with the

<sup>5</sup> *Oratio 31*, Theol. 5, n.24; MIGNE, PG 36, 159.

<sup>6</sup> *Comment. in Matthaeum*, lib. 2, c.13; Mt. v. 32; MIGNE, PL 26, 93.

problem of whether the Church perfects revelation, we also quoted texts in which Léris admits that some dogmas were contained in the primitive deposit only in an inchoate and unformed manner ("inchoate and unformed"), and thus need to be cultivated so that they may flower, mature, grow, and become perfect: "let it be cultivated, let it flower, mature, grow, and come to perfection." (187)

No one has given us, as Léris, the key to explain those passages in which some Fathers of the Church at times assert the immutability of dogma with such rigidity as to seem to leave no room for its evolution.

In effect, no matter how many texts from the Fathers are compiled to prove that dogma is completely immutable, not one will be found that expresses the immutability of dogma in such seemingly absolute and rigid terms as that memorable phrase of Léris: "*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*". And yet, the same hand that wrote those words, also wrote in the same book the words *inchoate and unformed*, and *let it mature, grow, and come to perfection*.

As a matter of fact, immutability and development are not two opposed things, but two harmonious aspects and two complementary facets of the same thing, that is, of homogeneous evolution. Given immutability alone, that is, with no development, there would be no evolution, but no life either. Given development, but without substantial immutability, there would not be homogeneous evolution, but corruption or transformation. The union of both these characteristics makes for the true life of dogma. This is why both are present together in the Catholic Church, and both are found wanting in the heretical, and even in the schismatic sects.

This explains why two Catholic apologists, as eminent as Bossuet and Newman, could have employed in defense of the Catholic Church arguments that seem contradictory. Bossuet said to Protestantism: "You change; therefore, the truth is not in you." To Anglicanism Newman said: "You admit no evolution; therefore, you have no life." Truth to say, far from contradicting each other, these two aspects represent the two properties that characterize the truth when it is deposited in human minds and hearts to give life both to the individual and the society.

It explains why all those sects that have separated themselves from the vital principle, which is the divine magisterium of the Catholic Church, are wanting in either one or the other of these two essential properties of life. Either they lack the characteristic of substantial immutability because they have abandoned dogmas that are truly primitive, or they lack the characteristic of vital progress because they have restricted their belief to the dogmas defined up to such a century or such a council and have rejected any development that such dogmas have had or might have had in subsequent times or councils.

These two fundamental properties of every living being find their parallels in two properties or states in every dead organism or corpse: either the unchangeable or rigid state of the mummy, or the dissolving state of corruption. The first is the state of immutability without progress; the second, the state of progress without immutability. The former is the state of the heretical or schismatic sects of the East; the latter is the state of the Protestant sects of the West.

Hence, the formula of true dogmatic life, which Léris gave us and the Vatican Council made its own, includes neither immutability alone nor progress alone, but includes substantial immutability together with vital or homogeneous progress: "Let it, then, *grow* . . . but *in the same sense*."<sup>7</sup>

360. ST. ANSELM. — We have seen that St. Gregory Nazianzen employed the way of conclusion or consequence to prove the divinity of the Holy Spirit, and at the same time pointed out that this process led to the knowledge of a dogmatic truth or truth of divine faith, even if it is not expressly contained in the Scriptures.

St. Anselm employs the same procedure to prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and teaches the same doctrine concerning the value of the way of reasoning or conclusion in the following terms:

"We have seen how truthfully and necessarily it follows that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. But if it were not true, then either some of the premises from which we said that it followed is false, which is against the faith which we hold in common with the Greeks; or we have concluded *inconsequently*, which cannot be shown. And if this is not true, the *Christian faith is destroyed* . . . Now, if to deny the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son induces such a great falsity as to destroy, against the Christian belief, the premises from which we have shown that it follows . . . let any rational heart consider for what reason it should be excluded from the Christian faith. Lastly, if it be erroneous to believe this procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, then divine authority itself leads us into error, since it teaches the truths from which it follows and the truths that follow it, and nowhere does it deny it or give any indication that it opposes it. Thus, if it be objected that no such thing must be said since *divine authority* never says it, let it also be said that it must not be denied since divine authority never denies it nor says anything opposed to it. We also say that divine authority *sufficiently affirms it when it asserts those truths whereby it is established and say nothing at all whereby it is denied*."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> LIRINENSIS, *Commentorium*, n.18, and VATICAN COUNCIL, *De Fide Catholica*, c.4; Denz.-Schön. 3020.

<sup>8</sup> *De Processione Spiritus Sancti contra Graecos*, c.26; MIGNE, PL 158, 321.



The reader here has a reply to the objection commonly raised by those who deny dogmatic evolution by way of conclusion. They argue that when God affirms the formally revealed or the principles, he does not thereby affirm the virtual or the consequences; and since nothing can be of divine faith or a dogmatic truth except what is affirmed by God, no conclusion in the proper sense of the term can become a dogmatic truth. St. Anselm provides us with a clear reply: "*Divine authority sufficiently affirms it when it asserts those truths whereby it is established.*" Since such an affirmation is implicit and requires explication, nothing else is needed for it to become a dogma but that the explication be made by divine authority, that is, by the Church's definition, and not merely by the theologian's human reasoning.

We now leave the patristic era and pass on to the age of scholastic theology. The foregoing passages are not too many; nonetheless, we believe that they are sufficient to enable the reader to realize that even in the patristic era the idea of dogmatic development by way of theological conclusions had already surfaced quite clearly. This idea subsequently gained both precision and completion in the works of the vast majority of the great theologians from St. Thomas up to the present.

## Section II

### ST. THOMAS'S DOCTRINE ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA

361. THE THOMIST SYNTHESIS. — St. Thomas's teaching has been cited in almost every page of this book, and we shall be citing it again further on (134, 238-243, 296, 302, 304, 466-468). To avoid useless repetitions, we will limit ourselves here to a brief synthesis of the Angelic Doctor's doctrine.

St. Thomas and the great masters of Scholasticism deal with the evolution of dogma in connection with two problems: (a) the problem of the *unity of the faith*; (b) the problem of the *constitutive element of heresy*. As a matter of fact, these two problems are simply the two aspects or opposite facets of one and the same problem, since heresy is nothing but the denial or the breaking of the unity of the faith as schism is the breaking of the unity of government.

The first of these two problems or difficulties concerning the unity of the faith had already presented itself to the consideration of the Fathers of the Church, notably St. Augustine and Pope St. Leo the Great, on account of the obvious fact that the doctrine of the faith had developed and grown throughout the Old Testament up to Christ and the Apostles. When the great schoolmen of the Middle Ages examined this problem they broadened it to include also another obvious fact, *viz.*, the continuing development and growth of the doctrine of faith after the Apostles. The problem centers on elucidating how it is possible to preserve the unity of something which, as the

doctrine of faith, grows and develops successively, so that the early faithful believe other parts or developments which were unknown to the former. St. Thomas and all the other great schoolmen dealt with this problem under such questions as: "Whether the faith of the moderns is the same as the faith of the ancients". "Whether the faith has progressed in the course of time". "Whether the articles of faith have grown with the passage of time", and others similar to these.<sup>9</sup>

St. Thomas's solution to this first problem, whatever the phase or guise under which it is proposed, is always formulated in the same terms, *viz.*, that there was a growth of *explication* of the implicit, but no growth of the *substance*. The argument he offers is always the same, *viz.*, that all subsequent developments were already *implicitly contained* in the former teachings, and since the difference between the implicit and the explicit is not sufficient to destroy the objective or substantial unity of the faith, it follows that the divine faith of the angels in heaven, of our First Parents in Paradise, of the Patriarchs and Prophets in the Old Testament, of the Apostles and ours in the New Testament, is objectively and substantially *one and the same*, notwithstanding the great doctrinal developments that occurred later, because all such developments are simply transitions from the implicit to the explicit, and hence the ancients implicitly believed exactly the same things that we explicitly believe. Says St. Thomas: "The act of the believer does not terminate in the *enunciabile* but in the *things*: for we do not form enunciabiles except for the purpose of obtaining by their means a knowledge of the things: as in *knowledge* so also in *faith*."<sup>10</sup>

"And thus it must be said that the object of faith can be considered in two ways: either *in itself*, as it exists *outside the soul*, and it is thus that it properly has the *reason of object* and that the habit derives from it *multiplicity or unity*; or insofar as it is participated *in the knower*. Consequently, it must be said that if the object of faith, that is, the *thing* believed, is taken as it exists *outside the soul*, then it is *one thing* which is delivered to us and to the ancients: and thus from the unity of the *thing* faith acquires *unity*. But if it is taken insofar as it exists *in our reception* of it, then it is multiplied by *different enunciabiles*: but the *faith is not diversified by this diversity*. Hence, it is plain that on all accounts the faith is *one*."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.2; *Summa Theologica* 2-2, q.1, a.7; *De Veritate*, q.14, a.12. See also the parallel places.

<sup>10</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.* 2-2, q.1, a.2 ad 2.

<sup>11</sup>ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q.19, a.12 "Whether the faith of present day believers is one with the faith of the ancients."

"Thus, consequently, it must be said that *with respect to the substance of the articles of faith there has been no increase of them with the passage of time, because whatever things are believed by the faithful who came later, were contained in the faith of the early Fathers, albeit implicitly*. But the number of articles *has increased with respect to explication*, because some things are *explicitly* known by those who came later, which those who preceded did not know explicitly."<sup>12</sup>

362. DIFFERENT DEVELOPMENTS. — However, there is an accidental difference between the developments that take place after the Apostles and those that took place before them, though both of them are an explication of the implicit. This is because there are two different kinds of implicitness. There is an implicitness that is objective and true, but so profound that relative to our minds it is as if it were non-existent, since its explication and development cannot be effected by our minds alone, but requires a *new revelation*. Such is the implicitness wherewith certain *articles* are contained in other *articles*, and all of them in the two universal articles of faith. Such truths are truly implicit if considered *in themselves*, but not if considered with respect to us. Thus, there was an explication or development of *new articles* in all the time that new revelations were possible; but it ended with Christ and the Apostles, with whom the deposit of revelation was closed: "This explication was completed by Christ." Such was the character of dogmatic evolution prior to the Apostles. (313)

363. There is another kind of objective and true implicitness. For its explication and development no new revelations are needed, but the reasoning of our minds suffices. Such truths are implicitly contained not only insofar as they are considered *in themselves*, but also insofar as they are considered *with respect to us*. They are not dogmas-articles but dogmas-sequences or derived dogmas. This is the kind of explication or dogmatic evolution that is possible, that has taken place, and will continue to take place after the Apostles: "And *with regard to this* the faith can be explicated *day by day* . . . and has been more and more explicated through the efforts of the Fathers."

364. THE TRUE MIND OF ST. THOMAS. — Such is the clear, plain, express mind of the holy Doctor, if many do not see it that way it is because they have had it drilled into their heads by modern textbooks that in those articles St. Thomas was not dealing with the evolution of dogma after the Apostles, but only with its evolution in the Old Testament. To convince them of the contrary we will quote only one passage. Having demonstrated that the

<sup>12</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, 2-2, q.1, a.7 "Whether the articles of faith increased with the passing of time."

evolution in the Old Testament is homogeneous and that the faith is *one and the same*, since its evolution is simply the unfolding of the implicit, the holy Doctor raises the following objection against himself:

"Fifth objection. Further, this would seem to show that even *now* the articles could be multiplied, for the same reason, with the passage of time: which appears to be false."

The reader will please take note of that "now", which means *now, after the Apostles*. Here is the reply:

"To the fifth it must be said that a thing which is contained *in an article* can be *explicated* in two ways: *one way*, insofar as *one article* is contained *in another*, or two in one common to both, as the resurrection of the dead is somehow contained in Christ's resurrection, and the Passion and the Incarnation in the common one which is the mystery of the Redemption [this is the implicitness of the articles considered *in themselves*, but not *with respect to us*]; and it is in this manner that *implicit* faith is explicated in *determinate* articles, and *this* explication was *completed* by Christ: hence, with respect to the *essentials of the faith* [the articles] it is not lawful to add or to subtract from his teaching."

Hereto we have the dogmatic explication or evolution of some articles into other articles by means of new revelations. Comes now the explication or evolution after the Apostles, by means of consequences:

"In the *other way*, that which is *contained in an article* is not an article, but something *concomitant* to the article, and *in this regard* the faith can be explicated *day by day*, and has been *more and more explicated* through the efforts of the Fathers [of the councils]."<sup>13</sup>

In the reply to the fourth objection the holy Doctor had already told us what he meant by *concomitant to the article*:

"To the fourth it should be said that the article is an *indivisible* truth with respect to what is actually explicated in the article, but *divisible* [explicable or evolvable] with respect to the things that are *potentially* contained in the article, insofar as he who *says* one thing somehow *says many things*: and *these* are the things that *precede the article or are consequent to it*: and *in this regard* the article of faith can be explicated and divided."<sup>13a</sup> "For faith, of itself, sufficiently inclines to *all the things* that *accompany, or precede, or follow* the faith."<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> ST. THOMAS, 3 *Sent.*, d.25, q.11, a.2, ad 5.

<sup>13a</sup> *Loc. cit.*, ad 4.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, d.24, q.1, a.2.

Consequently, our faith is *the same* as that of the primitive Church because everything we believe either was explicitly believed by her or is the *implicit consequence* of what she explicitly believed. Such is the solution given by St. Thomas to the first problem concerning the *unity of the faith*.

365. THE SECOND PROBLEM concerning the *constitutive element of heresy* is given the same solution. St. Thomas deals with this problem when he deals with the vices opposed to faith, but he had examined it particularly in the treatise on the Trinity, when dealing with the *divine notions*.<sup>15</sup> This problem was raised by what had happened to Gilbertus Porretanus, a theologian who had maintained certain personal opinions on the divine notions, and had been compelled by the Church to retract himself under pain of *heresy*. Now then, how is *heresy* — and, therefore, *dogma* — possible in matters, such as the question of the divine notions, that are not expressly contained in either the Holy Scripture or Tradition, and concerning which the Fathers of the Church have entertained different opinions?

To this question St. Thomas and all the great schoolmen give the following reply: heresy is nothing but the *corruption* of the faith. Thus, anything that corrupts the faith can become a heresy; and its opposite, can become a *dogma*. Since the faith can be corrupted not only by the denial of what is formally revealed, but also by the denial of the absolutely necessary consequences of what is formally revealed, it follows that the Church can condemn as heresy, or define as dogma, anything that is truly *consequential*. Here are some passages from St. Thomas:

"I answer that it should be said that a thing can pertain to the *faith* in two ways. One, directly, as those things that have been principally delivered to us by God . . . But *indirectly* all those things pertain to the *faith* from the *denial of which there follows something contrary to the faith*."<sup>16</sup>

"I answer that it should be said that we now speak of *heresy* insofar as it introduces the *corruption of the Christian faith* . . . To which a thing belongs in two ways: first, *directly* and principally, as the articles of faith; second, *indirectly* and secondarily, as *those things from which there follows the corruption of an article*; and *heresy*, as well as *faith*, can take place with respect to both."<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.32, q.1, a.5; *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.1; *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.4, and 2.2, q.11, a.2.

<sup>16</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.32, a.4.

<sup>17</sup> *Op.cit.*, 2.2, q.11, a.2.

"The same judgment applies to the latter [the *indirectly* revealed] as well as to the former [the *directly* revealed] since the one is *followed* by the other."<sup>18</sup>

"For certain things are contained in the *faith* of the Church as *conclusions* in the principles."<sup>19</sup>

"And on this account many things are now considered heretical that were not previously thus considered, because it is now more evident *what follows from them*."<sup>20</sup>

"Thus, a man is made a *heretic* through the pertinaciousness wherewith he disdains to submit himself to the Church's judgement *in the things that pertain to the faith* DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY."<sup>21</sup>

Hence, for St. Thomas these two things are equal in dogmatic value: a) the directly or formally revealed; b) the indirectly or virtually revealed, *if the Church defines it*. That is, clearly, our teaching on dogmatic evolution by way of implicit virtuality defined by the Church. (466-469)

### Section III THE TEACHING OF THEOLOGIANS ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA FROM ST. THOMAS TO MOLINA

366. IN THE THREE LONG CENTURIES from St. Thomas to the end of the 16th century, there has been not one theologian who has denied the evolution of dogma by way of rigorous and proper theological conclusion. At least, we have not come upon one notwithstanding the fact that during these last twelve years we have eagerly read all the theologians of that period that we could lay our hands on.

It would be an endless task to quote passages from all the theologians who maintain such a view. In order to avoid prolixity, we will limit ourselves to quoting those theologians who can provide us with a passage that is brief but sufficiently revelatory of its author's mind. For the sake of order we will proceed by centuries.

#### A. 13th Century

367. ST. BONAVENTURE. — "Whether it be lawful to have a contrary opinion about the notions? I answer that it should be said that one can have

<sup>18</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5.

<sup>19</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.1, ad 6.

<sup>20</sup> ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theol.*, p.1, q.33, a.1.

<sup>21</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 1 ad Cor.*, c.11, lect.4.

a contrary opinion either about things that concern the *doctrine of the Christian religion*, or about things that concern the *doctrine of human investigation*.

"It is lawful to hold a contrary opinion about the things that concern the *doctrine of human investigation*, since these *have no bearing on salvation*.

"But a *distinction must be drawn* relative to asserting the contrary in things that concern the *doctrine of religion*. For some things pertain to the *necessity of the faith*, others to the *necessity of the Scriptures*, and others are *annexed to these two*, as those things that contribute to the *explication of the faith* and the *exposition of the Scriptures*.

"With respect to the things that pertain to the *necessity of the faith*, to hold a contrary opinion is simply speaking (simpliciter) a sin, that is, in the one who opines falsely. And if it be a simple opinion, it is a sin of error; but if it be an assertion and defense, it is to be considered not only an *error*, but a *heresy*.

"Now, with respect to the things that pertain to the *necessity of the Scriptures*, those who are ignorant of the Scriptures may, without sinning, opine the contrary, as, for instance, if a simple man believes that Jacob was the father of Isaac, and another does not, but believes the converse. Now, the former, notwithstanding that he imagines or opines something false, does not sin because he is ignorant of the Scriptures. But this is not lawful in the case of one who knows the Scriptures, on the contrary, he sins, if he should hold it as a simple opinion. And if he should defend it, he is to be considered a *heretic* because he contradicts the Holy Scripture."

Now comes the important thing, that is, the passage concerning theological conclusions. The Saint goes on to say:

"But with regard to those things that are *annexed to the faith or to the Scriptures*, either one opinion is *consequent to the faith or to the Scriptures* whereas the *opposite* is consequent to the other opinion, and in such a case it should be said that, *before a thorough examination* of the matter, it is allowable to opine the contrary, but not *after its thorough examination*; on the contrary, *it is a sin* [that is, a sin of *heresy*], *as in the case of matters that are determined by faith or by the Scriptures*. As for instance the opinion of Porretanus about the properties . . . Hence after he had been shown its inconsistency, the Church would have judged him a *heretic* if he had not retracted his error. But he did retract it in the Council of Rheims, as St. Bernard says."<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> ST. BONAVENTURE, *In 1 Sent.*, d.27, q.6.

368. Although we did say that we would quote only a brief passage from each theologian . . . and we will do so with respect to almost all the theologians that follow . . . we found it hard to resist quoting almost in its entirety the foregoing article from St. Bonaventure in order to make it plain that by the *indirectly* revealed or the consequential the Saint meant not only the secondary items of the Holy Scriptures, as many think, but also everything that is truly consequential, and that such a consequential truth is of divine faith, and its denial a heresy, once it is defined by the Church: *after a thorough examination in the council*. This becomes even plainer in the following passages from the same holy Doctor.

"In order to understand the foregoing, it should be noted that the *doctrine of faith* has some things as antecedent, others as consequent, and others as principles or objects. As, for instance, in the case of the other sciences, we find that there are some common principles which are presupposed, as the dignities; whereas some are intrinsic principles of *demonstrations*; but some things are as *consequents*, as the *corollary conclusions*. So, too, in the *doctrine of faith* the antecedents are those things which are dictated by the natural law. Now, the principles are those things to which the illumination of faith *directly* leads, and these are called the articles. But the *consequents* are *those things that can be gathered from the articles and have it in them to follow in the wake of such articles*."<sup>23</sup>

He speaks no less plainly in the same place in reply to an objection, in these terms:

"To the objection raised that there are many things which are *to be believed*, and which are not contained in the articles, it should be said that this is true of the antecedents, as that God exists. And also of the *consequents*, as the many things that Holy Scripture and *theological teaching draw out from the articles themselves*, as that Christ had the fullness of grace *from the moment of his conception*, and *others similar to these*."<sup>24</sup> We believe that nothing could be clearer for anyone conversant with the language of the ancient theologians.

369. A LUMINOUS COMMENTARY. — Finally, it will not be redundant to adduce in confirmation the commentary appended by the learned editors of the great modern edition of the works of St. Bonaventure. Commenting on the article in which St. Bonaventure deals with the question: "Whether the faith has grown with respect to the multitude of things to be believed", they say as follows:

<sup>23</sup> ST. BONAVENTURE, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.1, a.1.

<sup>24</sup> *Loc. cit.*

"In this question and those that follow, St. Bonaventure insinuates a *twofold way* in which something is contained in an article, viz., either that in which *other articles*, which are subsequently to be believed determinately, are virtually contained in one article, as the Passion and the Death of Christ in the mystery of the Redemption; or that in which, not indeed another article is contained in one article, but something is contained in it as a *conclusion*. Cf. St. Thomas this same place, q.2, a.2, *questioncula* 1, ad 5. Thus, the substance of faith remaining the same the number of *articles* to be believed also grew by explication: but this explication, that is, as understood in the first way, was completed in the Gospel. But taken in the *other sense* [that is, as that which is contained in the article as a *conclusion*], the explication of the faith can grow both in individual men and in the whole Church. This is taught by the Vatican Council: <sup>25</sup> *Let it, then, grow*, etc. Cf. also this same place, q.2, 3, and *dub.* 1.<sup>26</sup>

370. COROLLARY. — Consequently, those who say that the doctrine of dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion began with Scotus either have read neither St. Thomas nor St. Bonaventure, or have glanced through them in a hurry. But it seems to us more probable that they have read them having in mind the notion that the term conclusion stands for the *non implicit* conclusion (the type 4 virtual, or Suárez's *merely virtual*), and since St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure clearly take the term in the sense of implicit conclusions — and thus describe such conclusions as growth of *explication*, — some modern theologians take it that they were not speaking of proper but of improper conclusions, whereas, as a matter of fact, only the implicit conclusions are properly theological conclusions.

371. AEGIDIUS ROMANUS. — The great Augustinian theologian and disciple of the Angelic Doctor, Aegidius Romanus, expresses himself in exactly the same vein as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, as follows:

"Whether it is allowable to opine the contrary about the notions? . . . Objection 2: Further, from an error about the notions *there follows* an error about the divine persons; but an error against the divine persons is not without sin. Consequently, since it is necessary that one of two contrary positions be false, to opine the contrary about the notions cannot be without sin.

"To the second, it should be said that one can err about divine things, provided that he does not contradict the articles of faith or the truths that have been determined by the Church, even granting that from what he says a *conclusion* can be drawn contrary to the articles of faith or to the truths held

<sup>25</sup> *De Fide et Ratione*, c.4.

<sup>26</sup> *Ed. Operum Sti. Bonaventurae* (Quaracchi 1887); *In 3 Sent.*, d.3, a.1, q.2.

by Church, but on condition that he himself be ignorant of *such a deduction*. However, if the deduction is made to him, and he is shown that what he says contradicts what the Church holds, then, if he does not relinquish his position, he sins by thus erring, and were he *pertinaciously* to assert his error, he would be a *heretic*.<sup>27</sup>

372. DUNS SCOTUS. — Let us come now to the great theologian, St. Thomas's worthy rival, who shares with St. Bonaventure the leadership of the illustrious Franciscan school. On this subject we find in him exactly the same doctrine we have just seen in St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Aegidius Romanus.

"Whether it is allowable to opine the contrary about the notions? I answer that it should be said that it is allowable to opine in different ways about the notions, but this must be done soberly in such a manner that one should be ready to relinquish one's opinion if the Church should declare otherwise.

"To make this plain, it should be borne in mind that *certain things* pertain to the *substance of the faith* in so absolute a manner (ita simpliciter) that everyone, including the simple faithful, provided that they have the use of reason, is bound to believe them explicitly . . .

"Certain *other things* likewise pertain to the *substance of the faith*, but are to be believed explicitly only by the elders in the Church . . .

"Finally, there are *other things* that regard *the faith* in such a manner that neither the simple faithful nor the elders in the Church are bound to believe them explicitly; and of such kind are *many conclusions necessarily included in the articles held by faith*, for no one is bound to believe them explicitly before they are declared and proposed by the Church as an object of faith . . .

"Now, the question about the number of the notions belongs and has regard to the order of *conclusions virtually included in the articles of faith*, and therefore, anyone may licitly hold a contrary opinion thereof; this is plain from the fact that even among the principal Doctors of the Church there have been various opinions about the notions without any mark or suspicion of error."<sup>28</sup>

"Nothing is to be asserted as pertaining to the truth of faith, except what is delivered in the Scriptures, or avowed by the universal Church, or

<sup>27</sup> AEGIDIUS ROMANUS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.33, q.6.

<sup>28</sup> VEN. IOAN. DUNS SCOTI, *Summa Theologica per Joannem Montefortinum*, p. 1, q. 32, a.4.

necessarity and evidently follows from either of these two thus delivered or avowed.<sup>29,29</sup>

"To the other [objection] taken from Cyprian I say that *some things* are of the substance of the faith, which everyone, including the simple faithful, are bound explicitly to believe . . . *Other things* are explicitly required as of the substance of the faith, to be observed by the elders of the Church . . . There are *other things* that are not necessarily to be believed explicitly either by the latter or by the former, because their truth has not yet been declared and determined by the Church; of this kind are many *conclusions necessarily included* in the articles held by faith, but before they are declared and explicated by the Church it is not necessary for anyone to believe them, but it is necessary to opine about them with sobriety, that is to say, in such a manner that one should be ready to hold them as soon as the truth is declared."<sup>29,30</sup>

"Nothing is to be maintained as of the substance of the faith, except what can be expressly had from the Scriptures, or is expressly declared by the Church, or *evidently follows* from something plainly contained in the Scriptures or plainly determined by the Church."<sup>29,31</sup>

We could quote various other theologians of the 13th century, but we believe that the four already quoted — the founders of the three great schools of theology: the Dominican, the Franciscan, and the Augustinian — are sufficient to show that the doctrine of dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusion was already an accepted and common teaching among the masters of scholastic theology in the 13th century.

#### B. 14th and 15th Centuries

373. TWO CENTURIES TOGETHER. — We group these two centuries together because there are not many theologians of true merit to be found in them, especially in the 14th century. Ockham's nominalism on the one hand, and on the other the regrettable and prolonged schism of the West produced a decline in theological studies or plunged them into useless dialectical subtleties. We will quote eight theologians, among whom we find some men of great renown and indisputable worth such as Gerson, Dionisius Carthusianus, Cardinal Torquemada, and especially Capreolus. Without exception, all the theologians of these two centuries that we have been able to peruse, teach, as their 13th century colleagues, the evolution of dogma by way of theological con-

<sup>29</sup>IOANNIS DUNS SCOTI, *Opera Omnia*; In 1 *Sent.*, d.26, n.26; ed. Vivès, t.10, p.316.

<sup>30</sup>IOANNIS DUNS SCOTI, In 4 *Sent.*, d.5, q.1, n.6 ad 5; ed. cit., t.16 pp. 404-405.

<sup>31</sup>*Ibid.*, d.11, q.3, n.5.

clusion in the proper sense. Some of them, however, being more or less tainted by nominalism, do not distinguish sufficiently between the habits of theology and faith, and consequently between the theological conclusion before and after its definition by the Church. Although Ockham precedes Aureolus by some years, we will begin by the latter because he deals with the problem ex professo and at greater length.

374. PETER AUREOLUS. — "Whenever we proceed from one proposition of faith and another necessary proposition, or from two propositions that are both of faith, in order to find out what is to be held with regard to something that is doubtful in the faith, no other habit is acquired but *faith*. Now, that habit truly is faith, the opposite of which is *heresy*. But the opposite of the conclusion deduced from an article and a necessary proposition is *heretical*, as, e.g., to say that in Christ there are not two wills, which indeed follows from the article that says that 'in Christ there are two wills', viz., the divine and the human, and from this necessary proposition, 'Every intellectual nature has its own will'. Therefore such a *conclusion* is also held by *faith*, and such a deduction does not generate another habit distinct from faith.

"Besides, the *implicit* and *explicit* do not diversify the habit of faith; otherwise, the faith of the Fathers of the Old and of the New Testament would not be the same. Still more, to believe a *bigger* or a *lesser* number of things does not diversify the faith; otherwise, the priest who is bound to believe explicitly more would not have the same faith as the old woman who is bound to less. But the *conclusion* deduced in the aforesaid manner is merely *explicated* from a previous article in which it was *implicit*; and further, the man who has the deduction of this conclusion does not on such account believe more things than another. Therefore, this does not preclude the fact that such a conclusion is known by faith."<sup>32</sup>

375. WILLIAM OCKHAM. — "Only such truths are to be considered Catholic truths and such that their belief is necessary for salvation, that are *explicitly* or *implicitly* asserted in the canon of the Bible, in such a manner that if some truths are not contained in the Bible under their own proper terms, they can be inferred from the sole contents of the Bible by a *necessary and formal consequence*."<sup>33</sup>

376. COMMENTARY TO THESE TWO PASSAGES. — It is plain that these two theologians of the 14th century — both nominalists, as various others of the 15th century whom we will meet later — are so far from deny-

<sup>32</sup>Sic. Clearly, what is meant is not "wills" but *natures*. — Transl.

<sup>33</sup>PETRUS AUREOLUS, In 1 *Sent.*, prol., p.11 (Romae 1596).

<sup>34</sup>*Dialogus inter Magistrum et Discipulum*, p. 1, lib. 2, c. 1 (Lugduni 1494)

ing the evolution of dogma by way of conclusion, that they defend it to excess. They see that the theological conclusion is truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit, which suffices for their *definability* as of faith or for the possibility of dogmatic evolution and this leads them to think that the mere explication of such implicitness by human reasoning makes it a dogmatic truth or truth of faith. They overlook the fact that the explication by reason is a human explication, and thus belongs to a human or theological habit, so long as the divine explication made through the Church's definition does not intervene.

377. JOHN GERSON. — "The first degree of truths to be believed is the canon of the whole Holy Scripture and of every single thing literally asserted in it. The second degree is the truths determined by the Church. . . . The third degree is the truths specially revealed by the Church. . . . without the least hesitation be believed by those to whom their revelation was made. . . . The fourth degree contains each and all the truths that are concluded from the preceding truths by a certain consequence through the light of faith [from two revealed premises] or through evident natural light [from one revealed premise and another of reason], even if they are not contained therein under their own proper terms. For instance, this truth is to be believed as necessary for salvation, viz., that Christ had sinews and veins, even if it is not contained in the Holy Scripture under these proper terms. And thus of countless other similar propositions. For this is an evident consequence, not just in the light of faith, but in the light of reason among philosophers: 'Christ is true man; therefore, Christ had sinews and veins.'"<sup>34</sup>

378. JOHN CAPREOLUS. — Called "the Prince of Thomists", because chronologically he was the first of the great commentators of St. Thomas in print, it was impossible for him not to defend both the characteristic *implicitness* of every truly theological conclusion in the revealed deposit, which is the foundation of dogmatic evolution, and the specific distinction between the habits of faith and theology, without which one can only end in the confusion between reason and faith, and between the human value of reasoning and the divine value of the Church's dogmatic definitions.

Taking his stand precisely on the implicitness of such conclusions, Scotus had denied, or had not distinguished sufficiently between the habit of theology and the habit of faith. Capreolus replies in the following terms:

"To the fourth we say that although the Bible does not proceed in the manner of a demonstrative science, nonetheless, from the things contained in the Bible, which are as the *principles of science*, the Fathers have demonstra-

tively inferred conclusions with which theology is concerned, by arguing against the heretics from the principles of theology. And thus, even if in the sacred canon theology is not delivered in explicitly syllogistic style, nonetheless, in the books of subsequent theologians it is delivered explicitly in a scientific and scholarly manner. However, all such things are IMPLICITLY contained in the Bible."<sup>35</sup>

Elsewhere (351) we have observed that every theologian ought to engrave in his mind this truly memorable phrase of the Prince of Thomists: "However, all such things [that is, every truly theological conclusion] are implicitly contained in the Bible." Since every truly theological conclusion is truly implicit in the revealed deposit or premise of faith, its definition by the Church is merely the explication of the faith, as St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus repeatedly observe.

379. CARDINAL TORQUEMADA. — After the Prince of Thomists comes the renowned Cardinal Torquemada who was the founder or the first organizer of the modern treatise *On the Church* [Ecclesiology]. Let us quote at least two passages:

"Catholic truth is that which is had immediately or mediately by the supernatural light of divine revelation, either explicitly under its own proper terms, or implicitly through a good and necessary consequence. . . . For these are the two ways in which something is said to be contained in the Holy Scripture: either under its own proper terms, as 'Christ was a man'; or else something is therein implicitly, viz., that which follows by a good and necessary consequence from the things formally placed in the Holy Scripture. For instance, from the proposition 'Christ was a man' [a perfect man] it follows that he had a rational soul, an agent and a possible intellect and all the powers of the soul. Likewise, that in his body they were sinews and veins and such other things. And yet none of these things is found under such proper terms in the Holy Scripture."<sup>36</sup>

The reader will please observe that both Torquemada and Capreolus not only employ the term *implicit* but also categorically explain what is meant by implicit when it is used in connection with being contained in the revealed deposit. "Implicitly, namely, that which follows by a good and necessary consequence from the things formally placed in the Holy Scripture." It is exactly the same formula employed later by Cardinal Cajetan and Báñez. (383, 396).

380. DIONISIUS CARTHUSIANUS. — The celebrated Ecstatic Doctor, Dionisius Carthusianus, well deserves to be cited together with

<sup>35</sup> IOANNES CAPREOLUS, *In 1 Sent.*, prol. q.1, a.2, solutiones ad argumenta contra quintam conclusionem; ed. Fabian-Péguet, t.1, p.17.

<sup>36</sup> *Summa de Ecclesiis*, p.2, lib.4, c.8.

<sup>34</sup> *Opera Ioannis Gersonii*, p.1, tit.14 "Quae veritates sint credendae de necessitate salutis." [What truths are necessarily to be believed for salvation]. (Basilense 1517)

plicate and make plain what is implicit: for that which is true and valid for the exposition of Holy Scripture is implicitly and virtually contained in it."<sup>39</sup>

381. GABRIEL BIÉL. — Let us close the 14th and 15th centuries, so deficient in great theologians, with the nominalist Gabriel Biel, who died in 1495. "Implicit faith", he writes, "is habitual faith or the actual assent to a general proposition that includes in itself many particular propositions. A universal or general proposition is said to include all those particular propositions that can be inferred from it, immediately or mediately through an assumed truth."<sup>40</sup>

It is thus plain that all the theologians of the 14th and 15th centuries persist in considering — with St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, and Scotus — all conclusions in the proper sense as *definable* as of divine faith, and hence, as capable of dogmatic evolution. The only difference is that the theologians of Scotist or nominalist affiliation confuse, or do not draw a sufficient distinction between the habit of theology and the habit of faith, or between the conclusions prior to the Church's definition, and the conclusions after the definition, considering such conclusions as pertaining to faith of themselves (*per se*) or without any definition.

#### C. 16th Century

382. LET US NOW COME TO THE 16th CENTURY, the golden century of the restoration of Catholic theology. In this century the great geniuses of the 13th century find at last worthy commentators and continuators of their achievements.

Among the theologians of this period that we have examined there are thirteen who deal with the question of the evolution of dogma or the definability of the revealed virtuality. They include such glorious names as Cardinal Cajetan, Melchor Cano, Domingo Soto, Ambrose Catarinus, Bartolomé de Medina, Domingo Báñez and Paolo Crisaldi, of the Dominican school; Alfonso de Castro, Andrés de Vega and Antonio de Córdoba of the Franciscan school; Luis de León, of the Augustinian school; Cardinal Toledo, of the recently founded Society of Jesus, and bishops Santiago Simancas and Bartolomé de Torres, of the secular clergy. Together they worthily represent all the schools or trends of Catholic theology in the 16th century. Let us begin with the Prince of the commentators of St. Thomas.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>39</sup> *In 1 Sent.*, prol.; ed. cit., t.18, pg.52

<sup>40</sup> *Collectorium in 4 Libros Sententiarum*, lib.3, d.24, dub.3.

<sup>41</sup> "Cajetan, who I dare say is the most outstanding of our family in acumen and erudition." (CANO, *De Locis*, 12, 5)

"Indeed, so great is Cajetan's authority in explaining the doctrine of Aquinas, so great his dexterity and keenness of mind that the Supreme Pontiff Leo XIII did not

Cardinal Torquemada. Although very well known on account of his scriptural and ascetic works, he is not so well known, or at least not quoted as much as he deserves, for his works on dogmatic theology. His commentaries on the four books of the *Sentences*, and his *Summa Fidei Orthodoxæ* which he subtitled "Medulla Operum D. Thomæ" (The Marrow of the Works of St. Thomas) are most noteworthy on account of the clarity and faithfulness with which he expresses the pure doctrine of St. Thomas. Let us quote some passages on the matter with which we are now dealing:

"Whether it is allowable to opine otherwise about the notions in God? A thing belongs to the faith in two ways, viz., directly, as the articles of faith . . . Secondly, a thing belongs to the faith indirectly, that is to say, those things from which there follows something contrary to the faith . . . Now with respect to such [the indirect] it is allowable to opine otherwise with no danger of heresy before it is determined that there follows from it something against the faith: for, if after such determination, particularly that which is made by the Church, one opines otherwise, heresy is incurred. Hence, many things are now considered heretical, which were not heretical before, because of a new determination of the Church, or because now it is more plain what does follow from them."<sup>37</sup>

In book 3, article 4, of the same work he deals with "How the faith is said to have grown with the passage of time", and solves the issue by resuming St. Thomas in almost his own words. What deserves to be pointed out is the use of the term *virtually* as synonymous to *implicitly*, which goes to show that when the ancients spoke of virtuality they always meant implicit virtuality. As for instance, in the following text: "Thus, some articles of faith are *virtually* contained in others: for in the belief of the Redemption of men are *implicitly* included the Incarnation, the Passion, the Resurrection, and others such."<sup>38</sup>

Let us conclude with another similar text: "Objection: it seems unlawful to add anything to the Scriptures of either Testament . . . To these St. Thomas replies: to add to the Scriptures happens in two ways: first, by adding something that is contrary or diverse, and this is erroneous or presumptuous. Secondly, by explicating more clearly that which is contained in the Scriptures implicitly, and this is praiseworthy. Hence, Richard: Nothing is to be added that is dissimilar or inconsistent, but that which is true can be added for its explanation. And perhaps this is not properly to add, but to ex-

<sup>37</sup> DYONISII CARTHUSIANI *Summa Fidei Orthodoxæ*, lib. 1, a.43. *Opera Omnia* (Monstrolii 1899) t.17, p.48.

<sup>38</sup> *Op. cit.*, pg. 339.



383. **CARDINAL CAJETAN.** — Every theologian knows that Cardinal Cajetan wrote an opusculum on the Immaculate Conception addressed to Pope Leo X, when the Pope was endeavouring to examine in the ecumenical Council of Lateran the definability of the Immaculate Conception as a truth of faith.

In this little work Cajetan had the opportunity to investigate ex professo what things are, and what things are not, definable as of divine faith. He devotes chapter I to this problem, with this title: "On Iwo Ways of Discerning What Things are of the Faith, or What Things are Opposed to it." Cajetan writes:

"There are two ways whereby *what is to be believed* may be determined for the Christian religion. One is the ordinary; the other, the extraordinary way. The ordinary way is divine revelation delivered in the first place to the authors of the Holy Scripture, contained in the canonical books of the Bible, the traditions of the Apostles, in the Symbol and in other things which it is clear that the Church has received through the Apostles, as the sacraments . . . [Here comes the important part] And it *makes no difference whether a thing has been revealed explicitly*, in the Holy Scripture and other sources, (as the creation of the world, the Incarnation of the Word of God, and others similar to these), or *implicitly*, as *all those things the opposite of which cannot be maintained together with the truth of the Holy Scripture and of other things which we hold by faith*, except that talent, effort, reason and understanding are required in order to make it plain that these things *that are said to be IMPLICITLY contained* are **NECESSARILY CONNECTED** with those things in which they are said to be contained."<sup>42</sup>

We would ask every reader, and especially every Thomist reader, to read and reread dispassionately the foregoing passage from Cajetan. It will be obvious that it clearly teaches that which constitutes the basis and the backbone of dogmatic evolution, to wit, that every and any thing truly *implicit* in the revealed deposit can be defined as a dogma of faith, and that everything that is necessarily connected with the revealed deposit is truly implicit in it. *Implicitly, as all those things the opposite of which cannot be maintained together with the truth of the Holy Scripture and of the other things which*

hesitate to proclaim him the most illustrious interpreter of St. Thomas, through whose lucubrations the teaching of so great a man flows as through copious streams." (Lit. Apost. Year 1880) "Prior to Leo XIII, Cajetan's teaching and admirable acumen were extolled by Cardinal Pallavicini (*Vind. Soc. Jesu*, c.26), himself a man outstanding in every sort of erudition, who wrote as follows: Cajetan, the Lyceum's first glory in the past century and, so to speak, the only one among all who amplified with most accomplished commentaries that divine *Summa* of human wisdom." (MICHAEL DE MARIA, S.J., prol. in ed. opusculi *De Ente et Essentia*, pg. 4; Romae 1907).

<sup>42</sup>CAJETAN, *De Conceptione Virginis*, c.1 (Venetis 1594), fol. 71 over.

*we hold by faith . . . ; those things are said to be implicitly contained that are necessarily connected with the things in which they are said to be contained.* No clearer definition can be given of implicit containment.

384. **THE HUMAN LABOUR OF THE CHURCH.** — The reader will also find in this passage a clear exposition of what constitutes the human labour of the Church previous to the definition. Intellectual labour is required, one that is exacting and that at times spans whole centuries. *Talent, effort, reason, and understanding are required.* For what? There are many who are satisfied with this reply: to find out if the truth proposed for definition is *implicit* or not in the revealed deposit. That is true, and Cardinal Cajetan admits it. But these theologians overlook the fact that the medium employed by the Church in order to find out if a truth is *implicit* in the deposit is to see if it is *necessarily connected* with it: "Talent, effort, reason, and understanding are required *in order to make it plain* that these things that are said to be implicitly contained *are necessarily connected* with those things in which they are said to be contained." Such is the purpose of the labour of the Church. This labour is accomplished in the council or has been previously accomplished by the Fathers whose texts are adduced by the Council. It suffices to make the definition of faith possible. The instrument employed is the *connexio*, but the thing found and defined is the *implicit containment* or inclusion. Hence, *absolutely necessary connexion* with the revealed, *implicitness* in the revealed, and *definability* as of divine faith, all amount to the same thing. This is the Thomist doctrine that Cajetan inherited from his predecessors, and which is found in almost all Thomists who succeeded him until the Salmanticenses got themselves entangled in the confusion spawned by Suárez and Lugo and passed on this same confusion to some later Thomists.

385. **ALFONSO DE CASTRO.** — After the Dominican Cajetan, let us hear the Franciscan Castro. The following is taken from his famous work *Adversus Hæreses*:

"Thus the proposition that contradicts the Holy Scripture, understood in the sense accepted by the Catholic Church, is to be considered *heretical* beyond all dispute. *Nor should any account be taken* of whether it contradicts openly or *hiddenly*; for howsoever the contradiction takes place, it deserves to be marked as heretical. For there are some hereses the contraries or contradictories of which are *expressed* in the Holy Scripture . . . There are also other hereses the contraries or contradictories of which, although not expressed in the Holy Writings in such a manner as to be found there under such tenor of words, nonetheless, are *inferred from them by the plainest consequence*, and such assertions are in *hidden* opposition to the Holy Scripture because the Holy Scripture is opposed to the things that are *necessarily derived* from them. And such propositions are also to be considered heretical, just as the former: for those things that are *inferred by a necessary*

consequence from what is contained in the Holy Scripture, have as much certainty of truth and necessity of faith as the things from which they are inferred. . . . This opinion is taught by Gregory Nazianzen, 5th book of theology, in these terms: 'The things that are gathered from the Holy Scriptures are to be considered as if they were written therein.' Thus Gregory. In accordance with this rule, the holy Doctors assert and most firmly proclaim many things as necessary objects of belief, because they are gathered from what the Holy Scriptures say, although they are not found in them."<sup>43</sup>

This text not only clearly defends the evolution of dogma by way of a truly theological conclusion, but also interprets in this sense the passage from Gregory Nazianzen we have already quoted (357).

386. DOMINGO SOTO. — Leaving Melchor Cano aside for the moment, since we will be speaking of him in a separate section (449), we come to his confere in religion and fellow professor at Salamanca, the renowned Domingo Soto.

It is well known that Domingo Soto not only defended the view that the properly theological conclusion is definable as of faith, but went so far as to regard it as being of itself (per se), that is to say, independently of the Church's definition, an object of faith. If the evident conclusions pertained *per se* to the faith, then theology was left with only the probable or doubtful conclusions. This view of Domingo Soto was impugned by Melchor Cano, Báñez, and all the Thomists.<sup>44</sup>

However, Soto corrected or explained himself in his classic work *De Natura et Gratia* where, while admitting that theological conclusions or

<sup>43</sup> *De Punitone Haereticorum*, lib.1, c.4; *Opera Omnia* (Parisii 1578) pg. 27.

<sup>44</sup> "Theological assent is gathered from the articles of faith, and furthermore not through an evident consequence; for those that are deduced by such a consequence, the same are assents of faith. . . . [Theological assent] cannot be said to be faith, since faith is an assent had immediately on authority alone, or which is thence evidently deduced, as e.g., Christ is man and, therefore, risible." (DOMINICUS SOTO. *In Dialecticam Aristotelis Commentarii*, p.1, q.2, ad 7; Salmanticae 1574, pg.91) "To the third argument the very learned Master Friar Domingo de Soto (lib.1 *Poster*, q.2) says that when a conclusion is deduced from principles of faith by an evident consequence, then the conclusion itself is likewise certain according to faith. . . . However, this opinion is false. . . . Similarly, what he says is false, to wit, 'likewise it is of faith that Christ is man and that Christ is risible.' For if there be anyone who confesses that Christ is a perfect man, but denies that he is risible because he thinks that risibility does not belong to the perfection of man, such a one would be a bad philosopher but not yet a heretic, since up to now the Church has not defined that Christ is risible. But if it were defined by the Church that risibility belongs to the perfection of human nature, then he who denies it would be a heretic." (BÁÑEZ, *In I partem D. Thomae*, q.1, a.2, ad 3um argumentum; Salmanticae 1585, pg.53) Melchor Cano, too, refutes Soto but without naming him, since both were teaching together at Salamanca. Cano's rebuttal will be quoted further on when we come to deal with Cano's mind (455).

deductions are definable as of faith, he observes that they are of faith only when they are defined by the Church's authority. He writes:

"The third is that which we have already worked out previously in proper places. For a habit does not generate assent except about its own proper object (this is a most celebrated axiom among all philosophers as well as theologians); now the object or intention of faith is nothing else but God and those things pertaining to our hope that are revealed in the Holy Scripture, or therefrom by the authority of the Church deduced and expressed. Therefore, only of such is the assent of faith."<sup>45</sup>

Thus, if Domingo Soto sinned by excess anywhere in this matter, it was certainly not by curtailing dogmatic evolution but by broadening its scope excessively, an excess which he subsequently corrected, explaining himself in the same manner as all Thomists.

387. AMBROSE CATARINUS. — Along with Domingo Soto let us quote the famous Ambrose Catarinus, his irreconcilable and choleric opponent on several questions. Famous, we say, not only for being original and peculiar in many questions, but also because, being a Dominican, he seemed to take pleasure in assailing preferably the opinions of his religious confreres. Nonetheless, in the matter of the definability of conclusions as of divine faith he follows the traditional doctrine.

"I, therefore, conclude that just as he is a heretic, not only who denies what is expressed in the Scriptures, but also who denies that which is contained in what is expressed and is therefrom deduced by a necessary and evident consequence; so, too, he is a prevaricator of divine law, not only who transgresses what is therein expressly enjoined, but also who neglects what is therefrom evidently deduced."<sup>46</sup>

388. ANDRES DE VEGA. — It was not necessary to quote this Franciscan theologian since all textbooks cite his name along with Vázquez as a defender of the view that conclusions in the proper sense of the term are definable as of faith. However, we believe that it will please the reader to see for himself the rarely quoted passage in which he defends his opinions as follows:

"There are many propositions of faith that cannot be shown to be of faith by any other means except the fact that they evidently follow from what is held by faith, at least when coupled with some other proposition that

<sup>45</sup> DOMINICUS SOTO, *De Natura et Gratia*, lib. 3, c.11, (Venetiae 1547) pg.210.

<sup>46</sup> *Tractatus questionis quo iure episcoporum residentia debeat*, an opusculum by Catarinus published in the opus entitled *De Summi Pontificis Auctoritate, gravissimum Auctorum Opuscula* (Venetis 1562) vol.1, pg.15 over.

is evident according to the natural light. And this can be plainly shown in the case of many propositions about God and Christ, which are for this reason accepted by all the faithful as certain, and their opposites as heretical, as in the case of the following propositions: God is incorporeal, God is immaterial, God is a being of infinite power; Christ has a heart; Christ has phlegm, Christ is in both species of the Sacrament of the Eucharist with his body and with his soul and everything that is contained in them, Christ is under both species of bread and wine without the substance of the bread and the wine; and such others as are similar. For these propositions are not expressed in the Holy Scriptures, but are evidently deduced from those contained therein, at least when coupled with a proposition that is evident according to the natural light."<sup>47</sup>

The reader will have noticed in this passage from Vega the same defect we have already pointed out in almost every theologian of Scotist or nominalist affiliation. They are all for dogmatic evolution, but excessively so, for they all regard it as dogmatic or of divine faith without drawing any distinction between before and after the Church's definition.

389. ANTONIO DE CÓRDOBA. — Together with Andrés de Vega we will quote his fellow religious Antonio de Córdoba who defends the evolution of dogma by way of conclusion with no less lucidity and with the same defect.

"A proposition of Catholic faith or a Catholic truth is a proposition or truth that is revealed immediately or mediately. What is called here an immediately or a mediately revealed truth is called by others a truth that is revealed in itself, or in its antecedent . . . Now a truth revealed mediately, or in its antecedent, is one that is inferred from the aforesaid Catholic truths, that are revealed in themselves or immediately, by a good, certain and necessary consequence, in the light of faith [from two revealed premises] or in the natural light [coupled with a premise of reason], although such a truth is not contained in the Holy Scriptures under its own proper form, as, e.g., that Christ had sinews, and blood, and other humours, bones and veins, and the like. And to this kind belong almost all the determinations and definitions of the Councils and of the Supreme Pontiffs, in matters, that is, of faith and morals, which are deduced from the Holy Scriptures in the aforesaid manner, and are proposed to all as truths of necessary belief."<sup>48</sup>

This learned Franciscan does not stop short of qualifying as mediately revealed almost all the definitions of the Councils. St. Thomas did not say

<sup>47</sup> Tridentini Decreti de Iustificazione Expositio et Defensio (Compluti 1564).

<sup>48</sup> Opere Antonii Cordubensis, Ord. Minorum, lib. I, q. 15, (Venetis 1569) pgs. 146-149.

almost all, but contented himself with saying many: "And on this account many things are now considered heretical, that were not so considered before, because it is now more manifest what does follow from them."<sup>49</sup>

390. BARTOLOMÉ DE TORRES. — Keeping to the chronological sequence, let us now quote a commentator of St. Thomas from the ranks of the secular clergy, first-rank professor (catedrático primario) of the University of Sigüenza in Spain, and bishop of the Canaries. Commenting on the hitherto frequently cited article of St. Thomas, "Whether it is Allowable to Hold a Contrary Opinion about the Notions", he says:

"Now, then, St. Thomas, after permitting a division of the credibles, establishes two conclusions. The division, clearly, is as follows: The credibles are of two kinds: there are some that belong directly, and some that belong indirectly to the faith. Now, they belong directly to the faith that are principally delivered to us by God . . . And they attain indirectly to the faith that are not chiefly proposed to us for belief, however from their opposites there follows something contrary to the faith. Having permitted this division, St. Thomas's first conclusion is: To assert pertinaciously something false which is contrary to that which directly pertains to the faith, is heretical. The second conclusion: To assert, but not pertinaciously, something false which is inconsistent with that which indirectly pertains to the faith, is not a heresy . . .

"Let the fourth assertion be: Pertinaciousness consists in this, that a man having both knowledge and prudence deliberately dissents from a proposition of faith, or assents to its opposite, understanding that it is contained in the Holy Scripture, or in the definition of the Church, or that it is evidently deduced from them, even if he should dissent for only the briefest of moments. St. Thomas openly holds this view here."<sup>50</sup>

391. SANTIAGO SIMANCAS. — Let us turn to the testimony of another bishop from the secular clergy, who wrote his book *De Catholicis Institutionibus* at the behest of Pope Gregory XIII, to whom it is dedicated.

"At the most we are bound to believe not only the divine Scriptures, the traditions of the Church, the legitimate councils, the Constitutions of the Supreme Pontiffs, the decrees of the Fathers, the accepted teachings of the holy doctors, but also those truths that are deduced from these by a certain consequence in the light of faith, or by evident natural reason: provided that such truths are inferred in such a manner as to persuade everyone, especially the learned; for such truths exist in the former, and are therein comprised and

<sup>49</sup> *Summa Theol.*, p. 1, q. 32, a. 4.

<sup>50</sup> *Commentaria in decem et septem questiones primae partis Sti. Thomae de Ineffabili Trinitatis mysterio*, q. 32, a. 4 (Compluti 1567).

contained wherefrom they are by such a consequence deduced. And this is the true, accepted and Catholic teaching."<sup>51</sup>

The reader will observe that by conclusions Simancas means the *inclusive* conclusions. "For such truths exist in the former, and are therein comprised and contained wherefrom such consequences are drawn." The definability as of faith comes from such inclusion or containment; the connexion is only the medium employed by the Church to see it.

392. PAOLO GRISALDI. — The Dominican Grisaldi expresses himself no less plainly: "To put the whole matter in a nutshell: a proposition of faith is to believe and hold all the things taught by the Holy Bible, Apostolic Tradition, the Roman See, the general councils, the concordant exposition of the Holy Scriptures by all the Fathers, and the things that are deduced from these by a necessary consequence . . . To the Catholic doctrine belongs not only what has been expressly revealed to the Apostles, but also that which is gathered by an evident syllogism and deduction from a revealed proposition and one of natural evidence."<sup>52</sup>

393. BARTOLOMÉ DE MEDINA. — The famous theologian Bartolomé de Medina was Grisaldi's contemporary and fellow Dominican, one of the immortal first-rank professors of the University of Salamanca, and a classical commentator of St. Thomas's *Prima Secundae*.<sup>53</sup>

"The second question is whether we can certainly and infallibly know that we have divine and supernatural faith. For the negative side the argument runs thus: Infallible certainty only renders us certain with respect to the divine revelations proposed by the Church . . . Reply: the virtue of faith is [i.e., attains] not only that which is immediately revealed, but also that which is deduced by an evident consequence from the divine revelations. Now, this truth, viz., that the believer has true faith is deduced from revealed truths by an evident consequence in this manner: It is of faith that no one can assent to all the things that the Church proposes unless he has true and divine faith.

<sup>51</sup>JACOBI SIMANCAS, Paensis episcopi, *De Catholicis Institutionibus liber*, tit. 28 de *Fide Catholica*, n.16 (Romae 1575) pg. 198.

<sup>52</sup>*Decisiones Fidei Catholicae* . . . (Venetiis 1582) Introd. and pg. 316, n. 13.

<sup>53</sup>Bartolomé, surnamed de Medina, from his birthplace in the region of León, Salamanca, and won the primary chair in a competition († 1581). He is regarded as one of the chief cultivators of scholastic and moral theology . . . He worked on his predecessors' traditional exposition, so to speak, of the *Summa* of St. Thomas, diligently begun by the very renowned Francisco de Vitoria with the writings of the students of the college, and thus with a clear and elegant style produced excellent commentaries on the First of the Second, and the Third Part." (HURTER, *Nomenclator*, 3, n. 68, pg.144)

But I experience that I do assent to all the things that the Church proposes. Therefore, I have true faith."<sup>54</sup>

394. LUIS DE LEÓN. — The famous Augustinian, Luis de León, well deserves a place beside Medina, his fellow professor at Salamanca. Eminent in literature, no less eminent in scriptural knowledge, and equally eminent in speculative sacred theology as in Scripture and belles-lettres, his not being quoted as often as he deserves can be accounted for only by the fact that in almost three hundred years there has not been a good edition of his theological works. Let us quote what he has to say with respect to the issue at hand:

"We can speak in two ways about things and propositions of faith: first, absolutely as they are in themselves; secondly, with respect to us. If we speak in the first way, those things alone are of faith that have been revealed by God, either immediately, because they have been explicitly delivered by him; or mediately, because they are plainly gathered from what he has himself delivered. But if we speak in the second way, then those things are of faith that are both revealed by God and we are assured for some reason that they are revealed by God. But there are four reasons that can give us such assurance in this regard: first, the Holy Scripture; second, the tradition of the Apostles; third, the definitions of the councils and pontiffs; fourth, the evidence of reason leading by inference from one to another . . . But someone might take exception to what we have said in the last place, viz. that those propositions pertain to the faith that are gathered by evident consequence from propositions of faith, as 'Christ is risible'; for this seems to be false . . . To this exception, let our first conclusion be: such propositions as are evidently gathered from propositions of faith are to be considered also as of faith. This is plain because they are revealed by God, at least mediately. Likewise, in the third Council of Constantinople; they were judged to be heretics who denied that there was a human will in Christ, because the proposition 'Christ has a human will' follows from this one, 'Christ is a [perfect] man'."<sup>55</sup>

The reader will please observe once more that the reason given by theologians for saying that the conclusions are definable as of faith, is not precisely because there is a connexion with what is revealed, but because, there being a truly theological connexion, there is an implicit containment, and hence true revelation, although mediate with respect to us. "This is plain because they are REVEALED by God, at least mediately."

<sup>54</sup>*Expositio in Primam-Secundae Angelici Doctoris*, q.112, a.5, (Venetiis 1580) pg.627.

<sup>55</sup>MAGISTRI LUYSHII LEGIONENSIS Opera, *De Fide*, q. 9, (Salmaniticae 1893) t.5, pgs. 407-409.

395. **CARDINAL TOLEDO.** — Next comes Cardinal Toledo, the first cardinal from the Society of Jesus, a theologian of equal piety and eminence. Commenting on the second article of the eleventh question of the *Secunda-Secundae*, he writes:

"Conclusion: Heresy is a pertinaciously asserted error concerning the things that are of faith directly or indirectly, for instance, concerning the articles of faith, or concerning the truths inferred from them . . . You will say: what proposition is that which is called a Catholic proposition? I say, an assertion or proposition is called Catholic in two ways: first, immediately, as that which is had at once from the rule of faith. Now, as we have said earlier, the rule to discern the faith is manifold, viz., the Holy Scripture, the general councils, the Pontiff as Pontiff, the Apostolic Tradition, the Universal Church. These assertions, then, that are had from any of these rules are called Catholic in the first sense. Secondly, an assertion is called Catholic mediately, viz., that which is derived by an excellent and clear consequence from the prior propositions. Hence, he who contradicts either of them falls into heresy."<sup>56</sup>

396. **DOMINGO BÁÑEZ.** — We conclude this examination of the theologians of the 16th century,<sup>57</sup> with the illustrious name of one of the most penetrating and exact commentators of St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica*, one who, in our opinion, surpasses them all, with the exception, of course of Cardinal Cajetan.

Báñez's teaching on the evolution of dogma can be resumed in these four propositions: (1) the theological conclusion, in the proper sense of the term, is not of faith prior to its definition by the Church. (2) However, it is of divine faith, if the Church defines it. (3) The Church can define, and has in fact defined, rigorous and proper theological conclusions. (4) Such definitions do not constitute a new faith, but they do constitute a new or a greater explication, although not greater than that which the Apostles had. These

<sup>56</sup>In *Summam Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis Enarratio*, 2-2, q. 11, a. 2, (Romae 1869) pgs. 119-120.

<sup>57</sup>We might add the Dominican Javelli, of the 16th century, who writes as follows: "On those words of St. Thomas that it was necessary for salvation that certain things should be disclosed to man through divine revelation, as the articles of faith; other things virtually, i.e., corollarily or deductively. For if God revealed that He is one and true, the production of persons by immanent actions and their distinction by relations alone is said to be revealed ex consequenti. Thus St. Thomas's demonstration is understood in both ways. . . . Hence it follows necessarily that all [faithful, including the] uneducated are theologians virtually: for they are obligated to believe not only the principles of faith but also everything necessarily deduced from them. I mean, to believe not expressly, but implicitly." (CHRYSTOSTOMI JAVELLI, O.P., *Expositio in primum tractatum Primae Partis Angelici Doctoris* (Antuerpiae 1612), q. 1, a. 1.

four propositions, that sum up, as it were, St. Thomas's teaching on dogmatic evolution, can be established with abundant passages from Báñez. We will select only four texts that are both brief and clear.

(a) "To the third argument the very learned Master de Soto<sup>58</sup> says that when a conclusion is deduced by an evident consequence from a principle of faith, then the conclusion itself is certain by faith . . . However, this opinion is false . . . likewise, it is false what he says that it is similarly of faith that Christ is a man as that Christ is visible. For if one should confess that Christ is a perfect man, but deny that he is risible, because he thinks that risibility does not pertain to the perfection of man, he would be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic, because up to now it has not yet been defined by the Church that Christ is risible . . . Therefore, to the argument we reply that the conclusions that are deduced by a good consequence from the principles of faith, or from a principle of faith and another naturally evident principle, are PROPERLY conclusions of theological science. This notwithstanding, they are said to be conclusions of faith, not immediately, but mediately; and their opposites are called error concerning the faith, mediately; and he who thinks the contrary, falls under suspicion of heresy."<sup>59</sup>

(b) "Because up to now it has not yet been defined by the Church that Christ is risible; but if it were defined by the Church that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, as having two wills, human and divine, has been defined, then whoever denies that Christ is risible would in that case be a heretic."<sup>60</sup>

(c) "The holy Church has many times defined as of faith propositions that were not expressly found in the Sacred Writings, but which were commonly affirmed constantly by all the theologians and doctors of the Church, and were theological propositions . . . Therefore she could likewise define now as of faith all those truths concerning which the whole body of theologians is in accord; therefore to contradict such truths is erroneous; e.g., all theologians firmly teach that Christ the Lord saw the divine Essence from the first instant of his incarnation. This is not found expressly in the divine Scriptures, nor has the Church of God defined it as something to be held as of faith; but the theologians draw it by a good consequence from other passages of the Holy Scripture and other foundations of faith, and it is commonly accepted to such a degree that it can be denied by no one without the mark of error, and it could be defined by the Church as of faith."<sup>61</sup>

<sup>58</sup>In I Poster, q. 2, ad confirmationem argumenti septimi.

<sup>59</sup>Scholastica Commentaria in p. I, q. 1, a. 2, (Salmanticae 1585) pg. 33.

<sup>60</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., a. 8, pgs. 127-128.

(d) "It is an error in the faith to assert that, after the time of the Apostles, the Doctors of the Church or even the Church herself believes a greater number of things about matters pertaining to the faith, or believes them in a more explicated manner than they were in the faith of the Apostles and the Sacred Writers of the evangelical doctrine. . . . This is proposed in the second place, by the fact that up to now the Church has never proposed for belief to the faithful or defined anything that is not expressly contained in the Sacred Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions or virtually contained in such a manner that it might be drawn therefrom by an evident consequence."<sup>62</sup> "Neither the Supreme Pontiff nor the whole Church can establish a new article or a new dogma, new, that is, with respect to the substance. We will illustrate this with an example. If one should consult a moral philosopher concerning some moral doubt, and he answers in accordance with moral principles, the philosopher would in that case be explicated what lay hidden rather than be the author of the truth. In like manner, when the Supreme Pontiff defines that something is to be held by faith, he is as one who explicates the hidden truth, not as the author of the truth. . . . And this is how St. Thomas is to be understood in the article when he says that a new edition of the Symbol belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, that is, with respect to a new explication. Whence it follows that heretics wrongly charge us with the objection that the Supreme Pontiff makes a new faith."<sup>63</sup>

397. IMPORTANT CONCLUSION. — Anyone who succeeds in penetrating well these four assertions of Báñez, which are nothing but a faithful commentary of St. Thomas's doctrine, will clearly perceive the possibility and the factual existence of dogmatic evolution after the Apostles by way of rigorous and proper theological conclusions, without thereby eliminating the specific difference between the habits of theology and of faith; or calling for new revelations or for a change of the non-revealed to revealed, but only for a change of the immediately revealed *quoad se* to immediately revealed *quoad nos*; or introducing an evolution with respect to the substance or heterogeneous, but an evolution with respect to new explication or homogeneous.

That certain Thomists, coming after the golden age of Theology, have been unable to harmonize these things and have even considered them inconsistent, can be explained by the fact that, having been obfuscated by the purely connexive virtual (*virtuale tantum*), they have lost the true Thomist notion of *implicit virtuality*, which is at once the specific element

<sup>62</sup>In 2-2, q.1, a.7, pgs. 85-86.

<sup>63</sup>*Ibid.*, a.10, pgs. 130-131.

of theology in the true and proper sense, and the basis of dogmatic evolution. Being an evolution of true *virtuality*, it is a true evolution, being an evolution of truly *implicit* virtuality, it is an evolution of *explicitation* or homogeneous

#### Section 4

### THE TEACHING OF THEOLOGICIANS ON THE EVOLUTION OF DOGMA FROM MOLINA UP TO THE PRESENT

398. MOLINA'S INFLUENCE. We have just seen in the preceding section that there is not a single theologian prior to Molina, at least among those we are acquainted with, who has denied the possibility and the fact of dogmatic evolution by way of truly theological virtuality or conclusion.

Elsewhere in this book (84 and 233) we have also explained that Molina radically denied the fact and even the possibility of such evolution by denying that the Church can ever define as a true dogma of divine faith anything that is virtually or mediately revealed.

No one, then, will be surprised to find that from Molina onwards the opinion of the theologians on this question is no longer completely unanimous. Given the indisputable prestige and merited renown immediately achieved by the original and independent author of the "scientia media", if the array of eminent theologians produced by the Society of Jesus in the 17th century had supported Molina on this issue as they had on many other points, the traditional doctrine on dogmatic evolution would have run the risk of disappearing from theology, since in the 17th and 18th centuries the other theological schools were not able to muster many theologians comparable in depth and scope to those of the 16th century. The 17th century represented the golden age of the theologians of the Society of Jesus, as the 13th and the 16th saw the heyday of the Thomist school.

Fortunately for Catholic theology, the leading theologians of the Society, such as Vázquez, Suárez, Bellarmine, Lugo, Tannero . . . stood against Molina on this point, and this accounts for the fact that the great majority of subsequent theologians, independently of school affiliations, have continued maintaining in substance the evolution of dogma despite the enormous variety and confusion of a new nomenclature.

This is what we intend to establish in this section. For the sake of order and clarity we will classify the theologians by centuries, as in the preceding section. To avoid prolixity we will indulge in commentaries as little as possible. On the other hand, we have selected only passages from authors whose mind is so plain as to require no commentary.

## 17th Century

399. GABRIEL VÁZQUEZ, S.J. — There is hardly any need to cite this eminent theologian, since he is well-known and quoted not simply as a defender, but even as an exaggerator of dogmatic evolution on account of his failure to draw a good distinction between the evolution of dogma and theology. We have already quoted him elsewhere (85). Here we wish only to advert to the fact that Thomists have always assailed him; not for having maintained the view that theological conclusions are definable as of faith, but for having considered them as of faith even without the Church's definition, and even more for having equated the value of the Church's definition to the value of the theologian's private reasoning.

400. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J., AND CARDINAL LUGO, S.J. — Suárez is the most famous and eminent theologian of his century. We have already quoted him earlier and explained his views on this subject (65-78). Suárez not only maintained that the implicit virtuality, which he calls confused formal, is definable as of faith, but went as far as asserting the definability of the non-implicit virtuality, in the belief that it was the properly termed virtuality whose definability as of faith had always been upheld by traditional theology. The immense authority wielded by Suárez over contemporary and later theologians, and the sharp comment (*mirandum est*) levelled by him against Molina's position on this question, have placed him in the ranks of those theologians who were mainly responsible for the general acceptance in substance of the traditional idea of dogmatic evolution. At the same time, his novel non-implicit virtual and its corollary theory of new revelations led to formulae that denied that same traditional view. On this matter of dogmatic evolution, as in most others, Suárez's fertile genius has left a deeper imprint than any of his contemporaries or successors.

In the opinion of St. Liguori, Cardinal de Lugo is, after St. Thomas, the prince of moral theologians. His reputation as a dogmatic theologian is not inferior to his renown as a moralist. We have earlier seen (79) that he upholds the metaphysico-connexive theological conclusion's definability as of faith, which is the point that concerns us here; and, like Suárez, even goes as far as admitting the physico-connexive conclusion's definability. Together with Suárez, Lugo is one of those mainly responsible for the acceptance by almost all subsequent theologians, in substance, of the traditional teaching on dogmatic evolution by way of theologico-metaphysical conclusion, although under the designation of formal-confused or identical real virtual.

401. CARDINAL BELLARMINÉ. — This distinguished theologian, deservedly acclaimed as the prince of Catholic polemicists against Protestant-

ism, and now already beatified,<sup>64</sup> on account of his heroic virtues, could not have done less than uphold the evolution of dogma, thoroughly acquainted as he was with the patristic and theological tradition. Here are some brief excerpts:

"The dogmas of faith can be established in four ways. First, by the express testimony of the Holy Scripture . . . Secondly, by the evident deduction from that which is expressly had in the Scriptures . . . Thirdly, by the word of God, not written, but handed down in Tradition . . . Fourthly, by the evident deduction from the word of God in Tradition . . . The sufficiency of these four ways is plain from the fact that that alone is of faith which is revealed by God *immediately or immediately*, and divine revelations are in part set down in writing, and in part not set down in writing. Thus, the decrees of the Councils and Pontiffs, and the general agreement of Doctors, and all the rest, reduce to these four ways: for then they establish a thing as of faith when they unfold the Word of God, or deduce something from it."<sup>65</sup>

"The Councils do not receive nor do they write down immediate relations from God, or God's words; they only make clear what is the word of God which is delivered in writing or in Tradition, and how it should be understood, and besides they deduce conclusions from it by means of reasoning."<sup>65</sup>

402. BALTASAR NAVARRETE, O.P. — Next comes the Dominican Navarrete, a most faithful interpreter of St. Thomas who has always wielded a very great authority on all later theologians, particularly on John of St. Thomas.

"Whether the propositions defined by the Church, which are gathered from the articles of faith, are principles of theology?"

"On this point, Molina, in the first disputation, holds the negative part. . . This opinion contains many false things, which as of now we do not wish to mark with a censure because the mind of this author is not sufficiently clear. . .

"Whence it is also gathered that this proposition, Christ has two wills, can be understood in two ways. First, *insofar as it is deduced by theological discourse and evident consequence* from the principles of faith, viz., that Christ is true God and true man; and thus we assent to it by the habit of theology. Secondly, *insofar as that very same proposition is defined by*

<sup>64</sup>Canonized in 1930 by H.H. Pope Pius XI. — *Transl.*

<sup>65</sup>*Disputationes de Controversiis fidei, De Purgatorio*, lib.1, c.15.

<sup>65</sup>*Op. cit., De Conciliorum Auctoritate*, lib.2, c.12.

the Church, and thus we assent to it not by the habit of theology, but by the habit of faith . . . Wherefore, the said author [Molina] greatly errs in asserting that the theologian assents to that truth by the habit of theology in the same manner that the Church deduces it. For, although the Fathers who were present at those Councils deduced that proposition by the habit of theology, nonetheless, in the supposition that it is defined, they assented to it by the habit of faith."<sup>66</sup>

403. JUAN GONZÁLEZ DE ALBEDA, O.P. — Next to Navarrete let us cite the name of his fellow Dominican and, like him, a professor at the University of Alcalá, Master González de Albeda, who had previously held a chair at the College of St. Thomas of the Minerva in Rome. Albeda is held in equal regard and quoted no less frequently than Navarrete by later Thomists.

"Second conclusion: The theologian does not assent by the habit of faith to propositions demonstrated in theology before they are defined by the Church, but by another inferior and subordinate light, viz., by a theological habit and assent. For instance, the theologian does not assent immediately by the habit of faith to this truth, Christ is risible, but by the acquired light of theology. This conclusion is against Fr. Gabriel Vázquez. . ."

"Third conclusion: All the faithful immediately assent by the habit of faith to the propositions immediately defined by the Church. This conclusion is evidently gathered from what has been said in the first conclusion, and it is proved first by the common agreement of the Doctors who teach it with St. Thomas. . . And consequently, every proposition immediately defined by the Church pertains immediately to the habit of faith. On this point see the doctors aforementioned and Master Báñez.

Secondly, it is confirmed and explained by the fact that the proposition demonstrated by the theologian is not immediately, but only mediately, of faith for the precise reason that although the principles are supernatural, viz., the articles of faith, they are nonetheless applied to the demonstrated truth by means of a natural discourse which is stated in form through the syllogistic art. Hence it immediately depends on something human and natural. But the defined proposition, with respect to everything on which it depends, rests upon the testimony of God: for the principles are supernatural, and the discourse is regulated by the motion and assistance of the Holy Spirit who infallibly directs the Pontiff. And if the latter assumes a natural premise, the Holy Spirit specially directs him also with regard to it. . ."

<sup>66</sup> *Controversiae in D. Thomae eiusque Scholae Defensionem*, cont. 7, c. 1, (Vallisoleti 1605) pgs. 30-31.

"Hence there can be no doubt that by his definition the Pontiff makes a proposition be immediately of faith, it being in his power to make an article of faith, not because he makes a new faith, but because he newly determines explicitly what was contained implicitly in the old definitions.

"Molina is moved by these grounds. . . that there is no power or authority in the Church to turn into an object of faith anything that was not such before. . ."

"We reply that there is in the Church the power to issue a Symbol of faith, not by bringing forth a new faith through a new revelation, as we have remarked in the second observation at the beginning; but by explicating the credibles, deducing them from the revealed truths. . . And since it is immediately certain by faith that the Church cannot err insofar as she is ruled by the Holy Spirit, it is also certain by faith that she does not err in what she proposes here and now. For we have already demonstrated above that whenever a universal proposition is immediately of faith, its singular instances are also immediately of faith, and to this extent every proposition defined by the Church is of faith. However, it is not another faith, whether totally or partially, but the same faith more explicated, as St. Thomas teaches."<sup>67</sup>

All the paragraphs we have just quoted from Navarrete and González belong to the purest Thomist tradition. There is in them not the slightest trace of the confusion introduced by the Suarezian nomenclature. We commend them to the sober consideration of all Thomists, particularly those who are shocked by whatever they cannot find in the Salmanticenses or Billuart.

404. ADAM TANNERO, S.J. — After the two famous Spanish theologians just mentioned, let us cite the no less famous German theologian and polemicist, Adam Tannero, of whom Miguel de San José has justifiably written: "Among the first rate controversialist theologians produced by Germany during his time, Tannero rightly should be given the first place."<sup>68</sup> Tannero writes:

"The question is about conclusions that have not been immediately revealed. . . First assertion: The assent to a conclusion of theology, as such, that is, as formally deduced from the revealed principles, is not an assent of faith, but of theology. This is common teaching against Scotus and Aureolus. . . Second assertion: If the theological discourse and assent is presupposed [if the Church's definition is presupposed, as a Thomist would

<sup>67</sup> *Commentariorum et disputationum in Primam Partem Angelici Doctoris D. Thomae*, p. 1, q. 1, d. 2, nn. 33-50 (Compiuti 1621).

<sup>68</sup> HURTER, *Nomenclator litterarum bibl.*, a. 1, 99; t. 3, pg. 639.



say] — one, viz., in which either both premises are revealed, or one is revealed and the other is naturally evident — as the condition that applies the formal reason of faith, every *theological conclusion can also be immediately held by faith*. . . This is proven. . . because *anyone who reveals something, also reveals, as far as he is concerned, that which is necessarily and evidently connected with it; and therefore, every truth that is necessarily and evidently connected with a revealed truth, is also revealed.*<sup>69</sup>

And in the treatise on faith, he repeats the same teaching. "IXth Assertion: *It makes no difference to divine revelation, insofar as it is the formal object of faith, whether the truth to be believed is itself immediately, or only mediately revealed by God. . . I have taught this same view in the first volume, even if certain others think otherwise. . . But the reason for the assertion is a general one: for any thing to be of faith so that I may and ought to hold it by faith, it is enough that it be really revealed by God. But the propositions of which we are speaking are such, because speaking per se, he who reveals something, also reveals whatever things are necessarily connected with it. . . It is by this argument that in the above-cited place we have proven in general that every conclusion evidently deduced either from two revealed premises, or from one revealed and another evident premise, is objectively of faith.*"<sup>70</sup>

405. FRANCIS SYLVIO. — We listen now to the faithful Belgian commentator of St. Thomas, from the ranks of the secular clergy, Francis Sylvio, who has this to say:

"When the Church defines or proposes for belief a dogma of faith, she does not establish an *altogether new* article, but in part makes clear what is contained in the Scripture or in the Apostolic traditions, in part defines and enjoins that it must be believed in such a manner as was not generally done previously, i.e., explicitly, owing to the fact that the dogma *had not yet been drawn out from the principles.*"<sup>71</sup>

"One should therefore take note of what propositions belong to the faith. Those propositions belong to the faith which are certainly contained in the Scriptures or in the Apostolic traditions, or have been defined by the Apostolic See, whether within or outside a council. . . Now, concerning those propositions that by a necessary and evident consequence follow from some proposition of faith — an instance of this sort is the *theological conclusions* — it must be said that they do not belong *per se* and *immedi-*

<sup>69</sup> ADAM TANNER, S.J., *Universa Theologia Scholastica* (Ingolstadtii 1626), t.1, *De Sacra Theologia*, d.1, q.5, dub.3, pgs. 137-138.

<sup>70</sup> *Op.cit.*, t.2, *De Fide*, d.1, q.1, dub.3, nn.68-70, pg.93.

<sup>71</sup> *Commentaria in Summam Sti. Thomae*, 2-2, q.1, a.8.

diately to the faith, and that he who pertinaciously denies them is not be considered a heretic, unless he should so pertinaciously persevere as not to recede from error even after seeing what follows from it, as St. Thomas says."<sup>72</sup>

"The second article [Whether heresy properly is about matters of faith] teaches that *heresy properly is only about matters that are of faith*. But he adds that *such matters are of two kinds*. For there are matters that are of faith *directly and principally, i.e., prescinding from any consequence of reason*; and to this kind belong both the articles of faith and other truths that are plainly held by the Church as *dogmas* of faith. But other matters are of faith *indirectly and secondarily or mediately*; to this kind belong those truths that are *gathered by a necessary consequence* from some proposition that belongs immediately to the faith. What he goes on to say: 'And *heresy can take place with regard to both' is true*, but in the sense in which he explains himself in lesson 4, ch.2, of the First to the Corinthians. A thing pertains to the teaching of the faith, says he, in two ways. . . But certain other things *indirectly*. . . But on account of these things no man is considered as heretic, unless he should *pertinaciously persevere* to such an extent that he will not recede from error even after seeing what follows."<sup>73</sup>

406. DOMENICO GRAVINA, O.P. — Next comes Domenico Gravina, an Italian Dominican, "no less renewed for his learning as for his holy life."<sup>74</sup> In his controversies against heretics he raises the question "Whether a conclusion of faith follows from a proposition of faith and another natural, necessary proposition" and answers it as follows:

"As St. Thomas teaches, that pertains to the faith, *at least indirectly*, upon the denial of which *there follows something contrary to the faith*. But, *it is plain* that such a thing happens upon the denial of such a conclusion. Therefore. . .

"To deny these conclusions before the Church's definition is, indeed, *erroneous*. . . To deny them after the Church's definition is *heretical*: for they are proposed for belief immediately and without benefit of reasoning, hence they are rightly numbered among the principles."<sup>75</sup>

We have chosen these two passages out of many others from Gravina to make two things plain once more: one, that St. Thomas includes the

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, q.11, a.1.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, q.11, a.2.

<sup>74</sup> HURTER, *Nomenclator*, 3, pg.998.

<sup>75</sup> DOMINICUS GRAVINA, O.P., *Catholicae praescriptiones adversus omnes veteres et nostri temporis haereticos* (Neapoli 1619), lib.1, praesc.6, pgs. 186-187.

theological conclusions in the *indirectly* revealed; two, that Thomists prior to the Salamancenses, when dealing with the question whether the theological conclusions are of faith, always distinguish between *before* and *after* the Church's definition, unless the distinction is presupposed.

407. GIOVANNI PAOLO NAZARIO, O.P. — Together with Gravina let us cite another Italian Dominican, a widely known and frequently quoted commentator of St. Thomas, "a man of quick and sharp wits, renowned Master of Sacred Theology."<sup>76</sup> We quote two brief texts:

"Furthermore, keep in mind that the *conclusions*, which the Fathers gathered in the Councils *deduce from the principles of faith and define*, belong *immediately to the faith*. . . and from these considerations *Molina's error* becomes plain."<sup>77</sup>

"Now, I call a *theological conclusion* that which is *not found expressly in formal, or altogether equivalent, terms* in the Holy Scriptures or divine traditions, although it is determined by the Supreme Pontiff or the sacred Councils and is to be held by faith."<sup>78</sup>

408. FRANCISCO DEL CASTILLO, O.S.F. — Next in chronological order comes the Franciscan Francisco del Castillo, a native of Madrid. Being a good Scotist, he could do no less than part from Molina on the question of dogmatic evolution by way of revealed virtuality. One quotation will suffice:

"From what has been said you should infer what is to be said to the question raised by Molina, as mentioned above, and Suárez, to wit, whether propositions *virtually contained* in revealed truths are of faith, if they are defined by the Church. *For I answer that they are*: in the first place, because it was already revealed through a conclusion deduced from the premises; hence the Church *does not define a thing that is not revealed*, which is the inconvenience that forces Molina to maintain the contrary; and although such a conclusion is elicitively theological, nonetheless, *objectively it is of faith*."<sup>79</sup>

409. FRANCISCO DE OVIEDO, S.J. — We next quote another native of Madrid, but a Jesuit this time. We will quote him at greater length not precisely because he was a theologian "endowed with a sharp

<sup>76</sup>HURTER, *Nomenclator*, 111, 939.

<sup>77</sup>*Disputationes et Commentaria Scholastica in Summam D. Thomae Aquinatis* (Coloniae Agrippinae 1621), t.1, q.1, a.2, pg.18.

<sup>78</sup>*Ibid.*, a.3, pg.30.

<sup>79</sup>*Subtilissimi Scoti doctorum super tertium Sententiarum librum, de tribus virtutibus theologis* (Antuerpiae 1641), d.2, q.111, n.25.

mind and solid judgment in the understanding, treatment and untangling of questions, especially moral questions"<sup>80</sup>, but because he is one of the many who have uncovered, without intending to, the contraband hidden under the new term *formal confused* introduced by Suárez.

"A distinction is also drawn between universal or *confused* revelation and *mediate* or remote revelation, the basis of which is that the universal or *confused* revelation immediately attains the *selfsame object* attained by the singular and distinct, and differs from the latter only in the *manner of conceiving*.

"On the other hand, the *mediate* does not attain the *very same object* attained by the immediate. For the *immediate* attains the *object in itself*; the *mediate* does not attain it in itself, but in something that is inferred from it, as for instance, when it is revealed that Christ is a man, the revelation terminates in those things that substantially constitute a man, and because it terminates therein, it is said to be the *mediate* revelation of all those things that are inferred by *true causality* from the former. Thus it is said that since it is revealed that Christ is a man, it is *mediately* revealed that he is risible. Now, to explain the point, say that risibility is a property physically distinct from human nature, or, in lieu of risibility, substitute any other accident that is distinct and *naturally* inseparable from human nature; and, on the other hand, say that that which is *mediately* revealed is not revealed in reality, but is inferred necessarily from that which is revealed . . .

"I have explained in the preceding point, no. 78, what is *virtual and mediate* revelation. Now I am discussing whether it suffices for the act of faith; e.g., whether precisely on account of it being revealed that Christ is a man it can be believed by an act of faith that there exists in him the *super-added power* of laughing, and for the sake of the argument, I assume that it is evident that such a power exists in every man. I raise the question in this manner, and I do not inquire whether on account of it being revealed that Christ is a man it can be believed that he is *risible* although the question can be, and is, *commonly raised* in these terms, *there are people who misuse them*, and change the question to mean the risible that is *identified* with the predicate rational. The question is not to be understood in this manner; for the risible *taken in this sense* is identical to the rational, and therefore by the same token that the latter is revealed, the former *will also be revealed* IN REALITY.

"It is not superfluously that I say IN REALITY. For there are some predicates that are identified with other predicates, but of whose identity

<sup>80</sup>HURTER, *Nomenclator*, 111, pg.921.

we are not certain. Let us give an example in God. There are many who maintain that justice, taken as a virtue in a special sense, exists in God. Let us assume that this opinion is true, in which case, it will be the same in God to be almighty and to be God and to have the attribute of justice; and thus the revelation which discloses that God exists, discloses that he is just with respect to anyone who adequately penetrates what is *in reality* imported by what the name God signifies.

"Nevertheless, no matter how truly this describes the real state of things, with respect to us it is not revealed that there exists in God the attribute of justice taken as a virtue in a special sense, because in *our case* we can have only *probability* concerning the existence of this attribute, which we can also deny with probability. And therefore, *in reality*, by the same token that God is affirmed to exist, it is also affirmed that the special virtue of justice exists in him, since factually it is *really identical* with the divine nature; however, such a revelation is not applied to us, who affirm the existence of this attribute only with probability, in such wise as to be able to elicit, in virtue of it, an act of faith whereby we judge that God has the aforementioned attribute of omnipotence, or that he is almighty. But in the case of one who *evidently* knows that omnipotence and the special attribute of justice *are really identified*, by the same token that he can make an act of faith concerning one attribute, *he can also make an act of faith concerning the other*, even in terms of the express concept whereby one attribute differs formally from the other. . .

"These things I say against Puente Hurtado and others who *confuse* the question concerning *really distinct* predicates with the question concerning predicates that *differ only formally*, and *wish to extend* to the latter, which *differ only formally*, the opinion which asserts that the conclusions deduced from one revealed premise and another known evidently is not of faith, on the ground that one of them is conceived priorly and in the manner of an essence, and the other is conceived posteriorly and in the manner of a property.

"With the question defined in this manner, the affirmative is upheld by Cano, Vega. . . For the negative stand the same Cano, Suárez. . . I make mine this *negative* opinion. . . The reason is: An object that is *connected* with a revealed truth, precisely on the score that it is connected with it, can be believed only in virtue of the connexion between it and another revealed object; but this connexion is not the motive of faith; therefore, it cannot be believed in virtue of the motive of faith: for we suppose that the object is not revealed in itself, but in another with which it is *connected and not identified*. Therefore, the connexion must be the whole reason for the assent. The minor is self-evident, for the formal object of faith is reve-

lation or divine authority, and not the connexion of one predicate with other predicates."

We are certain that every professional theologian, and even every one interested in the momentous problem on the evolution of dogma, will forgive us this lengthy quotation for the light it sheds on the true meaning of the new nomenclature introduced by Suárez with the terms *formal confused* and *mere virtual*, and the new meaning thereby imposed on the traditional terms *immediate* and *mediate*. By the term *formal confused*, or immediate implicit, or virtual implicit, or revealed IN REALITY, they mean that which is *really identical* with the revealed deposit, and reserve the term *mediate*, or *virtual*, or *connexive*, for that which *differs really* from the revealed, and is therefore *not revealed*. Thereby they uphold in substance the same view maintained by the ancients and by ourselves, although the formulae they employ appear to say the contrary.

In the aforementioned passages from Oviedo, who was John of St. Thomas's contemporary and countryman, the reader will have perceived the meaning given in the 17th century to the term revealed IN REALITY. It is employed to mean any and every virtuality or conclusion that is *really identical* to the revealed datum. Among Thomists the term makes its first appearance with John of St. Thomas, and it appears precisely in the final and most interesting paragraph wherewith John of St. Thomas ends and resumes the whole of his famous *fourth article* on the theological conclusion's definability as of faith. "Whence it can be gathered that there are two ways in which something can be *virtually* contained in the truths of faith. One in a *SOLELY virtual inferential* manner, and this belongs to theology, which has for its object that which is inferred from the truths of faith. Two, *virtually implicitly*, THAT IS, those things that are 'IN REALITY' revealed and intended by the Holy Spirit, but are hidden to us, and thus reached by discourse. And these [viz., everything that is revealed in reality, or really identical to the revealed in itself] the Church can define and declare."<sup>82</sup>

It is plain that by the term *virtual implicit* John of St. Thomas means exactly the same thing that we mean, that is, everything that is *really identical* to the revealed statements. Whether we, modern Thomists, like it or not, we must confess that John of St. Thomas, as so many other later theologians, suffered the overpowering influence of Suárez's prestige, and that the terms *virtually, only inferentially*, and *revealed in reality*, employed by John of St. Thomas and accepted later by other Thomists, bear the stamp of Suarezian origin.

<sup>81</sup> Tractatus Theologici, De Fide (Lugduni 1651), contr.4, nn.76-78 and 107-110.

<sup>82</sup> JOANNES A STO, THOMA, De Sacra Theologia, d.11, a.4, n.16.

410. MARCOS SERRA, O.P. — We omit Lugo and John of St. Thomas, who were Oviedo's contemporaries since we have quoted them elsewhere (79 and 307), and come to the Dominican Serra, a native of Valencia, and a distinguished commentator of St. Thomas's *Summa*, who well deserves a hearing.

"Not everybody admits that certain *theological conclusions* have been defined by the Church *solely* because they are *mediately revealed* on account of their being *evidently deduced* from immediately revealed propositions. For there are some who assert that the proposition 'Christ has a human will' has not been defined in the Scripture, and they say: *the same thing of other similar propositions.*

"But even if we grant, as I think we should, that such conclusions are defined by the Church, nonetheless, it does not thence follow that they have the certainty of *faith prior to such definition*, or that its contrary is *heretical*, but only *erroneous*. For just as by the Church's definition something can belong *manifestly* to the faith, so also by her definition something can belong *immediately* to the faith and thus have the certainty of faith, such that its contrary is *heretical*, which previously was only *erroneous*. Nor is it necessary that something that is *immediately of faith* should be *immediately revealed by God*; but it is enough that it be *immediately proposed by the Church, even if it is mediate revealed by God.*"<sup>83</sup>

All of it is pure Thomist stock. Serra has succeeded in expounding traditional Thomism not only in its substance but also in its terminology.

411. HONORATO FABRI, S.J. — The Jesuit Fabri expresses himself no less plainly, although his terminology is not as precise.

"You will ask: What is to be said of those conclusions that are deduced from the principles of faith? I will divide the answer to this question by numbers. . . In the second place, when the consequent's predicate is identical to the predicate of the antecedent, if the antecedent is of faith, then the consequent also is of faith [is definable as of faith, Serra would have said]; for instance, it is of faith that the Word was made man: therefore, it is of faith that Christ has a body and soul, that he is a *rational animal*, that he is *risible*, that he has an *intellect, a will*, etc. The reason for both answers is that everything that is believed *implicitly* is of faith; but in the act whereby I believe that Christ is a man, I certainly believe *implicitly* everything that man of its own nature signifies, that is, to have a

<sup>83</sup> *Summae commentarium in Secundam-Secundae D. Thomae* (Valentiae 1654), q.1, a.2, t.1, pgs. 268-269.

body and a soul, to have intellect, will, risibility, etc. Therefore, I believe all this *confusedly* and *implicitly*; therefore, all of it is of faith, *Otherwise, I know not what it is to believe something implicitly and confusedly.*"<sup>84</sup>

412. PETER ANNATO, S.J. — Together with Fabri let us quote his fellow Jesuit Peter Annato, of whom our own Contenson says: "Undoubtedly second to no one of the Society in writing clearly and sharply on theological matters."<sup>85</sup> Annato writes:

"Any proposition is said to be *erroneous* which is opposed . . . to a teaching which, although not defined by the Church nor formally and expressly revealed, is, nonetheless, commonly inferred by theologians through reasoning from revealed truths, whence it is also called a *theological conclusion*; thus it is *virtually* revealed, and closely approaches the faith because it is close to being defined by the Church, and *nothing else* is wanting for it to be of faith but the *definition of the Church*. . .

"You will insist: a thing must be *immediately revealed* or disclosed by a *formal* and immediate revelation for it to be believed with divine faith. Therefore, *virtual* and *mediate* revelation is not sufficient.

"I answer: I deny the antecedent. In the first place, as the Doctors of the famous Academy of Dñay [Duacensis] correctly observe in their declaration, it is *nowhere written that immediate* revelation is required for divine faith, and that *mediate* revelation is not sufficient therefor."<sup>86</sup>

413. PHILIP OF THE MOST HOLY TRINITY. — Comes now the famous Carmelite Philip of the Most Holy Trinity. Gonet says of him that "he published works worthy of imperishable memory", and of his *Summa Theologiae Thomisticae* Hurter writes: "It is greatly esteemed by the followers of St. Thomas, for it excels in remarkable transparency and clarity." From this distinguished Thomist we quote the following texts:

"That which is believed with divine faith must *either* be *immediately revealed* by God or be *deduced from immediately revealed truths* with the Holy Spirit's assistance."<sup>87</sup>

"The common agreement of the Church concerning a proposition that can be deduced from two premises, one of which is of faith and the other *naturally evident*, makes it a matter of faith. For if the agreement of

<sup>84</sup> *Summa Theol.*, (Lugduni 1669), tr.5, *De Fide*, c.2, n.15, pgs.339-340.

<sup>85</sup> CONTESEN, *Theologia mentis et cordis* (Coloniae Agrippinae 1687), lib. 5, dissert. praecambula, c.2, t.1, pg.813.

<sup>86</sup> PETRUS ANNATO, S.J., *Apparatus ad Sacram Theologiam* (Venetiis 1778) t.1, lib.1, a.5, pg.13; and lib.2, a.3, pg.142.

<sup>87</sup> *Disputationes theologicae* (Lugduni 1653), d.1, dub.11, t.1, pg.27.

a general Council concerning a similar proposition makes it be of faith, as is the case whenever the general Council deduces a theological conclusion from a proposition of faith and another that is naturally certain, much more will the common agreement of the Church concerning a similar proposition make it of faith."<sup>88</sup>

Also worthy of perusal is this author's commentary to those words of St. Thomas, "But after it has become manifest, and especially if it be determined by the Church."<sup>89</sup> Likewise his commentary to the question "How is the total object of faith contained in the Symbol?"<sup>90</sup> They are some of the best writings that we have read after the classical commentators of the 16th century.

414. DOMENICO DE MARINIS, O.P. — After the Carmelite Thomist comes one of the foremost Dominican Thomists, the Italian Domenico de Marinis, whose commentaries on St. Thomas are, in the opinion of Margott, "to be counted among the best theological works of the second half of the 17th century." Commenting on the classical article, "Whether heresy properly is about matters of faith," this great theologian writes as follows:

"St. Thomas here assigns as the *object and proper matter of heresy* that which *directly* and plainly is opposed to some truth of faith; and as its *less principal object, but still within the scope of the object*, he assigns that from which *by an evident consequence* is gathered or inferred something plainly contrary to the faith. . .

Thus that proposition *directly* pertains to infidelity which imports something manifestly contrary to the faith. But *indirectly* that proposition which imports an error from which something manifestly contrary to the faith is *mediately* and indirectly inferred, as, e.g., *propositions contrary to the truths demonstrated in theology from one or two propositions of faith*: for in this case something opposed to the faith is inferred *by means of reasoning*. . . For he who is obstinate in holding to a proposition from which something is inferred which is manifestly against the faith, errs in the faith and is a *heretic*."<sup>91</sup>

And previously he had said: "For the Church has so far defined or proposed to the faithful for belief nothing that is not expressly contained in the Sacred Writings or Apostolic traditions, or *virtually included there-*

<sup>88</sup> *Op. cit.*, d. 1, dub. 4, t. 3, pg. 20.

<sup>89</sup> *Summa Theologica*, p. 1, q. 32, a. 4.

<sup>90</sup> *Disputationes Theologicae*, t. 1, pgs. 28-29, t. 3, pgs. 32-33.

<sup>91</sup> *Expositio commentaria in 2-2 Sti. Thomae* (Lugduni 1663), q. 11, a. 2, c. 3.

<sup>92</sup> *Op. cit.*, q. 1, a. 9, c. 3.

415. JUAN MARTÍNEZ DE RIPALDA, S.J. — The illustrious Society of Jesus comes again to the fore in the person of one of its many great theologians of the 17th century, Martínez de Ripalda, a son of Navarre, of whom the oft-quoted Hurter writes with obvious family fondness, "[he was] together with Cardinal de Lugo the best scholastic theologian in Spain, and perhaps in all of Europe, during this period."<sup>93</sup> Anyone familiar with these matters will have observed that Ripalda is quoted by some as contrary to, and by others as in favour of dogmatic evolution. Both the former and the latter are partly right. Ripalda admits dogmatic evolution but not with the same amplitude as the majority of the other theologians. Of the five types of conclusion or implicit virtuality we have described elsewhere (45), Ripalda denies the definability of the first three types, or those whereby the metaphysical or radical properties are deduced; but he admits the definability of types 5 and 6 whereby actual or physical properties are deduced from the connatural or perfect essence. Let us quote his own words:

"In the second place, I say: An object that comes to be known from a revealed truth and another that is evident, can be credible by faith. . . For it is held by faith and revealed that Christ is a man not only in a metaphysical sense, but in a natural and physical sense, that is, in the sense of a revelation that discloses that Christ is a man [not only] in terms of the precise and metaphysical concept of the essence or of animality and rationality, but also in terms of the natural and physical concept of man which comprises the properties of man in keeping with the natural and physical laws in such things as are not derogatory to the dignity of the divine supposit and of the Redeemer of the world. But human nature revealed in a natural and physical sense comprises *formally* [the Thomist *implicitly virtual*], and not *only virtually* [Suárez's *extrinsic virtual*] the natural properties that are connected with it, setting miracles aside, one of which is the *power of laughing*. Therefore, by the sole revelation of Christ's human nature, conceived as commonly understood by the faithful, it is of faith [a Thomist would say, *it is definable as of faith*] that he has an intellect distinct from the soul, as well as a formal will, and *quantity* distinct from the substance of the body, without there being need for other singular revelations of these properties; for the sense of that revelation as understood commonly by all the faithful, comprises universally, aside from the essence and substance of man, *also the properties physically and naturally annexed to it*, and under these are included as particular species the *intellect* and the *will, quantity, and imagination*, as well as the *power of laughing*."<sup>94</sup>

<sup>93</sup> *Nomenclator*, t. 3, pg. 928.

<sup>94</sup> *De Ente Supernaturali*, t. 7, *De virtutibus infusis*, *De Fide*, d. 8, s. 3, n. 45, ed. Vivès (Parisii 1873), pg. 146.

By admitting the definability of the physical or actual properties and denying the definability of the essential or radical properties, Ripalda has given us one instance, among many others, of his tendency towards singular opinions. At the moment we are unable to recall any other theologian of rank guilty of such inconsistency. At any rate, Ripalda is worthy of praise for his defense of dogmatic evolution by way of the theological conclusion, even if he falls short of the extension given to it by Suárez and Lugo; for the deduction of properties — whether radical or actual — from the essence deserves to be called, and is, a properly theological conclusion. It is by this procedure that almost all the conclusions of the treatise on the Incarnation have been developed. Some of them, as for instance, the two intellects and two wills of Christ, have already been defined. All the others could be equally defined, assuming that they are truly evident or demonstrated conclusions (110; and 317).

416. JACOB PLATELIO, S.J. — Next to Ripalda, we will quote the remaining Jesuit theologians of this same century. The first among them is the distinguished Platelio, whose *Synopsis Cursus Theologici* has been re-edited a great number of times "on account of its elegance, clarity, solidity and utility."<sup>95</sup> He upholds the definability as of divine faith of every theological conclusion, and even of every dogmatic fact.

"Every conclusion deduced from a revealed proposition and another naturally certain proposition is of faith. For when a given predicate is affirmed of a subject, everything that is certainly evidently known to be identified or necessarily connected with such a predicate, is simultaneously mediately and virtually and to that extent really affirmed. . . . Therefore, this conclusion, Christ is risible. . . is sufficiently revealed. . . so that it is credible with divine faith."<sup>96</sup>

Next we see him defending, and with very good reason, the extension of dogmatic evolution to facts that are justifiably called *dogmatic*:

"In the fifth place it is proved by the fact that the propositions containing these facts can be deduced from a revealed major and a morally certain minor. But such propositions are *definable* by the Pontiff as propositions to be believed with divine faith. Therefore. . ."<sup>96a</sup>

417. TIRSO GONZALEZ AND DOMINGO VIVA, S.J. — The former not only admits as of divine faith the conclusions and the facts, but also extends divine faith to the canonization of saints. Instead of quoting

<sup>95</sup>HURTER, *Nomenclator*, 1.4, pg.328.

<sup>96</sup>*Synopsis totius cursus theologici* (Coloniae Agrippinae 1733), p. 3, n.143, pg. 98  
<sup>96a</sup>*Loc. cit.*

lengthy passages, suffice it to say that the title of the sixth section of his work reads thus: *It is of Faith that canonized Persons are truly Saints*.<sup>97</sup>

We find the same teaching in Domingo Viva, the classic commentator of the *Damianae Theses*:

"The Pontiff can define as of faith a theological conclusion that is gathered from a premise of faith and another that is morally evident. For instance, it can be defined as of faith that the Tridentine Council had the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which is a theological conclusion that is gathered from the premise of faith that any general council that is legitimately gathered has the Holy Spirit's assistance, and from this other morally evident proposition that the Tridentine was legitimately gathered.

"Consequently the Pontiff can equally define as of faith a fact connected with a principle, or a theological conclusion issuing from a premise of faith which concerns the principle, and another morally certain premise which concerns the fact, as for instance, the condemned conclusion that Jansen's propositions contained in his book are heretical in the obvious sense exhibited by the words. For it issues from this premise of faith which concerns a principle, viz., that such propositions are heretical, as for instance, 'freedom from coercion is sufficient for merit', and this other that is morally certain, to wit, that they are contained in the obvious sense in Jansen's book, as is plain from the experience of all who read Jansen.

"And as a matter of fact, many of these theological conclusions have been defined by the Church as of faith, e.g., that Christ had a human will, which is gathered from the revealed proposition that Christ is a man, and this other naturally certain proposition that every man has a will. Likewise, in the Tridentine it was defined as of faith that the substance of the bread does not remain under the eucharistic species, which is inferred from the revealed premise that Christ is present under the eucharistic species, and this other naturally certain proposition that two complete substances cannot be under the same accidents."

"And for the same reason the Church can define, for instance that Ignatius is a saint and to be worshipped with the cult of *dulia*; for it is gathered from the premise of faith that he is to be worshipped who after a life of heroic virtues dies in the embrace of the Lord, and from this other proposition that is morally certain after so many preceding diligent investi-

<sup>97</sup>TIRSO GONZÁLEZ, S.J., *Tractatus theologicus de certitudinis gradu quem, infra fidem, nunc habet sententia pia de Immaculata Conceptione* (Dillingae 1690), d.1, s.6, pg.17.

gations by the Church, viz., that Ignatius died in the embrace of the Lord after a life of heroic virtues."<sup>98</sup>

418. GERVASE BIGNONIO. — This discerning enlarger of Becano's *Summa* writes no less plainly.

"Every theological conclusion is, by the same token, credible with divine faith.

"You will object in the first place: The act of divine faith immediately rests on divine revelation; therefore it has for its object a proposition that is immediately revealed, which is not verified in the theological conclusion, which is only mediately revealed. Therefore...

"I answer by denying the consequence. For it is one thing to say that the act of divine faith immediately rests on divine revelation, and another thing to say that it rests on immediate revelation...

"You will insist: A proposition must be revealed in itself if it is to be credible with divine faith... I distinguish the major: if its meaning is that it must be immediately revealed, I deny. If its meaning is that it must be truly revealed, I grant."<sup>99</sup>

The two objections are admirably solved. Bignonio, as almost every non-Thomist theologian, is deficient in only one thing: he fails to observe that the intellectual deduction or explication of the implicit conclusion is not formally of faith until it is defined by the Church. The Church alone is commissioned to explicate divinely or dogmatically the deposit's implicit virtuality. The theologian's explication or deduction is a human one.

419. VINCENT CONTENTSON, O.P. — We come now to a theologian of true Thomist pedigree, the no less learned than pious author of the famous *Theologia Mentis et Cordis*:

"Although everything pertaining to the faith is virtually contained in the Scriptures, nonetheless, not everything is formally explicated, but many things are deduced from them under the influence of the Holy Spirit, as various conclusions are derived from the principles."<sup>100</sup>

"The second condition of the object of faith is the formal or VIRTUAL revelation declared by the Church. The object of faith must be not only virtually but formally revealed, or at least declared by the Church.

<sup>98</sup> DOMINICUS VIVA, S.J., *Damnatæ Theses* (Patavii 1724), quaestio prodromia, n. 9, pgs. 5-6.

<sup>99</sup> *Tractatus de natura theologiae*, q. 8, placed before Martin Becano's *Summa Theologiae* (Parisii 1658).

<sup>100</sup> *Theologia Mentis et Cordis* (Coloniae Agrippinae 1687), *De Fide*, lib. 7, d. 2, c. 1, spec. 1.

The reason is that the virtually revealed is deduced by reasoning, and is a theological conclusion, concerning which there is a controversy among the learned and even among the Church Fathers themselves. Consequently, it does not pertain to the object of faith until with the advent of the Church's determination it is made plain that there is a necessary connexion between the formally revealed and the virtually revealed proposition... and it is then that the proposition begins to pertain to the [formal or immediate] object of faith, not precisely because it is virtually revealed; but because, being virtually revealed, it is formally declared by the Church and educed from the article in which it lay hidden."<sup>101</sup>

The doctrine and the terminology in these two passages from Contentson come from the purest Thomist quarry. One seems to be reading St. Thomas, or Cajetan, or Báñez.

420. CARDINAL GOTTI, O.P. — It was our intention — one which we have kept up to now — not to quote on this subject of dogmatic evolution any theologian whose mind was not clear, not only in itself, but even upon the simple perusal of the quoted texts. But before leaving the 17th century theologians, we are going to make an exception in favour of an illustrious Thomist theologian, whose mind on this point is clear, but whose terminology is not equally so. Since John of St. Thomas made use of Suárez's nomenclature and designated the virtual implicit with the name of immediate implicit, some later Thomists can be found who say time and time again that the Church cannot define as of divine faith except what is immediately or formally revealed, however it is plain that by immediate or formal they mean the same thing that the Thomist tradition prior to Suárez always designated by the term virtual or consequential. One of such Thomists is Cardinal Gotti, who expressed himself as follows:

"Therefore when the Church defines that something which is newly to be believed is of faith, which was not held by faith before, she does not turn that which was only mediately revealed [the implicit virtual is never "only mediately", but it is mediately revealed *quoad nos* and immediately revealed *quoad se*] into something immediately revealed; but those truths which, even if previously had been immediately revealed to the Apostles [the point here is not how they were revealed to the Apostles, but how they were delivered by the Apostles to the Church; cf. n. 58], yet it was not clear that they were immediately revealed... Hence it is necessary to distinguish two things: one, that the thing is of faith; two, that the faithful are under obligation to believe it as a truth of faith. Regarding the former, no change is made by the Church's definition; for this truth, 'Christ has two wills', has always been immediately of faith [immediately in itself,

<sup>101</sup> *Loc.cit.*, spec. 2.

mediately relative to us]. But there is a change regarding the latter, in the sense that whereas there was no obligation to believe that which was of faith and immediately revealed [in itself], there is now an obligation to believe once the Church has defined that it is of faith."

Anyone who reads the preceding passage from Gotti, especially without the clarifications we have placed in brackets, would be persuaded that Gotti denies the definability of the mediate or virtual, and consequently denies the evolution of dogma. However, the following passage makes plain the sense in which Gotti takes the term *immediate*:

"I say: The articles of faith did not grow as regards their substance, but only as regards their *explication*, . . . Proof of the first part. *Science* is not said to grow as regards its substance because some of its *conclusions*, which were previously not known, come to be known now. Therefore, neither should faith or the articles be said to grow as regards their substance because some things are now held by faith, which were not held by faith before. Proof of the consequence. In the case of the former, those *conclusions*, although unknown, were nonetheless *implicitly* contained in the *principles* of the science. Now then all the things that we now believe are *implicitly* contained *either* in those two principles delivered by the Apostle . . . or in the truths that were revealed to the ancient Patriarchs and Prophets, or finally and more plainly in the truths taught by Christ and delivered by the Apostles under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Therefore:

"The second part [that there was growth only as regards their *explication*] follows from what has been said. For, if all the credibles are *revealed* at least *implicitly*, and in the course of time there has been only an *explication* of the things that were already contained *implicitly* in the revealed truths, then when the Church proposes something as an object of faith, this is not done in virtue of a *new revelation* made to her, but in virtue of a *new explication* of the revelation already made, or of the thing already revealed. Hence the Church has never proposed to the faithful for belief, or defined anything that was not at least *virtually contained* in the Sacred Scriptures or in the divine or apostolic traditions."<sup>102</sup>

421. IT IS THUS PLAIN that when Gotti says that only the *immediate* is definable, he thereby means the *virtual implicit*, since he explicitly admits the latter's definability. This is much plainer in the following quotations from the treatise *De Sacra theologia*:

"I say: A proposition or doctrine is *heretical* when it is immediately contrary *either* to the express word of God, or to the express definition

of the Church. Or to the express definition of the Church' has been added because a proposition that is only *implicitly* contained in the word of God, after it has been declared by the Church to be truly contained in the word of God, must be expressly believed with divine faith by those who have sufficient knowledge of the judgment pronounced by the Church.

"I call a proposition *erroneous* in matters of faith which is contrary . . . not indeed to a doctrine defined by the Church, or which is *formally* or *expressly* revealed, but which is, however, commonly *deduced* by the Doctors from revealed truths by means of reasoning. Hence, a theological conclusion is commonly said to be *virtually revealed*, for it so closely approaches the faith that nothing else is needed for it to be of faith but the express definition of the Church. Thus, the erroneous proposition coincides with the proposition that is proximate to heresy."<sup>103</sup>

The mind of the illustrious Cardinal Gotti on the subject of the definability as of faith of conclusions in the proper sense of the term, is thus plain. But how much more lucid would his — and John of St. Thomas's — nomenclature have been if the terms *immediate* and *virtual*, on which the nature of faith and theology hinges, had never been by them employed as synonyms, thereby sowing confusion among so many modern Thomists!

422. GABRIEL BOYVIN, O.S.F. — Leaving aside many other theologians so as not to make ourselves interminable, and since we have been quoting so many Jesuits and Dominicans, let us close the 17th century with the Franciscan Boyvin.

"It is asked: Whether such propositions [i.e., theological conclusions] are of faith when they are defined by the Church? To this question Molina, taking into account that the Church has no power to make of faith something which was not of faith before, since no new revelations are made to her, answers saying that the definitions of the Church are not of faith, but, within the bounds of the certainty of *theology*, only more certain than the private definitions of theologians; so certain, indeed, on account of the Holy Spirit's special assistance, that they are not liable to error. However, the contrary must be asserted, viz., that any conclusion defined by the Church is of faith. . . . Thus from all the foregoing it must be concluded that no theological conclusion as such is of faith, but insofar as defined by the Church it is of faith and numbered among the principles of theology, and to it is due an assent by the habit of faith, and not only by the habit of theology, as Molina pretends."<sup>104</sup>

<sup>103</sup> *Op. cit.*, *De Sacra Theologia*, dub. 5, nn. 6-7.

<sup>104</sup> *Theologia quadripartita Scoti*, prol., q. 5, (ed. 4, Parisiis 1678), pg. 14.

<sup>102</sup> *Theologia Scholastica-dogmatica*, *De Fide*, q. 1, dub. 9, nn. 4-13.



It is thus clear that, despite Molina's innovation, all throughout the 17th century the majority of theologians continue to maintain the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusions in the proper sense of the term.

#### 18th Century

423. BY CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE. — We have just seen that throughout the 17th century the great majority of theologians from all schools and countries defended, in spite of Molina's contrary opinion, the traditional doctrine on the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusions. The same is true, as we will presently see, of the 18th century. We will continue quoting theologians in a more or less chronological order, rather than by school affiliation.

424. JOHN LAWRENCE BERTI, O.S.A. — Let us begin with the distinguished theologian Berti, worthy representative of the Augustinian school.

"Since a proposition of *faith* is that which is contained expressly in the Sacred Scriptures, the traditions received by the Church, the decrees and definitions of the Church, or is deduced therefrom by a *connexion that is certain, manifest, and of utmost firmness*, the proposition that is found to be diametrically opposed to any one of these must be considered *heretical*."<sup>105</sup>

425. FRANCIS HENNO, O.S.F. — Next comes the Franciscan Henno, who is the most distinguished representative of the Scotist school in this century.

"There is no need that revelation be always *immediate*, so that it is possible for a proposition to be of *faith* even if it is not revealed *immediately* and in itself, but only *virtually and implicitly* contained in revealed propositions. But if it is inferred from one revealed and another natural proposition, it will not be of *faith* [per se or prior to its definition]. . . It should be observed that although a proposition is not of *faith* as inferred from a non-revealed and a revealed proposition, nonetheless, as soon as it is defined by the Church it is of *faith*, and not only certain. . . For the Church proposes to us many things as objects of *faith*, which are not contained explicitly, formally, and immediately in the Scriptures, but are only deduced from them through *consequence*."<sup>106</sup>

<sup>105</sup> *De Theologicis disciplinis* (Monachii 1750), prol., c.5.

<sup>106</sup> *Theologia dogmatica et scholastica* (Coloniae 1718), *De Fide*, d.1, q.2, a.4, conc.3.

426. GABRIEL ANTOINE, S.J. — Next follows one of the worthiest dogmatic and moral theologians of the Society of Jesus, who is also among the best theologians of the 18th century. His *Theologia Universa Speculativa et Dogmatica* deserves to be consulted on the subject of dogmatic evolution.

"I say fourthly: A proposition legitimately deduced from an altogether certain universal major proposition and a revealed minor is of *faith* and can be believed with *divine faith*. First proof: such a proposition is sufficiently revealed. . . Third proof: the Church proposes as revealed and as objects of *faith* propositions that are legitimately deduced from a universal proposition that is altogether certain, though not revealed, and a revealed minor. . .

"You will object, in the first place, that the proposition at issue, e.g., Christ is risible . . . is not *formally revealed*, not even implicitly. Therefore, it cannot be believed with *divine faith*.

I answer *denying the consequence*. For the *mediate* and *virtual* revelation of a proposition is sufficient for it to be believed with *divine faith*. . . It can be believed with *divine faith*; better still, it must be so believed at least upon its *definition* by the Church."<sup>107</sup>

427. EDMUND SIMONET, S.J. — Together with Antoine let us quote another theologian of the Society of Jesus, Edmund Simonet, S.J., who is no less clear.

"Speaking generally, *every conclusion* legitimately deduced from a premise of *faith* that is absolutely revealed, and another which is altogether certain. . . is of *faith*, as to its capability of [divine] belief, and even as to the obligation [of giving it *divine faith*] at least when the *Church defines* it. Hence *divine faith* can be given to the conclusion of this syllogism: Every man is risible; Christ is man; therefore, he is risible."<sup>108</sup>

428. JUAN MARÍN, S.J. — Comes now a third theologian also of the Society of Jesus, no less renowned than Antoine, and much more than Simonet, the Spaniard Juan Marín. He not only holds the same view as all those previously quoted on the subject of dogmatic evolution, but also is one more witness to the meaning given by Suárez and Lugo to the terms formal confused or immediate implicit, *viz.*, that which, albeit formally distinct, is nonetheless really identical to the revealed.

<sup>107</sup> *Theologia Universa* (Augustae Vindoborum et Cracoviae 1760), *De Fide divina*, s.1, § 4, pgs. 27-30.

<sup>108</sup> *Institutiones Theologiae* (Venetiis 1731), t.1, *De Fide*, d.2, a.5, pgs. 164-165.

"There is a greater difficulty concerning the conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and a natural premise. . . Suárez, Lugo. . . say that the conclusion is of faith when it is identified with the revealed object; but not when it is not identified. . . This opinion seems good. . ."

"You will insist: When God reveals omnipotence, he only reveals what this word means to the listeners, since the meaning of the word must be common to both speaker and listener. But this word 'omnipotence' solely means *omnipotence*, as distinct from *imminently* and *other attributes*. Therefore. . ."

"I reply conceding the major and distinguishing the minor. It solely means omnipotence *formally*, I concede; *really*, I deny. Hence, the listener *formally* only forms a concept about omnipotence, but *really* he also forms a concept about immensity, because that concept *affirms immensity really*, though not formally."<sup>109</sup>

This teaching of Suárez and Lugo, which Marín here makes his own, viz., that anything is definable as of faith provided that it is really identical to — even if it is formally distinct from — the revealed deposit, is upheld by at least ninety per cent of postsuarezian theologians under the name of formal confused or equivalent. The great merit of Suárez and Lugo — one that can never be sufficiently appreciated — consists in having endorsed with their great authority the definability of the identical-objective virtual, which is exactly what the ancient theologians simply designated with the terms "virtual" or "implicit". This is what truly constitutes the theological conclusion in the proper and rigorous sense of the term. Anything else is physics (73).

429. BERTHOLD CRASSOUS, Carmelite. — We next quote a theologian from the Order of Carmel. This will at least serve to make it clear that, despite the confusion created by the Salmanticenses with their celebrated *Nego maiorem* (80), one hundred years later the theologians of their order remained faithful in the defense of the traditional doctrine concerning the definability of truly theological conclusions. He has this to say:

"Every theological conclusion, insofar as it is contained in the premises, is of faith in the same manner as it is contained in the premises; so that is *formally* of faith if it is formally contained in the premises, but only *virtually* if it is only virtually contained in them. . ."

"Proof of the second part of the conclusion, viz., that a theological conclusion *virtually contained* in premises of faith, is itself *virtually of faith*. That is virtually of faith which is virtually revealed; for the manner in which something is revealed is the same manner in which it is of faith, otherwise God

<sup>109</sup> *Theologia Speculativa* (Venetis 1764), t.2, *De Fide divina*, d.9, pgs. 374-375.

would not be worthy of belief with regard to something revealed by himself. Now, a conclusion *contained virtually* in a premise or premises of faith is itself *virtually revealed*, for it is revealed in the same manner in which it is contained in the revealed premise. Therefore, it is of faith *virtually*. Hence this conclusion 'Therefore Christ is risible', which is deduced from this antecedent 'Christ is a man', is of faith *only virtually* since it is contained in the antecedent only virtually. However, it should be observed, as Fr. Henry says, that if the Church should define that this proposition is to be held by faith, then it would at once belong to the faith *formally and directly*. This doctrine is opposed by Molina alone, as Suárez testifies."<sup>110</sup>

We think that the Thomist doctrine can neither be more beautifully expressed nor more clearly argued for.

430. MIGUEL HERCE, O.S.B. — The Benedictine Order, always prolific in learned men, is represented by Herce who was for many years a professor at Salamanca and later became the general of his Order. Herce follows the Salmanticenses in almost everything, employing their arguments and even borrowing their very words; but he steers away from them to follow the traditional teaching on the definability of the conclusions by the Church.

"Whether virtual or mediate revelation is the formal object of faith [i.e. per se or without the Church's definition]. The first opinion defends the *affirmative*. . . The second opinion at the extreme opposite teaches. . . that it is not sufficient for the formal object of faith. . . Thomists are generally of this opinion, as are also the Doctor Eximius and many others among the Fathers of the Society of Jesus. Father Molina pushes this theory to such a length as to say that a conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and another that is evident is not of faith even if it should be defined by the Church. . ."

"You will argue, in the first place: It is a truth of faith that God is omnipotent, infinite, and has other similar attributes. But these truths are not immediately revealed. . . Ergo. . ."

"To the proof based on the examples, I concede the major and deny the minor. For that God is incorporeal, infinite and possesses other similar attributes, is found in the Holy Scripture with sufficient immediacy, if not in the same terms, in other terms that are equivalent and have the same meaning, as when the Holy Scripture says that God is a spirit and is omnipotent [hereto everything is taken almost literally from the Salmanticenses whom Herce quotes frequently, but he now goes on to speak on his own], except that such have been defined by the Church and would by this sole title belong to the

<sup>110</sup> *Prolesiones Theologiae* (Romae 1710), t.1, d.5, q.2, nn.8, 23-24, pgs.97-100.

faith, even if there had been no express or equivalent revelation concerning them."<sup>111</sup>

431. ANSELM SCHNELL, O.S.B. — Schnell belongs to the same period and Order. Suffice it to quote only the following from this author.

"In the fourth place, observe that those things are said to be *revealed virtually* which, albeit not being revealed immediately and formally in themselves, are nonetheless contained in some other thing that is formally revealed. On this basis, it is to be held that *virtual* revelation is a sufficient motive of *faith* for the reason that such a virtually revealed thing is *immediately* believed on account of divine revelation."<sup>112</sup>

432. JUAN SANTIAGO SIDRO VILLAROYO, O.S.A. — The Augustinian school is represented by the distinguished Villaroyo. As Aegidius Romanus, Luis de León, Berti, and all the theologians of his school, he too maintains the traditional teaching.

"We call *dogmas* of theology all the things that are revealed by God, or, being deduced from things revealed, are proposed by the universal Church. There is, to be sure, one difference between the *dogmas* and the *articles of faith*, viz. that explicit belief is required with respect to the latter, which is not case with respect to the former. . . . However, since anyone who denies either expressly equally contradicts the faith, it follows that both the dogmas and the articles of faith are *truths of faith* and are deservedly included in the common name of dogmas. Hence some dogmas are *immediately* revealed by God, some others only *mediately*, and the latter are those that are contained in the former and are *derived therefrom by a necessary consequence*."<sup>113</sup>

433. ST. ALPHONSE MARIA LIGUORI. — Setting aside many theologians of this century, in the same way that we made no mention of many of the previous one — although an opportunity will not be wanting to cite some of them further on (477-478) —, we will close this survey of the 18th century with its greatest theologian, one who has deserved to be raised to the ranks of the Doctors of the Church. Although St. Liguori is often quoted more as a moral than a dogmatic theologian, nonetheless his authority with respect to anything is great, not only because of his sacred character as a Doctor of the Church, but also because of the extraordinary impartiality of his theological outlook. He was so free of partisanship, of school or religious family

<sup>111</sup> *Tractatus theologicus* (Mairiti 1760), *De Fide*, tr.2, d.1, nn.84, 94-95, t.3, pg.188.

<sup>112</sup> *Opuscula omnia, De virtutibus theologicis* (Augustae Vindeliarum 1744), n.424.

<sup>113</sup> *Institutiones Christianae Theologiae* (Valentiae 1772), lib. 1, p.3, c.1, pgs. 202-203.

biases, that in our opinion he is in this regard without peer among scholastic theologians, if we except St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure.

"Indeed, all propositions condemned by the Popes, although not all are heretical but some temerarious, others erroneous, scandalous, etc., nonetheless, once they are defined by the Pope, it is to be held as of faith that such propositions are truly temerarious or tainted by some such other censure as the Pope has declared them to be."<sup>114</sup>

"Indeed, even if our view [concerning the Blessed Virgin's preservation from original sin] has not yet been defined by the Church, still it can well be held as of faith. . . . For St. Thomas says that we can believe as of faith not only those things that we hold by infused faith, but also those things that we perceive through *theological conclusions*."<sup>115</sup>

434. RESUME OF THE 18th CENTURY. — It is thus clear that all these 18th century writers keep upholding, as those of the earlier centuries, the definability of the truly theological conclusions as of divine faith. Each one expresses it in his own way. There is a great variety of opinion regarding particular details, but all are agreed on the evolution of dogma by way of virtuality or of consequence in the proper sense of the term.

#### 19th Century

435. NEW THOMIST REVIVAL. — If the 18th century can be described as a century of decadence for theology, this description is even truer of the 19th century, especially during the first two thirds of it that preceded Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris*. With the revival of the study of St. Thomas initiated by this immortal Pope, Catholic philosophy and theology began to flourish anew. Still, we are yet a long way from being able to claim philosophers and theologians of the caliber of those of the 16th and 17th centuries, not to speak of the excellence of those of the 13th. From the relatively few theologians who have written in the 19th century and in what has transpired of the 20th, we will quote only a handful in order to show that the traditional doctrine on dogmatic evolution by way of theological conclusions has been and is being taught as in the previous centuries.

436. LEOPOLD LIEBERMANN. — Let us begin with the pious and equally learned Alsatian theologian Liebermann, whose *Institutiones Theologicae* contributed in a very large measure to the promotion of sound theological studies during the first half of the 19th century.

<sup>114</sup> *Theologia Moralis* (ed.6, P. Gaudé Romae 1905), lib.1, n.103, t.1, pg.84.

<sup>115</sup> *Op.cit.*, lib.7, n.262, t.4, pg.407.

"But if the *conclusion* is deduced from the faith by an *evident consequence*, then it must be said to belong to the faith, at least mediately and indirectly; and the theologian who comprehends the strength of the argument must assent to it as a *truth belonging to the faith*. And do not say that in this case reason produces faith, for such a conclusion does not belong to the faith precisely because it is deduced from the premises by a legitimate consequence, but because *through such procedure it becomes clear that it is already contained in the revealed premise*. Reason sees the consequence, faith embraces the consequent as *contained in the sources of revelation*. Hence reason is only the means and the instrument whereby it becomes certain for me that the conclusion is contained in a directly revealed dogma. I do once this fact becomes clear to me, I then assent to it with firm belief on the *authority of the revealing God*."<sup>116</sup>

This is exactly what Vázquez taught. Dogmatic evolution is upheld, but to excess, since it is considered as of faith or dogmatic prior to the Church's definition.

437. HILARY OF PARIS, Capuchin. — This eminent Capuchin theologian expresses himself no less clearly, but with much greater precision and with a rigorously Thomist criterion. The following passage deserves to be transcribed despite being somewhat lengthy.

"Now the conclusions derived from the faith are of three categories accordingly as they carry either *faith*, or *certainty*, or *probability*.

"*Conclusions of faith* are those which are *deduced* from the revealed word of God *infallibly with respect to the Church*. . . . For the Church not only preserves, but also *infallibly explicates* the word revealed by God. However, this explication is not done through a new revelation. Hence it is necessary that the Church bring to this task the use of her reason, but with the Holy Spirit's assistance so that the Church's reasoning shall proceed infallibly. Now, when it is *infallibly* established that a thing is *connected* with the word of God in such a manner that it cannot be denied unless the word itself of God is denied, then it becomes plain that *such a thing is also revealed by God and belongs to the faith*.

"*Conclusions of theological certainty* are those that are taught by the unanimous and constant agreement of theologians. Such conclusions are close to the truth of faith and so have a certainty that neighbours on divine infallibility. *For the Church makes use of these theological conclusions in order to determine the conclusions of faith*. . . . But are they to be believed as objects of faith [prior to the Church's definition]? *This is an issue debated by theologians themselves*. Hence, there are those who dis-

<sup>116</sup> *Institutiones Theologiae* (Lovanii 1832), prol., t.1, pg.34.

tinguish, with Veronio, two kinds of faith, viz. *divine* and *Catholic*. . . . Thus, something could be of divine faith, and not of Catholic faith, e.g., in the case of a learned man who evidently perceives that something is contained in revelation, which is not proposed by the Church. And this seems to be the opinion of Fr. Perrone. . . . Nevertheless, this distinction [which is as old as Vázquez], even if *recently* it has been well regarded by many, is to be *rejected upon maturer consideration* because it is based on a false assumption, viz. that the *medium or organ whereby divine faith is proposed* can be of two kinds: one universal, which is the Church, and the other particular, which is the *science* whereby the learned are constrained to believe that which the Church has not promulgated. But there is *only one medium or organ whereby the faith is promulgated, Holy Mother Church*. Science, indeed, is the medium whereby theological conclusions are unearthed, but it is not a medium endowed with *divine infallibility* which Christ bestowed on the Church alone. Now, without divine infallibility, the word of God is not *divinely* proposed as the word of God, but as the word of men, as the *word of science*. . . . Hence the conclusions of theologians [without the Church's definition] are capable of engendering *certainty*, but are not sufficient for the *faith*.

"Nor does such a conclusion belong more to the faith because it issues out of *two revealed premises*, if it is not one of those that are usually *taught universally by the Church*. . . . Hence, for the theologian himself the *conclusion of science*, albeit certain, will never be a *conclusion of faith* as long as it is not transmitted by an infallible organ, for the *theologian and the simple faithful stand on equal footing in matters of faith*."<sup>117</sup>

438. TRULY PRICELESS are all the preceding paragraphs. In our opinion, they constitute the most faithful possible expression of the genuine Thomist position — the mean between the positions of Vázquez and Molina — which is reflected in the preceding work. One seems to be reading one of the classic expositors of Thomist teaching in the 16th century.

439. CARDINAL MAZZELLA, S.J. — We come now to one of the many illustrious theologians that have brought honour to the Society of Jesus and its famous Gregorian University in the 19th century. Cardinal Mazzella has this to say:

"Having completed these explanations, it should be observed that everybody concedes that truths *formally* contained in explicitly revealed truths [the *implicit-formal*] are themselves *revealed* truths, and, consequently, the material object of *faith*. . . .

<sup>117</sup> *Theologia Universalis* (Parisii 1868), introd., t.1, pgs.126-128.

"Theologians dispute whether the same is true of those truths that are contained only *virtually* in explicitly revealed truths. . . . In the case of a truth explicitly [the implicit virtual or identico-real] contained in another that is explicitly revealed, with which it is nonetheless only *really* and *not formally* the same, Ripalda, the Wireburgenses and others hold that such a truth is not revealed; however, De Lugo, Suárez [and all theologians prior to Molina] hold the contrary. *I am of the view that one should subscribe to this opinion.* For an object that is thus implicit in another that is explicitly revealed, is *truly said by God*. For God intends to manifest that which can be signified to those to whom the speech is directed by the sign which he employs. But the sign manifesting one object is capable of signifying to men also another object that is *only formally different*, if the *real identity* of both one and the other can be known by us *without a new revelation*. Therefore . . .

"Thus it is correctly said that the non-revealed premise is employed in this case to understand the *signification* of the divine speech, and not properly to infer some other thing *connected* with it. [The reader will please observe the meaning given by post-Suarezian authors to "by reason of *signification*" and "by reason of *connexion*."] Thus, on this basis, it is said that the *metaphysical* property of any nature whatsoever is credible by faith on account of the revelation of the nature itself; but it is otherwise in the case of a *physical* property which is supposed to be *really different* and *separable* from the nature at least by God's absolute power.

"But in the case of an object that is said to be contained in another that is explicitly revealed inasmuch as it is *only connected* to or follows from it (they call this a *properly virtual* comprehension), the same Suárez, De Lugo, etc., *deny that such an object is per se* said by God and credible by divine faith. Hence they say that a conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and another naturally evident is not per se revealed, if the latter premise does not explicate the *signification* of the former premise, but shows the *connexion* of an object with that which is explicitly revealed in the premise. I would here employ the distinction which seems to be *in accordance with the mind of these doctors*,<sup>118</sup> for either the implicit object *follows the explicitly revealed truth in such a manner that it can under no hypothesis be separated from it* [neither Suárez, nor Lugo, nor Mazzella, nor so many others, have observed that this is exactly the case in every rigorously theological, metaphysical, or mathematical conclusion . . .], and then *I would say that such a conclusion is revealed*, since otherwise the truth of the explicitly revealed object cannot stand at all; or *it can be separated from it, at least by God's absolute power*

<sup>118</sup> Suárez expressly indicates this distinction, *De Fide*, d. 3, s. 11, n. 12.

[this is the case only in *physics*, on in conclusions of type 4], and then the opinion of Suárez, Lugo, etc., comes up once again."<sup>119</sup>

We have allowed the transcription of this long passage for two reasons. One, to make it plain that this very learned theologian extends as we do, the scope of dogmatic evolution to include everything that, although formally different, is nonetheless really identical to the revealed deposit, i.e. to all the deposit's implicit virtuality. Two, to make it clear once more that Suárez, Lugo, and all their later disciples, include under the name of formal confused or equivalent the whole of implicit virtuality, and employ the term proper virtual to mean the non-implicit or type 4 virtual.

440. CARDINAL FRANZELIN, S.J. -- Next to Cardinal Mazzella's we cite the even more illustrious name of Cardinal Franzelin, of the same Society of Jesus, and his successor in the professorship at the Gregorian University. Anyone who has read nothing by Franzelin but his classic *De Divina Traditione et Scriptura* will form the impression that he is opposed to all dogmatic evolution: so forcibly and well does he stress dogma's first characteristic, viz., its objective immutability, that there seems to be no room left for its second characteristic, to wit, its development or evolution within that same objective immutability. But anyone who has read his treatise *De Deo Uno* and the excellent introduction on the nature of theology which prefaces it, will have been convinced that Cardinal Franzelin admits, although with a different phraseology, an evolution of the same amplitude as that described by Cardinal Mazzella. Witness the following passage:

"Whenever it is certain that both premises are revealed truths, or whenever one premise already contains implicitly that which is enunciated in the conclusion, while the other, which might not be revealed, evidently manifests the conclusion's comprehension in the revealed premise [this happens in the case of every reasoning the minor of which is metaphysically certain, as Franzelin himself says at the end], there is no doubt that the truth enunciated in such a conclusion is itself revealed. . . . An example of a conclusion under the latter form [i.e., a conclusion inferred from a revealed and a non-revealed premise] can be brought against the Monothelists. The revealed proposition that [Christ has, aside from a divine nature, a perfect human nature in virtue of which he is a true man [meaning to say perfect man, otherwise there would be no implicitness], already contains the other truths that Christ has, aside from a divine will, also a rational will and human volitions. Hence, when another proposition is assumed in order to complete the argument: Christ is true man; but it is essential to man to have the power of a rational will; therefore Christ has a human will: the assumed proposition only

<sup>119</sup> *De virtutibus infusis* (ed. 6, Romae 1909), d. 2, a. 7, nn. 413-414, pgs. 210-212.

makes manifest the comprehension of this conclusion in the revealed proposition. On this basis, the truth of the consequent can be considered in two ways: either formally as revealed by God, and then in such a case to the proposition corresponds the *assent of faith* . . .

"But if one of the premises is revealed and the other is certain only by the light of reason, and if what is enunciated in the conclusion is *not contained except in both premises taken together* [this can never be the case where the minor is a proposition of metaphysical certainty, as he later on confesses], that which is enunciated in the conclusion, indeed, is *certain* [with moral certainty, but not with metaphysical, let alone *theological* certainty], but it will not be contained simpliciter in revelation, and thus it is *not an object of divine faith*, but only of theological assent that is grounded partly on the revealed, and partly on the naturally certain truth of the premises. It is, e.g., revealed that the sacrament of Baptism confers grace on those who put up no hindrances to it. If I see an infant being baptized by such a minister and in such a manner that no suspicion can be had concerning the value of the sacrament, the fact that this infant is validly baptized is certain, but not withal revealed. Hence the conclusion that this infant is justified is *theologically certain*, but not of faith. [It is obvious that in his efforts to find an instance of theological conclusion that is not a rigorously theological conclusion, not by a long shot. But this is quite accidental. The essential point we wish to underscore with this quotation from Franzelin is embodied in the statements that follow next, to which we invite the reader's attention]. What, on the other hand, Cano and Vega [why does he leave Vázquez out?] maintain, viz., that a proposition deduced from a premise of faith and one that is naturally evident is itself an object of faith, is *not really contrary*: for they speak of a conclusion that is totally contained in the revealed premise in such a way that the naturally evident proposition only serves to make manifest the comprehension of the conclusion in the other revealed premise; and that this is what they mean can be easily shown from the examples that they use to make their position plain. [Here now is the juiciest part.] *Indeed, in these theological syllogisms the naturally certain proposition serves FOR THE MOST PART only to make manifest the comprehension of the conclusion in the revealed premise, and this is particularly true where the certainty is METAPHYSICAL; and, consequently, these conclusions are implicitly contained in the objective revelation and, hence, they can be explicitly proposed and defined by the Church as propositions to be held by faith.*"<sup>120</sup>

<sup>120</sup> *De Deo Uno* (ed. altera Romae 1876), prol. de *Theologiae obiecto*, pgs. 21-23.

Three things are worthy of note in this passage from the illustrious cardinal. First, he admits that for the most part (plerumque) theological conclusions are inclusive and definable as of divine faith. Second, he admits that this is especially true in the case of conclusions where the minor is metaphysically certain, or what is exactly the same, in the case of every rigorously metaphysical, since for us and for every Thomist who knows whereof he is speaking, no rigorously theological conclusion can be anything but a metaphysical conclusion. Third, when Cano and Vega and Vázquez spoke of conclusions of faith, they had in mind such metaphysical-inclusive conclusions. This is clear, since prior to Suárez no one had ever conceived the idea of calling the physico-connexive conclusion a rigorous conclusion.

Franzelin is quite right in saying that Cano and Vázquez understood by conclusions the *implicit* conclusions, since to the best of our knowledge no theologian prior to Suárez has taken the non-implicit or physico-connexive as the theological conclusion. "For the theologian gathers *his conclusions from the principles of faith revealed by God, and explicates such conclusions implicit in the principles themselves by a natural argumentation.*"<sup>121</sup> "As we have often said elsewhere, neither the councils nor the Pontiff of the Apostolic See nor the Fathers who interpret the Scripture; give new revelations to the faithful, but such revelations as the Church received from the apostles they either *articulate, or interpret, or gather the things that certainly follow from or are connected with them, make plain the things that are contrary and inconsistent.*"<sup>122</sup> Plainly, Cano takes as identical the theological connected and the implicit, since the non-implicit is not theological, nor metaphysical, nor mathematical, but physical.

441. SANTOS SCHIFFINI and WILLIAM WILMERS, S.J. — To the preceding two let us add another distinguished theologian from the same Society of Jesus. Having correctly denied that the revealed virtual is of divine faith *per se* or without the Church's definition — and on this point every true Thomist should align himself with Ripalda and the Wirceburgenes, and not with Vázquez and so many others — he clearly admits that it is of divine faith after the Church's definition. The following text should suffice:

"You will insist: The Church defines not only things that are found formally implicitly in the divine-apostolic teaching, but also many things that, albeit not formally implicit in this teaching, are nonetheless connected with it with a necessary bond. But, as earlier pointed out, this necessary bond is not

<sup>121</sup> CANO, *De Locis*, 8, 2.

<sup>122</sup> *Op.cit.*, 12, 3.

sufficient to make us say that these conclusions are implicitly revealed or implicit of faith. Therefore.

"I answer conceding the major and distinguishing the minor: if the bond alone is taken into account, and apart from the Church's definition that might have been added, I concede; with the added definition of the Church, I deny."<sup>123</sup>

Wilmers has the following interesting paragraphs:

"Whatever has been revealed by God can be held with divine faith. But it has been revealed by God that each and every act of the supreme magistratum is infallible in deciding and determining matters that pertain to religion, or infallibly declaring that a certain teaching is revealed, that some other teaching is opposed to the revealed doctrine either *immediately* or *mediately*, that the teaching of this or that book is in conformity with or in opposition to the revealed truth. Consequently, on the strength of divine revelation, and thus with *divine faith*, it can be believed that each and every defining act of the supreme magistratum is infallible, i.e., that the Church infallibly declares that a certain teaching is revealed, that some other teaching is opposed to a revealed doctrine either immediately or mediately. Now, in believing that the Church infallibly declares that a certain teaching is revealed, that some other teaching is either immediately or mediately opposed to a revealed doctrine, we at the same time *implicitly* believe that the teaching is really as the Church declares it to be; for the *act* cannot be conceived without its object.

"The second proof is taken from the simultaneous concurrence of two motives. When two motives concur or equally offer themselves as grounds for asserting something, it is left to our discretion to assent to a thing on the strength of either one or the other. Now, then, whenever the Church by her supreme judgment defines that a thing is so, two motives for asserting the truth of the definition offer themselves equally to us: one is the created authority of the Church; the other is the *authority of God who reveals* that the Church is infallible in all her supreme judgments, and thus also in this or that particular one. Consequently, we can accept what the Church defines as infallibly defined either on account of the Church's authority, or on account of the *authority of the revealing God*. If we hold it to be infallibly defined on account of the latter, we make an act of *divine faith* . . .

"First corollary: In the supposition that the Church is infallible in the solemn canonization of the Saints, it can by all be held with *divine faith* that deceased canonized person is one of the blessed . . .

<sup>123</sup>S. SCHIFFINI, *Tractatus de Viriutibus infusis* (Friburgi Brigoviae 1904), d.3, s.4, solvuntur obiectiones, n.130, pg.225.

"Second corollary: After the condemnation of the five propositions taken from Jansen's book, anyone can believe with *divine faith* that those five propositions, as contained in Jansen's book, are alien to the faith."<sup>124</sup>

442. PARTHENSIVS MINGUES, O.F.M. — As a representative of the Franciscan school in this century we cite the learned professor of theology in Munich, the Very Rev. Fr. Parthenius Mingués, whose *Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae* is greatly esteemed by all as a guide to the minds of St. Bonaventure and Scotus.

"In all these cases [where something is contained as a particular in the universal, or as a part in the whole] the conclusions can be said to be *formally* revealed, since it becomes manifest immediately by the mere explanation of terms, hence there is need only for an *explanatory syllogism*.

"But there is no *dogma* if the theological conclusion is included in another truth only *virtually*, *mediately*, more or less obscurely, such that there is need for *proper argumentation* in order to know the truth that is included in another. For instance, assume that this proposition is revealed: The soul is *spiritual*. From the soul's spirituality it can be deduced that it *cannot be generated* and that it is immediately produced by God himself. However, this conclusion requires *true ratiocination*; it does not follow at once from considering the term 'spirit'. Hence this truth is *not a dogma*.

"However, this conclusion can become a *dogma of faith* through the Church's proposition, or at least a Catholic truth. Thus, although it is only *virtually* revealed, the proposition that Mary was immaculately conceived is now become a dogma. It is of such conclusions that Scotus says (4 Sent., d.5, q.1, n.7): 'There are other truths that need not be necessarily believed explicitly either by the latter [the learned] or by the former [the simple Christians] because their truth has not yet been declared and determined by the Church; and of this kind there are many conclusions necessarily included in the articles of faith, but before they are declared and explicated by the Church it is not necessary for anyone to believe them; however, it is necessary to opine soberly about them, so that one is ready to accept them at such a time when their truth shall have been declared."<sup>125</sup>

In these paragraphs Fr. Mingués correctly expresses the traditional teaching that we already know. The revealed virtual is not of divine faith of itself or without the definition, but it can become of divine faith with the definition. By the way, the reader will do well to pay closer attention to the

<sup>124</sup>De Fide divina (Ratisbonae 1902), nn.262-263, 271.

<sup>125</sup>Compendium Theologiae dogmaticae generalis (Monachii 1902), pg.241.

passage from Scotus quoted by Fr. Mingués, which we have quoted earlier (372). As everybody admits, Scotus speaks there of theological conclusions in the *proper sense*. This notwithstanding, he calls the Church's definition of such conclusions by the names of *declaration, determination, or explication*, exactly as St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. Let this be a reminder to certain modern theologians who seem to have lost the key to the nomenclature employed by the great masters of the 13th and 14th centuries of this subject (506).

443. HONORATO DEL VAL and AURELIUS PALMIERI, O.S.A. — We come next to a theologian no less distinguished than the preceding ones, who has maintained in the 19th century the glorious theological traditions of the Augustinian school. His excellent textbook of dogmatic theology can stand comparison with the best written in the previous century.

"If in the explicitly revealed there be *virtually* contained some other thing which is *altogether inseparable from it* [only such cases are regarded by Thomists as rigorously theological conclusions], then this other thing is more probably to be considered as a *per se object of divine faith* [a Thomist would call it *definable* as of divine faith], although to us, on account of a defect of knowledge, it is not always an object necessarily to be believed.

"Particularly with respect to these things that are *virtually* revealed theologians debate whether they are *per se* objects of *divine faith*. In the present inquiry, there is nothing else to add to what we have said in the preliminary treatise to dogmatic theology, namely:

"Melchor Cano, Bellarmine and other theologians of great renown maintain the *affirmative* . . . However, many theologians, with Veronius and the Salamanticenses, defend the *negative* . . . The *affirmative answer* pleases me in the case of conclusions that are *logically necessary* [*metaphysical connexion*] in such a way that the denial of the *consequent proposition* cannot be sustained without *implying the denial of the divinely revealed premise*."<sup>126</sup>

Let us add the testimony of another well known Augustinian theologian, Fr. Palmieri, whose *Theologia Dogmatica Orthodoxa* is highly regarded by all.

"Catholic theology teaches that an *increase* which is declarative of the *faith, viz., dogmatic progress in a sense (secundum quid), or, in the words of St. Anselm, 'the progress of the faithful in the faith rather than of the faith in the faithful'*, effected through the Church endowed with the divine prerogative of an infallible magisterium, is possible, necessary, real.

<sup>126</sup>HONORATUS DEL VAL, O.S.A., *Sacra Theologia Dogmatica* (Matrii 1906), *De Virtutibus infusis*, c.2, nn.44-45, t.2, pgs.660-661.

"Before proceeding to the proof of the thesis, the distinction between things that are held by *divine faith explicitly or implicitly* must be made clear . . . Anyone who believes, e.g., that the soul is a *spiritual nature*, by the same token *implicitly* believes that the soul is *simple, incorruptible, rational, etc.*, all of which are requirements of any spiritual nature . . . To deny this is to say that God has commanded man to bury in the ground the treasures he has given, that he has revealed the principles of a more exalted science from which man has no right whatsoever to deduce conclusions."<sup>127</sup>

444. JOACHIM BERTHIER, O.P. — Let us now mention the name of a distinguished Dominican who is equally a theologian, a historian, and an artist. His *De Locis Theologicis* is, in our opinion, one of the best modern supplements to Melchor Cano's thrice secular, yet ever perennial, work. Fr. Berthier writes:

"Among men no truth is found that is *wholly and at once* comprehended and expressed both *in itself and in its consequences*. Inasmuch as he is composed of body and soul by a substantial unity, man has nothing in the intellect that was not earlier in the senses, and consequently he requires *discourse* and must investigate truths with slow and measured steps. He, thus, attains truth dispersed, as it were, in pieces and does not, as the angel, see all the *consequences and connexions* in the grasped principle. Now, innumerable other truths are connected with every and each truth, especially the higher ones or those of the supernatural order, *which it was neither easy nor useful to express at the same time*. These truths are said to be expressed *implicitly*, because they are not asserted in themselves but in *other truths*. Thus, when the Holy Spirit revealed the *principles*, he also revealed the *consequences* . . . For if one cannot be denied without the *ruin* of the other, this shows that there is the *greatest connexion* between the two, and that *the revelation of the one is contained in the revelation of the other* . . . Now, since the Holy Spirit, who is the author of divine traditions, sees in all truths all the *connexed truths*, it follows that he also willed to reveal the latter . . . Thus, it is easy to discern the truths on which the Church exercises her magisterium. First . . . Secondly . . . Thirdly, all the truths that are inferred by a *necessary conclusion* from some revealed truth. For everyone knows that that which is said explicitly, and that which is said implicitly, come from the same author . . . This can also be gathered from innumerable instances of the Church Fathers and Doctors who defended the truth and rejected error, even *dogmatically, by means of conclusions deduced from the Scriptures*."<sup>128</sup>

<sup>127</sup>AURELIUS PALMIERI, O.S.A., *Theologia dogmatica orthodoxa* (Florentiae 1911), t.1, pgs.45-47.

<sup>128</sup>*De Locis Theologicis* (Augustae Taurinorum 1888), nn.71-72, 80, 171, 274.



445. ALEXIS LEPICIER, O.S.M. — This famous theologian, professor of the College of the Propaganda in Rome, and General of the Servite Order, is well-known to everybody. His clarity, conciseness, faithfulness to St. Thomas, and his profoundly conservative criterion in all questions are recognized by all. His opinion on this subject follows:

"Hence *divine-Catholic faith* comprises all those things that the Church through her infallible magisterium proposes to us for belief as *formally* or *virtually* contained in written revelation or in Tradition. *Formally*, insofar as the truth is expressed and signified in God's written word or in Tradition in so many words, or their *equivalents*. *Virtually*, insofar as it is by a *logical process* deduced from a formally revealed truth. . . . And, indeed, if the Church's authority be brought into play, such a conclusion [the *virtually* revealed] is itself to be held by *divine Catholic faith*; otherwise, it will remain a *merely theological conclusion*."<sup>129</sup>

The author could have hardly expressed more plainly in so few lines how dogmatic evolution by way of true virtuality or conclusion is possible, how such evolution is merely theological prior to the definition, and how it becomes dogmatic after the Church's definition. This is the true Thomist position which is the mean between Molina's and Vázquez's.

446. M. M. TUYAERTS, O.P. — Next we quote an illustrious Belgian Dominican, Fr. Tuyerts.

"It is enough to review the definitions promulgated by the Church in order to find, from the first centuries up to the present, an astonishingly large number of theological conclusions defined as revealed by God, as truths to be believed with divine faith. To cite but a few examples: the Church has defined that the intellectual soul is *per se and essentially* the substantial form of the human body; that in administering the sacraments the minister must have the intention of doing what the Church does, that the baptism conferred by heretics is valid; that this sacrament is not to be reiterated in the case of those who fall into apostasy; that the Blessed Virgin Mary has been conceived without original sin; that when the Pope proclaims ex cathedra revealed doctrines on faith or morals, he is infallible, etc. It is certain, on the one hand, that the doctrinal points just cited, taken at random from hundreds of others, are not immediately revealed truths; it would be rewardless to look for them in the deposit of faith under the given tenor or under an equivalent form. On the other hand, it is no less certain that the Church proposes these doctrines as divine and Catholic dogmas, as truths to be believed with divine and Catholic faith. . . . We can boldly conclude that *the Church, through the constant exer-*

<sup>129</sup> *De stabilitate et progressu dogmatis* (Romae 1910), pgs. 22-23.

*cise of her infallible magisterium, teaches that theological conclusions can become dogmas of faith.*"<sup>130</sup>

447. OTHER AUTHORS. — The list of authors we have just cited could be broadened to include the names of many other distinguished theologians, particularly from the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, some of whom we will have the opportunity to quote later on (477-478).

Even limiting ourselves to contemporary theologians, we could have mentioned many very famous names who deny dogmatic evolution only to reaffirm it subsequently without being aware of their inconsistency.

For instance, we could have quoted the Jesuit Christian Pesch, who writes: "But a question arises here: Is this *consequent meaning* a true meaning of the Scriptures? I answer that a distinction must be drawn between those things that *logically follow*, and those things that by human consideration are linked to the literal sense on account of some sort of similitude. Where a *necessary logical connexion* exists, the *consequent* meaning is not undeservedly said to be a *meaning of the Scriptures*. For, even if not every man can be said to want to express by his words all the things that can be correctly deduced from them to *the last conclusions*, since perhaps he might not have the slightest suspicion of these conclusions, nonetheless, the *Holy Spirit*, who knows very well what is contained in his words, and what men will legitimately deduce from them, is *correctly said to have wanted to express all these things*."<sup>131</sup> What is all this but the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusion in the proper sense of the term?

We could also have quoted the classical commentator of the Vatican Council, Vacant, who says: "But this controversy [viz., whether the revealed virtual is truly revealed and definable as of divine faith, or not] is of little importance from the point of view with which we are concerned, if one ob-serves with Cardinal Mazella<sup>132</sup> that one must *certainly regard as revealed* every truth which, although not expressed in any of the formulae of Scripture or Tradition, is nonetheless *attached* to these formulae in such a way that one may well think that, in revealing the dogmas affirmed in the formulae, God also intended to manifest such truths. In communicating his revelations to us God has, in effect, accommodated himself to our human way of manifesting our thoughts. Now, when a man speaks, he intends to make known not only what he affirms, but also all that he *implies* and particularly *all the thoughts that must be attributed to him in order to reconcile his affirmations*. . . . Since God possesses infinite knowledge and knows perfectly *all the dogmas without*

<sup>130</sup> *L'évolution du dogme* (Louvain 1919), pgs. 88-89.

<sup>131</sup> *De inspiratione Sacrae Scripturae* (Friburgi Brigoviae 1906), n. 563.

<sup>132</sup> *De Virtutibus infusis*, n. 478.

which men would not be able to reconcile the truths formulated in its revelation in proper terms, there is all the more reason to think that he has willed to manifest these dogmas in revealing those truths. Consequently, it is possible to consider as revealed and as contained in the deposit of Catholic tradition all those doctrinal points, which are as yet undefined by the Church, but which it will be necessary to admit in order to reconcile among themselves the truths of the Catholic faith . . . Hence the Church can define as belonging to the faith all the truths without which the dogmas heretofore believed cannot be harmonized. It is possible that these truths should have been completely unknown in themselves. It is even possible that some authors should have impugned them before their definition, for it might be that these authors could not see that the truths which they rejected had a necessary connexion with the dogmas they admitted."<sup>133</sup> What is all this but an admission of the evolution of dogma by way of proper theological conclusion?

We could have in this manner cited many other modern theologians. We have refrained from so doing in order to cite only those who defined it clearly and consistently, without denying in some place the same thing that they affirm in some other place.

The reader will have noticed that the writers we have quoted admit dogmatic evolution by way of proper theological conclusion in a variety of ways, but all agree in admitting it. Some give it a wider scope than others. There are those who regard it as dogmatic or of divine faith in the manner of Vázquez and Vega, i.e., even prior to the Church's definition. Others, in true Thomist fashion, do not regard it as formally of divine faith except after the Church's definition. However, they are all one in admitting true evolution of dogma by way of properly theological conclusions.

448. COROLLARY — This small historical study should make it possible for any unprejudiced reader to draw as a bare minimum the following conclusion: anyone who affirms that the view defending the evolution of dogma by way of proper theological conclusions is of recent origin, or accepted by a handful of theologians, or contrary to the common opinion of the Thomist school, or a dangerous doctrine, simply shows himself uninform of the history of this problem.

<sup>133</sup> *Constitutions du Concile du Vatican*, vol. 2, n. 849, pgs. 293-294.

## SECTION V

## THE TRUE MIND OF MELCHOR CANO CONCERNING THE DEFINABILITY OF THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS AS TRUTHS OF FAITH

449. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION. — In the course of this work we have frequently promised to investigate the mind of Melchor Cano on the nature and definability of the theological conclusion as a truth of faith. We shall now keep our promise. The theological conclusion is, as it were, the focal point of the very serious problem of dogmatic development, and it will be worthwhile to find what is on this subject the genuine mind of the illustrious founder of the discipline of *De Locis Theologicis*, the great genius that is undoubtedly one of the greatest glories of Catholic theology and, in the opinion of Natalis Alexander, the first among Dominican theologians after the Angelic Doctor.<sup>134</sup>

<sup>134</sup>. Melchor Cano left behind in the twelve books of *De Locis Theologicis* an everlasting monument of his genius, teaching and industriousness . . . Whose genius I regard most highly above all other writers of the Dominican Order second to St. Thomas's angelical mind." (NATALIS ALEXANDER, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, saec. XVI, c. 5, a. 2, n. 18) — "He acquired immortal fame by that work whose volume can hardly be called large, of which there are as many praisers and admirers as there are readers, viz., the twelve books of *De Locis Theologicis*." (NICOLAS ANTONIO) — "Outstanding as much in doctrine as in genius; great in fame, greater in reality. I mean Melchor Cano, who was the first and the foremost to accomplish in a truly golden book this same study of *De Locis Theologicis*." (CARDINAL FALLAVICINI, S.J.) — "I can most truthfully affirm that . . . in the academy of doctors of the Dominican Order, Melchor Cano can single-handed take the place of a whole army." (FRANCISCO GARCIA, S.J.) — "He was a man of greatest and brightest fame. No one since his time has better explained the mysteries of the Holy Scriptures." (BENITO PEREIRA, S.J.) — "He wrote that most erudite book entitled *De Locis Theologicis* which is today widely and deservedly found in everybody's hands. Which are the chief loci that serve the theologian to establish his conclusions, and are as the foundations on which the whole structure of theology is to be built, are in this book by him so remarkably, accurately and eloquently settled that nothing could be more accurate and accomplished." (SIXTUS SESENSIS) — "The treatise on *De Locis Theologicis* is indeed a thoroughly golden book, perfectly accomplished in all its parts, and put together with the greatest elegance." (ELIAS DUPIN) — "That eminent author wrote a complete and golden book on the twelve Loci, which I would describe as a real treasure extracted from various mines, in which nothing is included that is not precious, not tested by fire, not roundly finished . . . Any attentive and serious reader will readily confess that (with the sole exception of the Fathers of the Church) there hardly is any book within the memory of men that is richer in content, or more suitable in method, or more plentiful in variety, or more polished in phrasing, or more remarkable in the disposition of everything: in it, indeed, exceptionally brilliant elegance, lofty wisdom, and profound erudition vie for honours." (VINCENT CONTENSON).

In this section we intend to show that there has been a confusion concerning the mind of Melchor Cano on this question, and that this confusion has been uncritically handed down from one to another to the point that it is common tender today.

In effect, it is commonplace to find in theological writers the assertion that Melchor Cano maintained, with Vázquez and Vega, that the *theological conclusions are of divine faith*. Let the reader look up in any theological treatise the question whether theological conclusions or the revealed mediate or virtual are of divine faith or not. He will invariably find some such statement as the following: "The first opinion maintains that these theological conclusions are of faith and, consequently, that it suffices for the faith that they be virtually revealed or virtually contained in revelation. Thus says Cano in book 6 of *De Locis*, last chapter *ad decimum*; more at length *Vega* in book 9 on the Tridentine, ch.39; and *Vázquez*, part 1, disp.5, ch.3."

Those are Suárez's words.<sup>135</sup> The majority of authors express themselves in similar terms, invariably quoting the same place mentioned by Suárez, which Vázquez had earlier quoted for his own purposes, viz. the *Ad decimum* of the last chapter of Book 6 of Cano's immortal work.

450. MELCHOR CANO'S TEXT. — Let us begin by quoting literally the passage that has given rise to this question, Melchor Cano's famous *Ad decimum*. "Finally, this should also be observed (for it is an important thing and worthy of diligent consideration) that to the *Catholic doctrine* pertains not only what has been expressly revealed to the Apostles, but also that which is *produced by an evident syllogism and inference from a revealed proposition and one that is certain in the light of nature.*"

Many other encomiums by distinguished writers can be found in SERRY's introduction to his edition of Cano's works. Today the fundamental course *De Locis* is often studied in modern *compendiums* and as a consequence Cano is neither read nor quoted that no one who studies or reads the classic and imperishable work of the founder of *De Locis* with the leisure that it deserves and compares it with what has been in modern times written on the subject, can fail to subscribe to the judgment of the distinguished and competent Fr. Berthier who says of Cano: *He absolutely was and HAS REMAINED the foremost.* "Thus the very same man who was the first discoverer of the science of the *Locis* THEOLOGICI was not just the author of the same discipline, but *absolutely was and HAS REMAINED its foremost exponent*, even if some things are to be added to his work or changed therefrom on account of the greater development of some sciences." (BERTHIER, *De Locis Theologicis* [Augustae Taurinorum 1888], prol., pg. 8). In turn Cano regards Cajetan as the greatest of St. Thomas's students: "Cajetan, who, I dare say, is the most outstanding of our family in acumen and erudition." (*De Locis*, lib.12, c.5.) It is well known that by the phrase *our own or our family* Cano usually means the Thomist school. "To us, that is, St. Thomas's family." (*Op. cit.*, lib.9, c.9).

<sup>135</sup>*De Fide*, 1.3, c.11, n.2.

This is all that Melchor Cano wrote in his often quoted *Ad decimum*, adding in support three examples which we place in a footnote because of their great length.<sup>136</sup> This text is the basis of the widespread persuasion that Melchor Cano defended, as Vega and Vázquez seem to have defended, the view that the theological conclusion is of *divine faith* in the sense that it is *immediately* of divine faith, as the phrase is commonly understood today.

<sup>136</sup>After the quoted words Cano continues: "As, e.g., that Christ the Lord has two wills and two intellects, and that likewise each of these has a created and an uncreated action, or that Christ is of his own nature capable of laughter as all other men, these things perhaps are not expressed in the Sacred Scriptures. However, since it is therein delivered that the Son of God is a man, and it is by natural reason certain that every man is endowed with a created will and intellect, and with the created operations of each of those two powers, and similarly that even as every man is capable of tears so is he capable of laughter; anyone who denies any of these things will be regarded as a heretic. For this reason: that by denying the consequent, viz. that the Son of God is endowed with a created intellect and intellect, he therefore denies the antecedent from which it was gathered, viz. that the Son of God is a man. Here is another example. That the Council of Nicaea, or of Chalcedon, or of Ephesus, did not err in the faith is not expressed either in the Sacred Books or in the Traditions of the Apostles except only for the assertion that Councils legitimately gathered in the Holy Spirit cannot err. But that the Councils of Nicaea, Chalcedon, Ephesus, were legitimately gathered is not believed on the basis of revelation. It is however so believed on the basis of human faith and the account of trustworthy history by which we know that these Synods convened from all the parts of the world by proclamation of the true pastors of the Church, who also confirmed them. Thus, although the certainty and truth of the things defined in these Councils seem to depend on two principles, so to speak, of which the one is revealed by God, viz. that Councils legitimately gathered are endowed with truth of utmost certainty, whereas the other is held only by natural certainty on the basis of what serious and upright authors committed to writing; yet, all this notwithstanding, whoever denies the findings and decrees of these Synods will be a heretic just as if he had denied the Gospel. Here is another very clear example. It is not disclosed in the Sacred Scriptures that the priests of our own times have been duly consecrated by true bishops, but this is rather a principle of fact that depends on the words and intention of the consecrators. From this principle which we hold by human faith, viz. that these priests have been duly ordained, that other thing necessarily depends, to wit, whether the Sacrament of the Eucharist truly exists today in the Church. Whoever denies it would be regarded as a heretic by the Church. Only the universal statement has been received through revelation to the effect that all true priests truly consecrate the Sacrament of the Eucharist provided that they have the right intention of consecrating. But that the priests now living are such is not certified by the Gospel alone, but by weighty and constant natural reason together with the Gospel. In much the same manner, too, whoever denies that the Roman Pontiff has the same authority that Peter received from Christ, is to be regarded as an enemy of the faith, even if nothing else is proximately gathered from the Gospel than that Peter's successors have the same power as Peter. For, if to this evangelical conclusion it is further added that the Roman Bishop is Peter's successor, which is a fact that we have received from the histories delivered by very sober men, it is plainly gathered that the Roman Pontiff is both superior to the rest of the bishops and possesses in the Church the same power and authority Peter had. Hence the Supreme Pontiff's have fittingly and

since the view that the theological conclusion is *mediately* of divine faith is commonly admitted by theologians.

Now, then, is it true that Melchor Cano defended the view commonly attributed to him, viz. that the theological conclusion is *immediately* of divine faith? Is this the meaning of the text quoted from the famous *Ad decimum*? Let us look into it. But let us begin by making two simple observations.

451. FIRST OBSERVATION. — All the great scholastic theologians divide *divine revelation* into *immediate* and *mediate*. According to all theologians, there are *immediately* revealed truths, and *mediately* revealed truths. Consequently, a thing can belong to the *divine faith* or to *Catholic doctrine* in two different ways: *immediately* or *mediately*. Therefore — and this should never be overlooked — when in the old theologians we read the phrase *it is of divine faith* or *it belongs to divine faith*, we must find out whether they mean to say *immediately* of divine faith, or only *mediately*.

452. SECOND OBSERVATION. — Although Vázquez confused, or seemed to have confused, the value of the *Church's authority* with that of *theological reasoning*, nonetheless, theologians generally, and Thomists very particularly, have drawn an essential distinction between the two. Thus, when a theologian, and especially a Thomist theologian, says that something is of divine faith or not, one must pay attention to whether he says or means that it is of faith *after* the Church's definition, or *before* or even *without* such a definition.

453. CONFIRMATION. — Indeed, the old theologians frequently employ the terms *revealed truth*, *to be of faith*, *to belong to the Catholic doctrine*, not only in today's strict sense of being *immediately* so, but also in the much broader sense of being so whether *immediately* or *mediately*. Although this is obvious, we will quote a few brief passages from various old theological sources.

"Revealed doctrine, immediately such as faith, or *mediately* such as theology."<sup>137</sup>

prudently referred those evangelical testimonies to the Roman Pontiffs and the Apostolic See." (CANO, *De Locis Theologicis*, lib. 6, c.ultimo, *ad decimum*)

This is all — neither more nor less — that Cano left written in his frequently quoted *ad decimum* on the question at hand. Cano's three examples mentioned in this footnote pose no special difficulty and are generally admitted by theologians. The obscurity lies in the general rule established by Cano in the passage quoted in the text, which asserts that conclusions deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason are *I. faith*, or *belong to the Catholic doctrine*. What does Cano mean by *are of faith*, or *belong to the Catholic doctrine*? That is what we propose to examine in this section.

<sup>137</sup> BÁÑEZ, *In I partem*, q. 1, a. 1.

"You will ask: What is it that is called a *Catholic proposition*? I say that something is called a *Catholic* proposition in two ways. One, *immediately*, as the proposition that is at once had from the rule of faith . . . Secondly, something is called a *Catholic* assertion *mediately*, as that which is derived through a good and clear *consequence* from the former kind of proposition."<sup>138</sup>

"*Catholic faith* can, thus, be understood in two ways, *precisely*, to mean the habit and assent to such things as are revealed *immediately*, i.e. *formally* and in themselves. Second, broadly, to mean the habit and assent to the *things just mentioned as well as to such things as are revealed* *MEDIATELY*, i.e. *virtually* and in another, as e.g., the conclusions deduced from the articles. For it is *common usage* to describe as *being of faith* those things that are plainly deduced from the articles."<sup>139</sup>

"It is *usual* to say that something is *of faith* immediately and formally, and *mediately* or virtually. That is said to be of faith *immediately* and *per se* primarily which is attained immediately by God's light and the assent of belief as immediately revealed. And that is said to be of faith *mediately* and *per se* secondarily which is attained through inference from a proposition of faith, and thus pertains to *theological light*, proper of which is to deduce from the things that are faith."<sup>140</sup>

"I take for granted in the first place, that something can be said to be of *divine faith* in two ways: either *immediately* or *only* *mediately*, i.e., *virtually*. That is said to be *immediately* of divine faith which is immediately revealed; *mediately*, on the other hand, that which is evidently deduced from a proposition immediately revealed by God and another known by natural light."<sup>141</sup>

"Something can be called a *dogma of faith* either *immediately*, because it is contained in the written word of God or in Tradition; or *mediately*, because it is necessarily inferred or gathered from the word of God. For this kind of conclusions, that are necessarily connected with matters of faith, *are to be said to belong to the faith* at least *mediately*."<sup>142</sup>

All these passages taken from such distinguished and different theologians are simply the development of the principle expressly formulated earlier by St. Thomas: "A thing belongs to the *faith* in two ways: one, *directly*, as

<sup>138</sup> TOLEDO, *In Secundam-Secundae*, q. 5, a. 3.

<sup>139</sup> MOLINA, *In Primam partem D. Thomae*, q. 1, a. 2, d. 1.

<sup>140</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Fide*, d. 9, a. 3, *solvuntur obiectiones*, n. 5.

<sup>141</sup> GONET, *De Fide*, d. 4, n. 99.

<sup>142</sup> GOTTI, *Theologia Scholastico-dogmatica*, tr. 1, a. 1, dub. 4, § 1, n. 10.

the articles of faith. . . Two, *indirectly*, as the things from which there follows something contrary to the faith."<sup>142a</sup> (323, 469)

The point here is not whether the old nomenclature is better or worse than the modern. The point is that in all our classical theologians the phrases *is of divine faith*, *belongs to the Catholic doctrine*, have two meanings: to be of faith *immediately*, or to be of faith *mediately*.

Today the phrase *is of faith* is getting to be understood in only one sense, in the sense of being *immediately* of faith. Even more, it is almost understood exclusively in the sense of being immediately not only of divine but also of *Catholic faith*. "When something is said to be of *faith*, it has become a rather widespread practice commonly to understand it as being of *Catholic faith*."<sup>143</sup> As we have seen, in earlier times theologians commonly understood it in quite a different sense. "For it is *common usage* to describe as being of *faith* those things that are plainly deduced from the articles."<sup>144</sup> "It is *usual* to say that something is of *faith* immediately and formally, and *mediately* or virtually."<sup>145</sup> Consequently, anyone who reads the old theologians, and particularly Melchor Cano, overlooking these two meanings whereby something is of *faith* or *belongs to the Catholic doctrine*, will debar himself from the understanding of traditional theology and, with the best of good faith, ascribe to an author exactly the opposite of what the author means.

With regard to the second distinction, that of *before* or *after* the Church's definition, suffice it to quote John of St. Thomas: "Concerning the certainty of the conclusions deduced by theology, a *distinction must be drawn*: either such conclusions are reached through *theological reasoning alone*, or *in addition* to reasoning the *Church's definition* is also brought to bear on them."<sup>146</sup>

Putting these two observations together we obtain the following result: in order to read correctly the mind of an old theologian when he asserts that something is of divine faith, one needs to find out two things: a) whether he says or suggests that it is of faith *immediately* or *only medially*; b) whether he says or suggests that it is of faith even *before*, or *only after* its definition by the Church.

<sup>142a</sup> *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.11, a. 2.

<sup>143</sup> VALENTÍN DE LA ASUNCIÓN, *Theologia Dogmatico-scholastica* (Burgis 1910), vol.1, prol., a.8, n.51.

<sup>144</sup> MOLINA, *loc.cit.*

<sup>145</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*

<sup>146</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus*, q.1, d.2, a.4.

454. MELCHOR CANO'S TRUE MIND. — When a writer has explained himself, and has explained himself not once but repeatedly and has couched his explanation in express and categorical terms, nobody is entitled to ascribe to him any other different meaning. Now, then, Melchor Cano has given us a categorical explanation of what he meant in the famous *Ad decimum* in saying that *theological conclusions* belong to the *faith* or to the *Catholic doctrine*. In the first place, let us find out whether he meant or intended to say that they are of faith *immediately* or *only medially*.

In Book 5, chapter 5, he discusses what things are matters of faith and can be defined as of faith by the ecumenical councils as follows:

"There are two kinds of conclusions that can be defined in the council. First, those that are *proper of theological science* because they are gathered either from two principles held by faith, or from one of faith and another known by the light of nature. Secondly, those that the Holy Spirit has in effect himself revealed to the Apostles, Evangelists, or Prophets, but since this was not so manifest, the Synod declares it. Conclusions of the *first kind* pertain to the faith *secondarily* and, so to speak, *mediately*. For this reason, as we will explain at length in its proper place, he who denies them is a heretic inasmuch as he denies *ex consequenti* the principle from which they are deduced. But conclusions of the *second kind* pertain to the faith *properly and of themselves*, nor should we expect new conclusions of this kind from the popes or the councils."<sup>147</sup>

Nothing could be plainer. Theological conclusions, whether deduced from two premises of faith or from one of faith and another of reason, belong to the faith *only medially*, secondarily, *ex consequenti*. This is the categorical explanation given by Melchor Cano himself of the sense in which theological conclusions can be said, and are by him said, to be of *faith*. This teaching, as explained by Cano himself, is so far from being identical to the view of Vázquez and Vega, that it is the position maintained by the whole Thomist school, and the opinion commonly followed by all modern theologians. Between the latter and Cano there exists only one difference, which is to Cano's credit. The difference is this: when they say that theological conclusions are of faith *only medially*, modern theologians make an exception of conclusions deduced from two premises of faith, and even of conclusions deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason if this latter premise is *inclusive* or *explicative*: in both cases, according to modern theologians, the conclusions are of faith not only *mediately* but also *immediately*. On the other hand, in the view of Cano and all Thomists, *no conclusions*, including those

<sup>147</sup> *De Locis*, lib.5, c.5, ad postremum argumentum. "Since we will be discussing the subject at length in the *twelfth* book there is no need to dwell on it now." (CANO, *loc. cit.*, § *illud autem domus*).

deduced from two premises of faith, are of faith *immediately*: they are properly and immediately *theological* and belong to the faith *only mediately*.

Hence, Melchor Cano's teaching is not only opposed to that of Vázquez and Vega but it is even more radically opposed than the teaching commonly followed today by non-Thomist theologians.

455. MORE PASSAGES FROM MELCHOR CANO. — The preceding quotation would be sufficient by itself, on account of its explicit and positive tenor, to establish the mind of Melchor Cano. However, there are many others that place the matter beyond all doubt.

It will have been observed that in the preceding quotation Melchor Cano himself says that he intends to speak at length on the subject in its proper place. As everyone well acquainted with Cano's work knows, and as Cano himself further on expressly says, that place is *Book 12*. Here the author deals extensively with the nature of faith and theology, and more particularly with theological principles and conclusions.<sup>148</sup> It would seem natural that any writer who wished to know Melchor Cano's mind on this issue would preferably look up the book where Cano discusses it *ex professo*, instead of merely glancing at the *Ad decimum* of another book where he touches on it only incidentally in order to solve an objection related to quite another matter. Following Cano's indication, let us look up *Book 12*. We will set aside the prologue, which in the edition we have at hand is counted as chapter one, and see what, from chapter 2 onwards, the author has to say on whether theological conclusions are of *faith* or not. Cano says textually:

"To call *faith* what is grounded *proximately* not on *authority* but on *reason* and *sylogism* is *absurd*. . . The argument given for this view is certainly *not trenchant* but even *dull*, viz. that where the connexion is certain and clear, the conclusion would *not in that case belong to theology* but to

<sup>148</sup>We give here the table of contents of *Book 12*. Chap. 1: Introduction. — Chap. 2: What theology, is its object, its purpose. — Chap. 3: Which are theology's principles. — Chap. 4: The arguments of the preceding chapter are refuted. — Chap. 5: Which are the questions or conclusions of theology. — Chap. 6: The signs whereby questions of faith can be discerned. — Chap. 7: Of the various degrees of error, and first of heresy and the heretical proposition. — Chap. 8: Some arguments against the definition of heresy. — Chap. 9: Three rules in accordance with which external judgments of faith are to be conducted. — Chap. 10: Of propositions that are erroneous, savouring of heresy, offensive to pious ears, temerarious, scandalous. — Chap. 11: How to find theological arguments and to draw them out of their loci. — Chap. 12: First example, in which a principle of theology is called into question. — Chap. 13: Second example, in which a principle of theology is called into question. — Chap. 14: In which a question that is both natural and of faith is called into question. — This 12th Book is a complete treatise on Sacred Theology and Faith, one of the best that have been written. It is the book to be looked up by anyone desirous of knowing Melchor Cano's true mind on these matters.

*faith*. But this is a *ridiculous* argument and thus it is deservedly censured by many. For the *difference between faith and theology is easy and plain to see*: *faith* is proximately and *immediately*, so to say, grounded on *authority*; but *theology* is proximately and *immediately* grounded on *reason*. For, as I have earlier said, *faith and theology are related not otherwise than as the HABIT OF THE PRINCIPLES and the SCIENCE OF THE CONCLUSIONS*. . . But to come to the point. When the connexion is *uncertain*, or when the other proposition that is taken together with the principle of faith is not certain, the conclusion will be held as an *opinion*, but *theology properly will not exist*. But, *whether* the two principles of the syllogism are taken from faith, or one is certain by faith while the other is naturally *evident*, the conclusion will *belong to theology*, provided that the consequence be clear in the light of nature or known by the illumination of faith. For, as I have said *many times*, and will say *many more times*, the *science* of such a conclusion is related to *faith not otherwise than natural disciplines* are related to the *habit of principles*. And since these things are so plain as to require no proof, let us turn from them to other matters.<sup>149</sup>

We believe that few theologians have more plainly, more exactly, and more vigorously described the distinction between theology and faith, and the nature of the truly theological conclusion. In Melchor Cano's view, the formal *medium* of faith is exclusively the *authority* of God; but the formal *medium* of theology includes besides human reasoning. Although both faith and theology are grounded on *divine* revelation, nonetheless, faith has as its *medium* of knowing *divine* revelation as declared by the *Church's divine authority*, whereas theology has as its *medium* *divine* revelation *reasoned*, i.e., declared by the *human reason of the theologian*. What is known through the first medium is grounded solely and *immediately* on *divine authority*; what is known solely through the second medium is grounded *immediately* on the theologian's human reasoning, and only *mediately* on revelation or *divine* authority.

This distinction between the formal *mediums of knowing* — it must be kept in mind that *faith* and *theology* are not merely *affective* habits or will-habits that can be given the kind of assent that one pleases; they are *cognitive* or intellectual habits that admit no other kinds of assent than those demanded by the kinds of *mediums of knowing* at their disposal — makes the distinction between faith and theology *easy and plain to see*. "The *difference* between faith and theology is *easy and plain to see*: *faith* is proximately and *immediately*, so to say, grounded on *authority*; but *theology* is proximately and *immediately* grounded on *reason*. For as I have earlier said, *faith* and

<sup>149</sup>*De Locis*, lib. 12, circa finem. This passage, as almost everything said by Cano in his admirable *Book 12*, comes from the purest Thomist quarry.

theology are related *not otherwise* than as the *habit of principles* and the *science of conclusions*.<sup>150</sup> Melchor Cano would find it unbelievable that anyone should impute to him such a confusion between faith and theology as is entailed in making *immediately* of faith conclusions known solely through *reasoning*.

But let us continue quoting from *Book 12*, in which according to Cano his mind on these matters should be studied, and where clear and explicit passages are found in abundance. In chapter 5 he writes: "Questions of faith are of *two kinds*. The *first* belongs *immediately* to the faith, as truly belong all those things that God delivered to his Church whether by word of mouth or by writing. The *second* is of faith *mediately*, and of this kind are *all the conclusions* that are evidently gathered from the first kind. Since these are *revealed by God not in themselves but in others*, as in *principles*, they are said to be of faith *mediately*, and he who denies them is said to deny the faith *in this manner*."<sup>151</sup>

Further on, in chapter 6, he writes in similar vein: "There being *two kinds of truths of faith*, as we have just said, one that is of faith *mediately*, and another *immediately*, we must from the beginning establish two levels of propositions of faith. The first comprises those that are the legitimate *principles* of theology, whatsoever they might be, whether primary or secondary, i.e. all those things that God has revealed to the Church *in themselves*. The second level comprises those that are necessarily gathered from the former."<sup>152</sup>

<sup>151</sup>*De Locis*, lib.12, c.5, circa finem. By the way, observe that Cano always employs the Latin adverbs *immediate* and *mediate* (to mean something that is of faith immediately or mediate) instead of the diphthonged adjectives *immediate* and *mediate* which would agree with the noun *faith*. Thomists do not distinguish between immediate divine faith and mediate divine faith as if there were two different *habits* of faith. They distinguish between two *objects*: one that is *immediately* revealed in itself, and another that is revealed *mediately* or *in another*. The former is faith's immediate and proper object; the latter is theology's immediate and proper object, and of itself belongs to faith only *mediately*.

<sup>152</sup>*De Locis*, lib.12, c.6. Cano immediately goes on to say: "Conclusions of this sort are also related to the faith inasmuch as they are connected with matters of faith, since by reason of being connected, one who concedes the former is obliged to concede also the latter and one who denies the latter is similarly obliged to deny the former. . . And thus, although *not on the same plane and degree*, *all can be called questions of faith* simply and without further qualifications, inasmuch as the truths of faith depend on both and are joined and linked with both." (*Ibid.*) "For we have said that faith, although not *immediately*, is nonetheless also about those conclusions that are gathered from the articles of faith by means of an evident and necessary consequence. Hence it is necessary that infidelity should also be *MEDIATELY* about conclusions that are opposed to theology." (*Loc.cit.*)

We think that these explicit and positive quotations are more than enough to place in clear light Melchor Cano's mind on the question whether theological conclusions are of faith or not. In Cano's view, as in that of St. Thomas and the Thomists, theological conclusions — whether deduced from two premises of faith, or from a premise of faith and a premise of reason — of themselves are *immediately* theological, not of faith; they belong to and are said to be of faith *mediately*. We believe that this conviction is or ought to be beyond doubt to anyone who examines without prejudices, not an isolated *Ad lectum*, but the whole work of Melchor Cano, especially his excellent Book 12, in which he examines the question *ex professo* and to which he refers every time he alludes to it.

456. THE THEOLOGICAL CONCLUSION AFTER THE CHURCH'S DEFINITION. — At the beginning of this section we remarked that, in order to know the mind of any theologian, particularly of one who is a Thomist, when he says that something belongs to the *faith* or not, one should pay attention to two things: a) whether he says or means that it belongs to the faith *immediately* or only *mediately*, for these are essentially different things; b) whether he says or means that it is of faith *before* or *after* the Church's dogmatic definition, since these are also two very different things.

We have already found Melchor Cano's mind relative to the former. Theological conclusions of *themselves* — or *per se*, in Cano's own words — belong to the faith only *mediately*. There remains the second question. What does Melchor Cano have to say about the manner in which theological conclusions belong to the faith *after* the Church's definition?

If Cano expressed himself categorically with respect to the first question, he is no less categorical with respect to the second. He establishes, with St. Thomas and all his school, that such conclusions, after they have been dogmatically defined by the Church, are of divine faith not only *mediately* but as properly and as rigorously as the very articles of faith, and that anyone who denies them deliberately after their definition is a heretic in the same proper sense as one who denies the Bible or the divine Tradition. Cano further establishes this proposition not as a more or less probable opinion, but as one of the indubitable canons or *rules (praeceptiones)* of the *loci theologici*. He says textually:

"SEVENTH RULE. — *If either the Church, or the Council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Fathers, should with one mind and voice deduce a theological conclusion and also PRESCRIBE it to the FAITHFUL, it shall be considered a CATHOLIC TRUTH AS IF it had been PER SE REVEALED by Christ; and anyone who opposes it shall be a HERETIC IN THE SAME WAY*

AS IF he had opposed the Holy Scriptures and the traditions of the Apostles."<sup>153</sup>

<sup>153</sup>*De Locis*, lib. 12, c.6. Melchor Cano continues: "I call a theological conclusion properly that which follows from the principles of this science with a certain and firm consequence. A great number of instances can be readily cited. The Sixth General Council deduced the existence in Christ of two wills and two operations from the text 'Not as I will, but as you will', as well as from the fact that Christ is God and PERFECT MAN. The Council of Lyons, under Gregory X, demonstrated by a firm *theological reason* that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son not as from two but as from one principle, not by two but by one aspiration. Indeed, in accordance with the *faith*, the Father and the Son are one God, one power, one wisdom; briefly, one in everything in which no relative opposition is found; for the unity of nature could not otherwise be preserved in two persons. Hence, inasmuch as in the act of spirating there is no distinction of the Son from the Father, it follows that the Father and the Son are not two but one principle of the Holy Spirit, just as they are not two but one principle of created beings. Which gives us to understand that both Erasmus and Ambrose Catharinus *gravely erred*; the former in thinking that this conclusion has nothing to do with the *faith*, the latter in counting it among the first principles, i.e., the articles of *faith*, when it properly is a theological conclusion. Likewise, the Lateran Council, under Innocent III, established by a *theological reasoning* against Joachim that the divine essence neither generates, nor is generated. The thing generated and the thing that generates must needs differ really. Hence if the divine essence generates essence, it would differ from itself not only in thought but also in reality. Similarly, all the Fathers to a man *have argued* from the principle 'This is my body' to the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ, since without such a conversion they could neither conceive the truth of those words nor of all the other things that the Catholic faith confesses about the true containment of Christ's body under the species of bread. Thus, the Lateran Council, taking its stand on the agreement of the old Fathers, determined that the bread is transubstantiated into the body and the wine into the blood of Christ: this is how the Council speaks. The matter having been thus settled, these consequences followed, sanctioned by a decree of the Council of Constance, viz., that the bread does not remain after the consecration, and *therefore* the accidents remain without a subject. For in any change or conversion the term from which the change and conversion take their beginning does not remain. Hence if by the words of consecration the bread becomes the body of Christ, then it itself does not endure, but its accidents endure. Likewise, from John's testimony 'As the Father has sent me, I also send you: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained', the Synod of Alcalá, sustained by Sixtus IV in his Extravagant, established by means of certain theological argument not only the institution of the sacrament of Penance, but also the precept of confession. This we have plainly deduced in the lecture on Penance; look there for the proof of this example. For we are here only sipping and touching with our fingertips, so to speak, the residues of things we have once upon a time pursued at very great lengths in daily lectures." (CANO, *loc.cit.*)

The reader will please understand that by these quotations from Cano we do not exactly mean to maintain that the examples or arguments adduced by him are conclusive or otherwise. What we mean to make plain is Melchor Cano's mind on the subject of the theological conclusion, or that, according to Cano, the theological conclusion is truly and properly of divine faith, *dogma of faith*, but only after its definition by the Church, since for as long as the Church has not defined it and it is known solely through *theological reasoning*, it is not of faith except *mediately*, which is to say that it is immediately theological and deserves only theological assent.

In support of this rule Cano cites numerous instances of true *dogmas of divine faith*, and not only of ecclesiastical faith, which in his opinion are found in the revealed deposit not as truths revealed in themselves or immediately, but only as revealed in other truths out of which reason deduces them by way of conclusion or reasoning, i.e., as revealed only *mediately*, and thus they constitute the proper and immediate object of *theology*, not of divine faith, until they were defined by the Church.

Thus, Cano is of the view that, before the definition, theological conclusions are only *mediately* of faith, and properly and rigorously *theological*. After the Church's *dogmatic* definition, they are *properly of divine faith* and demand the immediate assent of *divine faith*, and not merely a theological assent or an assent of ecclesiastical faith.

This is Melchor Cano's teaching. It is contrary not only to both Vázquez and Vega, but it also is the teaching commonly followed later by almost all the great theologians, both within and outside the Thomist school, even if the contrary persuasion seems to prevail today.

457. OTHER PROOFS OF MELCHIOR CANO'S TRUE MIND. — The transcribed quotations, and others that could be adduced, are clear and positive. In our opinion, they leave no room for doubt concerning Melchor Cano's true mind about this subject. Nonetheless, we will submit other proofs of an indirect character, which we believe will serve to confirm everything we have said. These proofs are like extrinsic *indications* that corroborate what we already know directly from Cano's textual passages. Among many others, we will adduce only three.

458. FIRST INDICATION. — When there are two extreme or radically opposed positions on any debated point, and those who defend both the one and the other cite and quote a famous writer for their side without the least reservation concerning the latter's agreement with their opinion, this provides a strong indication that the quoted author is not in complete agreement with either of the extremes.

Now, it is common knowledge that on the issue of whether theological conclusions are of *faith* or not, two radically opposed positions exist within traditional theology. One is the theory of Vázquez, the other, that of Molina. Vázquez is of the opinion that the theological conclusion is *immediately* of divine faith, even prescinding from the Church's definition. Molina is of the opinion that the theological conclusion is of faith only *mediately*, even with the Church's definition. Vázquez holds that *any evidently deduced theological conclusion* can and ought to be given not only a theological assent, but also an assent of *divine faith*, even before its definition by the Church. Molina holds that the theological conclusion can be given only a *theological* assent, never the immediate assent of divine faith, even after its definition by the Church. The opposition between these two theories cannot be more complete.



Now, here is an interesting fact, which, as far as we know, has not been noticed by anyone, viz. that both Vázquez and Molina quote Cano in support of their opposed theories, and quote him as one whose mind is clear and beyond all doubt. This strongly suggests that Cano is in the middle.

Few will be surprised on being told that Vázquez quotes Cano for his opinion since it is so commonplace today to see Cano cited as of the same view as Vázquez and Vega. But we believe that the reader will be surprised to learn that Cano is cited by Molina to prove not only that theological conclusions of themselves are not of faith, but also that they are not of faith even if the Church should define them dogmatically as she has defined the conclusion of the two wills in Christ. Molina says literally:

"The principles in this doctrine are all those things that God has revealed immediately and in themselves. . . There have been some who have said that among the principles of theology we must also place the definitions whereby the Church has established certain truths because she sees that they are *evidently deduced from revealed truths*, as, e.g., that in Christ there are two wills, divine and human, which although not expressed in the Scriptures is, nonetheless, *evidently gathered therefrom*. . . This opinion does not please me. *Cano also rejects it, De Locis*, bk. 12, ch. 3. For the assistance whereby the Holy Spirit is readily present to the Catholic Church, and to the Supreme Pontiff who is her head, is *not given in order to make of faith* what previously was not of faith, but only so that she will not err in declaring the things that belong to the faith *mediately or immediately*."<sup>154</sup>

Here we see Cano, whom we are used to find cited as of Vázquez's opinion, cited by Molina as of the diametrically opposed opinion.

The fact that both Vázquez and Molina should have with perfectly good faith cited Cano in favour of radically opposed theories has a very simple explanation. As the saying goes, extremes touch each other, i.e., radically opposed theories often share a common starting or terminal point. The characteristic common to the theories of Vázquez and Molina is the ignoring of the essential distinction between the *divine* or *dogmatic* value of the Church's definition and the *human* or *theological* value of *science* and *reasoning* relative to whether theological conclusions are or can be of faith. Such ignoring of *specifically* different values accounts for the fact that, in dealing with the question whether theological conclusions are *of faith* or not, both Vázquez and Molina dismiss as *accidental* and irrelevant the distinction between *before* and *after* the Church's definition. They both simply say that the theological conclusion is *of faith*, or is *not of faith*, without making any distinction by reference to the Church's definition. Vázquez asserts that for

<sup>154</sup>MOLINA. *In Primam Partem D. Thomae*, q. 1, a. 2, d. 1.

anyone who evidently sees the conclusion, it is *of faith* before as well as after the definition since the before and the after are accidental. Molina says that it is *not of faith* either before or after the definition since the definition is accidental and makes no difference. Since both theologians regard as accidental the distinction between before or after the definition, one should not be surprised to find that, when reading other authors, they should attach no importance and pay scant attention to whether these authors, in affirming or denying that theological conclusions are *of faith*, mean to affirm or deny it *before* or *after* the definition. If an author says that theological conclusions are *of faith*, Vázquez takes it as obvious that the author agrees with himself. On the other hand, if the author says that theological conclusions are *not of faith*, Molina takes it as equally obvious that the author shares his view.

Here we have the explanation of how two theologians as distinguished as Vázquez and Molina could have cited Melchor Cano in favour of two radically opposed theories. In Melchor Cano's theory -- as in that of every true Thomist -- two assertions can be made on this question, both equally true: 1) Theological conclusions are *not of faith*; 2) Theological conclusions are *of faith*. That is to say: *of itself (per se)* or *before* the Church's definition the theological conclusion is not of faith *immediately* but only *mediately*, since properly and immediately it is *theological*. But by or after the Church's definition it is not only theological, but *of faith* properly and immediately, since the Church's dogmatic definition furnishes another *different formal medium*, viz., *divine revelation as explicated* or defined by *the Church*. Vázquez will read this second assertion by Melchor Cano in the celebrated *Ad decimum*, and will cite him for his side saying that, according to Cano, theological conclusions are *of faith*. Molina will read the first assertion in many other places, especially in Book 12, and will also cite Cano for his side saying that, according to Melchor Cano, theological conclusions are *not of faith*. Both are somehow justified in so saying, since both of Cano's assertions are true in the Thomist doctrine.

We believe that this is the true account of how Vázquez and Molina, both first-rate theologians, but also often not too faithful to the teaching of the St. Thomas, could have cited Melchor Cano in support of their opposed theories. This is an indication that Cano is not totally in agreement with either one, but occupies a middle term, as we have seen from Cano's own clear and categorical texts.

459. CONFIRMATION. -- Even at the price of a small digression, it will not be superfluous to adduce here some quotations from John of St. Thomas, Báñez, Gotti, and De Groot. It is well known that John of St. Thomas is rated among the more profound, and almost always more faithful commentators of the true thought of St. Thomas and the Thomist school. Contenson has rightly described him thus: "John of St. Thomas, second to no

one in the understanding and penetration of the teaching of the angelic St. Thomas."<sup>155</sup> Describing Vázquez's and Molina's positions relative to the Thomist doctrine on this subject, John of St. Thomas says:

"What certainty does the theological conclusion have without the Church's definition, or together with it? Concerning the certainty of the conclusions deduced by theology, a distinction must be made: either they are reached solely through theological reasoning, or in addition to reasoning the Church's definition is also brought to bear on them. In the first case, there are two opinions. Some think that conclusions evidently deduced from principles of faith also belong to the faith, as Master Soto seems to believe. [We have seen in no. 386 that Soto has explained himself by saying "provided that they are defined by the Church".] Molina attributes the same opinion to Scotus when he [Scotus] says that faith and theology are the same habit. The other opinion, which is the more common, states that the conclusions thus deduced belong to the faith not immediately but mediately, but belong *per se* to theological science.

"Authors also differs with regard to the certainty of theology in the second case. Father Vázquez equates the Church's definition, whom he declares something to be of faith, to the theological demonstration, and assigns only a rather too material difference, viz., that the council proposes what it defines as an object of belief to the whole Church, whereas theological reasoning proposes it only to those to whom the consequence is evident. Here he equates the definition of faith to theological reasoning. But, on the other hand, Molina (with some others whom Granados cites and follows) maintains that the propositions deduced by the Church, and thus defined in virtue of the deduction, are not immediately of faith, but still belong to theological science as conclusions, and cannot become principles of theology. . . The third opinion states that propositions evidently deduced from the principles of faith, if defined by the Church, belong to the faith immediately and become principles of theology, they no longer are grounded on reasoning but derive their certainty from the divine testimony proposed by the Church in accordance with the Holy Spirit's infallible assistance in the definition of matters of faith. This is the opinion commonly followed by Thomists."<sup>156</sup> In the treatise *De Fide*, alluding to this same just quoted place, he says: "From what has been said it can be gathered that virtual or mediate revelation, or that which is deduced through reasoning, such as is found in theology, differs specifically from immediate revelation which is had from the testimony of the witness and attains that which is to be believed by

<sup>155</sup>CONTENSON, *Theologia Mentis et Cordis*, lib.7, d.5, c.1.

<sup>156</sup>JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus* q.1, de scientia theologiae, d.2.

faith, as we have extensively explained in Part 1, Q.1, Disp. 2, art. 4. where we rejected two extreme opinions: one, Vázquez's, who thinks that the conclusion deduced from the premises of faith is with respect to the knower's reasoning just as certain as the proposition defined by the Church; the other, Molina's who thinks that even if the Church's definition be brought to bear on a proposition that previously was not of faith, it would not make it of faith, and that the Holy Spirit assists the Church to preclude her from erring, but not to make of faith what previously was not of faith. These opinions can be seen in the aforementioned place, where they are impugned."<sup>157</sup>

St. Thomas's great commentator, Domingo Báñez, similarly writes: "Just as divine revelation is immediately the formal principle of faith, but mediately of theological science, so also faith itself immediately and *per se* inclines only to the articles of faith and to those things that are expressly revealed, but mediately and consequently also regards the conclusions gathered by evident consequence from the articles of faith. Hence, it is necessary that dissent regarding the propositions of theology should mediately and consequently be opposed to the faith."<sup>158</sup> "For anyone who confesses that Christ is a perfect man, and denies that he is risible because he thinks that risibility does not pertain to the perfection of human nature, he would indeed be a bad philosopher, but not yet a heretic, since up to now the Church has not yet defined that Christ is risible. However, if the Church were to define that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, as she has defined that Christ has two wills, human and divine, then he who denies it would be a heretic, because he would be opposing the teaching of the Church who is the pillar and support of truth. To the argument, then, we reply that conclusions deduced from principles of faith, or from one of faith and another naturally evident, are properly conclusions of theological science. Nonetheless, they are said to be conclusions of faith, not immediately, but mediately; and their contraries are said to be an error about the faith mediately; and he who maintains the contrary falls under suspicion of heresy, especially if he is a philosopher, since such a one is not presumed to deny what is evident by natural light, and therefore he is presumed to be denying the principle of faith. My teacher, Cano, is of this opinion in *De Locis*, bk.12, ch.2."<sup>159</sup>

Gotti, too, writes in similar vein: "Something can be said to be a dogma of faith either immediately because it is contained in divine Scripture or Tradition, or mediately because it is inferred and gathered from the aforesaid Word of God. . . Hence, the theological conclusion is commonly said to be

<sup>157</sup>JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Fide*, d.1, a.2.

<sup>158</sup>BÁÑEZ, in *Primum Partem*, q.1, a.8.

<sup>159</sup>BÁÑEZ, *ibid.*, a.2, ad. 3.

virtually revealed, because it is so close to the faith that nothing more is required to make it of faith but the *Church's express definition*.<sup>160</sup>

It is thus plain that Báñez, John of St. Thomas, Gotti (and we could easily cite all the other Thomists) solve the problem in the same way and with the same distinction as Melchor Cano: the distinction between being of faith *immediately or mediately*, and the distinction between being of faith *before or after* the Church's definition. Vázquez overlooked the first distinction and believed that Melchor Cano was of his own opinion. Molina overlooked the second distinction and attributed to Cano the opposite view.

460. FR. DE GROOT. — We keep insisting on these things, even at the risk of being considered importunate and diffuse, because they furnish the key to the understanding not only of Melchor Cano but of the whole Thomist position on the subject. Their being overlooked explains the fact that Cano is being saddled today, even by distinguished Thomists, with views that are a far cry from what he actually did say.

Thus, e.g., quote only a domestic theologian, the learned Fr. De Groot, whose *Summa Apologetica* is universally and deservedly held in high esteem, after saying that theological conclusions are not immediately of faith, but *mediately or ex consequenti*, and that their denial can thus be called *heresy* only in a *mediate* or inferential sense (which is exactly Cano's own teaching,<sup>161</sup> provided that the theological conclusion is considered *before* the Church defines it as of faith), goes on to say: "However, Cano, and some others, seems to depart from this rule when he says: 'It [the truly theological conclusion] shall be considered a Catholic truth as if it were *per se* revealed by Christ; and anyone who opposes it shall be a heretic in the same way as if he had opposed the Holy Scriptures and the traditions of the Apostles'."<sup>162</sup>

The complete rule given by Cano, here quoted by De Groot, but from which De Groot has omitted the first part thinking it unnecessary begins thus, as the reader already knows: "*Seventh Rule: If either the Church, or the council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Fathers, should with one mind and voice deduce a theological conclusion and also PRESCRIBE IT TO THE FAITHFUL, it shall be considered a Catholic truth,*" etc.<sup>162a</sup> These underscored words, omitted in all good faith by Fr. De Groot in the belief that they are accidental to this question, plainly show that in this Rule Cano

<sup>160</sup>GOTTI, *op. and loc. cit.*, dub. 4, n. 10, and dub. 5, n. 8.

<sup>161</sup>CANO, *De Locis*, lib. 12, c. 6, praecep. 7.

<sup>162</sup>DE GROOT, *Summa Apologetica*, q. 10, a. 6, n. 4, (ed. 3, Ratisbonae 1906) pg. 387.

<sup>162a</sup>CANO, *loc. cit.*

speaks of the theological conclusion *after* the Church's definition. Now, that the theological conclusion, *after* its definition by the Church, is immediately of divine faith, and that its denial is heresy in the proper and immediate sense, and not only in a mediate or inferential sense, such a view is not the particular opinion of Cano and some others, as Fr. De Groot gives to understand, but the constant teaching of the *whole* Thomist school, of the *whole* Scotist school, and of the immense majority of great theologians of all the other schools. In giving an innocently truncated quotation of Melchor Cano's *Seventh Rule*, Fr. De Groot overlooked the distinction between *before* and *after* the Church's definition, just as so many other modern theologians, in their reading or quoting of Melchor Cano's other passages, overlook the distinction between *immediately* or *mediately* pertaining to the faith. For Thomists both distinctions are essential to this problem.

461. SECOND INDICATION. — One of the best indications of a theologian's mind on whether theological conclusions known only by evident reasoning are of faith *immediately* or only *mediately* is to verify whether he admits or not a specific distinction between the habit of the *principles* and the habit of the *conclusions* of the sacred science.

Any theologian who regards as specifically identical the habits of faith and of theology, must logically admit that the theological conclusion is immediately of faith merely through being known by evident *reasoning* or deduction from revealed truths, which is theology's *formal* or immediate *medium*. On the other hand, any theologian who admits a specific distinction between the habits of theology and faith, must consistently admit that the theological conclusion which is known solely through the *theological medium*, i.e., through *reasoning*, is immediately theological and only mediately of faith. Inversely: anyone who admits that theological conclusions known only through reasoning are immediately of faith, must concede that the habits of theology and faith do not differ essentially; whereas anyone who admits that such conclusions belong to theology properly and immediately, and only mediately to faith, must conclude that faith and theology differ specifically.

This rule or criterion is of itself evident to anyone familiar with these questions, and can be inductively substantiated by a review of the various theologians and theological schools. It has been expressly and well formulated by Suárez. Speaking of the opinion that denies that theological conclusions are of themselves immediately of faith, Suárez writes: "And, thus, as favouring this opinion we may cite those who *distinguish* the habit of faith from the habit of theology."<sup>163</sup> Further on, speaking of the opposite opinion, he

<sup>163</sup>SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d. 3, s. 11, n. 3.

points to the same rule but inversely: "And of the same opinion are Aureolus and some Doctors who do not distinguish between the habit of faith, insofar as it assents to the conclusions, and the habit of theology."<sup>164</sup> This same rule is adduced by Lugo<sup>165</sup> and many other writers.

Thus, in order to find out whether Melchor Cano is of the belief that theological conclusions are immediately of faith, or only mediately, no better indication can be given than ascertaining whether or not he distinguishes specifically between faith and theology. If he does not distinguish them specifically, he must logically maintain that theological conclusions, known solely through evident reasoning and without any definition by the Church, are of faith immediately. On the other hand, if he specifically distinguishes faith from theology, or the principles from the conclusions of the sacred science, he must logically say that theological conclusions, known solely through theology's formal medium, viz., reasoning or deduction from the revealed truths, are immediately and properly theological, and belong to the faith only mediately or indirectly or ex consequenti.

Now, then, has Melchor Cano admitted, or not, a specific distinction between the habits of faith and theology, or between the habits of the principles and of the conclusions of the sacred science? He has admitted not only a specific but even a generic distinction, and in rather strong terms, too. "For the difference between faith and theology is easy and plain to see: faith is proximately and immediately, so to say, grounded on authority, but theology is proximately and immediately grounded on reason. For, as I have earlier said, faith and theology are related not otherwise than as the habit of the principles and the science of the conclusions."<sup>166</sup> "As we have said, by this distinction theology and faith are sundered not in words and thinking, but in their whole reality and generic constitution (*universa re et toto genere*)."<sup>167</sup> According to Cano, the root of this distinction is to be found in the fact that theology is to faith as reason or science is to simple understanding. "If we want to derive this whole matter from the source and see wherefrom everything flows, we must understand that the habit of faith is to theological discipline as the habit of understanding is to human sciences and faculties."<sup>168</sup> "For, as I have said many times, and will say many more times, the science of such a conclusion is related to faith not otherwise than natural disciplines are related to the habit of principles."<sup>169</sup> All of which is simply a

<sup>164</sup> SUÁREZ, *ibid.*, d.6, s. 4, n.3.

<sup>165</sup> *De Fide*, d.1, s.13, n.258.

<sup>166</sup> *De Locis*, lib.12, c.2.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, c.3.

<sup>168</sup> *Op.cit.*, lib.2, c.8.

<sup>169</sup> *Op.cit.*, lib.12, c.2.

faithful commentary to that great principle that St. Thomas reiterates time and again under various guises: "In the doctrine of faith the articles of faith are as the self-evident principles in the doctrine obtained through natural reason."<sup>170</sup>

Cano, then, has plainly and radically distinguished theology from faith, and the principles from the conclusions in the same way that St. Thomas did. This is a good indication that he could not have maintained that theological conclusions, of themselves or without the Church's definition, are of faith immediately, but only mediately, as we have learned from his own express textual testimony.

462. CONFIRMATION. — Also worthy of perusal in its entirety is the following passage from Cano on the distinction between theology and faith, and on the manner in which anyone who denies an evident theological conclusion is or may be called a heretic. In Book 12, ch.7, Rule 7, he establishes that anyone who denies a theological conclusion after the Church has defined it as of faith, is properly and formally a heretic. In Rule 8, he says that when all the theologians teach a conclusion with absolute unanimity and impose it on the faithful, such a conclusion is to be regarded as a Catholic truth, and its denial as proximate to heresy.<sup>171</sup> Cano then goes to say:

"But since almost all theologians are agreed on it, and I myself have frequently asserted that these conclusions, derived from the faith by an explicated consequence, BELONG PROPERLY TO THEOLOGY, NOT TO THE FAITH, someone might be surprised that I should now be guilty of confusion, as if faith and theology were the same virtue. For if an error about a theological conclusion is an error about the faith, as it truly is, if to deny it is heresy, it follows that faith and theology belong to the same virtue, inasmuch as the errors opposed to both faculties pertain to the same vice, for both errors are heresies. But anyone who rereads what has been said earlier will not find it difficult to crush and destroy this CALUMNY. For we have said that faith also regards, albeit not immediately, the conclusions gathered by evident and necessary consequence from the articles of faith. Hence it is necessary that infidelity should also regard mediately the conclusions contrary to theology. Now, since from these contrary errors there follows not only a sickness of the faith, but also its corruption, it follows that between them and the faith there exists, indeed, an indirect and consequent, but nonetheless true and natural opposition. Hence, although the Church understands that these conclusions depend not only on faith but also on natural principles, nonetheless, she judges anyone who opposes them a heretic because she does not presume any rational man to deny that which is plain and manifest to reason. She

<sup>170</sup> *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.1, a.7.

<sup>171</sup> In accordance with what he had already settled in Book 8, ch.4, concl.3.

presumes, and for a very good reason, that he does not waver with respect to the natural reasoning, which is evident, but with respect to the faith. But if anyone should be ignorant of the consequence of such things, which is otherwise plain, or even of the natural principle that is taken together with the article of faith in order to deduce the theological conclusion, such a one would *certainly not be a heretic*. For instance, suppose an unlettered man thinks that this proposition is false, *every man is risible*. Even if he believed that Christ is a man, he would not thereby believe Christ to be capable of laughing. But really he would not be properly an infidel but obtuse, since he is not per se opposed to the supernatural but to the natural evidence. However, since this obtuseness, albeit accidentally and indirectly, nonetheless corrupts and perverts *ex consequenti* the judgment of *faith*, it is *deceitfully in the eyes of the Church* considered not as obtuseness but as crime.<sup>172</sup>

All Thomists express themselves similarly and in almost identical terms. Suffice it to quote Báñez: "But an argument arises against this conclusion. For if an error contrary to *theological* propositions is also an error contrary to the *faith* it follows that *faith* and *theology* are not formally different habits. The consequent is false; therefore, also the antecedent. That the consequent is false has been shown above in art. 2. Proof of the consequence: a contrary cannot be opposed to two formally different contraries, but only to one. White is opposed only to black, and cold only to hot. Therefore, if error contrary to *theology* is contrary to *faith*, then *theology* and *faith* do not differ formally. The reply to this argument is that just as *divine revelation* is *immediately* the formal principle of *faith*, but *mediately* of *theological science*, so also *faith* itself immediately and per se only inclines to the articles of *faith* and those things that are expressly revealed, but *mediately* and *consequently* it also regards the conclusions gathered by evident consequence from the articles of *faith*. Hence it is necessary that dissent about the propositions of *theology* be *mediately* and *consequently* contrary to the *faith*, just as a physical agent that destroys the accidents necessary to the conservation of substance consequently destroys the substance itself. For this reason the Church condemns as an *infidel* anyone who opposes such theological propositions. For although she understands that such propositions are deduced not only from *faith* but also from natural principles, nonetheless, it is *presumed* that any rational man does not deny rationally evident things, but things that are held by *faith*. For instance, anyone who denies that Christ is risible, which is gathered from these two premises: every man is risible, Christ is a man, would be condemned as an infidel. For he is not presumed to deny the proposition that every man is risible, which is naturally evident, or the validity of the consequence, which is also per se obvious, but the truth of the

172 CANO, *De Locis*, lib. 12, c. 6.

assumed minor, Christ is a man. But if one is so ignorant or obtuse as not to perceive either the validity of the consequence or the truth of the natural principle, he might deny the theological propositions *without detriment to Catholic faith* because he would be excused on account of ignorance.<sup>173</sup> All of which is true *before* the Church's definition. As we have seen, Báñez acknowledges, with Cano, that *after* the Church's definition the theological conclusion is properly and rigorously of divine faith, and anyone who deliberately denies it would be a heretic properly and formally, not only *presumably*. "However, if the Church were to define that risibility pertains to the perfection of human nature, as she has defined that Christ has two wills, human and divine, he who denies it would be a heretic."<sup>174</sup>

Suárez himself defends this general teaching of Thomists: "Someone might say: anyone who, e.g., denies this proposition *Christ is risible*, is deservedly regarded as a heretic, because he is not believed to deny the evident proposition *every man is risible*, and thus he is convicted of denying the other proposition of *faith*, Christ is a man. Therefore, by denying the conclusion he falls into heresy; therefore, the proposition contrary to the conclusion is heretical. Reply: it is one thing to speak of such a man in accordance with human or external presumption; and it is another thing to judge him in accordance with internal truth. The argument obtains in the first case, because men judge in accordance with exterior appearances and do not see the heart. Thus, if the man in question is pertinaçious in his opinion, he will be deservedly punished as a heretic. However, if he internally believes that Christ is a man and does not believe that he is risible, either because he obtusely denies the universal principle, or because he rashly imagines that God has separated in Christ that property from the essence, he would not be *formally* a heretic, but mistaken in the faith, until the proposition that Christ is risible is *immediately defined by the Church*."<sup>175</sup>

Lugo expresses himself as Cano, Báñez and Suárez: "It might be asked whether, in case that the Church defines in a legitimate council a proposition deduced evidently from one revealed premise and another evident non-revealed premise, the man who denies it is *properly a heretic*? Of this case I have also already said in the aforementioned place<sup>176</sup> that such a proposition

173 BÁÑEZ, *In Primam Partem*, q. 1, a. 8, *tertia conclusio*.

174 *Ibid* a. 2, ad 3.

175 SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d. 19, s. 2, n. 15.

176 LUGO, *De Fide*, d. 1, s. 13.

is of faith *after the Church's definition*. Thus it must be said, in consequence, that he who denies it *afterwards is properly a heretic*.<sup>177</sup>

463. **THIRD INDICATION.** — We come now to the third indication — one must significant and convincing — viz., that Suárez himself recognizes that on this question Cano is not with Vázquez and Vega, as is commonly asserted and as Suárez himself had earlier affirmed, but with St. Thomas and all the Thomist school. To our knowledge, no one to date has noticed this important fact.

It is true that, in the place and passage we quoted at the beginning of this section, Suárez affirmed without reservations that Cano, with Vázquez and Vega, was of the opinion that theological conclusions are immediately of faith, even without the Church's definition, citing in support the aforesaid *Ad decimum* from Cano's Book 6. However, Suárez himself, dealing later on with the opposite opinion which maintains that such conclusions are immediately theological and only mediately of faith, writes as follows: "This opinion, besides the authors cited in the second opinion [viz., *Capreolus, Cajetan, the Thomists, others, and plainly St. Thomas*] is held by Cano in *De Locis*, bk 12, ch. 7, Rule 8, thus *explaining or correcting* what he had *earlier said*."<sup>178</sup> Further on he repeats almost the same thing: "This is the common opinion of the Doctors with St. Thomas, Cajetan, Capreolus, and it is also *Cano's better judgment in De Locis*, bk 12, ch. 3, 3rd conclusion."<sup>179</sup>

Suárez here plainly confesses two things: first, that Cano is of the opinion that theological conclusions are not immediately of faith, but immediately theological and only mediately of faith. Secondly, that with this express admission by Cano in Book 12, Cano has *explained or corrected* what is commonly attributed to him on the basis of the *Ad decimum* in Book 6. In the face of this categorical confession by Suárez how is it possible that his readers should have so nonchalantly continued citing Cano as being of Vázquez's and Vega's opinion, frequently bolstering such a claim with Suárez's authority, without observing or telling us that Suárez had himself eventually confessed the contrary? Particularly since what Suárez calls *explanation or correction* is only an *explanation*, which Cano did not defer until Book 12, as Suárez seems to suggest, but had already anticipated in Book 5, that is to say, much earlier than the celebrated *Ad decimum* found in Book 6. In Book 5, and alluding beforehand to what he intended to say in Book 12, Cano gives us the key to his mind in the following terms: "There are two kinds of conclusions that can be defined in the council. *First*, those that are

<sup>177</sup>*Ibid.*, d. 20, s. 2, n. 69.

<sup>178</sup>SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d. 3, s. 11, n. 7.

<sup>179</sup>*Ibid.*, d. 6, s. 4, n. 4.

*proper of theological science* because they are *gathered* either from two principles held by faith, or from one of faith and another known by natural light. Secondly, those that the Holy Spirit has in effect himself *revealed* to the Apostles, Evangelists, or Prophets, but since this was not so manifest, the Synod *declares* it. Conclusions of the *first kind* pertain to the faith *secondarily* and, so to speak, *MEDIATELY*.<sup>180</sup> Thus, Melchor Cano's mind, which Suárez correctly recognized in the whole of Book 12, is not a *correction* but a clearer and more ample explanation of what Cano had already said before and after his *Ad decimum* in Book 6.

In any case, it is beyond doubt that Suárez confesses that Cano's definitive mind on the issue of theological conclusions is not the mind of Vázquez and Vega, as is customarily asserted, but the mind "of Capreolus, Cajetan, the Thomists, others, and plainly St. Thomas."<sup>181</sup>

464. **RÉSUMÉ.** — From all the foregoing we believe that it has been clearly shown that Melchor Cano's mind on this question can be summarized in these two propositions:

1. Of themselves, or without the Church's definition, theological conclusions are not immediately of faith, but immediately and purely theological and only *mediately* of faith.
2. After the Church's dogmatic definition, theological conclusions are *properly and immediately* of faith.

The first proposition is diametrically opposed to the teaching of Vázquez and Vega; the second is diametrically opposed to Molina's. Both together reflect the Angelic Doctor's great theory, of which John of St. Thomas says: "This is the opinion commonly followed by Thomists."<sup>182</sup>

## SECTION VI

### A REPLY TO SOME HISTORICAL OBJECTIONS

465. **A HISTORICAL STUDY.** — In the preceding sections we have seen the view upheld by traditional theology on the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma by way of inclusive theological conclusion.

By way of complement we will deal briefly in this section with certain historical objections submitted to us by a distinguished theologian. Our objector intends to prove that, in maintaining the definability of theological con-

<sup>180</sup>CANO, *De Locis*, lib. 5, c. 5.

<sup>181</sup>SUÁREZ, *loc. cit.*

<sup>182</sup>*De sacra theologia*, d. 2, a. 4, n. 3.

clusions, traditional theology took the term to mean *improper* theological conclusions. Pursuing his point, he divides his historical study into four periods: a) The great Schoolmen of the 13th century; b) From Scotus to the Council of Trent; c) From the Tridentine to the Vatican; d) From the Vatican Council to the present. We will follow the same division.

466. THE GREAT SCHOOLMEN UP TO SCOTUS. — As we have just remarked, our objector intends to prove that when St. Thomas and the great Schoolmen of the 13th century taught that the consequences of the articles of faith are definable as of divine faith, they meant the *improper* consequences, i.e., *formally* revealed truths. To this end he explains several displays of erudition something which we have ourselves explained several times, viz., that the great Schoolmen consider the whole aggregate of revealed truths as an *organism*, and divide it into articles and not-articles. By articles they mean those fundamental truths that offer "special difficulty". Everything else that offers no special difficulty, even if it is formally revealed, is classified among the "not-articles". This latter group has often been subdivided into antecedents, concomitants, and consequences of the articles. Hence — says our objector — when they speak of "consequences" of the articles, they take this term to mean *formally* revealed truths even if they are not articles, and thus *improper* consequences. A further proof is the fact that they classify the Eucharist among the not-articles, but no one will deny that the Eucharist is a formally revealed truth. This is the whole meat of what our objector has to say relative to this first period.

Our reply is quite simple. In the great Schoolmen, and particularly in St. Thomas, we find *two* divisions of the revealed. Two very different divisions inasmuch as they are made from different points of view. The first is the division into *articles* of the *Creed* and *not-articles*. All the great Schoolmen treat of this division in connection with the *Apostle's Creed* in Book 3 of the *Sentences*. The second is the division into *directly* revealed and *indirectly* revealed, which is sometimes described as a division into things that are "contained in revelation in an *explicit* or *determinate* manner" and things "from whose denial or corruption there would follow the denial or corruption of what is explicitly or determinately revealed". The great Schoolmen of the 13th and following centuries treat of this second division in Book 1 of the *Sentences*, particularly in connection with the question "Whether it is allowable to opine the contrary about the Notions".<sup>183</sup>

Our objector has concentrated almost exclusively on the first division into *articles* and *not articles*, whereas he should have focused his attention

<sup>183</sup> ALBERTUS MAGNUS, d.26, a.14; ST. THOMAS, d.33, q.1, a.5, and other places we will cite further on; ST. BONAVENTURE, d.27, p.1, q.4; SCOTUS, d.33, q.1; DIONYSIUS CARTHUSIANUS, d.26, q.5, etc., etc.

primarily on the second division into the *directly* and the *indirectly* revealed. Having concentrated on the first division, and having observed that St. Thomas places the Eucharist in the second member of this division, viz., among the not-articles, he deduces that the division of the articles and not-articles is a division within the formally revealed. We invite our objector to consider the second division, and he will see for himself that St. Thomas never places the Eucharist or any other sacrament in the second member, i.e., in the category of the *indirectly* revealed.<sup>184</sup>

It is this division of the revealed into *directly* and *indirectly* revealed which is of interest for us at the moment. St. Thomas attaches such a great importance to it that he discusses it in a separate article in four different places, besides other secondary places, viz.: a) in *Sentences*, bk.1, d.33, q.1, a.5 under the title "Whether contrary opinions about the Notions can be held without sin"; b) in *Sentences*, bk.4, d.13, q.2, a.1, under the title "Whether heresy means the perversion of the faith"; c) in the *Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.32, a.4, under the title "Whether it is allowable to opine the contrary about the Notions"; d) in the same *Summa* p.2-2, q.11, a.2, under the title "Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith". These four articles are perfectly parallel and, together with the parallel articles in St. Bonaventure and Scotus, should be repeatedly perused, analyzed and compared by anyone to ascertain the mind of the great Schoolmen, and particularly St. Thomas's, on the question of dogmatic development by way of theological conclusions.

The difference between the directly and the indirectly revealed does not consist, as in the case of the articles and the not-articles, in offering greater or lesser difficulty. The difference consists in something else which is very important but not sufficiently noted by many people. For St. Thomas, as well as for St. Bonaventure and Scotus, the term indirectly revealed means *all those things from whose denial or corruption there necessarily follows the denial or the corruption of the directly revealed*. Once it is defined by the

<sup>184</sup> Whether the Eucharist is a special article of faith? Various opinions held by theologians are usually cited, but many of them differ *only in words* since they all do not have the same idea of the *article of faith*, nor the same meaning of the term *special*.

"Soto observes that a truth can be regarded as an article of faith on three levels: *First*, because it is *defined* by the sacred Councils. *Second*, because it is *expressed* in the Bible. *Third*, because it is *one of the fourteen articles of faith* proposed to all Christian faithful for belief.

"Thus everyone admits what Soto proves, viz., that this truth is a truth to be held with *divine faith*, and that it is an article of faith in the first two ways, since it is *defined* in almost all the councils from the beginning of the Church and... it is *expressed* contained in the Gospel." (IOANNES MARTINEZ DEL PRADO, O.P., *De Eucharistiae Sanctissimo Sacramento, super tertiam partem Summae Doctoris Angelici* [Compluti 1662], q.75, dub.1, nn.14-15, pgs.156-157)

Church, the indirectly revealed becomes a truth of truly *divine* faith and its denial is truly *heresy*. Here are some pertinent passages:

"I answer that it must be said that something pertains to the faith in two ways. One, *directly*, as those things that have been principally delivered to us by God . . . But *indirectly* those things pertain to the faith *from the denial of which there follows something contrary to the faith*."<sup>185</sup>

"I answer that we now speak of heresy insofar as it imports the *corruption of the Christian faith* . . . to which something pertains in two ways: one, *directly* and principally, as the articles of faith; two, *indirectly* and secondarily, as those things *wherefrom there follows the corruption of some article*. And *heresy* is possible with regard to both *the one and the other* in the same manner as faith."<sup>186</sup>

"I answer that . . . contradiction about matters pertaining to the faith can happen in two ways: for either it is about things that are *expressly contained* in the articles of faith . . .; or about things that are *followed by something in disagreement with and opposition to the faith*."<sup>187</sup>

Now, according to St. Thomas, the denial of each and every true and proper conclusion entails the denial of the principle from which it is deduced, and, consequently, the denial of each and every truly and properly theological conclusion entails the denial of the directly revealed. "This is the relationship of the *conclusion to the principle, that with the destruction of the conclusion, the principle is destroyed*."<sup>188</sup> "Demonstrative conclusions are necessarily related to the principles whereby they are demonstrated in such a way that *if the conclusions are not true, it is necessary that the principles be not true*."<sup>189</sup> "And since there are some things implicitly contained in the faith of the Church as conclusions in principles, on such matters there is a diversity of opinions *until one of them is declared by the Church to be contrary to the Church's faith, because therefrom there follows something directly opposed to the faith*."<sup>190</sup>

Finally, when the Church defines the indirectly revealed, "the same judgment applies to the *latter* [the indirectly revealed] and to the *former* [the directly revealed], that are determinate in the faith, *because the one is*

<sup>185</sup>ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.32, a.4.  
<sup>186</sup>*Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.11, a.2.

<sup>187</sup>*In I Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5.

<sup>188</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In Post. Analyt.*, lect.38.

<sup>189</sup>ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q.24, a.1, ad 18.

<sup>190</sup>*In 3 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.1, ad 6.

*followed by the other*."<sup>191</sup> "In this one may not err without *heresy*."<sup>192</sup> "If anyone should resist such a determination he would be considered a *heretic*."<sup>193</sup> "Thus the pertinaciousness whereby a man refuses to *submit* himself to the Church's judgment in matters that are of faith *DIRECTLY or INDIRECTLY*, makes a man a heretic."<sup>194</sup>

467. THE INDIRECTLY REVEALED. — Thus, in the second member, *i.e.*, the indirectly revealed, St. Thomas — and similarly St. Bonaventure and Scotus — includes two things: a) all the merely *ornamental* or *secondary* matters in the Holy Scripture, *e.g.*, that Abraham had two sons, or that Tobias's dog wagged its tail, because even if such matters are unimportant *of themselves* (per se), they are important on account of their necessary *relation* to something that is *directly* revealed, since their denial would entail the denial of the dogma of the total inspiration of the Holy Scripture which is something *directly* revealed; b) all truly *theological conclusions*, and for identical reason, *i.e.*, on account of their necessary *relation to the directly* revealed, since the denial or corruption of the theological conclusion entails the denial of the *directly* revealed dogma from which the conclusion is deduced: "Because therefrom there follows something *directly* opposed to the faith."<sup>195</sup>

Let every Thomist read and reread without prejudices these four fundamental articles in which the holy Doctor treats of the indirectly revealed, let him analyze and compare them among themselves, and it will be plain that in the definition of the indirectly revealed St. Thomas includes every truly theological conclusion.

Let him not consider exclusively the *example* given by St. Thomas. Examples are always taken from plain and obvious things in order to apply them later to things more difficult and less obvious. Let him consider instead the *definition* given by St. Thomas of the indirectly revealed as well as the *application* he makes of it to the question of the *divine notions* and the *theological conclusions*.

When St. Thomas speaks, *e.g.*, of *life*, he defines it as "anything that moves itself from within" and cites *animals* as an example. If any empirical reader would pay exclusive attention to the example, he would deduce that, according to St. Thomas, neither the angels nor God have life, since they are

<sup>191</sup>*In I Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5.

<sup>192</sup>*Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.32, a.4.

<sup>193</sup>*Op. cit.*, 2-2, q.11, a.2, ad 3.

<sup>194</sup>ST. THOMAS, *In I ad Corinth.*, c.11, lect 4; *od. Vivès*, vol. 20, pg. 725.

<sup>195</sup>*In 3 Sent.*, d.13, q.11, a.1, ad 6.



not animals. But this would be a ridiculous way of interpreting St. Thomas because, although the example usually given by him, when he treats of life, applies neither to the angels nor to God, nevertheless the definition applies. Similarly, when he deals with the indirectly revealed, St. Thomas gives as an example the secondary matters in Holy Scripture, but he defines it as "everything from the denial or corruption of which there follows the denial or corruption of the directly revealed". And it is obvious that this definition applies in full to theological conclusions, for as the holy Doctor himself reminds us, "with the destruction of the conclusion, the principle is destroyed."

On the other hand, in the first and the fourth of the aforesaid articles St. Thomas expressly and radically draws a distinction between truths that may in one way or another belong to the faith, and truths that can in no way belong to the faith. The former he subdivides into truths that directly belong to the faith, and truths that belong indirectly. Thus, according to St. Thomas, every truth whatsoever has to be classified under one of these three categories: a) truths that belong to the faith *directly*; b) truths that belong to the faith *indirectly*; c) truths that *in no way* belong, or can belong, to the faith.

He describes the first category as truths of divine faith *per se*. Of the second category he says that they are of divine faith because of their necessary relation to those of the first category, and that they are to be believed with divine faith *after their definition by the Church*. Of the third category he says that they are absolutely *indifferent* to the faith and may be freely affirmed or denied *without any sin*, except perhaps the subjective sin of vanity or presumption which is always possible in every human act even in the case of matters utterly profane and indifferent to the faith. "*There is no sin, except perhaps per accidens, viz., a sin of presumption or of vainglory or of many other kinds since causes per accidens are infinite.*"<sup>196</sup>

Now, then, let every Thomist say frankly in which of these three categories or groups is he going to classify the theological conclusions and even the dogmatic facts? If he classifies them in the third category, such truths would be utterly *indifferent* to the conservation of the faith, which is the Jansenist error. If he classifies them in either the second or the first, he is constrained to confess that, according to St. Thomas, such truths, upon being defined by the Church, become objects of truly *divine faith*. There is no evasion possible for anyone who subscribes to those two fundamental articles of St. Thomas.

Furthermore, in the first and third of the four aforesaid articles St. Thomas expressly applies the doctrine of the indirectly revealed to the *divine notions*. This is clear proof that St. Thomas takes the indirectly revealed to

<sup>196</sup>In *I Sent.*, d.32, q.1, a.5.

mean not merely the secondary scriptural matters since the divine notions are not scriptural.<sup>197</sup> The reason why the divine notions are included in the indirectly revealed, and, therefore, definable as of divine faith, is given expressly by St. Thomas, to wit, that from the denial of the notions there would follow the denial of the persons, and since the persons are directly revealed, it follows that the notions are indirectly revealed and definable as of divine faith. "The same judgment applies to the latter and to the former which are determinate in the faith, because *the one is followed by the other* . . . because *from an error about the notions there follows an error about the persons*." Consequently, the holy Doctor deduces that very fundamental corollary which no theologian or historian of dogmas ought ever to forget: "And on *this account* many things are now considered *heretical* that were not so regarded before." What teachings did St. Thomas mean in saying that they are now considered by the Church as heretical, which were not so regarded before? Certainly he did not mean directly revealed teachings since he was speaking of the indirectly revealed. Neither did he mean the secondary or ornamental details of the Holy Scriptures since none of such matters has been defined as heretical by the Church. Plainly, then, St. Thomas meant the truly theological conclusions, or those truths that have not been directly revealed, but whose denial entails the denial of a directly revealed principle. This suffices to render them also indirectly revealed and definable as of divine faith. The holy Doctor explains himself quite plainly: "And on *this account* many things are now considered *heretical* that were not so regarded before, because *it is now much clearer what follows from them*."

Let Thomists observe the term *because*. Many modern theologians are satisfied with pointing out that if the Church employs reasoning, it is for the *only purpose* of ascertaining whether or not the conclusion was implicitly contained from the beginning in revelation or in the intention of the revealing God. That is very true, and the Church has no other *purpose* but that. However, such theologians overlook the fact that, according to St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure and Scotus, the human instrument or *medium* available to the Church (but always under *divine* assistance or authority), in order to ascertain whether or not a conclusion was contained from the beginning in revelation or in the intention of the revealing God, is verifying whether that conclusion carries an absolutely necessary connexion with a directly revealed principle, and, therefore, that for St. Thomas *absolutely necessary connexion* with a directly revealed principle (it is this that defines the proper theological

<sup>197</sup>To this *Alfisdorensis* in his *Summa*, book 1, replies: "Neither of those opinions is heretical because we do not have it determined by the Sacred Scripture what must be held about the notions." (DIONYSIUS CARTHUSIANUS, *In I Sent.*, d.36, q.5; ed. cit., t.18, pg.52.)

conclusion) is tantamount to *implicit containment* in the intention of the revealing God or in divine revelation.

468. RESUMÉ. — Thus, all our argumentation — one which we have already expounded on other occasions and which we reiterate with the profound conviction — is condensed in the following propositions from St. Thomas:

1. Everything that is revealed indirectly can be defined as of divine faith.
2. By indirectly revealed is meant anything from the denial of which there follows necessarily the denial of something directly revealed.
3. From the denial of every truly theological conclusion there follows necessarily the denial of something directly revealed.
4. Therefore, every truly theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith.

469. FINAL CONFIRMATION. — Readers not familiar with these matters can find clear and definitive confirmation in the classical commentators of St. Thomas. The whole issue hangs on what St. Thomas and the great Schoolmen of the 13th century understood by *indirectly revealed*. Let us consult Báñez in his commentary to St. Thomas's classical article.<sup>198</sup>

"First conclusion: Heresy is possible about matters that are of faith directly or indirectly . . . With respect to the first conclusion of the second article it is asked: What does St. Thomas understand by *pertaining directly or indirectly to the faith*? For either it is taken to mean . . . or it is taken to mean . . . or, finally, *directly* is taken to mean something that immediately falls under the habit of faith, i.e. *without benefit of the consequence of reasoning*; but that is said to belong *indirectly to the faith which is gathered by a necessary consequence from a proposition that is immediate according to the faith*.

"To this question the answer is that St. Thomas is to be understood in *this last sense* . . . As, e.g., if anyone were to deny that Christ is risible, he commits an error in the Catholic faith *consequently and indirectly*, because it validly follows *by a naturally evident consequence* that Christ is not a perfect man."<sup>199</sup> Nothing could be plainer. Elsewhere Báñez adds: "If anyone should confess that Christ is a perfect man, but deny that he is risible in the belief that risibility does not pertain to the perfection of man, he would be a bad philosopher, *but not yet a heretic*, since *up to now* the Church has not defined that Christ is risible. But *if the Church were to define* that risibility

<sup>198</sup> *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q. 11, a. 2.

<sup>199</sup> BÁÑEZ, *In Secundam-Secundae*, q. 11, a. 2.

belongs to the perfection of human nature, as she has defined that Christ has two wills, divine and human, then anyone who denies that Christ is risible *would be a heretic*."<sup>200</sup>

We would advise every Thomist to peruse Báñez's whole commentary to the aforementioned article.<sup>201</sup> It is priceless.

However, we believe that one statement is inaccurate: "For *everything* found in the Holy Scripture pertains *directly* to the faith." Báñez seems not to have observed that St. Thomas expressly affirms that the *secondary* matters in the Holy Scripture pertain to the faith only *indirectly*.

But this is of small importance with respect to proper theological conclusions, the only thing with which we are now concerned. On this score all, or almost all, commentators interpret St. Thomas as Báñez did, and affirm that such conclusions are included by St. Thomas in the number of truths that are of faith *indirectly*. As mentioned earlier (263), there is no theologian who does not quote St. Thomas's texts on the *indirectly* revealed in order to prove that the Church's infallibility extends to the properly theological conclusions. We have already quoted Torres, Toledo, Silvio, Gravina, Serra, Philip of the Most Holy Trinity, de Marinis (390, 395, 405, 406, 410, 413, 243, 414). And we will further quote some others.

"A *heretical* proposition is one which *directly* and *immediately* contradicts a truth of faith immediately revealed by the Holy Scripture, or *defined by the Church*. This is the common definition given by St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 11, art. 2, and by the commentators of the same question . . . On a second level there is the *erroneous* proposition. An erroneous proposition is one which is contrary to a truth revealed by God *mediately or indirectly and secondarily*. AS ST. THOMAS EXPRESSLY TEACHES *in the same q. 11, art. 2*."<sup>202</sup>

"Because of the ratio sub qua *theological conclusions* are to be held as objects of faith. The ratio sub qua is the *connexion* between the immediately revealed and those things that are required in order to safeguard, propose, explicate, and defend the truths thus revealed . . . 'To which faith', says St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 11, a. 2, 'a thing belongs in two ways . . . One, *directly* and principally, as the articles of faith; two, *indirectly* and secondarily, as all those things from the denial of which there follows the corruption of some

<sup>200</sup> BÁÑEZ, *In Partem Primam*, q. 1, a. 2, ad tertium argumentum.

<sup>201</sup> BÁÑEZ, *In Secundam-Secundae*, q. 11, a. 2.

<sup>202</sup> PETRUS DE TAPIA, O.P., *De Fide* (Hispani 1657), lib. 1, q. 6, a. 4, nn. 2-3.

article; and heresy is possible with regard to both the one and the other in the same way as faith."<sup>203</sup>

"Nor is there any disagreement among theologians on this matter [i.e. on the extension of the Church's infallibility to theological conclusions in the proper sense], but on the censure which the contrary opinion deserves. A thing belongs to the doctrine of faith, says St. Thomas in I Cor., c. 11, lect. 4, in two ways: one, *directly*, as the articles of faith that are per se proposed for belief; but certain other things *indirectly*, *inasmuch* as from their denial there follows something contrary to the faith."<sup>204</sup>

We could continue citing many more theologians, ancient and modern. Thomists and non-Thomists, who interpret St. Thomas in the same sense. But we will limit ourselves to one further passage which we believe will please our objector since it is taken from the Salmanticenses.

"An *erroneous* proposition is one which immediately and evidently is opposed to a truth *revealed mediately* and *secundarily*, or one that immediately and evidently goes against a theological conclusion, as this proposition 'Christ is not risible'. THIS IS GATHERED FROM ST. THOMAS, 2-2, q. 11, a. 2, and is taught by Suárez, Báñez, Tapia, and modern Doctors generally."<sup>205</sup>

In these passages our objector can see for himself that St. Thomas and the great Schoolmen of the 13th century are interpreted by Báñez and the majority of theologians in exactly the same sense in which we have interpreted them. There it is clearly and explicitly explained what St. Thomas meant by the indirectly revealed or by conclusions or consequences of the directly revealed, viz. *theological conclusions* in the true and *proper* and *rigorous* sense of the term.

Let our objector now read St. Thomas, or any of the great Schoolmen of the 13th century, and he will ascertain that they place the Eucharist and other similar truths in the category of the *not-articles* of the *Creed*, but never in the category of the *indirectly revealed*. Our objector has busied himself with the analysis of the questions in which the Schoolmen deal with "How all the truths of faith are contained in the *Creed*", or "How the *Eucharist* is contained in the *Creed*", where they discuss the *accidental* division into articles and not-articles. He should also have given himself to the analysis of the questions in which they discuss "*Whether it is allowable to hold a contrary*

<sup>203</sup>DE GROOT, O.P., *Summa Apologetica*, (ed. 3, Ratisbonae 1906), q. 9, a. 2, n. 3, pgs. 310-311

<sup>204</sup>AEMILIUS DORSCH, *Institutiones theologiae fundamentalis* (Oemiponte 1914), vol. 2, p. 2, s. 1, a. 3, pg. 337.

<sup>205</sup>SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, d. 9, n. 48, (ed. Palmé) vol. 11, pg. 429.

*opinion about the Notions*", or "*Whether heresy is about matters of faith*". It is in these questions that they treat of the *fundamental* division into *directly* revealed and *indirectly* revealed. His confusion or insufficient understanding of these two divisions of the revealed object explains why all the remarks about the great Schoolmen of the 13th century made by our objector with such copious erudition are beside the point.<sup>206</sup>

470. FROM SCOTUS TO THE COUNCIL OF TRENT. — In this period our objector cites Scotus, Ockham, Gerson, Aureolus, and, among the Thomists, Cardinal Torquemada. He is constrained to confess that they all, Cardinal Torquemada included, expressly and plainly defend that the properly theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith.

Our objector could have likewise cited many other writers of this period — we have quoted them earlier (372-398) — who say exactly the same thing. Better still, he could have simply said that *all*, without exception, are of the same view. We have found *not one single theologian* prior to Molina — nor, we believe, will one be found — who has defended the contrary. Since our objector frankly admits all this, we could without further ado turn to the following period.

However, Capreolus belongs to this second period, and he is one who wields great authority among Thomists. Our objector could not simply ignore him, and neither should we. Our objector concedes that all the theologians of this period cited by him defend the same view that we do. He finds in Capreolus no clear statement to the contrary. So he contents himself with saying that "Capreolus *seems* to say the contrary." But from what source did our objector pluck that timid *seems*? Capreolus is not in the habit of allowing Scotus, Aureolus, etc. one single slip against the teaching of St. Thomas without the appropriate correction. Has he corrected in the least the teaching of these theologians on the *definability* of the theological conclusion? No, not one word on this subject has our objector been able to find

<sup>206</sup>In the *Summa Theologica* St. Thomas makes a division of the object of faith in four places, among others. (1) Division into directly revealed and indirectly revealed (p. 1, q. 32, a. 4.). (2) Division into articles and not-articles (2-2, q. 1, a. 6, corp.) (3) Division into revealed "secundum se" and revealed "in ordine ad alia" (*ibid.*, ad 1). (4) Division into directly revealed and indirectly revealed (2-2, q. 11, a. 2).

In making division (4) the holy Doctor remarks "As was said earlier." Our objector takes the phrase "as was said earlier" to refer to division (2); thus he gathers that division (4) into "direct" and "indirect" is identical to division (2) into "articles" and "not-articles". Since the Eucharist is placed by the holy Doctor among the not-articles, our objector believed that it should also be placed among the indirectly revealed. Since it is plain that the Eucharist is a formally revealed truth, our objector has attempted to conclude therefrom that St. Thomas takes the indirectly revealed solely to mean the formally revealed.

in Capreolus. All he has found is that, on the question whether theology is a science not of the articles of faith but of the conclusions, and whether theology is a *habitus distinctus* from the habit of faith, Capreolus answers both questions in the affirmative. We fail to understand our objector's reason for quoting these passages from Capreolus since that same answer has been, is, and will be given by all Thomists with St. Thomas. Those two questions are relevant to the issue whether theological conclusions are of faith *per se*, i.e., prior to the Church's definition, which is a view that Thomists have always rejected; but they are altogether irrelevant to the issue whether they are of faith *by their relation* to directly revealed truths when such a relation is defined by the Church, which is the view that Thomists have always maintained.

On the other hand, earlier our objector had asserted that whenever St. Thomas speaks of conclusions, he takes the term to mean improper conclusions, quoting in support of this assertion St. Thomas's passage *In Boetium*: "The things we hold by faith are as principles in this science, and the others are as conclusions." Now he says, and quite correctly, that when Capreolus speaks of conclusions he takes the term to mean proper conclusions. But our

This confusion arises from thinking that the phrase "as was said earlier" found in division (4) makes reference to division (2) into articles and not-articles. However, it is obvious that it makes reference not to division (2) but to division (1) into directly revealed and indirectly revealed, as the learned editors of the Leonine edition point out, or to division (3) into revealed "secundum se" and revealed "in ordine ad alia", as the reader can find out in any of the other editions of the *Summa*.

Now, it is plain that division (2) into articles and not-articles differs from the other two divisions into "directly and indirectly" revealed, or into revealed "secundum se" and "in ordine ad alia". Every article is revealed directly and "secundum se"; but not everything revealed directly or revealed "secundum se" (e.g., the Eucharist) is an article. It is therefore a case of two different divisions drawn from different points of view. To Thomas's view, that its denial be followed by the denial of anything directly revealed; and this happens in the case of every rigorously theological conclusion i.e., one that is truly *inclusivae*.

If our objector wishes to insist in taking all those divisions as equal, so much the better for our case. It is obvious that Báñez and the greater part of the Saint's commentators take the indirectly revealed to mean proper theological conclusions. It follows that the term "consequences of the articles" in the other divisions is to be taken also in this same meaning.

In a later article our objector eventually comes to admit all of this when he expressly says that St. Thomas takes the term revealed implicitly or secondarily or "per accidens", and the term explanations or determinations of the articles to mean "not only nominal explanations, but also explanations that differ conceptually and are deduced as theological conclusion." With this concession there is enough and more than enough, since it is a commonplace that every true Thomist regards as a *proper* theological conclusion every conclusion that differs conceptually from the primitive datum.

objector has failed to observe that, in making his point about proper conclusions, Capreolus (in the same place alluded to by our objector) quotes precisely the same passage from St. Thomas which our objector interprets as referring to improper conclusions.<sup>207</sup>

Even more puzzling is the fact that our objector has failed to take account of the one passage from Capreolus which is relevant to the present case. It says: "To the fourth it should be said that although the Bible does not proceed in the manner of demonstrative science, nonetheless, from the things contained in the Bible, which are as the principles of a science, the *Fathers*, arguing against heretics from the principles of theology, have demonstratively inferred conclusions with which theology is concerned. Thus, although theology is not in the sacred canon delivered explicitly in syllogistic style, nonetheless, in the book of subsequent theologians it is explicitly delivered in a scientific and scholarly manner. HOWEVER, EVERYTHING IS CONTAINED IMPLICITLY IN THE BIBLE."<sup>208</sup> Our objector can see for himself that both Capreolus and St. Thomas hold that true and proper theological conclusions — our objector correctly admits that it is of such conclusions that Capreolus speaks — are implicit in the Bible. This is the only requisite necessary for such conclusions to be definable as of divine faith.

Our objector ends the second period with Capreolus, and so will we.

471. A VERY SIGNIFICANT CONFESSION: FROM THE TRIDENTINE TO THE VATICAN. — Our objector begins this third period with this frank and honest confession: "The teaching that regarded the conclusions as truths of faith [i.e., definable as truths of faith] remained common also after the Tridentine on account of the common agreement of the theologians. Thus in the 16th century it was held by Pedro Soto, Bellarmine, Cardinal Toledo [and he could have added Cajetan, Cano, Domingo Soto, Báñez, Medina, etc., etc.]. More, John of St. Thomas, with Navarrete and Master González, declares it the common teaching among Thomists, at least with respect to the definability of conclusions."

Let the reader take good note of this momentous confession. That is what we have time and again pointed out in this book against certain textbooks that describe the definability of the theological conclusion as a particular view of Cano, Vázquez and Vega, when in fact it was the common opi-

<sup>207</sup>CAPREOLUS, *In I Sent.*, prob., q.1, a.1, *Quinta conclusio*. (ed. Paban-Pégués) t.1, pg.4.

<sup>208</sup>*Ibid.*, a.2, *Solutiones ad argumenta contra quintam conclusionem*, (ed.cit.) pg.17.

nion of *all* theologians prior to Molina, and of almost all who came after him. The excess of Vázquez and Vega consisted in asserting that the conclusions were of faith *per se* or without the Church's definition, not in asserting that they were definable as of faith, since that was already the common view, as our objector confesses and as Suárez had already confessed. We are happy that a historian as reputable as our objector should have come to this very important conclusion.

However, despite his frank confession, our objector believes that *later* theologians have restricted that common teaching, and that it is this restriction that should command our acceptance. He says: "Nonetheless during this period this nominalistic formula is no longer simply admitted but only with a restriction and distinction that bring it back to the path of truth."

In the first place, there is something funny in qualifying as "nominalistic" a formula which our objector confesses has been admitted without any restriction and distinction by *all* theologians, before and after the Tridentine, until Molina. Are we to say that all the classical theologians of the 16th century who admit without distinctions and restrictions the definability of truly theological conclusions are nominalists? That teaching is not in the least an offshoot of the nominalist period. Both the common opinion and the formula which our objector is pleased to describe as nominalistic are derived from the notion of the *indirectly* revealed expounded by the great Schoolmen, and in a very special manner by St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure. (361-370)

In the second place, when a teaching has been the *common doctrine* before and after the Tridentine, and especially among the classical theologians of the 16th century, it is of little consequence that *some* later theologians should have restricted it, even if such theologians should be called John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart. These are the three post-Suarezian theologians who have sown confusion in the *Thomist school* on these questions. The former by a confusion of nomenclature with the promiscuous use at times of the terms *immediate* and *virtual*. The latter two by using the new Suarezian terms *formal confused* or equivalent and *pure virtual* (*virtuale tantum*), thus giving grounds for debating whether they take such terms in the same sense or in a sense different from that which they had and that which they have since Suárez who coined them.

But let us set this aside and see who are the theologians that, in our objector's opinion, have made the *restriction* or cooperate in it. He writes: "Apparently it was Cajetan who gave the first impetus; Melchor Cano, the first to raise the question; Suárez, the first to pose the issue of definability; John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart gave the question a sufficient solution." Let us examine one by one, briefly, these six theo-

logians, the only ones cited by our objector on the matter of what he calls the *restriction* of the *common* teaching.

472. CARDINAL CAJETAN. — Of Cajetan our objector says the following: "Following in the wake of Capreolus, Cajetan assigned the conclusions to theology as its proper object. For this purpose, he distinguishes two kinds of revealed truths: 'the formally revealed, i.e., revealed in itself; and the virtually revealed, i.e., revealed in its principles.'" This is *all* our objector has found in Cajetan.

We have ourselves quoted this passage from Cajetan several times, and, frankly, we fail to see its bearing on the restriction with which we are now concerned. However, we suspect that, by the phrase "following in the wake of Capreolus" coupled with what he had previously said of Capreolus, our objector wishes to insinuate, without venturing to say it in so many words, that first Capreolus and then Cajetan, in designating proper conclusions as the object of theology, have modified or restricted the teaching of St. Thomas, who, according to our objector, had taken the term conclusions to mean *improper* conclusions. Is this what he means to say?

Well, then, anyone who looks up the *Summa Theologica's* first question, art. 3, "Whether the Sacred Doctrine is one science", will find that St. Thomas introduces there the distinction between the "revealed" and the "revealable", and designates the "revealed" as the proper object of divine faith and the "revealable" as the proper object of theology. "Hence, since the sacred doctrine considers certain things insofar as they are divinely revealed, all things whatever that are divinely revealable share in the one nature of this science."<sup>209</sup>

It is surprising that our objector should have missed this fundamental distinction drawn by St. Thomas between the "revealed" and the "revealable" inasmuch as the "revealable" is exactly the *properly* theological conclusion, and the root and vital force of all dogmatic progress by way of rigorous theological conclusions. The distinction later made by Capreolus into "principles" and "conclusions" as well as the distinction by Cajetan into the "formally revealed" and the "virtually revealed" are neither restrictions nor amplifications, but accurate translations of the holy Doctor's distinction into "revealed" and "revealable". Although this is obvious, we will quote the commentator who seems favoured by our objector on these questions. Commenting on the holy Doctor's just quoted article and text, John of St. Thomas says: "St. Thomas assigns on the part of the Holy Scripture the things that are *immediately* revealed since the things delivered by the Scriptures are credible by faith; but on the part of theological science he assigns

209 St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.1, a.3.

the things that are *revealed*, i.e., those that are *revealed virtually or in potency*.<sup>210</sup>

The reader can there find plainly stated not only that the distinctions made by Cajetan and Capreolus are identical to that made by St. Thomas, but, furthermore, that St. Thomas and the great Schoolmen took the term conclusions to mean the *proper* conclusions (revealed virtually or in potency), which is how both Capreolus and Cajetan understood the term, as our objector confesses.

On the other hand, our objector has forgotten to quote a very important passage in which Cajetan deals with and settles *ex professo* the question whether everything *necessarily connected* with the revealed principles is definable as of faith, which is precisely the point now at issue. "There are two ways whereby what is to be believed can be determined for the Christian religion. . . . *Nor does it matter whether something is revealed explicitly in Holy Scripture and elsewhere (as, e.g., the creation of the world, the incarnation of the Word of God, and others of the same sort) or implicitly, as are all those things the opposite of which cannot be maintained together with the truth of the Holy Scripture and of other things we know by certain faith, except that ingenuity, effort, reason and intellect are required to make it evident that the things that are said to be implicitly contained are NECESSARILY CONNECTED with the things in which they are said to be contained.*"<sup>211</sup>

Cajetan explicitly asserts there what we had already learned from Capreolus and St. Thomas, viz., that everything *necessarily connected* with true theological connexion is *implicit* and *definable* as of divine faith. Are we to say that Báñez, Capreolus and Cardinal Cajetan are also nominalists?

473. MELCHOR CANO. — Our objector makes three assertions about the illustrious founder of *De Locis*. We regret to say that all three assertions are inaccurate.

In the first place, he says that in *Book 6*, chapter 8, Cano began by affirming the common teaching that theological conclusions are of faith, but further on, in *Book 12*, he expressly added that they are of faith only mediately. This is not accurate. The view that they are of faith only mediately has already been indicated by Cano in *Book 5*, chapter 5, in the paragraph which begins with the words "Ad postremum argumentum". (463)

In the second place, he says that by affirming that conclusions are of faith mediately Cano modified the common opinion he had himself earlier expressed. This is even more inaccurate. That the theological conclusion is

<sup>210</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Theologicus, In I partem*, q. 1, d. 2, a. 7, n. 11.

<sup>211</sup> *Opusculum De Conceptione B. V. ginis*, ch. 1: "On two ways of discerning what is of faith, or what is opposed to it."

not of faith except mediately is asserted by Cano in the case of the theological conclusions *per se* or without the Church's definition. But in the case of conclusions *defined by the Church* Cano expressly and categorically affirms that they are of faith as immediately and as formally as the articles of faith or the Gospels themselves. And Cano asserts this not as a probable opinion but as one of the fundamental rules or "precepts" of the *Loci Theologici*. Says Cano: "Seventh Rule: If either the Church, or the Council, or the Apostolic See, or even the Fathers, should with one mind and voice deduce a *theological* conclusion and also prescribe it to the faithful, it shall be considered a *Catholic truth as if it had been per se revealed by Christ*; and anyone who opposes it shall be a heretic in the same way as if he had opposed the Holy Scriptures and the traditions of the Apostles."<sup>212</sup> Nothing could be clearer (456).

In the third place, our objector asserts that Cano describes the theological conclusions as "appendages of the faith", and affirms that when a theological conclusion is denied "the faith becomes ill, but does not perish." Obviously, our objector has read Cano in a hurry. The phrases "appendages of the faith" and "the faith becomes ill, but does not perish", written by Cano at the beginning of chapter 5, are referred by Cano not to theological conclusions but to *other* truths that do not attain to the category of conclusions because they do not have a *necessary* but a *strong* connexion. Of such truths Cano had just spoken in the preceding chapter, at the end. <sup>213</sup> We invite our objector to reread those chapters, and he will admit that such is the case. So very far is Cano from thinking that when the conclusions are denied "the faith becomes ill, but does not perish", that he expressly says a bit further on, after the passage quoted by our objector: "Now, since from these contrary errors [viz., the denial of the conclusions] there follows not only the illness of the faith, but also its corruption,"<sup>214</sup>

Thus, Melchor Cano's teaching is embodied in these two propositions: a) Truly theological conclusions (and no conclusion is truly and rigorously theological if it does not have an absolute or metaphysically certain connexion with the revealed principle from which it is deduced) are *purely theological*, or mediately of faith, *per se* or *without the Church's definition*; b) but they are formally or immediately of faith *after the definition*. Vázquez disagreed with the first proposition, Molina with the second. Both propositions taken jointly embody accurately, as we have seen, the doctrine taught

<sup>212</sup> CANO, *De Locis*, lib. 12, c. 6.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, lib. 12, c. 4, at the end.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 5, octava praecepto.

by St. Thomas concerning the indirectly revealed or theological conclusion. This is the same doctrine taught by all classical Thomists prior to the Suarezian confusion or innovation. (464)

474. SUAREZ AND LUGO. — From Cano our objector jumps to Suárez and Lugo. It would have been advisable to explain first the radically opposed theories of Molina and Vázquez, since Suárez's doctrine is hardly intelligible except with reference to those two theories that Suárez attempted to harmonize or combine (71) But let us turn to Suárez and Lugo.

Our objector begins by citing the three famous theses formulated by Suárez and Lugo, which we have repeatedly cited already, and which reduce to the following.

1. The revealed *formal-confused* is of faith *per se* or without definition.
2. The *purely virtually* or *purely mediately* revealed (*virtuale tantum*, *mediate tantum*) is not of faith *per se* or without definition.
3. The *purely virtually* or *purely mediately* revealed becomes of faith by the definition.

In these three propositions Suárez and Lugo employ two *new* terms in the history of theology, viz., *formal-confused* and *purely virtual* or *mediate*. These two terms were coined by Suárez, and both Suárez and Lugo mean by them something quite different from what the ancients and many moderns mean by the simple and traditional terms *formal* and *virtual*. Being unaware of this, our objector moves in a state of continuous confusion with respect to whatever he thereafter says of theologians posterior to Suárez and Lugo.

By *formal-confused* (subsequently translated by many as *formal*-equivalent) Suárez and Lugo mean all the conclusions that are really identical to, although they might differ conceptually from, the revealed principle from which they are deduced. By *purely virtual* or *mediate* they mean all the conclusions that *differ really* from the revealed principle. This is the explanation given by Suárez and Lugo themselves, and this is how they are interpreted by Ripalda, Mazzella and all the Suarezian writers we have read, as we have already shown elsewhere (73)

Thus, the three theses formulated by Suárez and Lugo have the following meaning:

1. Any conclusion that is *really identical to*, albeit *conceptually different from*, the revealed premise from which it is deduced, is of faith *per se*.
2. Any conclusion that *differ really* from the revealed premise is not of faith *per se*.
3. This same conclusion, viz., one that *differ really*, can be defined as of faith by the Church.

This is — we repeat and will keep repeating a thousand times — the true meaning of Suárez's and Lugo's three theses. Anyone who adverts only to the terms "formal-confused" and "purely virtual" and does not consider the meaning given them by Suárez and Lugo will grasp neither the mind of these two writers nor the mind of many other later writers who have made use of the same nomenclature. This, we believe, is what has happened to our objector.

Our objector describes Suárez's third thesis as inadmissible. It is exactly what we have said and say. What is *purely virtual* or *mediate*, or equivalently, what differs *really* and not only conceptually from the revealed premise from which it is deduced, cannot be defined as of faith for the simple reason that it is not truly revealed either directly or indirectly, since absolutely speaking the conclusion can be false without entailing the falsity of the revealed premise. The Salmanticenses were correct in attacking this proposition of Suárez and Lugo, which is the only one they had in mind in impugning these authors.

On the other hand, with respect to the first two theses of Suárez and Lugo our objector makes this important confession: "Since then almost all theologians, Thomists included, followed these two theses of Suárez. Our objector is quite accurate in making this assertion. We have gathered quotations from eighty or so theologians posterior to Suárez, and more than seventy of these theologians — or 90% — admit these two Suarezian theses. With one difference: where Suárez, in his first proposition, says that the conclusions are of faith, true Thomists say that they are *definable as of faith*."

It is plain that what our objector here confesses is what we have been saying ourselves. Except that, not having grasped the true meaning of the new terms *formal-confused* and *purely virtual* employed by Suárez and Lugo and repeated by so many subsequent authors, he has understood neither the doctrine of Suárez and Lugo, nor the teaching of 90% of later writers, nor our own.

Let us then set aside the nomenclature and go straight to the point. Does our objector admit that "any conclusion is *definable as of divine faith* if it is *really identical to*, even it should *differ conceptually from*, the revealed premise from which it is deduced"? If he admits it, he is in complete agreement with what we say, and the rest is only a matter of words. If he does not, he disagrees not only with ourselves but also with 90% of theologians, ancient as well as modern.

It is thus a demonstrated fact that both Suárez and Lugo are so far from having restricted the definability of the theological conclusion as a truth of faith that they have rather exaggerated it. In their first proposition they accepted, and very correctly indeed, the definability of *inclusive theological conclusions* as truths of faith. But in their third proposition they exaggerated that doctrine by extending it to physico connexive conclusions, which are not

rigorously theological conclusions. Hence, with respect to that third proposition they were forced to recur to the celebrated theories of new revelations or of transforming assistance (78-79).

One further remark and we are through with Suárez and Lugo. With the intention of suggesting that Lugo regards as a *modern* opinion the view that asserts the definability of the theological conclusion, our objector writes as follows: "Suárez's opinion obtained quickly such wide acceptance that Lugo already declares it to be common among the *more recent doctors*."

We cannot account for this surprising statement except by assuming that, as our objector was turning over a page of Lugo, he inadvertently turned over eight pages. Lugo deals with the question of the definability of a theological conclusion deduced from a premise of faith and a premise of reason — the point now at issue — in nos. 258-277 of *De Fide*, Disp. I. On the other hand, the phrase "the *more recent doctors*" appears in no. 326 where Lugo deals with the question "How is it of faith that this man is the true and legitimate pope?" This is an altogether different question, with regard to which John of St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses hold the same opinion as Suárez and Lugo. So far is Lugo from considering as *modern* the doctrine of the theological conclusion's definability that he says expressly: "Apart from the arguments brought forward by Suárez, it is confirmed by the praxis and use of *all*."<sup>215</sup>

475. JOHN OF ST. THOMAS. — Next to Suárez and Lugo, our objector cites John of St. Thomas, the Salmanticenses, and Billuart. Of John of St. Thomas he is forced to admit that "John of St. Thomas, with Navarrete and Master González, declares this opinion to be *common among Thomists*, at least insofar as the *definability of conclusions* is concerned." But our objector vainly insists on arguing that John of St. Thomas restricts that doctrine to improper conclusions.

There is one very simple and very objective way of ascertaining whether John of St. Thomas is speaking of proper or improper conclusions. It is common knowledge that John of St. Thomas confesses that he follows Navarrete and González against Molina and Granados. These five theologians deal with this question *ex professo*. Let anyone, then, look them up and compare them among themselves. If, after doing this, he still persists in saying that the question in which Navarrete impugns Molina, and Granados defends Molina against Navarrete, and John of St. Thomas with Navarrete and Master Gon-

<sup>215</sup> LUGO, *De Fide*, d.1, n.270.

zález impugns Molina and Granados, is not a question about proper but about improper conclusions, then he must be given up as a hopeless case.<sup>216</sup>

The text quoted by our objector is found in Part I, Q.1, Disp.2, art.4. We have already examined it elsewhere (307). Well, then, in his *De Fide* John of St. Thomas has expressly and authentically explained the meaning of what he said in the *aforementioned place*.

"From what has been said it follows that *virtual or mediate* revelation or that which is *deduced through reasoning*, such as exists in theology, *differs specifically* from *immediate* revelation which is had through the testimony of the witness and attains that which is to be held *by faith*, as we have explained at greater length in Part I, Q.1, Disp.2, art.4 [the place quoted by our objector], where we *rejected two extreme* opinions: one was Vázquez's who holds that a conclusion *deduced* from premises of faith is in respect of the knower's reasoning as certain as a proposition defined by the Church; the other was Molina's, who holds that even if the Church's definition should be attached to a proposition *that previously was not of faith*, the definition would not make it of faith, but that *the Holy Spirit assists the Church so that she will not err, but not that she may make of faith what was previously not of faith*. These two opinions may be seen *impugned in the aforementioned place*."<sup>217</sup>

Our objector can see there for himself that John of St. Thomas was speaking of a *proper* conclusion when he was arguing against Molina for the theological conclusion's definability. No one will say that the revelation that is *mediate, virtual, deduced through reasoning, specifically different from immediate revelation*, as there described by John of St. Thomas, is an *improper* conclusion. If in the solutions to the objections John of St. Thomas called such a conclusion *immediate*, and even added that nothing can be defined as of faith if it is *merely mediate*, that is because any truly theological conclusion — and only an inclusive *implicit* or *conceptual* conclusion can be

<sup>216</sup> The passage from John of St. Thomas reads as follows: "The third opinion holds that propositions *evidently deduced* from principles of faith, *if defined by the Church*, pertain immediately to the *faith* and become *principles of theology*; they no longer lean on reasoning, but their certainty is based on the divine testimony proposed by the Church in accordance with the Holy Spirit's infallible assistance in the definition of matters of faith. This opinion is *commonly* followed by Thomists, as can be seen in the *aforementioned Navarrete*, and Master González, and for this same view he cites in the *aforementioned place Granados, Bellarmine, Vega, Cano, Vázquez and others*." Passages from Navarrete, González, Granados, Bellarmine, Vega, Cano and Vázquez have been quoted respectively in numbers 402, 403, 232, 401, 388, 456, and 85. The reader can verify with his own eyes whether these writers speak of theological conclusions in the *proper sense*, or not.

<sup>217</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *De Fide*, d.1, q.2, n.13.



such — is always *immediate in itself* and is only *mediate to us*, as St. Thomas observes repeatedly and we have elsewhere explained. If, in the statement that nothing but the *immediate* can be defined, John of St. Thomas had only qualified the term *immediate* by the term *in itself*, there would have been nothing to censure in him, which is why we have blamed him only for an imprecision of nomenclature. But John of St. Thomas gave quite a clear account of himself by ending the whole question with the assertion that the Church can and does define the *virtual implicit*, but not the *purely connexive* (*connexive tantum*). That is exactly what we have said and say. *Connexio* without *inclusion* does not suffice for *definability* just as it does not suffice for true or rigorous *theology*.

476. THE SALMANTICENCES AND BILLUART. — By employing the new Suarezian and Lugoian nomenclature instead of the traditional Thomist nomenclature, the Salmanticenses have sown confusion in the majority of modern Thomists. Billuart does little else than transcribe the Salmanticenses.

According to the Salmanticenses, the *formal confused* or *formal equivocal* is definable as of faith; the *purely virtual* (*virtuale tantum*) is not definable as of faith.

Our reply is simple enough. Do the Salmanticenses mean what Suárez means by the term *formal confused*, viz., all the conclusions that, albeit *differing conceptually*, are *really identical* to the revealed principles? If they do, then by admitting that such conclusions are definable they are saying exactly what we are saying. If they do not, then by denying their definability they disagree with 90% of ancient and modern theologians, and our objector errs in putting the Salmanticenses together with Suárez and Lugo.

Likewise, do they mean what Suárez and Lugo mean by *purely virtual*, viz., “only those conclusions that *differ really* from the revealed principles”? If they do, then by denying that they are definable as of faith they are saying exactly what we are saying.

Finally, when the Salmanticenses and Billuart, and with them our objector, define the theological conclusion as “that which is contained in the revealed premises as the effect in its cause”, do they take cause to mean the *natural* or *physical* cause or cause *in essendo*? If they do, then in denying that such a conclusion is definable as of faith they are saying exactly what we are saying. A conclusion linked to the revealed premise with only a *physical connexion* can hardly be an object of *faith* when it cannot be even an object of *infallibility* or of *rigorous theological science*. Do they, on the contrary, take cause to mean the *virtual* or *metaphysical* cause or cause *in cognoscendo*? This is the sense in which the term must be taken in the case of sciences of absolute certainty. If they do, and deny nonetheless that the conclusions are definable as of faith, then we gladly hand over to our objector in

a silver platter the Salmanticenses and Billuart, and if it pleases him, even John of St. Thomas. Such a view is not only contrary to what we regard as *certain* and *evident*, but also contrary to what the great majority not only of ancient but also of modern theologians teach. Only a meager number of modern theologians do not admit the definability of the *conceptual* or *identico-real* conclusion as a truth of faith (490).

In short, to put an end to the confusion sown among Thomists by the Salmanticenses and Billuart, we invite our objector to choose once and for all the horn of the dilemma which best pleases him. If, in admitting that the formal confused or equivalent is definable as of faith, the Salmanticenses and Billuart take the term in the same sense as Suárez and Lugo, then the Salmanticenses and Billuart are with us, and not with our objector. If they take the term in another different sense, then the fictitious chain with which our objector sought to link the Salmanticenses and Billuart to Suárez and Lugo is completely broken, and those two Thomist theologians remain entirely isolated since, with the exception of Kilber, hardly half-a-dozen postsuarezian theologians will be found who deny the definability of the *formal confused* in the sense meant by Suárez and Lugo, viz., the conceptual or *identico-real* conclusion. Hence, Fr. Gardeil observes with his customary critical sense: “This view of the development of the doctrine of faith by way of a truly theological conclusion — i.e., one that is metaphysically connected with the revealed datum and *really included* in it according to the *distinction of concepts* by which the conclusion expresses the datum — has been *observed by the Salmanticenses and Billuart, who have been deceived by Suárez* and have carried away with themselves — at the cost of those struggles against the evidence of the definition of theological conclusions by the Church — a number of Thomist theologians themselves.”<sup>218</sup>

477. STATE OF THE QUESTION AT THE END OF THE 18th CENTURY. — With adroit courtroom strategy, our objector brings the history of this period to a close with Montaigne, since he is one of the theologians who deny the theological conclusion's definability: *Montaigne represents the state of the question* at the end of 18th century.”

We have been highly amused by this clever historical ruse. Why has our objector chosen to close the 18th century with Montaigne, one of the *few* postsuarezian theologians who deny the definability of the conclusion, and not with any of the *great multitude* of theologians who admit its definability, not to mention that many of them admit even the definability of dogmatic facts? Besides the many we have already quoted (399-434), we will now quote only four: two Jesuits and two Dominicans, all posterior to the Salmanticenses and contemporaries of both Billuart and Montaigne.

<sup>218</sup> *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, Oct. 1920, pp. 662.

The Jesuit Gautier says: "A theological conclusion, one that is *strictly such*, becomes *precisely dogmatic* and belongs to the sphere of *faith* if it is gathered by the Church herself or the Apostolic See and by its *definition*, or application of the divine revelation, proposed to all the faithful for belief."<sup>219</sup>

The Jesuit Platelio: "A conclusion deduced from an altogether certain universal, and a subsumed revealed proposition, and hence generally every conclusion deduced from a revealed premise and another naturally every and evident, is of *faith*. . . Proof of our conclusion: when a predicate is affirmed of a subject, all those things that are certainly and evidently known to be identical or necessarily connected with such a conclusion are simultaneously affirmed *mediately* and *virtually*, and hence *really*. Therefore this conclusion: 'Christ is risible', deduced from the premises: 'Every man is risible' and 'Christ is a man', of which the former is naturally evident and the latter of faith, is *sufficiently revealed*."<sup>220</sup>

The Dominican Labat: "Whoever denies a theological conclusion, *even one deduced from two revealed premises*, precisely as such [i.e. in the absence of a definition], would not be a heretic. . . I said *precisely as such*, because anyone who denies a theological conclusion that is *on another count defined by the Church*, would *truly be a heretic, whatever Molina might say to the contrary*."<sup>221</sup>

Lastly, the Dominican Preingüé: "You will object, in the first place, that it is not of faith that the Church is infallible in defining *what* is the meaning of a certain proposition, *since this is not revealed*. In reply, *the assumption is denied*. For that infallibility is revealed *at least mediately*, inasmuch as it is revealed that the Church is infallible in determining *what* the meaning of propositions is: and *such revelation suffices to make something pertain to the faith*. Thus St. Thomas here [2-2, q.11, a.2, corp.] says: 'A thing pertains to the faith in two ways. One, directly. . . Two, indirectly. . . And *heresy* is possible *with regard to both the one and the other* in the same way as *faith*."<sup>222</sup>

We have chosen this text from Preingüé to show once more the meaning of St. Thomas's *indirectly revealed*.

<sup>219</sup> *Prodromus ad theologicam dogmatico-scholasticam*, d.2, c.1, a.3, "Of purely theological conclusions", pg.99.

<sup>220</sup> *Synopsis totius cursus theologiae*, p. 3, n.202.

<sup>221</sup> *Theologia scholastica, secundum illibatam D. Thomae doctrinam*, t.1, pg.30.  
<sup>222</sup> IORDANUS PREINGÜÉ, O.P., *Theologia Speculativa et Moralis, De Fide*, d.7, q.5, t.4, pg.244.

478. OTHER 17th CENTURY THEOLOGIANS. — Having just quoted four end-of-the-18th century theologians, we will now quote for our objector's benefit other four end-of-the-17th century theologians from the number of those not yet cited — an Augustinian, a Benedictine, a Jesuit, and a Capuchin.

The Augustinian Gabardi: "I say, in the fourth place: *Theological conclusions* however *defined* by the Church (whether as deduced or as not deduced) *pertain to the faith* and are principles of theology; but this is not so in the case of conclusions that are not defined. This second part is against Vázquez who thinks that a *non-defined* conclusion is proposed for belief to those to whom it is evident through theological reasoning."<sup>223</sup>

The Benedictine Mezger writes as follows: "Observe, in the first place, that a thing can be revealed formally or virtually. . . That is revealed *virtually* which, on account of its being contained as it were radically and *virtually* (virtute) in something formally revealed, possesses an infallible connexion with it which is deducible through natural reasoning. First conclusion: The sufficient motive of *faith* is not limited only to confused and universal formal revelation, but includes also *virtual* revelation. First proof: Many propositions, not only of those revealed formally confusedly, but also of those revealed *virtually*, have been as a matter of fact proposed for belief to all the faithful and *defined by the Church*."<sup>224</sup>

The well-known Sorbonne theologian Martin Grandin: "Whether *mediate* revelation suffices for the faith? *Immediate* revelation is that which falls immediately on a certain proposition. Thus revelation immediately falls on this proposition 'Christ is a man'. *Mediate* revelation is that which by means of that proposition falls on another proposition, as, e.g., by means of the aforesaid proposition revelation falls on this one 'Christ is risible'. It is asked whether *mediate* revelation suffices.

*'Sole conclusion:* Such conclusions are of *faith*. Proof: When two things are necessarily connected with each other, if God says one of them, he also says the other to an extent that suffices for *divine faith*. . . This can be confirmed at least a posteriori in this manner: when two things are connected, if one of them is to be believed, the Church can also propose the other; therefore when one thing is connected to another, God who says the one, also says the other in a way that suffices for *divine faith*."<sup>225</sup>

<sup>223</sup> NICOLAUS GABARDI, *Theologia Scholastica Aegidii-Augustiniana*, t.1, n.66.

<sup>224</sup> *Theologia scholastica secundum viam et doctrinam D. Thomae Aquinatis*, t.3, De Fide, pg.130.

<sup>225</sup> *Opera Theologica*, t.3, De Fide, d.1, s.2, punctum postremum, pgs.47-48.

The Jesuit Haunoldus: "When *some* theologians usually affirm that there are in the Church no *new dogmas* to be newly believed, they mean to say no more than that nothing begins to be of faith formally and explicitly which was previously not of faith *radically, implicitly, and virtually*, inasmuch, that is, as the Church defines as explicitly to be believed only those things that, through the Holy Spirit's assistance, she knows are virtually contained in an object already formally revealed."<sup>226</sup>

Finally, the Capuchin Gervasius Brisacensis: "In the third place, you will ask whether *virtual* revelation i.e., that which is through a good consequence deduced from another revealed truth, suffices for the object of faith or for theological faith, or is merely a theological conclusion?"

"I answer that there are two opinions. Some affirm, . . . Some deny. . . However, in the meantime *all Catholics agree that with the Church's definition it suffices for divine faith.*"<sup>227</sup>

We could thus keep quoting innumerable theologians from the post-Tridentine period. The reader can now see for himself what is left of our objector's dogmatic assertion: "In this period the nominalistic formula is *no longer* simply admitted, but with a restriction." Thus is history written!

479. THE VATICAN COUNCIL. — Our objector labels the fourth period "The Vatican Council". With respect to this period he makes the following observations.

FIRST OBSERVATION. — "There is thus common agreement among the Scholastics on the substance of the doctrine. Hence the doctrine was sufficiently prepared for a definition in case of urgent necessity. This necessity presented itself to the Vatican Council on account of the error of the Protestants, the rationalists and Gunther, who refused to admit as *divinely revealed* the dogmas defined by the Church."

Reply. — The error of either Protestants, or rationalists, or Gunther, has nothing to do with the question of which we are speaking. All Catholic theologians admit that only that which is *revealed* can be defined as a dogma, and that alone suffices. Is it only the principles that are revealed, or also the truly theological conclusions? that is a question which remains completely free before and after the Vatican Council. Since Molina there is no unanimous agreement on this point, although *ninety per cent* admit that "*all* conclusions deduced from revealed principles through *conceptual reasoning*" are truly revealed and definable as of faith. That is our opinion. And those are, accord-

<sup>226</sup>Theologia Speculariva, lib.3, cont.7, n.153.

<sup>227</sup>Cursus theologicus, t.4, De Virtutibus theologicis, n.25.

ing to the Thomist school, the conclusions that are truly and rigorously theological.

480. SECOND OBSERVATION. — "As a matter of fact, the Vatican Council *approved*, at least *in substance*, the teaching of the Scholastics."

Reply. — The Vatican Council has defined only that nothing is definable as dogma except that which is *revealed*. If that is what our objector means by the *substance* of the scholastic teaching, it is undoubtedly a defined truth. But the Council has said not one word on whether it is only the formally revealed that is revealed, or also the virtually revealed. We repeat that this is a free question after as well as before the Council. The Council's classical commentator, commenting precisely on the passages referred to by our objector, says the following: "We believe as true the things that God has *revealed: ab eo revelata*. Behold the matter, or in scholastic language, the material object of the act of faith. But is it not possible to count among the *revealed* truths anything except those that are *formally revealed*, or can one also include therein the *virtually revealed* truths? *This is a question that our Council allows theologians to debate freely.*"<sup>228</sup>

481. THIRD OBSERVATION. — The Vatican Council expressly says that "The Holy Spirit was *not* promised to Peter and his successors so that by his revelation they should disclose *new doctrine*."

Reply. — Nothing can be deduced from this text against those who defend the definability of theological conclusions as truths of faith, since these theologians also defend against Kilber and Ripalda that the theological conclusion is not a *new doctrine* but a *new conceptual unfolding of the same* revealed doctrine.

On the contrary, this Vatican text works in their favour. Indeed, according to this text, the Holy Spirit, or what amounts to the same thing, *infallibility* was not promised to the Church in view of *new doctrine*; but, according to *all* theologians, the Holy Spirit or infallibility was promised to the Church in view of every truly theological conclusion, and even in view of every truly dogmatic fact. Therefore, neither truly theological conclusions nor truly dogmatic facts constitute *new doctrine*. Thus they are definable as of divine faith. This is what is deduced from the Vatican Council, and it is what we hope will someday be admitted by all theologians without exception (248).

482. FOURTH OBSERVATION. — "Among Scotists, Fr. Parthenius Minges<sup>229</sup> simply holds that theological conclusions are definable as dogmas,

<sup>228</sup> VACANT, *Constitutions du Conc. du Vatican*, t.3, n.559, pg.28.

<sup>229</sup> *Compendium theologiae*, 240-242.

and that the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary was thus defined. *He did not take into account the correction to Scotus made by later Scholastics*, nor did he take into consideration that Pius IX defined as a revealed truth the doctrine of the Blessed Virgin Mary's Immaculate Conception.<sup>230</sup>

*Reply.* — That Scotist theologian, whom we have elsewhere quoted (442), is perfectly entitled to say everything he says in that paragraph, and we congratulate him for it. With respect to the definability of the theological conclusion or of the indirectly revealed, Scotus had no need of being corrected by anyone. On the contrary, 90% of theologians follow St. Thomas and Scotus on this point against Molina, against Kilber, and if our objector so wishes, against the Salmanticenses and Billuart. On the other hand, Pius IX defined that the dogma of the Immaculate Conception is a revealed truth, but he did not say that it is a formally revealed truth. It could have been revealed indirectly as a conceptual conclusion of the principle of Mary's worthy divine motherhood. With Fr. Mingès, we think that this is how it was revealed. That is the indirectly revealed mentioned by St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure and Scotus in the question "Whether it is allowable to opine the contrary about the Notions" (209)

483. FIFTH OBSERVATION. — "The Jesuit School is divided, although the greater part holds that only the formally revealed can be defined as dogma, not the merely virtually revealed, as e.g., Cardinal Billot, Mazzella, Schiffini, Pesch."

*Reply.* — In the first place, if the Jesuit School is divided on this question, our objector is ill-advised in repeating so frequently that after the Salmanticenses and Billuart — as if there were no theologians in the world except these two — the question "has been settled in substance", and that "there exists a common agreement among the Scholastics", and even that "the doctrine was sufficiently prepared for a definition (!) in case of urgent necessity". As if the prestigious Society of Jesus counted for nothing at all!

In the second place, of those four Jesuit theologians chosen by our objector, Schiffini not only maintains, as we do, the definability of conceptually different conclusions, but extends it also to really different conclusions.<sup>230</sup> Cardinal Mazzella not only maintains, as we do, the definability of conceptual conclusions, but even maintains that they are of faith prior to their definition.<sup>231</sup> Cardinal Billot and Pesch do not distinguish clearly between conclusions that differ conceptually and conclusions that differ really, as neither have Suárez, Lugo and Mazzella. Hence we do not know exactly whether, in

<sup>230</sup> *De virtutibus infusis*, n.127.

<sup>231</sup> *De virtutibus infusis*, n.414.

denying the definability of the theological conclusion as a truth of faith, they deny the definability of every conclusion, or only the definability of conclusions that differ really. Meanwhile, as we have seen, Pesch admits the definability of every truly consequential meaning of the Bible, which is tantamount to admitting the definability of a conclusion in the proper sense (447).

484. SIXTH OBSERVATION. — "Among the Thomists, M. Tuyaerts holds that everything connected with things revealed, including the judgments of the Church concerning dogmatic facts . . . can be defined as dogma, in spite of the fact that these judgments obviously are not revealed."

*Reply.* — "Obviously are not revealed" if what we have in mind is direct revelation, but "obviously they are revealed" if what we have in mind is indirect revelation. Now, according to St. Thomas, the indirectly revealed can be defined as a truth of faith. The definition of the conclusions by the Church is only the infallible application of revelation, just as the definition of dogmatic facts is only the infallible application of revelation. The Church has divine authority to do both things. The texts of Báñez and Preingue commenting on St. Thomas's directly and indirectly<sup>232</sup> should here be recalled to mind. We think that Fr. Tuyaerts is deficient in three things: a) in not distinguishing between conceptual conclusions or conclusions of metaphysics — absolute certainty, and really distinct conclusions or conclusions of physico-

<sup>232</sup> Let us quote once more an important passage from Billuart since he is one of our contradictor's theologians.

"You will insist: Faith comes from hearing, but hearing is through the Word of God. Now, Jansen's fact is not contained in the Word of God. Therefore.

"Likewise: the Church has no new revelations, and the articles of faith do not increase with the passing of time. But these two things are seemingly to be admitted if Jansen's fact is accepted as revealed and of divine faith. Therefore.

"I answer that the solutions to these inconsistencies flow from what has been said.

"To the first, I distinguish the minor: Jansen's fact is not contained in the Word of God explicitly and immediately. I concede; implicitly and mediately, I deny. For it is contained in this revealed universal proposition: 'Every text condemned by the Church is condemnable'.

"To the second: The revelation of the universal proposition just mentioned is not new, but existed since the beginning. Consequently, the condemnation of Jansen's text is not a new article of faith but an explication and application of the revelation of the universal to a particular object." (BILLUART, *De Regulis fidei*, d.3, a.7, solvuntur objectiones)

Our learned contradictor is at complete liberty to follow the opinion he prefers in these matters that have not yet been defined by the Church. But it seems to us more prudent to be more considerate of those who follow a contrary opinion, and not to call evident without further ado what is a subject of debate among the greatest theologians.

contingent certainty. Only the former are rigorously theological conclusions and definable as of faith. b) In not distinguishing between before and after the definition. Before the definition, no conclusion can be given an assent of divine faith, not even one that is deduced from two revealed premises, no matter what the Salmanticenses may say. c) In having credited everything to the speculative reasoning and little or nothing to the practical sense of faith. The latter, as Fr. Gardell correctly pointed out, is as important as reasoning, if not more.

485. SEVENTH OBSERVATION. — "Not even the Nestor among French Thomists, Fr. A. Gardell, seems satisfied with the teaching of Thomists [i.e., the teaching of the Salmanticenses and Billuart] even if he does hold it in fact."

Reply. — We fail to understand why, for the purpose of classifying Fr. Gardell's opinion, our objector has not quoted what Fr. Gardell has most recently written on the subject: "The Salmanticenses and Billuart, deceived by Suárez, have obscured this idea, carrying away with themselves a number of Thomist theologians themselves. Fr. Marín-Sola has done us the service of retrieving our tradition and bringing it to full light. *I align myself unhesitatingly with this conception of the direct definition of truly theological conclusions.*"<sup>233</sup> Fr. Gardell was the first among the modern Thomists to call attention to the famous "revelable" which, according to St. Thomas, constitutes the specific object of sacred theology, and is the true bridge and the true vital force of dogmatic progress. In our opinion, Fr. Gardell's two inestimable monographs *Le donné révélé* and *La crédibilité* have been the true sources of whatever has been subsequently well said on the two questions of dogmatic development and the nature of apologetics.

486. FINAL OBSERVATION. — "Lastly, Fr. Marín-Sola has indeed touched a sore spot in Suárez's teaching, but has not healed it."

Reply. — Our objector has not understood the true meaning of the theses of Suárez and Lugo, and neither has he understood what we have censured and what we have approved in Suárez and Lugo.

As we have pointed out — and this will be admitted by all Suárez's disciples — Suárez and Lugo include in the term formal confused "all conclusions that are really identical to or absolutely inseparable from the revealed premise from which they are deduced".

<sup>233</sup> *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et théologiques*, Oct. 1920, pg. 662.

The *definability* of these conclusions is admitted by Suárez and Lugo. On this point, far from censuring Suárez and Lugo, we agree with them. Do the Salmanticenses, Billuart and our objector agree on this point with us, or not? If they do, then the dispute is at an end, since these are the true and proper conclusions of which we have been speaking all throughout this book. If they do not, then they obviously disagree not only with us, but also with Suárez and Lugo (in the first, and not only in the third, of their theses), and with 90% of ancient and modern theologians. We are quite certain that on this point all the true disciples of Suárez are with us.

We have censured Suárez on four points: a) for denying, in the first of his three theses under the new term "formal confused", that conceptual conclusions are proper conclusions; b) for affirming that such conclusions are of faith *per se* or without the Church's definition; c) for asserting, in the second and third of his theses under the likewise new term *merely virtual*, that the conclusion in the proper sense is the really distinct conclusion or physically certain conclusion; d) for regarding these conclusions as definable as of divine faith, thereby being forced to appeal to new revelations. We believe that these four criticisms of Suárez will merit the approval of anyone who has studied these questions, not in the Salmanticenses and Billuart who were misled by the Suarezian nomenclature, but in St. Thomas himself or in his commentators prior to the confusion created by Suárez's new nomenclature.

487. QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE AND QUESTIONS OF NAMES. — Speaking in another context the Salmanticenses make this very judicious remark: "From the liberty to attach new meanings to terms or to play loose at will with their ancient significations there arise long and interminable questions on the ways of speaking together with false and dangerous opinions which by playing with words, find shelter in their ambiguity so that it becomes impossible to convict them of falsity."<sup>234</sup>

This is what is happening to many modern theologians in connexion with the new terms formal confused, formal equivalent, pure virtual, pure mediate, and others such. Since Suárez coined those terms, theologians have found themselves trapped in a confusion comparable to that created at the druggist's by a practical joker who had furtively changed all the labels on the bottles. The salesclerks would swear that they had dispensed quinine as per prescription, whereas the customers or the physician would swear that they had been given arsenic instead of quinine. The only way out of the mess would be to ignore the labels altogether and examine the real content of the bottles.

Let us then ignore for the moment all these new terms or labels and go straight to the substance or content. We cannot of course speak of the sub-

<sup>234</sup> *Cursoa theologicas, De vitis et peccatis*, d. 15, dub. 3, n. 70.

stance without employing words. But instead of employing ambiguous or elastic words, let us employ only words whose meaning is exact, precise and admitted by all.

Now, then, everybody knows with perfect accuracy what is meant by *explicitly revealed*. Likewise, every theologian knows the exact meaning of the *distinction of reasoning reason* (*distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*), *distinction of reasoned reason* (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*), and *real distinction*. These four terms are sufficient to lay bare before any man, however unfamiliar with these matters, the exact *substance* of the problem labeled "the theological conclusion's definability as a truth of faith", and to classify with absolute precision the different opinions held by postsuarezian theologians.

As a matter of fact, God revealed to the Apostles, and they in turn delivered to the Church, a determinate set of *explicit* propositions called the *revealed datum* or the starting point of all development, both the theological and the dogmatic. From these explicit propositions there can emerge through reasoning no other kinds of conclusions but three: a) conclusions differing from the propositions delivered by the Apostles only with a distinction of reasoning reason; b) conclusions differing with a distinction of reasoned reason; c) conclusions differing with a real distinction. These are the only kinds of conclusions possible — there are neither more nor less.

488. FOUR SETS OF TRUTHS. — We have thus *four sets* of truths, viz.:

*Set 1: Explicitly revealed truths.*

*Set 2: Conclusions that do not differ from those just mentioned except with a distinction of reasoning reason.*

*Set 3: Conclusions differing with a distinction of reasoned reason, i.e., with a conceptual or virtual distinction.*

*Set 4: Conclusions differing with a real distinction.*

To these four sets so perfectly delineated there correspond in postsuarezian theology four opinions perfectly characterized and essentially different from each other, to wit:

*1st opinion:* that which holds that only truths of set 1 are definable as of faith. The best representative of this rigid opinion is, in a sense, *Arriaga*, who is followed by *Maisirio* and some other rare theologian. This opinion is today completely discredited.

*2nd opinion:* that which asserts that propositions of sets 1 and 2 are definable, but not propositions of set 3. This opinion is best represented by *Kilber* or the so-called Wirceburgenses, who in this question follow *Ripalda* in

part, and *Molina* and *Granados* in toto. This opinion has had few followers after *Kilber*.

*3rd opinion:* that which affirms that propositions of the first three sets are definable. In other words, definability is not restricted to what is explicitly revealed (set 1) and the conclusions of reasoning reason (set 2), but embraces also the conclusions of reasoned reason, i.e., conceptual or identical real conclusions (set 3). The most distinguished representatives of this opinion, apart from all the theologians prior to Molina, are Suárez and Lugo (in the *first* of their theses under the term *formal confused*). The immense majority of later theologians up to the present concurs with Suárez and Lugo on this point. This is also our opinion.

*4th opinion:* that which maintains that not only propositions of the first three sets but also propositions of set 4 are definable. This opinion holds as definable not only propositions that differ *conceptually* but also propositions that differ *really* or propositions of *purely physical necessity*. This is the opinion uniquely held by Suárez and Lugo (in the *third* of their theses under the term *merely virtual*), which logically led these two illustrious theologians to the inadmissible theories of new revelations or of indefinite and transforming assistance.

The theologian or historian of dogmas who fails to draw a clear distinction between these four perfectly characterized and completely irreducible opinions, or believes, as our objector seems to believe, that the four are equal *in substance*, either is uninformed on the postsuarezian history of this question or confuses the substance or content with the nomenclature.

We have said, and say it again, that on the issue of the *definability* of the theological conclusions, our opinion is the third. Will our objector, then, be kind enough to distinguish clearly on this point between the question of *substance* and the question of *nomenclature*.

The question of *substance* is the following: "When a proposition is explicitly revealed are all other propositions *really identical* to, albeit *conceptually different* from, it also revealed implicitly and thus definable as of faith?" No one can fail to see the profound significance of this question for the problem of the scope of dogmatic development and of the nature of sacred theology.

On the other hand, the question of *nomenclature* is the following: Are we to *call* formally revealed, or virtually revealed, those truths that are really identical to explicitly revealed propositions, albeit differing from them conceptually?

Anyone will understand that the problem of the *definability* of such conceptual truths, which is the problem with which we are concerned, depends on the answer to the question of substance, not on the answer to the

question of nomenclature. If the answer is that such truths are truly revealed, then everyone will concede that they are definable, no matter how they are called. If the answer is that they are not revealed, then everyone will say that they are not definable whatever the name they are given.

How, then, does our objector answer the question of substance? If his answer is affirmative, he is in complete agreement with us, and all else is a secondary question. If he answers in the negative, then he should not doubt for a moment that he disagrees not only with us but also with 90% of both ancient and modern theologians.

It would be unprofitable to attempt to evade a categorical reply by toying with words, e.g., saying that such conclusions are definable if they do not express any new doctrine, but not otherwise. For that is precisely the point. We want to know whether such conclusions, which differ only conceptually from the revealed premise from which they are deduced, express any new doctrine, or not. If our objector concedes that they do not express any new doctrine — which is tantamount to conceding that they are definable as of faith — then he is totally in agreement with us. If he answers that they express a completely new doctrine — which is tantamount to denying that they are definable — he disagrees not only with ourselves but also with the immense majority of ancient and modern theologians.

490. AN IMPARTIAL TESTIMONY. — To show our objector that this is indeed the opinion of the immense majority of theologians, ancient as well as modern, we close this section with a passage from a very modern and impartial author, who could have had nothing further from his mind than the thought of being quoted to corroborate our teaching. He is the Jesuit Fr. Daniel Sola, the most recent theologian that we have read on these matters, and a distinguished professor at the Pontifical Seminary of Comillas in Spain.

"Something can be contained in an explicitly revealed truth either formally or virtually. It is contained *formally implicitly* when it is formally, i.e. that there is no other distinction than the explicitly revealed truth, so that there is no other distinction than a distinction of reasoning reason . . . A thing is said to be contained in another *materially* and *identically* [this is what concerns us, and we beg our objector to take note] when there is *no real distinction* between them, but there is an *adequate metaphysical distinction* or a distinction of *reasoned reason*. It is thus that God's omnipotence is contained in his immensity, and vice versa; and so of all the other divine attributes."

Our objector can plainly see that what Fr. Daniel calls *material* or *identical* containment is the conceptual conclusions of which we are speaking. Here now is Fr. Daniel Sola's thesis, which is truly noteworthy:

"Thesis 76: Any truth that is *formally implicitly* contained in another which is explicitly revealed belongs in itself (quoad se) to the material object of faith. The same should more probably be said of those truths that are contained in another explicitly revealed truth *materially* and *identically* or *essentially connexively*, but not *formally*.

"Assessment. The first part, i.e., that any truth that is *formally* contained in another which is explicitly revealed is in itself the material object of faith, or truly and really revealed, is *certain* and *common* against Arriaga . . .

"The second part [let our objector please take note] is in reality THE MOST COMMON and *very much more probable*, at least if the real identity of both truths can be known by us with certainty without any new revelation. Among the *more ancient* this view is held by Suárez, Lugo [in the first, not in the third thesis], Oviedo, Marín, and *many others*, and COMMONLY BY THE MORE RECENT against Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses and others."<sup>2,3,5</sup>

Our objector can there verify that the opinion we hold, and which our objector seems to regard as something peculiar, is not only *very much more probable* and taught by the ancient theologians, but also followed *commonly* by the *more recent*. Our objector's whole thesis is flawed by the fact that, having been ensnared in the new and ambiguous terms "formale *confusum*", and virtuale *tantum*" coined by Suárez and Lugo, which the Salmanticenses were unable to assess correctly, he has not been able to grasp the true substance of the *conceptual* or *identico-real* conclusion which Suárez and Lugo called formal confused, and whose definability as a truth of divine faith has always been defended, as it is also today defended, by the great majority of theologians against Ripalda and the Wirceburgenses. Provided that our objector admits this *substance*, the *nomenclature* would not matter much. We do not believe, though, that any Thomist worth his salt would dare maintain that the conceptual conclusion is not a *proper* conclusion, not a revealed or theological virtual in the proper and rigorous sense.

## SECTION VII

### EXAMINATION OF A VERY RECENT BOOK ON THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS

491. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS. — An interesting introduction to the history of dogmas has just been published. It is written by the learned professor at the Angelicum in Rome, Fr. Schultes, with the title *Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum*. . . Auctore P. Reginaldo Maria Schultes, O.P., S. Theol. Mag. (Parisii 1922).

This distinguished historian of dogmas admits in substance, as we do, the evolution of dogma by way of theological conclusions. However, since on the subject of the theological conclusion or the revealed virtuality in the proper sense he entertains a notion, or at least a nomenclature, somewhat different from ours, the author frequently refers, even by name, to our teaching and makes us certain observations. We think that such observations have been more than sufficiently answered by all that has been already said. However, we shall here reply to them as briefly as possible, indicating in parentheses the numbers in this book where the reader can find the teaching explained at greater length. Fr. Schultes's observations follow.

492. FIRST OBSERVATION. — "As the very term revelation itself makes plain, dogmas have to be truly and properly revealed. Hence it is not enough that a doctrine be revealed only *improperly* or *in an analogical sense*, as further on when dealing with virtual revelation . . . we will ex professo explain."<sup>236</sup>

*Reply.* — Our objector serenely identifies there, as well as further on, the analogical and the improper. "Improperly or in an analogical sense."

The division of *revelation* into immediate or formal (*in se*) and mediate or virtual (*in alio*) is an analogical division, as is often the case with divisions in metaphysics or in theology. However, it is neither improper nor metaphorical, but proper and real and intrinsic exactly as the division of evidence into immediate evidence (*in se*) and mediate evidence (*in alio*).

Implicit-virtual revelation is, thus, true and proper revelation, but *in its own manner*. That manner is the *implicit* manner or "in alio", which is why it needs to be *explicitated*. When the explicitation is made through the theologian's private reasoning the result is theology. When it is done by the divine authority of the Church, who employs reasoning or theology as an instrument, the result is dogma (304, 326).

493. SECOND OBSERVATION. — "Although all dogmas express a revealed doctrine, nonetheless not everything revealed has the aptitude to become a dogma, but only such things as *per se* or *by reason of themselves* order us to God or to salvation."<sup>237</sup>

*Reply.* — According to St. Thomas, both that which is revealed directly or *by reason of itself* (*ratione sui*), as well as that which is revealed indirectly or *by reason of another* (*ratione alterius*), can become dogmas through the Church's definition.

<sup>236</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.12, footnote 2.

<sup>237</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.13.

"A thing belongs to the faith in two ways: one, *directly* . . . Another, *indirectly*. . . And heresy is possible with regard to both the one and the other in the same way as faith."<sup>238</sup> "The same judgment applies to the latter [the indirect] as to the former [the direct] which are determinate in the faith, since the one is followed by the other."<sup>239</sup>

The only difference is that the *scriptural* indirect is never or rarely defined by the Church. On the other hand, the *theological* indirect is frequently defined by the Church. (323, 466)

494. THIRD OBSERVATION. — "Hence the Vatican Council expressly insinuates that *nothing* new has been established by the definition of the Roman Pontiff's infallibility."<sup>240</sup>

*Reply.* — Nothing new *in substance* or *in no new revelation*. But something, and even a great deal, that is new as to *new explicitation*. Therein precisely lies the evolution of dogma: in a new or greater explicitation of everything that is truly *implicit*, as the implicit-virtual truly is (170, 173).

495. FOURTH OBSERVATION. — "Thus dogmatic progress or the evolution of dogmas is possible inasmuch as the revealed truths are successively *proposed by the Church* for belief, and are in the course of time more perfectly *known by us*."<sup>241</sup>

*Reply.* — There is not only a *proposition* and a *knowledge* of the explicitation that already existed, but also a *greater explicitation* than that already in existence — greater, that is, than that which already existed in the faithful, and greater also than that which already existed in the whole Church, although not greater than that which existed in the mind of the Apostles. Hence, although it is not a progress of the faith in itself or in its substance, nonetheless it is not just a progress of the faithful in the faith, but also a progress of the faith in the faithful, not merely in the individual faithful but in the Church herself. (177, 182)

It is one thing to catalogue, order, classify, divide, formulate . . . concepts already *known*, and even to deduce *known* concepts from others similarly *known*. It is another radically different thing to pass from *known* concepts to other concepts still *unknown*.

<sup>238</sup> *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.11, a.2.

<sup>239</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.33, q.1, a.5.

<sup>240</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.19.

<sup>241</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.44.



In the former case the intellect remains within the *formal*, within the *same concepts*. In the latter case there is a transition from the formal to the virtual-implicit, a transition to a *new concept*.

In the first case there is nothing but a greater distinction, or greater clarity, or greater order of the same concepts. In the second case there is not only a newness of order, classification, or formulation, but also a newness of *consequence* or of concept. "The explication of the articles of faith happens in two ways: one, when a man knows *distinctly* the articles themselves; another, when. . . a man knows the *things that follow from the articles*."<sup>242</sup>

It is evident that, by her dogmatic definitions, the Church does not merely order, or classify, or distinguish concepts already *known* but determines, or defines, or gives us *new concepts*, concepts *not known* previously, although already implicitly contained in the concepts primitively known. As Lirinenius puts it: "By thee posterity thankfully rejoices in something known, which antiquity heretofore venerated *unknown*."<sup>243</sup>

Let no one believe, as many seem to believe, that these are concepts unknown to the faithful in particular but known to the Church, as if the Church did nothing but define something unknown to the faithful but already known to herself. These are concepts previously not known to the faithful and to the Church herself, although known to the Apostles. "Thus, in the course of ages and centuries, let there be growth in the understanding, *knowledge* [scientia], and wisdom of each as well as of every one, of one man as well as of the *whole Church*."<sup>244</sup>

Dogmatic progress thus moves between concepts that are neither contrary nor diverse, but explicative or mutually implicit. Hence it is homogeneous and not transformist. But this does not mean that the concepts are *not new concepts*. Not entirely new since they are not new as to their objectivity or substance, but nonetheless partially new since they are new as to their development or explication (20, 306).

496. FIFTH OBSERVATION. — "It should be observed that, in the Schoolmen's view, the 'consequences or corollaries' are not contained in the articles in a way such that they are deducible from them *by reasoning alone*, but in a way similar to the way in which particular articles are contained in certain general articles, as, e.g., the Passion of Christ in the Redemption."<sup>245</sup>

<sup>242</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.11, a.1, sol.3.  
<sup>243</sup> *Commentatorium*, 23

<sup>244</sup> VATICAN COUNCIL, Denz.-Schön. 3020; LIRINENSIS, *Commentorium*, 28

<sup>245</sup> *Op.cit.*, pgs. 73-74.

*Reply.* St. Thomas and all the great Schoolmen expressly and clearly distinguish between the containment of one *article* in another, or the containment of all the articles in the two most general articles of the faith, and the containment of the *consequences* or corollaries in the articles.

Of the first mode of containment they assert that it cannot be done through human reason alone, but that it requires revelation, and hence the deduction or explication *from one article to another article* was completed in Christ and his Apostles. "This explication was completed by Christ."

Of the second mode of containment, i.e., the containment of the "consequences or corollaries" in the articles, they assert that such consequences can be known and deduced, and have as a matter of fact been known and deduced, without revelation, by human reason, as in the case of theology, or by reason with divine assistance, as in the case of Church definitions. "And in this regard the faith can be explicated day by day, and has been *more and more explicated through efforts of the Fathers*." (134, 314)

497. SIXTH OBSERVATION. — "Thus, according to St. Thomas, 'the articles' do not contain that which is revealed *per accidens*, but everything that is revealed *per se* whether explicitly or implicitly."<sup>246</sup>

*Reply.* — St. Thomas expressly says that in the articles two kinds of things are contained and can be deduced or explicated: a) things contained *actually* in the article; b) things contained *potentially* in the article.

Now, every Thomist knows, and St. Thomas says it expressly, that by *potentially* contained or revealed is not meant the formally revealed, but the *indirectly* revealed or the consequential: *the things that follow from the articles*. That is the *potentially* or *virtually* revealed; that is the truly and properly theological conclusion.

Let us quote a Thomist who will no doubt please Fr. Schultes. In his commentary to a parallel passage, John of St. Thomas writes: "St. Thomas assigns on the part of the Holy Scripture the *immediately revealed*, but on the part of theological science he assigns the *reveatable*, or that which is revealed *virtually* or *in potency*."<sup>247</sup>

Thus the *potential* content of the articles, of which St. Thomas expressly speaks and of which he says that it is *divisible* and *explicable*, is identical to what Cajetan and later Thomists called *virtual* in the proper sense. All of it, according to St. Thomas, is *truly contained* in the article. "That which is *potentially contained in the article*." (134, 296, 365)

<sup>246</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg. 75.

<sup>247</sup> *Cursus Theologicus*, p.1, q.1, d.2, a.7, n.11.

498. SEVENTH OBSERVATION. — "However, it must be observed that only certain determinate conclusions have been accepted as Catholic truths, viz. those that are inferred with a *good and necessary consequence*, i.e., which follow from any truth of the Holy Scripture or any other dogma with *logical certitude* through a mediating *immediately evident* proposition. Finally, these conclusions will be nothing but explications or determinations of the meaning of Holy Scripture or Tradition."<sup>248</sup>

*Reply.* — This passage is taken from a context in which our objector speaks of theologians of the 14th and 15th centuries, among them Scotus.

In the first place, it is not accurate to say that all these theologians require that the premise of reason be "*immediately evident*". The majority of them are satisfied with requiring that it be "necessary and evident". The reader can verify this by looking up the passages we have quoted (372-381).

In the second place, it is enough that our objector admits, as he does, that a conclusion from a premise of faith and a premise of natural reason is definable when the premise of reason is "*immediately evident*". That is enough for saying that theological conclusions in the *proper* sense are definable as of faith, unless there be some Thomist theologian capable of saying that no conclusion derived from an immediately evident premise of reason is a conclusion in the proper sense. That would be the limit!

In the third place, the reader is given to understand how our objector is to be understood when he says time and again in his book that nothing can be defined as a dogma if it is not "*formally*," revealed or if it is not an "*explication or determination*" of the revealed. By these terms he apparently means any theological conclusion, even one that is deduced through a premise of natural reason, provided that this premise is immediately evident. This alone is sufficient to warrant the acceptance of the definability of conclusions in the proper sense.

What happens in such theological conclusions is this: when the minor of reason is *immediately evident*, or both premises are explicitly revealed, the conclusion is quickly and without any difficulty accepted by all theologians, and even by all the faithful; it is quickly taught by the ordinary preaching of the pastors; it quickly gains admission into the teaching and belief of the universal Church, and thereby it is speedily defined by the ordinary magisterium with no need of any solemn definition.

But this does not mean that such conclusions are not truly and properly conclusions, or that they need no definition of the Church, at least the defini-

<sup>248</sup> *Op. cit.*, pg. 85.

tion of her ordinary magisterium, in order to be believed as truths of divine faith.

The more evident a conclusion, the more it is properly a conclusion, and the more properly and rigorously theological it is. "Thus the evidence and necessity of the consequences *does not eliminate but makes theology*; it *does not take theology away, but brings theology in*."<sup>249</sup>

Today, on the contrary, there seems to exist in many theologians the manifest tendency to regard a theological conclusion as all the more *theological* or all the more *scholastic* the more difficult, or doubtful, or obscure, or debatable it is. They have lost the true Thomist notion of theological science and of the theological conclusion in the proper sense of these terms.

499. EIGHTH OBSERVATION. — "Consequently, according to Báñez, the definitions issued later by the Church represent a *pure explication* of the knowledge had by the *Apostles* and delivered to the *Church*."<sup>250</sup>

*Reply.* — The reader who has read, or reread, Báñez's texts (396) will plainly see that Báñez clearly distinguished between the *explication* that the *Apostles* had of the revealed datum, and the explication that the posterior *Church* has.

If we compare the explication that the Church has and is given by her to us with the explication that the Apostles had, the former is not more but less than the latter. The Apostles possessed an explication greater than the explication given to us by the Church, and equal to any explication that might be given to us by the Church till the end of time (57, 58).

But if we compare the explication possessed and given by the Church of later centuries, not with the explication possessed by the Apostles, but with the explication given by the Apostles to the Church, which is what we call the revealed datum, then the explication is successively *greater*. According to Báñez, this explication embraces every truly and rigorously theological conclusion, and it is, he says, what St. Thomas meant by the indirectly revealed.

On this matter, as on many others, Báñez is superior to certain commentators of the 17th and 18th centuries.

Our objector will not be able to quote a single passage in which Báñez denies the definability of the truly theological conclusion as a truth of faith. On the other hand, we have quoted numerous passages, and we could quote many more, in which Báñez expressly asserts it.

<sup>249</sup> CANO, *De Locis*, 12, 2.

<sup>250</sup> *Op. cit.*, pg. 90.

500. NINTH OBSERVATION. — "The formula given by St. Thomas and other Schoolmen was sufficient to explain the development of the faith through new revelations, but not to explain the unfolding of the faith through the magisterium of the Church or in the course of dogmatic development."<sup>251</sup>

*Reply.* — St. Thomas has given us not only a clear formula to explain the progress of the Old Testament or the progress of new revelations, but also very clear formulae to explain the dogmatic progress that takes place after the Apostles by means of the Church.

These formulae are: a) "The things that are contained potentially in the article. . . and these things are those that precede the article and those that are consequent to it."<sup>252</sup> b) "The things that are contained implicitly in the articles, which is the case when a man knows the things that follow from the articles."<sup>253</sup> c) "The things that are contained implicitly in the faith of the Church as conclusions in the principles."<sup>254</sup> d) "The things from the denial of which there follows something contrary to the faith."<sup>255</sup> e) "The things from which there follows the corruption of an article."<sup>256</sup>

The reader has there five literal formulae taken from St. Thomas that express the scope of dogmatic progress after the Apostles with much more clarity and accuracy, and with much less confusion and empiricism than any formulae invented thereafter.

St. Thomas's five formulae are equivalent to one, viz., to the truly *theological conclusion* or truly *implicit virtually*, which is the formula whereby they are translated by Capreolus, Cajetan, Báñez, and almost all the Saint's classical commentators prior to the Salmanticensis (467, 469)

501. TENTH OBSERVATION. — "But the general reason for the confusion has been the failure to distinguish between the division of *revelation* itself (i.e. on the part of revelation itself) and the division of the various modes of *knowing* the revealed objects, i.e. on the part of the mode of our knowledge."<sup>257</sup> Our objector repeats this at every turn and believes that it is the principal distinction that has to be made.

<sup>251</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.99.

<sup>252</sup> *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.2, ad 4.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*, a.1, sol.3.

<sup>254</sup> *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.2, ad 6.

<sup>255</sup> *Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.32, a.4.

<sup>256</sup> *Op.cit.*, 2-2, q.11, a.2.

<sup>257</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.110.

*Reply.* — We concede that this distinction needs to be made since without it becomes impossible to know what is revealed immediately *in itself* or on the part of *revelation*, and what is revealed immediately *for us* or on the part of our knowledge.

But there is a third member, more important than these two and which our objector never mentions, viz., that which is *at the same time* revealed immediately *in itself* and revealed mediately *to us*. This is precisely the revealed implicit-virtual. Inasmuch as it is mediate to us it is virtual, and hence rigorously theological. Inasmuch as it is immediate *in itself* it is implicit, and hence definable by the Church.

Thus, the Church defines nothing that is not truly revealed, since she defines only that which was already *implicit* in the revealed object. Thus, too, the Church does nothing but turn the immediate *quoad se* into immediate *quoad nos*, since whatever is implicit or inclusive is already immediate *quoad se*, as St. Thomas repeatedly observes (168).

502. ELEVENTH OBSERVATION. — "H. Kilber, one of Suárez's brothers in the Society, does an excellent refutation of him [Suárez] based principally on this reason: that any doctrine which is *only virtually* revealed cannot be held *exclusively* on God's authority."<sup>258</sup> Kilber's objection is repeated subsequently by our objector on his own in pg. 196.

*Reply.* — In the first place, if Kilber and our objector are speaking of the virtual-implicit or inclusive, as they truly do, they are wrong in describing it as *only virtual*. Anything truly implicit or inclusive, albeit virtual or mediate to us, is formal or immediate in itself. They should describe it as *formal-confused*, as Suárez and Lugo call it; or *virtual-implicit*, as John of St. Thomas calls it; or *implicit* or *virtual* without further qualifications, as it was termed by all theologians prior to Suárez; or *identico-real* virtual or *connexive-essential* virtual, as it is called by the majority of modern theologians.

In the second place, setting aside useless questions of nomenclature, Kilber, as so many non-Thomists, has not distinguished sufficiently between *the faith* and *our faith*. That assent is to be given *exclusively* on God's authority is true speaking of faith in itself, i.e., of the faith of those who have received the revelation immediately from God. But it is not true speaking of *our* faith, i.e., of the faith of those who have received the revelation through the proposition and explication of the Church. In *our* faith there are two elements: a) the *object* which is revealed by God alone; b) its *explication* by the Church assisted by God. With respect to the revealed object, the formal mo-

<sup>258</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.119.

tive is God alone. But with respect to its explication, the Church's definition comes into play, not as the formal motive, but as an integral and indispensable *condition* of the formal motive. And since the definition is not done in virtue of new revelation but in virtue of assistance, *reasoning* comes into play as an instrument of the Church, just as history, critique and all the other necessary human means come into play in order to find the meaning of the explicitly revealed, or to explicate the implicit.

The argument submitted by Kilber and our objector proves apodictically that no conclusion, not even a conclusion deduced from two revealed premises, can be a truth of divine faith *before* its definition by the Church, since it is *human* reasoning that explicates and proposes the conclusion, and we would therefore assent with *divine* faith to a *human explicative*. But it proves nothing at all with respect to *implicit* conclusions defined by the Church, even if the Church had to employ reasoning to unfold or explicate them. In this case reasoning plays no part at all either in our knowledge or in our assent to the conclusion, which is known by us through simple and immediate definition. If it plays a part at all, reasoning has no part in *our act* [of faith] but in the *explicative labour of the Church*, and even there its part is not that of the formal motive but of a simple instrument or condition previous to the definition (129-134 and 135-156).

503. TWELFTH OBSERVATION. — "God does not disclose or reveal everything he knows about the thing, but only what is *signified* by the terms."<sup>259</sup>

*Reply.* — This second argument from Kilber is no more efficacious than the preceding one. God reveals not only what the terms *explicitly* say, but also what they say *implicitly*, i.e., what is *implicated* or *included* in the predicate of the revealed proposition. That is the *virtual inclusive* or *implicit*.

Explicative or analytic or conceptual reasoning, which is what we mean by inclusive reasoning, does not have for its purpose the addition of any meaning or signification that was not implicit. Its purpose is to explicate or unfold what was already implicit in the revealed premise, and in it alone, just as a tree develops the vitality it already possessed within itself into branches, flowers and fruits.

The only difference lies in that the tree cannot do it without assuming material from without, whereas our intellect, being in possession of a so-called *analytic* or *intellectual* process which is purely and exclusively intrinsic, can do it without any mixture, addition or change, by a simple *explication* or unfolding of what was already objectively and truly *implicit* in the starting point (224).

<sup>259</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.119.

Elsewhere (96, 246) we have quoted texts from John of St. Thomas and Gonet in which they assert that the truly theological conclusion is completely contained in the premise of faith alone, and not at all in the premise of reason. This is obvious to any true Thomist. However, we shall further submit the testimony of two modern Thomists.

"The conclusion, in effect, is *solely contained in the principle of faith*, and not at all in the principle of natural reason."<sup>260</sup>

"At any rate, and this observation is of *capital* importance, the theological conclusion is not contained virtually in the philosophical minor — the latter is absolutely extrinsic to the former — but *in the revealed major alone*."<sup>261</sup>

Such being the case, it is plain that the Church, in defining such conclusions as truths of divine faith, does not *objectively* increase the revealed deposit.

504. THIRTEENTH OBSERVATION. — "But if a thing is *in no way immediately revealed*, neither implicitly nor explicitly, the Church can never propose it as a truth of faith."<sup>262</sup>

*Reply.* — These words from John of St. Thomas, which our objector stresses as if they were a forceful argument, are effective against the definability of the *non-inclusive* or *physico-commixive* mediate. It is only such a mediate that is "in no way immediate", since it is mediate both *quoad se* and *quoad nos*. But they are of no force against the mediate *inclusive*, which neither John of St. Thomas nor any true Thomist would dare describe as being *in no way immediate*, since even if it is not immediate *quoad nos*, it is *immediate quoad se* (168). "Any proposition whose predicate is *included* in the reason of the subject, is *immediate* and per se evident of itself."<sup>263</sup>

Our objector likewise repeatedly observes that if a truth is to be a "conclusion properly speaking", it needs to be deduced from the revealed deposit "as the effect from its cause", and if it is contained and deduced only in this manner then it is not definable as of divine faith. But our objector seems not to have adverted, as neither the Salmanticenses seem to have, to the fact that to be deduced "as the effect from its cause" can have two essentially different senses.

260 R.P.MARTIN, O.P., *Revue Thomiste*, Jul.-Aug. 1912, pg.505.

261 A. DE POULPIQUET, O.P., *L'objet intégral de l'Apologétique*, pgs. 523-524.

262 *Op.cit.*, pg.121.

263 ST. THOMAS, *In Post. Analyst.*, lib.1, lect.3.

*First sense:* deduced as the effect from its "cause in the proper sense", viz. the *natural* or *real* or *physical* cause. In this case, it is obvious, and we readily concede, that the conclusion is not definable as of divine faith, nor even as of ecclesiastical faith, for the simple reason that it is not an *inclusive* or implicit conclusion, but merely connexive. It is not a rigorously theological-co-metaphysical or absolutely necessary conclusion, but a physical conclusion, which absolutely speaking is contingent or fallible. It is a conclusion of type 4.

*Second sense:* contained in the revealed deposit and deduced from it as the effect from its "cause in the improper sense", viz., the *virtual* or *meta-physical* cause with respect to its effects, or the *integral* or *perfect* essence with respect to its properties. It is thus that every rigorously theological conclusion is contained in and deduced from the revealed deposit. But in this case the conclusion is not purely connexive but also implicit or inclusive. It is *mediate quoad nos* but immediate *quoad se*. Hence it is definable as of divine faith. Such are the conclusions of the other five types.

Hence, these two things should never be confused: a) to be a *conclusion in the proper sense*; b) to be deduced as effect from its *cause in the proper sense*. The latter is not necessarily required for the former. The majority of those who deny the theological conclusion's definability as of faith do so because they understand it in terms of a conclusion deduced as an effect from its cause in the proper sense. But this is a wrong notion of the theological conclusion (46, 53, 98, 300).

505. FOURTEENTH OBSERVATION. — "For any thing to belong indirectly to the faith, it is indeed necessary that from its denial there should follow the denial of the principle of faith, but it is also *further* necessary that it be *revealed in itself*."<sup>264</sup>

*Reply.* — It is necessary that it be *revealed*, but not that it be revealed *in itself*. It is sufficient that it be revealed *in another*. This is what is known as the *virtual implicit*, and it is verified in every *inclusive* theological conclusion.

Such implicitness is not created by our reasoning; but it is discovered, or explicated, or deduced by reasoning. Since this implicitness exists *objectively*, and thus independently of our reasoning, it is by the same token a *true* and *objective* implicitness, and suffices for definability. But our reason cannot discover or explicate it except by *means of* reasoning, and for this reason it is called *virtual* or *mediate*, i.e., mediate for *our* intellect.

The passages we have quoted from Cajetan (383) and many other Thomists will make obvious that for *definability* they require nothing but

<sup>264</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.142.

*implicitness*, and for implicitness they require nothing but *necessary connexion*, since when we speak of theological, not physical connexion, we are speaking of a connexion of *objective analysis*, and hence of connexion with implicitness. For St. Thomas and the Thomists and for 90% of the other theologians, *objective identity* (provided that it can be known evidently without new revelation) is the same as *implicitness* and as *definability* as a truth of faith.

If Molina, and Kilber and certain other theologians think otherwise, they and those who wish to follow them are entitled to their views, since in the absence of a definition by the Church these are matters of free opinion. But we find it hard to comprehend that there should be Thomists who think that what is *really identical* is not likewise *objectively identical*, and what is objectively identical not *objectively implicit*, and what is objectively implicit in the revealed deposit not *implicitly revealed*.

We believe that such theologians, much like the ancient conceptualists, pay more attention to the statements and the subjective concepts than to the *objective reality* involved in the statements and concepts. They forget that the goal and terminal point of the statement and the concept, in science as well as in revelation or faith, is not the statement or concept, but the *reality*. "The act of the believer does not terminate in the *enunciabile* but in the *thing*. For we do not form *enunciabiles* except for the sake of obtaining by their means knowledge of the *things*, as in science so too in faith."<sup>265</sup>

506. FIFTEENTH OBSERVATION. — "Third corollary: The question, what conclusions are definable as dogmas, cannot be properly settled by the fact that they are *connected* with something that is revealed in itself . . . (but also by taking into account that they are *expositions* or *expressions* of a determinate revealed doctrine): for *connexion* with something revealed alone does not make a teaching definable as an object of faith."<sup>266</sup>

*Reply.* — We concede that *connexion* alone does not suffice for definability. What is needed is connexion with *inclusion* or *implicitness*. Such is the case with conceptual or analytic reasoning. Such is also the case with implicit virtuality.

We likewise concede that the definitions of the Church, whether they are definitions of faith or simply infallible definitions (Thomists have never distinguished between the two in the case of teachings, although there has been some difference of opinion in the case of dogmatic facts), are nothing

<sup>265</sup> *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.1, a.2, ad 2.

<sup>266</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg. 143.

but the *explication* of what is revealed. For this reason we do not admit as definable the non-implicit virtuality, but require that the virtuality be *implicit*, since only what is implicit can be *explicated*.

Lastly, we concede that every definition of the Church is nothing but a *determination* of what was already revealed. But that, and only that, is what a true conclusion does, if it is inclusive, viz.: *determine*, unfold, develop, or lay open (all these terms are equivalent) the revealed principle.

We believe that a lot of time is wasted beating around the bush without delving into the substance by all those theologians who pile texts upon texts from the Church Fathers and St. Thomas in which it is asserted that the definitions of the Church do nothing except *explicate* and *determine* the revealed deposit. That is undoubtedly true; but in the Fathers of the Church and in St. Thomas these terms do not have the superficial and empirical meaning frequently given them by the common people and the casuists, but the philosophical, organic, ontological and vital meaning they have in philosophy and theology. In the vocabulary of Léris and St. Thomas the terms *to explicate* or *to determine* mean *to unfold* or *to develop* what was already implicit, but with the sort of *virtual* implicitness in which the branches and themselves before breaking out of the trunk, the members of the body before acquiring their full development, implicit but true and proper conclusions before they are deduced from the principles. Let us quote an example from Léris and a couple from St. Thomas.

St. Vincent of Léris: "Let the religion of the souls imitate the condition of bodies, which, with the passing of years, *evolve* and *explicate* their parts, but without remain the same that they were."<sup>267</sup> The reader can here see the term *explication* taken in the sense of development or *evolution* of the virtual implicit: "*evolve and explicate*."

St. Thomas: "Of this natural knowledge a beginning and an end may be pointed out. Its beginning lies in a certain *confused* knowledge of all things, insofar, that is, that there naturally exists in man the knowledge of universal principles, in which, as it were in *seeds*, all the *knowable things* that can be attained by natural reason pre-exist *virtually*. But the end of this knowledge is reached when the things that exist *virtually* in the principles themselves are EXPLICATED in act: as e.g., when from the *seed* of an animal, in which all the animal's members pre-exist *virtually*, the animal is produced having all its members differentiated and perfect, the end of the animal's generation is said to be reached . . . And just as nothing pertaining to the perfection of his [Adam's] body was found in it not EXPLICIT in act, so whatever existed

<sup>267</sup> *Commonitorium*, n. 22.

*seminally* or *virtually* in the first principles of reason was all of it EXPLICIT in accordance with perfect knowledge."<sup>268</sup> The reader can here see clearly explained by St. Thomas himself the meaning of the term *to explicate*, viz., *to develop* the inclusive *virtuality*. Nothing could be plainer.

Another text from St. Thomas: "Therefore, since the principal intention of this Sacred Teaching is to deliver a knowledge of God . . . applying ourselves to the *exposition* of this teaching, we will treat: first, of God."<sup>269</sup>, etc. Here we see the term *exposition* of teaching taken as synonymous to deducing proper conclusions. Finally, another text from St. Thomas on the meaning of the term *to determine*. From the many texts available the question choose one in which St. Thomas plainly speaks of determining the *virtual*. In the *Summa Theologica*, p. I, q. 1, art. 7, St. Thomas deals with the question "Whether God is the subject of this science", i.e., of theology insofar as it is a science, and says: "To the second objection it is to be said that *all the things* that are DETERMINED in the Sacred Teaching are comprehended under God, not as parts, or species, or accidents, but insofar as they are ordered to him in one way or another."<sup>269a</sup> The term *to determine* is here applied not only to improper but also to proper conclusions. "*All the things that are determined*."

In short, those who accumulate texts from the Fathers of the Church, St. Thomas, and the great Schoolmen, containing the assertion that the definitions of the Church are only *explications* or *determinations* of the revealed deposit, and then proceed to deduce from such texts that the Church's definitions are not definitions of the implicit *virtuality*, simply do not understand the language of traditional theology.

To the Thomist novice, as Cajetan would say, who wishes to achieve a good understanding of St. Thomas's mind, we will, with his indulgence, offer two pieces of advice. First, with regard to the terms *explication* or *determination* of the faith, he should observe that St. Thomas employs them to mean *all infallible definitions* of the Church, both the definitions of divine faith and those that are known today as definitions of ecclesiastical faith. In the case of doctrinal definitions St. Thomas never drew a distinction between those two kinds of definition. Second, St. Thomas ordinarily employs the

<sup>268</sup> *De Veritate*, q. 18, a. 4.

<sup>269</sup> *Summa Theologica*, p. I, q. 2, prol. quaestiois.

<sup>269a</sup> *Summa Theologica*, p. I, q. 1, a. 7, ad 2.

terms *explication* and *determination* in the sense of *developing* or *unfolding* the implicit virtuality, and hence conclusions properly so called.<sup>270</sup>

All the *articles* of the Creed are only explications or determinations of the two most general articles of faith, but explications or determinations of such great profundity that they are beyond any human power and demand new revelations. These revelations ceased with Christ and his Apostles. "And this *explication* was completed by Christ . . . in *determinate* articles" (St. Thomas)

On the other hand, dogmas *not-articles* or dogmas *conclusions* are also explications or determinations, but of a kind that is relatively easy, so that human reason aided by simple divine assistance suffices to make them. "And in this regard the faith can be *explicated* day by day, and has been more and more explicated through the efforts of the *Fathers* [the ecumenical councils]." (St. Thomas)

Each stroke of the sculptor's chisel effects an explication or determination in the marble or in the features of the statue; each stroke of the pain-

<sup>270</sup> "In the teaching of faith the *articles of faith* play the same role that the *per se evident principles* play in the teaching achieved by *natural reason*." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.1, a.7) "Being *collative*, the intellectual power passes from certain things to others: hence it does not regard equally all the intelligibles that are to be known. *Certain things* it sees at once, as those that are *per se evident*, in which *certain* other things are contained *IMPLICITLY*, which it cannot understand except by *means of reason*, *EXPLICATING* what is *IMPLICITLY* contained in the principles." (*De Veritate*, q.11, a.1, ad 12) "When many things are *VIRTUALLY* contained in one thing they are said to be *IMPLICITLY* in it, as *conclusions in the principles*." (*Ibid.*, q.14, a.11) "And this was the cause why it was necessary to put forth *many Creeds*, which differ in nothing except that in one, there is a *fuller explication* of the things that are contained *IMPLICITLY* in the other." (*Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.1, a.9) "When we ask whether it is possible for the Supreme Pontiff to err in the *definition* of matters of faith, we mean the *EXPLICATION* of matters of faith through his definition. We will explain this with an example, if a moral philosopher is asked for advice on some doubtful matter and he answers in accordance with moral *principles*, then certainly the philosopher is not in this case the author of truth, but rather *EXPLICATES* what lay concealed. *IN THIS SAME MANNER*, when the Supreme Pontiff defines something as a truth to be held by faith, his role is that of one who *EXPLICATES* the hidden truth, not of one who is the author of the truth. *AND IT IS IN THIS MANNER THAT ST. THOMAS IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD* when he says in the article that a *new issue* of the Creed belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, i.e., as to a *NEW EXPLICATION*." (BANEZ, *In 2-2*, q.1, a.10) "For up to now the Church has never proposed to the faithful for belief or defined what is not expressly contained in the Sacred Scriptures or the Apostolic Traditions, or contained therein *VIRTUALLY* in such a manner that it can be deduced therefrom through an *evident CONSEQUENCE*." (BANEZ, *loc. cit.*) Etc., etc.

Let any Thomist read without biases these and thousands of other texts that could be quoted, and he will plainly perceive what St. Thomas and the whole ancient Thomist tradition understood by *explicating* what is *implicit* in the deposit of the faith.

ter's brush effects an explication or determination of the lines or details of the painting; each new branch is an explication or determination of the tree; each *inclusive* conclusion is an explication or determination of the principles of the science.

Analogously, each definition of the Church — provided that it truly is a *definition* and not a mere *redefinition* (171) — is also a new explication or determination, a new development or evolution, a new facet or new aspect of the divine deposit, the living and fecund deposit entrusted by God to his Spouse, the Church, for safeguarding and *explication*.

The only difference is that the first three instances just mentioned are instances of material things in which there is no explication or determination except by adding something from outside or by subtracting something from within; whereas reason, when inclusive or analytic, develops its principles, and the Church develops her deposit, without any objective change (224).

Thus the Church is not only the divine *guardian* whose mission it is faithfully to preserve the deposit as to what is already explicit and determine in it, but also the divine *artificer* whose mission it is to *explicate* or determine, to polish and chisel, to develop and mature, to perfect and complete what in the divine deposit is virtual or unformed, implicit or inchoate. "Let it be cultivated, let it flower, mature, develop and come to perfection. . . . Whatever things are of old *unformed* and *inchoate*, let her carefully foster and polish; whatever things are already firmly established and defined, let her keep safe."<sup>271</sup>

Such is, in our judgment, the ample, fecund, vital, philosophical sense of the terms *explication* and *determination* in Léris, St. Thomas, and all the great Schoolmen, as applied to the deposit of the faith.<sup>272</sup>

<sup>271</sup> LIRINENSIS, *Commentorium*, 23.

<sup>272</sup> "In matters of faith there are some things that are not perfectly *made clear* by the Church: e.g., in the primitive Church it was not perfectly *made clear* that persons converted from Judaism were not obligated to keep the legal observances, and during the time of St. Augustine the Church had not yet *made clear* that the soul does not originate from the seed. . . . But there are other things pertaining to the faith that have already been determined by the Church." (ST. THOMAS, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, c.14, lect.3) Thus it appears that some doctors have disagreed. . . . in certain matters of faith that had not yet been determined by the Church. But after they have been determined by the authority of the universal Church, anyone who should resist such a decision would be regarded as a heretic." (ST. THOMAS, *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.11, a.2, ad 3) "And since some things are *implicitly* contained in the faith of the Church as *conclusions* in principles, there are different opinions maintained concerning such matters until the Church determines that one of them is against the faith of the Church because from it *there follows* something directly contrary to the faith." (ST. THOMAS, *In 4 Sent.*, d.13, q.2, a.1, ad 6) "There are two ways of *explicating* the articles of faith. . . . The other

These two functions — that of *guardian* and that of *artificer* — entrusted to the Church with respect to the revealed deposit, and which the Vatican Council describes as *conserving* and *explaining*, have been recognized and admirably expounded by Léris.

The role of guardian is described by him as follows: "Keep, says the Apostle, the deposit. What is a deposit? That which is entrusted to you, not discovered by you; what you have received, not what you have devised; a thing not from *ingenuity*, but from *teaching*; not from private *usurpation*, but from public *delivery*; a thing brought to you, not brought forth by you; in respect of which you should not regard yourself as the *author* but as the *custodian*; not the *instructor*, but a *secreary*; not the *leader*, but a *follower*. Keep, says he, the deposit: *conserve* the talent of the Catholic faith inviolate and unimpaired. What has been entrusted to you, let it remain with you, let it be the same thing that you deliver. You received gold, deliver gold. I do not want you to substitute *one thing for another*. I do not want you either impudently to substitute lead or fraudulently to deliver bronze instead of gold. I do not want the appearances of gold, but *certainly its substance*." Here to the office of *guardian* or *custodian*, the function of *conserving*.

Léris follows with the description of the office of *artificer* or the function of *explicating* or developing the deposit. He compares the Catholic teacher, i.e., the Church, with Beseelel, the artificer mentioned by the Holy Scripture, <sup>273</sup> in these terms: "O Timothy, O priest, O handler, O teacher! If

way refers to those things that are *implicitly* contained in the articles themselves, and this takes place when a man knows the things that *follow* from the articles." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.1, sol.3) "Hence, just as the article of the resurrection afterwards *explained* to men of lesser understanding, so too, certain things that are obscure in the Sacred Scriptures he *unfolded* to the Church by the Spirit of truth." (CANO, *De Locis*, book 3, 3) "For the theologian *gathers his conclusions* from the principles of faith, and *explicates* such conclusions *implicit* in the principles themselves by a process of natural argumentation." (CANO, *Op.cit.*, book 8, 2) "As we have elsewhere repeatedly said neither the Church, nor the Pontiff of the Apostolic See, nor the interpreters of the Sacred Scriptures issue new revelations to the faithful, but they either express or interpret the revelations received by the Church from the Apostles, or certainly *gather what is consequent or connected, or make clear* what is contrary and *inexplicated* and divided." (ST. THOMAS, *In 3 Sent.*, d.25, q.2, a.2, ad 4) "And in this respect the faith can be explicated day by day, and has been more and more explicated through the efforts of the Fathers." (ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*) "I answer that it is to be said that with respect to *explication*, the articles of faith are as *general principles* no differently than the general rules of behaviour with respect to human laws. Hence, both such explication and human enactments are as *conclusions deduced from their general principles*." (GRAVINA, O.P., *Catholicae Praescriptiones* [Neapoli 1619]. lib. 4, a.5, Pg.361)

<sup>273</sup> Exod. 31:2.

the office divinely given thee has made thee fit, be the *Beseleel of the spiritual tabernacle* by thy intelligence and the exercise of teaching, *came* the precious jewels of divine dogma, *capt* them faithfully, *embellish* them wisely, *add* splendour, charm, beauty . . . By thee let posterity thankfully rejoice in possessing *understood* what antiquity venerated *not understood* . . . Accordingly, whatever has been *sown* by the faith of the fathers in this tillage of the field that is God's Church, it behooves that the same be *cultivated* and *tended* by the industriousness of the sons; let the same *flower* and *grow* to *maturity*, let the same *advance* and *come to perfection*. For it is right that the old dogmas of heavenly philosophy should in the course of time be *carefully fostered, refined, polished*. But it is unlawful to exchange them; it is unlawful to detruncate, to mutilate them . . . Whatever things are of old *unformed* and *inchoate* let her *carefully foster* and *finish*; whatever things are already firmly established and defined let her keep safe."<sup>274</sup>

There are historians of dogmas who give us a magnificent idea of the Church's function as *custodian* of the revealed deposit; however, they seem to deny, or at least dissemble, her other function as *artificer* or *gardener*. The role of artificer, far from being opposed to dogmatic immutability, complements it, provided that the artifice or cultivation is restricted only to effecting a transition "from one to another according to reason which is not another in reality", i.e., to conceptual conclusions or conclusions that differ with only a distinction of reason. As St. Thomas very correctly observes: "*The distinction of reason alters nothing on the part of the things*."<sup>275</sup>

507. SIXTEENTH OBSERVATION. — "Thus, finally, St. Thomas teaches the same thing that the Vatican Council teaches when it says: 'The Holy Spirit was promised to Peter's successors . . . so that, with his assistance, they would invariably *safeguard* and faithfully *expound* the *revelation* delivered through the Apostles or the deposit of faith."<sup>276</sup>

*Reply*. — This text of the Vatican refers not only to the definitions of faith, but also to the Church's every infallible definition. Since, according to all theologians, infallible definitions embrace also the virtual or the conclusions properly so called, it follows from this text that the exposition or explication of the deposit includes the development or definition of its implicit virtuality (248). All the more so since any development of implicit virtuality is nothing more than the exposition or explication of what is revealed (240).

<sup>274</sup> *Commentatorium*, nn. 22-23.

<sup>275</sup> *Summa Theologica*, p.3, q.75, a.7.

<sup>276</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.146.



508. SEVENTEENTH OBSERVATION. — "It is *firmly* to be held that any doctrine subsequently defined as a dogma of faith is revealed *properly* and *in itself* [formally]." 277

*Reply.* — Our objector again joins together and takes as identical *proper* revelation and *formal* revelation or revelation *in itself*, as if revelation *in another* or virtual revelation were not proper revelation. Now, it is true and "firmly to be held" that only *proper* revelation can become a dogma of faith. However, it is neither true nor "firmly to be held", but on the contrary, "it is freely debated" whether revelation *in another* or virtual revelation can become a dogma or not.

Both ancient and modern theologians are so far from considering the non definability of the virtual as "firmly to be held" that, when it is a case of inclusive virtuality or of conclusions that are identico-real or metaphysico-connextive to the revealed deposit, the majority of them maintain the contrary. Whether only the formally revealed is definable, or also the virtually revealed, is an entirely free question after as well as before the Vatican Council. Fortunately, the author eventually admits it expressly on pg. 195, at the bottom of which is found this brief and expressive footnote: "The conclusion is being debated." Well!

509. EIGHTEENTH OBSERVATION. — "Thus, by a proposition revealed explicitly and implicitly, one and the same thing, or better still, the same *formally known object* is known through different concepts under different aspects." 278

*Reply.* — We understand very well that one thing, remaining *materially* the same, can be known through formally different concepts.

What we cannot understand — and this is precisely what dogmatic progress is all about — is that a thing, remaining *formally* the same, can be expressed by means of concepts *differing formally from it* without going out of bounds of the formal. With the intervention of a formally different concept between the conclusion and the principle, there exists a virtual distinction and a conclusion in the proper sense. This is exactly what happens in many of the Church's dogmatic definitions, i.e., they are conceptually different from, albeit really identical to, the revealed premise as this premise exists in the primitive datum.

For instance, suppose that nothing existed in the revealed datum with regard to the transubstantiation except the statement "This is my body", and

277 *Op.cit.*, pg.161.

278 *Op.cit.*, pg.167.

that from it the primitive Church deduced the transubstantiation, as did St. Thomas and the Tridentine. In that case, there would have been a transition from the formal to the virtual, that is, to an implicit virtual (210).

Likewise, suppose that nothing existed in the primitive datum relative to the sacrament of Penance except the statement "Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained", and that from it the Church gathered the necessity of confessing the circumstances that change the species; there would have been a transition from the formal to the implicit virtual (211).

Similarly, suppose that in the primitive datum nothing existed with respect to the Immaculate Conception but the phrases "I will put enmities . . .", "Hail, full of grace", "Mother of God", and that from these the Church deduced Pius IX's definition; it would have been a transition from the formal to the implicit virtual (209, 312). And so of many other instances.

To pass from the knowledge of a known thing to the knowledge of other concepts formally identical to what is already known, is one thing. It is quite another thing to pass to the knowledge of other concepts *differing virtually* from, although *really identical* to, the concept *primatively known*.

Our objector seems to believe that no distinction exists between the propositions of the primitive datum and the propositions later defined dogmatically by the Church except a distinction of *formulae* or of reasoning reason, but in no case a distinction of concepts or of reasoned reason or *virtual* distinction.

On the other hand, we believe — and on this point we have on our side the whole theological tradition and the plain facts of the history of dogmas — that there can be, and there frequently is, a *virtual* distinction, a distinction of proper conclusion, i.e., an analytic or inclusive conclusion. "For up to now the Church has never proposed to the faithful for belief or defined anything that is not contained expressly in the Sacred Scriptures or Apostolic traditions, or contained *virtually in such a way that it can be deduced therefrom by an evident consequence*." 279

510. NINETEENTH OBSERVATION. — To show that *mediate* or *virtual* revelation is not enough for *implicit* revelation our objector argues as follows:

"Truth is revealed either *immediately* or *mediately*. Something is said to be revealed immediately or formally, if it is revealed or disclosed *in itself*, i.e., if the truth is as such disclosed by the proposition or the terms of the proposition, e.g., *if I actually say to someone: The treasure you are looking*

279 BÁÑEZ, *In* 2.2. q.1, a.10.

for is in such a place. Something is said to be revealed *mediately* or *virtually*, if it is revealed in its principles or causes, i.e., if a principle is disclosed by means of which or from which the truth or teaching at issue is made manifest to me through my own intellectual operation, e.g., if a thing is revealed from the knowledge of which I can come to know another teaching, either by knowing the effect from the cause, or the cause from the effect, or the property from the essence, or the essence from the property, or in some such other way: as, e.g., if I should show someone a *divining rod* by means of which he is able to find a hidden treasure.<sup>280</sup>

*Reply.* — In the first place, even if a man did not tell me expressly where his treasure is hidden, were he to give me a divining rod that infallibly shows the place where it is hidden, he has by the same token revealed it to me implicitly, since to know where it is I need do nothing but apply the rod. God has not revealed *explicitly* the treasure of the theological conclusions or the revealed mediate and virtual, but he has given us in the definition of the Church an infallible rod to find that treasure. We only need to apply the rod to find it. The treasure is thus *implicitly* revealed. As a matter of fact, simple common sense tells us that the treasure's hiding place is disclosed not only by one who says: "The treasure you are looking for is in such a place, but also by one who says: "The treasure you want is in the place indicated by this infallible rod I give you." That is exactly what God has said to us when he gave us in the Church's infallible authority the infallible rod to determine or define the revealed mediate or virtual. It is, therefore, of divine faith once it is defined, not because it is indicated by the rod, but because God said that it is there where the rod shows its presence.

In the second place, by denying the implicit revelation of conclusions in which the *essence* is deduced from a revealed *property*, our object unwittingly disagrees with the teaching of the Salmanticenses whom he holds in such high esteem: "There is this difference between the revelation of the subject and the revelation of the property: the express revelation of the former is not necessarily the implicit revelation of the latter; but, on the contrary, the *explicit revelation of the property is a formal implicit revelation of its subject* because the express revelation of the defined is an implicit revelation of the definition. But every property is essentially defined by its subject which takes the place of the genus or the difference, as it is said in logic."<sup>281</sup> How is it possible that Thomists of such caliber as the Salmanticenses should have fallen into such an obvious inconsistency as to deny, on the one hand, that theological conclusions in the *proper sense* are *implicitly*

<sup>280</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 167

<sup>281</sup> SALMANTICENSES, *De Fide*, d.I, n. 149.

revealed, and to affirm, on the other hand, that when a *property* is revealed, the essence is *implicitly* revealed? It is possible that any Thomist should not see that the deduction of the essence from the property is a conclusion in the *proper sense*? Our objector there has a new proof of the confusion suffered by the Salmanticenses on the question of the definability of the revealed virtual. It is one of the effects of Suárez's formal confused and pure virtual.

In the third place, St. Thomas expressly teaches that the revealed mediate or virtual is *implicitly* revealed: "That is *properly* called implicit in which many things are contained as if it were in one. . . . Hence whenever many things are *virtually* contained in some one thing they are said to be in it *implicitly*, as conclusions in the principle."<sup>282</sup> To evade the force of such a clear text our objector finds nothing better than to say: "St. Thomas takes the terms 'explicitly' and 'implicitly' in a broader sense."<sup>283</sup> Our objector has overlooked the fact that that is precisely Molina's solution: "St. Thomas spoke less *properly*." (169) He has also overlooked the fact that St. Thomas himself took the precaution of observing that he was speaking of the implicit in the proper and rigorous sense: "That is *properly* called implicit. . . . Lastly, he has overlooked the fact that if we are to interpret in a broad sense the term 'implicit' when St. Thomas affirms that the virtual or mediate is implicit, then we must likewise interpret it in a broad sense when the Saint affirms that the Church can define as of divine faith nothing but the implicitly revealed, in which case we equally arrive at the conclusion that, according to St. Thomas, the virtual is definable as of divine faith. Whatever the interpretation given to the terms "implicit" and "virtual" employed by the holy Doctor, we eventually arrive at that same conclusion if those terms are uniformly interpreted. The one way of escaping the dilemma is uncritically and arbitrarily to give those terms one meaning in certain passages, and another meaning in certain other passages, when it is the case that the passages are parallel passages from the same author, on the same subject, in the same question, and at times even in the same article, as is the case with the texts of St. Thomas on the *implicitly* revealed.

In short — to return to the example of the treasure and the divining rod — to find the treasure of the revealed virtual or mediate in the revealed deposit or premitive datum, there are two divining rods available to us. One is human reasoning alone. This divining rod is not infallible; above all, *God has not told us* that the treasure would be in the place indicated by it. Thus, whatever we find by its means is not and cannot be of divine faith, but of theological assent. The other is the Church's definition. This divining rod is not only infallible, but in its case *God has told us* that it is infallible and that

<sup>282</sup> ST. THOMAS, *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 11.

<sup>283</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 167, footnote 2.

the treasure would be in the place indicated by it. Hence, whatever we find by its means is of divine faith, not precisely because we have found it, or because it was pointed out by the Church's divining rod, but because *God had said so* implicitly.

It is for this reason that we have said time and time again throughout this book that the revealed virtual or theological conclusion, no matter how inclusive, is not of divine faith before it is defined by the Church, but it is of divine faith after its definition.

511. TWENTIETH OBSERVATION. — "Fr. Marín-Sola . . . if I am not mistaken, confuses two different things, viz., the objective distinction of the *mode of revelation*, and the distinction of the *mode of knowing* on our part."<sup>284</sup>

*Reply.* — We do distinguish those two modes, viz.: a) immediate or mediate on the part of the *revelation*, or *quoad se*; b) immediate or mediate on the part of *our knowing*, or *quoad nos*. But far from confusing the two, we add a third: c) immediate on the part of *revelation* and mediate on the part of *our knowing*.

St. Thomas and the Thomist school have always insisted on drawing a clear distinction between this *third mode* and the other two modes. It is this *third mode* which Scotus confused and which gave rise to the extreme opinions of Vázquez and Molina (169). It is this *third mode* which, we think, our objector has failed to understand. And it is exactly in this *third mode* that dogmatic development consists, since this mode is the revealed inclusive virtual: immediately revealed *quoad se*, but mediately revealed *quoad nos*.

Of the two elements — viz.: a) *revelation*; b) *explication* and proposition of the revelation — the revealed virtual possesses the first element without the second. Thus there is no need of revelation since the revealed virtual-inclusive already has it; but there is need of a new explication and proposition. And that is precisely what dogmatic progress consists in: in the explication and proposition of the implicit revealed virtual.

Our objector also repeats under various guises in his new book the following words which he had already written in *La Ciencia Tomista*: "The things that theology demonstrates, explains, makes manifest, are not only the theological conclusions properly so called, but *primarily* and *principally*, or even, in St. Thomas's view, *regularly* the revealed truths themselves, which are viz. unfolded, explained, made manifest. . . It is for this reason that St. Thomas identifies, as it were, the Sacred Teaching with the Holy Scripture."

<sup>284</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.170.

Our objector correctly says that theology is concerned with explaining the immediate or formal meaning of its principles; but we believe that he is far from correct in saying that that is its primary or principal concern. Our "elders" in the Thomist school have always taught something else quite different on the notion and nature of sacred theology.

"The proper office of scholastic theology, *insofar as we have gathered from our elders and experience in almost daily encounters as students of this faculty*, is, in the first place, *to bring as it were out of the darkness* into the light what is contained concealed in the Sacred Scriptures and the Traditions of the Apostles. For the theologian gathers *his conclusions from the principles of faith*, and *explicates* through a suitable *natural argumentation* the conclusions *implicit* in the principles themselves. For just as the faculty of Music connects *through reasoning*, from the things established in Arithmetic, *the things existing is measured sounds, whether consonant or dissonant*, so also the School's theology through natural reason gathers from the things established by faith *consequences* about God and things divine. . . This faculty of researching in the School has yet *another* proposed aim, viz., to *defend* our faith against heretics. . . Finally, it pertains to the Schoolmen's function *to illustrate*, insofar as this is possible, this teaching, and even to confirm it by means of human disciplines. . . Hence *three* ends should be acknowledged as the ends of *true theology*. For I am not speaking only of Scholastic Theology, but of any theology whatsoever."<sup>285</sup>

"For, in the first place, it deduces *conclusions* from indemonstrable principles, and this is common to it and other sciences; *then* it busies itself in various ways with the first *principles*."<sup>286</sup> All the great Thomists express themselves in similar vein.

Thus sacred theology, like metaphysics, has various purposes, but its primary, fundamental, regular and ordinary purpose is to deduce *conclusions* properly so called.<sup>287</sup>

<sup>285</sup> CANO, *De Locis*, lib.8, c.2.

<sup>286</sup> GONET, *De Summ. Theol.*, n.74.

<sup>287</sup> When in the *Summa Theologica*, q.1, a.2, St. Thomas asks "Whether the Sacred Teaching is a science", he takes this term to mean science in the proper sense, and therefore by Sacred Theology he does not understand the Bible or the formally revealed principles, but sacred theology insofar as it is knowledge of *conclusions in the proper sense*. Cajetan says to the point:

"Note to words in the title of this second article: one, *science*; the other *Sacred Teaching*. Science is here *taken properly* as an intellectual virtue [6 *Ethic.*, c.6, n.1] and the *habitus of conclusions* acquired through demonstration from the principles. And since subjects are such as are allowed by the predicates, it follows that the term *Sacred Teach-*

The other two purposes, viz., the defense and the explanation of the formal meaning of its first principles, do not belong to theology as science, but as wisdom, i.e., not *per se* but *per accidens*, inasmuch as there are people who deny or who do not understand those principles, and there being no other superior science to undertake their defense and explanation, such functions have to be undertaken by theology itself through its auxiliaries, Apologetics and Exegesis. "Hence the Sacred Teaching, *inasmuch as it has no superior*, argues against anyone who denies it principles."<sup>288</sup> But from saying this to saying that principles are theology's primary or principal business, or that St. Thomas *ordinarily identifies theology with the Bible*, there is a vast distance — the distance that exists between conclusions and principles.

Every true science consists in effect, of two integral parts, viz. *first principles and conclusions*, but the principal or specific part of science as such is not the principles but the conclusions. Now, the Bible and divine Tradition are the first principles of theology, not its conclusions. Hence, theology includes two integral parts: first, the Bible and divine Tradition as first principles; second, everything necessarily and evidently connected with these two sources, as conclusions. Both things or parts integrate theology, but the principal or primary or specific part of theological science is neither the Bible nor divine Tradition but their conclusions properly so called. However, being *theological* conclusions and not physical, these conclusions are inclusive or implicit conclusions, not merely connexive.

<sup>288</sup>ing is here taken to mean the revealed doctrine *insofar as it is about conclusions.*" (*Comment. in loc.cit.*)

But there was no need for it to be pointed out by Cajetan, since St. Thomas had himself pointed it out expressly in the treatise on faith where he alludes explicitly to the second article just quoted. "From these principles [viz., the principles of faith or authorities from the Sacred Scripture] something is established among the faithful in the same manner as something is established among all men *from naturally evident principles.* Hence, too, *theology is a science*, as it was said at the beginning of this work in part 1, q-1, a.2." (2-2, q-1, a.5, ad 2)

In a parallel place of the *Commentaries to the Sentences*, in which he raises the same question ("It is further asked whether it is a science"), he writes: "Just as the *habit of first principles* is not acquired through other sciences, but is had from nature, but what is acquired is the *habit of conclusions* deduced from the first principles, so also the *habit of faith*, which is as the habit of principles, is not acquired in this teaching, but what is acquired is the *habit of whatever is deduced from them.*" (*In 1 Sent.*, q-1, a.3, sol.2, ad 2)

Thus to say that St. Thomas takes the term science to mean science in the improper sense, or conclusions to mean improper conclusions, or that he almost identifies theology with the Bible — to say any of these things seems to us improper of a true Thomist.

<sup>288</sup>*Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.1, a.8.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, all these questions began to be considered from a more or less empirical or material viewpoint as a result of the pre-dominance of positive over speculative theology. Since then, certain theologians have almost forgotten the distinction between "principles" and "first principles" of theology, despite the existence of a formal distinction between the two.

To be a principle of theology it is sufficient that a truth be defined by the Church infallibly, or at least as of divine faith. Hence it is enough that it belong to any of the first three levels of Catholic doctrine (3), or at least to any of the first two levels. But to be a "first principle" of theology it is not enough that a truth be defined as a truth of divine faith, let alone as an infallible truth. It is necessary that it be an immediately revealed truth or a truth revealed in itself, such that the Church and theology have found it in the revealed deposit without the help of deduction or reasoning properly speaking. Hence it is not enough that it belong to the third or the second level of Catholic doctrine; it must necessarily belong to the first level.

Theology's "first principles" are principles and not conclusions properly speaking. Those that are principles, but not "first principles", are not only principles but also and at the same time conclusions properly speaking.

The first principles are principles *per se* and from the very beginning they were defined or determinate in the ordinary magistrum or universal preaching of the *Apostles* themselves. Those that are not "first", but secondary or derived principles, are not principles *per se*, but by the Church's definition or determination, and existed as true and mere theological conclusions before they were defined and became principles.

Instances of first principles are the so-called articles of faith in respect of their fundamental or primary concepts, e.g., that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, or that there are two natures in Christ. Instances of principles that are not first principles, but principles-conclusions are the dogmas posteriorly defined that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from *one* principle,<sup>289</sup> or that there are in Christ two intellects and two wills, or any of the many examples we have given elsewhere (202-212).

Almost all, or the greater part of, theological conclusions that are evident and admitted by all theologians have graduated to the second or the

<sup>289</sup>Which gives us to understand that both Erasmus and Ambrose Catharinus *greatly erred*: the former in thinking that this conclusion [viz., that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from *one* principle] has nothing to do with the faith; the latter in counting it among the *first principles*, i.e., the articles of faith, where as it is *properly a theological conclusion.*" (CANO, *De Locis*, lib.12, c.6, septima praecipio) The reader will do well to take note of the phrases "properly a theological conclusion", "first principles", and "greatly erred".

third level of Catholic doctrine through solemn or ordinary magisterium. Hence, the fourth level contains only conclusions that either are not plain and evident, or are not yet admitted by all. This understandably natural fact has given rise to two false conceptions of theology.

The first is that of certain theologians who overlook the fact that many true and proper theological conclusions have passed on to the third and even to the second level of Catholic doctrine, without prejudice to their being truly and properly conclusions. Thus they regard as conclusions only those remaining on the fourth level. Since those remaining on this level are mostly either not evident or not yet admitted by all, such theologians easily beget the notion that the truly and properly theological conclusion is solely the non-evident or the debatable conclusion. Hence the confusion in many theologians between theology itself and theological systems, and the discredit in which "Scholastic Theology" is held by many, as if the whole of the third level of Catholic doctrine and a great part of the second level were not genuine "Scholastic Theology!"

The second is that of those who look with contempt, or near contempt, at the fourth level of Catholic doctrine since there is so much in it that is obscure and debatable. Accordingly, they restrict theology to the first three levels. Now, all the truths on these first three levels are "principles" of theology. They thus form the notion that true theology is concerned principally and almost exclusively with principles in order to defend or to explain them, and secondarily or even scarcely, if at all, with conclusions properly speaking. They fail to appreciate the fact that, although all of the third level and a very large part of the second level is made up of principles, such principles, nonetheless, are not "first principles" but principles-conclusions, none-theology busies itself with these principles and shows how these secondary or derived principles are gathered by reasoning from the first principles, it is busy itself with conclusions properly so called.

These secondary or derived principles are now truths of divine faith, or of infallible faith, because they have been defined by the Church. But they also are, and in the beginning were, truly and properly theological conclusions, since they are not found in the primitive deposit or revealed datum except by means of proper reasoning, i.e. as conclusions differing virtually from the revealed principles in which they were contained and from which they were deduced. Such derived dogmas or dogmas-conclusions are not only objects of divine faith but also objects of theology, and it is the theologian's office to *demonstrate* them. For this task it is not enough to pile up texts from the Fathers and Councils *posterior* to the revealed datum, showing that the Fathers have *thus* understood them, and the Church has *thus* defined them. It is further necessary to show *why* the Fathers and the Church have *thus* understood and taught them. "*Why* the Church has thus understood it."

(212) That is to say, it is necessary to demonstrate *how* such secondary and derived principles are contained in and were gathered from the first principles. These *why's* and *how's* constitute the true and proper theological conclusions, and it is with them that theology is concerned, whether they are conclusions yet undefined (4th level), or conclusions already defined as infallible (3rd level), or conclusions or principles-conclusions already defined as dogmas of faith (2nd level). Ninety percent of the truly demonstrative articles in St. Thomas's *Summa Theologica* and of any other true course of theology has to do with either of those three levels of proper theological conclusions. Consequently, the ordinary, normal and proper function of theology as *science* is not concerned with the first principles, but with their proper conclusions.<sup>290</sup>

<sup>290</sup> There are three essentially different kinds of demonstrations: (a) *natural* or philosophical; (b) apologetical; (c) theological.

The first employs as a medium of demonstration the *principles of natural reason*; the second, the principles or *motives of credibility*; the third, the *revealed principles* or revealed deposit. When it is said that absolutely supernatural truths or mysteries are indemonstrable, this is to be understood of natural, not of apologetical or theological, demonstration.

A truth can be contained in the revealed principles or revealed deposit in three ways: (a) explicitly; (b) implicitly, but with a superficial or nominal implicitness; (c) implicitly, but with a conceptual or virtual implicitness. In the first case, the truth requires no reasoning at all in order to be known; in the second case, an improper reasoning is needed; in the third case, proper reasoning is needed, and this is what is properly called *theological demonstration*.

Theological demonstration can be effected by the theologian in two ways. One is the external or purely positive way, which consists in merely adducing *authorities* whether of popes, councils, or Church Fathers, etc., who assert that something is so. The other is the intrinsic and scientific or magisterial way, in which *theological reasons* are submitted, i.e. the internal links or vital streaks that bind a given truth with any of the organic centers of the revealed deposit or the so-called articles of faith, or, at least, with any of the *per se* and explicitly revealed truths — all of which is tantamount to showing *how* such a truth is contained in the primitive datum and *how* it follows therefrom. The latter is the true *scholastic theology*.

Of these two demonstrations, the positive and the scholastic, the former demonstrates *that* such or such is the truth, but not *why* it is the truth. The latter demonstrates not merely *that* such or such is the truth but also *why* it is the truth. The former shows that the Church has understood it so; the latter shows *why* the Church has understood it so. "*Quare sic intellexit Ecclesia.*"

These two kinds of theological demonstrations or "disputations" have been admirably described by St. Thomas in an article from which we transcribe the following: "One kind of disputation is aimed at removing the doubt *whether a thing is so*, and in this theological disputation *authorities* accepted by the adverse parties in the disputation are to be employed above all else . . . . Another kind of disputation is the *magisterial* used in the schools, which is not aimed at removing error, but at the instruction of the listeners so that they are led to the *understanding of the truth*, which it intends. In this case one

Those who think otherwise do so, in our opinion, because they do not understand, or, with Molina, they unduly restrict the Church's true dogmatic function. They regard the Church as a simple registering machine. Not one that registers the social awareness, as claimed by Modernism, but one that registers the revealed datum. They think that if any thing is formally of divine faith after the definition, it likewise had to be such before the definition. Since nothing can be a principle of theology if it is not of divine faith, they consequently think that if any thing is capable of becoming a principle of theology through the Church's definition, it already had to be such before the definition. In short, they believe that the Church's authority or definition reduces simply to *make of the record* as a truth of faith or a principle of theology that which already was of faith and a principle, but not to *make of*

should lean on the reasons that inquire into the root of the truth and which give us to know how it is that what is said is true. Otherwise, if the master should determine the question by means of authorities alone, the intellect will indeed be certified that it is so; however, it will have acquired nothing of science or understanding, but will depart empty." (Quodlibetum 4, a.18. "Whether theological determinations should be done through authority or through reason", ed. Vivès, t.15, pgs.444-445)

Certain modern theological courses devote so great a part to positive theology and so little to scholastic or rational theology, that they do not seem to be courses of true theological science at all, but courses of apologetics or of external history of dogmas. And we say "external" history, because the true "internal" history of dogmas does not consist precisely in pinpointing the dates and places in which each dogma developed, or the persons who contributed to its unfolding. It consists principally in pointing out the internal or organic links that bind one dogma to another, and all of them with the articles of faith or primitive datum. These internal bonds have been and are the true formal or vital causes of the evolution of certain dogmas into other dogmas.

Truth to say, any theology that is truly scholastic or rational is a true *internal* history of the dogmas. And thus there is no better internal history of the dogmas nor a better course of theology than the ever perennial *Summa* of St. Thomas. This immortal work is, for anyone knowledgeable enough to plumb its depths, a true anatomical and physiological chart of the revealed truth's organism, whose four levels of development constitute the luxuriant tree of Catholic doctrine.

The requirements demanded by the defense of the revealed deposit against Protestantism in the first place, and later on against rationalism and naturalism, in the same token they began to regard sacred theology from the external view-point of *defense* of the revealed deposit, rather than from the intrinsic viewpoint of the *development* or explanation of the deposit. This gave rise to the *extrinsicist* notion of sacred theology, a notion that has been gaining ground day by day, which looks at its conclusions as something *external* to the revealed deposit, not as something *internal* contained within and issuing out of its very innards (117, 245). Thence flows the natural and logical idea that, as something *external* to dogma, the theological conclusion constitutes a true objective or substantial addition to the revealed deposit, and hence not definable. Thence, too, the discredit in which the idea of rational or scholastic theology — and even the idea itself of theology — is held by many today. We believe that such people have lost the Thomist notion of true theology or theological conclusion.

faith or a principle of theology that which for us was but a proper theological conclusion.

Such theologians seem to forget that, on account of the Church's divine authority, sacred theology possesses a characteristic or peculiarity not possessed by any other science, to wit, that its conclusions can become principles because that which was previously known only through theological reasoning can come to be known subsequently through divine authority (308): "And thus this is peculiar in theology, that what at one time was a conclusion can become a principle."<sup>291</sup> "And this makes plain the error of Molina, who asserts the contrary."<sup>292</sup> We will not go so far as to qualify as erroneous Molina's opinion or innovation, but we will certainly subscribe to the "It is amazing!" jevelled at it by the illustrious Suárez with as much justification as thorough familiarity with theological tradition (84).

Thus, when our objector asserts time and again that the *principal* and quasi ordinary function of theology has to do with the principles and not with the conclusions in the proper sense, that assertion can have two meanings.

If by principles he means the "first" principles, then that would be tantamount to eliminating theology by destroying its character as science in the proper sense.<sup>293</sup> That would not be the Thomist teaching, but the teaching of Aureolus and the Nominalists.

291 JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *loc.cit.*

292 NAZARIO, *loc.cit.*

293 With regard to theological demonstrations concerning the first revealed principles or articles of faith, Báñez writes as follows:

"Briefly, I say that there is no incongruity in saying that even an article of faith is capable of *theological demonstration*, at least a posteriori. Thus, e.g., 'Any man who rises from the dead was dead; therefore Christ was dead.' However, such demonstrations seem to be *pointless* for they contribute neither certainty nor clarity to the conclusion." (BÁÑEZ, *In 1 Partem*, q.1, a.3)

"Such consequences, in which one article can be gathered from another, are *useless* argumentations, unless employed against people who deny one principle while conceding another [this is theology's role as apologetic or as wisdom]. Hence *speaking simpliciter* theology [insofar as it is science] does not reason to *prove its principles*." (BÁÑEZ, *ibid.*, a.8, ad 4)

As a matter of fact, to deduce a first principle from another first principle, or even a formally revealed truth from another formally revealed truth, might be useful for purposes of organizing or defending the revealed datum, but it is useless for the purpose of developing it. Science as such is not about the formal but about the virtual. Hence, the *principal* function of theology is not, and cannot be, to concern itself with the formally, but with the virtually revealed.

If by the term he means the secondary or derived principles, then the assertion has no force against us or against the question at issue, since the secondary and derived principles are theological conclusions in the proper and rigorous sense, and did not come to be known and defined by the Church except by way of proper and rigorous theological conclusion.

512. TWENTY-FIRST OBSERVATION. — "Fr. Marín-Sola likewise holds that the concept of virtual revelation was *vitiata* by Suárez. However, unless I am mistaken, there is here an equivocation which is cleared away by an easy distinction. Fr. Marín-Sola considers the *real distinction of properties from their essences*, whereas Suárez considers whether in two given propositions something *formally distinct* is being said."<sup>294</sup>

*Reply.* — Of Suárez and Lugo we have asserted two things, which bear repetition here: 1) that they affirm that *everything* really identical to the revealed deposit, albeit differing conceptually from it, is the revealed formal confused, which is not only definable as of divine faith but can also be given the assent of divine faith even without the Church's definition. 2) That they affirm that *only* that which differs really from the revealed deposit is virtual in the proper sense.

The reader can look up elsewhere (73) the proofs of our two assertions. That *that* is Suárez's true mind is admitted by all true disciples of Lugo and Suárez. That *that* is to vitiate the concept of virtual revelation or theological conclusion should be admitted by every true disciple of St. Thomas.

It is true that Suárez did not express that teaching as clearly and categorically as Lugo. If, on that account, our objector prefers to impute to Lugo everything that, with Lugo, Ripalda and all the Suarezians, we have imputed to Suárez, he is welcome to it with no objection from us. Whether it was Suárez or Lugo who authored the teaching or innovation whereby the traditional and true concept of virtual revelation is vitiated, is of little consequence for the question with which we are dealing. But it is of the greatest importance, indeed, to make it of record that Suárez and Lugo, together with all theologians before Molina and the majority of theologians after him, affirm against our objector, as we also affirm, that wherever *real identity* exists between the theological conclusion and the revealed principle from which it is deduced because their predicates differ only conceptually, there too *identity of doctrine* likewise exists, and therefore definability as of *divine faith*. That is enough, and more than enough, to assert the existence of true dogmatic evolution by way of proper theological conclusion. If our objector prefers to call *that* an improper conclusion, it is only a matter of names. Thomists have always called it a proper and rigorous conclusion (27), which it is.

<sup>294</sup> *Op. cit.*, pg. 172.

In support of our interpretation of Suárez we will quote three distinguished Suarezians.

"There is a greater difficulty regarding the object of a conclusion known form a revealed premise and a premise certified by natural reason. The *first opinion* holds that an object of this sort is believable by faith. . . The *second opinion* denies . . . the *third opinion* lies in the *middle*, i.e., it holds that the object of such a conclusion is believable by faith if it is REALLY identical to the revealed object, but not if it differs REALLY and is separable from it. . . Thus Lugo and Suárez."<sup>295</sup>

"Let us now come to those conclusions that can be deduced from a revealed premise and one that is evident. The *first opinion* universally affirms that such conclusions are of divine faith. . . The *second opinion* universally denies. . . The *third opinion* draws a distinction: for if the deduced property is *metaphysically*, i.e. *only formally different* from the revealed object, then it says that it can be believed with divine faith. But if it [the deduced property] differs REALLY, then it denies. Thus Suárez and Cardinal De Lugo."<sup>296</sup>

"If it is a question of a truth that is implicitly contained in another explicitly revealed truth, with which, however, it is *only REALLY but not formally identified*, Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses and others hold that such a truth is not revealed. But De Lugo and Suárez teach the opposite. And this seems to be the opinion to which one should subscribe."<sup>297</sup>

It should be plain to our objector that we have attributed to Suárez nothing but the teaching attributed to him by his most distinguished and fervent disciples. Even more, our objector eventually confesses indirectly that Suárez *did vitiate* the concept of virtual revelation. Speaking of Suárez's theory that the Church's definition of the virtual is tantamount to a new revelation, our objector remarks:

"However, this teaching [Suárez's] lacks solid foundation. . . It also perverts the teaching of the old Schoolmen; but, particularly after the Vatican Council, it can scarcely be admitted. Certainly a theory of the evolution of dogmas can hardly be built on the foundation of this teaching."<sup>298</sup>

If that is true, as it is, our objector is well aware that Suárez's theory equating the Church's definition of the virtual to a new revelation arose precisely out of his other theory designating as virtual that which differs really from the formal, as we have shown elsewhere (78).

<sup>295</sup> RIPALDA, *De Fide*, d.8, s.3, n.37.

<sup>296</sup> HAUNOLDUS, S.J., *De Fide*, lib.3, n.145.

<sup>297</sup> MAZZELA, *De virtutibus infusis*, n.414.

<sup>298</sup> *Op. cit.*, pg.97.

Finally, although this is not really necessary, it will not be superfluous to add that Montaigne himself, who is so highly praised by our objector on this subject, interprets Suárez as we have done.

"That is contained *identically* in another, says Suárez (d.19 *De Fide*, s.2, n.10), which is contained in it as in A THING that is altogether the same: thus in God the intellect and the will, justice and mercy, paternity and nature, are one and the same REALLY and *identically*."<sup>299</sup>

By looking up the place quoted by Montaigne, the reader will verify that the *real* and *identical* mentioned by Montaigne is exactly what Suárez calls *formal confused*, and what we call, *virtual implicit* or *inclusive*, since although it is formal or immediate *in itself*, it is nonetheless mediate or virtual to us, as Suárez confesses in the same place quoted by Montaigne.<sup>300</sup> They have not grasped, as neither have the Salmanticenses, the true meaning of Suárez's and Lugo's formal confused.

513. TWENTY-SECOND OBSERVATION. — Fr. Marín-Sola assails the teaching on proper or improper reasoning... but he fails to attain the *historical* distinction between the proper and the improper syllogism. For the proper syllogism is not said to be explicative as if it only explained the meaning of the terms of revelation with other words, but also inasmuch as it at the same time *explicates* the revealed doctrine by *different concepts*.<sup>301</sup>

*Reply.* — In the first place, to determine what is proper and what is improper reasoning is not a matter of *history*, but of logic.

In the second place, as we have earlier said (509), it is not a question of concepts that differ among themselves but are identical to the revealed premise, but of concepts that *differ from the revealed premise* or *primitive datum*. If the new concepts differ virtually from the concepts of the revealed premise or revealed datum, the reasoning is a proper reasoning and the progress is a progress of proper virtuality. This is elementary in Thomist teaching against Scotus and Aureolus. And this is exactly the point at issue in the question of dogmatic progress.

<sup>299</sup> MONTAIGNE, *De censuris*, a.2, §1; MIGNE, *Theologiae cursus completus*, t.1, pg. 1132.

<sup>300</sup> "Let me point out that, from what has been earlier said, there are two ways in which it can happen that a proposition is contained in another that is revealed. *One*, as in a THING altogether identical to it... Well, then, taking the *mediately revealed* proposition in the *first way*, it is true that any proposition opposed to it is *heretical*, since a proposition that is thus revealed is simpler of *faith*, as I have earlier said d.3, s.11, n.5... The reason is that, although QUOAD NOS and according to our manner of conceiving *confusedly*, such a proposition is said to be *mediately revealed*, nonetheless IN SE revelation falls on, or reaches it *immediately*." (SUÁREZ, *De Fide*, d.19, s.2, n.10)

<sup>301</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.185.


Speaking historically, the first and most fundamental division of revelation is its division into explicit and implicit revelation. All the great masters of the 13th century carry this division. Furthermore, they admit that not only what is explicitly revealed is definable as of divine faith, but also *everything* that is *implicitly* revealed.

Implicit revelation can be subdivided, as subsequently it was, into immediate or formal, and mediate or virtual, insofar as the explication of the implicitness requires either an improper reasoning leading to a nominal conclusion, or a proper reasoning leading to a conceptual conclusion. Observe that the reasoning based on real distinction is a proper reasoning, however it is not *explicative* of implicitness but merely connexive. Thus arose the first of the three divisions of divine revelation which we submit in the outline below. This is the division made by almost all theologians until the 17th century.

Later on, the division into immediate or formal and mediate or virtual was taken as the basis in lieu of the division into explicit and implicit. However, with Suárez and Lugo, a new member was added to the mediate or virtual, viz., the virtual non-implicit, as can be seen in the second division.

Lastly, Kilber and certain others, with Molina, denied that anything mediate or virtual could be implicit, and limited the term implicit exclusively to the immediate or formal. Thus came about the third of the three divisions given in the following outline:





The first of these three divisions is perfect and, in our opinion, expresses the genuine Thomist teaching both in substance and in nomenclature.

The second division is good to a large extent, but it is very seriously flawed by the fact that it introduces as a member of the division of *revelation* a member which *everybody* concedes is *not revealed*. That member is the fourth member, the mediate or virtual *non-implicit*, introduced by Suárez as proper virtual or *merely virtual* (73). If this fourth member were eliminated, the first three coincide perfectly with the members of the first division.

An attentive observation of any of those two first divisions makes it easy to understand why the ancient theologians, including John of St. Thomas, correctly speak of a truly revealed *virtual implicit* since in both divisions it is a fundamental member of the division of revelation.

On the other hand, the third division, Kilber's, is, in our view, anti-thomist in substance and nomenclature. It is based in its entirety on a complete divorce between implicitness and virtuality. The virtual implicit has been eliminated altogether from this third division which begins by identifying *a priori* the mediate or virtual with the non-implicit.

According to this third division, no virtual or mediate can be implicit or inclusive, and nothing implicit or inclusive can be mediate or virtual. This division overlooks the fact that in any datum or piece of knowledge, whether natural or revealed, there can be concepts truly inclusive or implicit in themselves, but nonetheless mediate or virtual to our human reason. This third division of Kilber's is the radical denial of the concept of *implicit virtuality*, the denial of the well-known division of objective propositions into *per se evident quoad se* and *not per se evident quoad nos*, which constituted the line dividing Thomism and Scotism in many fundamental philosophical and theological questions. Our objector's observation is based on this third division of Kilber's.<sup>302</sup>

302-Our objector also lays down the following canon:

"In the second place: One and the same implicitly revealed doctrine can be known by us from the same explicitly revealed revelation either by way of the implicitly revealed, or by way of the *virtually revealed*. E.g., this is a formally revealed proposition: God was made man. In it is implicitly contained that Christ had a body and a rational soul. . . . However, I can also deduce the same knowledge in the *manner of the virtually revealed*, as follows: It is revealed that God was made man; but from my philosophical knowledge I know that man is constituted of a body and a rational soul; therefore Christ had a rational soul. Thus I refute Apollinarism *by way of the virtually revealed*." (*Op.cit.*, pgs.186-187)

Reply. — Our objector fails to distinguish clearly between the *formal* and the *virtual*. The reasoning he submits does not proceed "by way of the *implicitly revealed*," but "by way of the *formally revealed*." For this reason — and this reason alone — it is an improper reasoning or a reasoning solely in form. The concepts "to be a man" and

514. TWENTY-THIRD OBSERVATION. — "Fr. Marín-Sola elsewhere draws a distinction between the *proper* syllogism in which the *medium* of deduction is a new and different reality, and the *proper* syllogism whose *medium* is only a different concept. However, the concept of *another thing* can intervene as a *medium* even in the *improper* or explicatory syllogism, as is obvious in *exegetical demonstration*. It is not necessarily the case that the conclusion is about a really different thing if the *medium of deduction* is a different thing."<sup>303</sup>

*Reply.* — Any proposition of the primitive datum, e.g., any biblical proposition, can be submitted to reasoning for two essentially different purposes: a) for the purpose of finding the immediate or formal *meaning* of the terms or of the formula, if the meaning is as yet unknown. This is often the case when the terms are rare, ambiguous, obscure; or when the phrasing is complicated, etc., etc. Examples could be given by the hundreds. This is the business of hermeneutics and exegesis with all their auxiliaries. Here the purpose is not to deduce a new formula, but simply to establish the meaning of the primitive formula. b) When the immediate or formal meaning of the scriptural terms or formula is already known, reasoning can be employed in order to deduce *new formulae*. This is no longer the business of hermeneutics or exegesis, but the business of theology as science (27, footnote).

In the first case — the purpose of which is not the deduction of any new formula but the finding of the immediate or formal meaning of the terms of the primitive proposition — one can, following the example set by St. Jerome and Cajetan, employ anything as a medium: a dictionary, a grammar, some other verse or book of the Bible, a bearded rabbi. Whether we employ any of these things, or some other things, or all of them together, we will remain within the bounds of *improper* reasoning because our business is with the *formal meaning of the terms*, despite the fact that the dictionary or the rabbi are things that differ really from the biblical proposition. Nor did we ever think or mean to say the contrary. This first case is the case to which the learned Cardinal Billot alludes in a passage quoted by our objector on pg. 180, as follows:

"Observe here that one should not confuse what is signified by the express words of a proposition with what is at once perceived by the mere reading or hearing of the proposition. For it might happen that the *meaning*

<sup>303</sup> "to be constituted of a body and a rational soul" are *formally* identical concepts. The minor premise is a *formal* identity, not merely a *real* identity. Hence the conclusion is *formally* included in the revealed major. Thus the instance is irrelevant to the issue under discussion, which is about conclusions that differ *virtually*. Many of the conclusions defined as of faith by the Church are of the latter kind.

of the words does not become clear except by means of a very studious inquiry, and thus there are many *explicitly* revealed truths that are not seen to be such except after much argument: I mean arguments of the kind that only show what, in a given context and according to the rules of *hermeneutics*, is the supposition, power, and connexion of the terms."<sup>304</sup> Plainly, the learned Cardinal has in mind only the demonstration or argumentation that is solely aimed at establishing the true *formal meaning of the terms*.

Not a few theologians fail to distinguish clearly between exegetical argumentation, or apologetic argumentation, or theological argumentation insofar as it is *wisdom*, on the one hand, and *theological* argumentation insofar as it is *science*, on the other hand. The former never gives rise to *new formulae* or propositions, the latter consists in deducing new propositions. And this is exactly the point of the problem of dogmatic progress. Hence neither hermeneutics, nor exegesis, nor apologetics are of any relevance here, but *theological science* alone.

The second case alone is our concern at present. The formal or immediate meaning of the terms of the primitive proposition or formula is known, and what is desired is the deduction of *another proposition* or formula through reasoning. The Church has acted, and does act in this second manner: she has not only defined as dogmas the primitive formulae, but has also defined with the aid of reasoning other formulae which are not primitive formulae. It is in the context of this second case, and in it alone, that the question is raised, When is the reasoning improper, and when proper?

The primitive proposition or formula has two terms. A *third* term is indispensable if we are to deduce a new formula. Well then: we have said, and we repeat it once more, that if the third term, which is indispensable for the deduction of a new formula, is *formally identical* to the two primitive terms, the reasoning is *improper*. If it differs *formally* but is really identical — and this is the distinction called *virtual* distinction — the reasoning is *proper* but characteristic of the superior sciences. If it differs *really*, the reasoning is also characteristic of the superior sciences. (St. Thomas) In our opinion, this is the *proper*, but in this case it is characteristic of the poor and inferior physical sciences, *Proper of natural science*. (St. Thomas) In our opinion, this is the ABC of Thomism (27, 106).

On the other hand, arguing against our position, for rigorously theological conclusions in spite of a *real distinction* between the conclusions and the revealed principles from which they are deduced, our objector cites as instances the conclusions that "human personality differs really from the

<sup>304</sup> CARD. BILLOT, *De virtutibus infusis*, pg. 258.

nature", "accidents differ really from the substance", which are respectively deduced from the dogmas of the hypostatic union and the transubstantiation. The conclusions, says our objector, *differ really from the dogmas*.<sup>305</sup>

Our objector could not have chosen less appropriate instances. The first of these two conclusions is deduced as follows: "In the hypostatic union there exists a human nature really separated from a human personality (premise of faith). But two really separable things are really different things (minor of reason). Therefore human nature and human personality are really different things (theological conclusion)." Now, either human personality is something purely negative, as Scotus holds, in which case the conclusion is not a truly theological conclusion since it *does not follow*, and the example is irrelevant; or, on the contrary, human personality is something positive, as Thomists hold, in which case the conclusion is a truly theological conclusion. But in this case it is really identical to the revealed principle because "real separation" and "real distinction", said of positive entities, are really identical. The latter is *included* in the former. Hence the minor in this reasoning is a premise of real identity.

Similarly, the second of the aforementioned conclusions is deduced as follows: "In the Eucharist there are accidents really separated from the substance (principle of faith). But, two things that are really separable are really different (minor of reason). Therefore, accidents differ really from substance (theological conclusion). Now, either the eucharistic accidents are mere appearances, as the Cartesians and many others say, in which case the conclusion is not a truly theological conclusion and is irrelevant; or, on the contrary, the eucharistic accidents are objective-real entities, in which case the argument concludes validly. But, then, the conclusion is *really identical* to the revealed principle from which it is deduced, since relative to objective-real entities "real separation" and "real distinction" are really identical. The second is included in the first. Let the reader observe the minor premises or mediums of both reasonings, and it will be plain that they are inclusive minors or minors of real identity.

Our objector has misread the two given examples, and will very likely misread any others he might give, provided that they are cases of rigorous theologico-metaphysical conclusions. Like many other modern theologians, he is handicapped by the fact that he takes *debatable* conclusions as models of conclusions, scarcely noticing that they are debatable because there is a question whether they truly are conclusions since many take the minor of reason in such a sense that the conclusion *does not follow*. But, then, it is clear that the example is irrelevant because we are speaking of conclusions

<sup>305</sup> *Op.cit.*, pgs.200-201.

that *do follow*. To hold that a mathematical, metaphysical, or theological conclusion *follows*, but is nonetheless not *really included* in the principle from which it is deduced, is plain nonsense to any Thomist (103-109).

515. TWENTY-FOURTH OBSERVATION. — "That which is only included in or identified with a revealed *reality*, is not properly revealed except in its principle or cause... For the *real* identity of the object of two doctrines does not make any man know the one when he knows the other, nor does it disclose the other when the one is disclosed or revealed."<sup>306</sup>

*Reply.* — Propositions are not said to be really identical precisely because they are about the same reality, i.e., the same *real* subject, as our objector seems at times to think. Really different, and even completely disparate propositions can bear upon the same real subject, e.g., "Peter is a Spaniard" and "Peter is a priest".

Propositions are said to be really identical when, besides having the same subject, they have really identical predicates, e.g., "The human soul is spiritual" and "The human soul is immortal". The subject is the same, "the human soul"; the predicates "spiritual" and "immortal" are really identical. It is of these propositions, which are called conceptual, that we have repeatedly asserted that when one is explicitly revealed, the other is implicitly revealed and definable as of faith, provided that their real identity is evidently detectable by us without new revelation.

Indeed, if we are to avoid Ockham's and Aureolus's subjective nominalism or conceptualism, it should be conceded that the value of a proposition does not depend precisely on the words, but on their *objective meaning*. The words are what is material in propositions, the meaning is what is formal. Thus, if two propositions have really identical predicates, they also have a really identical *meaning*. Now, *implicit* revelation suffices to make anything definable as of faith. Having the *same meaning* — *in eodem sensu* — suffices for implicitness. It follows, therefore, that to have really identical predicates is to have a really identical meaning, to be the one implicit in the other, to be definable as of faith.

Our objector, in fact, repeatedly asserts that if a conclusion is to be definable as of faith it is necessary that "it express the same doctrine". In the first place, it is not necessary that it "express", it is enough that it "imply" the same doctrine. It is not only the "explicit" that is definable, but also the "implicit". In the second and principal place, we take it that our objector does not take "the same doctrine" to mean "the same words", but "the same meaning", *in eodem sensu*. Now, when two propositions have the same

<sup>306</sup> *Op.cit.*, pg.206.

subject, the whole difference or identity in meaning depends on the distinction or identity of their predicates. Thus, if the predicates are really identical, the meaning will also be identical, and the doctrine also really identical. To say otherwise is, in our view, nominalism or conceptualism in disguise. We think that Kilber's opinion is a derivation of Roscelin's conceptualism which focuses on the statement rather than on the reality meant by it. On this question, as on all others, St. Thomas is a *realist*: "The believer's assent does not terminate in the *enunciabile*, but in the *thing*. . . in *science* as well as in faith."<sup>307</sup>

We do not, therefore, contend that such conclusions are definable because there is an *inclusive* connexion, nor because there is an identical *reality*, but because, there being an inclusive connexion or identical reality, there is "ipso facto" *identity of meaning*. The reason why anything is definable is solely and purely its *implicit revelation*; the reason why it is implicitly revealed is the identity of meaning. Real identity or analytic reasoning are not the formal reason of its definability, but the medium or instrument whereby we detect the presence or absence of identity of meaning, and thus of implicit revelation and by the same token of definability as of faith.

We believe that Kilber and the few who follow him on this question have fallen into a deplorable subjectivism or conceptualism. They have taken the *intention* of the speaker as a criterion to determine what is implicitly revealed. Whether a thing is implicitly revealed by my words or not, does not depend precisely on my having or not having the intention of revealing it, but on the *objective reach* or the real content of what I am saying.

Suppose that I have no intention of revealing that such an event took place in Madrid. Nonetheless, if I say that it took place at such and such geographical longitude and latitude that coincide exactly with those of Madrid, the location is thereby objectively disclosed, provided that among my listeners there be someone knowledgeable in geography and capable of "adding two and two together" to get at what is implicitly contained in my words.

Suppose that I have no intention of disclosing that the Apostles were twelve. Nonetheless, if I say they were  $4 + x = 10 + \frac{x}{2}$ ,\* their number has been objectively disclosed, provided that among my listeners there be someone capable of solving for  $x$ .

<sup>307</sup> *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q.1, a.2, ad 2;

\*Sic. There is probably a typographical error here. The equation should read  $4 + x = 10 + \frac{x}{4}$  . . . *Transl.*

Suppose that I do not want to reveal that Christ possessed knowledge and virtue. If I say that he was the *most perfect* man, his knowledge and virtue are implicitly revealed, on condition that among my listeners there be someone capable of penetrating well the concept "most perfect man".

Suppose that I do not intend to disclose whether or not the human soul is immortal. If I say that it is spiritual, its immortality is implicitly revealed and disclosed if there be among my listeners one capable of delving into the whole implicit content of the concept "spiritual".

If no one among my listeners is knowledgeable in geography, mathematics, physics, or metaphysics; none capable of "adding two and two together", i.e., none capable of solving for  $x$ , or unfolding what is objectively contained in what I have said, then the thing will be revealed or contained or implicit *in itself*, but not to my listeners.<sup>308</sup>

Now, the listeners to whom God has addressed *Catholic* revelation are the listeners of all times, the whole human race, *human reason*.<sup>309</sup> Hence, whatever is objectively contained in the Catholic revelation, but whose unfolding or development is impossible to human reason so that a new revelation is necessary, all of it is revealed implicitly "quoad se", but not "quoad nos". Whatever is not only implicit but also capable of being unfolded by human reason, is not only implicit in itself, but also implicit to us.

Thus, what we call *deducing* with respect to theology, or *defining* with respect to the Church, is simply "adding two and two together" in what God has said, "solving for  $x$ " in the revealed deposit, "unfolding", "developing" the objective or implicit content of God's words; in short, *explicating* revelation. If the job is done by human reason alone, there is a human explication of divine revelation — theology, not divine faith. If it is done by the Church's divine authority — the Church has divine authority for anything having to do with "explicating the deposit" — it is divine faith, a dogma of faith.

<sup>308</sup> Let us suppose that a confessor does not reveal expressly or directly the name of a penitent who has confessed a grievous sin; however, if he discloses something from which it can be certainly gathered or "be given to understand" who the penitent was, such a confessor has revealed *implicitly*, but nonetheless *really* and *truly*, the secret or state of confession. That is what common sense says, and moralists unanimously maintain. Consequently, a thing is revealed not only by disclosing it directly and *in itself* (formally revealed = revealed *in se*), but also by disclosing *some other thing* (virtually revealed = revealed *in alio*) in which it is included and from which the listeners can deduce it with certitude. This is what common sense says, and the contrary seems to us nothing but nominalistic or conceptualistic subtleties.

<sup>309</sup> "Men receive revelation [i.e., public or Catholic revelation] from God not only for the present time, but also for the instruction of *men of all future times*." (ST. THOMAS, *Contra Gentes*, lib. 3, c. 154)

If, in order to determine whether a thing has been revealed or not, we take as sole criterion the speaker's *intention* without taking account of the real or objective content of the revealed datum, then it would be impossible unwittingly to reveal a secret. But this is contradicted both by common sense as well as the speech of all peoples, according to which it is possible for a man to reveal something without intending to do so.

Through ignorance or inadvertence a man fails to see the reach of what he says. Thus he often discloses more or less than he intends to, either because his intention falls short of the content of his words, or because the objective content of his words falls short of what he intends to convey.

But in God there is neither ignorance nor inadvertence. Thus, the content or reach of his words cannot go farther than his intention, but neither can his intention fall short of the reach or the real and objective content of his words. God not only reveals all that he *intends* to reveal, but also intends to reveal *all that he does reveal*, i.e., *all the objective content* of what he says. "For he who says *one thing*", we repeat once more with St. Thomas, "somehow says *many things*; and *these things* are those that *precede* the article and are *consequent* to it, and *in this regard* the article of faith can be *explicated* and *divided*... And for this reason *many things* are now reputed *heretical*, which were not thus reputed before, viz. that it is now more obvious *what* follows from them... And *in this regard* the faith can be explicated day by day, and *has been more and more explicated* through the efforts of the Fathers [the ecumenical council Fathers]."

Let us add to St. Thomas four other interesting passages from John of St. Thomas, Martínez del Prado, Nazarius, and Valencia.

"However, St. Thomas, *considering at much greater depth* the per se evident proposition, spoke of it not only according to the formal reason of a proposition by *taking account of the concept or the meaningful word*, but also by taking account of the foundation which exists in the signified *reality* itself. For that a proposition should be demonstrable through a *medium*, or that it should lack a *medium* of demonstration and thus be *immediate* and per se evident, *does not proceed from the very meaning of the terms, but from the very CONNEXION OF THE THINGS signified*."<sup>310</sup>

"That a proposition is *mediate* or *immediate* does not proceed either from the words or from the formal concepts, but from the OBJECTIVE CONNEXION of the predicate with the subject."<sup>311</sup>

<sup>310</sup> JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus Philosophicus, Logica*, p. 2, q. 24, a. 4, ed. Vivès, vol. 2, pg. 676.

<sup>311</sup> MARTÍNEZ DEL PRADO, O.P., *Quaestiones Logicae* (Compluti 1665), lib. 3, q. 6, n. 12, pg. 530.

"In the third place, I say that to speak of a proposition by taking account of that which is *principal* in it, viz., the *thing* signified, is not to speak of it *less properly* [which is what Molina and Kilber say, and what our objector often says], especially since the whole *information* given by the proposition is to be referred altogether to the *thing* signified by the proposition. For, neither as regards the *terms* nor as regards the *concepts* is any proposition said to be evident, whether in itself or to us, except by reason of the *thing* signified by the concepts. For *concepts* and *words* are not formed unless for the sake of achieving knowledge of the *thing*. Hence the *thing* is that which is *primarily per se* said to be *known* whether in itself or to us, in the way explained above."<sup>312</sup>

Valencia: "It is a fact that *the conclusion does not always signify something really different from what the premises signify*, as is clear in the case of *metaphysical demonstrations*, in which the subject and the property do not differ *really, nor consequently the meaning of the premises and the conclusion*."<sup>313</sup>

In these texts our objector can see for himself that the principal thing to be taken into account is the *objective reality*, and that in any case where the reality is the same, as it is in every theologico-metaphysical conclusion, there the *meaning* is also *the same: idem significatum*. Anything else is, in our opinion, conceptualism rank and simple, with apologies to Molina and Kilber.

516. TWENTY-FIFTH OBSERVATION. — "Thus, by the revelation of God's unity the *Trinity* of Persons is not revealed, despite the *real identity*."<sup>314</sup>

*Reply.* — It would not surprise us to see this objection raised by Ripalda and Kilber, but it does surprise us to see a Thomist raise it without perceiving at once its weak point. We are speaking of conclusions that are really conclusions, i.e., objectively contained not only *quoad se* but also *quoad nos*; in other words, conclusions whose objective inclusion or real identity is capable of being perceived *evidently* by human reason; were it not so, it would not truly be a conclusion for us. The Trinity is really identified with God's unity and objectively contained in it *quoad se*, but not *quoad nos*, since it is impossible for us *evidently* to detect its identity or inclusion without new revelation. The example is thus irrelevant since for us it is not

<sup>312</sup> NAZARIUS, O.P., *In Summam D. Thomae*, t. 1, q. 2, a. 1.

<sup>313</sup> GREGORIUS DE VALENTIA, S.J., *De Fide*, d. 1, q. 1, punct. 2, (Ingolstadt 1595) t. 3, pg. 44.

<sup>314</sup> *Op. cit.*, pg. 206.

a true theological conclusion. A distinguished commentator of St. Thomas writes in this regard:

"I answer that it should be said that the total object of *faith* is contained *virtually* and *implicitly* in the Apostle's Creed or in the articles that compose it, as in *proximate* and adequate principles. Hence, the object of faith has never grown in its *substance*, but in its *explication*. This is the *common opinion* of theologians on this subject . . .

"To the third it should be said that the total object of faith is contained in the Apostle's Creed in a *different way* than it is contained in the *Apostle's* statement: For he who comes to God, etc. For in the articles of the Creed it is contained as in its *proximate* and *adequate* principles; but in the truths mentioned in the Apostle's statement (that God exists and is a *rewarder*) it is contained as in the *most universal* principles. . . Now, there is this difference in the mode of containment: The Creed proximately and adequately contains all the mysteries of faith *not only quoad se* but also *quoad nos*. . . But the Apostle's statement contains indeed *virtually and implicitly* all the mysteries of faith *quoad se*, but *not quoad nos*, in the sense that from that statement we could come to know the mysteries of faith through an *evident consequence*. Hence, it does not follow evidently *quoad nos*: 'God exists, therefore he is three Persons', although this follows necessarily *quoad se*.<sup>315</sup>

By the way, the reader should observe that the Trinity and every other revealed mystery was already contained in the two most general principles of faith *objectively quoad se*, even if it required new revelation to be known. For this reason St. Thomas repeatedly says that not even in all of the Old Testament was there any progress of *substance* or real objectivity, but only of *explication* although by means of *revelation*.<sup>316</sup>

On the other hand, there scarcely is one author today who does not say, distorting all of the traditional nomenclature, that in the Old Testament there was not only a progress of explication, but also a *substantial* or *objective* progress. It will be retorted that it is only a question of nomenclature. True. But one begins by giving the terms a *meaning different* from that given them by St. Thomas and the great theologians of the 13th and 16th centuries, and — naturally enough! — one ends by not understanding the language spoken by those great theologians, or by understanding them in a *different sense*.

<sup>315</sup>PHILIPPUS A SMA. TRINITATE, *Disp. Theol., De Fide* (Lugduni 1653), t. 3, pgs. 32-33.

<sup>316</sup>"For this reason not even Christ Our Lord instituted or made a *new article of faith quoad substantiam*, even if he did institute new sacraments." (BANEZ, *In 2-2*, q. 1, a. 10)

517. TWENTY-SIXTH OBSERVATION. — "Similarly, God's free will is not revealed with the revelation of God's unity, although God's freedom can be deduced from the notion of God and is really identical to it."<sup>317</sup>

*Reply.* — It should be interesting to know why, out of so many other attributes in God, our objector should have chosen as an example precisely the attribute of divine freedom. No doubt he has chosen it (as another theologian, who also raised the same objection, expressly wrote us) because of the great difficulty or obscurity encountered by human reason in the demonstration of this divine attribute on account of its apparent inconsistency with the attribute of immutability. These theologians are unmindful of the fact that any conclusion falls short of being rigorously a conclusion in the same degree that it is obscure to us, inasmuch as the conclusion is defined as that which is deduced with *evident* certainty.

Thus, our reply is a very simple one. Either such a conclusion can be deduced by human reason with evidence and absolute certainty, or not. If it cannot be so deduced, it is not a rigorous conclusion to us, and the example is irrelevant. If it can be so deduced, then we concede that in the revelation of God's existence divine freedom is *implicitly* revealed, i. e., with virtual implicitness.

Will our objector be kind enough to answer this question: Can the Church, on the sole basis of the revelation of God's existence, infallibly define his freedom, or not? If she cannot, then that conclusion is not truly a theological conclusion, and once again the example is irrelevant. If she can, we ask our objector to set aside that and other similar obscure instances and cite one single instance of a theological conclusion *already defined infallibly* by the Church, which cannot be defined as a truth of faith. He will certainly not produce even one. If, then, our objector cannot produce, out of all the conclusions already defined infallibly, one single instance that is not definable as of divine faith, it follows that every true conclusion is definable as of divine faith, since every true conclusion can be defined infallibly.

When it is a question of verifying whether every truly theological conclusion possesses the characteristic of being "definable as of divine faith", it is rather unscientific to put forward obscure examples that are meant more to strike the imagination than to enlighten the mind. In the sciences, when it is a question of determining the essential characteristics of a certain type, e. g., the characteristics of a living thing, one does not take as a specimen a doubtful case concerning which questions are raised as to its being alive or lifeless, but a case of which there can be no doubt that it is a living thing. It is in the latter and in all specimens that are *clearly* and *indubitably* alive that the

<sup>317</sup>*Op. cit.*, pg. 206.

essential characteristics of living organisms are investigated. Once they are determined, such characteristics are unconditionally applied to every living organism, and *conditionally* to any specimen of which we are not sure whether it is an organism or a mineral. If it is an organism it will have such characteristics; it will not have them, if it is not.

Now then: doubtful or debatable conclusions are not clearly conclusions since to question or dispute their truth is tantamount to questioning or disputing whether they are conclusions. Hence, only conclusions admitted as certain by all theologians are to be taken as specimens of rigorously theological conclusions, not those that are obscure, doubtful or debatable.

Furthermore: all the theologians of any determinate period can be deceived. Therefore, in the question of verifying whether the truly theological conclusion is or is not definable as of faith, the scientific procedure consists in taking account of the conclusions that the Church has already defined as *infallible*, for in such conclusions no deception is possible. If every conclusion defined as infallible can be defined as of faith, then every truly theological conclusion can be defined as of faith. Hence we ask our objector to set aside obscure or doubtful instances and to cite one single conclusion defined as infallible that cannot be defined as of faith. This is the truly scientific and certain method.

The foregoing would be sufficient, and more than sufficient, to rebut the example brought forward against us. But, for greater abundance, we will now examine it on its merits. Suppose a philosopher were to say "God is not a free agent", or "God is not omnipotent", or "in God there is no providence regarding this world". We now ask in turn, "On the basis of such statements alone, has the philosopher said, or not, 'God does not exist'?" We are not asking whether he *intended* to say it, but whether he has *said* it.

To be consistent our objector would have to say that he has not. He would have to say that *it follows* from what has been said, but that *it has not been said*. On the other hand, we affirm, with St. Thomas, that whether or not he *intended* to say it, *he has said it, implicitly* of course, but nonetheless truly. St. Thomas says: "Then does a man say that *God does not exist*, when he thinks that *God is not omnipotent*, and that *he has not any care of human affairs*."<sup>318</sup> Thus, if anyone who denies God's freedom or his omnipotence thereby says that God does not exist, then anyone who affirms or reveals God's existence reveals or *affirms* implicitly his freedom, omnipotence, or

<sup>318</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In Psalmum 13*, ed. Vivès, t.18, pg.290.

any other divine attribute that can be evidently known by human reason without new revelation.

Compare now the just quoted text of St. Thomas with that other text of the Saint which we have repeatedly quoted: "For he who says one thing somehow says many things: and *these things* are those that precede the article and are *consequent* to it. And *in this regard* the article of faith can be *explicated* and divided." The comparison of these texts will make it clear once more that St. Thomas takes *consequences* to mean true and proper consequences, since the attributes of omnipotence, providence, or divine freedom, are conclusions in the proper sense from the divine essence.

Therefore, everything that truly is a consequence of the revealed deposit — provided it is a consequence without which it is absolutely impossible to maintain the truth of the revealed deposit, and provided it is evidently deducible by us without new revelation — is *implicitly* revealed or *said* by God. But precisely on account of its being *implicit*, it has not yet been *explicated* or *proposed* by God, and hence it is not yet formally of faith. If its *explication* and *proposition* are done by *human reason*, then it is human science; theology. But if done by the Church's *divine authority*, then it is of divine faith.

Hence we have said, and say again, that there are two, not one, keys to dogmatic development: a) the truly *implicit* *virtuality* of the revealed deposit; b) the *divine authority* or definition of the Church. Without the former the development would not be homogeneous or an evolution *quoad explicationem*, but transformation or an evolution *quoad substantiam*. Without the latter the development would be theological, not dogmatic development (119, 156).

As a new, if unnecessary confirmation of the amplitude with which St. Thomas conceived the truly implicit containment of the Holy Scripture, suffice it to say that, according to St. Thomas, in the assertion "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father" is implicit and truly contained this other assertion "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son". Even more, according to St. Thomas, in the assertion "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *alone*" is truly contained the assertion "The Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son". The reason for it is the real identity required by the mystery of the Holy Trinity in *any and every* thing where no relative opposition exists, as none exists between the Father and the Son in being the principle of the Holy Spirit.

St. Thomas says: "Inasmuch as the error of those who assert that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son had not yet arisen at the time of the early councils, it was not necessary that it should have been *explicitly* stated . . . . However, it was *implicitly contained* in the saying that *the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father*."<sup>319</sup> "Consequently, when it is said that the

<sup>319</sup> *Summa Theologica*, p.1, q.36, a.2, ad 2.

Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, even if it were added that he proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thence be excluded, because the Father and the Son are not opposed in respect of being the principle of the Holy Spirit."<sup>320</sup> "It is impossible that everything should be explicitly contained in that Symbol, in which there is no mention made of the descent to hell. But the procession of the Holy Spirit [from the Son] is contained implicitly therein, INSO FAR as therein is contained the distinction of persons, which would not be possible otherwise, as has been said. But the Greeks ask how did the Latins presume to add this [viz., and the Son]. To which it is to be replied that there was a need, as their error shows, that the authority of the Roman Church should gather a council in which something that was implicitly contained in the articles of faith would be expressed."<sup>321</sup>

The dogmatic truth that "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son was already formally revealed in the words ('because he will receive of what is mine') and others similar."<sup>322</sup> But even if it were not formally contained in those words, it would be virtually, but implicitly and truly, contained in just these words, "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father", and, according to St. Thomas, this alone would suffice to enable the Church to define as a truth of faith that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son.

Thus, if the statement "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father" contains implicitly the statement "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son", then for the same, if not greater, reason the statement "God is the being by essence", or some such other statement, contains implicitly the statement "God is free". Let any Thomist ponder on it, and it will become clear that the reason is the same, viz., the objective containment of the one in the other not only in itself but also for us, that the one cannot be denied or affirmed without the other, that the one is of the understanding of the other. Such is the true implicit-virtual theology. Therein lies the root of the definability as of divine faith of every truly theological conclusion.

*Confirmation.* — We have elsewhere (249) quoted an interesting passage from the learned Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, in which he admits that in the concept of God or of any of his attributes the concepts of all the other attributes are implicitly contained. Let us quote another passage from another equally distinguished theologian, the profound and lucid Fr. De La Taille, of the Society of Jesus. After explaining that the concepts of animality and rationality are extrinsic to each other, and the former does not include the

<sup>320</sup> *Loc. cit.*, ad 1.

<sup>321</sup> ST. THOMAS, *In 1 Sent.*, d.11, expositio textus.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*

latter so that the latter is a true objective addition to the former, Fr. De La Taille goes on to say: "In God there is nothing of the sort; there is nothing of the sort in any divine attribute: no attribute is extrinsic to the other. I can, if it is true, conceive a divine perfection without adhering to the fact that it includes the others, but the others are there, and I have but to explore that which I have in mind to find all the others there, HENCE NOTHING IS ADDED THERE."<sup>323</sup> If that is true, as it is, every theologian who does not allow himself to be blinded by preconceived ideas should confess that in the revelation of God's existence or of any of his attributes, all the other attributes are by the same token implicitly revealed and definable as of divine faith, on condition that it be possible for us to know them evidently without new revelation.

Let us add other interesting passages from Billuart, Oviedo, and Marín. "Foreknowledge, goodness, justice and the other attributes are not God's substance in a virtual and explicit sense, according to the meaning of the terms, but in a REAL formal sense. For it is altogether one and the same REALITY that is signified by different names and grasped by different inadequate concepts, of which one does not explicitly signify the other, albeit it does so implicitly."<sup>324</sup>

"In God it is the same thing to be God and to have the attribute of justice; hence the revelation that AFFIRMS that God exists, AFFIRMS that he is just for anyone who adequately penetrates what that which is signified by the name God imports IN REALITY."<sup>325</sup>

"You will insist: God who reveals omnipotence solely reveals what this word signifies to the hearers, since the meaning of a word must be common to both speaker and hearer. But this word 'omnipotence' only signifies 'omnipotence' as distinct from immensity and the other attributes. Therefore,

"I answer conceding the major and distinguishing the minor. Only signifies omnipotence formally, I concede the minor; REALLY, I deny the minor. Hence the hearer forms only a concept about omnipotence formally; but REALLY he forms a concept about immensity, since that concept REALLY AFFIRMS immensity, albeit not formally."<sup>326</sup>

<sup>323</sup> M. DE LA TAILLE, "Recherches des Sciences Religieuses" (Jan.-Feb. 1923), pg. 11.

<sup>324</sup> BILLUART, *De Deo Uno*, d.2, a.3, 4, solvuntur obiectiones.

<sup>325</sup> FRANCISCUS DE OVIEDO, *De Fide* (Lugduni 1651), controv.4, n.107.

<sup>326</sup> JOANNES MARÍN, S.J., *Theologia speculativa* (Venetiis 1764), *De Fide divina*, d.9, pgs.374-375.



All this had already been said in a *real manner* by St. Thomas in the following terms: "The act of the believer does not terminate in the *enunciabile* but in the *THING*. . . as in science, so also in *faith*."<sup>327</sup>

In short, the distinction between the primitive dogmatic concepts explicated by the Apostles and the new consequential dogmatic concepts defined by the Church is exactly the same distinction that exists between the divine essence and its attributes or among the divine attributes themselves. It is not a real distinction. And neither is it a *major* virtual distinction as that which exists between concepts *extrinsic* to each other, and which the Schoolmen designated by the term *per modum excludentis et exclusi* (i.e. in the manner of the excluding and the excluded), as, e.g., the distinction between animality and rationality. It is solely and exclusively a *minor* virtual distinction which exists between mutually *implicit* or *intrinsic* concepts, which the Schoolmen designated by the term *per modum includentis et inclusi* (i.e., in the manner of the including and the included), as, e.g., the concepts of absolute immutability and eternity.<sup>328</sup>

For this reason we have repeatedly said, and say again, that the development or evolution of dogma through the definitions of the Church gives us concepts that are *new* or *different* from the primitive concepts; not, however, completely or adequately new, but only partially or inadequately; not new *simpliciter* but only *secundum quid*; not new in substance but in explication.

<sup>327</sup> *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

<sup>328</sup> "The distinction of reasoned reason is of two kinds: *major* and *minor*.

The *major* is that which distinguishes in the object formalities or concepts which do not include each other, e.g., animality and rationality in man.

The *minor* exists between concepts of which one formally and explicitly is not the other, however by reason of the subject in which they are found, the *one includes in the manner of the including and the included*, e.g., the concepts of justice and mercy in God." (MARCELLUS A. PUERO IESU, *Cursus Philosophiae Scholasticæ ad mentem Angelici Doctoris* [Burgis 1922], vol. 3, pg. 24)

"From this last conclusion it is gathered that in God the attributes, relations, and essence do not differ in exactly the same way as the metaphysical degrees, e.g. animality and rationality. The latter differs with a *major* distinction or by an *exclusive* precision; the former differs with a *minor* distinction or by an *inclusive* precision." (BILLUART, *De Deo*, d. 2, a. 3, § 3, at the end)

"The common opinion among Thomists holds that the divine attributes differ from the essence, or from one another, only in the manner of the *explicit* and the *implicit*, as being differs from its properties in which it is transcendently *included*." (GONET, *De Deo*, d. 3, a. 3, n. 30) Hence, if the divine attributes do not differ from the essence, or from each other, except as *explicit* and *implicit*, it is beyond us to conceive that there can be Thomists who maintain that the revelation of one of them is not the implicit revelation of the other, or that the latter is nonetheless not definable as of divine faith.

Inasmuch as they are new concepts, they are *proper* conclusions. Inasmuch as they are not new in substance but in explication, their definition by the Church is only an *explication* of the primitive faith, and therefore, dogmas of divine faith (306).

518. FINAL OBSERVATION. — "Lastly, Fr. Marín-Sola's opinion leads to *incongruous* consequences. For it would follow that *all theological conclusions* about God would be definable. The same would have to be said of *other mysteries of the faith*, Fr. Marín-Sola himself concedes and asserts that *all of St. Thomas' Summa Theologica* is definable . . . e.g., the real distinction between essence and existence in created things. Thus, finally, *all of metaphysics*, and even *all of philosophy and mathematics* would be definable as truths revealed by God!"<sup>329</sup>

*Reply*. — This is the last page of the book in which our objector cites us. In it, so to speak, he lays everything on the line in hopes of impressing the reader with an oratorical coup, which a metaphysician would describe as a *quantitative* argument. It would mean, he says, the definability of *all* conclusions of theology, *all* the mysteries of the faith, the *whole of the Summa Theologica*, the *whole of metaphysics*, the *whole of mathematics*. Fortunately, in metaphysics and theology arguments based on *numbers* and *quantity* usually carry little weight. This argument is very much like the argument submitted by royalists against the authority of the Church. When they hear it said that the Church has authority over the state in *everything* related to spiritual matters, they believe that therewith it is asserted that the Church has authority over *everything*, period, and that civil authority is eliminated.

To make our objector see the weak point of the argument it would be enough to ask: Can the Church define as infallible truth everything that our objector has enumerated there? Plainly not. Now, then, nothing can be defined as a truth of divine *faith* that cannot be defined as an infallible truth. That, we say, should suffice since the matter is plain enough. However, since the point is an interesting one, let us take it up by parts, even if we have previously touched on it elsewhere (318).

In the first place, let us eliminate mathematics. We fail to understand why our objector has mentioned it. Mathematics rarely or never has any necessary relation to the revealed deposit, and without necessary relation there is no definability. "As in *geometrical matters* and *others of the sort*, which can *never at all* belong to the faith."<sup>330</sup>

<sup>329</sup> *Op. cit.*, pgs. 206-207.

<sup>330</sup> *Summa Theologica*, 2-2, q. 11, a. 2.

In the second place, speaking of philosophy, and even of its principal part, metaphysics, let us eliminate all conclusions that *for us* are unrelated to the revealed deposit. Whether or not they are in themselves related to the revealed deposit is immaterial. If, for us, no relation is discernible, they cannot be defined as of divine faith, not even as infallible truths. Of such conclusions there is a great number.

In the third place, even in the case of conclusions in philosophy and theology that, for us, are related in some way to the revealed deposit, let us eliminate all conclusions whose relationship to it is for us only probable, uncertain, not evidently certain. Such conclusions abound in theology and philosophy, as well as in all other sciences. They are not science, but scientific theories or systems.

In the fourth place, even in the case of certain and evident conclusions, let us eliminate all conclusions whose certainty and connexion are only physically certain, e.g., the connexion between being a mother and not being a virgin, or between being a man and being a human person, or in other words, all conclusions of what we have called type 4. Our objector knows very well that we do not regard such conclusions as objects of infallibility, let alone as definable as of divine faith.

With these four cuts or eliminations which every theologian is bound to make, the pile of definable conclusions — the great mass of which so alarmed our objector — has been reduced to a much smaller quantity. It has shrunk to include only the theologico-inclusive conclusions or those that are gathered from the revealed deposit through objective analysis, only the conclusions without which it is impossible to maintain the truth of the revealed deposit, only the conclusions whose denial entails with absolute necessity the denial of the revealed deposit, provided that our reason is able to know these conclusions evidently without new revelation. It is of such conclusions that St. Thomas writes: "Those from whose denial *there follows* something contrary to the faith... Those from which *there follows* the corruption of some article... And with respect to both the one and the other *heresy* is possible in the same way as *faith*." (467)

Will the author be kind enough to answer this question: Are these conclusions — whether many or few is immaterial since *quantity* has no bearing on metaphysical or theological questions — are these conclusions definable by the Church as *infallible*, or not? Every Catholic theologian is bound to answer, as in fact he does, that these conclusions, whatever their number, are objects of infallibility. This being so, as it truly is, we ask our objector to reflect on three things:

First, St. Thomas devotes a whole article of his *Quaestiones Disputatae De Fide* to prove that no infallible faith is possible other than divine faith. We

have analyzed that article at great length elsewhere in this book (239), and earlier in *La Ciencia Tomista*. Our objector knew of this article of St. Thomas's and our analysis of it. And yet, in a book in which he quotes so many other articles and passages from St. Thomas, he makes not the slightest allusion either to this fundamental article of the holy Doctor or of our demonstration based on it.

Secondly, even setting aside the question whether an infallible faith is possible other than divine faith, *all* theologians prior to Molina expressly affirm that such conclusions are definable as of *divine faith*. The author has been unable to cite one single theologian for the opposite view.

The uninitiated reader who peruses our objector's book without being clear in his mind as to the point at issue, might be impressed by the many writers quoted by our objector seemingly in his favour. We ask the reader to observe that two different points can be at issue on this subject: a) whether the Church's definitions are an *explication* of the revealed deposit; b) whether truly *theological conclusions* can be defined by the Church as truths of divine faith. Our objector has fruitlessly amassed a multitude of texts asserting the first point apparently unaware that they are all pointless since we all agreed on it and no one disputes it. But he has not quoted one single text or cited a writer prior to Molina who denies the second point, which is precisely the point at issue. On the other hand, we have quoted numerous writers, before and after Molina, who not only assert the first point, but likewise expressly assert the second point, viz., that every rigorously theological conclusion is definable as of divine faith. Inasmuch as every rigorously theological conclusion is *implicitly* contained in the revealed premise alone, its definition is nothing but an *explication* of the revealed datum.

Thirdly, even after Molina, and despite his great and well-deserved prestige, the vast majority of theologians, irrespective of religious or school affiliation, have asserted that inclusive conclusions are definable as of divine faith. Among these theologians we find names as illustrious as those of Vázquez, Suárez, Bellarmine, Lugo, Tannero, Oviedo, Fabri, Annato, Platellus, Tirso González, Gautier, Antoine, Simonet, Marín, Haunoldus... of the Society of Jesus; Navarrete, González, Gravina, Nazarius, Serra, Labat, Contenson, Preingué... of the Order of the Preachers; Gabarti, Berti, Villarroyo, Honorato del Val... of the Order of St. Augustine; Castillo, Boyvin, Gervase of Brescia, Hilary of Paris... of the Order of St. Francis; Mezguer, Herce, Schnell... of the Order of St. Benedict; Philip of the Most Holy Trinity, Crassous... of the Order of Carmel; Grandin, Silvius, Bijonius, Liebermann... of the secular clergy. Earlier in this book (398-448) we have submitted passages from these writers, passages that are clear and resistant to tergiversation.

Fourthly, a distinguished Jesuit theologian has only just now, as it were, written that our opinion "is in reality the *most common* and *very much more probable*... Among the ancients this opinion is held by... and *commonly by the more recent* against Ripalda, the Wirceburgenses [or Kilber] and others." (490)

It is regrettable that a historian and theologian of the caliber of Fr. Schultes should have chosen to side with Kilber against the other opinion ("most common and very much more probable") which is also our own. But this is the condition as well as the right of the human mind relative to all matters left by God to the free debate of men.

519. IMMUTABILITY AND EVOLUTION. — We do not want to close this section without mentioning that the work of our distinguished fellow religious Fr. Schultes is, in our opinion, an excellent textbook on the history of dogmas as to the *immutability* of dogma; but as to the *evolution* of dogma we find it somewhat deficient, perhaps in nomenclature rather than in substance.

We believe that Fr. Schultes's position and our own are somewhat analogous to the positions of Bossuet and Newman respectively described earlier (359). The former stressed the immutability of dogma, the latter its vitality and homogeneous evolution. Far from being opposed the two positions complement each other.

#### EPILOGUE TO THE WHOLE BOOK

520. SUMMARY OF THE SEVEN CHAPTERS. — It is now time to summarize and bring to a conclusion this rather lengthy and dry study on the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

In *chapter 1* we saw that a doctrinal system evolves homogeneously when the evolution is restricted to developing what was already truly implicit in the primitive datum or starting point.

In *chapter 2* we saw that the revealed datum or whatever is explicitly revealed provides the starting point of all Catholic doctrine. There existed and exists in it a truly *implicit* virtuality, viz., the metaphysico-inclusive virtuality known to traditional theology before Suárez by the names of revealed virtual or virtual implicit.

In *chapter 3* we saw that the Church possesses truly *divine* assistance and authority not only to safeguard, but also to *explicate* or unfold everything that is truly implicit in the revealed datum.

In *chapter 4* we saw that, provided it is truly inclusive or analytic, theological reasoning keeps within the bounds of truly *implicit* virtuality. Likewise, the sense of faith keeps within the same bounds, provided that it includes the whole body of Christian believers. These are the Church's two human instruments. By employing them under *divine* assistance, the Church can define, and has in fact defined, many new dogmas. New, that is, not *quoad substantiam*, but *quoad explicationem*.

In *chapter 5* we saw that both the revealed datum's *implicit* virtuality and the Church's *divine* authority to *explicate* it dogmatically reach as far as the lowest level of Catholic doctrine, including even the dogmatic facts.

In *chapter 6* we saw that all the objections raised against the evolution of dogma are valid only against substantial or transformistic evolution, as, e.g., the evolution of the physico-connexive or non-implicit kind. They have no force against the evolution by way of *implicit* or metaphysico-inclusive virtuality. This kind of evolution is *explicatory* and hence homogeneous.

Finally, in *chapter 7* we saw that dogmatic evolution by way of *implicit* virtuality or conclusion is admitted by all theologians before Molina, and by the vast majority of theologians after him.

521. THE DIFFERENT FACTORS OF DOGMATIC EVOLUTION. — We believe that the foregoing has thrown sufficient light on the material, the process, the principal cause, the instrumental agencies, and the scope of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma.

The *material* is the implicit virtuality. "That which is *implicitly contained in the articles*." (St. Thomas)

The *process* is always and exclusively the development of the *implicit*, a process of explication. "The *explication of the faith*." (St. Thomas)

The *principal cause* is the Holy Spirit's assistance, which is to say the divine authority of the Church, she who is "the *minister of the object of faith* through whom the First Truth *explicates itself and other objects of belief*." (Cajetan)

The *instrumental agencies*, great in number and variety as all human agencies are, reduce to two, viz. inclusive reasoning and the sense of faith, or the Christian mind and the Christian heart, or the effort of the learned and the labour of the saint. "Through *rational inquisition and through con-naturalness to things divine*." (St. Thomas)

The *scope* is equal to the scope of divine assistance or the Church's infallibility, equal to scope of sacred theology, viz., all the levels of truly Christian doctrine. "Everything [i.e., all things theological] is *implicitly contained in the Bible*." (Capreolus) "For this reason many things are now

reputed *heretical* that were not thus reputed previously, *viz.*, that it is now much clearer *what follows from them*." (St. Thomas) "nor is it necessary that what is *immediately of faith* should be *immediately revealed by God*; but it suffices that, even if it is *mediately revealed by God*, it be *immediately proposed by the Church*." (Serra) "For the Church has up to now never proposed to the faithful for belief or defined anything that is not contained expressly in the Sacred Scriptures or in the Traditions of the Apostles, or contained in them *virtually in such a manner that it is gathered therefrom through evident consequence* . . . And it is *in this sense that St. Thomas* is to be understood in the article when he says that a new issue of the Creed belongs to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, *i.e.*, as to a new *explication*. Whence it follows that heretics wrongly charge against us that the Supreme Pontiff makes a new *faith*." (Báñez)

Such is our concept of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma after the Apostles. In our opinion, it is also the true concept of St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and traditional theology.

522. TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. — In the course of this book's exposition of that concept, two questions should be distinguished: one principal, the other secondary. The principal question refers to the definability of metaphysico-inclusive *theological conclusions* as truths of divine faith. The secondary question refers to the definability of dogmatic facts as truths of divine faith.

Anyone who admits the definability of the metaphysico-inclusive theological conclusion, as it is in fact admitted by all traditional theology before Molina and by the vast majority of later theologians, admits by that sole token true and proper evolution in dogma by way of theological conclusions in the proper sense. The implicit virtuality of such conclusions is no obstacle to their being theological conclusions truly and properly.

On the other hand, the other question relative to the definability of dogmatic facts as truths of faith, and to the canonization of saints, is a relatively secondary problem since it has no bearing upon the existence or non-existence of truly dogmatic evolution, but on its greater or lesser extension.

Thus, although we have defended and defend the affirmative view on both questions, we regard the first as the principal and fundamental question. Provided that this first question is accepted, it is of no great significance for the question of the evolution of dogma whether the second question is accepted or not.

The central purpose of this book has been the investigation of the first and fundamental question. It was our aim to show that, even after the Apostles, there has been and will be a true homogeneous evolution of

Catholic dogma by way of rigorous metaphysico-inclusive conclusions, whether such conclusions be apodictically detectable through the speculative channel of reasoning, or solely detectable through the intuitive channel of the sense of faith (218). We are intimately persuaded not only that such is the view of traditional teaching, but also that it is the only view capable of explaining honestly and without forced tergiversations the plain facts of the history of dogmas, and of successfully rebutting the objections based on those facts which Modernism raises against the homogeneity of Catholic dogma.

Our teaching is identical to that described by bishop Simancas in the 16th century as follows: "This is the true, accepted and Catholic teaching." (391)

It is the same as the teaching of which the Capuchin Gervase of Brescia said in the 17th century: "All Catholics are agreed" on it (478).

Lastly, it is the same teaching of which the Jesuit Daniel Sola has recently written: "In reality it is the *most common* and *much more probable* . . . This view is held . . . *commonly by the more recent*" authors (490).

523. THE TRUE FORMULA OF HOMOGENEOUS EVOLUTION. — We close our book as we began it: with the two golden formulae of the homogeneous evolution of Catholic dogma bequeathed to us by St. Vincent de Lérins and St. Thomas Aquinas.

The formula of St. Vincent de Lérins, already consecrated by the Vatican Council, is embodied in these brief words: "Let it, then, GROW . . . but IN THE SAME SENSE."

Even more concise is St. Thomas's formula, which is also the formula of St. Bonaventure and Scotus. It is made up of only two words, than which there can be, and there is no better summary, no better epilogue, no better ending to our book:

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